The 3rd RTR will get Stuarts in late summer of 1941

The 3rd RTR had somewhat more than 60 tanks when they were sent to Greece. All were lost, and only their machine guns were stripped. Robert Crisp did not think much of British tank design. His description was that the cavalry had undue influence in the process, so fast, lightly armoured vehicles were the result. In reality, the story was more complicated than that. There was a push to get vehicles into production before they had become mechanically mature. The British track design was also very fragile. Robert Crisp says that American technicians arrived to receive the Stuarts and take them into service. The Stuarts proved to be very robust and mechanically sound. The American track design was much stronger. The Stuarts were powered by aircraft radial engines, and this resulted in a very short, high silhouette. The Stuart's gun was the inadequate American 37mm and several Browning machine guns. The Stuart's other virtual, besides reliability is that the frontal armour was greater than that on British cruiser tanks of the time. The track links had big rubber blocks in them. This is based on the account in Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots.

Robert Crisp decided to volunteer for the LRDG in July 1941

In July 1941, Robert Crisp had tired of enforced idleness and had talked with some New Zealanders about the Long Range Desert Group. That seemed like the perfect place for some excitement and danger. Robert spoke with Colonel Prendergrast, the LRDG commander, who promised to ask for his transfer to the unit. In a few days, the battalion adjutant for the 3rd RTR informed Robert Crisp that he wasn't going anywhere. They needed trained tank crews for the coming offensive, and that would keep him with the 3rd RTR. Gradually, his situation improved. Many new men joined the unit, to make up the losses from Greece. They learned that they would be equipped with American M3 light tanks, nicknamed the Stuart. Until the Stuarts arrived, they were training with A10s and A13s, along with a very few surviving A9s. The main problem with these vehicles was their mechanical fragility. Most of the tanks lost in Greece were due to "broken tracks or other mechanical breakdowns". This is base on the account in Robert Crisp's book Brazen Chariots.

The beginning of Robert Crisp's book Brazen Chariots

In July 1941, Robert Crisp was playing cricket in Cairo. He was very well-known in the sport and enjoyed the attention that a good player received. He was a South African, and had been a professional cricket player before the war. In July, there were many soldiers in Cairo. The abortive Operation Battleaxe had failed, and that left the army in the position of rebuilding and training. Only in May 1941, Robert Crisp and the remnants of the 3rd RTR had returned from the disaster in Greece. The battalion had been reduced to a few hundred men. After a short rest, the battalion was pulled into providing protection to the airfield at Heliopolis. They were reduced to the petty occupations of an idle unit. They were fortunate, however, to enjoy the amenities of the rear area in Egypt. Robert Crisp was newly promoted to Captain, a rank he had previously held, three months after being commissioned in June 1940. Robert Crisp put his promotion to his playing cricket for South Africa, while his battalion commander had played cricket for Hampshire. After the Greek disaster, and the losses in officers, Robert Crisp had regained his rank. This is based on the account in Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots.

I probably need to add Brazen Chariots to my list of books to summarize

This period in the Crusader Battle is well-covered in Robert Crisp's classic book Brazen Chariots. I realized that I should summarize the book for readers, as not many people are likely to have recently read the book. I highly recommend the book, as Robert Crisp provides a good narrative about his service in the 3rd RTR up to the time his Stuart was knocked out by 50mm PAK 38's during the Crusader Battle. He has a vivid description of the incident where the 4th Armoured Brigade was overrun, in the night (presumably) by the Germans. Alec Gatehouse, the brigade commander, was able to escape, but the soft vehicles in the headquarters were taken by the Germans. That put the brigade out of touch with the division commander, corps commander, and army commander until 24 November 1941.

The 7th Armoured Division was in dire straits by the 22nd of November 1941

After their encounters with the combined German panzer divisions, the 7th Armoured Division had minimal armoured forces left. The Germans had reclaimed Gabr Saleh and moved to retake Sidi Rezegh. The 7th Armoured Brigade had been further decimated and now had only 10 tanks left by the end of 22 November 1941. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had only 34 tanks. The remaining strength of the 4th Armoured Brigade is somewhat unclear, but the Germans had at least claimed to have captured about 50 Stuarts when overrunning the brigade. The Germans now had an overwhelming superiority in tanks, with 173 tanks left after the day's battles. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More events from 21 November 1941

Orders had been issued for the 4th Armoured Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, but they never were able to do so. That allowed them to eliminate the 7th Armoured Brigade as an effective fighting force. The ill-timed breakout attempt from Tobruk ran into some resistence from Germans, but not as much as was expected from the Italians. 70th Division, in the execution of the breakout plan ran into the as not-unexpected dug in besiegers fighting from behind barbed wire and minefields. The 1st RTR and 4th RTR, along with the 2nd Black Watch succeeded in taking the "Tiger" area in intense fighting. A major mishap that occurred in the process was when the 15th Panzer Division ran into the leaguering 4th Armoured Brigade and succeeded in dispersing the brigade. Alec Gatehouse remained free, but the brigade was temporarily eliminated as a coherent fighting force. In Brazen Chariots, Robert Crisp describes this event. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Ian Paterson has a good narrative of events in the Crusader Battle

On the Battles 1941 page, Ian Paterson has a good narrative of events in the Crusader Battle. The page is very ambitious, covering all actions for the 7th Armoured Division in 1941. His assessment of the situation on 23 November 1941, early in the day seems quite accurate:

By dawn on 23rd November, 7th Armoured Division was in considerable disarray. The 4th Armoured Brigade was scatted everywhere, the 7th Armoured Brigade had only 15 battle worthy tanks, with the 22nd Armoured Brigade reduced to 34 Crusaders. The Support Group was virtually non existent. If the Division was to survive these scattered and battle weary elements needed to be concentrated.

General Gott had completed the scattering of his division that had been partially planned by 30th Corps and the army commander. That enabled the Germans to overwhelm the scattered pieces.

The situation after four days of the Crusader Battle

We have seen that General Gott's deviation from the plan expended the 7th Armoured Brigade without really achieving anything substantive. He allowed the two German panzer divisions to fight the unsupported 7th Armoured Brigade. Rommel's plan was working. He had ordered General Crüell to use the concentrated German panzer divisions against the British armoured brigades, individually. General Gott played into Rommel's hands by fighting with the 7th Armoured Division brigades dispersed. Ordering the breakout from Tobruk without having defeated the Germans, as planned was a major error that almost cost the British the battle. As we shall see, the situation eventually got so out of control that General Auchinleck intervended and won the battle.

The 7th Support Group on 21 November 1941

The 7th Supprot Group was heavily engaged on 21 November 1941. The Support Group commander was Brigadier "Jock" Campbell. The 7th Support Group, at this date, consisted of the following units:

1st Battalion, KRRC
2nd Battalion, The Rifle Brigade
3rd Regiment RHA (anti-tank)
60th Field Regiment, RA
one battery of 51st Field Regiment, RA

This is based on the footnote at the bottom on page 45, in Vol.III of the Official History.

The fight on the Trigh Capuzzo

The attack to the north, diminished, due to the need to fight the Germans, had the 1st KRRC on the right, and the 6th RTR on the left, with a company of the 2nd Rifle Brigade. The artillery support was given by hte 3rd RHA and the 4th RHA, along with the 60th Field Regiment, RA. The 7th Hussars and 2nd RTR had to fight the two panzer divisions. Jock Campbell commanded the attack to the north, while Brigadier Davy was in command of the 7th Armoured Brigade, fighting the Germans. The infanty reached their objecte, while the 6th RTR took heavy losses. Despite that, the remnants were pulled into the main battle, along with the 2nd Rifle Brigade. By the end of the fight, by "late in the afternoon", the brigade only had 28 tanks running. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

I am starting to have serious doubts about General Gott

Given General Gott's activities in the first few days of the Crusader Battle, he seems not suitable for higher command. If he had not been killed in an aircraft crash in August 1942, he was the designated Eighth Army commander. Instead, Bernard Law Montgomery was designated as the new commander, which despite his shortcomings, was capable of achieving success.

A three day battle at Sidi Rezegh started on 21 November 1941

The battle at Sidi Rezegh started on 21 November 1941, and lasted for three days. The Official History says that it was the most intense combat yet seen in the Western Desert. A telling point is that four Victoria Crosses were awarded for heroism in this battle:

1. 2nd Lt G. Ward Gunn, RHA
2. Rifleman J. Beeley, the KRRC
3. Captain P. J. Gardner, RTR
4. Brigadier J. C. "Jock" Campbell, commander of the Support Group

Over night on November 2oth/21st, the 7oth Division initiated the breakout from Tobruk that had been ordered. General Gott's plan was for the 7th Armoured Brigade and Support Group "to attack northwards from Sidi Rezegh airfield to secure part of the ridge overlooking the Trigh Capuzzo". When the objective was gained, the 6th RTR was to join with the forces breaking out of Tobruk. At this point, the 15th Panzer Division and the 21st Panzer Division arrived. That forced the 7th Armoured Division to fight them, without the Support Group, which was committed towards Tobruk. In fact, the 7th Armoured Brigade only had 2nd RTR and the 7th Hussars to fight the Germans. The 6th RTR "lost three-quarters of its tanks, mainly to guns onthe opposite ridge". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

While General Gott was making moves, he was not in touch with 70th Division in Tobruk

On 20th November 1941, General Gott, 7th Armoured Division commander, was making big plans, but he was out of touch with 70th Division, in Tobruk. 70th Division, with the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, was about to execute the plan to create a defended corridor out of Tobruk. German aircraft were starting to become involved in the battle, as the landing fields had dried out sufficiently for them to operate. That brought them into contact with the British air operations, which were in progress, attacking the western-moving Axis units. 20 November was the first appearance in the desert of fighter bombers, in the form of Hurricanes equipped with eight 40lb bombs. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Changes in the Crusader plan may have created some of the problems

General Cunningham had approved the change in the plan that called for 70th Division to attempt a breakout prior to the big armoured battle. Prior to the engagement between the British and German armoured forces, the British "were confident of the outcome". After all, there were six British armoured battalions against four German battalions. The 7th Armoured Brigade was "out of the picture", so instead of an overwhelming British superiority, there was a more moderate superiority. Also a change in plans, the 1st South African Division would be used piecemeal, instead of concentrated. One brigade would go to Sidi Rezegh, another would face the Italians at Bir el Gubi. As all this was decided, the 15th Panzer Division (135 tanks) encountered the 4th Armoured Brigade. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had not arrived, yet, and the British were fortunate to only have 26 Stuarts "lost or damaged". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

20 November 1941

The two German panzer divisions moved east. At first, General Crüwell did not realize that there were only armoured cars before him. The 21st Panzer Division had to halt, as they had run out of fuel, and needed more ammunition. General Crüwell wanted to continue the advance the 15th Panzer, but Rommel wanted him to wait until the 21st. Despite Rommel's wishes, General Crüwell decided to send the 15th Panzer Division forward, looking to make contact with the British. He wanted the 21st Panzer Division to go forward to them in the night. The Official History says that the Germans were reacting to the British advance as General Auchinleck had anticipated. British tactical signals intelligence warned General Norrie of 30th Corps that both panzer divisions would attack the 4th Armoured Brigade. General Norrie ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to come up to support the 4th. The 1st South African Division would be left in front of the Ariete Division to keep them away from the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The forces for the breakout attempt from Tobruk on 20 November 1941

The forces for the breakout attempt from Tobruk were the 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 14th Infantry Brigade, with supporting artillery:

32nd Army Tank Brigade   Brigadier Willison
 C Squadron, The King's Dragoon Guards
 1st RTR
 4th RTR
 D Squadron, 7th RTR

14th Infantry Brigade (part) Brigadier Chappel
 2nd York and Lancaster Regiment
 2nd Black Watch

16th Infantry Brigade  Brigadier Lomax
 The 2nd King's Own

Supporting Artillery
 1st Regiment RHA
 104th Regiment RHA
 107th Regiment RHA
 144th Field Regiment RA

Engineers
 2nd Field Company RE
 54th Field Company RE

This is drawn from Note 2 on page 43 of Vol.III of the Official History--The Mediterranean van Middle East (September 1941 to September 1942): British Fortunes Reach Their Lowest Ebb (1960).

The German plan to encircle the British on 20 November 1941

The start of an encircling movement by the Germans consisted of moving the 15th Panzer Division east and sending the 21st Panzer Division to Sidi Omar, to block a southward retreat. The Axis forces on the Egyptian frontier would bar that direction.

General Cunningham had visited 30th Corps HQ and left with "the impression that the enemy might be trying to slip away". General Cunningham had heard that the DAK HQ had
moved in the general direction of Tobruk, having been at Bardia. General Gott had moved up to Sidi Rezegh. General Gott had the idea that he was thinly opposed, so he thought that the Support Group might move up to meet 70th Division, if they would sortie from Tobruk. This would involve discarding the plan of destroying the Axis armoured forces before attempting a breakout. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Plans for the second day of the Crusader Battle

With the 7th Armoured Brigade doing well at Sidi Rezegh, General Cunningham sent the Support Group there, as well. He sent the 1st South African Division towards Bir el Gubi, and told them to prepare to send one brigade to Sidi Rezegh. He left the 22nd Armoured Brigade to "to operate north of Bir el Gubi" and left the 4th Armoured Brigade at Gabr Saleh. At the end of 19 November, the British finally had Rommel's attention, and he told General Crüwell "to destroy them". The Germans intended to concentrate against each of the British brigades and destroy them one-at-a-time. The British would pay for dispersing their forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 30th Corps fought these dispersed actions

If 30th Corps had been kept concentrated, they might have well swept the field in the early days of the Crusader Battle. Instead, their strength was squandered in these separate fights against comparable Axis forces. At this stage, 13th Corps only moved forward to the enemy positions and did not attack. The navy, in the form of the Dido class cruisers Naiad and Euryalus, "bombarded the Halfaya defences". Fortunately for the British, as this stage, the weather to the west still kept the Axis air force from flying. This all apparently happened on 19 November 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Composition of the British armoured brigades

In notes on page 40 of Vol.III of the Official History are given the compositions of the British armoured brigades in the Crusader Battle:

22nd Armoured Brigade
  2nd Royal Gloucester Hussars
  3rd County of London Yeomanry
  4th County of London Yeomanry
  C Battery, RHA
  one troop of the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, RA

7th Armoured Brigade
  7th Queen's Own Hussars
  2nd/RTR
  6th/RTR
  4th Regiment, RHA (less one battery)
  one troop of the 102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, RA 
  
4th Armoured Brigade Group
  8th King's Royal Irish Hussars
  3rd/RTR
  5th/RTR
  2nd Regiment RHA
  102nd (Northumberland Hussars) Anti-Tank Regiment, RA, less one battery
  2nd/Scots Guards

Rommel finally responds to the initial British moves

The DAK commander correctly realized that what they were seeing was the start of a major British offensive. As that was contrary to what Rommel wanted to see, he refused to make a major response. He did allow the 15th Panzer Division to move near Gambut and the 21st Panzer Division to provide support to its reconnaissance unit that "were being chased by the King's Dragoon Guards" (KDG). The battlegroup sent was called the "Stephan Group", and had 80-90 tanks and artillery. They were sent towards Gabr Saleh, but along the way, they "ran headlong into the 4th Armoured Brigade Group". This happened about 4pm. Robert Crisp's 3rd/RTR was supporting the KDG, so the two remaining regiments were about equal to the Germans. The Germans came off better than the British, as the 4th Armoured Brigade lost 23 Stuarts, compared to very few German losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Gott ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack

General Gott arrived to see the situation where the 22nd Armoured Brigade approached Bir el Gubi. He ordered the brigade to attack the Ariete Division, which was sitting there. Unfortunately, the brigade only had one 25pdr battery in support. By the time the brigade broke off the attack, they had lost 25 Crusaders. They had destroyed 34 Italian tanks and damaged 15 more. They had also destroyed 12 Italian guns. The 7th Armoured Brigade captured the Sidi Rezegh airfield along with 19 Italian aircraft. This caused the 90th Light Division troops on the escarpment a good deal of concern. General Cruwell believed that this was the start of a British offensive, although Rommel would not believe that could be the case. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British sacrificed a great deal of good will from the Commonwealth nations in 1941, including the Crusader Battle, when the New Zealanders and South Africans suffered needless losses. I am sure that Churchill was chagrined, that this would have happened. Politics, on a global scale, drove much of what Churchill wanted to do in the war. When Russia was attacked and driven back by the Germans, he wanted the British army in the Middle East to respond. Churchill’s desire for action ignored the realities of the British position in North Africa, where the newly arrived equipment and troops were not ready for action. General Auchinleck successfully resisted, but at some cost to his favor with Churchill. Churchill was also very aware of the tendency among the British senior officers, such as Bernard Law Montgomery, to be slow to move and to required overwhelming superiority in men and material. Churchill could contrast that with Rommel’s opportunism and willingness to act when the occasion demanded. Even while the British had waited to be better prepared, the South Africans and New Zealanders took their lossed in the Crusader Battle. New Zealand responded with a request to withdraw the division in early 1942.

The page on the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry describes another view of the Crusader Battle. The story of the South Africans being overrun is described, although it says that in the process, the German armour suffered.

The New Zealand Electronic Text Centre has some good pictures of the Sidi Rezegh battlefield

One excellent resource for the war in North Africa, and the Crusader Battle, is the New Zealand Electronic Text Centre. They have a page with some good pictures of the Sidi Rezegh battlefield. With that are some maps that help to put the scene in context. There are also a number of narratives, such as that for the 24th NZ Battalion.

The situation at the beginning of the Crusader Battle can be explained

We have left the offensive at the start of the Crusader Battle with the British having advanced and the Germans and Italians having not responded with any counter-movements. I suspect that left General Cunningham very worried, as he was outside of his expertise, and he had followed bad advice. Simple movements, without engaging were not sufficient to get Rommel's attention. His subordinates might have responded to the British moves as the British had hoped, but Rommel was in denial, and would not believe that a real offensive was underway. If the British had wanted a response from Rommel, they would have needed to actually attack at some key points. They should have pressed on to the Sidi Rezegh airfield and taken it, and threatened to break into Tobruk. That would have gotten Rommel's attention, and the battle would have started in earnest. Instead, the British forces had advanced and stopped. And that left the British without an obvious "next move".

The German reaction to the initial moves in the Crusader Battle

Rommel was so fixated on attacking Tobruk that he dismissed the initial British moves, starting on 18 November 1941, as "a reconnaissance in force". The Afrika Korps commander, General Crüwell, that that the movements portended an offensive, but Rommel was determined to not change his dispositions. That left the 15 Panzer Division between Tobruk and Gambut. The 21st Panzer Division was situated "to the west of Sidi Azeiz". They were to cover the units on the frontier, such as at Halfaya Pass. The Ariete division was to cover the Axis flank, to the desert side. It was positioned at Bir el Gubi. This was all planned to support the coming assault on Tobruk. In fact, Rommel had no intention to move his divisions in response to the British advance. The 7th Armoured Division was left with its brigades dispersed. The 4th Armoured Brigade was positioned to protect 13th Corps on the frontier. Because the ultimate objective for the 7th Armoured Division was to be Sidi Rezegh, the 7th Armoured Brigade was headed in that general direction. That left the 22nd Armoured Brigade, with the Yeomanry regiments to take Bir el Gubi. The Support Group was to be used for either of the 7th or 22nd Armoured Brigades, depending on circumstances. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

18 November 1941: the start of the battle

The offensive started on early 18 November 1941 with the 30th Corps rolling across the frontier with Libya. With no opposition, they easily reached their initial objectives by evening. That did not prevent them from losing tanks to mechanical breakdowns. This is the status by the end of 18 November:

Unit                  Tanks at start   Runners by end of 18 November
 7th Armoured Brigade  141              119
22nd Armoured Brigade  155              136
 4th Armoured Brigade  165              not known but few breakdowns

The Stuarts were much more mechanically reliable than the British tanks, so the 4th Armoured Brigade finished 18 November a nearly full strength, although we do not know the exact number of runners.

On 18th November, the 13th Corps just moved up close to the enemy forces. The weather had continued to be poor, but had the advantage that German and Italian aircraft were kept on the ground. However, British air reconnaissance was also affected, due to low visibility. That left General Cunningham wondering what to do next, as the initial movements had not provoked a response. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Some more thoughts about Lt-General Alan Cunningham

Lt-General Alan Cunningham's tenure as 8th Army Commander was a failure. I suspect that he had embraced the mystique of armoured warfare in the British army, and thought that somehow, different rules applied than he knew, that he relied on others' advice. I suspect that he felt almost paralyzed to be thrust into a position that involved commanding something that he didn't know anything about. British army doctrine about armoured warfare, in late 1941, was sadly mistaken. The key pieces of information that could have made General Cunningham successful was knowing about "sword and shield" tactics, as devised by the Germans, and that his experience with highly mobile warfare could be transfered to the situation in North Africa. He had just arrived in North Africa after conducting a brilliant campaign in East Africa, and that had been what had impressed General Auchinleck to appoint him as the new 8th Army Commander. I believe that General Cunningham must have relied on advice about to fight the Crusader Battle, and that advice was sadly mistaken, being based on bad doctrinal ideas. When General Auchinleck realized that the battle was going badly, and the army was running without adequate direction, he stepped in and, ultimately, won the battle. After this, Churchill had complete confidence in Auchinleck as a field commander, and really didn't want to have anyone else commanding the 8th Army in the field.

An excellent page that includes an account of the Sidi Rezegh engagement in the Crusader Battle

There is an excellent page, apparently written by Ian Paterson, about the 7th Armoured Division during 1941. On that page is an account of the continuing action at the Sidi Rezegh airfield, during the Crusader Battle, to the immediate southeast of Tobruk. Some of the information nuggets here:

1. New tanks involved included the M3 Light Tank, the Stuart or "Honey" and the Valentine Inf. Mk.III tank
2. The 11th Hussars was equipped with Humber armoured cars for the battle
3. The 4th Armoured Brigade was totally equipped with Stuarts (not new news)
4. The 7th Armoured Brigade had mostly Crusader tanks, but still had some A.10 and A.13 tanks, as well
5. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had all Crusader tanks

The M3 Stuart tank used by the 3rd/RTR in the Crusader Battle

In Brazen Chariots, Robert Crisp talked about receiving new M3 Stuart tanks from America about August 1941. He mentioned that they were powered by radial engines, which must have accounted for the high silhouette. The Wikipedia entry confirms the radial engine. As I have come to expect, Wikipedia has a useful entry on the Stuart tank. The entire 4th Armoured Brigade was apparently equipped with Stuarts for the Crusader Battle. Robert Crisp described traveling at very high speed over the desert, so they must have removed the governor, which would have restricted the speed to 36 mph (58 km/hr). He had described driving the Stuart over 40 mph. The Stuart had mobility and mechanical reliability greater than any British tank of the time. Prior to the Greek campaign, the 3rd/RTR had been equipped with early British cruiser tanks (probably A9's and A10's). They left these in Greece, and Robert Crisp fantasized about Greek refugees taking refuge from the elements in the abandoned tanks. OnWar.com has a very complete specification for the Stuart.

Robert Crisp's account of the Crusader Battle gives you a good idea of the confusion and lack of control

One of my favorite books about the war in North Africa is Brazen Chariots, written by a tank commander, Robert Crisp. He was a South African with the 3rd/RTR and had fought in the abortive Greek campaign. His account of the Crusader Battle ends with his Stuart being knocked out and he was seriously injured by German 50mm PAK38's. Early on, the army commander had lost control of the battle, and Robert Crisp gives a good impression of the confusion and the hard-fought battle at Sidi Rezegh.

The navy intended to draw attention away from the Crusader offensive

The decision had been made to run a simulated convoy from Gibraltar, through the Mediterranean Sea. The idea was to draw the Axis air forces away from the battle area. The simulation started on 16 November. The Mediterranean Fleet sortied from Alexandria, Force H sailed from Gibraltar, and Force K sailed from Malta. Some merchant ships were included, to make the simulation look like a genuine convoy. The army started to move at midnight on 17 November 1941. Not for the last time, a commander had an idea about what the enemy would do and how they would react, and would ignore what was really happening. In this case, Rommel was sure that the British might react to his impending attack on Tobruk, but that a major offensive was not pending. His only screening forces were the two armoured car formations, the 3rd Reconnaissance and the 33rd Reconnaissance Units. The Crusader Battle was planned to start on 18 November, and Rommel only had his light forces in front of the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British forces for the Crusader Battle

The British had a assembled a great army for the Crusader Battle, and placed great hopes on the outcome. This list of forces is drawn from Vol.III of the Official History: The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol.III (September 1941 to September 1942), subtitled "British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb":

30th Corps (Lieutenant-General Norrie)
  Orders: "To advance north-west, find and destroy the enemy's armour, 
            and protect the left flank of the 13th Corps"
    7th Armoured Division (Major-General Gott)
       7th and 22nd Armoured Brigades
    4th Armoured Brigade Group (Brigadier Gatehouse)

  Orders: "To protect the communications of the 7th Armoured Division
           on the west and south-west; later to capture the 
           Sidi Rezegh ridge"
    1st South African Division (Major-General Brink)
       1st and 5th South African Infantry Brigades

  Orders: "To protect the communications, supply dumps and landing 
           grounds in the 30th Corps' area"
    22nd Guards Brigade (Brigadier Marriott)

13th Corps (Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austen)
  Orders: "To pin down and cut off the enemy's troops on the
           Egyptian frontier; later to advance west"
    New Zealand Division (Major-General Freyberg)
       4th, 5th, and 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigades
    4th Indian Division (Major-General Messervy)
       5th, 7th, and 11th Indian Infantry Brigades
    1st Army Tank Brigade (Brigadier Watkins)

Tobruk Garrison (Major-General Scobie, 70th Division commander)
  Orders: "To make a sortie when ordered"
    70th Division (Major-General Scobie)
        14th, 16th, and 23rd Infantry Brigades
    Polish Carpathian Infantry Brigade Group (Major-General Kopansky)
    32nd ARmy Tank Brigade (Brigadier Willison)

Oasis Force (Brigadier Reid)
  Orders: "To secure Jarabub, advance to protect landing-ground 125,
           and seize Jalo"
    29th Infantry Brigade Group
    6th South African Armoured Car Regiment

Army Reserve
  2nd South African Division (Major-General de Villiers)
     3rd, 4th, and 6th South African Infantry Brigades

For the British, at least, wireless communications were unreliable in late 1941

In the British army, pre-war parsimony had led to inadequate spending on communications equipment. In North Africa, with the fast movement and large battlefields, this caused commanders to lose communications at critical times with the forces engaged in battle. That contributed to General Cunningham's loss of control over the battle in late November 1941. There were factors such as inadequate number of channels. At night, fading frequently occurred. They also found that there was often neither the time nor the means to charge radio batteries. In tanks, everyone had assumed that tanks would be constantly on the move, and able to user their engines for recharging batteries. What actually happened was that tanks spent much less time with their engines running, so that their radio batteries had to be charged with external battery chargers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Eric Dorman-Smith

Eric Dorman-Smith was an Irishman who served in North Africa from 1940 until August 1942. Basil Liddell-Hart liked him very much, and heaped praise on him. He was originally on General Wavell's staff, and was involved in planning in support of General O'Connor's offensive in late 1940 and early 1941. He became a close advisor to General Auchinleck, by 1942. When Auchinleck was removed in August 1942, Dorman-Smith was removed, as well. He was apparently not liked by the establishment soldiers. Dorman-Smith seems to have been best suited as a staff officer, not a commander in the field. He eventually failed at field command, at the brigade level, when he was forced into that role. I have wondered how much of his difficulty was created by prejudice against the Irish, but more likely, it was prejudice among the "good old boys", like Neil Ritchie, against "geeks" (although that term probably had not been invented, yet). For Eric Dorman-Smith was a "geeky" guy. He was very intellectual and creative, rather than so much as "man of action". Wikipedia has a page about him. He is also well-treated in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

"Strafer" Gott

William Gott (nicknamed "Strafer") was another colourful figure who fought in North Africa, with British forces. General Gott was actually Churchill's choice to commande the 8th Army in August 1942. General Gott was killed in an air crash on 7 August 1942, so Churchill turned to Bernard Law Montgomery, launching him to fame. Wikipedia has a page on Strafer Gott. He apparently arrived in Egypt in 1939, as a Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the 1/KRRC (King's Royal Rifle Corps). As a brigadier, he commanded the 7th Armoured Division Support Group. He eventually commanded the division. He was promoted to Lieutenant-General and given command of 13th Corps by early 1942, which was a good match, given General Gott's infantry background. If he had actually commanded 8th Army in battle, we might be better prepared to judge whether General Gott was just a competent officer, or something more. I have trouble knowing how good he was, on the basis of what I have read.

Jock Campbell and "jock columns"

The war in North Africa in WWII produced some colourful characters. One is Brigadier Campbell, nicknamed "Jock", as his name was John and he was Scottish. Wikipedia has a page about him. He was an artillery commander, a Lieutenant-Colonel, in the 7th Armoured Division Support Group at the start of the war (Royal Horse Artillery). He eventually won a VC at Sidi Rezegh, during the Crusader Battle, on 21 November 1941, not many days after the start of the offensive. One of his inventions was the "Jock Column". The Jock Column was a small combined arms force with all arms, although the armour was typically armoured cars. There also could be field artillery, anti-tank artillery, and infantry with integral transport. There is an interesting piece about the 2nd New Zealand Division jock columns in 1942. The more conservative officers in the 8th Army did not think much of dispersion and the use of ad hoc formations such as jock columns. I believe that jock columns disappeared as a factor after Montgomery's arrival on the scene.

Wikipedia has a good piece in infiltration tactics

Again, Wikipedia has a literate piece on a subject. This time, the topic is infiltration tactics. We find that a French officer had described the tactics in a pamphlet published in 1915. The Germans captured a copy in 1916, and recognized that this was a "breakthrough idea". The Germans only used infiltration for the first time in September 1917, on the Eastern Front. They used an infiltration-based attack to raise the seige of Riga. In October 1917, Rommel participated in an infiltration attack on the Italian front, which was very successful. Rommel was involved with these ideas very early in their introduction. They formed the basis, really, for the rest of his military career.

The British lacked adequate air reconnaissance at the start of the Crusader Battle

The British only had three squadrons of trained reconnaissance pilots operating in the tactical reconnaissance role. To make matters worse, the first two days of the battle had rain. Ordinary fighter and bomber aircrew were less familiar with the terrain and the way the armies operated in the desert. With the vehicles operating dispersed, and indeed, possibly intermingled with enemy vehicles, telling what was happening in the battle was difficult. That feature of the operation left General Cunningham pretty much blind as to what was happening. All he knew was that the plan was for 30th Corps to move forward and stop, and wait for an Axis attack that never came. Once that happened, the situation deteriorated rapidly. The mistake was that 30th Corps did not advance towards a position that would have threatened the Axis position and would have brought an immediate ripost from Rommel. Part of the problem was that Cunningham relied on "experts" in armoured warfare who were anything but experts. The may have served for some time in armoured units and taken part in battles, but they were using equipment and doctrine unsuited for modern, mechanized warfare. The equipment part was less critical, as the German tanks were less than ideal, but the Germans used the right doctrine and were lead by an expert in the field, in Rommel.

The Axis mechanization situation prior to the Crusader Battle

The Axis armoured divisions (15th Pz Div, 21st Pz Div, and Ariete) all had their infantry completely equipped with integral transport, as did the Trieste motorized division. The German division that was in the process of forming in North Africa, tentatively called the Afrika Division, but to come the 90th Light Division, was without transport. The Italian infantry divisions did not have enough transport to be mobile. They were reduced to moving by foot. With these units and the British units, the Official History says that there were as many as 30,000 vehicles about to be in the battle area, upon commencement of the Crusader Battle. The presence of airpower required the use of dispersion, so that there easy targets were not presented to the enemy. The Germans moved in more compact, but still dispersed formation, while the British tended to be widely dispersed under most circumstances. At night, the units would be drawn together to form "leaguers" that were more defensible. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British won the Crusader Battle

The Official History summaries the Crusader Battle by saying that the British won the battle, relieved Tobruk, but it took longer than planned, and by the time the battle was won, the British had "exhausted themselves". The battle took place between the border, as far south as Fort Maddalena, and Tobruk, including towards the south to Bir el Gubi. The stretched out over two weeks, as the British initial thrust misfired, and they were confused and ineffectual for some time, really until General Auchinleck intervened. The area is pretty much ideal for armoured warfare, except near the coast, where there is the escarpment and poor going. The ground inland is quite good for tanks and vehicles, except when there is rain. Near the coast is the Via Balbia, the coast road built by the Italians. Much of the important fighting occurred near the Sidi Rezegh airfield. On the British side, almost the entire army was now motorized, even the infantry. The infantry divisions drew their transport from a pool, while motorized units had integral transport. 30th Corps was completely motorized while the 13th Corps had units that were not. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More thoughts on Rommel

Rommel was trained in infiltration tactics in the Great War, and was a skilled practitioner, as he proved on the Italian front. Infiltration tactics really formed the basis of armoured warfare, as practiced by the Germans in WWII. Patton understood them, and largely adopted the concepts. He, especially, of the Allied generals, was a master of mobile warfare, and the use of armour. Montgomery was not. He required material superiority, and fought in set piece battles. He detested spontaneous, unscripted operations. That was because he was ponderous in thought and always wanted to be in control. The Germans had many who understood the principles. General von Manstein applied them in the 1940 campaign against France, even though he did not command armour. I believe that he commanded an infantry corps. Von Manstein proved himself a master of the form, able to function as a very high level commander on the Eastern Front.

Rommel

Rommel outclassed all of the British generals in North Africa, with the possible exception of Claude Auchinleck. The British ultimately won the Crusader Battle because General Auchinleck stepped in, after the battle had gone horribly wrong, and defeated Rommel and the Axis forces. Auchinleck was very focused on his position as theater commander, and he did not want to be commanding the army in the field. Only after General Cunningham showed that he had lost control, and had no idea about how to remedy the situation, that Auchineck took over. General Cunningham had only recently fought a brilliant campaign in East Africa, against the Italians and colonial troops. I speculate that Cunningham had accepted the armour mystique, and thought that you somehow used armoured forces differently. You did, but the British did not have a clue, in November 1941, as to how that was done. They were seriously rattled by Rommel's lack of reaction to British moves, and his use of the "sword and shield" methods. Auchinleck had some of the characteristics of Rommel, in that he was able to know about the flow of battle and make informed decisions. As we study the Crusader Battle, we will see how all this unfolds.

The situation in the middle of November 1941

At the middle of November 1941, both the British and Axis forces were preparing for offensives. The British intended to break through to Tobruk and raise the seige. They hoped to drive the Axis forces back towards Tripoli. Rommel was preparing to attack Tobruk, hoping to break through the defenses and take the fortress. Both sides intended to attack about the same time, but the British were able to move first. They had the largest tank force seen to that date in the desert, and had high-hopes about a tank-vs-tank battle. Rommel was apparently ready to concentrate against Tobruk and allow the British to make whatever moves they wanted. The Official History says that we need to study how the conflicting plans interacted, and how the commanders behaved, given the expectations about what the opposing forces would do.

Other tanks in late 1941

Besides the tanks previously listed, the Italians had 52 light tanks assinged to the Ariete Division and 110 more were assigned to the Italian infantry divisions. The Italian light tanks were generally used for infantry support. The Germans had every running tank with the panzer divisions. The first German tank shipments arrived in late December. The British had more tanks besides those assigned to the armoured units, and tehre was the Convoy WS12 that had 124 Crusaders, 60 M3 Stuarts and 52 infantry tanks (it is unclear if they were Valentines or Matildas). The ships in the convoy all seem to have been assigned to units, being sent to the theater. The Crusaders and Stuarts were assigned to a brigade of the 1st Armoured Division. The infantry tanks appear to have been assigned to a battalion of the RTR. In addition, there were many tanks in the shops, either for repair or modification: 92 cruiser tanks, 90 M3 Stuart light tanks, and 77 infantry tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Tank forces for Crusader

We have a pretty good idea of the tank complements at the start of the Crusader Battle in November 1941. These are the Axis tanks:

Type      15th Pz Div    21st Pz Div   Ariete Div
Pzkw II     38             32
Pzkw III    75             64
Pzkw IV     20             15
M 13/40                                  146

The British had a more diverse tank complement, of which we don't know the exact details. This is what we do know:

Type                  HQ 30th Corps  HQ 7th Ar Div 4th Ar Bre 7th Ar Bre  22nd Ar Bre
Cru Mk I, II, and III                    6                      26
Cru Mk IV                                                       62
Crusader                                 2                      53          155
Stuart M3               8                            165


1st Army Tank Brigade (13th Corps): 3-cruiser tanks and 132 infantry tanks
                                                       (half Matilda, half Valentine)
32nd Army Tank Brigade (Tobruk):  32-cruiser tanks, 25 Lt Mk.VI, and 69 Matilda

This is base on tables in Vol.III of the Official History

British armoured division organization

In November 1941, the British armoured division still had two armoured brigades and a support group. Each armoured brigade had three armoured regiments (or the equivalent RTR battalion). A regiment had about 50 tanks, with a headquarters squadron and three squadrons (A, B, and C). The support group had motorized infantry and supporting artillery. In addition to the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Armoured Brigade Group operated independently, and had its own organic motorized infantry and artillery. The 4th Armoured Brigade Group could be included in 30th Corps or could be attached directly to the 7th Armoured Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British 3.7in AA gun

The Official History mentions the British 3.7in AA gun. The primary role of this gun was heavy AA, and the guns were positioned guarding major installations such as the Suez Canal, as well as landing grounds. The gun was capable of being used in the anti-tank role, when supplied with a suitable gunsight. Finally, in April 1942, sixty 3.7in AA guns were fitted for the anti-tank role. A very few were used in a portion of the abortive Gazala battle in May. This is based on a note in Vol.III of the Official History. Contributors have increasingly made the Wikipedia a good source for information about tanks and guns. There is a page for the "QF 3.7in AA Gun".

Minefields and anti-tank guns in late 1941

Even before the Crusader battle, both the British and Axis had laid extensive minefields of anti-tank mines. They had been laid around Tobruk and on the frontier, as well. These were used in conjunction with emplaced anti-tank guns. In June 1941, during Battleaxe, the German 88mm gun had been a potent force against British tanks, especially Matildas near Halfaya Pass. The Official History says that probably most British tanks knocked out during Crusader were the result of hits from 50mm PAK38's. There were mostly Italian 47mm ATG's around Tobruk and on the frontier. The Germans did have 23 88's on the frontier. The other 15 88's were with the DAK, along with the 96 50mm PAK38's. The DAK also had a number of the inadequate 37mm ATGs. The British had to rely upon 25pdrs for an effective anti-tank weapon. A price was paid, as it impacted their normal artillery role. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

British infantry tanks

The British infantry tanks were built to serve in an obsolete role. The infantry tank was trying to fill the that tanks were used in 1917 and 1918, in support of infantry in trench warfare.

That explains the existence of the diminutive Inf.Mk.I Matilda, armed soley with machine guns. The Inf.Mk.II Matilda was armed with a 40mm 2pdr high velocity gun, almost just because the gun existed, and it did make the tank more viable as a battle tank. The Matilda had good armour, good enough that it took an 88mm APC round to knock it out. It might also be disabled by a 105mm howitzer round.

The Inf.Mk.III Valentine was conceived of as tank that was more easily mass-produced than the Inf.Mk.II and it also proved to be capable of improvement, unlike the cast-hulled Inf.Mk.II. The Valentine was based on the proven Cru.Mk.I and Cru.Mk.II designs. The Valentine eventually received a 75mm gun, before it went out of production.

The Inf.Mk.IV Churchill was the ultimate embodiment of the infantry tank concept. It had the long tread, that allowed easier movement over shelled ground, and had good armour. The Churchill eventually received a 6pdr gun and then the British 75mm gun. By that time, the tank was obsolescent, but its good armour kept it around for longer than it might otherwise have been. The infantry tank concept was dead with the Churchill. It was replaced with main battle tanks that could fire HE or AP rounds, with a superior gun. The first such tank was the Centurion, of which prototypes arrived at the front at the end of the war.

More about tanks in 1941

The Russians were the only army that had well-conceived tanks of modern concept in 1941. The Russians were handicapped by the purges of the latter 1930's that wiped out most of the senior officers who were capable. That process almost disabled the Red Army. Fortunately, there were a small cadre of capable generals, and enough good men to stop the Germans before reaching Moscow in late 1941. The Russians had early versions of the T-34, which was like a well-armoured and gunned British cruiser tank, and the KV-I heavy tank, which was armoured on the scale of the Matilda infantry tank. Both the T-34 were equipped with a rather low-velocity 76.2mm gun, but this was replaced with a longer-barreled, higher velocity 76.2mm gun that was superior to anything the Germans had in 1941. The British cruiser and infantry tanks looked poor in comparison with the Russian tanks, as did the German tanks.

The Germans had to rely upon the "88" and field artillery to stop the Russian tanks. One poorly manned T-34 or KV-I could still terrorize a German army, until they managed to disable it or knock it out. Often, the Russian tanks simply bogged down, and then could be knocked out. The need to combat the powerful Russian tanks caused the Germans to rapidly improve their tanks and anti-tank guns. The Pzkw III received spaced armour and a 50mm L/60 gun, in small numbers. The Pzkw IV eventually received a 75mm L/48 gun. That same gun was mounted as an anti-tank gun. The only problem was that the numbers were too few. The Germans also started rush development of the Tiger I with an 88mm gun to combat the KV.

The British effort looked pretty pitiful, compared to what the Russians had, and soon, the Germans had, if in small numbers. Fortunately for the British, the Americans were developing 75mm gunned tanks that would become available by the late Spring of 1942. The Grants and Lees, with their hull-mounted 75mm gun were less than ideal, but by the fall, the British had received the Sherman, with a turret-mounted 75mm gun and good mobility. The Sherman also had the minimally acceptable scale of armour to allow it to compete with what the Germans had. The Italians lagged considerably behind at this time, as the best they had, by 1942, was the M15/42 with the longer-barreled 47mm gun and somewhat better armour. The British only produced better tanks by the end of the war. The Centurion, then only in prototype, was one of the premier tanks of the post-war period.

More about British tanks

The Official History says that General Norried described the earlier British cruiser tanks as suffering from a "general debility". I take that to mean the A.9, Cru.Mk.I and Mk.ICS, the A.10, Cru.Mk.II, IIA, and IIACS, the A.13 Cru.Mk.III, IV, and IVA, and CS variants. The first really viable cruiser, according to this narrative, was the A.15 Cru.Mk.VI Crusader I. The Crusader suffered from severe teething problems, resulting frequent breakdowns. Due to the poor recovery capability at this date, that caused many to be total losses, as they had to be abandoned to the enemy. The British cruiser tanks, at this date, were all armed with the inadequate 40mm 2pdr gun. The one bright spot was the presence of the American M3 Stuart tank, which was extremely fast and reliable. The main drawbacks were the light armour and small 37mm gun. At least, the 37mm gun had capped AP shot, so even with the light round, Stuarts were better prepared to deal with German face-hardened armour. This is based, in part, on Vol.III of the Official History.

Tanks and the Crusader Battle

The British expected that the tank would dominate the Crusader Battle (also known as the Winter Battle). While the Official History indicates that the Germans also thought that, Rommel certainly did not. Rommel was a combined armed advocate, and made his reputation with infantry, using infiltration tactics pioneered in WWI. His approach to modern combined arms battlefighting was to use "sword and shield" tactics. He used armour against infantry and transport and artillery against tanks, particularly the 5cm PAK38 and the 88mm FLAK18 and other models.

The Germans had their pre-war tank designs. There were a small number of Pzkw I's, which were just MG armed and were of little consequence. The larger 20mm gun-armed Pzkw II was useful as a reconnaissance tank. The Pzkw III was the main battle tank, although the newest were just armed with a medium length 5cm gun that was capable of firing the "arrowhead" ammunition. The Pzkw IV was used in a similar role to the British support tanks, in that it was burdened with the short 75mm gun, intended to fire HE shells. The German tanks had the advantage of having some face-hardened armour that would shatter the British 2pdr shot and had a few Pzkw III's with appliqué armour.

The British had tanks built to an erroneous, pre-war concept. They had the slow, well-armoured infantry tanks. Originally, these were the Inf. Mk.II Matilda. Later, they were joined by the Inf. Mk.III Valentine, which were capable of being upgunned, unlike the Matilda, stuck with its cast hull. Infantry tanks were supposed to support infantry, but lacked a suitable armament for that role. The faster cruiser tanks were to fight other tanks, but they were under-gunned and armoured to be successful in that role. It was only when the British saw the American Grant, Lee, and Sherman, that they saw how to effectively arm a tank. The American medium tanks had the medium velocity 75mm gun at this date, which could fire either HE or an AP shot. The AP shot was on the order of 12 lbs, so it had much greater striking power than the high velocity, but lightweight 40mm 2pdr gun. Due to bad decision-making, the excellent 57mm 6pdr gun did not appear until 1942.

The Italians had the diesel-powered M13/40, at first. This was joined by the M14/41 and M15/42 tanks. The latter with a longer, higher velocity 47mm gun. They also had the useless L3 light tanks. Their more useful light tank was the L6, which really had too high a silhouette. They did have the excellent Autoblinda armoured cars, which were as good as any used by the Germans and better than what the British had.

The consequences of the relief of the Australians from Tobruk

The withdrawal of the Australians from Tobruk and the transport of the relieving forces placed a great strain on the Royal Navy and the air force. The first step was to bring in the 1st Polish Carpathian Brigade to replace the 18th Australian Brigade. Every night, convoys ran with destroyers and fast minelayers. They had cruiser escorts "to give extra anti-aircraft protection". The navy took damage to "the cruiser Phoebe and the destroyer Nizam". The British 6th Division was now the 70th Division. In late September, the 16th Infantry Brigade Group was brought in, as well as the HQ of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 4th RTR. The 24th Australian Brigade was withdrawn. In mid to late October, the rest of the 70th Division was transported to Tobruk and almost all of the remaining Australians were withdrawn. The situation at sea, given the increased German air presence made the cost of withdrawing the last few Australian units prohibitive. They were left for the time being. In the process of the withdrawal, the navy lost the fast minelayer Latona, the destroyer Hero was damaged, as well as the gunboat Gnat. The oiler Pass of Balhama and the storeship Samos were torpedoed and sunk by submarines. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The defense of Tobruk in 1941

The defense of Tobruk since May 1941 had been commanded by General Leslie Moreshead, the commander of the 9th Australian Division. The Australians mounted an active defense, mounting constant small operations against the attackers. The Axis surrounded Tobruk with a system of minefields and artillery. Axis aircraft constantly were in the air over Tobruk, harrassing the defenders. A great deal of AA ammunition was expended by the defenders. The attackers did not want to attack until they were able to build up an arsenal of heavy artillery. In the event, the Tobruk garrison not only withstood the attacks but were able to break out during the Crusader battle.

The Australian commander, General Blamey, asked that Australian troops be replaced and withdrawn. That seems to have reflected the desires of the Australian government. The Australian government undoubtedly wanted their troops removed from what seemed to be a vulnerable position, in the besieged port. By August, the first withdrawals took place. By the end of August, there had been a change of government in Australia, and the new Prime Minister pushed for the rest to be removed from Tobruk. That seriously interfered with plans for Crusader and put naval assets under increased risk of attack. General Auchinleck was greatly distressed by the matter and Churchill assured him of their complete confidence in him. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British commando raid on the night of 17/18 November 1941

Rommel was in Rome for a meeting about transportation and supplies in mid-November 1941. He was in Athens, on the way back to North Africa, on the night of 17/18 November 1941, when the British staged a commando attack, trying to capture Rommel. Two submarines, the Torbay and Talisman, put a detachment of the No.11 (Scottish) Commando ashore close to Apollonia, where the British had thought Rommel was living. Lt-Col. Keyes, son of the fleet admiral, was killed in the attempt. He received a posthumous VC for his efforts. The commandos actually assaulted the house that they were trying to reach, and had an itense battle, including hand-to-hand fighting. There is a page that gives much more detail than Vol.III of the Official History, which I have summarized here.

Hitler decided at the end of October 1941, that the something major was required in North Africa

At the end of October 1941, Hitler appointed Field Marshal Kesselring as Commander-in-Chief South, with Luftflotte 2 and Fliegerkorps II to be withdrawn from the Russian front. He was to take charge, neutralize Malta, and establish air superiority over the Mediterranean Sea. He would be charged with interdicting British sea traffic, in the east-west directions, and would be able to issue orders to the naval commands. Kesselring would report to Mussolini. Rommel would still report to General Bastico. The Italians did not welcome Kesselring's appointment, but were forced to accept him. Kesselring would have a mixed German-Italian staff, in at least a gesture to the Italians. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Axis supply situation in late 1941

Rommel was also planning an attack in November 1941. He hoped to attack Tobruk again, but the situation at sea put that plan into jeopardy. The British anti-shipping campaign was doing so well that Rommel's supply situation was becoming increasingly difficult. The OKH was concerned that the British planned top lift the seige of Tobruk, and then shift forces to defend the Caucasus. The Italians were more concerned that the British planned take the whole of Tobruk.

The Italian high command warned General Bastico that the British planned to launch an offensive soon. Generals Bastico and Rommel thought that would not be possible. Rommel, in any case, thought that he had sufficient forces to deal with any such attack, while he broke into Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Panzer Gruppe Afrika in the fall of 1941

"At the end of July 1941", Panzer Gruppe Afrika was formed with General Rommel as the commander and "General Gause as Chief of Staff". Panzer Gruppe Afrika and the Italian 20th Corps (the Mobile Corps) both reported directly to the Italian North Africa Command, under General Bastico. The XXth Corps had the Trieste Motorized Division and the Ariete Armoured Division under its command. Panzer Gruppe Afrika was a much larger organization with the Deutsche Afrika Korps and teh Italian 21st Corps under its command. The Italian 21st Corps was composed of the divisions surrounding Tobruk. The DAK had the Savona Division holding the border area and had the two armoured divisions, the Afrika Division (to become the 90th Light Division). Both armoured divisions were what Churchill described as "colonial armoured divisions", as they had a smaller organization than the divisions that took part in the invasion of France in 1940. This is based in part, on Vol.III of the Official History.

The navy's role in Crusader

Part of the navy role was to interdict Axis shipping to North Africa, and they had been quite successful in that endeavor. Once the attack began, the navy would provide inshore gunfire support to the land operations. Right before the start of the land campaign, the navy planned to run mock convoy operation "from Gibraltar through the Mediterranean". Another dummy convoy would sail from Malta and head for Tripoli, to make it appear that a landing would be attempted. Operations would be continued on the coast to interdict smallcraft attempting to carry supplies forward to the Axis troops. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air force was ready and at full strength on 17 November 1941

The Desert Air Force was up to strength, with reserves, and ready for battle on 17 November 1941. The Desert Air Force had already damaged the Axis supply system and air forces. The British were also very well prepared as a thorough reconnaissance had been conducted. When the battle started, they would have three tasks:

1. maintain air superiority
2. disrupt the enemy supply system
3. carry out reconnaissance as needed

Now, the British could reasonably hope that the coming attack would achieve surprise, due in no small part to the dominance of the Desert Air Force. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History

Aircraft types in the RAF Middle East Command on 11 November 1941

Appendix 5 of Vol.III of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East lists the RAF Orders of Battle and in particular, the RAF Middle East Command as of 11 November 1941. The entire OOB is probably to large for this forum, but listing the range of aircraft in the inventory seems interesting:

Aircraft                    Role

Morane Saulnier 406         Single-Engined Fighter (Free French)
Fairey Albacore             Torpedo Bomber
Avro Anson                  General Reconnaissance (SAAF)
Avro Anson                  General Reconnaissance/Torpedo Bomber
Hawker Audax                Air Transport
Hawker Audax                Tactical Reconnaissance
Bristol Beaufighter IC      Long Range Twin-Engined Fighter
Bristol Beaufighter IPR     Photo Reconnaissance
Bristol Beaufort I          Torpedo Bomber
Bristol Blenheim I          Light Bomber
Bristol Blenheim IV         General Reconnaissance
Bristol Blenheim IV         Light Bomber
Bristol Blenheim IV         Tactical Reconnaissance
Bristol Blenheim IVF        LR Twin-Engined Fighter
Bristol Bombay              Bomber Transport
Douglas DC2                 Air Transport
de Havilland DH 86          Air Ambulance
Dornier Do.22               General Reconnaissance (Yugoslav)
Fairey Fulmar               General Reconnaissance
Gloster Gladiator           Tactical Reconnaissance
Hawker Hartbeest            Light Bomber (SAAF)
Hawker Hurricane I          Single-Engined Fighter
Hawker Hurricane IIA        Single-Engined Fighter
Hawker Hurricane IIB        Single-Engined Fighter
Hawker Hurricane IIC        Single-Engined Fighter
Hawker Hurricane I          Tactical Reconnaissance
LR Hawker Hurricane I       Photo Reconnaissance
Junkers Ju.86               General Reconnaissance (SAAF)
Lockheed Lodestar           Air Transport
Westland Lysander           Tactical Reconnaissance
Martin Maryland             General Reconnaissance 
Martin Maryland             Operational Training
Martin Maryland             Strategic Reconnaissance 
Martin Maryland             Survey Reconnaissance 
Curtis Mowhawk              Single-Engined Fighter (SAAF)
Percival Proctor            Air Transport
Short Sunderland            General Reconnaissance
Fairey Swordfish            Torpedo Bomber
Vickers Vincent             Light Bomber
Vickers Wellesley           Bomber Transport
Vickers Wellesley           Light Bomber
Vickers Wellington IC       Air/Sea Rescue
Vickers Wellington I & IC   General Reconnaissance
Vickers Wellington IC       Medium Bomber
Vickers Wellington II       Medium Bomber

The Desert Air Force Strength on 17 November 1941

The Desert Air Force, commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, had been increased in strength considerably. By 17 November 1941, the air force had the following units, as quoted from the Official History:

Short range fighters:    14 squadrons (including one naval squadron)
Long-range fighters:      2 squadrons
Medium bombers:           8 squadronds (for a short time 9)
Tactical reconnaissance:  3 squadrons
Survey reconnaissance:    1 flight
Strategic reconnaissance: 1 flight

The SAAF played a considerable part, having provided six squadrons and two flights. The RAAF had two squadrons, the Rhodesians had one squadron as did the Free French. Of course, the heavy bombers (probably Wellingtons at this date), fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft in the theater also occasionally made an appearance in combat. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The SAS raids on 16 November 1941

Two separate raids took place on 16 November 1941 by two detachments from the SAS. One flew on three Bombays to Gazala and the other on two Bombays to Tmimi. The weather was bad, with heavy rain and low visibility. This made navigation difficult, and only one the five Bombays dropped its men on target. The rain had "turned dust into bog", and there were men injured on landing besides. The operations failed and the attacks never took place. Only some of the attackers escaped. "Others were killed or taken prisoner". The only positive feature of the weather is that the Axis airfields were much more effected than the British. That helped to secure surprise for the impending attack, as the Axis aircraft were stuck in mud on their landing fields. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The decoy effort a Jarabub paid off on 15 November 1941

The Germans finally bit on the decoy effort a Jarabub on 15 November 1941. A "brisk fight" happened "in which one Blenheim was lost, five others and two Hurricanes were damaged, and some petrol and transport were destroyed". When the German records were finally seen, there losses were found to be "three Me. 110s, one Ju. 88 and one Me. 109 destroyed, and one Ju. 88 damaged". The official history thought that this was a reasonable showing. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe was pounding Tobruk on a daily basis. They also raided the Suez "on five nights". They also hit Fuka, where Blenheims were apparently based ("medium bombers"). The only significant and sustained attacks were on Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air operations from 13 November 1941

The intensity of air operations over the Western Desert dramatically increased starting on 13 November 1941. There were several aims for the air offensive. One was to press the Axis air force to the greatest extent and the other was to cover the ground movements that preceded the start of Crusader. The weather did not cooperate, as the cloud cover kept increasing, which hampered aerial reconnaissance. In the daytime, the Axis airfields were pounded. Wellingtons were active at night, with FAA Albacores, hitting both the supply lines and the airfields. There continued to be low-level fighter sweeps, but they did not provoke the sort of counterattack that had been anticipated. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air operations in late October and November 1941

The Hurricane in service in the Desert Air Force did not match up well with the Me-109, particularly the Me-109f (actually, the Bf-109f). There was a certain amount of activity centered on raiding the German air fields, in hopes that it would instigate aerial combat, but this only happened three times, and the Germans dominated those, losing one Me-109f to three Hurricanes. There were 68 sorties (one aircraft on one mission) in the last two weeks of October and 72 in the first week of November. The weather was very cloudy, so this discouraged the airfield attacks. That left the British fighters free to strafe ground targets, including transport on the roads. Wellingtons from Malta were active at night, and succeeded in destroying or damaging 16 aircraft in two nights. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

British tank and armoured car wargame pieces

This is a sheet of my 1980's era British armoured car and tank wargame pieces. Clicking the smaller image will pop the full-size sheet:

One of my miscellaneous guns and vehicles sheets of wargame pieces

This is one of my sheets with a selection of different guns and vehicles for use as wargame pieces. They are from my quick and dirty sketch series. I am making the smaller image clickable, so you can get the larger scale sheet:

FAA Albacores in the desert

The lumbering Fairey Albacores proved to be very important for night air operations over the desert and the enemy ports. The archaic design of the Albacore, with good visibility from the cockpit, gave them an advantage in accurate navigation. The aircrews became experts in navigation over the desert in nighttime. Because of this advantage, they came to be used a pathfinders more than bombers. They carried many flares at the expense of bombs, as that was more useful for their new role. Their flaredropping over targets greatly aided Blenheims flying in night attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Bombing transportation targets in October-November 1941

The following targets were hit by British bombers:

Tripoli-attacked on 12 nights by 58 Wellingtons, some 4,000 lb bombs used
Naples-hit on 12 nights by 96 Wellingtons, some 4,000 lb bombs used
Brindisi was attacked once by 21 Wellingtons
Benghazi was hit by Wellingtons at night and SAAF Marylands in daytime
Derna-two attacks by 50 Wellingtons and 26 Blenheims at night, 11 Marylands in daytime

The harbour bombing proved to be pretty effective and caused disruptions to the Axis supply effort. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The battle in the air started in mid-October 1941

The air campaign in support of the Crusader plan started in the middle of October 1941. Operations from Malta and Egypt were closely linked to Crusader. They had several roles: reconnaissance for the Army and interence with the Axis supply lines. They also fought for air superiority over Cyrenaica. They had to do all this without giving away too much of the plan for the ground campaign. Reconnaissance alone was almost beyond the resources that were available to the air force. Three units were involved: the Strategic Reconnaissance Unit, the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit, and the Survey Flight (newly formed). This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

My A.13 Cruiser Mk.IVA wargame piece

I will occasionally upload scans of my wargame pieces from the 1980's. This is my A.13 Cruiser Mk.IVA drawing. It is meant to be colored, sized, and printed on index (card stock). You can then cut them out and fold on the middle line to make wargame pieces. That is what I used from the mid-1970's up to the late 1980's when I shifted gears in my historical research. My original drawing was done at 1/48 scale, and this is reduced from that. You should be able to graphically size it to whatever scale you want to use for gaming. It is a convenient way to build armies (I used a 1:4 ratio between game pieces and actual tanks, guns, and trucks).

A more complete accounting of air strengths for Crusader

Apparently, the quote figures for the Axis air strength were based on the idea that they would not be able to hold any aircraft reserve, while the British air strength only included aircraft in service with squadrons. "In Crete and the Aegean", there were 72 more aircraft, not including shorter range fighters. The British had 48 bombers at Malta that could be a factor. The actual figures, not just estimates, show that the British had more than 650 aircraft, of which a portion were "heavy bombers in Egypt". Of the 650, 550 were in servicable condition. Of the 74 at Malta, 66 were servicable. While the Axis airforces had as many as 556 aircraft in Cyrenaica, "only 342 were servicable". It turns out that there was a large reserve of "750 servicable Axis aircraft of suitable types" that could be pulled into the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Estimates of Axis versus known British air strengths

There were apparently considerable differences between the estimates of "relative strengths" of the opposing air forces. This was an important topic, because the government was being pressed by the government of New Zealand over their desire to see that there troops were not operating in a situation where there was an Axis air superiority. The differences between London and Cairo caused the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff to be sent to Cairo to resolve the issue. They finally agreed that the combined German-Italian air forces would have abouty 385 aircraft available "in Cyrenaica". The British air force strenght would be 528. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air support for Crusader

Each corps and armoured division headquarters in the 8th Army would have a "joint 'Air Support Control'" operation. The goal was to provide better support to the army than had been previously possible. Because overall air superiority was still a priority over direct support, the Air Officer Commanding still had ultimate control, so he could hit important targets with overwhelming force. The quality of air support was especially important to the government of New Zealand, who had strong memories of what happened in Greece and Crete, earlier in the year. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British were ill-prepared to fight the Crusader Battle

When you realize that the British plan involved tanks fighting tanks, then you know that they would not do well against the Germans. Rommel avoided tank-to-tank battles, always intended to use anti-tank guns against tanks. The guns would be protected and would be either 50mm PAK38 or 88mm FLAK18, FLAK 36, or FLAK 37 with improvised shields. The latter could knock out any British tank, even the Inf.Mk.II Matildas. A Matilda might avoid being knocked out by a 50mm PAK38, but could be, if hit at a favorable spot and at a closer range. The high velocity shot with a tungsten core could take out any British tank at close range. At this stage, the British only had the 40mm 2pdr ATG. The AA artillerists would not allow the potent 3.7in AA gun to be used in the anti-tank role. That meant that the only other alternative was direct fire with 25pdrs with solid shot.

The British had a better chance of succeeding with tank-vs-tank battle when the US M3 Grants and Lees appeared on the scene, along with the Crusader III with the 6pdr gun. The 6pdr gun finally gave the British a gun on a par with the German 50mm gun, in fact it was better, being 57mm with a heavier shot at a good velocity. Once the Sherman arrived on the scene by the fall of 1942, then the British were equipped the sort of battle they wanted to fight. There were a few German tanks present that were superior to them, but they were present only in very small numbers.

Further developments in the Air Force in November 1941

Another change to accommodate the conditions expected in the Crusader offensive was to split the fighter wings into smaller "flying wings", with two squadrons per wing. The intent was to put a wing onto a single airfield. There would be three of these airfields connected to the main headquarters for the original, large wing organization. In addition to the new organization, the Desert Air Force started training to learn "the latest tactics" as used back in Britain. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Desert Air Force needed to be mobile

Since the Army was expected to be able to quickly advance against the German and Italian forces, the Desert Air Force needed to be prepared to advance with them, to be in a position to support the Army. The mobility would be required at both the wing and squadron levels. The plan was to leap frog the two wing headquarters units and their control centers. Finally, duplicate control centers were assembled for each wing, in order to be sufficiently mobile. Sufficient transport needed to be available, if mobility were to be a real possibility. In the end, there was just barely enough transport, but the lack of suitable vehicles "was felt throughout Crusader". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Building up air power

No.204 Group was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Coningham, "a New Zealander". There were initially the following units:

8 squadrons of short range fighters
1 squadron of long range fighters
6 squadrons of medium bombers
1 squadron of tactical reconnaissance aircraft

To improve the strength of the squadrons, the unit strength was raised from 16 aircraft to 18. As many as seven aircraft would be "held in immediate reserve". A new feature was there was now "an Aircraft Replacement Pool" at Wadi Nostrum. This unit would receive incoming aircraft and distribute them to squadrons. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The start date for Crusader was moved to 18 November 1941

I am sure that it greatly grated on Churchill for his offensive against Rommel to be pushed out as late as 18 November 1941, but there were reasons for the delay. The first was that the 22nd Armoured Brigade arrived late, and then they discovered that their tanks needed time in the workshops to be ready. The offensive had already been delayed due to the delays in accumulating supplies, forward. Finally, the 1st South African had insufficient transport, and the lack thereof interfered with their training an readiness. That was the final delay that pushed the date to 18 November. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Dumping Program: Preparation for Crusader

The hope was that early in the Crusader offensive, that the port of Tobruk could be used to receive supplies sent by sea. The preparations consume the enormous amount of 180,000 gallons of gasoline per day, shipping supplies from the rear. The plan was that once the port was opened, that the Inshore Squadron would convoy cargo ships from Alexandria. "The aim was to deliver 400 tons of cased petrol, 100 tons of bulk petrol, and 600 tons of stores daily." Ever optimistic, the British hoped to have Derna and Benghazi available, and they made plans to prepare the harbours for receiving supply shipments. HMS Glenroy, the landing ship, would carry "two motor launches and eighteen lighters" for moving supplies. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

We are moving towards discussing the Crusader Battle

One of the hardest fought and longest running battles in the war in North Africa in 1941 and 1942 was the Crusader Battle, which started in November 1941 and ended the the Axis retreat to the west. One of the nastiest features of the battle was that the British only won after Claude Auchinleck took charge of the battle. Auchinleck was the theater commander, but he was Churchill's favorite to command the 8th Army in the field. Auchinleck just wanted to be theater commander and let a more junior officer command the 8th Army. Auchinleck kept picking men who were not up to the job of successfully fighting Rommel, so Auchinleck had to keep getting more involved in operations than he wanted. Stay tuned for the eventual "blow-by-blow" of the battle.

The Water Supply from August to November 1941

In August 1941, when the water situation was examined, they found that there were not enough water sources west of Matruh. Work was moving forward to extend the pipeline from El Daba to Mersa Matruh, but the pipeline really needed to be extended further west. There was not enough transport available to ship water by road, so something needed to be done. The work had progressed, but on 11 October, an air raid on Fuka damaged new pumps that had been installed, and all the water that had been accumulated was lost, as well. A massive effort was mounted, so that only by 13 November did the piped water reach the railhead at Misheifa. The supply of water had been provided by many voyages of the water carrier Petrella, as well as trains carrying water. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Something I wrote, earlier today, apparently did not get posted

I hope what I wrote this morning about the water supply situation in support of Operation Crusader is still there so I don't have to recreate it. I am trying to give a details summar of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East, now for Volume III, and this is the sort of detail that is required for completeness.

The administrative plan for Crusader

The administrative plan for the Crusader operation included three "Forward Bases":

1. Sidi Barrani
2. Thalata, "just west of Misheifa railhead"
3. one "on the frontier near Jarabub for the Oasis Force"

The expectation was that they would need 32,000 tons of supplies for the first week of the offensive. After that, they had hoped to have relieved Tobruk and would be able to ship supplies into the port. That did not happen, so we can only imagine the disruptions that caused. An innovation was the transformation of Field Supply Depots into the Field Maintenance Centres. Four FMC's supported 30th Corps and two supported 13th Corps (the Official History switched from Roman numerals to the numbers at this point in Vol.III). This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Fairey Battle light bomber

When I was young, the Kalamazoo Public Library had a copy of a book about making balsa wood and tissue aircraft. The book had a photo of a Fairey Battle model and the plans for it (although they were crude). That sparked an interest on my part in the aircraft. It was only later that I realized that the Fairey Battle performance was only slightly better than the Vickers Wellesley, and that, only in the Mk.II version. The Battle's range was somewhat less, while the Wellesley had a considerably greater load carrying capacity.

The Vickers Wellesley light bomber

In the transition from biplanes to monoplanes, a single-engine, low-wing monoplane seemed like a reasonable configuration for light bombers in the the 1930's. The Vickers Wellesley, which was advanced in the sense of having Barnes Wallis's geodesic structure, was an early competitor. The Wellesley had a low-powered, air-cooled engine, which produced a top speed of about 238 mph. The Wellesley saw extensive service in the Middle East and Africa before being replaced by more advanced, twin-engined aircraft. Its load carrying ability and range allowed it to remain in service, despite its low top speed.

In preparation for Operation Crusader

Given the forces required for Operation Crusader, the railhead, which was 130 miles from the border seemed too far away. General Wavell had tried to get the railhead extended in May 1941, but there were no materials available at the time. The demands of material and supplies for Operation Crusader, planned for November 1941, were such that it was essential to extend the railhead as close to the border as possible. The work was finally pressed by the 10th New Zealand Railway Construction Company, starting in September. At the end of September, the 13th New Zealand Railroad Construction Company joined the project, and they were extending the track at a rate of two miles per day. They opened a railhead at Misheifa, which seemed to be far enough forward to support the offensive. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The German raid in September 1941

The British had screening forces along the frontier to cover their preparations for the offensive in November 1941. Cover had been given by the 22nd Guards Brigade and the 7th Support Group, but by early September, 4th Indian Division was moved in, and General Frank Messervy, the division commander, was given overall command of the screening forces. Rommel had become aware of the existence of several supply dumps, and particularly, one a Bir el Khireigat, 15 miles east of the border. Rommel decided to raid the area with the 21st Panzer Division with air support. German intelligence had found that the dump was not in use, but they decided to attack the forces in that area. The German attackers fought against Brigadier Jock Campbell's 7th Support Group, which blocked the attack. The SAAF achieved a success when two squadrons, No.12 and No.24 Squadrons SAAF caught the Germans refueling. Bombers also hit the German fields at Gambut. The result was that the Germans had left 5 tanks behind and had 9 aircraft either destroyed or damaged. On 11 September, the 21st Panzer Division had 110 running tanks, but by 20 September, they were down to 43. It took until November to rebuild their tank strength, probably mostly by repairs. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The LRDG in the summer and fall of 1941

After April 1941, the Long Range Desert Group had expanded to two squadrons of three patrols each. They had acquired men from the Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, Souther Rhodesians, and the 1st Cavalry Division. They picked up a 4.5in howitzer and light tank, to give them a little more "punch". On their own, they managed to purchase "two Waco aircraft". After Colonel Bagnold was "recalled to Cairo in August to advise on long range matters", Lt-Colonel Prendergast took command. He was a pilot, and flew one of the aircraft. By July the LRDG had started reconnaissance deep in the desert to "learn about tracks, water, and sites for landing grounds". They penetrated deep into southern Tripolitania. By September 1941, the LRDG operated under 8th Army orders and "set a watch on the coast road to the west of El Agheila". This is based on the account in Vol.III in the Official History.

Plans for "Oasis Force"

One of the subsidiary operations planned in support of the main offensive in November 1941 was for Oasis Force to take Jalo, a landing ground that would be built 100 miles northwest of Jarabub could be shielded. The idea was to have a field from which to bomb Benghazi. Part of the plan was a deception where the southern operations were made to be seen as being larger and more important than they actually were. An elaborate buildup of dummy "camps, dumps, dummy tanks, and an appropriate volume of spurious wireless traffic was maintained". Meanwhile, Oasis Force would mount harrassing operations against the Axis southern flank. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The role of XXXth Corps

General Norrie, XXXth Corp commander, did not like the concept of his corps being required to protect the flank of XIIIth Corps. He wanted freedom of maneuver to be able to engage the German armoured divisions. A striking feature of this discussion was that the British intended to use armoured to fight armour, while the Germans preferred to use armour to fight infantry, and would use their anti-tank guns, hidden and protected, to fight armour. In Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots, he describes being hit by a hidden and protected 50mm PAK38, and having his Stuart knocked out. General Godwin-Austen wanted to have the 4th Armoured Brigade as flank protection. The 4th Armoured Brigade was equipped with Stuarts and included Robert Crisp's battalion, the 3/RTR. General Cunningham decreed, probably in October 1941, that the 4th Armoured Brigade would remain under the XXXth Corps command. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan for the breakout from Tobruk in November 1941

General Cunningham hoped that XXXth Corps would defeat the two German armoured divisions in tank-to-tank combat, and then occupy the Sidi Rezegh ridge. At that point, the Tobruk garrison would break out and occupy the El Duda ridge. In the first days, XIIIth Corps would hold the Axis forces on the frontier and protect "the forward bases and railhead". Two brigades of the 4th Indian Indian Division would be so employed. The third brigade would take Side Omar, as flank protection for XXXth Corps. General Norrie's plan was to move to "the El Adem-Sidi Rezegh area" on the second day, if the Axis forces did not respond to his initial move. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Cunningham's plan for the attack

General Cunningham's original proposal was for the primary armoured forces with cruiser tanks to swing out and towards Tobruk to raise the seige and to draw the German armour into battle. The infantry would attack the German and Italian border forces and remove them. One armoured brigade was to operate between them to protect the armour's flank. The final plan put al lthree armoured brigades into XXXth Corps, which would drive towards Tobruk, hoping to draw the Axis armour into battle. XIIIth Corps would attack the frontier. The initial British move would be to put XXXth Corps "near Gabr Saleh". Depending on the response, General Cunningham would decide where they would go next. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Axis dispositions in late 1941

The British believed that almost all the Axis strength was forward-deployed to Cyrenaica, with just a few divisions in Tripolitania. The frontier was held by an Italian division backed by some German units with guns. The two German armoured divisions were located between Bardia and Tobruk. Three Italian divisions, with more German units encircled Tobruk. The British believed that there was an Italian mobile corps forming near the Jebel Akhdar (Ariete armoured division and the Trieste Motorized Division, and another?). The actual Italian Mobile Corps, the XXth, certainly had the Ariete Armoured Division and the Trieste Motorized Division. At the time of the offensive in November, the British expected to have a 3:2 superiority in tanks and a 2:3 inferiority in aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Reorganization in North Africa in the fall of 1941

A complicating factor in the reorganization and re-equipping of British forces in North Africa was that the Australian government had asked that their troops be withdrawn from Tobruk. In the meantime, the scattered operations that General Wavell was forced, finally against his will, to pursue had left the forces in disarray. At least the opening of the Red Sea to sea traffic from America had simplified the buildup and resupply. Traffic also flowed from the UK and the Dominions with fresh troops and equipment. The goal was to start a new offensive in November 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More pressure on General Auchinleck from Churchill

The Prime Minister had some very strong opinions strategy in North Africa that were contrary to what General Auchinleck and Air Marshal Tedder thought prudent. Churchill was focused on the fact that while the British forces were rebuilding, they should have kept continuous pressure on the Axis forces, rather than giving them a respite. After all, if the Germans were successful in Russia, it might free more resources to be redeployed to North Africa, so action should be taken immediately. Continuous operations against the Axis forces would use up their valuable resources that would be harder for them to replenish than the British resources. Churchill chafed at the 4-1/2 month build-up period, and constantly pestered Auchinleck during that period. The opinion of the Official History is that it would have been British resources that would have been "used up piecemeal" from July to November 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Politics in dispositions

General Auchinleck was concerned with covering the northern flank from attack down from Russia. The very incomplete 6th Division was in Syria, and was being built up in strength. When the 50th Division arrived from the UK, Auchinleck directed that they be sent to Cypress. That got the attention of Churchill, as Churchill was concerned that they main forces in North Africa were not British, but from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India. The Prime Minister's pressure got Auchinleck to replace the 5th Division with the 5th Indian Division, which had been in Iraq. The 50th Division, at this time, was under the command of the 9th Army. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

8th Army organization in September and October 1941

After the 8th Army was created and a Headquarters formed, the corps were organized. First, the Western Desert Force reverted to its old designation: 13th Corps. Since Lt-General Noel Beresford-Peirse had been appointed to command in the Sudan, Lt-General Godwin-Austen became the corps commander. General Godwin-Austen had previously commanded the 12th African Division. The 30th Corps was created to be the corps in which armoured divisions would be assigned. The remnants of the 2nd Armoured Division were used to form the 30th Corps Headquarters. Lt-General Pope had been intended to command 30th Corps, but he and his senior staff had been killed in a air crash. In his place, Major-General Norrie was appointed as 30th Corps Commander. General Norrie had been the 1st Armoured Division commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.