The Greek situation in January 1941

The Greek army was successfully fighting the Italians in the mountains. The Italian divisions had been reduced to two regiments from three, so they felt the lack of infantry. The Greeks were handicapped by the lack of transport and anti-tank guns. They could not risk fighting in the open field, where these deficiencies would be most exploited. The RAF bomber contigent in Greece was limited to operating against Italian lines of communication. Snow and ice was making operations difficult and dangerous. As the RAF was operating from fields near Athens, any raids into Albania were limited, due to the 200 mile distance from their operational fields to the border. Everyone expected the Germans to intervene from Bulgaria, so the tension was great.

The Excess Convoy was the Royal Navy's first taste of operating under strong air attack in the Mediterranean Sea

The best Italian bomber aircraft that the British had to deal with was the SM79 torpedo bomber. When that was augmented by Ju88 and Ju87 divebombers, the British quickly found themselves in trouble. In addition, the mining effort was a continuing danger. The Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea was as competent a force as any in world in dealing with air attacks. They had the advantage of having Admiral Cunningham as fleet commander. During early 1941, the Italian fleet, particularly the battlefleet was a danger. The British had nothing to compare with the new Italian battleships, such as the Vittorio Veneto. The rebuilt ships such as the Conte di Cavour and Andrea Doria were also a threat, even though they were not as strong.

The five Excess convoy ships stopped at Gibraltar, before making the run to Malta and Greece. They were delayed while repairs were made to the Renown. The Essex was the ship for Malta. The cargo included 12 Hurricanes in crates. On the night of January 1st, the Northern Prince was stranded as the result of a storm. The 400 troops were taken off and distributed to the AA cruiser Bonaventure and the destroyers. They ship was refloated, but had to turn back.

The Mediterranean Fleet had sailed from Alexandria in what became the standard pattern for running convoys through to Malta. They escorted to more ships bound for Malta, the Breconshire and Clan Macaulay. Concurrently, two convoys, one fast and one slow, had set sail from Malta headed east.

In a foretaste of what was to come, the Royal Navy was suffering under the new scale of air attacks. The cruiser Southampton was disabled and had to be scuttled with torpedoes on January 11th. The aircraft carrier Illustrious was damaged, and this would hamper the Royal Navy's ability to operate in the central Mediterranean. Still, the convoys all passed through without loss.

Hitler's proposal to Mussolini

As early as November 20, 1940, Hitler proposed, in a letter to Mussolini, that the German airforce start operations against British shipping from Italian airbases. Erhard Milch was sent to Italy to make the arrangements. The Germans had hoped that the operation, dubbed "Mittelmeer" would only last until February. Fliegerkorps X was brought from Norway to commence operations from airfields in Sicily. 96 bombers had arrived by January 8th, 1941. By the tenth, 25 Me-110's had arrived. By the 15th, they had a total of 186 aircraft in the theater. They would soon have a big impact on British operations.

The Long Range Desert Group in early 1941

The two Long Range Desert Group patrols arrived back in Cairo in early February 1941 after covering 4,3oo miles. They had left on their mission about 6 weeks before. With most of Cyrenaica now in British hands, the LRDG would need to be based much further west. Colonel Leclerc and his men captured Kufra on March 1st. The HQ and three patrols moved to Kufra in April, as it was well-situated for further operations. This is from the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Fezzan operation

In late December 1940, the Long Range Desert Group sent two patrols to attack the Italians at Fezzan. Major Bagnold had coordinated with the Free French in Chad, and found some interest in their participating. Colonel Leclerc asked if they would help the Free French capture Kufra on the way back. The Long Range Desert Group sent a New Zealand and a Guards patrol twoard Fezaan. They had Sheikh Abd del Galil Seif en Nasr with them. He had been carrying on a resistance against Italian rule. The LRDG patrols traveled for 1300 miles and then were joined by the French under Lt-Colonel d'Ornano. They attacked the fort at Murzuk. The fort was too strong to take, but they inflicted a good deal of damage on the Italian aviation capability at that location. The attackers lost five men, including Lt-Colonel d'Ornano. After leaving Murzuk, the force headed for "the French base at Faya", where they met Colonel Leclerc. While the British were scouting ahead, they were attacked from the air and by their Italian counterparts, the Auto-Saharan company. Colonel Leclerc decided to defer the attack on Kufra and sent the British patrols on their way home. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Aircraft in Malta on December 31st, 1940

The air contingent based in Malta on December 31st, 1940 was pretty small:

• No. 830 Squadron Fleet Air Arm: 12 Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers
• No. 261 Squadron RAF: 16 Hurricanes, plus 4 in reserve
• No. 148 Squadron RAF: 16 Wellingtons, plus 4 in reserve
• No. 228 Squadron RAF: 4 Sunderland flying boats, plus 2 in reserve
• No. 431 Flight RAF: 4 Martin Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft ("Glenn Martins") with one in reserve. Eventually, this became No. 69 Squadron
  

This is from Vol.I of the Official History, page 312.

More about the fall of Tobruk, and a correction

By nightfall on the first day of the attack on Tobruk, half of the area had been captured. General Mackay ordered that they would attack to secure the rest in the morning. By 3:45pm on the second day, they had completely subdued the Italian resistance. The commanding general of the 61st Sirte Division surrendered to an Australian battalion commander. The Italian naval detachment also surrendered. The captors were pleased to find that there was still much of the harbor and equipment either in working order or repairable. In any case, the capture of Tobruk took much of two days, not one. This is based on the account in the Official History, Vol.I.

The initiation of the Long Range Desert Group

The Long Range Desert Group were an early Special Forces unit that was authorized by General Wavell in 1939. Major R. A. Bagnold had spent the 1930's with his colleagues becoming adept at navigating the great sand deserts far from the coast. He made a proposal to General Wavell in 1939 for the formation of the unit if Italy entered the war. The French had such a unit, as well, but their exit from the war took them out of the equation. The initial formation was the Long Range Patrol Unit. The Australians were offered the opportunity to participate, but General Blamey didn't want his troops serving outside of Australian units. Three patrols were organized and included some 30 New Zealanders, as well as British soldiers. By November 1940, the men had achieved enough success that General Wavell authorized the expansion into the Long Range Desert Group. The 3rd Coldstream Guards and the 2nd Scots Guards contributed men for a new patrol.

More about the capture of Tobruk

It was the 2/3 Australian Battalion that moved forward at 5:40am on January 21st, 1941. There was an artillery bombardment and the engineers had worked during the night to clear mines and disarm booby traps. It was the 6th Australian Division on the attack. Not more than an hour later, the 16th Brigade, supported by 18 infantry tanks, had pushed through the perimeter into the Tobruk area. They consolidated the gap, setting up to the east and west to protect the gap from attack. The 19th Brigade moved north. They had help through the day from the air. By 3:45pm, Tobruk had fallen. They took 23,000 soldiers and 2,000 sailors prisoner. They captured 208 medium and field guns. There were also 87 tanks captured. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

"By early afternoon, 13th Corps was once more counting booty..."

Correlli Barnett, in The Desert Generals, described the scene after the fall of Tobruk: "By early afternoon, 13th Corps was once more county the booty while 7th Armoured Division rolled away to the west." General O'Connor continued to give a textbook presentation of how to conduct blitzkrieg. Half of his enemies were in Cairo and London, sadly enough. O'Connor's answer to the wrong-headedness of his superiors was to move so quickly that the brass would not be able to stop him. They had attacked Tobruk starting at 5:40am on January 21st and by afternoon they had conquered the place. General O'Connor was already moving towards the next prize, Benghazi.

The Tobruk defences

The Italian garrison at Tobruk had half as many men to defend a perimeter that was twice as long as Bardia. The ends of the perimeter were both at the beach. Tobruk, like Bardia, was on the edge of the escarpment. A rough terrain descended to the beach. Tobruk had two lines of concrete emplacements with minefields. There was also a partial anti-tank ditch. Two forts anchored the defences. Fort Pilastrano seems to have been on the highest ground. Fort Solaro overlooked the road to Derna to the west. The first day of the attack took place on January 21st. The 6th Australian Division penetrated the defences just to the east of the El Adem road. By the end of the first day, they had reached Fort Solara and had crossed the Bardia road. This is based on the account in the Official History.

Correlli Barnett says that General O'Connor had a plan to conquer the rest of Libya by the end of February 1941

If Churchill and Wavell had not stopped him, there might have been no place for the Germans to land in North Africa. The mad scheme to aid Greece in the face of German invasion killed the opportunity that Italy could have been knocked out of Libya by O'Connor's blitz into Libya. If you read Churchill's communications in February 1941, you will see that he had become totally unhinged. This was not the last time, sadly, but this would prolong the war and cost Britain much manpower, equipment, and time to recover what was lost in this month. Correlli Barnett, in The Desert Generals, on pages 50 to 56, tells the whole sale tale. As I am a Churchill enthusiast, it pains me greatly to read the story.

Another view of the capture of Tobruk in January 1941

Correlli Barnett wrote that on January 11th, 1941, Hitler made the decision to send troops to support the Italians in Libya. The event that caused this determination was the fall of Bardia. A new formation, the 5th Light Division, organized as a mixed division of tanks and motorized infantry, would be formed and sent to Libya. The move would start on February 15th. General Wavell really wasn't perpared to fight a blitzkrieg-style campaign, but General O'Connor had his forces already investing Tobruk, so he allowed the campaign to continue. Typically, during this period, the British were trying to do everything "on the cheap", with insufficient forces and equipment. The attempt to save Greece was a forlorn effort because of this, and the situation in the Western Desert would be compromised by the same problem, along with too many WWI-minded officers at various levels. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

The 7th Armoured Division in January 1941

The 7th Armoured Division had lost considerable strength in the course of a month. In any case, they could not take Tobruk, unaided. They had 69 cruiser tanks and 126 light tanks. The 8th Hussars and 6th RTR were withdrawn from the field and their tanks were distributed among the remaining units. At the same time, the 2nd Armoured Division was arriving in the Middle East. It was equipped with two cruiser regiments and two light tank regiments. Their tanks were in poor condition, but they were moved up to Cyrenaica (Eastern Libya) in early February 1941. General Mackay planned the attack on Tobruk with the 6th Australian Division and the remnants of the 7th RTR playing a prominent part.

Supplies held up the attack on Tobruk

The British were stretched to supply the 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division at Tobruk. The attack was delayed due to the need to stockpile supplies to support an attack. The systems and organizations were still being developed that would ultimately be used for the rest of the war. They had succeeded in building successive depots across the desert, but the rapid push to Tobruk, after the quick fall of Bardia meant that they had finally outstripped their logistic support. The port at Sollum was operated by a detachment managed by General Wilson. This allowed General O'Connor and 13th Corps to focus on the advance. After a brief period, General Wavell assumed control of 13th Corps from the Theater Headquarters. For some reason, Bardia was only used for transshipping supplies to Greece, and Sollum was the main center for receiving supplies.

The Greek campaign started to impact Compass in January 1941

The desert offensive was impacted by the vain effort to aid Greece. The Middle East lost three RAF squadrons. Alexandria lost its Hurricane squadron while the Western Desert lost one Blenheim and one Gladiator squadron. If the British only had the Italians to deal with, it was not a great loss. The problem was that the German Luftwaffe was gathering in Sicily to take control of the Central Mediterranean Sea. They were to make life very difficult for Malta, the Royal Navy, and even the army in the desert.

After Bardia, Tobruk (January 1941)

Tobruk was close enough to Bardia that the 19th Australian Brigade left the Bardia environs later in the day on January 6th and was on the outskirts of Tobruk's defences by morning. The British 16th Infantry Brigade moved up to the southeast. The 4th Armoured Brigade moved further west on the south side of Tobruk. The 7th Armoured Brigade Support Group and the 7th Armoured Brigade moved into a blocking position to the west of Tobruk. The Italian airforce was pushed out of range of Tobruk. Fighters had to operate from Maraua, which was 170 miles from Tobruk. The RAF, however, had moved forward, so they were in position to continue to provide support.

The capture of Bardia

The Italians losses at Bardia were immense. They had lost 40,000 men, killed, wounded, or prisoners. The booty included:

• 400 guns
• 13 medium tanks
• 117 light tanks
• 200-300 vehicles

"The Corps Commander, General Berganzoli escaped." The Italian army in Libya lost 8 divisions to Operation Compass, as of early January 1941. The British response was to send the 7th Armoured Brigade to cut the road west from Tobruk. The infantry was quickly sent towards Tobruk. General O'Connor knew well how to do blitzkrieg.

The assault on Bardia on January 3rd, 1941

The attack on Bardia started at 5:30am on January 3rd, 1941. The 2/1st Australian Battalion had reached its objective by 7am. The 7th RTR advanced at 7am and worked in conjunction with the 2/2nd Australian Battalion crossed the Bardia-Fort Capuzzo road. Meanwhile, the 6th Divisional Cavalry had advanced two miles in the direction of Bardia. They had their Bren carriers and little else. Six Italian medium tanks attacked and were eventually knocked out by two anti-tank guns. The 2/6th Battalion lost two platoons in a diversionary attack in the north. The battleships Warspite, Valiant, and Barham bombarded Bardia at 8:10am. The Illustrious provided air cover and spotter aircraft. The monitor Terror and the gunboats assisted the bombardment. The RAF hit airfields in the Italian rear. The second wave of the attack started at 11:10am, when the 17th Australian Infantry Brigade attacked from the south, along the road.

The Australians established themselves near Bardia, starting in late December 1940

The commanding general of the 6th Australian Division, Major-General Mackay took charge of the area around Sollum starting December 21st. The Australians immediately started aggressive patrolling about the Bardia defences. The goal was to establish control of the area right up to Bardia's perimeter. The RAF had been photographing Bardia to determine the extent of the defences. The duties of 16th Australian Division patrols was to gather intelligence about the details of the Italian defences around Bardia. The Italians defended their perimeter but did only minimal patrolling. The 6th Australian Division, minus many of their divisional support units, was augmented by the 7th RTR with only 23 Matildas still runners and about 120 artillery pieces. The 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers were the only available machine gun battalion. General Mackay chose to attack the western side, about 2-1/2 miles south of the road to Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History. He had finalized his plan on December 28th, 1940.

The commanders-in-chief decided to give Compass the priority on December 26th, 1940

After taking steps to strip the attack against the Italians in Libya of resources, the Commanders-in-Chief decided abruptly to give that front priority. The goal was to capture Tobruk, although Bardia was still waiting to be assaulted. The logistic situation became even more difficult, as supplies had to be accumulated for a continuation of the offensive. Marshal Graziani realized that the British were having difficulties, and his immediate reaction was to make a strong defence of both Bardia and Tobruk. Mussolini endorsed the idea, but Marshal Graziani immediately had doubts about the wisdom of such a plan. Meanwhile, General Bergonzoli ("Electric Whiskers") was able to bring the troops from the border region into Bardia to strengthen the defences. The raw 6th Australian Division would make the assault on what they supposed was a force of 20,000 men in Bardia. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The water shortage during Compass (December 1940)

A contingency plan for keeping Mersa Matruh supplied if the Italians had succeeded in cutting the supply line allowed the British to supply their troops being gathered for an assault on Bardia. The navy had organized a unit with the sole purpose of keeping Matruh supplied. Now, they were used to bring supplies to the troops in eastern Libya, near Bardia. Sollum would provide a useful port, but at first it was not yet in working order. The greatest problem was the water supply. Fort Capuzzo had storage tanks, but the water was contaminated with salt, so it was unusable. 12,000 gallons were shipped by road from Mersa Matruh. Part of the problem was the 4 gallon can, which would often leak. The navy used the gunboats Aphis and Ladybird, the water-carrier Myriel, and the monitor Terror to bring water forward in sufficient quantities.

By mid-December 1940, the focus had shifted to Bardia

The RAF flew 150 sorties against Bardia from December 14th to 19th. In conjunction, Wellingtons from Malta operated against Italian airfields in Libya. They destroyed some 44 aircraft. The 16th Infantry Brigade moved up to the southern side of Bardia while the 16th Australian Brigade moved to the southwest side. The 7th Armoured Division moved to block any relief efforts from Tobruk. Meanwhile, supply depots were set up. One line was along the coastal road while another followed the line of the escarpment. The transport received reinforcements from captured Italian trucks. Meanwhile, Sollum fell to the British on Decmeber 16th. This was convenient because it provided a small seaport close to the front.

The arrangements after December 11th, 1940

When Major-General Mackay and the 6th Australian Division arrived, they would have as additional forces the 16th Infantry Brigage and the 7th RTR, along with artillery. Their first task would be to capture Bardia. The orders for the 7th Armoured Division were to move between Tobruk and Bardia. On bright aspect of the previous week's action was that the RAF totally dominated the air against the Regia Aeronautica. The RAF used Gladiators for giving air cover in the field while the Hurricanes were used against Italian forces to the west of Bardia. The RAF and RAAF were quickly expending their supply of Gladiators. The bag for December 9th to 11th was impressive:

1. 38,300 Italian and Libyan prisoners
2. 237 guns
3. 73 tanks (L3/33, M11/39, and M13/40)
4. More than 1000 vehicles

This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The results of December 11th and 12th, 1940

The British offensive had almost driven the Italians from Egypt by December 12th. The only Italian position still held was blocking Sollum and there was a force at Sidi Omar. The next step was to send mobile forces to block the road between Tobruk and Bardia. In the meantime, the offensive had progressed so well that General Wavell felt confident enough to follow his plan to withdraw the 4th Indian Division and send them to the Sudan, removing a large part of the attacking force. They would be replaced by the 6th Australian Division. They would have the opportunity to take Bardia, when they had arrived. The British 16th Infantry Brigade would stay and continue the offensive. At this point, Wavell was conducting the anti-Blitzkrieg: instead of reinforcing success, he stripped away what made the success possible. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

December 11th, 1940 Operation Compass

On December 10th, the 7th Armoured Division, with cruiser tanks lent to Selby Force, operated with armoured cars, mobile artillery, and light tanks. They were at least crossing the coastal road. December 11th saw the 7th Armoured Brigade assaulting Buq Buq, and capturing a large number of Italian troops and artillery. The 4th Armoured Brigade was intended to be sent to Sofafi, but didn't receive the word in time, so that the Cirene Division was able to withdraw, umimpeded. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group found that the Cirene had withdrawn from Rabia and Sofafi during the night of 10-11 December. The day was still successful, as Selby Force and the 6th RTR fought the 1st Libyan Division, which had given their surrender at 1pm. By nightfall, the 4th Blackshirt Division had also surrendered. This is from the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

British Armour on December 9th and 10th, 1940

The Matildas of the 7th RTR were a critical piece of the assault on Nibeiwa. Sadly, on leaving Nibeiwa, after the victory, 6 Matildas ran into a minefield and were lost. There 6 Matildas to assault Tummar East. While the 4/6th Rajputana Rifles were held up by Italian tanks , the Matildas got into the camp. Meanwhile, the 4th Armoured Brigade was providing cover for the 4th Indian Division. The 11th Hussars spread out to the west, as a screen. The 7th Hussars, with light tanks (perhaps Lt.Mk.VIBs) moved across the road between Sidi Barrani and Bug Buq. The 7th Armoured Division Support Group covered the south, while the 7th Armoured Brigade was kept in reserve, awaiting developments. On December 10th, 10 Matildas from the 7th RTR supported the 16th Infantry Brigade's advance on the road network to the west. They blocked the exits from Sidi Barrani from the south and west. General Beresford-Peirse ordered to them to attack Sidi Barrani before dark. He sent armoured support from the 7th RTR and the 2nd RTR to operate to the west (the left flank?). This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

After the fall of Camp Nibeiwa

After Nibeiwa and Tummars were overrun, but before Brigadier Selby was told about the outcome, he sent forces to attempt to block the escape route from Maktila. Sadly, they were too late, and the British forces eventually learned that the 1st Libyan Division had escaped in the darkness. By late afternoon, General O'Connor was wondering what had happened, and as he had received no word, he drove to the Tummar West Camp to meet General Beirsford-Peirse. They would send the 5th Indian Brigade against Tummar East. The 16th (British) Infantry Brigade was sent to the west to block the coastal road that led to Sidi Barrani. The 7th RTR and two field artillery regiments were also sent in motion. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Official History has some good photos from December 1940

The Official History, Vol.I, between pages 280 and 281, has some good photos from December 1940. One is "A burnt-out British tank which had become bogged in a salt marsh near Buq Buq in December 1940". The tank is probably a Lt.Mk.VIB, although it could be a Lt.Mk.VIA. The next photo is an aerial view of Sollum, showing the harbour and rising escarpment in the background. Another shows a truck, perhaps a gun tractor, towing an Inf.Mk.II Matilda up the road towards Halfaya Pass. There is also a picture of the river gunboat Aphis in Sollum harbour, where she had landed water for the army. Another photo shows burnt out and sunken ships ain the harbour at Bardia, where the Aphis had provided gunfire support on December 17th, 1940. Another photo shows Italian L3/33 light tanks abandoned on the hill above the harbour at Bardia. In another photo, you can see black smoke rising from the harbour at Tobruk. In the last photo of this series, you see the burning and sunken armoured cruiser San Giorgio, a survivor from the pre-dreadnought era.

The assault on Camp Nibeiwa

At 7:15am on December 9th, 1940, the assault on Camp Nibeiwa commenced. There was a 72-gun barrage from the 4th Indian Division artillery while 2 squadrons from the 7th RTR rolled towards the northwest corner of the camp. These were Inf.Mk.II Matildas. They were supported by 31st Battery, Royal Artillery. On the flanks were Bren carrier from the 2nd Battalion The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders and 1/6thRajputana Rifles. The 20 Italian medium tanks and a few light tanks were quickly taken. The camp was quickly divided the camp into quarters and artillery was used, firing point-blank, to silence holdouts. The 5th Indian Brigade and 25th Field Artillery Regiment (without the 31st Battery) attacked the Tummar West camp to the west of Nibeiwa.

A small tidbit about the attack on Bardia in January 1941

The 6th Australian Division was eager to attack Bardia. Their sole fear was that the Italians would escape before they could attack. For the attack, General Mackay was given "120 of the 154 available guns". The 7th RTR was also there for the assault. They had managed to get 23 tanks running. Their main problem was lack of spare parts. They were equipped with Inf.Mk.II Matilda tanks. The 1st Northumberland Fusiliers, a machine gun battalion was also available for the assault. The only available unit not to take part was the 16th Infantry Brigade, a British unit.

Another look at the initial operations in Compass

Vol.I of the Official History also has information about initial operations in Compass. Selby Force, commanded by Brigadier Selby, had a strength of about 1,800 men. This was apparently all that could be provided with transport. These were drawn from the garrison at Mersa Matruh. They were to be a blocking force between Tummar and Maktila. The monitor Terror and the gunboat Aphis bombarded Maktila. Another gunboat, the Ladybird, fired on Sidi Barrani. The camp at Nibeiwa was scouted by the 2nd Rifle Brigade, which was looking for the best approach. They found that the best spot was where a road entered the camp on the northwest corner. The Fourth Indian Division, commanded by Major-General Beirsford-Peirse, had moved into position about 15 miles from Nibeiwa. On the night of December 8, 1940, one brigade (11th Indian) moved forward with the 7th RTR to a position near Nibeiwa. The 7th Armoured Division was far to the southwest, ready to block any rescue effort.

The experiment with mixed squadrons in October and November 1940

The British experimented with mixed squadrons in an attempt to provide useful short range reconnaissance and ground support to the offensive. No.208 squadron was equipped with 8 Lysanders and 4 Hurricanes. No.3 RAAF squadron was equipped with 8 Gladiators and 4 Gauntlets. There was also one flight of No.6 squadron equipped with just 4 Lysanders. The lesson had been learned in France that Lysanders needed fighter escort to be effective. The idea was to integrate fighters and reconnaissance (or Army cooperation) aircraft into squadrons. It was also an opportunity to train fighter pilots in the art of reconnaissance. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Mid-October 1940: decisions about air strength in the Middle East

By mid-October, the Chiefs of Staff decided that with the focus on the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, that air strength must be augmented, and quickly. Existing squadrons would be rearmed with newer aircraft and squadron strength would be increased from 12 to 16 aircraft. The Sunderland squadrons would have their strength increased to six aircraft. They would send 48 Blenheim IVs and 24 Hurricanes every month. They would fly out 23 Wellingtons to replace Bristol Bombay bomber-transports. They would send 227 Mohawk fighters to the Middle East as well as 149 Martin Maryland aircraft, instead of the planned 75. The Marylands did not start to arrive in Africa until December 12th, so that setback plans. The RAF also found, when Mohawks started to arrive that they were unsuitable for combat, due to their low performance. They were diverted to India and South Africa for training, instead. In December, RAF losses were mounting, at least partly due to the Italian explosive bullets. Even when aircraft were not lost, they could be put out of action for a while because of damage from the explosive bullets. Despite the RAF situation, General Wavell decided to mount the Compass operation anyway. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Even in 1940, the Germans were preparing to intervene in North Africa

During the summer of 1940, the Italians kept begging for German equipment, but the German preferance was to send their own troops, instead. The initial plans were for two armoured divisions and one motorized division. The Germans were focused on the Suez Canal, and thought it unlikely that the Italians would be able to capture it. The General staff dispatched General von Thoma to Libya to survey the situation. The 3rd Panzer Division was to make preparations to be sent to North Africa. General von Thoma submitted an unfavorable report, and the 3rd Panzer ceased their preparations.

The air component of Operation Compass

Operation Compass, the attack on Italian forces, had a strong air contingent, given the remoteness of the region. They had 48 fighters and 116 bombers. They included two Hurricane squadrons and one Gladiator squadron. Of the bombers, there were three Blenheim squadrons, three Wellington, and one Bombay squadron. Air Commodore Collishaw commanded the force from his headquarters at Maaten Baggush. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Reinforcements, temporarily, for the 11th Hussars

In October, the RAF No.2 Armoured Car Company arrived from Palestine to reinforce the 11th Hussars. They almost certainly were also equipped with Rolls Royce armoured cars. Very likely, they were the 1924 pattern. The served alongside the 11th Hussars from October 1940 through February 1941.

Air reinforcements for Malta in early October 1940

The decision was made to bring Malta's air strength up to one full squadron of Hurricanes and 12 Martin Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The chiefs of staff wanted to start bombing Benghazi, but there were not adequate resources available. Blenheims from Egypt were out of range. The No.216 Bomber Transport squadron was needed as transports, so they could only be diverted to bombing by impacting their transport duties. In the first two weeks of October, the Hurricanes in Malta were able to stay active. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Air power to be sent to Greece: late 1940

The British commanders planned about what air units could be sent to aid Greece. This started about November 4, 1940, when instructions arrived. The commanders found that what could be sent would be limited by the availability of suitable airfields. The main problem was the lack of all-weather airfields. The terrain was very unsuitable, as well, for constructing new airfields. To protect what airfields there were, General Wavell was to send AA artillery. That would initially be one heavy and one light AA batteries. After that, three Blenheim squadrons would be sent. One of these was actually a mixed squadron of bombers and Gladiators. One additional fighter squadron equipped with Gladiators would be sent. As the Hurricane inventory reached the critical point, a second fighter squadron would then be sent. Egypt would be stripped to the bare minimum, if not below that level. Given the hindsight we have about how forelorn an operation this would be, the risks that were taken seem reckless, in the extreme. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

June 11, 1940 and beyond

The British put out a covering force to be ready for the commencement of hostilities with Italy. The 11th Hussars, equipped with Morris AC9 and Rolls Royce Model 1924 Mk.I armoured cars, were spread out across the desert as much as 40 miles from the coast on June 11th. That night, they crossed the border and took surprised Italian outposts that weren't aware that war had been declared. The 7th Hussars and 1st/KRRC moved up to the border, and on June 14th, took Fort Capuzzo. Fort Maddalena fell to the 11th Hussars. On the 16th, a squadron of the 7th Hussars and J Battery, RHA, routed a column of 17 Italian light tanks, guns, and infantry and captured all the tanks.

As early as June 11th, the Italians commenced bombing Malta. Malta had never received the planned AA artillery outfit. Instead of 112 heavy and 60 light AA guns, they only had 34 heavy and 8 light. They did have the famous three Gladiators named Faith, Hope, and Charity.

The Western Desert

The area where the combatants moved and fought in 1940 would become known as the Western Desert. The Western Desert actually refers to the Western Desert of Egypt, but the British forces came to call the entire area on either side of "The Wire" as the Western Desert. "The Wire" was what the British forces called the Italian-erected triple barbed wire fence that marked the border between Egypt and Libya. From the sea to the Libyan plateau, the land rose to 500ft above sealevel. The rise was called the escarpment, as it was a rough stretch that restricted movement from the shore to the plateau. The terrain is covered by a thin layer of "clay or fine sand" over "limestone rock". The land is very rocky, which could make travel difficult. What water there was could be "found in deep wells and those cisterns known in service Arabic as 'birs', which date from Roman times". This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History, and the quotes are from page 115.

The RAF was active following the commencement of war with Italy

Flying from Egypt, Blenheim I's had a limited reach into Libya. For example, Benghazi was beyond their range. Right before they were at war, the British moved No.202 Group to Maaten Gaggush. 26 Blenheims attacked an airfield at El Adem. Three of the attacking aircraft were lost. In a repeast attack, 18 Italian aircraft were destroyed or damaged. In a dawn attack the next day, nine Blenheims attacked Tobruk and among other targets, damaged the old cruiser San Giorgio. A few days later, when the Army took Fort Cappuzo, just beyond the border, the RAF supported the attack with Gladiators and Blenheims. After the initial burst of activity, the limited resources of the RAF caused them to have to drop back to harrassing attacks with single aircraft. Short range reconnaissance over Italian lines was done by Lysanders, while longer range reconnaissance was handled by Blenheims. Fighter support was still limited to Gladiators, as Hurricanes had not yet arrived in the desert. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Count Ciano on the Italian ultimatum to Greece in 1940

In a note quoted in Vol.I of the British Official History, Count Ciano noted in his diary on October 22, 1940 that "Naturally it (the ultimatum) is a document that allows no way out for Greece. Either she accepts occupation or she will be attacked." Despite the Italian charges in the ultimatum, the Greeks had maintained a strick neutrality prior to the Italian note. Because of that, the British had no real idea about Greek troop deployments or what they planned. In Alexandria, the British commanders met to plan what to do about establishing a British presence in the strategic island of Crete. The initial plan was to establish a fueling station. The fleet would escort store ships and auxiliaries to Suda Bay, in the northwest. This is based on the account in the Official History.

On August 15, 1940, Italy attacked Greece

Hostilities opened between Italy and Greece with the torpedoing of the Greek cruiser Helle on August 15, 1940. The Greeks suspected an Italian submarine, but had no proof. General Metaxis asked what help Greece could expect from Great Britain on August 22. At that date, Britain didn't have any available forces to deploy to Greece. British forces, such as they were, were committed to defending Egypt. The actual Italian invasion was delayed, while they inquired what the German reaction would be. The Italian note was only delivered on October 28, 1940. Within hours, Greece and Italy were at war "through no fault of her own". This based on the account in the British Official History.

RAF planning in early August 1940

The decision was made that the highest priority was to rearm existing squadrons rather than divert aircraft to new squadrons. By the end of September, the plan was to have "five medium bomber squadrons, three fighter squadrons, and one bomber transport squadron would be reamred with modern aircraft: a total of 84 Blenheim IVs, 60 Hurricanes, 12 Wellingtons and a small quota of replacements." The SAAF would receive 24 Hurricanes, where they would form new squadrons. From the French orders from the Glenn Martin company, there were 150 Marylands available. The Middle East and the SAAF would divide these. Immediately, three Marylands would be diverted to use for long-range reconnaissance. Three more Marylands were sent to Malta to use for spares. More aircraft were in transit. 24 Hurricanes had been sent around the Cape. They were close to arriving in Egypt. 36 were in transit to Takoradi. 24 Blenheim IVs had arrived in Egypt by way of Malta. Antoher 24 were in transit to either Takoradi or Egypt. Six Wellingtons were newly arrived in late August. Desperate measures were required after the fall of France. One step was to use Takoradi as an arrival point in Africa for aircraft. They were then sent on to Egypt by air. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Air Chief Marshal Longmore's srequirements in 1940

Air Chief Marshal Longmore took over command of RAF forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East in May 1940. The Air Ministry informed him in July about what they might be able to send him. They would send him 12 Hurricanes, 12 Lysanders, and 12 Blenheim IV aircraft immediately. The target shipments every month were:

• 12 Hurricanes
• 12 Blenheim IVs
• 6 Lysanders

In three weeks, he had lost 10 Blenheims and 11 Wellesleys. The Wellesleys were being replaced by Blenheims, and the Wellesley was disappearing from the inventory. Longmore sent his estimate to the Air Ministry of his requirements: 35-50 Blenheims and at least 24 Hurricanes every month. He also needed a long range reconnaissance aircraft. The American Glenn Martin Marylands eventually filled that need. He also needed a torpedo-reconnaissance aircraft for use from Malta, and needed a replacement for the Lysander, which had proved to be unsuitable for the conditions. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Italian attack on September 13, 1940

On September 13, 1940, the Italians attacked British forces in Egypt. They bombarded Musaid with artillery, and then advanced up the coast road. The British had expected the Italians to outflank them from the desert, but the Italians were concerned that the British were more at home in the desert than they were, so they didn't make the attempt. Count Ciano wrote that "Never has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of the Commander" (quoted in the Official History). He was writing about Marshall Graziani.

British opposition was limited to the following units:

• 3rd Coldstream Guards,
• C Battery RHA
• later, a portion of F Battery, RHA
• one section of 25/26th Medium Battery, RA
• one company 1/KRRC
• 1 machine gun company from 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
  

They were commanded by Lieutenant-Coloonel J. Moubray. They were able to inflict some casualties with artillery fire, along with air attacks, but the Italians easily captured the barracks and then to advance along the road to Sollum. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Major-General Percy Hobart

Correlli Barnett criticizes Major-General Percy Hobart as the source of the mistaken idea that "tanks should fight other tanks". That was not the German way, although they often did fight other tanks, at least on the Eastern Front and later, on the Western Front, after there was one. Rommel used the "Sword and Shield" approach where armour was the sword and the shield was his anti-tank weapons. The 88mm FLAK36 was his key weapon in the shield, although the 50mm PAK38 was also highly effective, at least against the British cruiser tanks that Rommel's forces faced.

But Percy Hobart was a maverick and a champion of mechanized warfare. I would treat him better than Correlli Barnett. He was tossed out of the British Army by Archibald Wavell, after Hobart's commanding officer wrote an "adverse report" about him. When confronted on this incident later, Wavell could not adequately explain his dismissal of Hobart. This was the same mindset that later forced out Eric Dorman-Smith, another mechanized warfare expert.

Through the efforts of Winston Churchill, Hobart was returned to the army, although only in an organizing and training role, for which he was well-suited.

Trevor Constable has a paper about Hobart in the Journal of Historical Review. I have drawn upon that, as well as Correlli Barnett, in my discussion here.

Operation "Brevity"

The Brevity was planned to have an attack by three columns commanded by Brigadier Gott. The column that would cut through the desert to flank the German positions on the border would have the 7th Armoured Brigade Group with only two squadrons from the 2/RTR totalling 29 cruiser tanks. They were to advance to Sidi Azeiz, WSW of Bardia. The 22nd Guards with 2 squadrons from the 4/RTR (with 24 Inf. Mk.II's) would attack Halfaya Pass. The 2/Rifle Brigade and the 8th Field Regiment would block the coast road, stopping any eastward advance from Sollum. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Tiger Convoy ships (May 1941)

The actual fast (15 knot) transports used for the Tiger Convoy were the Clan McChatton, Clan Lamont, Clan Campbell, Empire Song, and New Zealand Star. The Empire Song was mined and sunk, taking with it 57 tanks and 10 Hurricanes. The original totals for the convoy were 295 tanks and 53 Hurricanes. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

There are some good websites about the war in the Western Desert in 1940-1943

I went looking for information about the Tiger Convoy with a new search engine (Temoa) and found some good sites. For example, there is this page titled "Engagements-1941" that must be 7th Armoured Division-centric, given the red desert rats insignia at the top. The Tiger Convoy tank list that I am seeing is something like this:

1. 135 Matildas
2. 82 Crusader tanks
3. 21 light tanks (I believe that these were Lt.Mk.VIC's)

I need to keep looking, as I am not certain about the cruiser tanks being all Crusaders.

British tank strength in Egypt in September 1940

The British official history points out something that I had not realized, but should have, that the Italian medium tank designations included their size in tons. For example, the M11/39 was an 11 ton tank and the M13/40 was a thirteen ton tank. British intelligence knew that they were facing Italian medium tanks of both sorts, but didn't know numbers. The British, in the September 1940 timeframe had something like 85 cruiser tanks, of which 15 were in the shop. The British tanks were 12-1/2 and 14 ton vehicles. British offensive operations by air, at this time, had been limited to a nightly bombing raid by a single Bristol Bombay aircraft on targets at Tobruk. Typically, these were ships and fuel tanks. As Italian air operations increased in tempo, the RAF started bombing with their three available bomber squadrons, Nos. 55, 113, and 211. The British had grand plans for reinforcing Egypt and the Middle East, but shipping the men, equipment, and supplies around the Cape would take time. This set the scene for the consideration to ship immediate reinforcements with the Hats operation.

Operation Hats in August 1940 and other reinforcements for the Middle East

The decision was made to send reinforcements to the Middle East. Churchill was presented with a list of units and equipment that would be included in the shipment. They included the following:

• 3rd Hussars with light tanks
• 2nd battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment with cruiser tanks
• 7th battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment with 50 infantry tanks
• 48-2pdr anti-tank guns
• 20-Bofors 40mm light anti-aircraft guns
• 48-25pdr guns
• 500 Bren guns
• 250 0.55in Boys anti-tank rifles
• 50,000 anti-tank mines
• 300 tons of spare parts and equipment

The navy was preparing an operation to reinforce the Eastern Mediterranean, so the plan was to include four 16 knot transports carrying the supplies and vehicles. The operation was called "Hats", and involved the Mediterranean fleet and Force H, based at Gibraltar. The navy became increasingly concerned about risking the fleet to escort a convoy at 15 knots, and their view eventually prevailed, causing the army convoy to be sent around the Cape, to arrive in late September at Suez. After the Prime Minister saw the success of Hats, minus the tanks and equipment, he insisted in 1941, on sending them through the Mediterranean in the Tiger Convoy. This is based on Vol.I of the Official History and Winston Churchill's Their Finest Hour.

Correlli Barnett referred to General Godwin-Austin as an "eighteenth century kind of general"

We now jump back to the crisis in the Crusader battle. General Cunningham, the Eighth Army commander had lost his nerve, on understanding that he had lost control of the battle, and that the British situation was increasingly desperate. British tank doctrine was fatally flawed, since the British view was that "tanks fought tanks". The Germans, as I have already written, used their tanks against the opposing soft transport and infantry, and used their anti-tank guns to engage the British armour. Cunningham's BGS was Brigadier Galloway. He had sent him to speak to one of his corps commanders, Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austin, who commanded 13th Corps. Galloway broached the subject of a withdrawal to Egypt, and Godwin-Austin reacted violently, saying that he couldn't ask Bernard Freyburg and the New Zealanders to stop their attack. The officers and men under Cunningham's command conspired to keep the attack going until General Auchinleck could arrive and stabilize the situation. Cunningham could no longer function as army commander. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

This should be helpful

I have seen this, and have probably mentioned it previously, but I continue to be pleased with the existence of war diaries for units such as the 11th Hussars, who were stalwarts in the war in North Africa against Rommel. I'm not sure that I understand who is behind this site, but it seems quite useful. I've not spent too much time reading it yet, but I can see where it might answer some questions about the individual units.

December 1940 in Libya

In the attack on Camp Nibeiwa, soemthing like 20 Italian medium tanks were caught outside the camp and shot up by the passing Inf. Mk.II's. They moved into the camp and created chaos. The Italians were caught by surprise, and some troops immediately surrendered. Most fought well, but by 8:30am, the fight was over. Over 2,000 men were prisoners and 35 medium tanks were captured. The attacking forces then headed for the Tumman camps. General O'Connor left his BGS at headquarters and headed for the action. Brigadier Caunter was left to command the 7th Armoured Division as General Creagh had been forced into the hospital because of "an abscess on his tongue". After the initial attack on December 9th, only 8 Inf. Mk.II Matildas still were runners. Selby Force did not do as well, and "allowed the Italians to escape from Maktila". This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.

Operation Compass in December 1940

General Wavell gave his approval on December 5, 1940, for the attack on the Italians in Libya. The field commander was General O'Connor, who had prepared his troops for this moment. The army had trained for 6 months with the attack in mind. The attacking force was not large. They had the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division. The 4th Indian Division was provided with 57 infantry tanks (Inf. Mk. II Matildas). There was also a battlegroup called "Selby Force" after its commander, Brigadier Selby. The attacking force consisted of 36,000 troops. The attack was launched on December 7th, 1940. O'Connor's plan was to move forward in two moves. The first would put them part way into the desert. The second would position them for the attack. In the strange happenings of the times, in five days, General Wavell intended to withdraw the 4th Indian Division for use in Eritrea. He didn't want to spoil O'Connor's concentration by letting him know ahead of time. On the morning of December 9th, the attack began with the 4/7 Rajput Regiment assaulting Camp Nibeiwa.

The race to Sidi Barrani

General O'Connor and Eric Dorman-Smith struck out across the rough ground behind the 7th Armoured Division. O'Connor wanted to be present to assure that the 7th Armoured Division was sufficiently active and pursuing opportunities. As they crossed the broken ground, they saw a trail of broken down tanks, and O'Connor became increasingly concerned. Eventually, the ground smoothed out, but the dust got worse. The 11th Hussars reached Msus first, 60 miles from the road. Brigadier Harding visited General Creagh's headquarters, now located at Msus. They decided that they needed to send out another group, headed further south, to increase the odds of cutting off the Italians before they escaped. The 11th Hussar's commander, Colonel Combe, led the new group that included some of his armoured cars. They headed for Antelat. O'Connor caught up the the 7th Armoured division HQ at Wadi Azzin. He received the news that Colonel Combe and his group had reached Antelat at 10:34am. It was empty, so they moved on to Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

The situation in February 1941

The Italian commander, Marshal Graziani, concluded that they must abandon Cyrenaica and evacuate their forces to defend Tripolitania. They would fall back to Syrte and concentrate there. General O'Connor's forward headquarters was located at Bomba. His staff included his Brigadier General Staff, Brigadier Harding and Brigadier Eric Dorman-Smith, who had arrived on January 29th. General Wavell had send Brigadier Dorman-Smith to document the campaign and write a study for future reference. The situation was getting tense, as reinforcements had not arrived and they were down to 50 cruiser tanks as runners. O'Connor dispatched Brigadier Dorman-Smith back to Cairo to ask permission to advance further. The goal was to cut off the Italian retreat. General Wavell gave permission to move forward, and Brigadier Dorman-Smith arrived back at Bomba to witness the action. On February 4th, the 7th Armoured Division with 50 cruiser tanks and 8 light tanks advanced from Mechili. They headed out across the rugged terrain towards the coast near Beda Fomm. This is based on Correlli Barnett's account in The Desert Generals.

General Cunningham in East Africa in early 1941

General Cunningham attacked Italian Somaliland from Kenya, starting on February 10th, 1941. He had four infantry brigades in his force. On February 22, he fought a battle against six Italian brigades and indiginous troops, and beat them. When his enemy melted away, Conningham advance 200 miles to capture Mogadishu (a familiar name to us, as this point). Since he had no opposition, he marched his troops 700 miles to Ethiopia (which the British called Abyssinia). The British were already attacking the Italian positions in Eritrea, so this put Cunningham's forces in the Italian rear. After resting three days, he set off again. After itermediate stops at Harrar (March 26th) and Diredawa (March 29th), his troops entered Addas Abab on April 6th. General Auchinleck was so impressed by Cunningham's performance that he appointed him to command the 8th Army. The problem was that Cunningham was thrust into a role and environment with which was new to him. He had not commanded mechanized troops, and the desert was different from East Africa. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.

Russians had a much better sense of what a tank should be like in 1939-1941

The Russians who issued the specifications that led to the development of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks had a much better understanding what a battle tank should be like than their counterparts anywhere else. Germany was still building tanks that automotively were adequate but which were underarmed and underprotected. They still had too many Pzkw I and II tanks even by June 1941. If the Russians had had a good professional army, they would have slaughtered the Germans in 1941, but instead, Stalin had killed most of the competent soldiers, so they were run over by the Germans. When the Germans attacked, the front collapsed.

Rommel's initial reaction to Crusader

In November 1941, Rommel had been preparing to attack Tobruk. General Cunningham had wanted to hit Rommel after he had attacked, but the political pressure from Churchill was overwhelming. When Rommel recognized the tremendous British buildup, in preparation for Crusader, he altered his dispositions. He stationed the 21st Pz. Div. at Gambut. He had the 15th Pz. Div. be ready to reinforce them. From Bardia to Sidi Omar, he built a defensive position manned by the Italian Savona division and German anti-tank units. The area was heavily mined. The Italian armoured division, the Ariete, was positioned at Bir Gubi, which Rommel expected would be on the British flank. Churchill sent Generals Auchinleck and Cunningham a message (quoted in The Desert Generals):

For the first time British and Empire troops will meet the Germans with an ample supply of equipment in modern weapons of all kins [sic]. The battle itself will affect the whole course of the war. Now is the time to strike the hardest blow yet struck for final victory, home and freedom. The Desert Army may add a page to history which will rank with Blenheim and Waterloo. The eyes off all nations are upon you. ALl our hearts are with you. May God uphold the right!

Correlli Barnett wrote that Cunningham was not fit to command, as he was near a nervous breakdown, from the strain of combat since February. Being thrust into an unfamiliar environment, mobile warfare in the desert, simply increased the strain.

The 8th Army at the start of the Crusader battle

The 8th Army was deployed, ready to attack, by late November 15, 1941. They had about 100,000 troops at the ready, along with 453 cruiser tanks (or equivalent) with the 7th Armoured Division. 166 of these were American M3 Stuart tanks with only the 37mm gun. The rest were mostly Crusader I and II tanks with the 40mm 2pdr gun. There were still a few A13 Cru.Mk.IV and Cru.Mk.II tanks, but they left the scene after Crusader. The American Stuart tanks could make 40mph, if they were ungoverned, but along with the Crusaders, they had governors to increase their mechanical life and reliability.

British intelligence thought that the opposing forces had 272 German tanks and 138 Italian tanks. Of the German, they thought that there were as many as 96 Pzkw II's, with only a 20mm gun. The British assumed that there would be an "armour-to-armour" battle, and that they had superior forces. To bring the Germans to such a battle, the British intended to occupy a position that would bring Axis forces to counterattack. At 6am on November 18th, the 8th Army set out around the Axis flank. They crossed "The Wire" south of Bir Sheforzen, headed towards Gabr Saleh, and then to Bir Gubi and the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. As they moved forward, the British command was perplexed that Rommel had not responded. What did they have to do to bring Rommel into a battle?

This is based on Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals, augmented with what I know from other sources.

Correlli Barnett said that Battleaxe was the antithesis of Sidi Barrani

Correlli Barnett argues, in The Desert Generals, that Battleaxe was lost on the first day. They had attacked Halfaya Pass and had been repulsed, primarily by the dug in 88mm guns. Correlli Barnett puts the blame on the lack of inspired leadership. At Sidi Barrani, the British were lead by General O'Connor, who was a brilliant leader in the field. In Operation Battleaxe, they had mediocre leadership, and failed. Still, the real cause of failure was Churchill's pressing Wavell to attack too soon. The result was that most of the tanks pushed through the Mediterranean in the Tiger Convoy were left on the battlefield when the British retreated. Churchill was in his worst manic-depressive mode, and when Battleaxe failed, he reacted by relieving General Wavell. I am an admirer of Churchill, but the 1940-1942 period in the Mediterranean and Middle East shows him at his worst. O'Connor's gains were lost because of going into Greece. Up until the Greek operation, General Wavell had waged a successful campaign against Italian interests in Africa, and was close to defeating them. After Greece, the Germans came in and the British position was in sharp decline, despite the British having a sense that they could beat the Germans, if properly armed and supplied.

More about Operation Battleaxe

This duplicates, to some extent, what I had written on May 20, 2005. Churchill had badgered General Wavell to immediately attack using the tanks that had arrived from the Tiger Convoy. The attack took place starting on 15 June 1941. The British and Commonwealth forces consisted of about 25,000 troops and 180 tanks (cruiser and infantry tanks). The divisions involved were the 7th Armoured Division (Gen. Michael Creagh) and the 4th Indian Division (Gen. Frank Messervy). The armoured brigades were the 7th with cruiser tanks from the Tiger Convoy and the 4th with Inf. Mk.II Matilda tanks. The Matildas could make about 8 mph, except on smooth roads. They were desparately short of transport for troops and supply. This is from Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals. Churchill had pressed to have a convoy of tanks sent through the Mediterranean Sea by fast transport vessels. He felt that he could affect the outcome by immediately sending tanks, which seemed to be the key weapon of war in the theater. A15 Crusader tanks were just coming off the assembly line, so it is not clear that they were included. More likely, the tanks sent were A13 Cru. Mk.IVA's. There was also a regiment of light tanks, presumably Lt.Mk.VIC's. I believe that there were also newly produced Inf.Mk.II's, as well. They took at least one transport loss on the way, so some tanks were lost. I can imagine that Churchill's political position was deteriorating with the events of early 1941. The next year went as badly, except for the American entry into the war in December.

The aftermath of "Battleaxe"

Operation Battleaxe went badly for the British. The Germans used anti-tank guns to kill tanks while using tanks against infantry and trucks. The British had thought that you needed to use your tanks to kill other tanks. They had the disadvantage of having a small tank gun (the 40mm 2pdr). The Germans had a very small number of 88mm FlAK36 guns that were used in the anti-tank role. During Battleaxe, there were about 5 at Halfaya Pass, 4 "at Hafid ridge", and 4 operating with one panzer regiment (the 8th). After the battle, the British assumed that the Germans must have tanks that had a better gun than they did, and that accounted for their many tank losses. In fact, it seems that they were mostly killed by anti-tank guns. The Germans also had the advantage of good tank recovery equipment and organization. The British had almost none. When the British were forced to withdraw, they left behind knocked tanks that were repairable, because they had no way to recover them.

The impression taken away from Greece (in 1941)

The British and Commonwealth forces in Greece were not acclimatized to mountain combat. They face specialist German mountain troops, so they were at a disadvantage. As the political situation in Greece declined along with the military, the British were left with only one option: to withdraw. The Germans attacked at the "Monastir Gap", which was the junction between the Greek and British forces. Overhead, the Germans dominated the air. The collapse happened swiftly, so the British and Commonwealth forces had to rush to the south, to reach evacuation beaches. Somehow, they succeeded, and lost less than could have been expected. The Official History says that they left with the impression that they could beat the Germans, if they had the forces, despite the Germans being quite able and strong. This is my summary and paraphrase from the Official History.

April 25, 1941 in Greece

The Germans moved forward on April 25, 1941. General Wilson considered the possibilities. The Germans could stage an attack with airborne troops on either Athens or the Straits of Corinth. General Wilson decided that the withdrawal needed to be made from southern beaches, to buy time. He ordered the 16th and 17th Australian Brigades to Kalamata. The 6th NZ Brigade was sent to Tripolis, rather than Marathon. They were to guard the roads to the beaches in the south. He sent 4th NZ Brigade to the Corinth Canal to embark with the troops guarding the canal. The 1st Armoured Brigade would be sent to Raphina to withdraw, rather than crossing the Corinth Canal. The operation was extended, due to the distance to the Peloponnessus beaches. Also on April 25th, the amphibious transport Ulster Prince was bombed and wrecked. Another transport, the Pennland was also bombed and sunk. The navy sent three destroyers so that all but 500 troops were embarked from Megara. This is my paraphrase of the paragraphs in the Official History.

There is an interesting story about Eric Dorman-Smith

After Generals O'Connor and Neame had been bagged by the Germans, General Wavell decided that Tobruk needed to be held. He believed that was a good way to slow Rommel's advance eastwards. At that time a Brigadier, Eric Dorman-Smith was ordered to fly to Tobruk and give the commanders there Wavell's plan for the defense of Cyrenaica and Egypt. He flew in a ubiquitous Westland Lysander, an early STOL aircraft. The pilot flew through a sandstorm to a what Correlli Barnett called a perfect landing at Tobruk's airfield. He delivered Wavell's orders to Brigadier John Harding and Australian General Leslie Morehead. Dorman-Smith had the impression that the two had the situation under control. As he flew out, Brigadier Dorman-Smith noticed what appeared to be German troops east of Tobruk, astride the road to Bardia. Rommel attacked Tobruk on April 13 and 14, 1941, and was repulsed by the Australians. He attacked again on the 16th and 17th. While he was doing that, his advance forces were blitzing towards Egypt. They arrived on the border on April 28th, a started to mop up the local British and Commonwealth positions.

O'Connor hoped that the victory at Beda Fomm would gain him permission to take the rest of Libya

The odds were stacked against him, but General O'Connor hoped that winning at Beda Fomm would gain him permission to advance further. The Italians were is disarray, and had taken considerable losses in the process. They had lost 20,000 prisoners, 112 medium tanks (M11/39 and M13/40), 216 guns, and 1500 cars and trucks.

The problem was Greece. Churchill was eager to go into Greece and to help them fight Germans, if and when they were attacked. Churchill warned General Wavell that his overriding priority needed to be to aid Greece and possibly Turkey. He was to halt his advance into Libya, so that he had resources to send to the Balkans. Just possibly, O'Connor might have been able to advance far enough to forestall any German reinforcements, but it was not to be. Within a month, Rommel, and his advance forces, were in Libya, scouting out the British positions.

What happened in early 1941 was incomprehensible

The British reaction to driving the Italians from Cyrenaic (eastern Libya) was to disband the force that took the area. We can imagine that Churchill's Greek (mis-)adventure played a role. General O'Connor, the victor of Beda Fomm, went to Egypt. He was still having stomach problems. In his place, General Neame was put in charge of a "static area command". The 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn and scattered about Egypt. 13th Corps was disbanded. The newly arrived 2nd Armoured Division and an Australian brigade occupied the front facing Libya. Rommel attacked on March 31, 1941. When he realized that there was no organized resistance, he pushed harder. One group advanced up the coast road. Another crossed over the route used by O'Connor from Msus and Mechili. Another crossed further south, along a line connecting Mechili and Derna. For anyone who has followed this action, these names are quite familiar. Wavell ordered General O'Connor forward to help General Neame. They got lost and were bagged by the Germans.

Churchill could not resist fighting Germans, so he jeopardized the North African front

Churchill wrote to General Wavell saying:

"Neither of these [action in the Sudan or the Dodecanese] ought to detract from the supreme task of inflicting further defeats upon the main Italian army." (quoted in Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals).

The Germans planned to go into Greece from Bulgaria, although not until March 1941. They were on a tight timetable, as the plans for attacking Russia in June were quite advance. To Churchill, defending Greece became more important than holding the gains in North Africa. He was ready to pull strong forces out of Libya and send them to Greece,w there they were expended, with only a portion being retrieved.

Churchill apparently felt that he had to contest every German attack

The Greek adventure where the British and ANZAC forces went into Greece, starting as early as late 1940 can be rationalized since they quite rightfully believe that they would only face Italians. In fact, the Italian assault was blunted, which was the excuse for the Germans to come in and rescure the situation. Still, the whole operation into Greece and the withdrawal to Crete was part of the overall collapse of Churchill's strategic vision. He was really geared to fighting Italians, not Germans. His forces could mop up the Italians in East Africa and eastern Libya with considerable ease, although with a sustained effort. The expedition to Greece dashed the opportunity to take all of Libya before the Germans arrived in strength. After the Germans, lead by Rommel, arrived in Libya, the British and Commonwealth forces were set back on their heels, as there was no one on the British side commanding armies in the field who had the skill and energy of Rommel. General O'Connor might have done well, but he was bagged early in the German attack. Auchinleck could do well, but he was tied up as theater commander.

More about the British withdrawal from Greece

The army depended on the navy for being able to evacuate Greece in later April 1941. The RAF was pursuing an independent plan, as the situation went into collapse. As long as they could use airfields near Athens, they flew out the pilots and technicians. When the Blenheims were moved to Crete, they took as many as they could. Others were flown out by No.216 and 267 squadrons flying Bombays and Lockheed Lodestars. Flying boats, probably Sunderlands, were also used. The Wellingtons had already been withdrawn, s they were too vulnerable on the ground. Remaining RAF personnel would leave with the army.

The army plan was to move at night, as the Germans were not operating at night, to the relief of the British. Troops would move into position during the dark, and hide. Towards night, they would destroy equipment that they planned to abandon, and then move to the beach. Admiral Pridham-Whipple's force included the amphibious transports Gelnearn and Glengyle, which were equipped with landing craft. There were also 19 troopships and four "A-lighters". The A-lighter was an early LCT.

The ANZAC corps had been in a defensive position at Thermopylae since 19 April.

As the situation progressively got worse, partly due to the collapse of the Greek army, German air dominance became increasingly a factor. Not only did it complicate the withdrawal, but over the next month wrote off many of the Royal Navy's assets in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This is from Vol.II of the official history.

The defense of Post 11 at Bardia

The last Italian position to surrender at Bardia was "Post 11". Post 11 had put up the most resolute defense of Bardia's defenders. Two tanks and some carriers from the 6th [Australian] Divisional cavalry attacked Post 8, shortly after Post 13 had been taken when carriers and soldiers with grenades had attacked. 70 prisoners were taken. from Post 13. Post 8 was taken with little effort besides a perfunctory attack. That stopped anti-tank gun fire that had been harrassing the attackers of Post 11. When the tanks appeared, Post 11 surrendered. The 2/6th Battalion took their surrender. It turned out that there had been 350 Italians in Post 11, along with two field guns, two 3in mortars, six anti-tank guns (presumably 47mm/L32), 12 medium MG, 27 LMG, and 325 rifles. Gavin Long remarked that two days earlier, Post 11 had been attacked by about 50 Australians with rifles and grenades. No wonder they had been repulsed. This is my recounting of what is in Gavin Long's To Benghazi, an essential source of information about the successful campaign against the Italian forces prior to the German's arrival.

Operation Battleaxe: a lost opportunity

Churchill had pressed to supply General Wavell with a shipment of tanks pressed through the Mediterranean on fast transports (the Tiger convoy). Churchill immediately started pressuring Wavell to use the newly arrived tanks. Apparently, some of the shipment were newly build Crusader I tanks (A15). Wavell's response was to mount Operation Battleaxe, starting on 15 June 1941. They had about 25,000 troops and a mix of 180 tanks, including cruiser and infantry tanks. They were extremely short of transport. As I have written, truck shipments to the Middle East were way below what was both promised and required. General Beresford-Pierse had planned the operation and led it. The formations involved were the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division. The two armoured brigades were the 7th, equipped with cruiser tanks, mostly newly arrived, and the 4th, with infantry tanks. The hastily planned attack failed, with needless losses in tanks, and Churchill relieved Wavell and replaced him with Claude Auchinleck. This happened on June 21st. We can only imagine that Churchill acted on a whim or for political reasons, as Wavell had performed well as theater commander. Most problems were caused by pressure from Churchill and his effect on operations and plans.

Truck shipments to the British in the Middle East in 1941

The War Office had told General Wavell in October that 3,000 3-ton trucks would be shipped to the Middle East, every month, from North America, and that 7,000 would be shipped by the end of 1940. The reality was pretty grim: in early 1941, the shipments were only 616 in March, 863 in April, and 1,276 in May. Much of the Middle East transportation had been shipped to Greece, and was lost there. I imagine that this includes what was sent to Crete before the German attack. The distances in the Middle East were vast, and demanded large numbers of vehicles to move supplies and fuel. It was logistic nightmare for both sides. This is from the Official History of the Second World War The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol.II.

Auchinleck's strategy at the First Alamein

The winning strategy used by General Auchinleck, in the First Battle of El Alamein, was to attack the Italian formations with his infantry, which he had in abundance. Both German and Italian units were weakened by the action from May 1942 until July, besides having their supply lines stretched to the breaking point. Rommel felt powerless, as he lacked the means to stop Auchinleck. The Germans were too few to hold the front, and he relied on his Italian allies to provide the "boots on the ground" to maintain their position. Correlli Barnett puts the victory date at July 17, 1942. The Axis advance had been stopped, and nearly broken. The offensive launched in May at Gazala had failed, and now Rommel was forced to prepare defenses to hold what he had gained, with little hope of advancing further. This is based on Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals.

More consideration of General Auchinleck and Montgomery

General Claude Auchinleck had gained his military experience largely in India. He was born in Northern Ireland (Ulster), and graduated from Sandhurst at the age of 20. That may explain his affinity for Eric Dorman-Smith, another Irishman. He joined the 62nd Punjab Regiment, after graduation and served in the Middle East. In 1933, he had served with Harold Alexander, fighting tribesmen and imposing order. He commanded the abortive operation at Narvik, after which Winston Churchill criticized him as being too cautious. That didn't stop Churchill from appointing Auchinleck to succeed Archibald Wavell as the theater commander in the Middle East and North Africa. Churchill was forever hounding his commanders to fight, as Churchill's political situation demanded action, often before his forces were ready.

The charge that Auchinleck made poor choices in his subordinate commanders is certainly valid. One defense was the lack of talent available, but that does not excuse him from what we see in hindsight as indefensible choices. Alan Cunningham simply did not have the relevant experience to be successful. His entire time in command of the 8th Army was so stressful to him that he was physically and mentally exhausted by the time he was relieved by Auchinleck. Neil Ritchie was a stolid organization man without any apparent original thoughts or ability. He was suitable as someone to take orders, not to be the key decision-maker.

The irony is that Bernard Law Montgomery was even more cautious than Auchinleck, and delayed the next offensive beyond the date that had been planned by Auchinleck. Unlike Auchinleck, Montgomery could only win with overwhelming forces, unimaginably applied. He came close to misfiring at the Second Alamein. The things that allowed him to prevail were his material superiority and the extreme difficulty with supplies that the Axis forces experienced. That allowed Montgomery to wear down Rommel's army until he was forced to withdraw them. Montgomery made such a feeble pursuit that he was never able to catch Rommel's army until they reached Tunisia, when they had no place to go.

General Ritchie planned to stake the entire Middle Eastern Theater on the battle at Mersa Matruh, circa June 25th, 1942

General Ritchie, after the collapse following Gazala, designed what he considered a blocking position at Mersa Matruh. The 8th Army was now reduced to 10th Corps and 13th Corps. The 10th Corps had the 10th Indian Division and 50th Division located within the perimeter at Mersa Matruh. Facing west on the coastal road, there was a minefield. South of that was a gap patroled by two small battlegroups, Leathercol and Gleecol. South of that, on the escarpment, protected by a minefield at the west end was 13th Corps, with the New Zealand diviosn and the remnants of the 1st Armoured Division. There was an incomplete position at the east end of the southern force at Minquar Quaim. General Auchinleck had succeeded in reinforcing the 1st Armoured Division, so that it had 159 tanks, including 60 Grants. How this was going to block the Axis forces, when the center was empty, is baffling. General Auchinleck arrived in the afternoon to review the situation and relieved Ritchie as army commander. This is based on Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.

The Boys anti-tank rifle was suitable for sniping, as well

During the assault on Bardia, in January 1941, two Australians, Privates Kneen and Hurley, traded shots with an Italian anti-tank gun, and succeeded in defeating it. This was just south of the road to Tobruk on the outer edge of the defense perimeter surrounding Bardia. A platoon from the 2/1 battalion had attacked at 9 in the morning and was beaten back by MG fire and pinned down. Once the anti-tank gun was silenced, the original attackers were able to withdraw. A fresh, battalion-sized attack was mounted in the afternoon, and post 54, the well-defended position, was taken. One third of the defending 30 men were casualties. This goes to show that the Italians could fight bravely and effectively. This is based on a section in Gavin Long's book To Benghazi.

One piece of trivia is that the Australian 6th Cavaly regiment manned M11/39 tanks at Tobruk in January 1941

The Australian 6th Cavalry Regiment apparently was equipped with captured Italian M11/39 tanks as early as January 1941 for the assault on Tobruk. There is a photo of four of them painted with kangaroos on the hull and MG turret, at Tobruk. The caption on the photo indicates that they had been taken at Bardia. Cavalry carriers, presumably from the 6th Cavalry, were also in action during the assault on Tobruk. At one point, the grounded Italian armoured cruiser San Giorgio fired on them. Earlier, they had fired their MG's at the cruiser.

There was almost continual pressure from Churchill on Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army

Winston Churchill had almost unbounded confidence in Claude Auchinleck's ability to lead an army in the field. He constantly begged Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army. Auchinleck, however, was feeling the demands of being theater commander, and only took the reins of the 8th Army during crises. The first time was during the Crusader battle, as I recently wrote, and the second, and last time, was in the retreat from Gazala towards the Egyptian border. On the first occasion, the Crusader battle was one, and Tobruk relieved. On the second occasion, the first Alamein battle was won, and a plan made for Alam el Halfa. By late summer 1942, Churchill was so hard-pressed politically that he sacked Auchinleck and put Harold Alexander and Bernard Law Montgomery into the Middle East as a team, with Alexander as the theater commander and Montgomery as the field commander. They succeeded, but Montgomery's main strength was not losing battles, which was not a bad thing. The British Empire had had a string of defeats from 1940 to 1942, so they needed to stop losing.

There was almost continual pressure from Churchill on Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army

Winston Churchill had almost unbounded confidence in Claude Auchinleck's ability to lead an army in the field. He constantly begged Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army. Auchinleck, however, was feeling the demands of being theater commander, and only took the reins of the 8th Army during crises. The first time was during the Crusader battle, as I recently wrote, and the second, and last time, was in the retreat from Gazala towards the Egyptian border. On the first occasion, the Crusader battle was one, and Tobruk relieved. On the second occasion, the first Alamein battle was won, and a plan made for Alam el Halfa. By late summer 1942, Churchill was so hard-pressed politically that he sacked Auchinleck and put Harold Alexander and Bernard Law Montgomery into the Middle East as a team, with Alexander as the theater commander and Montgomery as the field commander. They succeeded, but Montgomery's main strength was not losing battles, which was not a bad thing. The British Empire had had a string of defeats from 1940 to 1942, so they needed to stop losing.

There was almost continual pressure from Churchill on Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army

Winston Churchill had almost unbounded confidence in Claude Auchinleck's ability to lead an army in the field. He constantly begged Auchinleck to personally take command of the 8th Army. Auchinleck, however, was feeling the demands of being theater commander, and only took the reins of the 8th Army during crises. The first time was during the Crusader battle, as I recently wrote, and the second, and last time, was in the retreat from Gazala towards the Egyptian border. On the first occasion, the Crusader battle was one, and Tobruk relieved. On the second occasion, the first Alamein battle was won, and a plan made for Alam el Halfa. By late summer 1942, Churchill was so hard-pressed politically that he sacked Auchinleck and put Harold Alexander and Bernard Law Montgomery into the Middle East as a team, with Alexander as the theater commander and Montgomery as the field commander. They succeeded, but Montgomery's main strength was not losing battles, which was not a bad thing. The British Empire had had a string of defeats from 1940 to 1942, so they needed to stop losing.

The turning point in the Crusader battle in November 1941

The British doctrine was that you fought tanks with tanks, and so their armoured formations charged the German infantry and artillery covering the tanks, and were badly shot up by the 5cm PAK38's. The Crusader tanks were also mechanically unreliable, and broke down frequently. By November 23, the British had lost about 300 of their 450 cruiser tanks. General Cunningham requested that General Auchinleck fly out to the army headquarters to discuss the situation. Cunningham was ready to pull back, in the face of the losses. Fortunately, Cunningham's commanders disagreed, and wanted to continue the battle. Auchinleck had a sense that Rommel's forces were in as bad shape as the British, and decided to continue to prosecute the battle. By the end of November 23rd, the Germans were down to 100 running tanks. Rommel had sensed that Cunningham had lost his nerve, and decided on a bold stroke. He led his forces through a succession of British headquarters and swung across the desert toward the Egyptian border ("The Wire"). What ensued was what General Norrie dubbed "The Matruh Stakes", as it was a race for the border. Auchinleck's reaction was to order the 8th Army to continue to attack. It turns out that the German advance achieved nothing, and they were unsupplied, as well. They stayed in the "Omars" for for the 24th and 25th, and then withdrew. The Germans had hit the 4th Indian Division, which was holding the area around Sollum, Capuzzo, and Halfaya Pass. They repulsed the German assault, and inflicted considerable losses. They were losses that the Germans could ill afford. While Rommel was off swanning through the desert, 30th Corps struck at the critical point. When they reached Sidi Rezegh airfield, Colonel Fritz Bayerlein frantically called Rommel. But General Cunningham was suffering from exhaustion from the strain of the an unfamiliar situation that was out of his control. Auchinleck reluctantly removed him and replaced him with one of the few available options, Lt-General Neil Ritchie. This is based on Correlli Barnett's narrative in The Desert Generals.

General Gott on German tactics, written after the Crusader battle

Correlli Barnett has a quote from General Gott, who was 7th Armoured Division commander during the Crusader battle in late 1941. General Gott wrote:

"The German will not commit himself to tank versus tank battle as such. In every phase of battle he coordinates the action of his anti-tank guns, Field Artillery and Infantry with his tanks and he will not be drawn from this policy"

The German superiority was based on their use of the 88mm AA gun as an anti-tank weapon. This should not have been a surprise, as they had used them in this role as early as the Spanish Civil War. Correlli Barnett says that just four "88'" were sufficient to block an armoured brigade.

The rearguard during the withdrawal from Crete

The British army and navy, especially in WWII, had these situations that went terribly wrong, but where men's bravery shown, nonetheless. On May 30th, 1941, 6,000 men were embarked at Sphakia by ships under the command of Vice-Admiral King. The amphibious transport Glengyle was an important compeonent, as she had the necessary landing craft to take men off the beach. On May 31st, four destroyers took off another 1,500 soldiers. General Freyburg was ordered to leave, and he and the senior naval officer at Suda Bay were taken by flying boat to Egypt. The rearguard was commanded by Brigadier Vasey. They were the 19th Australian Brigade, some light tanks from the 3rd Hussars, the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment, the Royal Marine Battalion, and "Layforce". The Germans tried to turn the flanks, but most were able to be withdrawn. 4,000 were taken off, but 5,000 were left to surrender. A last ditch attempt was made to rescue more, but all they had to show for their efforts was the loss of the AA cruiser Calcutta.

Small guns in 1941

The best guns in use in the Western Desert in 1941 were the German 5cm PAK38 and the 8.8cm FLAK36. Since the British were using the 40mm 2pdr and the toy gun 0.55in Boys anti-tank rifle, they had to rely on firing 25pdrs over open sights. As we noted recently, they also were not issued very many AP shot. After all, they were mostly expected to be firing in howitzer mode, so for that, they needed HE shells. The German tanks were not very well armed, either. In early 1941, they still were using MG-armed Pzkw I, 20mm-armed Pzkw II, with the short 5cm L42 being the best tank gun. The Pzkw IV was still just a close support tank with the short 75mm L24. When the American Stuart light tank arrived, it had the pop-gun like American 37mm gun. Their only chance was to get a close-in side shot at a German tank. That was practically true of the 2pdr, although it did have better performance than the 37mm. Once the Germans started using applique armor on the glacis and turret, the lesser guns were almost useless.

British aircraft at Habbaniya, during the Iraqi revolt

The British had a presence in Iraq from 1917. At the outbreak of war in 1939, the King of Iraq was a small boy. The regent was the pro-British Amir Abdul Illah. In March 1941, a revolt took place, and eventually, the RAF training base at Habbaniyah was besieged. Habbaniya had an odd collection of aircraft, especially since it was a training base, but partly because that was what the RAF had in the Middle East and Africa. The aircraft at Habbaniya consisted of:

• 32 Hawker Audaxes
• 8 Fairey Gordons
• 29 Avro Oxfords
• 3 Gloster Gladiators
• 1 Bristol Blenheim I
• 5 Hawker Hart trainers

In addition, there was a squadron of Vickers Vincent bombers at Shaibah. They faced an Iraqi air force with 50 or 60 aircraft of similar vintage to what the British had.

Correlli Barnett on Auchinleck's failings

Correllis Barnett wrote that Auchinleck's second mistake was retaining Neil Ritchie as army commander after the Crusader battle. The first mistake was putting Alan Cunningham in place as 8th Army commander. Cunningham was up to colonial warfare in East Africa, but did not have the experience to command a modern mechanized army. Correlli Barnett quotes General Galloway as saying that Auchinleck failed : "from his inability coldly to conisder whether a man was really up to the job". General Ritchie had been a staff officer in Cairo, and now he was thrust into position of field commander, a job that he proved to be incapable of performing.

The defence of Malta in February 1941

Apparently, Malta's defences in February 1941 included:

• 8 infantry battalions plus the King's Own Malta Regiment
• Two field batteries, Royal Artillery
• One beach defence regiment, Royal Artillery, armed with 3.7in howitzers, 6in howitzers, and 18pdrs.
• One Royal Tank Regiment troop with 2 light tanks and four infantry tanks (presumably Inf. Mk.II Matilda)

This is from Vol.II of the official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East.

The British colonial army was at its best in East Africa

The British colonial army was in its element in East Africa, fighting the Italians. they weren't up to fighting Germans in North Africa, at least without relearning their craft, but they knew Africa and warfare there. General Alan Cunningham, whom Auchinleck mistakenly put in charge of mobile forces in the Western Desert, led the attack against Gondar. Vol.II of the British official history tells the story of the East African campaign in Chapter XVI. There was only a skeleton force left in East Africa to pursue the campaign to defeat the Italians. The high command needed the best troops for use in Greece and the Western Desert. The RAF was involved as well, flying an odd collection of largely antique aircraft. There were Hurricanes, Gladiators, Fairy Battles, Harbeests, and even the Vickers Wellesley. Throughout Auchinleck's theater, there were present almost all the different types produced in the 1930's.

Churchill vs. Hitler as supreme military commander

Winston Churchill had military training and experience. I often forget that he had command experience in France during the Great War. Before that, he had been looking for opportunities to command in the field. He had many abilities besides being a naval administrator. When the situation had collapsed in May 1940, Winston was the obvious choice to lead the country.

Hitler lacked Churchill's experience and flare for the Supreme Commander role. That Germany did as well as they did was due to a number of factors. First was the dynamic and forward thinking army. There was some uneven quality, even in the German Army, but you saw giants like Field Marshall van Manstein, Has Guderian, and Rommel, to name a few. The second factor was their ability to produce technologically superior weapons. They often continued to use inferior hardware, but they could go from an army still equipped with Pzkw I's to the Panther in a short period. A feature of the early 1940's was that new weapons and technology could be developed quickly.

What Churchill particularly had was a high-level strategic vision. Hitler was more driven by politics and opportunism. You could argue that eventually, Germany would need to take out Russia, and June 1941 caught Russia in chaos. The German stroke came close to succeeding. Only the vast spaces and the work of some key generals saved them from defeat in the first few months. As it was, they lost large numbers of soldiers, mostly as prisoners of war, and immense quantities of equipment captured or destroyed.

Germany, though, under Hitler's leadership, was playing a gigantic Risk game. In 1942, they pushed as far as they could, until lack of resources and poor leadership at the highest level (Hitler's interference) dashed any hopes of success. Field Marshall von Manstein tried to rescue the situation, it was lost in the decision to tie up an army in Stalingrad. Improving Russian leadership, equipment, and manpower had grown strong enough to stop the German tide, and cause it to recede.

I still have a large amount of unpublished material from the 1970's and 1980's

I have what I imagine is a large amount of unpublished materials that I both produced and accumulated, starting in the early 1970's and continuing up to about 1989. There are notes, orders-of-battle, and orders-of-arrival, drawings, and photographs. The drawings and photographs are generally of guns, armored cars, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, trucks, and gun tractors. I have the usual sort of collection of photos that largely originate from Aberdeen proving grounds from the early 1970's up until about 1985. Towards the end, I had photos that were taken with a scale in the picture to better judge dimensions. I have many photos taken from angles, but I had started to take pictures from right angles to the front, side, and rear, so as to aid transfer to drawings. The main obstacle at present is that work and my other writing has preempted any work on my military materials. I started blogging here so as to at least be able to start writing on the subject and to make available information from notes and research materials.

Greg Costikyan has a review of "World at War"

Greg Costikyan has a long history in gaming. He attended the first game design class at SPI in the early 1970's as a 13-year old (I believe). He has made a career out of gaming, not just wargame development. He is now into wireless games, and works for Nokia. Greg has a review, on his blog, of World at War, a Gary Grigsby game:

World at War is actually a bit of a departure for Grigsby; he tends more toward big, long-lasting, complicated games, and World at War is essentially "Axis & Allies done historical." That is, it features areas rather than hexes, representational units rather than historical ones, a system vastly simpler than most of his games, and total playtime of maybe 4 hours, rather than 20+. In other words, it's clearly an attempt to make an historical wargame that might appeal to a wider audience.

Greg concludes:

If I were conceiving this product from inception (with, to be sure, the advantage of hindsight, of being able to see it already working, which the developers surely did not), I'd say: Not only do we need to simplify this UI as drastically as possible, we also need a series of programmed learning scenarios, along the lines of your typical RTS, that gradually and slowly introduce players to new concepts. Scenario 1, take France, Crete, and for bonus points Egypt by Fall 41, and we ignore the damn partisans. Scenario 2, everything is frozen except for Western Europe, you have to take Gibraltar, and we make the partisans ultra-important. And so on.

As it is, your typical Axis & Allies player is going to find himself stumped by this game.

And that's a shame, because when you get down to it, it's pretty damned cool.

On the other hand--if you aren't daunted by the thought of reading a manual, and like the idea of playing out the whole of WWII in an evening in a reasonably realistic game, this may be just your thing. And incidentally, both hot-seat and PBEM multiplayer provided.

Buy it via directly download from the Matrix Games site. Why should the retailers get a cut?

Artillery ammunition, circa 1944

A 25pdr in a field regiment was to be supplied with 144 rounds of HE, 16 rounds of smoke, and 12 rounds of armoured piercing shot. Certainly, in 1941-1942, there were plenty of opportunities in the Western Desert for firing AP shot at German and Italian tanks and armoured cars. 5.5in guns in medium regiments were only supplied with 100 rounds of HE. It seems to be the case that there was no AP round for this gun.

As I have written, the main criticism of General Auchinleck was his inability to choose good commanders

While General Claude Auchinleck was clearly a skilled commander in the field, in his theater commander role, he failed repeatedly to choose suitable field commanders. The first choice was Alan Cunningham, the admiral's brother. As I have previously written, he was experienced in combat, such as fighting in East Africa. That was a realm where he could be successful. That did not translate into being successful at leading armoured forces in North Africa. The second choice was Neil Ritchie, who transitioned into the role in November 1941, after Cunningham was relieved. Lt-General Ritchie seems to have only taken the reins after Auchinleck had intervened to ensure a successful outcome to the Crusader offensive to relieve Tobruk. Despite the overwhelming material superiority of the British and allied forces, the battle had almost been lost in the early days. Ritchie was not tested until the Gazala battle, where he was also found wanting. In his case, as I have previously written, he felt insecure in leading a mobile, armoured army, and relied upon his corp commanders for decision making. Since he had a diverse group in his command committee, they had trouble arriving at decisions. That seems to have been Lt-General Ritchie's failing, in particular. He also seems to have not been an experienced armour commander. His experienced commanders were all with limited experience against Italians, and lack of success against Germans. The British command seemed to generally lack the energy and high activity level of the Germans, led by Rommel. Rommel set the pace for his forces, and that really just reflected the general superiority of the German command training.

When you pit an indecisive committee against Rommel, it's hardly fair

Just think about the indecisive British committee commanding the 8th Army at Gazala, fighting against Rommel, and "it hardly seems fair". Rommel's command style was to lead from the front, so that he set an example for his troops, and so that he knew the situation on the ground. The British style, developed by the command team that Auchinleck had put in place, was to discuss everything and take votes. General Neil Ritchie was nominally the army commander, but he must have been insecure enough to rely upon his corps commanders. There is a photo in Correlli Barnett's book that shows Lt-General Norrie (30th Corps), Lt-General Gott (13th Corps), and Lt-General Ritchie poring over a map, presumably during the battle. You can imagine that they were most of the command-committee team.

Correli Barnett said that tthe British were commanded by a committee at the Gazala Battle with predictable results

The result of the British command at Gazala, in 1942, was that decisions were not being made in a timely fashion. Forces were committed piecemeal and action was not being taken, generally. Even General Frank Messervy, who was sometimes doing questionable things, complained about the command setup: "They put us--an absurd thing, a static fortress under an armoured commander. Bir Hacheim fell because [General] Ritchie had not really made up his mine what his main plan was going to be: There was a token advance towards Bir Hacheim, but it was too far away." (quoted by Correlli Barnett in The Desert Generals, page 156)