The aftermath of the Australian patrol action in early August 1942

The Australians were ready with a plan to deal with the condition that the patrol lost the element of surprise. The plan was that when surprise was seen to have been lost, intensive fire would begin from "machine-guns, artillery, and mortars". The idea was that the enemy would think that a broad-front attack had been launched and they would likely be confused by the action. The plan caused the enemy to lay down their defensive fire plan. The result was that the enemy fire safely passed over the retreating patrol. Point 25 and Trig 33 were the recipients of the enemy fire. Captain Cobb believed that there were a continuous line of defenses from the coast to Point 25. The prisoner that had been taken was with the 125th Regiment that had just arrived from Crete.

The enemy appeared to be unaware that the Australians had abandoned El Makh Khad. On 7 August, an enemy reconnaissance gave them information about the withdrawal. General Morshead decided that the Australians needed to occupy posts around that area. The idea was that occupying posts would keep the enemy from getting too close a look at El Alamein and Tel el Eisa. To carry out Morshead's plan, one company of the 2/13th Battalion moved into Trig 22. The 2/13th Field Company immediately laid a protective minefield. A patrol was sent out about 1,800 yards forward. That had the effect of drawing enemy fire. Also on 7 August, the 2/43rd Battalion put a company "with anti-tank uns and machine-guns astride the Qattara Track". This was "east-southeast from Trig 22.

On 8 August, the 2/43rd Battalion replaced the company from the 2/13th Battalion. They took over a portion of the Makh Khad Ridge. They sent out patrols about half-way to the Ruin Ridge. They didn't see any minefields or enemy soldiers.

The 2/15th Battalion sent out a 17 man patrol towards a path that was often traveled by German working parties. After the patrol had traveled about 2,400 yards, they sighted a forty man working party. They Australians could see other working parties, but they were too far away to be easily attacked. The patrol sat for about thirty minutes. They could see a 25 man working party approaching. The patrol leader tossed a grenade as a signal for his men to start firing. The Australians had two Bren guns, four sub-machine guns, and six rifles. They killed or wounded every German in the working party. They carried out one wounded German. One of the Australians was wounded and one man was missing. Again, a pre-planned fire support was shot in support of the patrol. Once again, the enemy fired his defensive fire. The Australian patrol was able to pull back without any problems. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Early August 1942 at El Alamein

Early August 1942 saw the men of the 9th Australian Division improving their defenses in preparation for what was expected by mid-August. Rommel was predicted to launching an attack by mid-August. The infantry and engineers were busy laying mines and doing more digging for better defensive positions. At night, some men were always on watch. Others were able to sleep knowing that their turn to stand watch was coming. Other men were engaged in "deep patrolling" of the enemy area.

August was peak season for flies. The flies interfered with eating and sleeping. For example, the 9th Australian Divisional Cavalry had so many flies at midday, that they had to forego eating lunch, except for a small amount. Part of the problem was that there were still dead bodies in the area. 20th Brigade starting working on checking the area and burying bodies. In a few weeks, the fly situation had greatly improved.

The Australian 20th Brigade was positioned with two battalions forward with the third battalion in reserve. 20th Brigade had only been in place since 3 August 1942. The brigade commander had decreed that they would fire on any enemy soldiers that were seen They would also patrol into enemy territory and conduct raids on enemy positions. That would be very similar to their time at Tobruk. They would be engaged with the same enemy, just in a new spot. The first 20th Brigade patrol was sent out at 9pm on 4 August. The patrol was led by Captain Cobb with 12 other men. They traveled some 1,500 yards north, which put them in the middle of an enemy position. They were challenged and they "knew that surprise had been lost". They crawled some sixty yards forward when they heard the bolt of a Spandau machine gun. The captain tossed a grenade in the direction of the sound. The machine gun started firing and the captain and some other men were wounded. Despite being wounded, the captain and men moved forward towards the machine gun, which had stopped firing. One of the men had a Thompson sub-machine gun and was causing a large commotion. The captain then ordered the patrol to withdraw. They had lost one man killed and others wounded. They had a prisoner, but he was killed by another enemy soldier with a sub-machine gun. The captain "blacked out" and was carried back. They had reached the Bren guns. The men on the patrol had done well and had not hesitated to carry on even though they had lost the element of surprise. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Comparing general experience levels in August 1942

The Australian general Blamey "had been a regular from 1906 to 1925". We already knew that Bernard Law Montgomery was a "buffoon" although a very successful one. Montgomery flat out stated that Blamey's characterization of British commanders was correct: that the Dominion officers had not been produced by the British army training and experience system. The Australian historian thought that another issue that was not stated was that Generals Auchinleck and Ramsden had been "difficult" to deal with. The Australian historian then proceeded to examine officers. Freyberg was a former regular army officer. His wartime record was impressive. He was also more senior at Major-General than Alexander, Montgomery, Wilson, and Auchinleck. He was only nine months behind General Wavell. Despite that, Freyberg was still must a division commander in the campaign for Greece, Crete, and North Africa. Only in 1944 was Freyberg appointed to be a corps commander. During 1942 and beyond, major command appointments were decide by the CIGS, Alan Brooke.

There were Australian politics involved, as well. General Morshead wanted to see Brigadier Ramsey appointed as division commander is something happened to Morshead. There was the concern that Brigadier Tovell was senior to Ramsey. Morshead's solution was to have Tovell recalled to Australia and given a higher command. The problem with that solution was that General Blamey had other plans for men. Blamey also wanted to send a Major-General to North Africa to be Morshead's deputy. Morshead asked Blamey to let him approve of a deputy, because Morshead wanted to work with someone who would be compatible with him. Blamey named J.E.S. Stevens as his caondidate deputy to General Morshead. Morshead told Blamey what Stevens would be acceptable to him. We find that the discussion about Dominion officers being corps commanders had a positive effect on the British officers. Montgomery told MOrshead that if General Leese became a casuaty, MOrshead would succeed him as XXX Corps commander. This si based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Blamey reacts to the command changes in the Middle East in August 1942

Despite our concerns about General Blamey, he was a tireless advocate for the Australian Army. Blamey's partner in government in August 1942 was the Labour prime minister, Mr. Curtin. After seeing General Morshead perform well in 1941 and 1942, often under great duress, General Blamey took a special interest in promoting Morshead's cause. On 21 August 1942, General Blamey wrote Mr. Curtin, saying that some of the British generals promoted to corps commanders had less experience and success in battle than General Morshead had shown. General Blamey told Mr. Curtin that he felt that General Morshead was deserving of being appointed as a corp commander. Blamey even stated that Morshead being being passed over for corps commander was detrimental to the morale of Australian troops in the Middle East.

The British were apparently saying that only British officers were eligible for corps commander. Here, you had Bernard Law Montegomery asking for Brian Horrocks to be a corps commander. Brian Horrocks had apparently last commanded a machine gun battalion in France, but Montgomery was engaged in promoting Brian Horrocks cause. General Morshead replied back that he was busy commanding the 9th Australian Division to be concerned with having hurt feelings. We can only decide that it was General Blamey had the hurt feelings. Mr. Churchill said his piece, saying that he had great confidence in General Morshead and had asked that he be considered for corps command. General Brooke, the CIGS, had told MOntgomery that he should consider Morshead for corps commander. We suspect that perhaps Montgomery had some prejudice against using Dominion officers as corps commanders.

On 13 September 1941, General Morshead had spoken with General Alexander about corps command, and that corps command had been discussed with the Australian government and General Blamey. We get the sense that Montgomery did had prejudice about Dominion officers, particularly General Morshead for corp commander. Montgomery did allow that General Morshead could command the corps, if General Leese were a casualty. General Montgomery derided officers who were not professional British soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Once in command, Montgomery laid down the rules to be followed in August 1942

When General Montgomery appeared on the scene, he "stole" two days of command from General Auchinleck. Montgomery did not believe in "Jock columns or battle groups". At least on paper, he wanted to fight divisions as intact units and in a somewhat contradictory fashion, said he would fight brigades as brigades. In the desert, they were used to having brigades as the normal fighting unit. In the past, they had often treated battalions as if they were brigades, but Montgomery was opposed to doing such. He wanted the divisions to hold their ground with no plans to withdraw any further. Montgomery tried an Australian hat but he did not understand how they were worn. Montgomery eventually settled on wearing a beret as his signature headgear. It turns out that Montgomery had an Australian connection, because his father had been Bishop of Tasmania at some point.

He disliked some of what Auchinleck and Eric Dorman-Smith had thought was a good idea. There were not more mentions of "boxes". He also did not like the term "consolidate", which he thought should be referred to as reorganization. Montgomery also wanted to use a real Chief of Staff, unlike Auchinleck's system of using an assistant chief of staff in Eric Dorman-Smith. He also expected when he issued orders that they would be acted upon, they were not to be a topic for debate.

There had been an idea that men should not wear their division insignia ("flashes"). Montgomery disagreed and said that flashes should be worn. Another step was that anti-tank guns should be fired for training the gunners. There apparently had been a concern to conserve ammunition so that six-pounder gunners had never fired their guns.

Montgomery chose to have his headquarters close to the front. Alexander chose to locate a tactical headquarters near Montgomery's headquarters. The Desert Air Force headquarters was also near where Montgomery chose to locate his headquarters. Since Montgomery expected an attack by Rommel's forces quite soon, he got control of the 44th Division, which he put on Alam el Halfa Ridge. Montgomery asked Alexander if he could have General Horrocks in Egypt to command XIII Corps. General Lumsden eventually commanded X Corps. When Churchill returned to Egypt, he was happy with the way that his changes had affected the organization. This is based on the account in Vol. III Of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck replaced in August 1942

I have long been an admirer of Churchill or at least his writings. After studying in detail, the events of 1941 and into 1942, I have become aware of his shortcomings. While we have been aware of Auchinleck's shortcomings in 1942, Churchill was pretty much unaware of the merits of Auchinleck. That resulted in his removal and replacement in August 1942. Churchill was unhappy with Auchinleck because of Auchinleck's refusal to act prematurely and attack the Germans and Italians almost immediately. Once Auchinleck was replaced, his successors waited much later to attack. Churchill was an armchair general, much in the manner of Hitler on the German side. In Churchill's case, he had military training as an officer and had commanded troops in the Great War.

We were interested to read General Morshead's take on Auchinleck in the Official History. Morshead wrote to Auchinleck saying "I am very sorry and very surprised that you are going away, and every single member of hte A.I.F. will be as regretful as I am, for we all hold you in the highest regard." Churchill had offered a position to Aucnhinleck, but he declined the offer, as he thought that the proposal was unsound. After being relieved, Auchinleck was off to India. Morshead had a high opinion of Auchinleck, after seeing him in action in late 1941 abd through 1942 up through August. Auchinleck had brought the Crusader battle to a successful conclusion and saved the day, really, although he was helped by the New Zealand division and the Australians. In 1942, when things had gone very badly, he stepped in and stopped the enemy forces at El Alamein, in the first battle there. He was aided by the strong showing by the Australians and the infantry tank units. The cruiser tank units under General Gott did not perform as well. Sadly, Gott's death when his plane was shot down was a blessing in the Bernard Law Montgomery was a much better general and he acquitted himself well for the rest of the war. Montgomery had personal traits that were easy to dislike, being rather vain and cautious. When he was able to fight a set-piece battle, he was very able. He did not show up so well in mobile, quickly-changing situations. Auchinleck and his assistant, Eric Dorman-Smith, had studied Rommel's methods and at least tried to find a formula that would work as well for the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Big plans made during July and August 1942

The situation at El Alamein in July 1942 had put Churchill into a panic. He wanted to immediately travel to the Middle East to try and influence events. The CIGS, General Brooke, was much more level-headed than Churchill and he persuaded Churchill to wait while the situation stabilized. Brooke did get Churchill's permission for General Brooke to travel to the Middle East by himself. The news about the American Sherman tanks and self-propelled guns being sent to North Africa was good news, but experienced observers knew that would goad Churchill into demands for an immediate offensive with the new tanks. American officials visited London and met with their British counterparts to discuss strategy for the next year. They agreed to invade North Africa soon and to wait to invade continental Europe.

General Auchinleck's recent communications just inflamed Churchill. Churchill did not want to wait for a new offensive to mid-September. You would have to imagine that made Churchill ready to fire Auchinleck and replace him with a man who would listen to his orders from Churchill to keep on the offensive. Churchill flew into Cairo on 3 August 1942. He had a meeting with General Brooke and General Auchinleck that evening. They wanted to replace Auchinleck as Eighth Army commander, when his actual appointment was as theater commander. Brooke was pretty sharp, he recommended Bernard Law Montgomery as army commander. Churchill wanted General Gott, but Brooke said that Churchill did not know anything about Gott. Churchill resisted Montgomery, since his arrival in the theater would delay Churchill's premature offensive.

A great question to decide was whether to defend the Persian oil fields or to hold Egypt. General Brooke's position was that if the southern Russian front broke, they had to defend the Persian oil fields, even if it meant losing Egypt. Churchill did not really agree with this policy, as he wanted to resolve the situation in North African as the first thing to do. Apparently on 5 August, Churchill and General Brooke visited the 9th Australian Division. Churchill was very complimentary to the Australians, They then visited Eighth Army headquarters and met with General Gott. Churchill was impressed by Gott while General Brooke had his misgivings confirmed. On 6 August, Churchill decided to replace Auchinleck. Churchill wanted General Brooke to take over as theater commander, but Brooke wanted to stay as CIGS. General Alexander would then be the new theater commander with Gott as Eighth Army commander. The Australian historian thought that Gott was responsible for the bad things that had happened. As soon as 7 August, General Gott was killed when his plane was shot down. CHurchill then agreed to Montgomery as Eighth Army commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situations in the Middle East and in the Far East up to August 1942

In the light of events in the Far East, General Morshead's requests for reinforcements for the Middle East seem extravagant. The Japanese forces in New Guinea were now in position to threaten Port Moresby. General Blamey's position on the situation is interesting. He says that they need another corps of three divisions. The Ausralian Prime Minster, Mr. Curtin, made that request to Franklin Roosevelt. At the same time, Mr. Curtin approved sending the reinforcements that General Morsehead had requested. In the event, circumstances caused Mr. Curtin to change his mind.

In the Middle East, the Eighth Army Headquarters was making contingency plans for bad outcomes that were "dispiriting" to the men. They decided in early August to pull out of the Makh Khad ridge area that they had recently captured. The El Alamein Box would continue to be important fortifications. Auchinleck, at this point, was still commander, and he wanted to reduce the force needed to hold the front line. He wanted time to regroup and prepare for new attacks starting in the middle of September. The 9th Australian Division had different ideas, as they expected the enemy to create a force that might attack as soon as mid-August. You had XXX Corps, ready to hold its positions while increasing the depth of their defenses. The Australian plans were to move the 24th Brigade into the El Alamein Box. Over the course of two nights, they would swap the positions of the 20th and 26th Brigades. The 20th Brigade would occupy the area between Trig 33 and Pointy 26, being in place by August 3. They would be connected to the El Alamein Box and would add minefields to the defenses. The 9th Australian Division would defend the coast with support from the 50th RTR. On Ruweisat Ridge, they had the South African Division touching the 5th Indian Division. You had the New Zealand Division defending the right side of the XIII Corps. Part of the South Africans were in back of the 9th Australian Division.

The high level decision makers were deliberating what they should do next. The British had Mr. Churchill and Sir Alan Brooke as negotiators. The Americans had Franklin Roosevelt and the American Chiefs of Staff. The Americans made a move that would greatly help the British situation in the Middle East. They would send one hundred self-propelled guns and three hundred Sherman tanks. Churchill was to visit the Middle East and meet with Stalin in Russia. We believe that Churchill had lost confidence in Auchinleck and hoped to make a change. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australian considerations due to events in the Far East in 1942

In May 1942, pulling the 9th Australian Division back home was discussed. The Australian government was eventually convinced to leave their division in the Middle East. The argument was that oil fields in the Middle East were in danger of German attack from the north. If those oilfields were lost, then there would be problems with supplying Australia with oil. We have difficulty in estimating how real the danger was to the oil fields. Certainly, Germany was desperate for oil supplies, so perhaps this was a reasonable argument. On 10 May 1942, there were some 32,700 Australians in the Middle East. That number was gradually reduced by July 1942. In Australia, the decided in July that they needed to send about 6,000 more men to the Middle East to replace losses.

Mr. Churchill's misjudgments in 1941 caused considerable political instability in Australia. The had gone through some quick changes of government following the Greek campaign. They ended up with John Curtin, head of the Australian Labour Party, as prime minister. He stayed in place until he died in 1945. The Japanese attacks starting in December 1941 threw the Far East into turmoil. What concerned the Australian government most was the Japanese invasion of New Guinea in March 1942. The Japanese landed forces on the north coast of New Guinea on 21 July. The Australians eventually realized that their base at Port Moresby, in Papua, was now very vulnerable to Japanese attack. Besides that, Papua is only 90 miles from Australia. The Australian government felt that Churchill and his advisers in Britain were disregarding the situation in the Far East and the dangers there.

By the end of July 1942, at the conclusion of the First Battle of El Alamein, the 9th Australian Division had 2,552 casualties from the fighting. Given that information, Mr. Curtin approved that 3,978 men be sent to the Middle East as reinforcements. Mr. Curtin made the point, though, that his position was still that all Australian forces should return to Australia to participate in the war in southwest Pacific area.The news of reinforcements prompted General Morshead to comment that the numbers sent were insufficient. Morshead wanted to see 6,113 men sent to the Middle East as reinforcements. This is based on account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Retrospective on failures in late July 1942

The extent of the disastrous attack on Ruin Ridge caused General Morshead great unhappiness. He blamed the cautiousness of British armored formations for the failure. They had run into a minefield that had not been found prior to the attack. The minefield was about 900 yards from Ruin Ridge. They also had considerable difficulties communicating. The unit on Ruin Ridge also had no flank protection, so it was very vulnerable to German attack. He especially blamed the 1st Armoured Division for not providing the promised support. The Australians now tended to expect British armor to fight German tanks, while at Tobruk, the Australians would fight infantry with the tanks and then let artillery fight the tanks. That had been a formula which had served them well at Tobruk. At Tobruk, the Australians would "lie low", hold their ground, fight the German and Italian infantry, and let the artillery in the rear fire on the tanks.

The 1st Army Tank Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Richards, has performed well. It was the cruiser tank units, like the 1st Armoured Division, which had confidence problems because they had no faith in the tanks or methods. In the First Battle of El Alamein, infantry won the successes. The German successes were with armor, as their infantry did not fare well fighting the Australians, particularly. Both the Italians and the 90th Light Division had a hard time in the battles such as the attack on Ruin Ridge. The Australian historian placed the blame on commanders, not on the men in the tanks. There had been lack of coordination between the infantry units and the armored units. The historian thought that the minefield issues should be dealt with by giving armored units their own specialist engineers and equipment for clearing paths through minefields.

The Eighth Army had finished July 1942 feeling uneasy, but they had not failed to hold the enemy forces. Fighting under General Auchinleck's command, they had stopped Rommel's army. They had taken Tel el Eisa from the enemy. Rommel no longer had the ability to push in to the British rear areas. The 9th Australian Division had regained their fighting form. They hd grown rusty since Tobruk, but they were now back at their peak. The situation in Australia since May 1942 were such that they were not able to send reinforcements to the Middle East. On 14 July 1942, they had decided in Australia that they could send about six thousand reinforcements to the Middle East. This was about the same time that General Morshead asked for reinforcements. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Changes made from 27July 1942

From 27 July 1942, we were near the end of General Auchinleck's tenure in the Middle East. This was the day that included the disaster to the 2/28th Battalion. On 27 July 1942, Auchinleck appointed Brigadier de Guingand as senior staff officer at Eighth Army Headquarters. de Guingand felt he was not qualified for the position. In fact, though, he was Auchinleck's best appointment in the Middle East during his time in command. At least the Australian historian considered de Guingand as "brilliant and successful".

Also on 27 July, Eric Dorman-Smith gave Auchinleck his paper about their situation and how hey might make changes to improve the Eighth Army. One main point was that the enemy were not strong enough to attempt a break through to the Delta and least with any chance of success. They would be making a big gamble if they attempted such an operation. He also presented a plan for what seems to be like what Bernard Law Montgomery eventually executed as the Battle of Alam el Halfa. de Guingand did offer criticism of the "Observation Post" idea, which he thought was ineffective and would cause the artillery to be moved around, causing confusion. de Guingand thought that there were too many "plans and schemes" being considered and thought that contingency plans for withdrawals to the east would cause the army to be unable to stand and fight in place. On 29 July, General Auchinleck met with General McCreary, his adviser on armor. Auchinleck told him that he had been considering assigning an armored brigade to each infantry division in hopes of getting better support. McCreary disagreed with Auchinleck, who told him that if he was so much in disagreement, that Auchinleck should replace him.

On 29 July, General Ramsden met with General Morshead. Morshead told him that he was not ready to make any more attacks without some assurance that "British armour would fight". It seems that the problem would not be solved until Bernard Law Montgomery arrived on the scene and the crisis situation at the Second Battle of El Alamein for the problem to be resolved. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 2/28th Battalion surrendered on 27 July 1942 in the First Battle for El Alamein

The end for the 2/28th Battalion came when they were essentially overrun by the Germans. Up to 10am, they still were not pressed so hard as to consider surrender. The situation was that tanks "were closing in from three directions". The forward company on the left side was overrun by the enemy. A warrant officer from A Company responded by calling for his men to keep firing their weapons. Tanks were coming closer to the battalion headquarters. A Bren gunner ran out and commenced firing, but he was killed by fire from a tank. When the battalion commander witness this event, he called for his men to surrender. Many of the men of the battalion were very emotional as they were lined up to be marched into captivity. British artillery was still firing in support, and some of the men from the 2/28th Battalion were killed by friendly fire. One platoon quite forward was firing until they were overrun by German tanks.

The Australians were marched about five miles to the German rear areas, where they were loaded onto trucks and were driven to Daba. The Australians were prepared for such an event as what happened to the 2/28th Battalion. They "regrouped" the battalion. They had two echelons, one being the operational portion and an administration portion. There were 98 men in the operational portion and 105 men in the administration portion which had drivers and administrators.

The 2/28th Battalion had achieved some success by pushing into the German positions. They had pushed into two units from the 90th Light Division, the I/361st Battalion and the I/200th Battalion. The Australians had pushed in some five to seven kilometers. The units had taken losses, with part of the I/361st Battalion being destroyed. The advance of the 50th RTR was stopped by I/115th Battalion and 33rd Reconnaissance Unit, along with artillery fire. The German counter-attack came to the east and to the north. In part, anti-tank guns came into play to halt the British infantry tanks. The counter-attack was successful, since they "they took about 700 prisoners" (largely Australians) and knocked out "20 to 25 tanks". Rommel's assessment was that his forces would be able to hold their front, but that the "British" forces had stopped his advance. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

27 July 1942 "we are in trouble" from the 2/28th Battalion

The 2/28th Battalion sat on Ruin Ridge, hoping that men from the 2/43rd Battalion, the 69th Brigade, and the 2nd Armoured Brigade would arrive. There was constant anti-tank gun and machine-gun fire all night. At about 3am, the battalion sent out men to destroy a German 50mm anti-tank gun that was hitting vehicles in the minefield gap. They found that the gun was too well-protected by infantry. By 4:30am, they were concerned about not hearing anything about ammunition arriving. They sent out someone at about 4:30am to investigate. The man's vehicle was mined. The men got through on foot to the 2/43rd Battalion. They were able to speak with Brigadier Godfrey, commanding the 24th Brigade and told him of the ammunition situation and the need for anti-tank guns.

Some eighteen German trucks drove up just before dawn and unloaded infantry. They were on the right side. The 2/28th Battalion could not call in artillery support and were running out of ammunition. There was a fight with small arms. The 2/28th was doing pretty well in the fight. ONe company could see tanks and armored cars approaching. They first thought that they must be British, but they proved to be German. The company commander was killed in the fight. The battalion radio was just repaired and they communicated with the brigade headquarters. As the enemy attacked, the Australians sent message about artillery support, which they got. The Australians had anti-tank guns, and they had some success, knocking out eight German tanks and armored cars. A gun on the right was fought by a battery sergeant-major until the gun was knocked out and the man was killed.

They sent a message at 9:43am talking about being surrounded by tanks and asking for artillery fire.

The 50th RTR tried to help, but was hit hard, losing 22 tanks of which only ten were later recovered. The survivors so far from the 2/28th Battalion watched as the tanks were battered. They thought that the 2nd Armoured Brigade would get involved, but typically, they were afraid of fighting and would not venture through they minefield until they had some sort of guarantee from the infantry. By the time that the 2nd Armoured Brigade was ready to get involved, it was too late to help. At 10:30am, the 2/28th Battalion sent a message that they had to "give in". A few men fought on until the afternoon. One group did not hear of the surrender and fought until they were overrun by tanks. They were marched back as prisoners for about five miles and then were loaded onto trucks. Of the 2/28th Battalion, two officers and 63 men were killed or wounded. Another twenty officers and 469 men were missing. They may have well been prisoners. At this time, the 69th Brigade had lost about six hundred men. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The fighting on Ruin Ridge on 27 July 1942

The two front companies of Australians had arrived at Ruin Ridge by 1:10am. At the minefield, enough of a gap had been cleared that vehicles moved forward. The first vehicles were bringing six anti-tank guns, and also had two carriers and a truck with a machine-gun. The enemy hit vehicles following them and four were burning. That blocked further passage through the minefield and lit everything around. Other vehicles drove back to the "assembly area". Five out of ten carriers were left and they started transporting prisoners. They got some 115 Germans and 12 Italians out. The 2/28th Battalion asked for more ammunition. The 2/43rd Battalion got the message. Major Simpson, in charge of 2/28th's supply vehicles decided to try to run the ammunition forward to the battalion. Some seven or eight vehicles "followed the tape" and arrived successfully. Other trucks hit mines and burned. Wounded men were evacuated from those hit during the initial move forward. A medical officer went out to tend wounded men he had heard were lying in the minefield. He did that until Germans took him and 11 patients prisoner.

The artillery observer on the ridge with the 2/28th was unable to use his radio because of interference. He was sent back to the brigade headquarters to ask for ammunition and telephone cable. The observer was killed in a fight with enemy troops. The carrier was knocked out, but the driver got back to the brigade headquarters. The brigade commander ordered the 2/43rd to send its ammunition truck forward to the 2/28th Battalion. They also called in artillery to try and silence the enemy gun covering the minefield. They were unable to get the truck through with the ammunition.

The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey could not get information about what was happening to the 2/28th Battalion. They expected that the 2/28th Battalion would be in trouble by dawn. The 69th Brigade moved forward at about 2am. They got hung up and became disorganized. After what progress was made, the enemy attacked and overran two battalions. The 2nd Armoured Brigade was supposed to move forward at 7am, but the commander decided that there was not a large enough gap in the minefield to pass through. At dawn on 27 July, the 24th Brigade was out of touch with the 2/28th Battalion, so they did not realize just how bad the situation was. When Brigadier Godfrey heard that the armor would not go forward, he ordered the 2/43rd Battalion to try and destroy the gun covering the minefield. The 50th RTR was at first asked to carry ammunition to the 2/28th Battalion, but then to go forward and rescue them. At 8:45am they heard the 2/28th's radio saying that they were in trouble. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The next Australian attack on Ruin Ridge on 26 to 27 July 1942

General Morshead wrote an instruction on 24 July 1942 to the 9th Australian Division. He seems to have been embarrassed by the last attempt to attack Ruin Ridge. The Australians had been at their peak efficiency while they were garrisoning Tobruk in 1941. His instruction addressed reconnaissance by officers, for one thing that they should not be so obvious about their reconnaissance to keep the enemy from being warned. He also told officers that they needed to inform their troops quickly about what they had learned. Another point was that tanks could not sit in support for an extended period, as they would expect to have too many losses. Tanks would, after a period on the objective, "rally" to a position behind the infantry. The purpose of tanks in support was to destroy machine-guns. The infantry's purpose was "to destroy anti-tank guns and artillery", the enemies of tanks.

For the second attempt on Ruin Ridge, the 2/28th Battalion had spent planning and reconnaissance time. The battalion stepped out at exactly midnight of 26 to 27 July. The moon was bright and they attacked with two companies in the front, with a width of some 800 yards. They were trying to move at 100 yards in two minutes. The 2/28th Battalion had a new commander, Lt-Col. McCarter. He told the officers to expect fire from the sides as they moved forward. He suggested that the men "fire from the hip" without changing direction or stopping.

After traveling some 800 yards from the start, the right front and rear companies took officer casualties, including company commanders. They were taking fire from machine-guns, mortars and field guns. There were vehicles in company carrying supporting weapons, but they took anti-tank gun fire and then ran onto a minefield. Five vehicles were knocked out and some were burning.

At least this time, the front companies had reached Ruin Ridge by 1:10am. On the left side, the rear company charged with bayonets and cleared the objective. The 2/28th Battalion commander had moved his headquarters forward to a point some 900 yards from the "ruin" (to the northwest). They were having communication problems because they could not get good wire laid through the minefield while they were receiving fire. To make matters worse, the battalion radio had been destroyed. ON the site, the men tried to dig in, but the ground was too hard to do much. They had three wounded company commanders, another factor. On Ruin Ridge, they were receiving heavy enemy fire. They had been unable to hit the enemy guns that fired across the minefield. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A new offensive at El Alamein to start on the night of 26-27 July 1942

Generals Ramsden and Morshead had decided that the offensive should start during the night of 26 to 27 July 1942. The objective for the offensive was to attack the enemy positions on Miteiriya Ridge and break through to the enemy's rear areas. The 9th Australian Division would use the 24th Brigade. The reliable 2/28th Battalion would capture Ruin Ridge. They would have artillery support for their attack. After taking Ruin Ridge, they would create a position on the left flank of the 24th Brigade and on the right side of the 69th Brigade. The 69th Brigade had their own objective to take. Once the 2/28th and the 69th Brigade had performed their roles, the 2/43rd Battalion would move forward and taken the next ridge to the west of Ruin Ridge. If they needed the help, they could use the 50th RTR. If they did not need the tank help, the 50th RTR should push westward and take ground between Trig 30 and Point 27. This was near someplace called El Wishka. If they caused the enemy to withdraw, the 20th Brigade (Australians) would follow the enemy withdrawal.

General Auchinleck published a "Special Order of the Day" to the men of the Eighth Army, praising their achievement in stopping the enemy advance on Egypt and thrown the enemy on the defensive. The enemy was attempting to resupply their army, but the navy and air force are attacking the ships with supplies. Auchinleck said that they needed to keep fighting, as they were close to breaking the enemy.

British intelligence had an assessment of the enemy strength as of 25 July in the evening. They believed that the Italian strength in the El Alamein area was low, with about 9,100 men, some 70 field and medium guns, 45 anti-tank guns, 15 armored cars, and about 12 tanks. For the Germans, they were thought to have "two battalions of the 382nd Regiment, the Kiehl Group and 33rd Reconnaissance Regiment, the 361st Regiemental Group (two battalions), the Briehl Group and the 200th Regiment. These totaled about 3,580 men and had from 106 to 120 guns in support including 26 to 29 88mm weapons."

The Germans were holding an area north and east of Ruin Ridge. They only had light forces, but were equipped with "machine-guns, anti-tank guns and a few field guns". There were stronger forces south and west of Ruin Ridge. They knew that the enemy (presumably Germans) had tanks available. The British were aware of the existence of a minefield on east side of the Qattara Track. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Sorting things out in the push to Ruin Ridge on 22 July 1942 at El Alamein

The authorities determined that, yes, the advance towards Ruin Ridge had stopped far short of the objective. The 50th RTR was new to battle and they had a hard time, having lost some 23 tanks in the fight. They infantry had told them that they had gone too far forward, which seems to have not to be true. The brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey went forward with Brigadier Richards to the 2/28th Battalion. He ordered them to spread out to the sides, put out patrols and make contact with the 2/32nd Battalion. They also were to advance as far as they could. They did manage to contact the 2/32nd Battalion by 9:23am. They may have been disappointed with their progress, but the enemy was forced to move the 90th Light Division and parts of three Italian divisions to hold their left flank. The Australians had apparently captured almost a entire company of the I/155th Battalion. Tanks from the 21st Armored Division were called upon to attack the Australians and their tank support. They accounted for 23 tanks with 12 of that number knocked out by the Briehl Group (a battle group). The Australian historian called Auchinleck's attack, "costly and abortive". Auchinleck was concerned that the enemy was being reinforced and would be tougher to fight if they waited longer. The Australians were the most effective unit available to Auchinleck. He wanted to attack some more as soon as an attack could be mounted.

The new attack would be by XXX Corps with the 1st Armoured Division, short of one armored brigade, the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, and the 69th Infantry Brigade. The 1st South African Division would go after the enemy mine field south-east pf Miteiriyha Ridge. They would make a gap. The 24th Australian Brigade would attack the eastern end of the ridge and then push north. The 69th Brigade would also push through and move on Deir el Dhib. Two armored brigades would push into the enemy rear area. The Australian historian was again critical of the plan. Auchineleck watnted to attack on the night of 24-25 July, but General Ramsden thought that the South Africans were too tired. The 69th Brigade commander also wanted more rest for the brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Ruin Ridge goes badly

Being in too much of a hurry to bother to do the right things, the attack intended to reach Ruin Ridge did not go well. An infantry platoon was to ride the second "wave of tanks" got on the the first "wave" by mistake. The tanks only had infantry on board, although they were supposed to carry sappers as well. Because of the lack of preparation, the tanks went the wrong way and ran onto a minefield, losing about 20 tanks. The other tanks, traveling with carriers, pushed out to a ridge that the tank commander thought was the right distance for Ruin Ridge, but probably was not. The tanks did manage to scatter some enemy soldiers and they sat and waited for the 2/28th Battalion to reach them. The rest of the 2/28th got a late start. They actually advanced in an "extended line formation." General Morshead was watching the 2/28th Battalion moving forward and he had the impression that they would succeed.

There was no news reporting the situation until 10:45pm. The 2/28th Battalion had lost their wireless van early in the advance. One thing that happened is that an unexpected fifty German prisoners arrived at the 2/13th Battalion. They finally were able to communicate and they got a report at 11:45pm from COlonel Cox that they had reached a ridge with a ruin at the end. The tanks had withdrawn and the infantry "were getting in position on the reverse slope". They could see some ten Italian tanks.

So far, the 2/28th Battalion had taken 59 German prisoners from the 90th Light Division. They also had five Italian prisoners from the Trento Division. They had losses, though, of two officers and 52 other men. Tanks returned in support, but were gathered back further than was wanted. At that point, Brigadier Richards of the 1st Army Tank Brigade went forward to investigate, because he thought that they were not on the intended objective. He returned from his reconnaissance and reported that they were actually about three thousand yards short of Ruin Ridge. A "Forward Observation Officer accompanying the 2/28th Battalion reported that he considered them about 2,500 yards to far from Ruin Ridge. The brigade commander decided that they were "deployed west of the road on a front of 400 yards between Kilos 8 and 9." Officers had been fooled by seeing some ruins into thinking that they were at Ruin Ridge when they were still short of the place. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian OFficial History.

22 July 1942 at El Alamein, General Morshead is involved

During the day on 22 July 1942, General Morshead visited 24th Brigade headquarters a number of times. The general was waiting to hear that the brigade had achieved the first phase goals. "Just before 3:45pm" heard that the 2/32nd Battalion now had solid possession of its ground. General Morshead was thinking ahead to the exploitation phase. The situation was not quite so rosy, as Point 24 was still to be resolved. General Morshead consulted with General Ramsden and they decided not to continue with armor and infantry exploitation some 2,000 and 4,000 yards. They would still push to the south with the goal of reaching Ruin Ridge by dusk and setting up positions on the back side during the night.

They had planned to use the 2/28th Battalion for the westward move that was cancelled, so they decided to use the battalion for the push to the south. The 2/28th would take the place of the 2/43rd Battalion. The 50th RTR would be used for the attack on Ruin Ridge. Two squadrons would transport infantry and engineers. They were to cover six miles in just an hour. The tanks would have some six-pounders and machine-guns following them. Behind all that would be the rest of the 2/28th Battalion on foot, covering two miles in an hour. At the rear would follow the remainder of the 50th RTR. The 50th RTR, with 52 Valentine tanks would move into hull down spots on Ruin Ridge. They were to say there until the main group of the 2/28th Battalion arrived. They would be able to withdraw once the 2/28th Battalion was in place.

Ruin Ridge had been attacked four days earlier, so they hoped that the enemy would not expect another attack so soon. They optimistically expected that they could skimp on preparation, which was a bad idea. Major Cox, of the 2/28th Battalion had just received "oral orders" for an attack starting at 7pm. Here they were leaving the brigade headquarters at 5pm. The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey heard between 6pm and 7pm that a reconnaissance aircraft had seen some five hundred vehicles dispersed on Miteiriya Ridge> They were infantry reported digging positions and the report mentioned twenty gun positions. Brigadier Godfrey reported the news to Colonel Wells as 9th Australian Division headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 July 1942 with the 24th Brigade at El Alamein

Operations on 22 July 1942 had been tough for the Australians in the north at El Alamein. The 2/32nd Battalion was to attack Trig 22. They knew that Trig 22 was well-defended and had anti-tank guns and machine-guns. The 2/32nd Battalion was reduced to three 90-man companies, short of NCO's. The commander got the loan of one 2/43rd Battalion company for the attack. The attack was made with three companies in front. They stepped out at 5:30am with 1,700 yards to travel. They had fifteen minutes of artillery support before the attack started. The 2/43rd Company took the first fire from the enemy. They were stopped by heavy fire and forced to dig in. The company commander was hit and died. The 2/32nd Battalion company in the middle also lost its company commander. The company reached its objective, but was then pinned down by enemy fire. The third company "captured three anti-tank guns". But the company was stopped short, below Trig 22 and had to dig in as well. An Australian commanding a machine-gun section, charged a German machine gun in a sanger. The Lieutenant had only a pistol, but he used it very effectively. One of his men shot the German machine-gunner. They then fired on the Germans with the Spandau which eventually jammed.

On the right, the 2/43rd Company was till pinned down by artillery fire from two field guns. The reserve company was sent out to attack the gun position. They were supported by artillery and mortars. They took the position and forced the Germans to retreat. Later, Australian engineers ventured out and damaged the German guns. Suddenly at 9:45pm, the Germans hit the Australians with artillery and then sent tanks and armored cars at the center company. The company commander was killed and 66 Australians were taken prisoner. Artillery fire finally forced the tanks to withdraw.

The tanks and armored cars, along with several self-propelled guns attacked next at Trig 22. There was a protracted fight where two of the armored cars and the two moblie guns were disabled. The Australians were finally able to position some anti-tank guns to protect Trig 22 from further attacks. They also dug positions "back from the crest". The 24th Brigade had taken 57 German prisoners in the fighting, all from the 1/155th Infantry Battalion. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Australian Official History.