The 17th (Australian) Brigade

 The 17th Brigade was given orders in writing that would be quite challenging. Brigadier Savige had arrived at General Blamey's headquarters as early as 13 April 1941. The 17th Brigade headquarters had arrived at Larisa on 11 April. We know already that when Savige arrived at Blamey's headquarters, General Wilson was there. He apparently ordered Savige to do some reconnaissance work. He was supposed to take the road from Larisa to Kalabuka. It would be to take the road that lead to the rear of the Epirus Army. He was also to check the Kalabuka-Grevena road. This happened to be the road that the 1st Armoured Brigade was taking while withdrawing. That was also true for the Western Macedonian Army. 

Brigadier Savige set off with his liaison officer. The drove from Larisa to Kalabuka and never saw any Greek troops. From there, they drove to Pindus to a point that was said to be above the snow line. It was said that from there, they could see the Adriatic. By the time they had driven back to Kalabuka, the town was filled with Greek troops. 

By 14 April, General Blamey had asked Brigadier Savige to return to his headquarters. He found Brigadier Galloway there doing Wilson's work by wanting the 17th Brigade to go to Kalabuka. While talking, word arrived that the Germans had broken the line on the left side. Blamey accordingly sent the 17th Brigade to hold a line that included Kalabuka. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The British misperception of the Greeks

 It seems that the British problem originated with General Wilson, Churchill's buddy. Wilson commanded in Greece because he was Churchill's friend, or at least seemed like one. The Greeks gave the impression of being second-class soldiers. They were inherently disorganized, or at least gave that impression to Wilson. The Greeks walked along the sides of roads in small groups. They wore uniforms that were rather "dingy" as the British said. 

The Greeks were not equipped with nice vehicles, but rather used whatever they could find, such as donkeys and farm carts. What vehicles they had were rather unimpressive. 

Wilson was now concerned that the Germans might move quickly south "along the Gravenna road" and "reach Larisa" a "bottleneck" and cut the British off from Athens. Wilson reacted by ordering the newly arrived 17th Brigade to try and protect this area, so that the British were not cut off from Athens. 

Interestingly enough, Brigadier Savige, who commanded the 17th Brigade, reached General Blamey's headquarters. Savige was hoping to receive some orders from Blamey. Savige had a headquarters, as well, and had reached Larisa by 11 April. He had his three battalions along with the extra battalion, the 2/11th, which was still located in Athens. 

It happened that when Savige had arrived at Blamey's headquarters, he ran into Wilson there. Savige was told to do some reconnaissance the road that went from Larisa to Kalabaka. There was a road that went towards that Greek Epirus Army.  This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

What would disturb General Wilson 13 April 1941?

 So what would cause General Wilson to be worried on 13 April 1941? There was a road at Grevena that Wilson wanted to be able to use for the 1st Armoured Brigade to withdraw. Word was, however, that the road was jammed with slow-moving Greek troops. They were described as "plodding south". What they thought that they had heard was that the 12th and 20th Greek divisions "had disintegrated" while trying to move to the Siatista and Klisoura passes. They had heard, though, that the Greek Cavalry Division was "well-established in the Pisoderion pass" in the north. 

General Wilson complained that the "Greek Central Macedonian Army" had failed in the process of executing the withdrawal. He also complained that the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions had never been able regain control over their men after they left the "Vermion positions". The disorganized divisions were now simply intent on reaching Athens.

The Australian historian commented that he expected that the Greek divisions were not really disorganized and that was simply a mistaken impression by the British based on the poor equipment and their appearance on the road. The historian also thought that what they were concerned about were service troops walking alongside the roads and not actually combat units.  This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The new situation and the British responsibilities

 It seemed that the new situation involved a defense on the Aliakmon line that had the Greek forces positioned on the left. They would occupy the passes "west of the Florina Valley and along the Albanian frontier." 

General Papagos issued an order on 12 April and defined the British resposiblities. The 6th Australian Division had lost heavily in anti-tank guns. General Wilson, though, ordered General Mackay to handle the demolitions along the Klisoura Road as well as the Argos Orestikon-Grevena Road. Some guns from the 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment were provided to the 20th Greek Division. 

The 12th and 20th Greek Divisions to march from "the Vermion Passes" to the western passes. That would give the Anzac Corps the best roads. The biggest challenge would be communication between the Greeks and British. 

The poor British command structure only made things worse. 

"On 13 April General Papagos told the armies of Western Macedonia and Epirus that they would withdraw eventually to the coast at Lake Vutrinto. The Greeks were in this deep salient that they would have to leave. 

General Blamey thought that the British position would be in "an immensely strong natural position". "The Greek line would be in extremely rugged country". 

This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

14 to 15 April 1941 in Greece

 You have to think that the Australians were too quick to blow bridges over the Aliakmon River. By later on the 13th of April, engineers were ordered to bridge the river next to the 19th Brigade. Just to make things more interesting, the 19th Brigade radios were often out of order. 

That caused some silly things to happen. One of General Mackay's intelligence officers took a message by motor cycle to the river, swam across with help from a Greek to find the headquarters. 

General Blamey was still involved on 15 April. His units were mostly available, except the 16th Brigade was moving into position to the right of the 4th New Zealand Brigade. 

With the British having vacated the Olympus-Aliakmon line, that left the Greeks in a salient The salient being a triangle with about 73 mile sides. They were in a spot where the Germans were about to attack the eastern side. There was also a 6,000 feet mountain range that was not very organized. 

The Greek supply situation was becoming an issue. By then, the Trikkala-Kastoria road had become more important than they would have liked. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

13 to 15 April 1941 with Australian and New Zealand soldiers

 On 13 April, the 1st Armoured Brigade was still at the Sotir rearguard position. General Mackay drove south to join the "16th, 4th, and 19th Brigades". The bridge "that carried the main road over the Aliakmon" was still intact. Mackay learned that General Blamey had already ordered a New Zealand battalion to reinforce the 19th Brigade. General Mackay waited at the bridge until 3:20pm. The rearguard at Ptolemais was being attacked at this time. Australian sappers blew the bridge at General Mackay's orders. Even after being blown, infantry could still walk across the bridge wreckage. 

It figures that right after the bridge was blown, six British three-ton trucks drove up. For a little while more, a pontoon bridge was still available for the trucks to use. 

The 4th Brigade was at the Servia pass and had been digging in. Three field regiments, three Australian and one New Zealand were in place. 

There were two battalions from the 19th Brigade in position on 13 April. Stragglers had arrived that increased the 2/8th Battalion to 308 men. During the night of 14 April, you saw the 26th Battalion use a "folding boat and a rope to cross the river". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The move to the Mount Olympus-Aliakmon River line

 You had General Mackay's group and the Greek Central Macedonian Army pulling back to the Florina-Kozani Valley. "To their right, you had the Australian and New Zealand "moving back to the Aliakmon Line". They were able to withdraw without being so hard-pressed. The New Zealand Division had reached Mount Olympus by 10 April. They had a blocking force consisting of the division cavalry with armored cars and carriers, along with some field artillery. They were providing cover for the positions at Mount Olympus. 

We have already learned of the long column of German vehicles headed south, starting at some ten miles north of the river. This was seen on 12 April 1941. The Germans had motor cycles driving south along the river, approaching the bridge which had been blown. 

"Right before dusk" about thirty vehicles drove into sight loaded with infantry. They drew fire from New Zealand field artillery and pulled back. In the morning, the Germans attempted to cross the river, near the road bridge. They were fired on by armored cars and carriers. Long range artillery fire, from some ten thousand yards, drove back the Germans. 

The next phase involved advancing German tanks. The blocking force drew German artillery fire. By 1:30pm, the blocking force was ordered to withdraw. In a couple more hours, the 1st Armoured Brigade was in action at Ptolemais. 

As the Germans advanced on 14 April, the last rearguard was ordered back to Katerini. By 4pm, they had reached the Olympus position. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria". 

More rearguard action from 12 to 14 April 1941

 At about 3:30pm, the 1st Armoured Brigade was then at Ptolomais engaged in a last rearguard battle. British carriers and armored cars were firing on advancing Germans. New Zealand artillery, positioned some 10,000 yards back was engaging the advancing German force. 

By early on 14 April, the Germans were starting to move forward. German tanks and infantry were moving towards the defenders. By 10am on 14 April, the rearguard was pulled back to Katerini. By late afternoon, they were within the Olympus defensive perimeter. 

As all this was happening, the 16th Brigade was moving into the Servia position. They had been forced to travel over the mountains using borrowed donkeys. Back on 9 April, "the engineers had cratered the pass". Soon, they were ordered to move on to the Olympus defenses. They destroyed or burnt much gear prior to the withdrawal. Of course, just to make things interesting, they got a day of snow at Veria, before they moved out. 

General Blamey had ordered the 2/3rd Battalion to move into position near the main road and the track they would take on the way to crossing the Aliakmon river. The 2/1st Battalion had reached Leventes by 3am on  13 April. They walked south on foot to Avlianna, where they had to ask directions about how to reach the river by traveling over the mountain.  This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Withdrawing towards the Olympus-Aliakmon line

 We are moving around in time at this point. We are now looking back at the period of 11 to 13 April 1941. You had General Mackay's group and the Central Macedonian Army moving back towards the Florina-Kozani Valley. You had the New Zealand Division and the Australians moving back towards the Aliakmon Line. By 10 April, the New Zealand Division was on Mount Olympus. By the afternoon of 12 April, a long convoy of German vehicles was seen about ten miles north of the Aliakmon river. The New Zealand Division had destroyed the "road bridge". Long range artillery fire was called in from some ten thousand yards away. The force that was blocking the enemy advance was ordered to pull back. During the night of 13 April, the New Zealand cavalry lay behind a tank ditch. Early on 14 April, the Germans started to move forward. At 10am, the rearguard was told to pull back to Katerini. By 4pm, they were back within the defenses at Mount Olympus. 

At the same time, the 16th Brigade was pulling back to Servia. They had obtained donkeys from the Greek villagers. They would be used to cross the mountains. Much equipment was destroyed since it was thought to be too much for the donkeys to carry. They burned tents, buried ammunition. Even some "great coats and blankets were burnt". To increase the difficulty, they got snow at Veria during the day before the withdrawal. 

General Blamey had ordered that one battalion be withdrawn immediately. The 2/3rd Battalion was pulled back to the bottom of the pass on 11 April. They provided cover to the brigade that was to move south and cross the river. By 6am on 13 April, they were able look down on the Aliakmon. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The Anzac corps is in action

 On 12 April, General Blamey announced that the 1st Australian Corps was now the Anzac Corps. The German corps had advanced to Axios and had connected with the Italians in Albania. General List had ordered the corps "to wheel south tp Kozani". That would put them into the rear of the Greeks and British on a line at Katerini-Edesssa-Florina. They would ignore the remnants of the Yugoslav army. 

The German force causing trouble for the British and Greeks had the 5th and 9th Armored Divisions and the 73rd Infantry Division. They also had the SS unit, the "Adolph Hitler Division". By 10 April, the "Adolph Hitler" division had moved into Florina. The Germans were forced to drive down poor roads that were muddy and had bomb craters. In addition, they were forced to endure bombing and strafing by British aircraft. 

It seems that German intelligence was misinformed about the British divisions involved in this campaign. They might have learned in Athens what divisions they faced, but they didn't. 

The attack that started on 12 April included three "battle groups". The Germans described being in a "fierce tank battle at Ptolemais. The Germans lost four tanks in this fight. The Germans mentioned taking 480 British (called English) and 40 Greek prisoners. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

 While the British were trying to hold back the German advance, some thirty German tanks "swung over the foothills". The German tanks were advancing towards the site where Brigadier Charrington had located his headquarters. This was some three miles back from the British positions. There was a fierce fight that included German bombers attacking. 

The German advance was stopped by the Rangers and anti-tank gunners. They thought that they had knocked out as many as eight German tanks. British tanks also came into action and thought that they had knocked out five more German tanks. 

The armored brigad headquarters men came into action with their rifles and Bren guns. They were also with the New Zealand machine gunners who came into action. All this action happened at sunset. They had stopped the Germans but Brigadier Charrington decided to withdraw. 

British tanks and armored cars "covered the withdrawal". The tanks and armored cars were able to withdraw behind a smoke screen without a problem. The armored brigade was able to withdraw to Kozani and then drove down the mountain road to Grevena. 

By the time they came to Grevena, the armored brigade was very weak. Much of it was due to tanks breaking down. If you read Robert Crisp's book, Brazen Chariots, he writes about the poor mechanical condition of British tanks used in Greece. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The Greek withdrawal and the British

 Despite what the Greek commander thought, the Greeks were able to withdraw. It was on 12 April that Greeks pulled back to passes on the Albanian frontier. "By the morning of 13 April, the British rearguard was on the road at Sotir". Greek forces were in the passes in the mountains "to the west". The British armored brigade force was still covering the pass at Siatista. The British rearguard sat on a ridge that was 600 feet high "that lies across the gap". This was an area "between Lake Vegorritis and a marshy area on the left". 

There was a creek and the marsh which "were both impassable to tanks." General Mackay had given permission to the armored brigade to add the 2/4th Battalion to the force. The only other infantry was "a company of the Rangers". The 2/4th was weak, with only two companies. The Australian infantry was positioned "on a line that was three miles long." To their left was what was left of the Rangers. 

The infantry was to "fight a rearguard action" and had tanks attached. They had most of the 3rd RTR, a Hussars squadron, the 2nd RHA, some New Zealand machine gunners, and a battery from the 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment. The British returned German fire and ended up killing some British prisoners. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

From late on 12 April 1941

 The situation for the Australians was getting very tense. The Germans were advancing on Hill 1001. Communication was now only possible by using runners. The men from Hill 1001 were led out. They kept to the west to stay away from the Germans who were moving south near the road. Lieutenant Copland "marched his men down the hill to Xinon Neron, four miles away". Major Barham waited for New Zealand machine gunners to move out. 

The Australians had not all heard to keep west of the road, so Major Barham's group encountered German motorcyclists. who they fought. Australians walked, unknowing, into a German position and were captured. There were some 70 Australians captured at this spot. 

One good thing was that the Australians had held long enough. During the night, "only 250 men from the 2/8th Battalion had arrived at Rodona. Of these, "many had no weapons". 

One good thing was that the artillery had been able to keep fighting until the enemy had closed. Communications had been an issue that caused trouble. The men had needed to be ordered to withdraw sooner and to stay to the west of the road.

By the time they arrived in the south, there were only some fifty men with "arms". The 2/8th Battalion had arrived in the south having lost all organization. They mentioned that the commanding officer was "completely exhausted". The Australian historian thought that the 2/8th Battalion, given their circumstances, had performed well.

The Australians had been tasked to cover the 20th and 12th Greek divisions while they withdrew. The Greeks did not recognize that in fact they had been covered by the Australians. General Mackay's force "had eld the Vevi Pass until after dark on  12 April. The Australians were supposed to hold Sotir, a rearguard position. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More about the 2/8th Battalion on 12 April 1941

 The 2/8th Battalion would try to withdraw to the southeast, since the Germans had tanks moving south along the road. There was the additional problem of machine gun fire. Some men were told not to try and take weapons and equipment, because they might get slowed down and captured. The thought was that they needed to move fast over the hills, trying to find whatever cover was available. 

On  the left, one officer was looking to collect men as they came along as stragglers. From the top of a ridge, they could see the battalion moving south. In the dark, men were struggling through mud. The first  men reached Sotir "the reserve position". The men who had reached Sotir had traveled some ten miles from where they had started. In another two hours, they had walked to the road fork at Rodona. They were able to meet the vehicles that were there, waiting for them. 

Gradually during the night, more men arrived. At one point, the numbers had grown to 250 men. They were still missing half of the officers and about two-thirds of the men. In the center, the 2/RHA and "two of the Australian anti-tank guns" were able to block the German advance. That was sufficient to keep the Australians from being overrun. They were able to safely withdraw, as the Germans approached. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The Australians on 12 April 1941

 After fighting the Germans for some six hours, the 2/8th Battalion was still holding on, although they had been hit hard on the left. They were lucky to still hold the heights after the fighting that had occurred so far As we have seen, the Rangers had pulled back about two miles. They blocked the road at that point. One bad thing was that the 1/2nd Anti-Tank Gun had five of six guns abandoned after losing protection. The 2/8th position had degenerated into a "deep salient". 

The 2nd RHA now only had "a platoon of New Zealand machine gunners" for infantry support. The commander at the Australian brigade headquarters kept insisting that the Rangers had not pulled back. The truth was that they had now pulled back a second time to "the pre-arranged rearguard position at Rodona." 

The last of the Greek Dodecanese had left by 4pm, leaving the 2/8th Battalion in a weaker position. The battalion now was receiving German machine gun fire from higher ground on the right. The left side now was receiving German machine gun fire on the battalion headquarters. They now had lost phone connection to the brigade due to the Rangers pulling out. 

By 5:30pm, some 500 German infantry, some tanks, had run into the 2/8th Battalion position along the entire front. The left company in particular was in trouble. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The German attack starting on 12 April 1941

 The German attack that had been expected started at 8:30am on 12 April 1941. The Germans attacked east of the road. It was at the place where the Rangers position and the Australian 2/8th Battalion joined. The Germans made no attempt to disperse, and rather, stayed in a close "formation". The Australians were so used to always being dispersed to reduce the casualties from any air attacks, that they were surprised by the German formation. The Germans overran the front Australian platoon. The platoon had six men escape capture. The rest of the company held, but then they observed the Rangers "in the valley" start to withdraw. The Australian historian speculated that the Rangers had thought that the2/8th Battalion had been overrun. After that, "the remaining platoons moved farther up the slopes". 

There was a lot of German activity "with tanks, trucks, and guns" below the 2/8th Battalion. The Germans held back for several more hours. The two 2/8th companies were not attacked and were able to shoot at the Germans. Australians "counter-attacked and retook some ground. So the 2/8th was able to hold their positions, but the Rangers were seen to be gathering some two miles back. One issue was that five anti-tank guns had been left unprotected and were ultimately abandoned. The Australian positions on the ridge were now a "salient". 

The 2nd RHA guns now did not have any infantry in front of them. At 3pm, the reality was that the Rangers were far to the rear, not close by. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

 To some extent, the impression that the Greeks had collapsed was a false impression. The Greeks were poorly equipped and were in poor uniforms and were walking along the side of roads. One feature was that it was services troops that were in retreat, while the fighting men were still in place, holding out. General Wilson was concerned about "his inland flank". One concern was that the Germans might move rapidly along the Grevena road to the "Larisa bottleneck". That would cut the road to Athens for the British forces. Wilson decided to use the Australian 17th Brigade, only just arriving at the Piraeus, as his flank protection. 

It was only on 13 April that the 17th Brigade commander arrived at General Blamey's headquarters. The 17th Brigade had "reached Larisa on 11 April". On 12 April, they were still in Athens. It turns out that General Wilson was at Blamey's headquarters when the 17th Brigade commander, Brigadier Savige had arrived. 

General Mackay gave orders to the 19th Australian Brigade. They were to thin out the infantry and get on vehicles in preparation to withdraw. He wanted them to be on vehicles by "4am on 13 April. A rearguard position was to be held at Rodona and Sotir. This would be some six miles to the south. They would need to "cover the main withdrawal". The German attack that they had expected started at 8:30am on 12 April. The Australians were surprised that the Germans did not disperse to defend against air attack, which the Australians always did. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The Greek withdrawal from the salient

 After the latest moves ordered, the "boundary between the Greek and British forces would be a north-south line that ran through Deskati. One consequence was that the 1st Armoured Brigade would need to move east. The Greeks had the problem that they would need to  march one hundred miles. Someone would need to hold two passes, the Klisoura and the Siatista passes. Someone would also need to hold the Grevena road for several days. That would be necessary to be able to execute the "retirement"

At General Wilson's headquarters, they learned that "the road through Grevena" was blocked by slow-moving Greek troops trying to march to the south. The report said that the Greek 12th and 20th had "disintegrated" on their move towards Athens. The Australian historian was saying that the Greeks were not in such a poor condition, and that their appearance made it look worse than it really was. 

Apparently General Wilson considered that there was a "serious threat to his inland flank". General Wilson ordered the 17th Australian Brigade, then unloading at the Piraeus, "to guard the inland flank". Sometime on 13 April, the 17th Brigade commander arrived at General Blamey's headquarters. At this point, General Wilson was located at Blamey's headquarters. 

Brigadiier Savige, the 17th Brigade commander, "drove from Larisa to Kalabaka". They did not see any Greek troops during their travels. After that, they drove to Pindus, "above the snow line where they could see the Adriatic". They drove back to Kalabaka, which by then was "crowded with Greek troops." By the next morning, Savige was called back to Blamey's headquarters. "While they were talking, word arrived that the Germans had broken through on the left". Blamey then ordered the 17th Brigade to hold a line "covering Kalabaka". This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

A bad situation for the 6th Australian Division

 The German attack had created a major difficulty for the Greeks. There was the Trikkala-Kastoria road, with the piece "leading through the Mersovon Pass to Epirus. This was now a critical route for supplies. By this time, the 6th Australian Division had lost so many anti-tank guns, they were not in a place to support the Greek army. You see, though, that General Wilson had given General Mackay "responsibility for demolitions on the Klisoura road and the Argos Orestikon-Grevena road". You see that the 102nd Anti-tank Regiment had to provide support to the 20th Greek Division. 

To simplify "cooperation" between British and Greek forces, the Greeks were forced to march "from the Vermion passes". The Australian and New Zealand forces were given the best roads. The greatest problem in Greece was the fact that the Greeks spoke only Greek, generally, and the British only spoke English. That and the fact that Wilson's organization with five commands made cooperation especially difficult. 

The next event was that General Papagos ordered the "armies of the Western Macedonia and Epirus to withdraw to the line along the Ventikos River and running through the Pindos. They would have to pull out of the deep salient. It is interesting that General Blamey thought that the "British line was an immensely strong natural position". 

The Greeks were stuck with "extremely ragged country". The 1st Armoured Brigade would have to "side-step" towards the east to enter the British area. This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Difficulties in the withdrawal of British and Greek forces

 It seems that the biggest problem with the withdrawal of Greek and British forces included communication between English-speaking and Greek speaking men. There were obstacles created by "the differences in equipment, tactical doctrine, and national temperament. There were issues such as the Australian and New Zealand forces were allowed to use the best roads while the Greeks were given the worst. The Greeks were forced "to march from the Vermion passes across the Florina-Kozani valley to the western passes." The Australian and New Zealand forces needed better roads for their equipment. The Greeks were relegated to the road that could not handle trucks. 

Wilson's organization of his force made communication from five different British commands to the Greeks that much more challenging. The communications problems between Greek-speaking officers and English speaking officers  were a major issue. 

On 13 April 1941, General Papagos ordered the armies of Western Macedonia and Epirus to withdraw. The Greeks were in a deep salient to a new position that continued the British line in a east-west direction.  General Blamey called the British line "an immensely strong natural position". This is based on the account in "Greece Crete and Syria" by Gavin Long.