The situation by 4 July 1942

The fighting on 3 July 1942 had forced the Axis forces to go over to the defensive. The German divisional strength was extremely low, Rommel reporting them as only 1200 to 1500 men. He also complained about the effective British bombing at night, as it made supplying the troops almost impossible. The Italians may have been in even worse shape at that date. Auchinleck was encouraged enough to imagine that they might be pursuing Rommel's forces back from this position. It was not to be, as when the British probed towards the Axis positions, they were stopped by anti-tank gun screens that were hastily assembled. Some more smaller attacks were mounted over the next few days, but there was little success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The action on 3 July 1942 at El Alamein

As we saw, the British armour had let the Germans attack and had left the Germans in extreme distress. In the South, the New Zealanders had a good start to the day, from 7am. Columns from the New Zealand Division had engaged Ariete Division artillery and infantry. 19th Battalion of the 4th New Zealand Brigade had attacked and captured 44 guns and had taken 350 prisoners, with weapons and transport. The 5th New Zealand Brigade had attacked El Mreir, where the Brescia Division was located. By the next morning, the brigade had secured a position close to the Qattara Depression. The Royal Air Force flew 900 sorties up to sunset on 3 July. The Desert Air Force had flown 770 of those sorties. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

2 July to 3 July 1942 at El Alamein

Even though the British armour, backed by their artillery and New Zealand and 7th Motor Brigade columns, were left in possession of the ground, Rommel considered the fight on 2 July to have been indecisive. Rommel intended to attack the next day, although the German tank strength was down to 26 runners. The Italian 10th Corps would hold El Mreir, while the 20th Corps would more forward in the south.

The British mounted heavy air attacks all night, including one where the attacking Wellington was destroyed by the blast on the ground. The Axis ground forces did not receive the force of the attack, however, which was directed against the supply dumps near the coast.

General Auchinleck also intended to continue with his current plan. He made a few adjustments, as he placed the 1st Armoured Division under 30th Corps command. He ordered the 13th Corps to turn the enemy flank and attack their rear. The British armour actually absorbed the Axis attack in place, fighting a sharp action near Ruweisat Ridge. As we heard, the Germans started 3 July with 26 tanks while the 4th Armoured Brigade had 18 Grants, 22 Stuarts, and 12 Valentines. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had a further 20 Grants, 28 Stuarts, and 8 mixed cruisers, probably mostly Crusaders. The Official History, in Vol.III., upon which this account is based, says that at the end of the tank battle, the German troops were at the breaking point.

The afternoon of 2 July 1942

Two things happened at El Alamein, on the afternoon of 2 July 1942. One was the German attack against the El Alamein defences. The other was the counter-attack by 13 Corps. The 1st South African Brigade successfully withstood the German attack, supported by "Robcol" from the 10th Indian Division. General Pienaar was still worried about exposing his troops to capture, unsupported by armour. General Auchinleck responded to that concern by replacing the brigade with "Ackcol" from the 50th Division. The 90th Light Division made no progress and complained about the heavy air attacks that had a strong fighter escort. Two armoured battles were fought further south: the 4th Armoured Brigade versus the 15th Panzer Division and the 22nd Armoured Brigade versus the 21st Panzer Division. The Germans retreated, leaving the British on the ground under dispute. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

2 July 1942 at El Alamein

Early on 2 July 1942, the 90th Light Division had attacked without success at El Alamein. Instead of sending the DAK around the British rear, Rommel redirected them to help the 90th Light Division break through to the coast road.

General Auchinleck also changed his plans, given the progression of the battle. Rather than have the %th Indian Division HQ and the 9th Indian Brigade be exposed in the far south, they would leave a column and pull back. The same was ordered for the 6th NZ Brigade somewhat further to the north. With Rommel clearly readying an attack at El Alamein in the north, Auchinleck planned a counter-attack by the 13th Corps, with the 30th Corps containing the Axis attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Later on 1 July 1942 at El Alamein

While the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade was still putting up a gallant defence on 1 July 1942, the other parts of the Axis attack came slowly to a halt. The Italian portion of the attack achieved nothing. The 90th Light Division was stopped and was digging positions. After attacking the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade, the Deutsche Afrika Korps was reduced to 37 running tanks. They had been under frequent air attack during the fight. Rommel still hoped to continue his attack as planned, but by the next morning, had had to concede that the attack had stalled. He hoped to regroup on 2 July and try to break through to the coast. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The afternoon of 1 July 1942 at El Alamein

Only at 1:30pm did 30th Corps HQ realize that the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade was in extreme danger. They were informed by the 1st South African Division of the situation. The armoured cars, however, made an erroneous report that made the brigade position was quiet. This report was made at 2:30pm. Finally, at the last moment, 30th Corps ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade towards Deir el Shein, where the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade was near collapse. The 22nd Armoured Brigade ran into German armour and had fight. The Germans were from the 15th Panzer Division and were driven back.

Over the same period, the 90th Light Division had gotten in trouble. They had finally been able to disengage from the El Alamein position by 1:30pm. They came under fire from the entire 1st South African Division (all three brigades). They lost their composure and when they had regained it, they had "gone to ground". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.
,/P.

The heroes of the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade

As we said, the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade had just arrived in the desert from Iraq. The brigade had a temporary commander, Lt-Col Gray, of the 2/3 Gurkha Rifles. The brigade operated under the overall command of the 1st South African Division. The brigade, with three battalions, had arrived without artillery, but on the night of 30 June 1942, they received 23-25pdr guns. They also had 16-6pdr ATG's. The South African engineers helped the brigade carve out defences from the rocky soil. Nine Matilda's were sent to reinforce the brigade. The idea was that the brigade would be organized as a column. By the morning of 1 July, the enemy artillery was registering their guns on the brigade's position and they knew an attack was imminent. The Axis forces had forced a hole in the minefield by 1pm. About a dozen German tanks passed through the gap. Another eight tanks arrived by 4pm and that doomed the brigade. At 5pm, all of the Matildas were knocked out. The attack was only against two of the three battalions: the 2/5 Essex Regiment and the 4/11 Sikhs. The 2/3 Gurkhas were unengaged. The position fell by 7pm, but only after a spirited defence by the brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

At the beginning of July 1942 at El Alamein

At the end of June, Rommel could either try to blitz his way through the British positions at El Alamein or he could take time to study the situation. Rommel had so much success against the British with mobile, unscripted operations, he tried another one. The problem was that the British had forces in positions that were a surprise to the Germans. Instead of the 18th Indian Brigade being forward at Deir el Abyad, they were further back on Deir el Shein. The 1st South Africans were at Alam el Onsol, where they were totally unsuspected. The 4th Armoured Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade were sitting forward and to the southwest of the South Africans. Rommel intended to send the 90th Light Division and the Afrika Korps through the British positions and then swing up to the coast, cutting off El Alamein. The Italians would attack El Alamein frontally and also follow the mobile German force. Quite quickly, the situation went badly for the Axis forces. The two panzer divisions becamed entangled and confused. The 90th Light Division lost their way and ran into the El Alamein position directly. Instead of moving in the dark, the Germans were only at Deir el Shein at daylight. The DAK commander decided to attack the 18th Indian Brigade, newly arrived from Iraq. The brigade was defeated, but only after hard fighting that saw only two of the three battalions engaged. Their brave defence gave time for the British armour to recover and come into action. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The German air situation in late July 1942

In late July 1942, Rommel was pressing to be able to break the British line at El Alamein. To aid that goal, Rommel wanted to see more air operations over Egypt. The German air forces, though, had problems. With defense of the Axis supply lines at sea being critical, the Germans had to divide their air forces between attacking Malta and shipping and in support of the army and against Egypt. That was especially true of the air forces based on Sicily. More than half of the available Ju-88 bombers were based there. They were largely used in the anti-shipping role as well as bombing Malta. The biggest problem was a shortage of German fighters. They were operating at a increased tempo, plus they faced late-model Spitfires for the first time. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel's opinions on 21 July 1942

In the course of fighting in the desert, Rommel had come to respect the New Zealand and 9th Australian Divisions. By late July, those divisions had the opportunity to train up to an effective level. Rommel also respected the British artillery, from the 25pdr field guns up to the medium and heavy artillery. At the start of the fighting, the British had started with an odd collection of artillery, much of it from the Great War, such as the 18pdr field gun, the 4.5in howitzer, and the 60pdr medium gun. By the summer of 1942, they been equipped with the latest war production, such as the 5.5in and 4.5in guns. The British also benefited from the short supply lines. That situation also aided the air force, so that they were able to attack the Axis supply lines and sea traffic. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel asks for reinforcements

By late July 1942, Rommel had given his high command a grim assessment of his situation in North Africa. He made a plea for German troops, for more "Special" tanks (Pzkw IV Ausf F2 and Pzkw III Ausf. J Sdkfz 141/1), 5cm PAK 38 and 88mm anti-tank guns, more armoured cars, and "recovery vehicles". He also asked for the air force in North Africa to be strengthened. He wanted more air power not only to protect his troops and equipment, but to attack the canal. The high command had anticipated the sort of problems that Rommel complained about, so they were no surprise. That is why that had attempted to persuade Rommel to pursue a more cautious plan. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

British success in July 1942 meant an Axis disappointment

At the end of June 1942, Rommel fully expected to be able to blitz all the way to the Suez Canal. Instead, his army was stopped and thrown onto the defensive. After the first week of July, Rommel knew that he had been stopped and by the end of July, the Axis command was worried that they would be thrown back. So certain of success were the Axis leaders that Mussolini had flown across to North Africa to be there when they captured the canal. Mussolini did act to increase the Italian air force in North Africa, in support of the army. Mussolini returned to Italy on 20 July, after it was obvious that the Axis army would not be able to advance further. Both the Germans and Italians concentrated on increasing their army, after it had been weakened by the battles from May to July 1942. German losses, in fact, were about 70% of their initial strength. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Behind the lines

While the Axis had staged air attacks against Alexandria, the Canal and the Red Sea, they achieved little. They did close the canal for a week with mines, but they were cleared. They inflicted some damage at Port Said, but it was not severe. They did sink a water boat, damaged a boom defence vessel, and sank an Egyptian coast guard vessel on 28 July 1942. The volume of shipping was unaffected and supplies, men, and equipment continued to arrive in the Middle East. The port of Suez was not affected, as they Axis commanders did not recognize its importance and vulnerability. The fleet had left Alexandria due to the close proximity of Axis air fields. Ships were based at Haifa and Port Said. Over four nights from 12 to 20 July, ships bombarded Matruh by the light of flares dropped by Albacores. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air situation in July 1942

The official history notes that a feature of the air actions in July 1942 was that the British lost many fighter aircraft in combat. Losses of Kittyhawks were particularly great. Many squadrons had lost more than half their strength. A German general commented that while British fighter losses had been great, the British had maintained a capable fighter capability, nonetheless. He mentioned that the arrival of Spitfire squadrons in the desert had given the British an aircraft that was a match for the Me-109s. Oddly enough, the Germans had not hit the targets in the rear of the battle zone with very many bomber strikes. They had concentrated on ground support of the Axis armies at El Alamein. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More about the British air effort in July 1942

When they were not supporting the army at El Alamein, the British air forces were engaged in a wide variety of operations. They hit distant targets with bombs, such as "Benghazi, Tobruk and Matruh", as well as Heraklion and Suda Bay. The types of operations included the strikes, providing air cover, and all types of reconnaissance (strategic, tactical, survey, and photography). The British air losses in July 1942 exceeded those of the German and Italian air forces. The British lost 113 aircraft "against about 80 German and 18 Italian".

Both Axis and British air forces and armies had difficulty in cooperating in July. The organizations that had been built up on the British side were all disrupted by the defeats and long retreat. Also, Auchinleck's HQ was separate from Air Marshal Conyngham's. The British were successful enough that the Axis forces were forced to disperse widely in the night. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The RAF in July 1942 in the desert

The retreat of the desert air force to Egypt resulted in a great dislocation. There was a shortage of airfields due to the large number of aircraft that were involved. One result was that the medium and heavy bombers were moved to airfields in Palestine. The fighters and light bombers were located from behind the front to airfields in Cairo and the Canal Zone.

With the front stabilized at El Alamein, the air force was able to commence a high intensity of operations against Axis forces. From 1 July to 27 July, there were an average of 570 sorties per day. The targets included the enemy supply lines, against the German and Italian air forces, and the actual direct support to the army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The action in July 1942 at El Alamein

The action at El Alamein in July 1942 consisted of a series of strokes and counter strokes. At first, Rommel tried to penetrate the line immediately south of El Alamein and turn towards the south. He was stopped by the attacks of 30th Corps from the north and 13th Corps from the south. The next phase saw 30th Corps still blocking Rommel while the 13th Corps tried to cut to the north and northwest. They were stopped. Then, on 10 July, the 30th Corps staged an assault at Tell el Aisa that put Rommel on the defensive. On 14 and 16 July, Auchinleck attacked twice at Ruweisat Ridge (a familiar name) to bust through the Axis center. He was stopped. He tried next at El Mreir without success on 21 and 22 July. These attacks were mostly made by 13th Corps. A short time later, 30th Corps tried attacks at Tell el Aisa and Miteirya Ridge without result. At this point, Auchinleck decided to rest and refit the army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Contingency plans

Given the string of defeats suffered by the Eighth Army, General Auchinleck thought it prudent to make contingency plans in the event that Rommel would be able to push past El Alamein. In that case, Auchinleck planned a fighting retreat, never withdrawing without a fight. Defences were built deeper into Egypt and communications, in the sense of moving supplies, were improved. A "Nile Flotilla" was organized by the Royal Navy. All military schools were closed and the men were organized into improvised units. In the worst case, a force would stand on the canal while the main force would retreat along the Nile. If needed, the GHQ would move to Gaza, with a section left in Cairo. General Auchinleck declined to destroy anything needed by the Egyptian people. Still, plans were made for demolishing essential services and stocks of supplies. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

No "last stand" at El Alamein

General Auchinleck recognized the ascendancy of the Axis forces in July 1942. The defences at El Alamein were only partially completed. The British troops had been recently defeated and had lost a good deal of equipment. As we have said, Auchinleck's primary concern was to keep the army in being, rather than risk losing what was left. General Auchinleck intended to fight to stop the Axis advance, but there was no certainty that was possible. Very discretely, west of the Nile, defences were prepared and land was flooded. Great care was taken to not panic the Egyptian people and alarm the government. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Auchinleck's plan for El Alamein

General Auchinleck wanted to hold some positions at El Alamein, but keep other forces mobile. For better or worse, the infantry divisions would form battle groups that would be controlled by the division commanders. He also wanted the corps commanders in control at a higher level, to ensure that concentrations were made at the decisive points in the battle. In the past, the corps commanders had not been so closely in touch with operations. Anything that did not provide a tactical use would be sent to the rear. Auchinleck's primary concern was to keep the army intact, even if that meant a further retreat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Back to the desert to El Alamein

As June 1942 ended, Rommel was intent on blitzing on t0 the Nile Delta. He hoped to keep the British on the run and not allow them to block his forward progress. General Auchinleck, for his part, was intent on setting up a blocking line at the narrow point of El Alamein. A few troops were already there and there were men streaming back from Mersa Matruh. Other troops were in transit from Iraq and Palestine, headed for El Alamein.

In the end, Auchinleck was successful and Rommel failed. Rommel's task was made more difficult by the lack of transport and the unpreparedness of the Axis transport organization. They had been promised a six week pause to recover after Tobruk fell, but that never happened. The leading Axis forces reached El Alamein about the same time as the forces retreating from Mersa Matruh. General Auchinleck planned to hold strong points, rather than establish a complete line. He hoped to "channel" the Axis forces into positions where they could be successfully engaged. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air exploits in July 1942

Two events of note associated with aviators took place in July 1942. In one case, six Bristol Bombays were loaded with 1500 gallons of fuel and 60 gallons of oil. On the night of 9/10 July, they flew to an abandoned landing field near Fort Maddalena. Ten Fleet Air Arm Fairey Albacores flew in and fueled up for a mission. They intended to attack an Axis convoy near Crete. Sadly, they didn't sink any ships, but it was a good attempt.

In another incident, a Beaufort had to make a forced landing behind enemy lines. They were taken prisoner and were being flown to Italy. However, they were able to takeover the seaplane they were on and fly it to Malta. The seaplane was later used in service from Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Effects of the retreat on land

The army's retreat to the east in June to July 1942 put great pressure on the navy and air force. The withdrawal of the fleet from Alexandria only made matters worse. Benghazi and even Tobruk were difficult to raid from the air. Benghazi could only be hit by B-24 Liberators, which had a great range with a good bomb load. The convoys in June and August had diverted the submarine force away from attacking Axis shipping in order to support the convoy operations. With the loss of the submarine tender Medway, the submarines ended up being based in Beirut, which had been a French submarine base. The navy had requested more submarines and destroyers, but only the submarines were available. The submarines previously based on Gibraltar were moved east to Beirut. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More about Malta

After the Pedestal convoy, the main concern on Malta was food for the populace. In a rather desperate measure, they slaughtered the entire of Malta's livestock, for meat and so they did not have to be fed. This was obviously only a short term measure, and the island's livestock would have to eventually be replaced. Lack of fuel for aircraft was a major issue, as well. The island relied upon risky missions by submarines and the minelayer Welshman for the aviation fuel. Fighter aircraft were always being lost, so the aircraft carrier Furious ferried another 29 Spitfires to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Phases in the effort to keep Malta supplied

As the nature of the war changed over time, there were distinct phases in the effort to resupply Malta. The first phase was the 6-1/2 months between Italy's declaration of war and the end of 1940. 21 ships arrived at Malta without loss during this period. Once the German air forces arrived on the scene, the dynamics changed radically. From January 1941 to August 1942, 82 ships were sent towards Malta, while 49 actually arrived. The remaining 23 were sunk in transit. The fast minelayer Welshman made three trips from May 1942 to July 1942. Submarines also carried supplies to Malta on 31 occasions. Operations to ferry aircraft to Malta from August 1940 to August 1942 succeeded in bringing in 670 Hurricanes and Spitfires. They were ferried on aircraft carriers to within range and then flown off to Malta. The period from the defeat at Gazala to August was one of the most difficult of the war in North Africa. The lack of airbases within range in North Africa forced the dispatch of a large naval force for Pedestal that took heavy losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Axis forces that attacked the Pedestal convoy

The British could take some solace from the fact that very strong Axis forces had opposed them in the Pedestal convoy. The Axis forces had inflicted almost devastating losses. Some 400 Italian and 200 German aircraft had been positioned to strike the convoy. Crete and North Africa had been stripped of aircraft so that a large force could attack the convoy. Twenty submarines, including 3 German and 17 Italian, were spread between the Balearic Islands and Algeria and in front of the Skerki Channel. A minefield was laid off Cape Bon. 4 German and 19 Italian motor torpedo boats were placed south of Cape Bon. Events had started to go wrong when the Italian submarine Axum had hit the two fighter direction ships. After that, as the convoy was spread over a greater distance, the motor torpedo boats had been very successful in the night. The next day, the Axis aircraft were dominant. The convoy was fortunate to be spared attack by Italian cruisers. This great effort on the Axis side was the final serious opposition to convoys. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The merchant ships of the Pedestal convoy

The Pedestal convoy commander, Admiral Syfert had special praise for the men who manned the merchant ships in the convoy. Five merchant ships actually arrived at Malta, and the oiler Ohio had to be brought in by the destroyers Penn (P-class), Bramham (Hunt type 2), and Ledbury (also Hunt type 2) and the minesweeper Rye (turbine-engined Bangor class). Captain D. W. Mason, master of the Ohio, "received the George Cross for his outstanding services". The merchant ship Brisbane Star had sailed independently after being damaged and had arrived at Malta safely. The other merchant ships, the Port Chalmers, Melbourne Star, and Rochester Star, had arrived with the naval escort. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

After Pedestal

Despite making a massive effort to support the Pedestal convoy, the Royal Navy took heavy losses, perhaps due to the inadequate AA armament of ships in mid-1942. The Fleet Air Arm took the greatest losses on the British side. They lost 13 aircraft in combat and 16 with the loss of the Eagle. The RAF lost but 5 aircraft while the Axis air forces lost 35 aircraft during the operation. On the run back to Gibraltar, the two merchant ships from Malta arrived without incident. The warships, on the other hand, were heavily attacked, but took no more damage. They arrived at Gibraltar on 15 June 1942. They had to fight their way through the same motor torpedo boats, submarines, and aircraft as on the way to Malta. A diversion run from the east towards Malta was not disturbed by the enemy. The merchantmen were disappointed to not be making the difficult run to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Pedestal convoy: the morning of 13 August 1942

After 7:30am on 13 August 1942, the captain of the cruiser Manchester decided to scuttle the ship after she had been severely damaged by a torpedo fired by a motor torpedo boat. In the daytime, the air attacks recommenced while the motor torpedo boat threat subsided. At one point in the night, four Italian cruisers seemed to be a threat, but they turned to the east. After 8am, with long range Spitfires and Beaufighters providing air cover, the attacks started. The merchantman "Waimarama was hit and blew up". The tanker Ohio took engine damage during more attacks. By 11:30am, the convoy was 80 miles from Malta. They were now within range of short range Spitfires from Malta. Three merchant ships, the Port Chalmers, the Melbourne Star, and Rochester Castle arrived at Malta, escorted by minesweepers. The tanker Ohio arrived in Malta on 15 August with two destroyers tied alongside to provide steering and power. The Brisbane Star had been boarded by the French near Tunisia, but had arrived at Malta on 14 August. The other ship that had been straggling, the Dorset, had been sunk by further attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Heavy attacks on Pedestal in the night of 12-13 August 1942

The Pedestal convoy steered south of Zembra Island to avoid the minefields in the Sicilian Narrows. The ships in the convoy were scattered over a large distance, making defence much harder. After Midnight, the motor torpedo boat attacks started. They had an immediate success when they torpedoed the cruiser Manchester. Five of the merchant ships were also hit in the attacks. The attacks on the merchant ships all happened between 3:15am and 4:30am. The Rochester Castle was the only survivor, but was still able to make 13 knots. By 5:30am, the cruiser Charybdis and destroyers Eskimo and Somali had joined the main force. They had been sent as reinforcements as the escort had been damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Pedestal convoy takes damage on 12 August 1942

After 7pm on 12 August 1942, after the air attack from Sicily had ended, the cruiser Nigeria, the AA cruiser Cairo, and the oil tanker Ohio all took hits from torpedoes fired by the Italian submarine Axum. The Nigeria was sent back to Gibraltar, the Cairo had to be sunk, and the Ohio continued towards Malta. This was followed by another air attack that caused considerable damage: the Empire Hope was bombed and had to be scuttled, the Clan Ferguson blew up after being hit by a torpedo, the Brisbane Star was also torpedoed but could continue towards Malta. After this air attack, an Italian submarine torpedoed the cruiser Kenya, which was able to continue with the convoy. The attacks would only increase in intensity and effectiveness. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The last half of 11 July 1942: the Pedestal convoy

In the last of the midday air attacks on 11 July 1942, an Italian bomber dropped an armour-piercing bomb on the aircraft carrier Victorious. The bomb broke up on hitting the armoured flight deck and the ship was undamaged. After passing north of Galita Island, the convoy fought off a series of submarine attacks. The destroyer Ithuriel sank the Italian submarine Cobalto during this time. By 6:30pm, air attacks recommenced, this time from aircraft based on Sicily. Two casualties happened within the half hour of attacks. The destroyer Foresight was disabled and had to be sunk. The other casualty was the aircraft carrier Indomitable, which took three bomb hits on her flight deck, which became unusable. Her aircraft had to land on the Victorious. Force Z turned away at 7pm and Force X was left to take the convoy in to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The first air attacks on the Pedestal convoy

At sunset on 11 July 1942, the Pedestal convoy was about 200 miles west of Sardinia. The Germans launched an attack with 36 aircraft on the convoy. The attack seems to have been timed to occur at sunset. The attackers were difficult to see, but were beaten off with no damage to the convoy. During the night, the Sardinian airfields were attacked by Liberators and Beaufighters. A morning attack on 12 July did no harm. The main attack of the day came at the middle of the day. The attackers came from Sardinia and were 70 strong, escorted by fighters. The first wave consisted of 10 Italian torpedo bombers, probably SM-79s, armed with circling torpedoes. Several more waves followed. The only damage was to the merchant ship Deucalion. She was ordered to hug the Tunisian coast with her escort. After beating off one attack, a second of Italian torpedo bombers hit her and caused her to explode. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The opening act of Vigorous

The Vigorous convoy consisted of 11 British and 3 American merchant ships. One wsa the fast tanker Ohio, which could make 15 knots. The convoy entered the Mediterranean on 10 August 1942. Axis reconnaissance aircraft were constantly following the convoy. The Furious launched her Spitfires in the early afternoon. A major mishap occurred at 1:15pm when the Eagle was torpedoded by U-73. The Eagle sank in only 8 minutes, although most of the crew was rescued. After the Furious had launched all her Spitfires, she turned back to Gibraltar. The destroyer Wolverine rammed and sank an Italian submarine Dagabur while en route to Gibraltar. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Official History.

The Situation at Malta

The fighter strength at Malta had been reduced to 80 aircraft by the end of July 1942. Since the losses averaged 17 per week, the decision was made to fly in more aircraft on board the old Furious. The Furious was to be a secondary operation taking advantage of the main Pedestal convoy. Some of the lessons learned from Harpoon and Vigorous caused there to be two oilers and a fleet tug, all escorted by four corvettes. There were also 8 additional destroyers. These would be available to escorte the Furious back to Gibraltar. Force X also had a fleet tug attached. Submarines were positioned to attack any Italian surface warships. Malta had its air strength augmented for the Pedestal operation. The peak numbers available included: "100 Spitfires, 36 Beaufighters, 30 Beauforts, 3 Wellingtons, 2 B-24 Liberatorss, 2 Baltimores, 3 FAA Albacores and Swordfish". There were also reconnaissance aircraft: "5 Baltimores, 6 P.R.U. Spitfires and 5 Wellington VIIIs". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The forces for "Pedestal"

The next convoy to be planned was seen as the final hope for Malta. This was the "Pedestal" convoy. The British finally committed a large naval force to escort the convoy. The escort fleet consisted of the aircraft carriers Victorious, Indomitable, and Eagle, along with the battleships Nelson and Rodney. The cruisers earmarked for the convoy were the three Dido class ships, Sirius, Phoebe, and Charybdis, and the Nigeria, Kenya, and Manchester. In addition, the old C-class cruiser Cairo was along as an AA cruiser, with a total of 24 destroyers. The air contingent on the carriers were also significant:

Victorious: 16 Fulmars, 6 Hurricanes, and 14 Albacores
Indomitable: 10 F4F Martlets, 24 Hurricanes, and 14 Albacores
Eagle: 16 Hurricanes

This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History

More of the war at sea in late June and July 1942

Admiral Harwood had moved from Alexandria to Ismailia on 2 July 1942. A few days before, on 30 June, the submarine depot ship Medway had been torpedoed and sunk while on the way to Haifa. Haifa had seemed like a good possible submarine base. Not only was the Medway sunk, but the almost 90 torpedoes on board were lost. Fortunately, 47 were recovered from the wreck. As the navy grew to understand that Alexandria was going to be safe from attack by land for the near future, Admiral Harwood and his staff returned there by 8 August. A difficult situation had arisen when the British withdrew from Alexandria, as the French squadron stayed behind. He did not want to be attacked by his erstwhile allies, as other French squadrons had been. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Other events in June 1942

While the Harpoon and Vigorous convoys were at sea, the British withdrew from the Gazala line. Within five days after the convoys, Tobruk was taken by the Axis forces. There was the rapid advance after Tobruk fell so that the Axis forces had occupied Mersa Matruh by 28 June 1942. Admiral Harwood responded to those events by dispersing the fleet and moving merchant shipping and unneeded warships to the south of the Suez Canal. In the meantime, the Queen Elizabeth was repaired so that she could be moved out of drydock, before being moved further out of harms way before being sent to Norfolk, Virginia for permanent repairs. The extent of the danger from a further Axis advance was unclear, so perparations were made to block Alexandria, if necessary. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Malta resurgent in July 1942

The Axis air forces dropped more than 700 tons of bombs on Malta in July 1942. Most of the bombs were dropped in the first half of the month. They succeeded in destroying 17 aircraft and damaging many more. In that same first two weeks, Malta's defenders flew almost 1,000 sortees. Of the 136 Spitfires, 36 were lost from enemy action, but the enemy lost 65 aircraft during the same period. The defence was so strong that the Axis air forces had to send more escort fighters with the bombers. By late July, they were forced to resort to fighter-bomber attacks and forgo bomber attacks. On 15 July, Air Vice-Marshal Lloyd was replaced by Air Vice-Marshal Park as AOC Malta. He had served as AOC Malta for just over a year. He moved to Air Marshal Tedder's staff from Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The failure of the June 1942 convoys

The operation to run two convoys to Malta in June 1942 was a failure. 17 merchant ships had been sent in two convoys, one from either end of the Mediterranean Sea, but only two ships arrived at Malta. Of the remainder, six were sunk and nine had turned back in the face of attacks by surface ships, submarines, and especially, aircraft. The main problem at Malta was fuel for aircraft. The continued air attacks were rapidly depleting the remaining stocks. Fortunately, the submarines Parthian and Clyde were able to bring in "aviation spirit, ammunition and special stores". In two operations, the aircraft carrier Eagle flew in 59 Spitfires. The fast minelayer Welshman, having a large internal volume for cargo, brought more "special stores". The situation had improved enough by late June that Admiral Harwood ordered the 10th Submarine Flotilla to return to Malta. One fruit of the Harpoon convoy was the presence of the minesweepers at Malta, and they were able to make headway on clearing mines. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Vigorous convoy returns to Alexandria

At 1:45pm on 15 June 1942, the Vigorous convoy and escort were still steaming eastward. At this time, the Italian fleet was still heading in their direction, apparently undamaged. The convoy escort was suffering heavily by this time. The cruiser Birmingham had been damaged by a near miss a couple of hours earlier. The Newcastle had been previously torpedoed by a motor torpedo boat and had a reduced speed. Admiral Harwood gave Admiral Vian discretion to do what he thought best by 2:20pm. The next lost came at about 3:20pm when the Hunt class destroyer Airdale was hit and had to be sunk. Good news came that the Italian fleet had apparently headed back to Taranto at 3pm. The problem was that the ships were running low on AA ammunition. The remaining Hunt class destroyers were reduced to "less than 30% of ammunition left". Admiral Harwood had hoped to send the fastest ships on to Malta, but ordered them back to Alexandria after receiving this status report. During the night, the cruiser Hermione was torpedoed and sunk by U.205. In the morning, the Australian destroyer Nestor had to be sunk after being hit during air attacks. The convoy escort and part of the convoy arrived at Alexandria late on 16 June. Admiral Vian had sent part of the convoy to Port Said. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Early on 15 June 1942: the Vigorous convoy

In the night and early in the morning, British aircraft mounted attacks on the Italian fleet. Wellingtons from Malta attacked with torpedoes at midnight, but were unsuccessful, partly due to an effective smoke screen. At 6am, Beauforts attacked, thinking that they hit the battleships, but they had stopped the cruiser Trento, instead. British submarines also attacked at about the time the Beaufort attack occurred. They missed the battleships, but the damaged Trento was sunk at 10am by P.35. B-24 Liberators attacked at 9am and scored one bomb hit n the Littorio, but she was not seriously damaged. A further attack by Beauforts was planned for the time of the Liberator attack, but they were intercepted by German fighters. Two were lost and five had to turn back. The remainder attacked, but had no success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Italian fleet menaces the Vigorous convoy

A Martin Baltimore based on Malta was on a maritime reconnaissance mission when the crew spotted the Italian fleet leaving Taranto at 6:45pm on 14 June 1942. The battleships were misidentified as Cavour class, when they were actually the faster Littorio class. The harbor at Taranto was photographed by a reconnaissance aircraft at 8pm. The photographs showed that the Cavours were still at Taranto, so that meant that the battleships that the Baltimore saw were Littorios. Admiral Vian could see, by 11pm, that he might be intercepted by the Italian fleet in the morning. At Admiral Harwood's orders, they continued west until 2am and then turned east. Right after this, the cruiser Newcastle was torpedoed by a motor torpedo boat, but was able to continue at 24 knots. A bit later, the destroyer Hardy was torpedoed and had to be sunk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

14 June 1942: the Vigorous Convoy

During the day on 14 June 1942, the Vigorous Convoy was in range of shored-based fighter cover. Late in the afternoon, they passed out of range so that only long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufighters were providing cover. Between 4:30pm and 9:15pm, seven different air attacks were mounted by Ju-87's and Ju-88's. At about 6pm, the merchant ship Bhutan was hit and sunk. The merchant ship Potaro was damaged but stayed with the convoy. As the sun set, the destroyer Pakenham had a near miss from a submarine-fired torpedo. A little while later, six motor torpedo boats were seen. After sunset, aircraft dropped flares to help the submarines and torpedo boats.

Earlier on 14 June, the main Italian fleet sortied from Taranto, intending to attack the convoy. The fleet was substantial: two battleships, 2-8-inch gun cruisers, 2-6-in gun cruisers, and 12 destroyers. They were on course to intercept the convoy at 9am on 15 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Decoy Convoy

A day-and-a-half ahead of the Vigorous convoy, 11 ships sailed with an escort as a DecoyConvoy. The idea was to draw the Italian fleet to the decoy convoy and keep them away from the main body of the Vigorous Convoy that sailed later. The Decoy Convoy had an escort consisting of the old cruiser Coventry and 8 destroyers. Early in the game, the merchant ship, City of Calcutta, was bombed and had to be sent into Tobruk. They rendezvoused with the main body on 13 June 1942. One more merchant ship, the Elizabeth Bakke, was not able to maintain the speed of the convoy. That left the Decoy Convoy with 9 merchant ships. Early on 14 June, the Dutch ship Aagtekirk was also left behind as the ship was not able to steam the convoy speed. The Aagtekirk and her escort were attacked by 40 aircraft. The Aagtekirk sank about 12 miles from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Allied air power in support of the Vigorous convoy

A torpedo striking force was based at Malta and on the Libyan border in Egypt. Torpedo-armed Wellingtons and Beauforts were at Malta. More Beauforts were based just inside Egypt from Libya. American B-24 Liberators from the Halverson Detachment were based at Fayid. they had raided Rumania on 12 June 1942 and then were kept in the Middle East for use against the Italian fleet. There was also fighter cover for part of the run to Malta. The short range fighters based behind the front would provide cover at the beginning of the voyage and then Kittyhawks with external fuel tanks and Beaufighters would provide air cover when the Vigorous convoy was beyond the range of the short range fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official history.

The Vigorous convoy: June 1942

In parallel to the Harpoon convoy in the west, the Vigorous convoy was commenced from the east. Admiral Harwood and Air Marshal Tedder commanded from shore. Rear-Admiral Philip Vian commanded at sea. Rear-Admiral Vian had commanded the convoy in March and intended to generally follow the earlier plan. This time, the convoy and escort were both larger than before. The escort consisted of the former battleship Centurion, armed only with AA guns, seven cruisers, one AA cruiser, 26 destroyers, four corvettes, two minesweepers, four motor torpedo boats, and two rescue ships. There was also a screen of nine submarines that would defend the convoy to the north and would move with the convoy. There were also about forty aircraft available. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon Convoy arrives at Malta

By the late afternoon on 15 June 1942, the Italian surface force had turned for home. They were low on ammunition and were in danger of attack by Malta-based aircraft. There was a further air attack, but no ships were damaged. The escort as well as the two surviving merchant ships arrived at Malta. In the confusion about what channel to take to enter Malta, five ships were mined. One, the Polish Kujawiak, sank. Still, 15,000 tons of stores had arrived at Malta. A heavy price had been paid to get them there, though. Two destroyers were sunk, a cruiser was damaged, as were three destroyers and a minesweeper. Late on 16 June, the convoy escort sailed for Gibraltar where they arrived late on 17 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More British ships lost

As noted, the British were very fortunate that the Italian commander, with the two cruisers, had broken off the action. He could have easily destroyed the survivors. This all was happening on 15 June 1942. The Italians, later in the day, swept through the scene of the previous encounter and found the destroyer Hebe, all by itself. The British commander turned back with the cruiser Cairo and three fleet destroyers. When the British could see the Italians in the distance, the Italians turned to engage some unseen targets. These would almost certainly have been the destroyers Partridge and Bedouin. The Partridge had been able to tow the Bedouin. They were headed for the coast of Tunisia, hoping to elude the Italians. Italian aircraft found them and torpedoed the Bedouin, sinking her. They also probably sank the tanker Kentucky and the cargo ship Burdwan about this time. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy loses two ships

The Ju-87 attack at about 9:30am disabled the tanker Kentucky. The minesweeper towed the Kentucky, but the convoy was now reduced to 6 knots. The merchant ship Chant was sunk in the attack. The convoy was very fortunate that the Italian cruisers had left, as they could easily have destroyed the convoy. Still, the convoy was without air cover, except for a period when long range Spitfires were present and repelled an air attack. Another air attack at 11:20am disabled the merchant ship Burdwan. The convoy was reduced to two merchant ships, Troilus and Orari, as the convoy commander, Captain Hardy, decided to have the Kentucky and Burdwan sunk, as they were a burden on the convoy, being disabled. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

15 June 1942: a desperate fight

By 7am, the British had two fleet destroyers disabled: the Bedouin and Partridge. The British destroyers had disabled one Italian destroyer, the Vivaldi. The Italian admiral sent his three other destroyers to help the Vivaldi, leaving the two cruisers to fight the remaining British ships. The cruiser Cairo and the Hunt class destroyers were able to shield the convoy, but were unable to join the action at this point. The Cairo and destroyers headed back towards the convoy and laid down smoke to shield the merchant ships. By 8:40am, the Italian admiral ordered a withdrawal and the Harpoon convoy survived for a while longer. The convoy had maneuvered, however, and that had slowed progress by three hours. When the AA defence ships had been drawn into the surface battle, that left the convoy exposed to air attack. That came in the form of 8-Ju-87 divebombers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy runs towards Malta

While the Harpoon convoy had a quiet night on the night of 14/15 June 1942, they would face a strong Italian surface force the next morning. A fast surface force had been sent to intercept the convoy. The VII Division consisted of the cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli (named after the 17th Century Austrian general Raimondo Montecuccoli), with five destroyers. The Harpoon convoy was 30 miles south of Pantelleria when they heard that the Italian ships were close. The AA cruiser Cairo only had 4inch guns, so the fight was left to the fleet destroyers with 4.7in guns and 21inch torpedoes. The Italians opened fire at 6:40am on 15 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More air fighting over Harpoon on 14 June 1942

As noted, when the Harpoon convoy got within 150 miles of Sicily, the main body was attacked by Ju-88s and a few Ju-87s. the old aircraft carrier Argus managed to maneuver and avoid torpedoes from the SM-79 torpedo bombers. The FAA fighters fought valiantly, although 7 were lost on 14 June 1942. The Italians and Germans lost 17 aircraft to AA fire and British fighters. After dark, the convoy picked up a Beaufighter escort from Malta. The main escort force turned back when the convoy reached the Skerki Channel and the much smaller Force X (AA cruiser Cairo, 9 destroyers, 4 minesweepers, and 6 minesweeping motor launches) were the sole escort in the final run to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The first air attack on the Harpoon Convoy: 14 June 1942

The Italians were known to have 20 bombers and 50 torpedo bombers based on Sardinia. The Harpoon convoy was within range by dawn on 14 June 1942. The British had the disadvantage of having the wind from the rear, which meant that the Argus and Eagle would have to turn to launch aircraft. The first wave of attackers consisted of "two groups of Italian fighter-bombers" at 10:30am. At 11am, the convoy was attacked by 28 SM79 torpedo bombers and 10 Cant bombers. The cruiser Liverpool took a torpedo as did the Dutch merchant ship Tanimbar. The Tanimbar quickly sank. The Liverpool had sustained an engine room hit and was reduced to 3 or 4 knots. The Liverpool was towed by a destroyer and escorted by another. The plan was to send her back to Gibraltar. The convoy was not attacked until evening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon Convoy Ships

The Harpoon convoy consisted of the American tanker Kentucky, the British merchant ships Troilus, Burdwan, Orari, the American merchant ship Chant, and the Dutch merchant ship Tanimbar. The main covering force, which would not go all the way to Malta, consisted of the battleship Malaya, the aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus, the cruisers Kenya, Liverpool, Charybdis, and 8 destroyers. The main covering force would turn back at the Skerki Channel, leaving just the AA cruiser Cairo (an old C-class cruiser converted as an anti-aircraft ship), 5 destroyers, and 4 Hunt class escort destroyers to accompany the convoy to Malta. There were also 4 minesweepers and 6 "minesweeping motor launches" to clear the way into Malta. Another tanker, the Brown Ranger, sailed independently to refuel the escorts to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy sails

The operation to run the two convoys to Malta was designed to put the western convoy, Harpoon, the day before the Vigorous convoy arrived. They plan envisioned bombing the Axis seaports and air fields before the convoys sailed. The fast minelayer Welshman was to run more ammunition to Malta, and would sail independently upon reaching the narrows. The Harpoon convoy consisted of six ships with a heavy escort, including the battleship Malaya and aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus. The Harpoon convoy was eventually intercepted by Italian surface forces on 15 June 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air forces to support the Harpoon and Vigorous convoys

A note in Vol.III of the Official History lists the squadrons available in Malta and Egypt to support the Harpoon and Vigorous convoys being run to Malta in June 1942:

                      Malta                   Egypt
Albacore              No.830 (FAA)           Nos. 821 and 826 (FAA)
Baltimore             No.69
Beaufort              No.217                 No.39
Blenheim                                     Nos.203 and 13 (Hellenic)
Hudson                                       No.459 (RAAF)
Maryland                                     No.203
Spitfire              No.2 PRU
Sunderland                                   No.230
Swordfish (A.S.V.)                           No.815 (A.S.V.)
Wellesley                                    No.47
Wellington (torpedo) No.38
Wellington (A.S.V.)  No.221 (Detachment)     No.221

There were also 95 Spitfire fighters on Malta after 9 June 1942
divided between Nos.126, 185, 249, and detachments from Nos.601 and 603 squadrons.
There were also night fighter Beaufighters in No.1435 Flight
and a No.235 Squadron detachment from the U.K.

As we indicated, this is based on the notes in Vol.III of the Official History.

The irony of Malta and June 1942

Tbe hope had been that the 8th Army would be victorious and move forward so that land-based aircraft could better support the defense of Malta. Instead, as the battle went badly for the army in June 1942, Malta had to support the defense of Egypt. The plan to resupply Malta was to run a convoy from either end of the Mediterranean Sea. The western convoy was called Harpoon and the eastern was Vigorous. A feature of the latest convoys was that there were more British maritime aircraft available. Malta had "six Baltimores, four Wellingtons fitted with A.S.V. and three P.R.U. Spitfires for reconnassaince". There were also six Wellingtons with torpedoes, a Beaufort squadron, and an Albacore squadron for anti-submarine work. There was also a larger maritime air force in Egypt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation right before the 1st Battle of El Alamein

The navy had done a remarkable job, supplying the army at Mersa Matruh right up until the withdrawal took place. The situation rapidly shifted, as Rommel's intent was to roll over the British troops that were retreating to the east. That did not happen, first due to the core of the units remaining intact and the support of the air force and navy. The harbours at Sollum and Mersa Matruh were mined from the air on 23 June and 28 June 1942. The water storage facilities at Mersa Matruh were destroyed and the water was contaminated. The navy was prepared to do shore bombardment in support, as well, but the fighting took place too far inland for this to be useful. The action rapidly moved east to El Alamein, where Rommel was stopped from further advance. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Action in the air from 29 June 1942

The Desert Air Force had kept fighters forward at El Daba while 10th Corps withdrew on 29 June 1942. That night, "Wellingtons, Bostons and Blenheims" hit Sidi Barrani and transport on the roads. By 30 June, they put a large number of aircraft up in reaction to the Axis arrival at El Alamein. The 8th Army as providing little useful information, so the Desert Air Force had to rely upon their own reconnaissance to decide where to bomb. The commander, Air Vice-Marshal Conyngham was actually choosing targets for his bombers to hit. Baltimores and Bostons made a few attacks, but mostly it was the Kittyhawk fighter-bombers doing the work. Most of the attacks were against the 90th Light Division, to good effect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 10th Corps Plans breaks out

13th Corps had succeeded in withdrawing from Mersa Matruh, but 10th Corps had been left in a tenuous position, as the Axis forces had blocked the road to the east about 17 miles. The 13th Corps had already reached their withdrawal objectives on 28 June 1942, but that was when the 10th Corps breakout was to occur. 50th Division and the 10th Indian Division would breakout to the south, travel 30 miles, and then turn east to Fuka. 10th Corps broke out in brigade group size units. The brigade groups invariably ran across Axis leaguers in the night. The Indians suffered the worst losses in the breakout. The corps headquarters, with General Holmes, was sent back to command "Delta Force" on their arrival in the rear. 10th Indian Division and the 50th Division were in no position to execute Auchinleck's plan to use them at El Alamein. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Gott orders the withdrawal on 27 June 1942

General "Strafer" Gott was the 13th Corps commander in the Eighth Army. At 7:20pm on 27 June 1942, General Gott issued the pre-arranged code word to his units telling them to start the withdrawal from the Mersa Matruh vicinity. He reported the news to Eighth Army headquarters which promptly issued a similar code word to 10th Corps.

Brigadier Inglis decide to use his best unit, the 4th NZ Infantry Brigade, to lead the breakout. The rest of the New Zealand Division would follow. As luck would have it, Brigadier Inglis took the division headquarters and the 5th NZ Brigade on a separate route that took them into the 21st Panzer Division leaguer, causing chaos. The New Zealand Division headed east to their rendezvous, reaching it on 28 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation at Mersa Matruh deteriorates

The attack on the New Zealand Division at Minqar Qaim seems to have caused General Gott to decide that his troops needed to withdraw to the east. He sent a cryptic message to General Lumsden, 1st Armoured Division commander that authorized him "to withdraw east of the Bir Khalda track". The message indicated that the New Zealand Division had already left Minqar Qaim, which was not the case. The New Zealand division also received a message, possibly from General Gott. After General Freyberg was wounded, Brigadier Inglis, the acting division commander, decided to withdraw to the El Alamein line. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British armour threw the Germans on the defensive: after 4pm on 27 June 1942

After the New Zealand Division had its transport scattered, General Freyberg asked for help from the 1st Armoured Division. This was at 4pm. The 4th Armoured Brigade had moved about 10 miles to the west of the New Zealand Division. They had sent the 3rd County of London Yeomanry (3rd CLY) towards the New Zealanders to support them, but they mistakenly had fired on the British tanks. Still, the 3rd CLY and the newly arrive Queen's Bays (with many tanks in company) posed a great enough threat to the 21st Panzer Division that they broke off their attack. Meanwhile, General Gott was planning to withdraw, based on General Auchinleck's orders to prevent the 8th Army units from being surrounded and pinned down. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

By 27 June 1942, the Axis forces were stretched thin

On 27 June 1942, Rommel was again trying to win through intimidating the British forces while having little actual fighting power. At the time that Rommel ordered the 21st Panzer Division to advance around the south of Mersa Matruh and attack the pocket of strength at Minqar Qaim, they were reduced to five Pzkw II and 16 Pzkw III tanks. Of course, the panzer division also had infantry and artillery. This reduced force was in the process of surrounding the New Zealand Division by 2pm. Earlier, at 12:30pm, General Gott had visited the New Zealanders. They were receiving heavy incoming artillery fire at this time. It was after this that the 10th Corps was ordered to attack towards Minqar Qaim to draw off the attacking force. The one thing that 21st Panzer's attack accomplished was to drive off the transport for the 4th and 4th New Zealand Brigades. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

27 June 1942 at Mersa Matruh

On 27 June 1942, Axis forces moved around the south of Mersa Matruh to block the coast road and trap retreating British forces. The New Zealand Division was located south of Mersa Matruh, at Minqar Qaim. By midday, Rommel directed the 21st Panzer Division to attack the forces located at Minqar Qaim and by 2pm, they had started to encircle the New Zealand Division. The army took steps to send support to the New Zealanders. The 10th Corps would attack south. The 50th Division and 5th Indian Brigade were moving towards objectives nearby. What really relieved the pressure was a move by the 1st Armoured Division that threw the 21st Panzer Division on the defensive. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis forces attack on 26 June 1942

The heavy British air attacks had delayed the advance and had inflicted many casualties on the DAK and the Italian forces. The 90th Light Division and 21st Panzer Division did manage to break up Gleecol and Leathercol. The British units realized that a major advance was underway. By early on 27 June, the 90th Light Division had some heavy fighting and by afternoon withdrew and tried to be inconspicuous. The DAK was oblivious to the New Zealand Division, but had made little progress. The 15th Panzer Division was moving east above the escarpment while the 21st Panzer Division was below. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Auchinleck assumes command

General Auchinleck arived at Maaten Baggush on 25 June 1942, after he assumed command of the Eighth Army. He left his CGS, Lt-General Corbett in Cairo to act on "all matters except those of the highest strategic or political importance". General Auchinleck immediately changed the plan to defend Mersa Matruh and decided to keep the army mobile and able to fight a withdrawal back to El Alamein. Auchinleck's first move was to change the organization to brigade groups whose main strength was artillery. General Freyberg did not want to change the New Zealand organization, and was able to make two brigades mobile. It is unclear what the difference was between brigade groups and the New Zealand mobile brigades, which were undoubtedly supported by artillery. Presumably, the New Zealand division was not subdivided into all-arms columns, which the British brigades may have been. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan to defend Mersa Matruh

Like Tobruk, the defences at Mersa Matruh were in poor repair. The position was not particularly defensible, but rather the place had a history. The Crusader battle had been launched from Mersa Matruh, for example. The actual arrangements were in disarray. There were the forces retreating from the frontier. There were reinforcement arriving, such as the politically sensitive New Zealand division, under the command of General Freyberg. There were units releaving others, and the overall impression was of chaos. By 25 June 1942, General Auchinleck had had enough. He relieved General Ritchie and personally took command of the Eighth Army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Where was the Luftwaffe?

As Axis forces finally advanced to the east on 24 June 1942, there was almost no sign of the Luftwaffe. In fact, all the Axis air forces had been preparing for an all-out assault on Malta, along with an invasion. There had also been heavy fighting around Bir Hacheim and Tobruk. The sole appearance of Axis aircraft were the few reconnaissance aircraft that overflew the retreating British troops. the Axis air forces would require a great deal of preparation and transport to move forward to support the rapidly advancing mobile forces (the DAK and Italian 20th Corps). This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 8th Army withdraws from the Egyptian border

With the 8th Army withdrawn from the Egyptian-Libyan border area, the Desert Air Force light bombers and fighter-bombers made a strong effort against the Axis forces. On 23 June 1942, the light bombers flew 45 sorties and the fighter-bombers flew 30 sorties. The fighters made their first jump back to pre-prepared fields at Mersa Matruh. The bombers were moved further back to El Daba. The Axis mobile forces were held up until 24 June due to a shortage of fuel. The DAK and the Italian 20th Corps cut across to the south, while the 21st Corps and 10th Corps moved east along the coastal road. The Douglas Bostons and Martin Baltimores flew 72 sorties on 24 June while the fighter bombers flew another 30 sorties. The Beaufighters had a greater range, so they attacked transport. There had been almost no sign of Axis fighter aircraft in this phase. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Desert Air Force

The Desert Air Force, at the time of Tobruk's fall, had 22 fighter squadrons, two tactical reconnaissance squadrons, and four light bomber squadrons. The aircraft were a mixture of British made and American made aircraft:

Fighters
11 Hurricane squadrons
6 Kitty Hawk squadrons
1 Spitfire squadron
2 Tomahawk squadrons
2 Beaufighter squadrons

Tactical Reconnaissance
1 Hurricane squadron
1 Tomahawk squadron

Light Bombers
2 Boston squadrons
1 Blenheim squadron
1 Baltimore squadron

The Desert Air Force had 463 aircraft on 22 June 1942, with another 420 distributed across the Middle East. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

American reinforcements to the Middle East

The fall of Tobruk had many repercussions. One was that the Americans decided to send air units and aircraft to the Middle East. They would leave the United States in late June or early July 1942. The reinforcements included the following:

One squadron of 27 Lockheed Hudsons
One group of 80 Curtis Kittyhawks
One group of 57 North American B-25 Mitchells
One group of 35 Consolidated B-24 Liberators

This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air force takes the load

As we said, Air Vice-Marshal Conyngham had a chain of landing zones prepared going deep into Egypt, so he was prepared for any rapid withdrawals. A great effort was made to increase the size of the Desert Air Force that would help slow the Axis advance. So much fighter strength was shifted to the desert that the defence of the Nile Delta was left to some Beaufighter night fighters and a few Spitfires. One bright spot was that there was finally a full squadron of Martin Baltimore day bombers. They were supplemented at night by a Blenheim squadron (no longer fit for day bombing). The size of the threat to the Middle East was finally realized and aircraft destined for India and the Far East were diverted to the Middle East. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The First Plan

General Ritchie's plan was to use a force commanded by General Gott to delay the Axis advance into Egypt. Doing that would allow the RAF to continue to operate from airfields close to the border and to bomb stores that had been left intact. Everything would be staked on a decisive battle to be fought at Mersa Matruh. The 1st South African Division was sent off to El Alamein. In the event, the delaying action became a normal withdrawal. One innovation was the sequence of landing-grounds that were prepared on the way deeper into Egypt. This was an innovation introduced by Air Vice-Marshal Conyngham to allow almost continuous air support to the army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Frontier, Mersa Matruh, or El Alamein?

The question of the moment on 23 June 1942 was where to fight to stop Rommel. The Defence Committee in London would have liked to see a stand made at the Frontier. For a number of reasons, this was appealing. First, it would keep Axis forces further away from Alexandria and the Nile Delta. Secondly, Allied Air Forces would be better able to protect convoys to Malta and to interdict Axis supply lines.

In the Middle East, the commanders thought that they lacked sufficient mobile forces, especially armour, to risk a fight at the frontier. Mersa Matruh was another 120 miles East of the Frontier. They calculated that there would be that much more strain on Axis supply lines by fighting at Matruh. The problem with fighting at Mersa Matruh was that there still was a lack of mobile forces and defending Mersa Matruh without them was problematic. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British plans from 21 June 1942

When the British commanders could see that Tobruk was about to fall, they reported their plans to London. General Ritchie had recommended not trying to hold the frontier, but to slow the enemy advance to give time to withdraw to Mersa Matruh. The New Zealand division was being sent to Mersa Matruh where there were some fixed defences for a division-sized unit. The one bright spot was that the British were strong in the air. The British proceeded to plan on a delaying action on the frontier to give the Matruh defenders more time to prepare defensive positions. One new difficulty was that by withdrawing to Matruh, the Axis air forces would be positioned to hit the base at Alexandria and other targets in the Nile delta and the Red Sea. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Axis plans on 26 June 1942

Italian naval forces would make a strong effort to push convoys to Benghazi and Tobruk. They would also use aircraft and submarines to deliver supplies. On 26 June 1942, Rommel had Cavallero and Bastico as vistors to his headquarters that was now located near Sidi Barrani. Rommel wanted to take El Alamein and use that as a base to push deep into Egypt. Mussolini wanted to take the Suez Canal and to be able to impede the arrival of British reinforcements. The one positive benefit to the British of losing Tobruk was that the Americans agreed to supply 300 Sherman tanks and 100 105mm self-propelled guns to the British in the Middle East. They would also supply "a large number of aircraft". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation after Tobruk fell

Mussolini sent Marshal Cavallero to North Africa to provide support to Rommel's advance towards the Suez Canal. Field-Marshal Kesselring thought that the correct next move would be to capture Malta, but he realized the possibilities with an immediate advance into Egypt by Rommel's forces. By 26 June 1942, Rommel had moved forward to Sidi Barrani. Rommel intended to make Mersa Matruh his next objective. From there, he would move deeper into Egypt, where he hoped to reach Cairo by 30 June. One issue was that British forces had commenced offensive operations against Axis shipping from Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

After Tobruk's capture

Mussolini's overriding concern was to capture Malta with the planned Operation Herkules. Mussolini had only authorized Rommel to advance to the Egyptian frontier, where he must wait until Malta was captured. Rommel would have none of it, however. He had an ally in Hitler, who was concerned that the capture of Malta could become a long and drawn out battle. Hitler asked Mussolini to reconsider and allow Rommel to advance into Egypt. Mussolini finally agreed with Hitler, as he coveted the Suez Canal. They decided to neutralize Malta rather than capture the island. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Fall of Tobruk

The Official History estimates that 33,000 men were taken prisoner at Tobruk, when the fortress was surrendered. The German casualties in the campaign to capture Tobruk were about 3,360 men killed. South Africa lost about one-third of their men in North Africa was prisoners. The German practice of officers leading in combat led to high casualties (perhaps as much as 70% in the motorized infantry and armoured units).

The main reason that the fortress fell was that a decision had been made as far back as February 1942 not to allow Tobruk to be besieged again. Because of that, the defenses were in poor condition. On top of that, the 2nd South African Division was not suited to defend the place, as the commander and men lacked the necessary experience.

With the surrender of Tobruk, Rommel was promoted to Field-Marshal. He expected to be able to blitz all the way to the Suez canal. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tobruk falls

In the night of 20 June to 21 June 1942, there were discussions about either holding out, surrendering, or trying to break out from Tobruk. General Klopper sent General Ritchie a message that the mobile troops would attempt to break out before morning. Apparently, no breakout was attempted and a surrender was arranged in the morning. A few units held out for longer, such as the Gurkha Rifles and the Cameron Highlanders. Some troops did succeed in escaping, however. 199 officers and men from the Coldstream Guards and 188 other men broke out to the southwest and were escorted by South African armoured cars. A very few others escaped to arrive on the frontier, in one case, much later. The loss of Tobruk devastated Churchill. He was in Washington at the time of the surrender and took the news very hard. The loss resulted in a no-confidence motion in Parliament on 25 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The attack on Tobruk, underway

The Italian 20th Corps was sent after the 15th Panzer Division, which had run into some British tanks, which had put up a good fight. The 21st Panzer Division came up, as well, and by 1:30pm, they had taken King's Cross, which was a high point. The harbour was hit by gunfire by 2pm. They had captured the town by 7pm and stopped the fight at 8pm, until morning. A series of missteps on General Klopper's part meant that an organized counter-attack never happened. Finally, a breakout was attempted in the night, as the situation had become untenable. By 6am on 21 June 1942, General Klopper had decided to surrender. This is based on the account in Vol.III of of the Official History.

The attack on Tobruk started on 20 June 1942

A small outpost had been kept outside of Tobruk at Acroma. These troops were withdrawn on 18 June 1942. A reconnaissance force of South African armoured cars and small columns continued to screen the defenses at Tobruk. Rommel had asked Field-Marshal Kesselring for a concentrated air attack at the time of the assault on Tobruk. Kesselring wanted to finish with Tobruk so they could concentrate on Malta, so he was a willing accomplice. The orders for the attack were given on 18 June. The attack would commence on 20 June. The Axis bombers began their attack at 5:20 in the morning. German troops moved forward to start the attack at 7am. Crossings were constructed over the tank ditch and the tanks moved forward at 7:45. The leading tanks of the 15th Panzer Division actually crossed the ditch at 8:30. They were followed by those of the 21st Panzer Division, which had been slowed by mines. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel's attack plans

Rommel intended to attack Tobruk on the southeast side, as he had in November 1941. The attackers comprised "the 21st Panzer Division on the right, the 'Menny' Group of the infantry of the 90th Light Division in the centre, and the 15th Panzer Division on the left." To their left would be the Italian 20th Corps, also a mechanized unit. Italian infantry from one 10th Corps division would follow the DAK and occupy territory as it was captured. The other division would surround El Adem. In the south lay the Italian Littorio armoured division. The bulk of the 90th Light Division and the reconnassance units would cause a distraction at the frontier. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Preparations at Tobruk in mid-June 1942

The South African Major-General Klopper, the 2nd South African Division commander, also commanded the defence of Tobruk. Brigadiers Willison and Johnson had made suggestions to Klopper, but he implemented none of them. General Gott had been in Tobruk, but General Ritchie ordered him to leave. The garrison awaited events on 20 June 1942, prepared to fight. General Auchinleck was becoming increasingly concerned by what he saw. He thought that the preparations in Tobruk were progressing too slowly. He also anticipate that the attack, when it came, would come from the east. All the records from 20 and 21 June were lost. The account of the battle on those days was built from personal accounts, as that was all the official history authors had available to them. The result of the battle was the capture of Tobruk and almost all of its defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Artillery at Tobruk in mid-June 1942

Tobruk was equipped with a rather meager supply of artillery in mid-June 1942. They already been stripped of 18 3.7in AA guns, which had been sent back to the Egyptian frontier. There were three field artillery regiments. The usual equipment of such a regiment was 24-25pdr gun-howitzers. There were also two medium regiments. Each was equipped with 8-4.5in guns and 8-155mm howitzers. The infantry units now had organic anti-tank artillery assigned. There were also two anti-tank batteries. The total count of anti-tank guns consisted of 15-6pdr anti-tank guns, 32-2pdr's, and 8-Bofors anti-tank guns. The anti-aircraft artillery was reduced to 18-3.7in AA guns and one regiment of light AA guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The fortifications at Tobruk in June 1942

Tobruk was originally captured by the 6th Australian Division in January 1941. The perimeter of the fortifications was essentially the same in June 1942 as they had been a year-and-a-half before. The fortifications had been improved with an inner ring that ran about two miles in from the outer perimeter. The two brigades of the 2nd South African Division were the primary defenders of Tobruk. They occupied defenses that were inferior to those of late 1941, as the anti-tank ditch was partially filled in and many mines had been removed for use elsewhere. The division did not have the experience and leadership of their predecessors. The other defending units included the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, the 201st Guards Brigade, and the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade. The army tank brigade was reduced to the 4th RTR with 35 Valentines and the 7th RTR with a mix of 26 Valentines and Matildas. The defenders had a few of the new 6pdr anti-tank guns among them. There was a mix of artillery units, as well. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 20 June 1942 assessment

On 20 June 1942, the commanders in the Middle East sent a message to the Chiefs of Staff in Britain that indicated that they had no idea that they were on the brink of Tobruk being overrun. They continued with their usual over-vonfidence that would soon be shattered. They listed the known reinforcements that were enroute to the Middle East and thought that Tobruk was well-defended and supplied. They thought that Tobruk should be able to hold out until relieved. The 8th Armoured Division was due to arrive in late June and the 44th Division was due to arrive in mid-July. Even if Tobruk was taken, surely, the Axis forces were in no shape to advance into Egypt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tobruk loses air support

By 18 and 19 June 1942, the Desert Air Force had to withdraw all the way back to Sidi Barrani. They had been forced to withdraw from the Gambut fields and Sidi Azeiz could not be protected against fast-advancing Axis forces. What this meant was that Tobruk no longer had air support. One squadron of Kittyhawks with long range tanks could reach Tobruk, but that was the extent of what could be done. By early on 20 June, the German reconnaissance units had reached Sidi Azeiz. The Axis air forces spent 18 and 19 June readying for the big attack on Tobruk on 20 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British plan on 18 and 19 June 1942

General Auchinleck was now involved with developing plans to fight the advancing Axis forces that has enveloped Tobruk and pushed past towards the border. The plan by late 18 June 1942 was to use the 13th Corps, supplemented by the 7th Armoured Division, with the remnants of the 4th Armoured Brigade, the 7th Motor Brigade, and the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, as a mobile force. The British were reduced to 66 tanks and had six columns of artillery and motorized infantry. The 1st South African and 50th Divisions provided one brigade each to be used to constitute three columns of mobile infantry and artillery. The rest of those divisions would be concentrated on the border, with the 10th Indian Division, to defend that area. They knew that there was a chance that Rommel would strike towards the border, but expected an attack on Tobruk as being more likely. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tobruk surrounded: 18 June 1942

By early morning of 18 June 1942, Tobruk was surrounded by Axis forces. Axis control extended east about 40 miles. The DAK was situated on the east side of Tobruk, while the Ariete Division was southeast. The 10th Corps (Italian Pavia and Brescia infantry divisions)was on the south side. The 21st Corps (Sabratha and Trento divisions) was to the west, with some German infantry. General Ritchie reported to General Auchinleck, the theater commander, that he was not able to operate against the forces around Tobruk and still defend the frontier. At that, General Auchinleck flew out to the front to assess the situation. The result was that 13th Corps would protect the frontier, the 30th Corps would be withdrawn into reserve, and the army would directly command the forces in Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

the 20th Indian Brigade tries to withdraw

As the 4th Armoured Brigade tried to disengage to the southeast, the 30th Corps commander, General Norrie, could see that Belhamed was about to be surrounded. He ordered the 20th Indian Brigade to break out and withdraw back to Sollum. Two battalions ran into German forces astride the road and were captured. The headquarters, another battalion, and the 97th Field Regiment succeeded in breaking out. Air Marshal Coningham heard that El Adem was in Axis hands and immediately ordered a withdrawal from Gambut. Fortunately, the Axis air forces were busy providing air cover to their advancing troops and so did not prevent the withdrawal. The fighters flew to Sidi Aziz while the day bombers flew back to fields near Mersa Matruh. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 4th Armoured Brigade on 17 June 1942

The 4th Armoured Brigade, with composite regiments, had about 90 tanks, the 1st RHA, and the 1st King's Royal Rifle Corps. They had an encounter with the enemy near Sidi Rezegh and then spent the night about 10 miles to the southeast. Early on 17 June, the brigade was performing maintenance on their tanks and had dispatched two groups to support the 20th Indian Brigade. That had the unfortunate affect of dispersing the brigade's artillery regiment. In the afternoon of 17 June, the division commander, General Frank Messervy, had ordered the brigade to move to the Trigh Capuzzo, between Belhamed and El Adem. Before the 4th Armoured Brigade had moved to that position, the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions drove into the brigade. The 9th Lancers were closet to the enemy and faced them to the north. The 3rd/5th RTR were to their southwest and were next to come in contact. The 1st/6th RTR was yet to engage, but only partially engaged due to a misunderstanding. The 4th Armoured Brigade was forced to withdraw southeastward. Brigadier Richards, the brigade commander, withdrew to a Field Maintenance Center to be in position to return to action in the morning. The brigade ended the day with 58 operable tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

16 and 17 June 1942

The 20th Indian Brigade was holding key positions at Belhamed, with one of its four battalions at Sidi Rezegh. After an attack by the 21st Panzer Division late on 16 June, General Norrie considered withdrawing the brigade, but decided to hold on a little longer. While this was happening, the Desert Air Force at Gambut found itself exposed to attack, because they were only informed that El Adem had been abandoned twelve hours after the withdrawal. The air force was responding to requests for attacks from the 20th Indian Brigade. On 16 June, the 4th Armoured Brigade, now a scratch unit without its regular regiments, was near Sidi Rezegh, acting in support, with about 90 tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The airfields at Gambut

On 15 June 1942, the Axis forces were getting very close to Gambut, where the Desert Air Force was based. Air Vice-Marshal Coningham decided to stay there with his aircraft, so that they could continue to support the forces defending El Adem. At Gambut, there was an armoured car screen from the No.2 Armoured Car Company, RAF. Behind the screen, Gambut was defended by "four infantry battalions and three and a half anti-aircraft batteries (ready to engage tanks if necessary)". Bostons attacked the "El Adem-Sidi Rezegh area" seven times. Fighter bombers attacked twenty times. The Germans had thought that they were taking 20mm cannon hits on their forces, but it was actually Hurricane IID's with 40mm guns. Some Bostons were attacked by Me-109s, but took no losses. The Kittyhawk escorts drove off most of the Me-109s. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air operations were intense on 15 June 1942

On 15 June 1942, the Desert Air Force was still able to operate from the airfields at Gambut. Gambut was just 30 to 35 miles east of Tobruk, so Boston's and fighter bombers had just a short hop to where the fighting was happening to the west. The fighters needed to provide escort to them as well as to the Vigorous convoy to Malta. The Germans had flown 193 sorties against the ship in the convoy on 14 and 15 June. That actually gave the 8th Army some relief, as the bombers that might have hit them were attacking the convoy, instead. The British had sufficient fighter strength so as to have intercepted them, anyway, if they had attacked the 8th Army formations. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Withdrawal from El Adem

On 16 June 1652, General Norrie, 30th Corps commander, realized that El Adem could not be held much longer. He did not want to lose the 29th Indian Brigade, so he ordered the brigade to withdraw to the frontier. They were able to successfully withdraw early on 17 June. General Ritchie had been out of touch, so General Norrie made the decision with consultation with General Messervy. The withdrawal from El Adem left the Tobruk defenses without the southern end. That allowed the mobile Axis forces to turn the defenses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

El Adem on 15 and 16 June 1942

The 29th Indian Brigade had two battalions holding El Adem and one battalion holding a position to the northwest. The 7th Motor Brigade was giving support to the Indian brigade. By 7:30pm on 15 June 1942, however, the 21st Panzer Division had taken the detached battalion at point B 650. By the morning of 16 June, the 30th Corps commander, General Norrie realized that he would not be able to effectively support the remaining two Indian battalions at El Adem and the force holding Belhamed, either. General Norrie told the 7th Armoured Division commander, Frank Messervy, that he expected that they would need to withdraw to the Egyptian frontier. General Ritchie was out of touch at this critical period. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.