Alleged British atrocities

A German thought that 121 casulties were more than would have been killed in the battle. He thought that the British must have shot or stabbed all the wounded men. There were about 20 dead Australian and New Zealand soldiers and none had bayonet wounds or injuries from a rifle butt. 

LieutennantWalker replied to the charges o atrocities in 1952. He wsaid that the Germans had grought forward large numbers of automatic weapons. The British had captured many of these and had turned them on the Germans. The fighting took place in olive  trees. At close range the captured automatic weapons had killed many Germans.The British had capture three wounded Germans and it is likely that many wounded Germans had reached the German lines. Walker stated that no wounded. No wounded German offering to surrender or unwounded German offering to surrender was shot. 

Walker spoke about an incident where Germans were shot at a wall. The Germans were unarmed. Walker thought that the men were running away, and were delayed by the wall. If someone did not offer to surrender, it was acceptable to shoot them. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

More action on 27 and 28 May on Crete

 The German plan on 27 May was to complete encircling Canae and then send multiple columns towards Retimo. One of the columns would move east along the coast. The regiment of Jais  was the unit that fought the intense battle at 42nd Street that was very costly. It was at 6:45am that they were ordered to move to the head of Suda Bay with the intent to block any British retreat. I Battalion was in the lead. From 11am and for another half an hour, they heard nothing from the leading battalion. Jais thought that the lead battalion must have been dispersed, so he halted the following III Battalion until they could learn more about the situation. It was about 2:30pm when the I Battalion commander arrived at Jais' headquarters. He reported that they had been surprised to run into British positions some 2.5 kilometers to the west of the Suda Village. This was in the middle of very thick olive country. The leading company of the I Battalion had run onto a minefield and had incurred heavy losses. It looked like the english might surround the battalion, so yje "fighting troops were pulled back" and lost more men in the process. Most of the officers and other men were killed or wounded. The I Battalion was withdrawn to the west on the high ground. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Evacuate Crete?

 The first step seemed to be to withdraw to Sfakia. The Greeks situation was difficult and their forces were at the point of disintegration. Wavell finally ordered Freyberg to evacuate his men  from Crete. They were not able to tell Colonel  not able to tell Colonel Campbell because they did not have ciphers at Retimo. Navy Lieutenant Haig was going to Retimo with ten tons of rations, Haig left without knowing about the order to withdraw from Crete. Freyberg was traveling to Sfakaia and didn't  know that Haig did not know about the evacuation order. Freyberg then asked the Cairo headquarters to dro a message to Campbell from an aircraft. 

The Germans were having  great deal of success on 26 and 27 May. the assault regiment had moved towithin two kilometers west of Canea. The 196th Mountain Regiment had captured Karatsos. From the Prison Valley, the 3rd Parachute Regiment had captured Perivolia. Still, the Germans were tired and had taken heavy losses. The 3rd Parachute Regiment had the strength of a weak battalion. During the day reinforcement landed at Maleme. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Weston personally inspected the withdrawal route

 Weston travelled south to see the withdrawal route. He found that the traffic along the road to the mountains made the route impassible, The traffic was from Suda, including gunners, base troops, men and from "improvised" infantry units that had been near Suda. While there were units with their weapons marching as units, the traffic was mostly a disorganized mass of men who qite often had disgarded their weapons. There were many thousands of unarmed men, including Cypriots and Palestinians. Freyberg seems to have been shocked by the complete disorganization. 

Lieutenant Stephanides wrote later that it was obvious that he was in a retreat. He thought that it bordered on being a route. There were discarded rifles and uniform pieces along the road. You could see open boxes with rifle ammunition and even grenades. Occasionally you would see officer valises and a few open suitcases. 

Eventually, Cairo replied to Freyberg's message about the situation being hopeless. The message from Cairo said that Major-General Evetts would be arriving to function as a liaison. They suggested that the units fron the Suda-Maleme area should moce to Retimo with the plan being to hold the eastern prt of Crete. Freyberg thought that the Cairo group had no idea of the situation on Crete.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Weston out of touch on 27 May

 While Weston was to command the rearguard, communication had failed. Neither Vasey nor Hargest ever received any orders from Weston on the 27th. Given that, Vasey and Hargest worked together to cooperate on executing the withdrawal. That day, a battalion commander of commandos from Layforce met with Vasey and Hargest. Weston had ordered this commando battalion to take up a holding position on the road to Sfakia. After this, Casey and Hargest decided that their units would travel to Neo Khorion. This was south of Stilos. They thought that they would be protected by Layforce in this position. They decided to move the 5th Brigade to Stilos. The 19th Brigade would take position in Neo Khorion. The 2.8th Battalion would sit at the connection of the road to Kalives and the 2/7th would connect with the New Zealand force in Stilos. It was at 9pm that the rearguard at 42nd Street would move to Stilos. Stilos was 14 miles away. The front of the column reached Stilos by 3:30am which was now on 28 May. 

Meanwhile, Weston ordered Laycock to occupy a position at Babali Inn more to the south and to act as a rearguard. Laycock would use his D Battalion. Laycock had just landed from a ship. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Continued actionon 27 May

 The New Zealand charge may have begun before the Australian charge. The Australian charge carried them forward for about a mile. The New Zealand charge included the Maoris, the 21st Battalion to the right  and the 18th Battalion to the left. The New Zealand force moved forward some 600 yards. Most Germans were in flight from yhe location. The Maoris thought that about 80 dead Germans on their front.  The Australians counted about 200 dead Germans while the Australians too three German prisoners. The Australian casualties included ten killed and 28 wounded in the 2/7th Battalion. 14 of the Maoris were hit by gunfire. 

The Australians were stopped when there was no cover from air attack. Lt. Bolton brought forward a Vickers machine gun. He fured on the Germans as they ran. He fired with some good results. The Germabs were shocked by the charge. The Germans didn't attack on the 27th, although they stayed "in contact" with the Australian and New Zealand units. During the day, they could see "hundreds of Germans" movig akong the hills to the south. They seemd to be trying to suuround the Australian and New Zealand units.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Further events on 27 May

 That night, General Freyberg paid a visit to the Australians. He was impressed by their confidence. After that, Freyberg watched 80 tons of supplies being unloaded at Suda Bay. 

The commander of the Maoris was visited by other battalion commanders, namely Colonels Walker and Allen, He told them if the Maoris were attacked by Germans, his men would open fire and charge. Walker and Allen told the Maori commander, Colonel Dittmer that they would cooperate with the Maoris. 

The Australians observed some 400 Germans moving along the Suda Bay road. The Australian 2/7th Battalion was sitting with two companies ay the front. The company on the right sent out a patrol to watch the Germans. They were planning a counterattack. He informed the commander of the company on the left of his plan and invited him to join the attack. He also sent a runner to inform his battalion commander.

The Germans were going into an abandoned supply depot. They were surprised and ran, The two companies charged the Germans who were running away. Yhere was eventually a bayonet charge. A private came up and fired a submachine gun. He chased away some Germans who had been in a wadi. The Germans threw away their weapons and ran.  

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Action from 27 May

 Duncan, the commander of the Welch, chose to move to the Kladhisos Creek. When the Germans tried to "encircle" the left flank of the Welch, the two rear companies were ordered to go to the west side of Suda to provide cover to the rest of the battalion. That group could hear a heavy fight at 42nd Street. 42nd Street was some five miles behind their original position. The two rear companies of the Welch were commanded by Major Gibson. They managed to travel to Suda. A small group from the Welch held a position on the coast until the morning on 28 May. That was when the Germans learned that a small group had held a position for 18 hours against a strong German force. 

When the Australian and New Zealand forces reached 42nd Street, General Weston was not there. Since Weston was not there, Puttick and Vasey chose positions for their brigades along 42nd Street, a straight dirt road that ran through the olive groves. Holding the line were the Australian 2/8th Battalion (on the main road) and the 2/7th Battalion, and 21st, 28th, 19th, and 22nd New Zealand Battalions. The line was dense, with the 28th Battalion with a 250 yard front. The weak 21st Battalion covered a very short front. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

More about 26 May to 27 May and events

 The Suda Brigade with drew after the 5th and 19th Brigades. The "Suda Brigade" was actually the S Battalion of the Royal Marines,  the Australian 2/2nd Field Regiment, the "Royal Perivolians", and the 106th Royal Horse Artillery. The Composite Brigade had been ordered to advance had been ordered to move forward to a spot about a mile west of Canea. 

During the night, the 5th and 19th Brigades moved back to a position just to the west of Suda. The A Battalion of Layforce was located naer the "Suda village". While on the move, withdrawing, the Australians looked for the British brigade that was supposed to be the rearguard and did not see it. The British must have been traveling along the coast road. The Australians were moving along the inland road. Also, during the night, you had the 4th Brigade miving to Stilos. Since Brigadier Inglis could not find the Composite Brigade, he reverted to being 4th Brigade commander while Kippenberger was 29th Brigade commander.

At around 1am, Weston realized that the Welch were in danger, so he ordered the Welch to withdraw. The Welch didn't receive the order on time. The Germans launched an attack at dawn. By 9a, one forward company had been surrounded while another had heavy losses. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Plans for 26 May on Crete

 Freyberg tpl Puttick that Wesyon would be giving him orders Puttick checked with the Australian Vasey and that was when he decided on the move we already mentioned to move tp the head pf Suda Bay. Puttick had told Weston about this move. The 5th Brigade would be in position on the left side. They would send the 4yh Brigade to Stilos along the road to Sfakia. The orders were given at 10:30. Vasey ordered his men to withdraw. Vasey tol the Greeks and nearby British of the planned moves. 

Freyberg and Weston met twice. That was at 7:30pm and 10:15pm. In the earlier meeting, Weston informed Freyberg that the New Zealand Division would not be able to hold their positions for one more night. Freyberg then ordered the Composite Brigade to relace the New Zealand Division. The Comosite Brigade was told to be ready to move by 8:30pm. Weston gave inaccurate information about the Australians. Hs said that the Australians were pulling back, which was wrong. Freybergordered Vasey to hold avposition in the wadi until nightfall on 27 May. Vasey received thev order too late, He had already ordered a withdrawal. H learned that the New Zealand Division had not been ordered to hold and the division was moving back. Vase decided that his units would be captured if they did not also pull back. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

Events on 26 May

 The New Zealand Division was to proceed to a position along the creek that was located something like 1.5 miles to the west of Canea. the 21st Battalion group would be on the right side of the line. The center was held by the 19th Battalion. The left end was held by the 28th (Maori) Battalion. They would connect with the 19th Brigade, which was just a battalion and a half. The boundary between brigades would be the Prison Road. The 5th Brigade was on the new line by dawn. By then, yhe men were saidvto be "tired, hungry, and jaded". There were many small groups of stragglers. With men concealed by the olive groves and hiding from air attack, getting organized was nearly impossible. 

There were base unit men moving along the roads from Suda. They were joined by the large numbers of stragglers. By 9:30am, there was a meeting that included Freyberg, senior nval, irf force, and army officers. Freyberg sent Wavell a message indicating that he beloeved had been pressed to the limit of their endurance. Freyberg wrote that the situation was hopeless. He thought that Germans would be firing on Suda Bay as soon as in 24 hours. 

When Weston returned to Canea, he had to leave due to the heavy bombing that Canea was enduring, Plans were made and were being executed to withdraw to the "head" of Suda Bay.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long

New Zealand fighting on 25 to 26 May

 While the Greeks were doing well against Germans, the New Zealand Division was not doing so well. The Greeks had forced the Utz Group from the area around Aliakianon. The Greeks had also out-fought the mountain regiment commanded by Krakau. General Student landed in Crete on 25 May. Airborne troops took the "heights" to the southwest of Galatas. German mountain troops actually took Galatas. More German units landed at Maleme on 25 May.  

It was 25 May that Puttick informed Freyberg that the Germans had penetrated the line at Galatas. Puttick said that he was trying to form a new line "running north to south" from the right side of the 19th Brigade.  Puttick expressed doubts that he woud be able to "hold" the Germans on 26 May. During the night, a liaison officer to the Greeks told Freyberg that the Greeks could be ready to break. 

At around 1am on 26 May, an order was issued that the New Zealand Division might be ready to withdraw. The division would move to a position along a creek west of Canea by a mile-end-a-half. The 21st Battalion would be on the right with a cavalry detachment., with an engineer company, along with a company from the 21st Battalion. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More action on 25 May

 The 19th Brigade was the next unit on the left of the line. The 19th Brigade was not attacked on 25 May. There had been a plan for the Australian 2/8th Battalion to move forward about a thousand yards, The success of the New Zealand operation meant that the proposed Austrlian move was not needed. Men from the New Zealand 4th and 5th Brigades were mixed into the front line. Both Brigades had taken heavy losses. The men were very tired because the pace of the action had left little time for sleep. As we had mentioned, the constant air attacke wore down the men's spirits. 

Puttick decided that they would benefit by shortening the line. This would involve withdrawing from the area  around Galatas. They would move to a line through Karatsos, the line running north to south "from the right flank of the 19th Brigade". 

Fortunately, the 8th Greek Regiment was holding their position. The New Zealanders did not realize that the Greeks were reinforced by men from the villages. They were holding on against an attack by men from the 85th German Mountain Regiment. The Germans wanted to surround the British forces. The Greeks had also had sucess against German airborne troops. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Kippenberger's plan on 25 May

 The 23rd Battalion had just reached the critical area. Kippenberger ordered two companies from thc 23rd Battalion to recapture Galatas. The companies would move forward, one om each side of the road. Two light tanks would be in the lead. The tanks drove forward, followed by the infantry, now including groups from other units, The infantry "cheered and shouted". They arrived at the narrow, cobble-stoned area of the tow. They could see traces coming from Galatas, and there were mortar bombs fired as weel. One tank lost a tread, but the other continued forwaed. Some Germans threw grenades feom window in upper stories. The infantry oved forward to the town square. The front tank was disabled while there was an intense hand-to-hand fight in the square, The infntry were firing their rifle and Thompson sub-machine guns "from the hip". It waas the sort of fighting where rifle butts and cayoneta were used.  The Germans were forced back, which stopped their advance decisively.

The 19th Brigade was located on the left. They were not attacked on 25 May.  An advance by the Australian 2/8th Battalion was considered, but this was cancelled after the New Zealand attack had been successful. Even so, the situation still seemed serious. They had increasing casualtes hile the men were very tired. The scale of the German air attacks sapped the men's spirits.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The situation seems desperate

 Kippenbergersent his brigade major to see Brigadier Inlis. Kippenberger had sent a request for help. &he regimental aid station had almost 200 wounded. Two trucks were busy transporting wounded men to the Advancecd Dressing Station. There were many men with serious wounds. Men were hard-pressed and were abandoning positions without orders. An example was Wheat Hill abandoned without authorization. The abandonment of Wheat Hill left the center company of the 18th Brigade without support so they dropped back.

Suddenly many men were moving to the rear. There signs of paic among the men. Kippenberger walked among the men, asking them to "Stand for New Zealand" and other words of encouragement, as he thought of them. Kippenberger plugged the gaps with the men semt by Inglis. The 4th Brigade Band lined up along a wall. The defensive linev was extended on the right side by the 20th Brigade Pioneers and the Kiwi Concert Party. One company from the 20th Brigade extended the line further to the right. The main part of the 20th Brigade were told to move back and line up with the other groups. 

The 23rd Battalion had just arrived in the area that was threatened. Kippenberger thought that patching the line would not help. They needed to attack the enemy. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Attack on May 24

 On the morning of May 24, The enemy was gathering in front of the 18th Battalion.  This was on the west side of the New Zealand position. The 18th Battalion was involved in heavy fighting. The company on the right was overrun while the cebyer company was surrounded. Colonel Fray, the battalion commander led a group from his headquarters to try and restore the battalion position, but the German attackers were too strong. 

Brigadier Inglis sent two 20th Battalion companies to help the 18th Battalion. Howard Kippenberger was in charge of the men in the forward area. He ordered the two companies to the right on the ridge next to the Composite Battalion. When they reached their assigned position, the Composite Battalion "was nearly all gone". The two companies managed to stop the Germans from moving through the gap on the right. The Germans were now oushing along the Prison-Galatas Road.

The situation was now seeming very difficult, Kippenberger kept a diary that later used to write about the battle. There were numbers of men leaving the fighting and heading to the rear.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events on 24 May, including at headquarters

 Freyberg thought that Blamey "must be officiating", based on the last communication Freyberg had received. Blamey had shown in Greece that he was more capable than you might have thought, based on his "resume". Freyberg described the communication as "clear and direct".  Headquarters was working to help the forces in Crete. Freyberg heard that the Rangers had failed to clear the road. He also learned that German paratroops had landed "west of Heraklion" and blocked the Argylls from coming from Timbakion. On the plus side, three destroyers had set sail from Alexandria with two commando battalions. The first commando battalion ("Layforce") had already landed at Suda from the fast minelayer Abdiel.

The New Zealand Division now faced two German airborne regiments and one mountain regiment,  Another mountain regiment was travelling over hills towards Suds Bay. The Germans on the north were organized into three groups. More German units were flown into Maleme. 

The New Zealand Division expected that the German attack that started on 24 May would peak on 25 May. Inglis was granted authority to pull in the reserves, the remnants of the four weak battalions of the 5th Brigade. They had been reduced to less than 1,400 men. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Action on 24 May

 The Germans from Maleme reached the force near the prison. On the 23rd, more units had landed at Maleme. They were "two mountain artillery units, one mountain armored unit and most of a motor cycled battalion". 

The British force on Crete was situated with the west end located in an arc to the southwest of Canea. It was a circle with a radius of about three miles. They faced a German a German group from Maleme and from near thye prison. More German mountain troops were moving to the east over the hills towards Suda Bay, moving north. They hoped to encircle the British. The 8th Greek Regiment was in front of this German group. The Greeks had been isolated when the German paratroops had landed near the prison. 

In the afternoon of 24 May, patrols of Germans investigated the 4th Brigade position. The Germans seemed to be getting ready to attack the 4th Brigade. Arpund 4pm, a strong attack hit the 18th Battalion. They were initially pushed back, but they regained their position with a counter attack. Ther was more back and forth action at dusk. During the afternoon, Canea was heavily bombed, as if to try and level the town. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

23 to 24 May and earlier news on Crete with reinforcements

 Two infantry tanks arrived at Heraklion on 23 May after being landed at Timbakion. They also told  that the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were travelling to Heraklion. Those tanks, wiyh one that had been at Heraklion, were loaded on a lighter (presumsably a landing craft) which took the tanks and two 75mm guns to Suda. 

There were more attempts to send help to Crete. Glenroy had been sent, but turned back, probably to Alexandria. The fast minelayer Abdiel departed from Alexandria with a commando unit (soon to be called "Layforce). Abdiel also brought supplies and ammunition. 

The German staff attributed the British pull back to the move by "the Utz Group" to envelope the British force, The Ramcke group followed the British pull back and fought the rearguard troops. General Ringel sent the 85th Mountain Regiment east through Alikianon, traveling through mountains in the direction of Suda Bay. They hoped to "outflank the British in the Galatas-Suda area" The plan was to continue on to Retimo. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Action on Crete from 23 to 24 May

 During the night, the soldiers in the Platanias area withdrew to the area behind the 4th Brigade. The uninjured infantry were on foot. What vehicles that were available carried the wounded and towed heavy weapons. 

The units at Retimo lacked ciphers,so messages from Freyberg were sent in the clear. The ciphers at Heraklion were destroyed because of the paratroop landing on 20 May. There was a submarine cable which allowed secret communication. 

Freyberg ordered a 1/Rangers company, with two anti-tank guns, to travel east from Suda. They were ordered to open the road to the Retimo airfield. They arrived at Retimo by 8pm. Captain Lergessner met them when they reached the town of Retimo. Colonel Campbell ordered Captain Lergessner to go to Suda to pass information to Freyberg and to ask for instructions. When Captain Lergessner  heard that the Rangers were coming, he tried to convince them to not attack the Germans. The Rangers company attacked without success. Captain Lergessner then travelled to Suda, eventually followed by the remains of the Rangers unit. 

The two ninfantry tanks that had been landed at Timbakion arrived at Heraklion during the night of 19-20 May. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.