The losses from the Heraklion evacuation gave the commanders pause

After taking the losses from the Heraklion evacuation (800 troops killed and the destroyers Imperial and Hereward sunk, with Orion, Dido, and Decoy damages), the commanders hesistated to attempt the evacuation from Sphakia. Factors that helped make the Sphakia evacuation go more smoothly were that fighter protection became increasingly effective and the Germans became more tentative in their efforts. Successful fighting by the 5th New Zealand Brigade and 19th Australian Brigade and other rearguard actions relieved pressure on the evacuation. Considering that the battle for Crete went badly, the Official History points out that credit must be given to the troops for toughness and bravery under desperate conditions. Two VC's were given to New Zealanders, Lt. C. H. Upham (20th NZ Battalion) and Sergeant A. C. Hulme (23rd NZ Battalion). This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

At the last minute, the navy was expected to evacuate 20,000 men from Crete

The evacuation from Crete started on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941. The navy was expected to rescue the 20,000 soldiers on Crete, 4,000 from Heraklion and 16,000 from the beach at Sphakia. In fact, the situation was so dire and communications were lost that some were never informed. Colonel Campbell and his men at Retimo surrendered on 30 May, after they were running out of ammunition and food.

On the first night, Captain Arliss, with four destroyers, took 700 men from Sphakia and carried them back to Alexandria. At Heraklion, three cruisers and six destroyers were under attack. The destroyer Imperial took a near miss and the cruiser Ajax was damaged enough to have to withdraw. Still, by 3am, the ships had evacuated 4,000 men and were headed for Alexanderia. The Imperial's steering gear failed and she was sunk. That delayed the withdrawal, and they were caught in daylight. In the attacks, about 800 of the soldiers evacuated were killed.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation on Crete on 26 May 1941 was getting very bad

On 26 May 1941, General Freyberg's concerns about the feasibility of withdrawing forces from Crete were ignored by the commanders in Egypt. The air attacks were so intense that all unit cohesion and control were evaporating. We see that General Wavell had informed London, and Churchill replied that they could not afford to lose Crete. In fact, the "Canea front had collapsed", and there was no prospect of bringing in reinforcements. They would be fortunate to hold off the Germans long enough to withdraw any of the troops. The Chiefs of Staff finally authorized a withdrawal. How the navy would be able to withdraw 20,000 troops was a mystery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

From 24 May 1941, the Chiefs of Staff were living in unreality

When asked on 24 May 1941, Admiral Cunningham informed the Chief of Staff that the fleet could not operate in the Aegean or near Crete in daytime without crippling losses. The Chiefs of Staff responded that the fleet had to be ready to accept those losses. On 26 May, Admiral Cunningham told the Chiefs of Staff that he could predict losses if the fleet were required to operate in daytime. By 24 May, the battle on the ground was clearly lost. The airforce was able to do some damage, through heroic efforts, but the available strength was too small and the distance from Egypt was too great. Interestingly, the SAAF was using Marylands on offensive sorties, not just maritime reconnaissance. By the morning of 26 May 1941, General Freyberg informed General Wavell that if they wanted to save any of the troops on Crete, the withdrawal should start immediately. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

At sea on 22 and 23 May 1941 near Crete

Admirals King and Rawlings were headed southwest from Crete in the afternoon. At one point, the battleship Valiant was hit. Lord Louis Mountbatten, with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, arrived at 4pm on 22 May 1941. They were sent to the southwest side of Crete. Kelly and Kashmir attacked a caique laden with troops, and then bombarded the airfield at Maleme. Captain Mack and four destroyers were sent to patrol on the north side of the island. On the south coast, two destroyers embarked the King of Greece, "the British Minister and other important persons". Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships at sea to replenish during the night to be ready for another day of activity. By mistake, the commanders thought that Warspite and Valiant were low on light AA ammunition, although this was not the case. They were ordered to withdraw, leaving Lord Mountbatten unsupported. In the morning, about 8am, 24 divebombers attacked Lord Mountbatten in the Kelly with the Kashmir and sank them. The Kipling was able to rescue Lord Mountbatten and 278 other men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Australian War Memorial website has a page about the battle for Crete, as do others

The battle over the island of Crete in late May 1941 was of epic proportions. Our friends from the southwest Pacific played an important part. The Australian War Memorial website has a page on the battle. The History Learning Site in the UK also has a page called the "Fall of Crete". The Explore Crete site has a page called the "Battle of Crete". The Wikipedia also weighs in with a Battle of Crete page.

The German plan to attack Crete by sea

The Germans had hoped to use two groups of caiques to carry troops to Crete's beaches. The first of caiques, carrying about 2,000 troops came to a bad end at the guns of Admiral Gennie's ships. The second group of 38 caiques, carrying about 4,000 troops, is what Admiral King had seen when forced to withdraw because of diminishing AA ammunition. After word had been received of the disaster to the first group, the German admiral ordered the second group to turn back. He also had planned to tanks and artillery carried in merchant steamers, as well, but these apparently did not arrive in time for the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Naval dispositions at the start of the invasion of Crete

The navy started the fight to defend Crete at a disadvantage, as the aircraft carrier Formidable was unable to participate, as after the Tiger Convoy, her fighter strength was reduced to four. Suda Bay was no longer usable, so the fleet had to return to Alexandria to restock with ammunition and to refuel. There were only some motor torpedo boats based there.

Admiral Cunningham's plan was to interdict traffic by sea at night and to withdraw to the south during daylight hours. He had assembled three groups of cruisers and destroyers, augmented by the MTB's from Suda Bay.

The Corinth Canal was mined to impede traffic flow, and this was successful.

At the start of 20 May 1941, Rear-Admiral Rawlings, in the Warspite and with the Valiant were to the west of Crete. They had a screen of 10 destroyers. The Naiad and Perth, with four destroyers were heading south from Kaso Strait. The Dido, Ajax, and Orion, with four destroyers were heading to join Rear-Admiral Rawlings from Antikithera Channel. The cruisers Gloucester and Fiji had left Alexandria, heading to join the battlefleet, as well. The Queen Elizabeth and Barham had returned to Alexandria after the Warspite and Valiant had arrived.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History

The second day in the attack on Crete

On the second day, two companies of the Second Parachute Regiment were dropped into near Pirgos. In the event, the Maoris cut them up pretty badly and they were pinned in Pirgos. What started to tip the scales was that transport aircraft, landing under artillery fire, brought in the 100th Mountain Regiment. This was apparently at Maleme. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on Crete on the first day

German air superiority meant that the British forces defending Crete had to keep under cover, as any movement brought an attack from roaming German aircraft. The air attack was so intense at Maleme airfield that the commander of the defenders had little idea of what was happening. All of his communication lines had been cut. The defenders had to withdraw to better cover, and this left the airfield in contention. In Prison Valley, the attackers had not been able to advance. At the end of the first day, Retimo and Heraklion airfields were still in British hands. Georgeopolis had not yet been attacked, and General Freyberg moved an Australian battalion to Suda Bay. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Correlli Barnett points out all that was happening in April to June 1941

Correlli Barnett says, in The Desert Generals, that General Wavell hoped for relative quiet in Cyrenaica, as he was fully occupied in many other places. He characterizes withdrawal from Greece as the British being "thrown out", with the loss of one fifth of their forces on 29 April 1941. In Iraq, on 5 May, Rashid Ali led a coup that was sympathetic to the Germans. On 20 May, the Germans attacked Crete. Intelligence indicated that Germans were entering Syria, so Wavell resolved to take the country. The British invasion launched on 8 June, with forces inferior to the Vichy French. From 12 May, Churchill starting pressing Wavell for a date when the Tiger Convoy tanks would be used in an offensive. Wavell seems to have been unable to deal with this sort of political pressure for premature or unwise action, and it ultimately led to his downfall. Churchill's lease on power must have seemed tenuous enough to him, that he continually made decisions based on politics, and his anxiety to see action taken.

The attack on Crete proceeds

Aside from a psychological effect, the paratroopers mostly were ineffective, except where they dropped into an area where they were unopposed. The glider-borne troops were decimated. The two points where they posed a real threat were the Assault Regiment landing in the dry river bed of the Tavronitis and where the 7th Air Division had dropped in the southwest of Canea, in the Prison Valley. The New Zealand Division took the main assault. From 6am on 20 May, the attacks proceeded. Many of the paratroopers dropped into a bad situation and were immediately pinned down, reminiscent of Normandie, three years later. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The attack on Crete

General Wavell had one eye on Iraq in mid-May 1941, as the Iraqi's had moved their army up on the plateau near Habbaniyah, the RAF training station. He soon had his attention fixated on Crete and on 14 May, bombing and strafing attacks had commenced against British airfields on Crete.

The German attack forces were distributed against what they considered to be the main targets. The Assault Regiment would take Maleme. The 7th Air Division would take Canea, Retimo, and Heraklion. One regiment of paratroopers was allocated to each target. The Assault Regiment would use gliders against Maleme. The attack would commence in the early morning on 20 May 1941. The Germans planned to have the airfields under their control by evening of the first day. The attacks were intended to be made where there were no defenders, a pretty reasonable plan. In the event, the plan did not work, as the Germans lacked adequate intelligence of the defences. This is based on Vol.II of the Official History.

Crete: one British advantage

The one shortcoming of the German preparations for attacking Crete is that they new essentially nothing about the forces opposing them. The seem to have expected far fewer troops in the defence than there were actually there. The British, in contrast, had been keeping watch over preparations through aerial reconnaissance. Undoubtedly, they must have had agents in Greece, as well, since they had only recently left there. They had a fairly complete picture of the forces being prepared for the assault. The mistaken report that the Germans might attack Cypress, instead of Crete proved an unwelcome distraction for Wavell and his staff. The deteriorating situation in Iraq seemed to lend credence to Cypress being the target. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

German preparations for the attack on Crete

One reason that the Germans were able to ready so large an airforce for the attack on Crete was the weather had become drier. They also were able to perform such feats as building a new airfield at Molaoi in a week. They also took Milos Island on 10 May 1941. In three days, they built another airfield. As it was, airfields were greatly congested. The German organizational skills were displayed in their ability to distribute fuel to all the bases. The shorter range Ju-87 and Me-109 fighters were deployed forward at Milos, Molaoi, and Scarpanto. Their bases were back at Corinth and Argos. The Me-110's operated from the Athens area. This was about 200 miles from Crete. The longer range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft could be accommodated further away, a locations such as Salonika, Bulgaria, and the island of Rhodes. The Ju-52 transports were based forward in southern Greece at places such as "Corinth, Megara, Eleusis, Tatoi, Tanagra, and Topolia". Everything but the gliders were ready by 14 May. The gliders only arrived at Tanagra on 16 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The leadup to the attack on Crete in May 1941

May 1941 was action-packed. There was the battle for Crete, the Bismarck voyage and destruction, and there was the Tiger Convoy. British resources were stretched to the breaking point. Prior to the German attack on Crete, Wellingtons from No.37, 38, 80, and 148 squadrons flew from Egypt to bomb airfields in Greece every night. Egypt was 300 miles from Crete while Crete was within range of an arc of German air bases.

The German effort would primarily involve the army and air force, as Hitler had decided to leave naval efforts in the Mediterranean Sea to the Italian navy. The air force proposed taking Crete with an airborne attack, and planning proceeded in April and into May. The attack on Crete was named Operation Merkur, and the command was given to General Löhr, commander of Luftflotte 4, with Fliegerkorps VIII and XI. The latter had the airborne troops and their aircraft. The operation included 13,000 troops from the 7th Air Division and 9,000 mountain troops.

Fliegerkorps VIII was equipped with "228 bombers, 205 dive bombers, 114 twin-engined fighters (Me-110), 119 single-engined fighters (probably mostly Me-109), 50 reconnaissance aircraft". The total was 716, of which 514 were serviceable on 17 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More preparations and misgivings about defending Crete

General Freyberg must have contacted his government and expressed his concern, because the New Zealand government approached Churchill with their misgivings about their troops defending Crete. Churchill simply replied that defending Crete would greatly contribute to the security of Egypt, and that was it. General Freyberg was particularly worried about a combined seaborne and airborne attack. Many support personnel were withdrawn to reduce to the drain on provisions, and the rest were armed with rifles. The heavy AA guns were all protecting Suda Bay. The light AA were spread over the other sectors, except for Retimo, where there were none. The air strength was decimated over time, and with General Freyberg's agreement, the Air Officer Commanding "sent away the surviving four Hurricanes and three Gladiators". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Preparing to defend Crete

General Wavell flew to Crete on 30 April 1941 to tell his senior officers that he wanted to deny Crete as a base to the Germans. He expected that the most likely targets would be the two airfields, at Heraklion and Maleme. General Wilson was sent to Palestine to command the force against Iraq, leaving General Freyberg to command the defence of Crete. General Freyberg's reaction was to tell the high command that either they give him adequate force or they should reconsider the decision to hold Crete. The air resources on the island were 6 Hurricanes and 17 "obsolete aircraft, clearly inadequate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the early situation in Crete

One thing that General Wavell told General Wilson was that the RAF strength in Crete would not be increased. At least, the anti-aircraft artillery had been increased, but only to 32 heavy AA and 36 light AA, "of which 12 were not mobile". A consequence of the decision to not increase the air strenght was that there would be almost no capability for aerial reconnaissance north of Crete. The only aircraft with the range would be Sunderlands, and they were too vunerable. General Wilson told Wavell that without additional aircraft, their ability to resist invasion by sea would be limited. There was too much beach to be able to defend it all. General Wilson also told General Wavell that unless all the services could increase their force levels, that the island could not be held. Basically, he was saying that as the situation stood, the "he did not think that the island could be successfully defended". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The island of Crete by April 1941

When General Papagos suggested the British withdraw from Greece, he assumed that Crete would be defended. Apparently, by 17 April 1941, Churchill had decided that Crete would be held. Only the day before, the Mediterranean Fleet had been given guidance that their top priority was to interrupt the flow of supplies to Libya. By 18 April, Churchill acknowledged that in fact, the top priority was to withdraw the troops from Greece. With all the conflicting priorities, a new one was forming: a pro-Axis coup in Iraq. Given the chaotic state in the Mediterranean theater, supplying Crete was low on the list. General Wilson arrived at Suda Bay on 27 April. General Wavell immediately asked for his recommendation for defending Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British presence on Crete

Early in the war, the British and French had contingency plans for French troops from Syria to occupy Suda Bay in Crete, as soon as Greece was attacked by Axis forces. After the fall of France, the British were hard-pressed to find the resources to defend Suda Bay. The issue became critical after Italy had invaded Greece in late October 1940. Once they went to Suda Bay, a natural refuelling spot, the Royal Navy provided a few defenses and the army stripped Malta to provide a weak brigade along with 8 Heavy AA and 12 Light AA guns. A landing strip was built a Maleme so that fighters could defend the harbour. The only available aircraft were from the Fleet Air Arm. The Greeks withdrew their troops to the mainland when they assessed that the Italians were unlikely to attack Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Mediterranean Fleet Prior to the Loss of Crete

The Mediterranean Fleet had been involved in intense operations from the date that the fleet sailed from Alexandria on 18 April 1941 to bombard Tripoli. Shortly after returning to Alexandria, they had the withdrawal of the army from Greece to carry out. This was followed closely by the Tiger Convoy. The only losses incurred were one of the Tiger Convoy fast transports and the damage to the destroyer Fortune. This was mainly possible due to the highly unusual weather in late April and early May 1941. The heavy clouds and rain meant that the fleet had considerable immunity from air attack. There was also the factor that the Italian navy was recovering from the attack at Taranto on 11 November 1940 that crippled their fleet. While good fighter cover and AA fire had so far saved the fleet from losses, the coming battle over the island of Crete would be a different matter. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The second bombardment of Benghazi

Lord Louis Mountbatten commanded the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, which had five destroyers. A short time after midnight on the night of 10 May to 11 May 1941, they closed with the harbour at Benghazi and commenced firing. One merchant ship "lying at the northern breakwater as severely damaged", but the remaining ships could all be seen to be wrecked, so firing stopped. In the first case of divebombing at night in the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Destroyer Flotilla was attacked. AA fire was difficult due to the aircraft only being visible at the last moment before bomb release. Lord Mountbatten decided that instead of the further sweep planned, they should withdraw to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Tiger Convoy on 8 and 9 May 1941

On 7 May 1941, Vice-Admiral Malta had reported that the harbour was closed due to mining. Admiral Cunningham resolved that the two Malta convoys should continue, despite that word. On 8 May, there was rain and restriced visibility. Two Albacores from Formidable were lost, and only one crew was recovered. The light cruiser Ajax and three destroyers rejoined the fleet at 5pm after having bombarded Benghazi. On 9 April, the Mediterranean Fleet was still giving general cover to the convoys. The fleet was about 120 miles to the south, while the convoy was 90 miles west of Malta. The two Malta convoys were able to enter the harbout due to minesweeping and dropping depth charges to explode mines. The Tiger Convoy met the fleet at 3:15pm and continued with them in close escort towards the east. Axis reconnaissance aircraft had seen the convoy and fleet, but there had still been no attacks. Beaufighters from Malta continued to fly cover for the convoy and along with the weather conditions, this had so far deterred air attacks. In the twilight of 10 May, 9 Malta-based Beaufighters straffed bombers on the airfields at Catania and Comiso, Sicily. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the Tiger Convoy

Five 15-knot transports made up the Tiger Convoy. Three had "Clan" names: the Clan Chatton, the Clan Lamont, and the Clan Campbell. The others were the Empire Song and the New Zealand Star. They carried 295 tanks and 53 Hurricanes. The convoy entered the Mediterranean Sea on the night of 5th and 6th May 1941. In the Skerki Channel, on the night of 8 May, the Empire Song hit two mines, which set ammunition afire. The New Zealand Star had a mine explode on a paravane with little damage. The Empire Song exploded, but her crew had been removed by a destroyer, prior to that moment. The Empire Song had carried 10 Hurricanes and 57 tanks, all of which were lost. 238 tanks and 43 Hurricanes eventually arrived at their destination. These included 135 Inf. Mk.II Matildas, 82 Crusader Mk.I tanks and 21 light tanks, probably Lt.Mk.VIC. A torpedo bomber, probably an SM79, staged an attack on the Queen Elizabeth, but she narrowly avoided the torpedo. The next day, Beaufighters from Malta flew cover for the convoy. The destroyer Fortune, with Force H, was hit, but reached Gibraltar. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The motivation for the Tiger Convoy

General Wavell sent a message to the commanders in London on 20 April 1941, telling them of his inferiority in armoured vehicles, and that the situation was to get worse. When Churchill saw the message, he decided to make a bold stroke and send tanks through the Mediterranean Sea to Egypt. For such an operation, Admiral Cunningham thought the risks were acceptable. This was despite the increased air threat from Fliegerkorps X. As usual, multiple convoys would run concurrently. One fast and one slow convoy would be run from Alexandria to Malta. Force H would escort the Tiger Convoy to Malta and the Mediterranean Fleet would take over the escort and accompany them to Alexandria. Force H consisted of the Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and 9 destroyers (soon to be involved in the Bismarck operation). There were also reinforcements being added to the Mediterranean Fleet: Queen Elizabeth, Naiad, and Fiji. Based on Malta, there was Gloucester and 5th Destroyer Flotilla. Malta harbour was mined after Gloucester, Kipling, and Kashmir had sailed, so they were not able to return. The Mediterranean Fleet consisted of Warspite, Barham, Valiant, Formidable, Orion, Ajax, Perth, Abdiel, and destroyers. The Breconshire carried fuel and munitions for Malta. The slow convoy to Malta had "two tankers, [and] was to be escorted by two anti-aircraft cruisers, three destroyers and two corvettes". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Admiralty was going to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta

The commanders in London seem to have been far removed from reality. They had stopped the advance in North Africa. They had sent and army to Greece that was unable to affect the issue, and mainly served to expend equipment not easily replaced. It also placed a great burden on the Mediterranean Fleet. They had pressed for the bombardment of Tripoli, which achieved little but which risked the fleet. They even were ready to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta. That would have been a grave mistake, as increasingly, ships in Malta could not be defended from air attack. What decided the issue, however, was that the Germans were increasingly using air-dropped ground mines. When originally broached on the subject of a battleship at Malta, Admiral Cunningham had agreed, if there were two fighter squadrons available to give cover, with 150% reserve of spare aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We might be excused if we wondered what happened to Fliegerkorps X during the operation to bombard Tripoli. The fleet was at sea during the day on April 21 and 22, and did not experience any air attacks. Fliegerkorps X did attack Malta on those two days. The Official History speculates that the German command was too inflexible to be able to respond to a fluid situation. They also point out that during this period that Fliegerkorps X had a lower aircraft availability and a shortage of crews trained for maritime operations. In any case, for the next week or two, the British Mediterranean Fleet was heavily involved with withdrawing the army from Greece, where they were exposed to intense air attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We now know that the attack on Tripoli caught the Italians completely by surprise. The results were disappointing, considering the 478 15in rounds and about 1,500 smaller caliber rounds were fired at the city and port. Only one cargo ship with fuel and bombs was sunk. The torpedo boat Partenope was damaged. Many 15in shells hit the city, but many failed to explode. Reports give the civilian casualties as 100 killed and 300 wounded. The Official History notes that more damage was done when a cargo ship exploded on 3 May 1941. The ship was said to have carried German bombs which spontaneously exploded. Two merchant ships were sunk and the quays were seriously damaged. Admiral Cunningham was thankful that the fleet was untouched, but expressed the opinion that the operation was a poor use of valuable resources. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The operation to bombard Tripoli in April 1941

The Mediterranean Fleet sailed on 18 April 1941 and headed "through the Kaso Strait". The escorting destroyers refueled in Suda Bay, in northwest Crete. The fleet met Pridham-Whipple's cruisers and destroyers and the convoy for Malta (the Breconshire and her escort). The empty ship convoy from Malta passed them on their way back to Alexandria. In the dark, the Breconshire and one destroyer made their dash to Malta. The bombardment force and the carrier force headed in the general direction of Tripoli. The bombardment was preceded by an air attack by 8 Wellingtons and Swordfish, all from Malta. The bombardment ships passed the submarine Truant, which was acting as a lighthouse. The bombardment of Tripoli commenced at 5:02am. The dust in the air and the AA fire made spotting impossible, so we can imagine that the gunfire was less effective than it could have been. The fleet turned for a second pass and only then did shore batteries fire, and then ineffectively. The firing lasted 40 minutes and then Force B, the bombardment force withdrew, covered by Force C, the carrier group. The fleet arrived back in Alexandria the next morning. The attack had been carried out without loss. The results were paltry, however, due to the firecontrol difficulties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

My alternate post about the bombardment of Tripoli

I had accidentally posted this to the wrong blog. This was my original post on the bombardment.

Given the need to run a convoy through the Mediterranean Sea, Admiral Cunningham proposed to stage a bombardment of Tripoli in conjunction with that operation. That seemed to satisfy the commanders in Britain. Captain Mack's destroyers had just destroyed a convoy off Sfax, so they were in a more accepting mood. The impending need to withdraw the troops from Greece was also a factor.

The harbour at Tripoli was about a mile square, and was enclosed by breakwaters. The town sits "on a rocky promontory which forms part of the western and northern perimeter of the harbour". The berths for ships are on the northern segment of the breakwater. A seaplane station was on the southeast corner. Admiral Cunningham's plan was to bombard at night, with flares dropped from aircraft from his aircraft carrier, which he did not want to risk in close to shore. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The plan for the bombardment of Tripoli

Admiral Cunningham proposed, as a compromise, to bombard Tripoli inconjunction with a convoy from Malta. This was accepted by the commanders in Britain. This became more palatable to them after Captain Mack's recent destruction of a convoy off Sfax with his destroyers. The impending need to evacuate troops from Greece was also a factor.

Tripoli was a mile square harbour enclosed by a breakwater. The town was a promontory that formed the western and northern border. The ship berths were on the northern breakwater. The southeast corner had a seaplane station. Admiral Cunningham proposed to bombard Tripoli in the early morning, before dawn. Aircraft from the aircraft carrier would drop flares to provide light for the shooting. The submarine Truant would shine a light and ping its sonar (ASDIC). The forces involved were:

The Bombarding Force:

Battleships

Warspite (Cunningham's flagship)
Barham
Valiant

Cruiser

Gloucester

and 9 destroyers

The Carrier Force:

Formidable
3 cruisers
4 destroyers

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Admiral Cunningham questioned the plan for blockships

The plan for attacking Tripoli with blockships, especially the Barham, was poorly conceived, and Admiral Cunningham was very resistent. Those in Britain making the proposal were not aware of the consequences. The idea was that the Barham and C-class cruiser would bombard before scuttling their ships. That meant that a substantial crew would be aboard. Admiral Cunningham thought that the chances of rescuing many would be small. He also was extremely sceptical that ships could be sunk in such a way as to block the harbour. The probability of success seemed very small. He also thought that the fleet would lose confidence in the higher command, as a consequence. A bombardment of Tripoli seemed a better option, even though the risks were great. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Back in North Africa in April 1941: plans for the bombardment of Tripoli

In early April, a plan had been considered that including sinking the old battleship, now target ship, the Centurion, to block Tripoli harbour. Admiral Cunningham ruled that out, since the ship was not already in the Mediterranean, and she probably could not have made the trip from the straits to Tripoli, without attack and damage. Admiral Cunningham did not want to bombard Tripoli with ships. Admiral Cunningham still thought that the best option was for the RAF to bomb Tripoli with Wellingtons. The commanders in Britain, as well as Churchill, kept pushing for a bombardment, and the admiralty was willing to sacrifice the battleship Barham and a C-class cruiser as blockships. These grand plans were being proposed just as the crisis point had been reached in Greece, and the commanders were forced to concede that the only option left was withdrawal. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

50,732 personnel were embarked from Greece, from 24 April until 1 May 1941. The total included some Greeks and Yugoslavs, as well as British forces (meaning British, Australian, and New Zealand). After the surrender at Kalamata, a few more men were embarked on the next few nights. There were also 700 taken from Milos, a nearby island. For several months afterwards, stragglers managed to escape, often with the help of friendly Greeks.

The 5th Panzer Division was ordered on from Thermopylae towards Lavrion. Lavrion is located at the south end of Attica. The pursuit pressed on towards Argos, Kalmata, and Sparta. Part of the SS Adolf Hitler Division moved across to Patras. The bridge over the Corinth Canal had been destroyed, but the Germans were able to cross near the ends. During the pursuit, one NZ battalion was bombed and the 6th NZ Brigade was able to hide during 28 April. The 6th NZ Brigade was taken off during the night of 29 and 30 April. Most were taken off from Monemvasia. So ended the Greek disaster. This was based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The continuing withdrawal from Greece in late April 1941

On 27 April 1941, a convoy of 6 ships was sent to Alexandria with an escort of two cruisers and seven destroyers. One transport, the Costa Rica, was sunk, but her crew and all troops were saved. A destroyer was able to take troops from the beach at Raphina. "The Ajax and two destroyers went to Porto Raphti where the 4th New Zealand Brigade had been heavily bombed during the day". The embarkation proceeded "without many casualties". The remaining troops on 28 April were at Monemvasia and Kalamata. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was at the former. Between 7 and 8 thousand were at the latter beach. There were also about 800 men on Kithera Island, who had reached there by boat. The troops at Monemvasia were able to be embarked quickly, as the landing craft from Glenearn were there. The three sloops sent to Kithera were able to take off the men without incident. Kalamata did not go so well. There, the Germans had broken into the town and captured the embarkation team and communications equipment. Only 300 men were taken off the beach, and then the rest were left to surrender on 29 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The withdrawal from Greece in April 1941

The British continued to use covering forces (or a rearguard) to protect withdrawals. A unit would move to a dispersal area on a night. They would hide through the next day, and then destroy equipment to be left behind. They would be called to "the beach by the embarkation staff". The ships would arrive "one hour after dark and leave not later than 3am". The RAF planned to fly out as many personnel as they could fit into aircraft. They used Bombays, Lodestars, and flying boats (Sunderlands?) to carry out men as well. Some had been carried by Blenheims to Crete. Those left would try to embark from beaches with the soldiers. The tentative plan was to leave starting on 28 April 1941. German advances disrupted this plan. The result delayed the withdrawal, as more time was needed to reach beaches in the Peloponnesus. On 25 April, the Ulster Prince was bombed and caught fire, becoming a total loss. The transport Pennland was bombed and sunk. Destroyers took her place, and all but 500 troops were withdrawn from Megara. On 25 April, General Wilson was forced to leave Athens for an embarkation area. This meant that he was out of contact until he arrived. Units were cut off and plans had to be changed. The 4th NZ Brigade had to be redirected to Porto Raphti. General Wilson was able to fly to Crete on 26 April. General Fryberg was left in command in Greece. There were many unfortunate losses, such as the Dutch transport Slamat, which had tried to embark more men, and was caught at daylight. The destroyers Diamond and Wryneck had tried to save men, and were sunk as well. On about 50 men, total, were ultimately rescued. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The plan for the embarkation from Greece in April 1941

The plan was to embark as many British troops as possible from Greece in April 1941. They would take their personal weapons and valuable, but light equipment, such as sights and other optics. Stores and equipment that might be useful "to the Greek people would be given to them". The rest would be destroyed, if possible, or at least rendered useless. The troops would be embarked in boats from " widely scattered beaches". The fast Glen Line ships and destroyers would take troops to Crete. The rest would be taken to Alexandria. The covering force would be limited to cruisers and their escorts: "the cruisers Orion, Ajax, Phoebe, and Perth; the anti-aircraft cruisers Calcutta, Coventry and Carlisle; about twenty destroyers and three sloops; the infantry assault ships Glenearn and Glengyle", 19 troop ships, four "A-lighters--an early type of tank landing craft", as well as a few other vessels. There were also some locally-acquired smallcraft thought to be suitable for the planned operation. The available beaches were surveyed and chosen. There needed to be deep water and they must be accessible to the retreating troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Readying for withdrawal

Apparently, by 21 April 1941, the cruiser York had already been sunk in Suda Bay by air attack. In any case, the ship's crew was "organized into beach parties". Additional personnel had been sent from Alexandria. Small craft were being gathered from many places, including Tobruk and the Suez Canal. On 20 April, the last 15 Hurricanes had intercepted an attack on airfields at Athens and 5 were lost and the rest were damaged. After this incident, the Germans had pretty much total control of the air. 23 Greek ships were bombed and sunk, including "a destroyer and a hospital ship". The plan was to take the troops off from beaches and take them to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The collapse in the Balkans in April 1941

The British had become separated from the Greek army. Yugoslavia had surrendered. The Greek government was in turmoil. The Greek president of council had committed suicide on 18 April 1941. General Wilson had spoken with the Greek king and asked if he would stay in Athens as long as possible. Some in the Greek government wanted to withdraw to Crete and continue fighting. Other ministers thought that further resistent was not feasible. General Wavell flew to Athens on 19 April and met with General Wilson and Brigadiers Galloway and Brunskill, Rear-Admiral Baillie-Grohman, and Air-Vice Marshal d'Albiac. General Wavell was resistant to withdrawal, partly because of the equipment that would be left behind. General Wavell needed to consult with the Greek government before definitely deciding on withdrawal. He met with General Blamey, who would have to hold Thermoplyae. He told Wavell that he could not hold Thermopylae for long. General Wavell then met again with the King and the new head of council. By 21 April, the Greek government notified Wavell that the best course would be to withdraw. The withdrawal appeared to be difficult, partly because the navy was in such a strained state. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

I continue to wonder about the process where British forces were sent to Greece in 1941

If you believe Churchill, he could have been dissuaded from sending troops to Greece in 1941, if the commanders had objected. The reason why I might trust that declaration is that as soon as Churchill was notified about Greek concerns about heavy fighting, he ordered the British withdrawal. I think that much of the responsibility for the failed adventure lies with General Wavell. General Wavell was trying to be the "good soldier" and do whatever the politicians wanted, regardless of the consequences. The result of proceeding with the operation not only were the loss of men and, especially, equipment in Greece and the near-loss of the North African position, as well. If the Greek adventure had not proceeded, Rommel could have been stopped, during the February-March 1941 timeframe.

The withdrawal from 16 April to 18 April 1941

The 5th New Zealand Brigade was holding Olympus Pass. They held against tank and infantry attacks on 16 April 1941. At sundown, they pulled back to the top of the pass. On 17 April, the brigade was able to disengage, although one battalion had trouble breaking free of German mountain troops. They were able to reach their transport and the road to Larissa. The 4th New Zealand Brigade, at Servia, was able to disengage during that same period, and withdraw. On 17 April, the 1st Armoured Brigade passed through Savige's force on the way to Thermopylae. Savage's force withdrew on the evening of 17 April. On 18 April, the 6th New Zealand Brigade faced tanks, where they were positioned as rearguard at Elasson. The artillery had responsibility for engaging the tanks, which they did for the entire day of 18 April. The units involved included the 2/3 Australian Field Regiment, "one troop 64th Medium Regiment", and the 27th NZ Field Battery. On the evening of 18 April, the rearguard was able to disengage and withdraw. By the 19th, General Wilson's force was mostly at Thermopylae, with a rearguard at Domokos. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A good page about Operation Battleaxe

There is a good page about Operation Battleaxe on this Geocities-based site. The site is a manifestation of George Bradford and AFV News. He has other pages on Operation Brevity and the Crusader battles.

A short digression to analysis

The evidence suggests that General Wavell is largely to blame for the British collapse in early 1941. Churchill has a good responsibility, as well, but Wavell essentially saluted and agreed to measures that were totally destructive. A better man would have resisted Churchill's demands, and Churchill would have backed off (at least that is my reading of Churchill's writing). Wavell was used to taking risks and hoping for the best outcome. He had been lucky up until February 1941, when events took a turn for the worst, with Rommel's arrival in Libya.

Wavell did have the advantage that many of his personnel choices worked out well. He was also a good planner and administrator. His successor, General Auchinleck, seems to have been inept at choosing personnel. Auchinleck's main abilities were as a field commander, not as planner or administrator. That the latter topics worked as well as they did was more due to having a competent staff.

In any case, by the end of May 1941, the British were on the ropes in the Mediterranean theater, even while East Africa was wrapped up successfully.

The ANZAC retreat

The Germans were threatening Larissa from the coast. German tanks and infantry attacked the 21st New Zealand Battalion, which was defending positions at Platamon, trying to protect the railroad tunnel. They were forced to withdraw, by 16 April 1941. They retreated to the Vale of Tempe, the ancient river gorge for the River Pinios. The 16th Australian Brigade was ordered to move to the western side of the gorge. By April 17, the Germans had moved across the south peak of Mount Olympus. Elements of the 6th Mountain Division entered Gonnos by around noon. The 2nd Panzer Division succeeded in cutting off the 21st New Zealand Battalion and the 2/2 australian Battalion. They were forced into the hills. The Germans were blocked long enough for the main formations to withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The air war in mid-April 1941 in Greece

Initially the German air force concentrated its efforts against Yugoslavia and Eastern Macedonia. As they became accustomed to moving their support and aircraft, they increasingly devoted effort to hitting British positions and the road system in the rear. The RAF was outnumbered and while they did their best to counteract the German air superiority, they suffered great losses. In one case, on 15 April, the Germans hit Niamata airfield and destroyed all ten Blenheims on the ground. The improving weather simply aggravated the situation. While the day seemed like one continuous air attack from strafing German fighters, actual losses on the ground proved to be quite light. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Complications to the withdrawal plan in mid-April 1941

The commanders had expected that the main threat to the planned British withdrawal in Greece would come from the west. Instead, the problem came from the east, and the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade would have new responsibilites. The withdrawal of the 1st Armoured Brigade over bad mountain roads left their tanks in poor mechanical condition. They no longer could be expected to act as a covering force. Then, the road through Volos became impassable, as of 17 April. That left the road from Larissa carrying all traffic, and this while the German air force was becoming a dominant force. The British air forces were suffering heavily. During the first week of the German attack, air operations had been hampered by rain. The British air effort was primarily to attempt to slow the German advance. No.211 squadron suffered heavily. "On one mission all six Blenheims of No.211 Squadron were shot down with the loss of the Squadron Commander and the Commander of the Western Wing". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The withdrawal to Thermopylae

The distance to Thermopylae for the ANZAC corps was about 100 miles or more. The road network was unfortunate, because the roads into and out of Olympus Pass ran through Larissa. The British were already operating in a situation where the Germans had air superiority. That meant that movements would need to be at night. Three rearguard positions would be utilized. The 6th New Zealand Brigade would be positioned north of Larissa, not far from Elasson. The 16th Australian Brigade would be on the Kalabaka road near Zarkos. A composite force commanded by Brigadier Lee would be at Domokos. The other forces would head for those positions and withdraw through them. This meant that the vital point of Larissa would be covered on three sides. All this was to happen starting about 16 April 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German advance on 14-15 April 1941

The New Zealand Division was opposite the German 18th Corps, which had the 2nd Panzer Division moving forward along the Adriatic coast. The 6th Mountain Division was moving in parallel, but inshore. The New Zealand Cavalry withdrew back through the Olympus Pass in the evening of 14 April 1941. Over the next day, leading elements of the German forces were in combat with units from the New Zealand Division. The 17th Australian Brigade arrived at the front and was given Kalabaka to defend. The hpe was that they would guard roads leading to the Piraeus. The 1st Armoured Brigade was still at Grevena, and was only withdrawn with difficulty to a location behind the Venetikos river. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Balkan situation in mid-April 1941

After the Germans took Belgrade on 13 April 1941, the British command in Cairo had to face the fact that the Balkans situation was close to collapse. They immediately looked at what would be needed to withdraw "British" forces from Greece. When General Wavell heard of General Papagos's suggestion that the situation was lost and that the British should consider withdrawing to save Greece from the destruction involved with a fierce battle, he asked the high command in Britain for instructions. Churchill's reaction was to order the evacuation to proceed. By the night of 15/16 April, token German forces had crossed the Aliakmon and were in contact with British forces. The last British withdrawal had broken contact. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Churchill on the "decision to aid Greece"

I thought it worth looking at Churchill's rationale for going into Greece in his book The Grand Alliance. With our hindsight, the decision looks like a bad idea, and the consequences were grave. In early 1941, plans had been made to send forces to Greece, but there were no hard committments. Admiral Cunningham had warned of the dangers involved in such an enterprise. The potential allies in the Balkans, the Greeks, Yugoslavs, and Turks all had decided that the British could send such small forces that they could not affect the issue. That was the reason that the Turks turned down any cooperation with the British. We might say, in this day, that they were correct in their assessment. The decision was made partly because commanders such as General Wavell seemed ready to be involved and because the brain trust in Britain hated to not contest a German attack in the Balkans, particularly if it might mean the loss of Greece, Yugoslavia and Turkey. They thought that if Yugloslavia showed any inclination to stand with the Allies, that forces should be sent into the Balkans to support the Greeks and Turks. This is based on the account in Churchill's book The Grand Alliance.

Further retreat by 15 April 1941

General Wilson had discussed a further withdrawal to Thermopylae as early as 13 April 1941. When reports surfaced of the collapse of morale and discipline in the Greek army, and the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions were seen as just barely surviving, General Wilson discussed with General Blamey the further withdrawal to Thermopylae. When General Wilson and General Papagos met on 16 April, General Papagos approved the withdrawal and discussed the Greek army's plight. General Papagos suggested the the British army withdraw totally from Greece, at least partly to save Greece from the destruction involved in an intense battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

12 April 1941 and later in Greece

Fortunately for Force W, the Germans were having trouble moving a balanced force forward and keeping them supplied. The Germans attacked the junction between the 1st Rangers and the 2/8 Australian Battalion on 12 April. The Rangers and 2/8th were only able to withdraw with difficulty. Fortunately, the plans for the rearguard position worked and the Germans were delayed there. The 1st Armoured Brigade Group subsequently withdrew to Grevena.

Meanwhile, the New Zealand Division had been active. Their divisional cavalry had armoured cars and Brend carriers before the Olympus Pass. The 16th Australian Brigade was sent across country, to keep the roads free. This only was done with difficulty. By 14 April, the 17th Australian Brigade was arriving from the Piraeus to reinforce the ANZAC Corps, commanded by General Blamey. The situation was deteriorating as the Greek divisions were in obvious trouble and in danger of collapse. The ANZAC Corps was planning withdrawal, starting on 15 April.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Mackay Force in Veve Pass

General Mackay's task was to hold the Germans at Veve Pass until the night of 12/13 April 1941. At his disposal, he had the Australian 19th Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Vasey) and the 1st Armoured Brigade Group. The 1st Rangers, the motor battalion from the 1st Armoured Brigade Group, was temporarily placed under Brigadier Vasey's commmand. That meant that there were now three battalions to hold a ten mile front. To their right was the "Greek Dodecanese Regiment". The two armoured regiments were positioned to suppor the infantry. These were the 4th Hussars, with light tanks, and Robert Crisp's 3rd RTR with cruiser tanks (A.9 Cru.Mk.I and A.10 Cru.Mk.II). The plan was that the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade would withdraw starting in evening of 12 April with the armoured brigade as rearguard. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

April 9 and 10 1941, in Greece

Up through 9 April, the Greeks had been engaging Italian troops in Albania. The threat from the German moves caused General Papagos to disengage and withdrew to a line that went from the west coast to the "big bend" in the Aliakmon river, to the southwest of Servia. By the 10th Mackay force was firing on the vanguard of the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division. On 10 May, General Papagos ordered General Wilson to withdraw to the line of the "Olympus-Servia-Lake Prespa" position. General Wilson had positioned his Greek divisions on his left flank. These were the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions. General Wilson was getting nervous about his Greek divisions as they had little or no transport and seemed to lack cohesion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

General Wilson expected to have to withdraw

Because General Wilson could see that a withdrawal from the Aliakmon position was unavoidable, he made some preliminary moves. He ordered General Blamey to make some preliminary moves. The 19th Australian Brigade, with only two battalions, a field regiment, and an A/T regiment were moved north to Veve. The 1st Armoured Brigade was moved to Amyntaion. General Mackay colocated his HQ with the Greek General Karassos. A portion of the Greek 20th Division moved position on the right of Mackay Force. Under General Blamey's command, portions of the New Zealand Division were on the move, including towards the Olympus Pass. At Aliakmon, the demolition took place in hopes of slowing the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History (being the History of the Second World War: The Mediterranean and Middle East).

8 April 1941 in Greece

General Wilson realized on 8 April 1941 that the German 40th Corps would be a threat, as it moved from Monastir. The Australian Generals Blamey and Mackay were given responsibility to strengthen the situation with a readjustment and with arriving elements of the 6th Australian Division. General Mackay was put in command of the "Amyntaion Detachement" and told to strengthen the unit as he could. He now reported directly to General Wilson. There were still Greek forces in the field. While Mackay Force would defend the Veve Pass, the Greek 20th Division would defend a line across Lake Vegorritis to Edessa. They pulled back from Edessa, itself. The Greek 12th Division would defend the line from Verria to the coast, along with the New Zealand Division and the 16th Australian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack in April 1941

Once the decision was made to attack Yugoslavia as well as Greece, plans were altered to pull in some forces intended for Barbarossa. Luftflotte 4, in Austria, was tasked to operate over Yugoslavia. The German 2nd Army would attack from Austria and Hungary. The 12th Army, in Bulgaria, would still attack Greece. The German airforces involved dwarfed those available to the British. Luftflotte 4 had 576 aircraft, alone. Another 168 were pulled in from Fliegerkorps X. The air support for the 12th Army was provided by Fliegerkorps VIII, which had 414 aircraft.

The situation in Yugoslavia was such that the country was doomed in a couple of days. When the attack commenced on 6 April 1941, the 9th Panzer Division, of the 40th Corps was a at Skopje. The 73rd Infantry Division moved to Prilep. Armoured forces reached Salonika on 9 April.

In air attacks on the Piraeus on the night of 6 and 7 April, the Clan Fraser was bombed, caught fire, and exploded. The explosion of the Clan Fraser's cargo of 250 tons of explosives sank other ships and damaged the dock facilities. The damage was so extensive as to shut down the port.

On that night of 6 and 7 April, Sofia was bombed by 6 Wellingtons, hitting an ammunition train and damaging the railway in Sofia. Blenheims from No.84 Squadron bombed a railway station 50 miles south of Sofia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The initial stages of the German attack in Greece

A prominent feature of the German attack on Greece was that the Germans controlled the air. The terrain and weather were also unfamiliar to many of the troops (Australians and New Zealanders, in particular). There were mountains and snow to deal with. All that and they had to stage a fighting withdrawal to embarcation points a great distance away. And somehow, they largely succeeded. The Germans had struggled in Bulgaria to prepare for the campaign. By 1 April 1941, Field Marshal List could report that his troops were ready to invade Greece. On 27 March, the Germans heard of the Yugoslav coup, and the orders were changed. They decided the Yugoslavia must be quickly neutralized, so they could not interfere with the attack on Greece, and later, the attack on Russia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

When the Germans turned the flank at Aliakmon

After the German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece in early April 1941, the Germans quickly crossed into the "upper Aliakmon valley". This flanked the Greeks facing Albania and also W Force. The British had no choice but fall back on Thermopylae. That meant withdrawing across Thessaly, a plain. That also meant that the main airfields would be lost to the advancing Germans. With the Greek government at the breaking point, the commanders decided to stage a complete withdrawal of British forces. For all the sacrifices made to send troops to Greece, it all came to nought. British forces were unable to affect the outcome in the Balkans and almost lost North Africa, as well. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation unfolds in Greece in April 1941

Around 5 April 1941, General Wilson had been told that the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Brigade would not be sent to Greece. Of the troops actually in Greece, most were not deployed where he had wanted. Greece was a spent force and would not count for much. Yugoslavia was in political turmoil after the coup which forestalled the attempt to join the Axis. The entire British campaign in Greece became a withdrawal. There was never a decent prospect of being able to face the Germans and fight in place. The Yugoslav army in the south was rapidly beaten. That allowed an open path to the Germans to enter Greece through Monastir. General Wilson changed his deployment, but his resources were meager enough that his left flank was dangerously exposed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Right before the storm: early April 1941 in Greece

Intelligence started to be collected indicating German forces moving through Bulgaria from late March 1941. The German forces were much stronger than the Allies had defending the Aliakmon line. At the end of March, there appeared to be about 20 German divisions in Bulgaria, menacing Greece. Of these 20, 6 were on the west side, while 4-6 were in the center. The German XVIII Corps, with two mountain divisions was active on the Greek-Bulgarian border. The Italians in Albania were also moving to the frontier. At the same time, Rommel was attacking in Libya. News went out to Allied troops on 4 April 1941 to be prepared for an attack, perhaps on 5 April. In the event, the attack actually took place on 6 April, in the early morning, and was against both Greece and Yugoslavia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British air power in Greece early April 1941

The British air strength in Greece in early April 1941 consisted of the following squadrons:

No. 11 Blenheim bombers
No. 84 Blenheim bombers
No. 113 Blenheim bombers
No. 211 Blenheim bombers
No. 30 Blenheim fighters

No. 33 Hurricanes

These were a mix of Hurricanes and Gladiators
No. 80 single seat fighters
No. 112 single seat fighters

No. 208 Army Cooperation (Lysanders?)

Wellington bombers from Egypt were 
available on moonlit nights

In fact, when the attack happened on 6 April, there were
only 80 operational British aircraft in Greece. The main
problem was the shortage of suitable airfields and space
for planes.

April 1941, the British in Greece

By early April 1941, General Wilson was getting increasingly nervous about his supply lines. There was ample reason to divert troops to supply line defence, although that was very distasteful to him. An additional issue was that the britis rations were superior to local food, which attracted pilfering. On April 5th, General Wilson was finally allowed to openly command his troops, wear his uniform, and travel. The situation was that the 1st Armoured Brigade, without the 3rd RTR, was on the Axios plain. To their right was the New Zealand Division. They were in front of Katerini, but one brigade was moving towards the Olympus Pass. The 6th Australian Division was only just starting to arrive. The 16th Australian Infantry Brigade was to take over the defence of the Verria gap. The 19th Australian Brigade was moving two battalions forward Athens. The 17th Australian Brigade was still in Egypt, along with one field regiment (artillery). General Wilson felt uneasy about trying to command from Athens, so he split his headquarters, so that he had his main HQ near Elasson, 15 miles to the north of Larissa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official history.

The 3rd RTR in early April 1941

The South African cricket player Robert Crisp was in the 3rd RTR in 1941. They were the sole cruiser tank unit (then called a battalion and later regiment) in the 1st Armoured Brigade. General Wilson had held them back, as he was reluctant to position them out on the plain, where the light tank battalions were situated. Their tanks also had very worn tracks. General Wilson decided to form a battlegroup around the 3rd RTR. He added the 64th Medium Regiment, Royal Artillery (minus one battery), the 1st Australian AT Regiment (less one battery), and half of the 27th New Zealand MG Battalion. The force was commanded by Brigadier Lee, the Corps Medium Artillery commander, and was called the "Amyntaion detachment". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

March and Early April 1941 in Greece

The deployment plan for W Force in Greece was as follows. The 1st Armoured Brigade, without its one cruiser tank regiment would be on the plain in front of the defensive position, covering the preparations for demolitions "as far forward as the river Vardar (or Axios)." The armoured brigade was to fight a delaying action, while withdrawing on the Edessa gap. General Wilson ordered the New Zealand Division as early as 11 March to occupy "a position in front of the railhead at Katerini". That would stretch the New Zealand Division across a 15 mile front, where they were supposed to prepare defences at the Olympus Pass. General Wilson had agreed to a plan by General Papagos to move the 19th Greek Division to the Eastern Macedonian Army The 6th Australian Division was to move to the left of the New Zealand Division (presumably with an outward facing view) The two divisions would then comprise General Blamey's 1st Australian Corps. The 12th Greek Division would move to the north, while the 20th Greek Division would be on the far left. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British plan for unit arrival in Greece in March and April 1941

The British plan was for a phased arrival of units in Greece. This was probably necessitated by the realities of transport availability. This was the order:

1. 1st Armoured Brigade Group-Brigadier H.V.S. Charrington
2. The New Zealand Division-Major-General Bernard Freyberg
3. The 6th Australian Division-Major-General Sir Iven Mackay

Along with these would be interwined:

• The Force HQ
• HQ 1st Australian Corps-Lt-General Thomas Blamey
• two medium regiments, Royal Artillery
• corps, base, and line of communication troops

To follow would be the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Brigade. More than 31,000 men had been carried to Greece by the end of March 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Unpleasant alternatives in Greece in on the British arrival

There were no good options for moving through mountainous Greece. There were a few one-way roads. There were a few other roads that were not suitable for bad weather and had steep descents. The rest of the paths were "bridal paths". The Greek army was horse and ox and mule-drawn, so they were able to travel, although not at a fast pace. The British army was motorized, and was tied to the few good roads. In the spring, with the rains, much of the travel would turn into mud (March and April). The powers that be in Cairo had decided that the British army would be based in the "Piraeus-Athens area". They hoped that by having intermediate bases with supplies for 90 days, that they could somewhat counter the poor transportation situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. Going into Greece does not even seem like a rational decision, which of course it wasn't, as it was driven by Churchill and his willing minions. This was not a rational, calculated move. The consequences were disastrous to the position in North Africa.

The Aliakmon front in 1941

General Wilson arrived in Athens on 4 March 1941, but the Greek government asked him to remain in civilian clothes and not advertise his presence. This made his task as commander quite difficult. He was not able to personally reconnoiter Aliakmon. The basic position was strong, and had slopes facing the potential attack that sharply descended. There were four passes through which traffic could flow. The main difficulty was that the position could be readily turned by a force attacking through Yugoslavia from Monastir to Florina. If an attack developed from that direction, the British would have to make a difficult withdrawal under air attack. The terrain through which such a retreat would have to be made was mountainous and had little cover. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The military situation in Greece in March 1941

The Allied defence plan for Greece was to have the main front against the Italians in Albania, and then to have Lt-General Bacopoulos's force in Eastern Macedonia, and a force defending the Aliakmon position. General Wilson would command the Aliakmon force. The Greek leader, General Papagos would be in overall command. Lt-General Bacopoulos's force consisted of three divisions without any transport and some fortress troops. The weakest portion was near Salonika, which was very unfortunate. General Wilson's W force was slow to happen. His force was still incomplete at the time of the German invasion. The British deployment was covered by a weak Greek "Central Macedonian Army" commanded by General Kotulas. He had just one corps of three understrength divisions. One, the 19th Division, was nominally motorized, but was newly formed and had a mix of British and captured Italian equipment. The others, the 12th and 20th Divisions, had only two regiments with little artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The effect of the situation in the Balkans in February-May 1941

As an aside, the military and political situation in the Balkans in February through May 1941 may have affected the outcome of the war. The critical incident was the coup by the Serbians in Yugoslavia. That probably brought in a more immediate and decisive German intervention in the Balkans that delayed the attack on Russia by a month. If the Barbarrosa could have taken place a month earlier, Moscow might have been taken with incalculable affect on the outcome of the war. Seemingly small and obscure events can have great effects.

The British air effort against Italy in March 1941

The Greeks had wanted the RAF to act in close support of the Greek army, but by March 14, 1941, Air Vice-Marshal D'Albiac directed attacks against crowded Italian fields at Tirana, Valona, and Berat in Albania. The Wellingtons from No.37 Squadron operated against Italian shipping. There were supplemented by six Swordfish from No.815 Squadron FAA. On March 17, the Swordfish carried out a successful attack on Valona harbour, sinking the torpedo boat Andromeda and three merchant ships. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The effects of the Yugoslav coup in 1941

Necessarily, the coup leaders in Yugoslavia in April 1941 could not reasonable weaken their northern defences to allow them to attack the Italians in Albania. The coup was driven by the Serbian desire to resist the move towards alliance with Germany. The Croatians in the north were pro-German, but Serbia still felt a natural connection to the allies. The coup pointed out the lack of cohesion in the Yugoslav national fabric.

The Italian offensive in Albania was being pressed to succeed before the Germans intervened. The attack had started in early March. Mussolini had even come over to witness a victory. The Italians had 28 division supported by an average air strength of 26 bombers and 105 fighters. The 4th Squadra, flying from Italy had an additional 134 bombers and 54 fighters. They were faced by 14 Greek divisions which were stretched to the breaking point. Still, in 10 days or so, the Italian offensive failed. The Italians were faced in the air by a small RAF contingent consisting of one Gladiator squadron, a few Hurricanes, one Blenheim bomber squadron, some Blenheim fighters, and some Wellingtons. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

After the coup in Yugoslavia in March 1941

When Anthony Eden and the CIGS General Dill heard of the coup in Yugoslavia, they were on the island of Malta. They immediately flew to Athens, after hearing of the German ultimatum. In Greece, General Papagos wanted to immediately move towards Salonika after hearing of the Yugoslavian coup. The British opposed any moves until they better understood the intentions of the coup leaders. Because Yugoslavia was not prepared for war, cooperation was limited to staff discussions with the Allies. When the talks were held on April 3rd, the Allies were disappointed because the Yugoslav representative, General Yankovitch, only could discuss defending Salonika. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More developments in Yugoslavia in March 1941

The British government learned on March 17, 1941, that the Yugoslav government had been asked to sign the Tripartite Pact by the German government. Anthony Eden decided to send an appeal to Prince Paul, the regent, by way of Prince Paul's friend Terence Shone, who was the British minister in Cairo. Anthony Eden appealed to Prince Paul to intervene and attack the Italians in Albania. The goal would be to knock Italy out of the Balkan war. Despite the letter to Prince Paul, the British learned on May 20th that the Yugoslav government had offered to sign the Tripartite Pact under certain conditions. This brought the situation in Yugoslavia to a breaking point, as 3 Serbian cabinet ministers resigned on March 22nd. In the end, the Yugoslav government signed the Tripartite pact in Vienna on March 25th. That led to a coup in Prince Paul's name by a groupled by General Simovitch. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Greece and Britain wanted the Yugoslavs to attack the Italian rear

The sort of game that the British were playing in the Balkans in early 1941 to provide general assurances to the Yugoslav government that they would be aided if they joined the Allies. They did not want to be committed to any definite steps, which is what the Yugoslav government wanted. What they were hoping to achieve was to persuade the Yugoslavs to attack the Italian rear in Albania. They hoped that would cause an Italian collapse and would make the main Greek forces available to resist a German attack.

Anthony Eden had visited Ankara at the end of February 1941. The Turkish government seemed intent on remaining neutral and passive. General Wavell and Air Chief Marshal Longmore resisted providing any assurances to Turkey, as they seemed more of a liability than an asset (a paraphrase of the Official History). The primary reason that the British wanted a declaration of war by the Turks was to influence Yugoslavia to stay out of the Axis.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Negotiations in the Balkans in early 1941

The aim of British negotiators was to build a coalition in the Balkans to oppose the Germans, particularly. The Yugoslav government was being pressured by Germany to join the Axis side. The British minister in Yugoslavia thought that if the Prince Regent, Prince Paul, knew how much aid the British were supplying to Greece that he would choose to join the Allies. In response to that input from Mr. Campbell, Anthony Eden wrote a letter to Prince Paul, telling him an outline of Greek and British plans. He suggested that how well Salonika could be defended depended largely on the Yugoslavs. He invited Yugoslav officers to Athens to coordinate plans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Back to the Balkans in early 1941

As we have already seen, Anthony Eden, Foreign Secretary, and the CIGS Sir John Dill were sent to the Middle East in February 1941. The goal was to build a counter to German aggression in the Balkans. They hoped to arrange to give support to Greece and attempt to bring Turkey and Yugoslavia into an alliance to oppose the Germans. In the event, the Greeks did agree to allowing some British troops into Greece to help defend the Aliakmon position. Lt-General Maitland Wilson was designated as the commander of troops sent. Anthony Eden put out feelers to the Yugoslav goverment, as their position could be turned by an attack through Yugoslavia. Part of the difficulty with Yugoslavia was that the Serbs were sympathetic to the Allies while the Croats were closely aligned with the Axis. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

A special mission from Malta in February 1941

Space needed to be available on Malta airfields between 8 and 21 February 1941. To do that, 5 Wellingtons from No.148 Squadron were sent to Egypt. The need was to provide space for 8 Bomber Command Armstrong-Whitworth Whitleys from No.78 Squadron. These aircraft flew a mission to Southern Italy where they dropped 38 officers and men from the 11th Special Air Service Battalion. Their mission was to carry out an attack on an aqueduct. They achieve partial success, but not escaped to the submarine rendevous that had been arranged. The main benefit was the lessons learned from the operation, as well as the morale effect on the Italian populace. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The air situation at Malta from April to June 1941

On May 1st, 1941, No.252 Squadron arrived at Malta from Gibraltar. Their equipment was 13 Beaufighters equipped for coastal operations. They were sent to provide long-range cover to the Tiger Convoy and to the Parracombe which had unfortunately been mined and sunk. The Hurricanes based in Malta were to provide cover within 40 miles of the island. The attack on Crete in May disrupted plans and the Beaufighters were sent east. They carried out one attack on Greece on May 16th from Malta and then were sent to Egypt due to the maintenance challenges on Malta. On April 27th, 6 Blenheims from No.21 Squadron arrived. Between January and June, the Swordfish were still actively operating from Malta against shipping, in conjunction with the Wellingtons of No.148 Squadron. The Swordfish had arrived on Malta as long ago as June 1940. At the end of April, the Wellingtons were withdrawn to Egypt to free up airfield space for more Blenheims. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The importance of air reconnaissance to Malta

For Malta-based strike forces to be effective, they relied upon aerial reconnaissance. In January, there were No.228 Squadron with 5 Sunderlands and No.69 Squadron with 4 Martin Marylands (at first just called "Glenn Martins"). By later in March, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the Sunderlands were too vulnerable, so they were withdrawn to Egypt. The demands for reconnaissance were more than the small number of Marylands could provide. The peak in strength was 7 aircraft, and usually there were fewer. To improve the situation, No.39 Squadron at Mersa Matruh was used to cover the southern part of the search area. By May, three more Marylands had arrived to reinforce No.69 Squadron, and some camera-equipped Hurricanes were improvised. The combination of moves enabled the air reconnaissance report more targets "than the striking force could deal with". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Early 1941 was a good time for British naval forces operating near Malta

The first five months of 1941 were quite successful for British naval forces operating near Malta. We have already discussed the surface forces, but there were also the larger submarines which operated in deeper water and the much smaller U-class which operated in the shallows off Tunisia and Libya near Tripoli. The greatest successes of this period were the sinking of the Italian light cruiser Armando Diaz by Upright and the liner Conte Rosso by Upholder. Lt-Commander Wanklyn received the Victoria Cross for what was called "a daring attack" on the Conte Rosso. Unfortunately, two U-class submarines, the Usk and Undaunted were lost, as well. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Starting on 24 April 1941, surface forces at Malta were reinforced

The light cruiser Gloucester arrived at Malta on April 24, 1941. Further ships arrived by April 28. They included the light cruiser Dido, the fast minelayer Abdiel, and the 5th Destroyer Flotilla. The 5th Destroyer Flotilla was commanded by Lord Louis Mountbatten and consisted of his flagship, the Kelly, and Jackal, Kelvin, Jersey, Kipling, and Kashmir. The 14th Destroyer Flotilla left, escorting the fast transport Breconshire. After the Jersey was mined on May 2nd, the Gloucester , Kipling, and Kashmir were sent to Gibraltar. The Kelly, Jackal, and Kelvin sailed on May 9th to join the Tiger Convoy escort. The Tiger Convoy, as we know, was taking tanks and Hurricanes to Egypt. Upon their arrival, Churchill immediately started applying pressure for them to be used. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British tried basing a surface raiding force at Malta

Admiral Cunningham had always hoped to base a surface raiding force at Malta, if the air defences could be improved enough to provide protection (and if the threat diminished). The 14th Destroyer Flotilla arrived at Malta on 11 April 1941. The flotilla commander was Captain Mack in the Jervis, with the Janus, Mohawk, and Nubian. The latter two were Tribal class ships while the former two were J-class. They immediately left port to see if they could attack a convoy, but they were unsuccessful. On the night of 15-16 May 1941, they found a convoy of German ships. They succeeded in destroying the entire convoy of three escorting Italian destroyers, one Italian merchant ship and four German merchant ships. One Italian destroyer, the Lampo, was later salvaged. The Mohawk was torpedoed twice, and had to be scuttled. About a week later, they missed a convoy but did sink one merchant ship. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Axis transport to North Africa from February to May 1941

The transport of the 5th Light Division to Libya started in early February. By the end of March, 15 convoys had crossed with 25,000 men, 8,500 motor vehicles, and 26,000 tons of supplies. The transport of the 15th Panzer Division had been completed by the end of May, and that freed up shipping so that Italian troops could be finally brought across to Libya. From March to May, 9 German ships were sunk and 9 were damaged during the transport operation. The trip could have been much safer if ports in Tunisia were available. Protracted negotiations with the Vichy French ensued, but fortunately for the British, they never resulted in the ports becoming available to the Germans. Since Hitler was focused on Russia, no pressure was applied to the French. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Fliegerkorp X was losing effectiveness by May 1941

Fliegerkorps X, while having been effective since the unit first entered action in January 1941, General Geisler, the commander reported that the unit could not sustain the pace of operations up until the end of April 1941, as losses had reached the unacceptable point. The problem corrected itself in May, as the remaining units were rotated to either Greece, the Eastern Front, or to North Africa. The Germans essentially gave up on the effort until the end of 1941. The had loss as many as 60 aircraft per dayThat left the Italians to operate from airfields in Sicily. The potent SM79 was still a threat, particularly as a torpedo bomber. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

This continues to be a good summary of the war in North Africa in 1941

I keep running into the "Engagements 1941" page in Google searches. This is still a good one page summary of the North Africa campaign in 1941.

Malta in April and May 1941

At atttempt was made to sneak a disguised merchant ship to Malta in late April. The ship, the SS Parracombe had a cargo of supplies and 21 Hurricanes. Unfortunately, the disguise was useless, as the ship was mined and lost off of Cape Bon. In late April, some Hurricane I and II fighters were flown in by aircraft carrier. This only brought the island fighter strength up to something over 40 aircraft. The defending fighters did not do very well in the first week of May. The results were attributed to the Hurricane I and inexperienced pilots. The Official History suggests that fatigue from the intense operations could have been a bigger factor. The decision was made to send the pilots from No.261 Squadron to Egypt and to retain the pilots from No.249 Squadron, due to arrive shortly. No.185 Squadron was formed, as well. Fighter command sent out new leadership and the control communications were improved. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air Reinforcements from March to June 1941

Air Arthur Longmore pushed to get reinforcements to Malta. He sent 6 Hurricanes to Malta on March 2nd and another 6 on March 14, 1941. By late March, the first 12 Hurricane Mk.II's arrived at Gibraltar on the Argus. They were transferred to the Ark Royal and an operation was conducted by Force H, under the command of Admiral Somerville to reinforce Malta. The forces involved were the Ark Royal, Renown, Sheffield, and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla. At 6am on April 3rd, the aircraft were launched, led by 3 Skuas. They flew 400 miles to Malta. By June, 224 fighter aircraft had flown into Malta. Most went on to Egypt, but 109 were kept on the island. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The air campaign against Malta intensified

Up until February 1941, the German attacks on Malta were in the daytime. The largest attacks included up to 60 bombers and 40 fighters. In February, tactics changed to night attacks. As many as 45 Ju-88 and He-111 bombers would independently bomb targets on the island. After 12 February, Me-109's conducted daylight attacks while the bombers kept to the night. February also saw the start of a concerted effort to mine the harbour by minelaying aircraft. The intensity had reached the point where after raids on 5 and 7 March, the Sunderlands and Wellingtons were withdrawn, as they could no longer be protected. Sending Hurricane II's to the island became an increasing priority. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Malta's air defence in mid-1940

I had hoped to find a picture of one of the Sea Gladiators that defended Malta in mid-1940, and was rewarded to find a good page about them with a picture. The Sea Gladiators only lasted a short time, but were the initial first line of defence against Italian air attack. The actual site that contains this page is called Malta GC.

Fliegerkorps X from January 1941

Fliegerkorps X had made a strong effort against Malta while the aircraft carrier Illustrious was in port. After she left on January 23, 1941, the attacks were reduced in scope. Fliegerkorps X was struggling to meet its commitments. The charter of Fliegerkorp X included operating against British shipping in the central Mediterranean, to support Marshal Graziani in Libya, and to protect Axis shipping. While the strength of Fliegerkorps X grew from 243 aircraft in the middle of February 1941 to as many as 443 aircraft by late March, its losses mounted. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The air situation in Malta in January 1941

When the German attacks started in January 1941, the aircraft on the island of Malta were the following:

• No.261 Squadron RAF-12 Hurricane Mk.I
• No.228 Squadron RAF-5 Sunderlands
• No.69 Squadron RAF-4 Martin Marylands
• No.148 Squadron RAF-12 Wellingtons
• No.830 Squadron FAA-10 Swordfish

There were only three airfields at this date. One in the south, one near the Grand Harbour, and one in the center of the island. The flying boat base was in the south, near the airfield.

Malta had the disadvantage of being only 20 minutes flying time from German bases in Sicily. The AA defence of the island relied upon "Box Barrages" sent up to disrupt the approaches to targets. He AA commander, Brigadier Sadler, had experience in defending Dover from air attack, so he was well-equipped for the job. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The ongoing situation in late April 1941 around Tobruk

The active patrolling tactics were used so successfully by the Australian defenders of Tobruk that they invoked a response. In addition to the other attacks, a company of the 2/23 Battalion made an incursion across the Derna road and took almost a 100 prisoners from the Brescia Division. The Germans responded to this success by modifying how the Axis troops were deployed and they worked to be able to transport the 15th Panzer Division to Libya sooner than had been originally planned.

The situation in the air was still difficult. Sir Arthur Longmore was in the Sudan, so Air Marshall Tedder (later to be famous) altered the dispositions to respond. He had ten Hurricanes on the ground at Tobruk during daylight. He withdrew the Lysanders. Only the minimum groundcrews were kept in Tobruk. The situation was intense enough that the squadrons were being written off quite rapidly. No.73 Squadron was down to 5 Hurricanes. By April 25th, No.73 Squadron was withdrawn for rest and rearming. No.274 Squadron operated from Gerawla while No.6 Squadron hung on at Tobruk, as its losses mounted. The squadrons in the desert were down to a total of 14 Hurricanes by late April.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

April 16, 1941 and immediately after: Rommel Attacks Tobruk

On April 16, 1941, Rommel personally led the assault on Tobruk. He attacked on the west side using the Ariete Armoured Division and the Trento Motorized Division. The Italians lacked enthusiasim for the attack, and surrendered in numbers to the Australians. A total of 26 Italians officers and 777 men surrendered. On the next morning, the Ariete resumed the attack. They were stopped with the loss of 5 tanks. General Moreshead instituted a defence based on "vigorous patrolling". An example was an attack on April 22, where one company of the 2/48th Australian Battalion, with 3 Inf.Mk.II Matildas and one troop of M Battery RHA. They captured a position, destroyed two guns, and took 370 Italian prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The initial German attacks on Tobruk

Rommel had assumed that Tobruk would be evacuated. He was surprised that the Australians were putting up a stiff resistance. The timeline was that the Germans performed a reconnaissance on April 11 and 12, 1941. This was followed by an attack from the south on April 13 and 14. Another attack was attempted from the west on April 16 and 17. All these attacks failed, so the Germans dropped back into a holding operation, while gathering strength for another attack in a few weeks. The action on April 11 and 12 was the 5th Panzer Regiment probing the 20th Australian Brigade near the road to El Adem. The attack was stopped by artillery fire. The German infantry were repelled by the Australians. The next attack was by the 5th Light Division on April 13 and 14, over the intervening night. The Germans forces were attacked from the air by No.45 and No.55 Squadrons. The actual attack was made by the 8th MG Battalion, supported by engineers against the 2/17th Australian Battalion. A posthumous Victoria Cross was awarded to Corporal Edmonston for his actions in repelling the German attack. The 5th Panzer Regiment tried to follow, with the idea of splitting, with one group to take Tobruk, while the other turned and caught the garrison in the flank, as they retreated from the attack. The Germans lost 16 of 38 tanks, as they were caught by artillery and British cruiser tanks engaging from "hull down positions". The 8th MG Battalion lost 3/4's of its strength. The garrison's losses were modest, being "26 killed, 64 wounded and two tanks and one 25-pdr gun disabled". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The forces in Tobruk

In early to mid-April 1941, the forces in and around Tobruk included the 24th Australian Infantry Brigade (two battalions), the 18th Australian Infantry Brigade, the 20th and 26th Australian Brigades, initially outside the perimeter. They entered "on the night of 9th April". As we noted, there was the remains of the 3rd Armoured Brigade. There was no medium artillery. There was only three 25pdr regiments, two anti-tank regiments (each one less a battery), and 16 heavy AA guns and 59 light AA guns. Most were used to defend the harbour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

This situation in the border area in April 1941

Brigadier Gott had been tasked to resist the German advance whereever he could. He had the 22nd Guards Brigade and four columns. The columns varied in strength, but usually consisted of a field artillery battery, an infantry company, and light tanks or armoured cars. The columns were positioned at Halfaya, where the 22nd Guards Brigade was in a defensive position, at Sofafi, Bug Buq, and Sidi Barrani. One company of the French motor battalion held the escarpment pass at the Halfway House. The columns were successful enough that they drew an attack by Herff Group. That forced the British to fall back on the Buq Buq-Sofafi line.

At Tobruk, they started with the Italian defences. There were double rings of defensive positions that covered a thirty mile front. The Australians worked on a defence in depth that would be hard to breach. In supportm, they had the remains of the 3rd Armoured Brigade. It had a regiment of armoured cars, two mixed regiments of light tanks and cruiser tanks, and one troop of Inf. Mk.II Matildas. The numbers were 26 cruiser tanks, 15 light tanks, and 4 infantry tanks (Matilda).

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.