At Tobruk from 22 June 1941

The defenders of Tobruk listened to the BBC News on the radio. The BBC described Battleaxe as a three-day test of the enemy strength. At the end, the British "retired to their original position". A unit diarist responded that while all this was a concern, what they really cared about was what had happened to their mail?

North Africa, by 22 June 1941, was the only place in the world where British troops were fighting Axis forces on the ground. The concern was that British forces could not face Axis forces with any chance of success. The one thing that was somewhat assuring was that the Germans had driven off to the east and declared war on Russia (on 22 June 1941). The men of Tobruk were well-equipped with radios, partly by the Australian Comforts Fund and the various unit funds. On the night of 22 June, the men listed to Winston Churchill speak. He denounced "the Nazi war machine". Churchill declared that their purpose was to destroy Hitler and every piece of his regime.

The daily paper published at Tobruk, the Tobruk Truth, described the scene at the Salvation Army Hall. When Churchill had spoken, a man called out for "a cheer for Winnie". This was quickly followed by a call for a cheer for the King. The men jumped to attention and sang the national anthem. German aircraft dropped leaflets on Tobruk on 24 June, making threats and asking the men to surrender.

General Morshead responded to the situation by putting the men to more work. The prospect of a successful Operation Battleaxe had halted a good deal of work that had been planned. The first thing to do was to increase the depth of the defenses. The work was mainly done by those units held in reserve. Now, the men moved into new positions. They noted that the Germans fired on the old positions, wasting fire. The battalion commanders were anxious to advance their front lines further. Work by the 2/13th and 2/15th Battalions started during the evening of 22 June. The first thing that went wrong was that a mine exploded in the 2/15th Battalion area. At 1am, another surprise trap blew up. This was apparently a setup, German machine guns opened up in the area near the explosion. From then on, there was constant enemy fire in the area where the Australians were working on new positions. At first light, the work was unfinished, at least in the 2/13th Battalion area. They decided to let the men of the 2/15th Battalion continue the work that the 2/13th Battalion had started. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Now, Auchinleck

While we have criticized General wavell's conduct as theater commander, we now believe that the worst problems of his tenure were caused by a combination of Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden. If they could have avoided going into Greece, the rest of 1941 probably would have played out much better than it ultimately did. still, the Australian historian, author of Volume III, thought that General Auchinleck was about the best choice at the time of the available men.

Both Auchinleck and Wavell were British Indian Army officers. During the Great War, Auchinleck served mostly in Mesopotamia. Between wars, he commanded a division in a military campaign in 1935. He started 1940 organizing the IV Corps, getting the organization ready to go to France. He did not go to France with his corps, but instead went into Norway as the commander. After that, he commandec V Corps. By July, he was GOC Southern Command with Bernard Law Montgomery becoming V Corps commander. He was in Southern Command for just four months when he was appointed as Commander-in-Chief in India.

When Auchinleck was appointed to succeed Wavell in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Wavell agreed that they would benefit from a fresh commander. In fact, there was nothing wrong with Wavell except that Churchill had lost confidence in him for the wrong reasons. Auchinleck would have a period of time, about a year, where he take the action he thought was needed without fear of being fired by Churchill. Auchinleck was eventually fired by Churchill in 1942.

Auchinleck had the distinction of defeating Rommel in two important battles. Churchill was so impressed by Auchinleck as a field commander, that he begged Auchinleck to take command of the British field army in North Africa, but Auchinleck wanted to be the theater commander, instead, a role that he filled rather poorly. Still, Auchinleck was at his best when he saved the situation in the Crusader operation and drove the Axis forces back to the border area between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in late 1941 and early 1942. Later in the summer of 1942, after Tobruk fell, Auchinleck saved the British position in North Africa by defeating Rommel's forces at the First Battle of El Alamein. Before he left, Wavell's last impact on Tobruk was to place the Tobruk fortress directly under the Middle East headquarters, rather than under the Western Desert Force.

For any Australians hoping that Battleaxe would have meant some relief from the siege situation, such hopes were dashed. In some ways, the men in Tobruk were more concerned about more personal issues, such as their mail from home. In any case, they knew that they were in for a long haul, although news of the German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 was a cause for hope. The men heard an inspired speech by Winston Churchill, after which he and the king were cheered. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge about 1941 and 1942 in North Africa.

Action on the third day of Operation Battleaxe: 17 June 1941

The two German armored divisions were on the move very early on 17 June 1941, the third day of Operation Battleaxe. The German 15th Armored Division was the premier division of the two German armored divisions. The 15th Armored Division, equipped with towed 88mm guns encountered the 7th Armoured Brigade. The 5th Light Division was also active. They entered Sidi Suleiman a little while later. News of these movements caused General Messervy to keep the 4th Armoured Brigade in support of the 4th Indian Division.

The events of 17 June caused the 7th Armoured Division commander to ask General Beresford-Peirse to come to his headquarters to make a decision. General Wavell was at Beresford-Peirse's headquarters, so they both traveled to the 7th Armoured Division headquarters. While that was happening, General Messervy had orcered his men to abandon Fort Capuzzo. By the time that General Wavell had arrived, he authorized ending the operation.

Rommel was apparently trying to catch the British at Fort Capuzzo. He was unsuccessful, as the remaining infantry tanks of the 4th Armoured Brigade covered the withdrawal from Fort Capuzzo.

Australian anti-tank gunners were involved in Operation Battleaxe. One battery was with the column on the desert flank. The Australian gunners performed well during the operation and got hits on German armored cars and some tanks.

British infantry tank losses were heavy in the battle. They started the operation with about one hundred infantry tanks. They lost 64 tanks either destroyed or disabled and abandoned. The British had about ninety cruiser tanks at the start of the operation. They lost 23 of them during the operation. The Germans only lost 12 medium tanks (mostly Pzkw III) and captured 12 operable British infantry tanks. The Germans, in fact, only had 81 running or recoverable medium tanks. At the time, the British believed that the Germans had more than that number. Churchill was apparently the only one who thought that the Tobruk defenders should have made an attack to draw the Germans from the frontier.

The main result of the battle was that General Wavell was informed that he would exchange places with General Auchinleck. It is not clear that General Wavell was particularly responsible for the loss. The actions of his commanders did affect the outcome in a negative way, though. We will see that Auchinleck had the same problems in choosing men to command under him. General Dill, the CIGS, told Churchill to either back Wavell or fire him. Churchill said that the choice was not that easy. General Dill did not have confidence in Auchinleck and told Churchill that. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The second day of Operation Battleaxe (16 June 1941)

By the morning of 16 June 1941, the British situation in Operation Battleaxe was not progressing well. The desert flank, particularly the 7th Armoured Division, had some 48 cruiser tanks still running. The 4th Armoured Brigade, with the 4th Indian Division, was down to about 40 running infantry tanks. They British had not been seriously engaged with the German armored forces, so they figured to still have most of their 170 medium tanks (mostly Pzkw III with some Pzkw IV tanks).

The plan for 16 June was for the forces near the coast to stage a frontal attack on Halfaya Pass, which sounds like a bad idea. The center column could push towards Bardia. The infantry tanks of the 4th Armoured Brigade would attack Hafid Ridge. The 7th Armoured Division forces would engage the German tanks that had arrived the previous evening.

The Germans decided to go on the offensive in the morning of 16 June. The 15th Armored Division would attack Fort Capuzzo. The 5th Light Division would attack the British tanks on the coast. The Ariete Division was to move to Ed Duda.

Almost accidentally, the British infantry tanks were actually in position to support the infantry during the German attack at Fort Capuzzo. There was the 7th RTR with artillery support seriously damaged the German 8th Armored Regiment. The regiment had started with battle with 80 tanks, but now was reduced to 33 runners. The 4th Armoured Brigade stayed with the 4th Indian Division and was not allowed to go to Hafid Ridge.

The Guards brigade had some success. The Scots Guards took Musaid and then the barracks at Salum. The 4th Indian Division frontal attack on Halfaya Pass predictably failed. On the desert area, the 7th Armoured Brigade was successful in stopping a German attempt around the flank.

The British had done better than they might have deserved, and this caused the Germans concern that they might break through to Tobruk. Rommel hoped to send the 5th Light Division against the desert flank, but the division was tied up kept the attack from happening. By late afternoon on 16 June, the British situation deteriorated greatly. The 7th Armoured Division tanks were dispersed, rather than kept concentrated. They lost the artillery support that they had previously had. The cruiser tank regiments were later attacked by the 5th Light Division with artillery support. They were saved by the fall of night. Another attack on Halfaya also failed. By the end of 16 June, the British tank strength had shrunk. They had about 25 cruiser tanks and about 29 infantry tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The events of Operation Battleaxe on 15 June 1941

On 15 June 1941, the first reports indicated that Fort Capuzzo had been taken, but Halfaya Pass had not been. The 18th Brigade commanded by Brigadier Wooten had been waiting for the news that the attackers were within 20 miles of Tobruk, but they never got that close. The immediate judgement about Battleaxe at the time was that the operation failed. The usual situation after these battles in 1941 was that the Germans were left in control of the battlefield, while the British withdrew, leaving their disabled tanks. They had not easy way to recover the knocked out tanks. The Germans, being left of the battlefield were able to recover their damaged tanks and take them back to their workshops for repair.

Two columns advanced on Fort Capuzzo and Halfaya Pass. They were both from the 4th Indian Division, commanded by General Frank Messervy. The 7th Armoured Division was to go around the open desert flank.

Battleaxe was notable for the Royal Air Force having established air superiority over the battlefield. The RAF had fighters operating over the three advancing columns, protecting them from air attacks.

The column nearest the coast was actually divided into parts, one above the escarpment and one part below. They attacked Halfaya Pass. On the coastal plain were two battalions from the 4th Indian Division and six infantry tanks from the 4th RTR. The tanks ran onto a minefield which had not been lifted and had four tanks immobilized. The other group, in this case being above the escarpment, had the 2/Camerons and 12 more infantry tanks from the 4th RTR. There were German 88mm guns and probably 50mm PAK38's laying in wait. They caught the British infantry tanks by surprise and knocked out 11 of the 12. The infantry battalion was helpless and could not advance.

The center column, with the main force from the 4th RTR, moved on Fort Capuzzo. After some initial problems, they eventually overran Fort Capuzzo. They captured a position with eight field guns in the process. Unfortunately, German armored cars staged a counter-attack and recaptured the guns. After the 7th RTR got Fort Capuzzo, the 22nd Guard Brigade moved in to hold the position.

On the desert flank, the 7th Armoured Division had been held by artillery fire, but an attack by a squadron with artillery support was able to take come artillery.

By this time, the German command figured out that the British seemed to intend to destroy the German forces on the frontier and to break the siege of Tobruk. The initial German response was to send to the border a reconnaissance unit and artillery from the 5th Light Division. They were to head for the Fort Capuzzo area. The Germans asked the Italian government for permission to use the Ariete Division. Then the permission was received, they were given orders to move at about 3pm. At late morning, the bulk of the 5th Light Division was ordered to a position south of Gambut. The commander of the 15th Armored Division ordered his reserves to points 206 and 208 to recover their lost artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Plans for Operation Battleaxe on 15 June 1941

The Axis forces near Tobruk were very much aware that an offensive was planned for 15 June 1941. They expected a fight starting at the first light of day on 15 June. They even planned an artillery barrage to be fired "at moonrise".

The 9th Australian Division had been holding Tobruk for about two months. While there had been no formal announcement, the men heard about the impending operation and the large numbers of British tanks that would be involved. There were practice exercises and knowledge of "administrative arrangements that gave the men knowledge of the impending battle.

The 9th Australian Division at Tobruk was to stay engaged and keep the Axis forces from moving to the frontier area. They would not move out from Tobruk unless the armored force managed to break through to Tobruk. If the circumstances warranted, the Tobruk garrison would break out to join the attacking force at Ed Duda, to the southeast. Apparently, late in the year, during the Crusader battle, a similar plan was executed.

General Morshead was very intent on making a big impact on the battle with his division. The problem was that he still would have to defend the Tobruk perimeter while trying to break out through the encircling force. There was no way that the Australians could take Ed Duda and make a strong position. The need to use his four brigades to hold the perimeter overrode that desire. He thought that he could still make an impact close to the perimeter.

The primary breakout from Tobruk would be executed by the 18th Brigade along with the 3rd Armoured Brigade. One battalion from the 26th Brigade would make an attack on the left. They would be operating near the Bardia Road. Something new was that a British commando company would land about six miles east of Tobruk. The commandos included Major Randolph Churchill. The right side of the attempted breakout would involve the 24th and 20th Brigades. There was some wishful thinking about what might be done if the Axis forces on the perimeter thinned out. The 18th Brigade had just moved into a reserve role, but now would be involved in an attack. They would push out two battalions that would establish a position from which artillery would be sited. Also from Tobruk, the 7th RTR would be involved with their 15 infantry tanks. They were part of the 3rd Armoured Btigade. Other tank units involved were the 1st RTR with "old" cruiser tanks. The 3rd Hussars would also be involved with their 19 light tanks, presumably Lt.Mk.VIb. The Kings Dragoon Guards was also involved with their 26 armored cars, almost certainly Marmon-Herrington Mk.II's. If the attack went well, one Australian infantry battalion would operate with the 3rd Armoured Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The German perspective anticipating Battleaxe

For comparison purposes, the British Official History listed the British tank force for Battleaxe as 90 cruiser tanks and 100 infantry tanks. British intelligence, prior to Battleaxe, thought that the German tanks force was at the Egyptian frontier 100 medium tanks and 66 light tanks. At "Gazala, Tobruk, and El Adem" there were thought to be 76 German medium tanks and 46 light tanks. The Italians were thought to have only 18 medium and 46 light tanks. General Morshead had information from highly classified sources. His numbers were more specific. The Germans at the Frontier were listed as 62 medium tanks and 36 light tanks. 26 of the light tanks were Pzkw II so the rest were 10 Pzkw I. In the general area of Tobruk, the Germans were listed as having 116 medium tanks (Pzkw III and Pzkw IV). They were listed as having 66 light tanks, of which 46 were Pzkw II, so the other 20 were Pzkw I. The Italians were listed as having just 18 medium tanks, presumably M13/40 tanks. They also had 46 light tanks.

The Indian historian remarked that the planned tactics were those which were successful for Brevity, a month before. The 4th Indian Division would attack Halfaya Pass on the right. They would have infantry tank support, presumably Matilda tanks. They would attack "both above and below the escarpment". A second column would attack Fort Capuzzo and Salum (Sollum). They would have the 4th Armoured Brigade with many infantry tanks. There was also the 7th Armored Division, equipped with cruiser tanks. They would be on the left, going around the flank. They hoped to draw the German armor from the coast. The Support group was also on the open flank, providing a screen to warn of enemy activity.

The German headquarters in North Africa had intelligence reports about British preparations. The headquarters thought by 6 June that a British attack was extremely likely. A German note on 10 June reported that the Pavia Division had relieved the Ariete Division. They had hoped to pull the 5th Light Division out of their positions in Tobruk, but that was not possible. They were positioned in the El Adem-Acroma area, providing a reserve force.

The German plans included three positions prepared to fight in all directions. They were concealed and had artillery and anti-tank guns. They hoped that the British would run onto them and be surprised. These positions were designed based on their experience in the Tobruk fighting. Two of trhe positions were equipped with dug-in 88mm guns. Behind the German positions lay an Italian line, based at Fort Capuzzo, Musaid, and Salum. Two more positions had been built "at Bir Weir and Qalala". The positions were equipped with artillery that strengthened the defense. The German 15th Armored Division was in reserve at the frontier. There was also motorized infantry, artillery, and 88mm guns and light anti-aircraft artillery. They were in the Fort Capuzzo area. The German command was aware that the British attack would take place on 15 June. On 14 June, they warned key units to be ready for an attack the first thing on 15 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Battleaxe plans

We have noted that General Wavell had very pessimistic expectations about Operation Battleaxe. He told the CIGS, General Dill, that they had 230 cruiser tanks, of which 90 were in the workshops. He also had 217 infantry tanks, with 30 in the workshops. He also mentioned that there were the two German armored divisions and one Italian armored division in North Africa. He thought that by September, there might be another two or three German armored divisions. He had no idea that the Germans were about to invade Russia, which changed the actual prospects. He also thought that the Germans might get permission to send more armored divisions through Turkey. What Wavell was asking for were more armored reinforcements to be sent to North Africa. He expected that they would be needed in Egypt as soon as August and they needed to be ready for action.

On 6 June, Wavell told the CIGS that for the Tobruk garrison to mount an attack during the initial phase of Operation Battleaxe might compromise their ability to defend the fortress, especially if Battleaxe had problems. He thought that Tobruk just needed to be on the defensive at first, and if the first phase when well, they might carry out offensive operations in the second phase. Wavell did not expect to do well enough with Battleaxe to reach Tobruk.

In a Middle East meeting on 13 June 1941, General Wavell suggested that if the main forces were driven to the east, that they might abandon Tobruk and leave it without a garrison. We can imagine what Churchill might have said if he were aware of those plans. Battleaxe was planned for 15 June 1941. While that date was inadequate for having the newly arrived tanks in the hands of units that were thoroughly trained. There was no hope of that happening. The driving issue to keep the date as early as possible was that they expected that Rommel's supply situation would improve after the capture of Crete. Also, the Royal Navy had taken heavy losses in the Greek and Crete campaigns, so that they would have greater problems with interdicting the Axis supply lines to Libya.

Wavell had a plan for Battleaxe that included about 200 tanks, with about 100 being Infantry tanks with the rest being cruiser tanks. They believed that the Germans had about 100 tanks near the frontier and another 120 near Tobruk. The Germans also had about 70 light tanks (Pzkw I and II tanks). The Pzkw III and IV tanks counted as medium tanks. Wavell thought that the Germans might actually have up to 300 tanks to face the 200 British tanks. The Australian historian says that the actual situation was better than Wavell thought. The Germans actually had less than 200 tanks available for the battle and the British infantry at the Egyptian frontier was about twice the number of Axis soldiers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The big picture in late May and early June 1941

While the situation in Tobruk had become static warfare, there was much action in other theaters. 20 May 1941 had been the day that the Germans launched the airborne assault on the island of Crete. The Germans had secured their possession of Maleme airfield by 23 May. The next day, 24 May, the Bismarck sank the battle cruiser Hood in the Denmark Strait. The battle around Crete seriously depleted the British Mediterranean Fleet. By the end of May, the fighting in Crete had ended. About half of the men on Crete were evacuated. This was fairly soon after the debacle in Greece. With the German lack of commitment in Iraq allowed the hostile Rashid Ali to be forced from power. at this time, this was one of the few bright spots for the British.

In the Egyptian-Libyan frontier area, the Germans launched an attack on 26 May. The Germans had 160 tanks divided into four groups. They lacked sufficient fuel, so they were limited in what they could do. The British only had a small force at Halfaya Pass. They had 9 infantry tanks, some field guns, some anti-tank guns, and some anti-aircraft guns. The infantry were from the 3rd Coldstream Guards. The right group hooked towards Deir el Hamra. The center groups, heavy in tanks, was to go for Sidi Suleiman. The left group would go to the escarpment and would attack infantry.The German attack was successful, and the main result was to get a document from Churchill to the Chiefs of Staff.

Churchill thought that the Western Desert was the one venue where the British had the opportunity to launch a successful attack on the Germans. The Chiefs of Staff were sympathetic to Churchill's document, but wanted to get air power re-established in Cyrenaica. General Wavell responded by issuing orders for a new attack that he called Operation Battleaxe. The idea was that they would defeat the German forces at the Egyptian Frontier, and then break the enemy hold on Tobruk, and then move on to Derna and Mechili. The Australians in Tobruk were expected to be heavily involved. An ominous sign was that General Wavell warned the Chiefs of Staff that he felt that the chances of success were "doubtful".

There was a meeting in Cairo on 4 June. These were the Commanders-in-Chief and they talked about Tobruk in negative terms. Wavell's primary concern was that the enemy forces would launch a new attack on Tobruk (a "blitz"). Admiral Cunningham talked about the difficulties in keeping Tobruk supplied. Air Marshall Tedder remarked that there were few fighters to give support to Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rotating Australian units in and out of the line in late May and June 1941, and the fuel and lubricant shortage

General Morshead had a plan to rotate, at the brigade level, Australian units in and out of the line. The 26th brigade was Tovell's. The 24th Brigade was Godfrey's. The 20th Brigade was Murray's brigade. The 18th Brigade was Wooten's. The 26th Brigade relieved the 24th Brigade over the night of 20 to 21 May 1941. They were in the Bardia Road sector. The 24th Brigade replaced the 20th Brigade on 23 May. The 20th Brigade then was in reserve for a while. They eventually moved to the Salient to replace the 18th Brigade. There were also some battalion movements during this period.

During April and May 1941, Tobruk had used up their stock of fuel and lubricants. By June, they were in trouble and needed more petroleum products. There were attempts to move some fuel and lubricants by sea, but the German air dominance made that difficult. The situation only improved when the Pass of Balhama made two trips to Tobruk. The first trip brought 760 tons of fuel in bulk. That provided about 40 days supply. Later in June, they made another trip, and had brought some 1,400 tons of fuel and lubricants during June.

From 20 May to 4 June, the men of one squadron of the King's Dragoon Guards filled and infantry role by holding S21 to S27 near the Dernal Road. They were replaced by a pioneer company.

This left the Derna Road area in the hands of the 2/1st Pioneers. Posts S8 and S10 were on the left. The 2/13th Battalion held the right. The 2/17th Battalion was in the center section. Another battalion, the 2/15th, held the left side. During May, the German and Italian units had constructed a straightened line behind their line and then withdrew into it. Lt-Col. Burrows also planned to straighten his line, that of the 2/13th Battalion, but in this case, by moving forward. Brigadier Murray liked Burrows plan and approved of it. The Germans had laid minefields with booby traps. The first task was to clear paths through them and remove the booby-traps.

By straightening the line, the line was shortened by about 600 yards. That allowed companies to hold their front with two platoons. Post S8 was no longer isolated. Post S10 was now more strongly held. Former German minefields were now used by the Australians for their defense. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Axis forces at Tobruk in May to June 1941

The Australians, in early June 1941, after the failed attack on the enemy forces, realized that the Germans were preparing to pull back. They had an engineer battalion at work constructing a new line behind the line that they currently defended. The Australians apparently heard air compressors and jack hammers at work on the new line.

In retrospect, the Australian historian was aware of the Axis forces deployed at Tobruk. The Italian Brescia Division and the Italian 16th Artillery Regiment were deployed north of the Salient, near the Derna Road.

In the Salient, itself, there were two battalions of the 115th Motor Infantry Regiment. There was also one battalion of the 104th Motor Infantry Regiment. There wree also two desert units, a mix of various types of troops. There was also the 2nd Machine Gun Battalion. There were two German artillery Battalions. The Italians had part of the 16th Artillery Regiment in the Salient. In addition, there were two German engineer battalions.

Deployed near Fort Pilastrano and the road to El Adem was the Italian Ariete Division, the first Italian armored division. The Italian Pavia Division was in the process of relieving the Ariete Division. There was the 132nd Regiment and the 46th Artillery Regiment.

The Trento Mechanized Division was located near the Bardia Road. They had two motor infantry battalions, a motorcycle battalion, and a machine gun battalion.

There were other units at Tobruk, as well. One battalion of the 18th Anti-Aircraft Battalion was there. Perhaps they had 88mm guns. The 8th Machine Gun Battalion now had three companies. At least part of the battalion was probably in the Salient. There was also the 5th Light Division headquarters and units not already mentioned. The division was on the west side of El Adem. Part of the Ariete Division and about 80 tanks (mostly M13/40 medium tanks) were about 25 miles west of Tobruk. We can see that most of Rommel's forces were tied up defending the Salient. That kept Rommel from being able to do much on the Egyptian frontier. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation from 6 June 1941 at the Salient

After the fierce fight in the night against the Germans, the Germans asked for a truce so that they could retrieve wounded from the battlefield. They sent five ambulances with a Red Cross flag. They searched the neutral zone for wounded. Australians from the 2/13th Battalion went out to help in the search. They also took the opportunity to view the German positions. During the truce, the Australians were able to relax. At the end, the Germans fired a machine gun burst to mark the truce end.

The 2/9th Battalion was to the right of the 2/13th Battalion. They had been in the Salient the longest. They had been ab le to push out their front line far in front of their starting position. When the 2/13th Battalion had advanced their line recently, the 2/9th Battalion moved ahead another 150 yards. Their lines were well prepared with wire and trip-wire setups.

The Australians had taken the Salient, the scene of a German penetration, and had been able to create a stepping-off point for new adventures. Most nights, many patrols were sent out to harass the enemy troops. During the day, the RHA, 51st Field Regiment, and eventually, the 2/12th Australian Field Regiment were at work. Although the enemy gunners were able to get hits, the British and Australian gunners inflicted more hits than they took.

After the 18th Brigade left the Salient, a German battalion commander wrote a testimonial to their prowess. Major Ballersted commanded the II Battalion of the 115th Motor Infantry Regiment. He rated the Australians as superior to the German soldiers in important ways. He especially praised the Australians capabilities as snipers. In return, the Australians found the German soldiers to be tough competitors.

One disadvantage that the Australians had was that they used British 3-inch mortars, which were inferior to both the German and Italian mortars. The Italians had an 81mm mortar that performed well. The Australians had captured several and used them. There was little ammunition for the 81mm mortars, but they were the best thing that the Australians had. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 2/12th Field Regiment arrives at Tobruk early on 17 May 1941 and the brigade change on 5 June 1941

Until the 2/12th Field Regiment arrived by sea at Tobruk, all the supporting artillery was British. The 2/12th Field Regiment was provided with a variety of guns, all that was available. They operated under the command of the 51st Field Regiment, which was one of the key artillery units at Tobruk. The 2/12th Field Regiment inherited a troop of 60 pounder guns (5 inch guns). The 60 pounders had the issue that they only had a meager supply of ammunition, although more was eventually found for them. They also had two troops equipped with ten 4.5in howitzers that had been made available when the 51st Field Regiment had received 25 pounders. These troops were apparently armed with five 4.5in howitzers each. Perhaps the 60 pounder troop had five guns, as well. The 2/12th lost its first man on 20 May when they were shelled by enemy guns.

One positive action on 29 May 1941 occurred when a 60 pounder gun fired on enemy guns and "neutralized" them with ten rounds. They had to be careful with the limited 60 pounder ammunition supply. Initially, the 2/12th Field Regiment lacked some of the usual amenities that field regiments usually had: "flash spotting and sound ranging". They also needed some air reconnaissance to provide intelligence about the enemy artillery units. The salient area was a problem due to the enemy occupying the best ground for observation. The British and Australian artillery observation posts were at a lower level than the enemy observation posts, so the artillery were hampered in their operations. On occasion, they were able to achieve some success with "predicted fire". Usually, they were reduced to firing to harass the enemy and were able to fire on targets of opportunity.

Wooten's 18th Brigade had been in the salient until 5 June. After that date, Brigadier Murray's 20th Brigade moved into the salient. They had not been able to make any big attacks. They did continue to make adjustments to the lines, however. Back on 18 May, moves were made to close up the distance between Post S8 and the rightmost battalion. The battalions effected were the 2/9th, the 2/10th, the 2/12th, and 2/13th. The 2/13th Battalion was planned to move the center company forward some 300 yards. Some movement happened on 27 May, but the men were forced to retire to their previous position at daylight. The enemy were suspicious of what might be happening and dropped some 650 shells on the western side. Also on the 27th, the 18th Indian Cavalry Regiment sent out a patrol with 2inch mortars and some 18 pounder guns. They drew artillery fire from four batteries and the patrol commander was killed.

Two Australian battalion headquarters moved further west. The 18th Brigade headquarters moved the next day. As the 2/13th Battalion center company moved back to their planned positions, they were attacked by some 200 German soldiers. The Germans were actually ambushed, as they had expected to find the positions empty. The Australians fought with mortars and Bren guns. The Germans withdrew and were chased by some Australians who used grenades and Bren guns to good effect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting on 17 May 1941 near the posts, including S4

The attacks mounted early on 17 May 1941 had left many Australians as prisoners of the Germans. To make matters worse, the 2/23rd Battalion commander, Lt-Col. Evans was not aware of the situation of his surviving men. Even though they were surrounded, the men in Post S4 were holding onto their position. Other men were holding out in the stone building near the water tower.

MOre than the 2/23rd Battalion saw action. The men of the 2/10th Battalion held an area to the left of the 2/23rd Battalion. The enemy fired an artillery barrage starting at about 8:35am. German infantry supported by four tanks moved near the water tower. The tanks opened up on the 2/10th Battalion, but they received supporting fire from the 51st Field Regiment. That forced the tanks and infantry to withdraw. One tank had been damaged by the firing. More tanks arrived about four minutes later. They seemed to be near Post S4. The British artillery did not know that S4 was still being held by Australians. They fired on the tanks and S4 and drove the tanks off. One of the 2/10th's "Bush Guns" fired on the German guns near the wrecked aircraft.

At about 12:15pm, German tanks and infantry were overcoming remaining Australian resistance. A brave signaler, took a phone line to Post S6, which was still in Australian hands. After thirteen line breaks were repaired, they could speak with Post S6. Now that artillery fire could be called in, they forced three enemy tanks to withdraw. Later, another five tanks were stopped from moving forward. Men in Post S9 could see men at ease near Post S7, which they supposed meant that it was in German hands. Brigadier Wooten had hoped that the 2/23rd Battalion might stage another attack, but Lt-Col. Evans decided that they were too weak to mount another attack. General Morshead and Brigadier Wooten decided that Lt-Col. Evans should withdraw his remaining men "after dark". They would try to establish a new defensive line between the 2/10th Battalion and Post S8. While the 2/23rd Battalion was to withdraw, they would go out and try and find wounded to take out with them.

The sound of tanks, presumably German, could be heard after 7:30pm. The sun set at about 8:10pm. The enemy tanks seemed to be moving in on Post S6. Three carriers were sent out, but they ran into anti-tank guns. One carrier was disabled and casualties were taken. Lt-Col. Evans told the commander of the men in S6 to go to Post S8. Instead of reaching Post S8, the men from Post S6 reached post S10. There was heavy British artillery fire and Very lights in the sky. In the attacks, the 2/23rd Battalion lost 163 men. The men in Post S4 were left to surrender to the Germans on early 18 May. Many mistakes were made through inexperience, both of the Australians and the British tank crews. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The new plan for the attack by the 2/23rd Battalion on 17 May 1941

Since Posts S8 and S9 did not have to be recaptured, a new plan was prepared for the attack by the 2/23rd Battalion, starting on 17 May 1941. The plan still included taking Posts S7 and S6. They expected to be able to capture those posts and the new plan included pushing forward to attack and take Posts S5 and S4. Brigadier Wooten, the 18th Brigade commander, approved of the plan, as did Colonel Lloyd, General Morshead's "most senior staff officer". The attack would be conducted by two companies with supporting infantry tanks. Artillery support would be provided by the 2/12th Field Regiment, which had just arrived at Tobruk. The start time would be at 5:30am. The attackers were supported by machine guns, as well as the artillery. Smoke had been laid down at Medauuar. The visibility was made worse by the smoke from the German artillery fire. In the reduced visibility, the tanks with the right-most company got confused and then lost. The infantry lost their tank support. The tanks ended up at Post S9, instead of being 750 yards forward.

The company that had lost its tank support now was taking casualties from 88mm guns firing air burst over the men. The other platoon that was directed at Post S7 overran the post from the right side. The situation became increasingly desperate and casualties mounted. They had lost communication with the battalion and could not call up the reserves to help.

Post S6 was taken. They captured 19 Germans from the post. They left a garrison in S6 and then pressed forward to Post S4. They succeeded in overrunning Post S4 with a hard fight. Most of the enemy troops were killed in hand-to-hand fighting. They left a small garrison in Post S4 and then pulled back to S6. They fired a signal flare that was not seen by the battalion commander. The men in Post S6 were forced into a more defensible stone structure nearby. A carrier brought ammunition and supplies forward to the men near Post S6. Another carrier sent to Post S4 were not able to reach the post. One group attacked sangers held by the enemy. They ended up being surrounded and captured.

Lt-Col. Evans, the 2/23rd Battalion commander, did not have good information about what had happened in the attacks. By 7am, he had an incomplete story about the results. With four infantry tanks in support, they were going to attack Post S7, thinking that it had not been taken in the first attacks. This group started moving at 7:40am. The enemy fired on the attacking forces and laid smoke. Again, the tanks did not go where they had been planned to go. The tanks had turned to the right when they were within 100 yards of Post S7. The infantry with the tanks followed them in the wrong direction. The infantry could see enemy tanks approaching, but the infantry tanks were unaware of their approach. The German tanks led and assault that recaptured Post S7 and took many Australian prisoners in the area. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of Operation Brevity from 16 May 1941

The British Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East considered Operation Brevity to be a failure. The Australian Official History, however, gives the operation more credit. Brevity had actually achieved a good bit, and the main problem was that the British commanders were not ready to take risks to hold the ground that they had taken. By 17 May 1941, the British still had Halfaya Pass. The cruiser tanks had withdrawn without being pressed, as they were timidly commanded. The Germans had moved back into Salum (Sollum) since the British had pulled back.

The Australian Official History looks at the comparative losses and thinks that the British and Australians did not do so badly. As for tanks, the Germans lost three and the British lost five. Rommel considered that Halfaya was a very important position, as it dominated both roads that ran east-west.

General Wavell wrote that the priority for the British forces should be to push the German and Italian forces to the west, beyond Tobruk. They needed to make airfields available to the west for RAF use. They needed to use the 7th Armoured Division and the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions. At another meeting, the opinion was given that all Australian forces in the Middle East needed to be consolidated.

Churchill also weighed in on the situation. He tended to speak without knowing the relevant facts. His immediate concern was quite predictable. He wanted to know when the tanks from the Tiger Convoy could be brought into action. The truth was that at this point, an attack on Crete from German forces in Greece was the next crisis. This was a crisis created by Churchill's decision to go into Greece with a strong force that would not be enough to prevail. All the heavy weapons taken into Greece were left on the shore and only men and small arms were removed by ship.

There was new concern that German aircraft might be involved in attacking Crete from airfields in Syria. There was going to be pressure to intervene in Syria with the 7th Australian Division. One positive point was that the Italian army in east Africa surrendered on 19 May. Another positive development was that the force sent to Habbiniya in Iraq was nearing the air base.

A more concerning development at Tobruk was that posts S8 and S9 had remained in Australian hands. There had been a mistaken message that post S8 had bee "retaken", when it had never been lost. The next step was going to be attacking the enemy force that had been holding ground since 1 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Brevity: 15 May 1941

The British plan for Operation Brevity included three columns. The 2/Rifle Brigade would take the bottom of Halfaya Pass and then move on to Salum (or Sollum). The 22nd Guards Brigade with the 4th/RTR would capture the top of Halfaya Pass and then move northwards. They would have 24 infantry tanks. The open desert flank would be taken by the 7th Armoured Brigade. They had the 2/RTR with 29 cruiser tanks. They also had three Support Group columns in support. The support group columns each had an Australian anti-tank gun troop. The 12th Anti-Tank Gun Battery commander was with one of the columns. The headquarters was sitting on the coast. They had a troop from 5th Battery, 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment, another Australian unit. All the action started at dawn on 15 May 1941.

Even though the Germans had expected the attack, the British still achieved surprise. The Guards Brigade and the infantry tanks were able to quickly capture "the top of Halfaya Pass". The bottom of Halfaya Pass did not give up so easily. They bottom fell only by 5pm. The center group also captured Salum with 123 prisoners. Fort Capuzzo was also taken, but most of the attacking infantry tanks were disabled.

The attack achieved enough success to cause the German command some anxiety. Partly, this was because reports enlarged the attacking force beyond what was actually used. Motorized and mechanized units near Tobruk were redeployed to be ready for an attack by British forces from the Egyptian Frontier. One German tank battalion was sent to El Duda. Some Italian tanks were sent to El Adem. A counter-attack by the Herff Group retook Fort Capuzzo displaced the Durham Light Infantry and took some prisoners. The British did not have a good tank recovery system in place, so the disabled infantry tanks were left where they had been abandoned. The British were able to recover a few, destroy others, while the rest ended up in German hands.

Herff reported to Rommel that the British seemed to have some 40 to 50 tanks. Herff expected them to push on towards Tobruk by morning. He would sit on the flank position, ready launch an attack when he was reinforced. The British were actually quite cautious, and Brigadier Gott would move to Halfaya, if the Germans attacked with tanks. Rommel ordered reinforcements to be sent to Herff. Another group of all arms was also ordered to join Herff. The British were much less prepared and General Beresford-Peirse was slow to respond to Gott's message. His initial thought was to order Gott to hold the positions that he had taken. On 16 May, the British tanks withdrew, while the Germans were immobilized due to lack of fuel. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

16 May 1941 at Tobruk in the morning

When the sun came up on 16 May 1941, there were still enemy troops nearby. Patrols brought in 21 Italian prisoners who were survivors of the early morning fighting. They also brought in captured equipment, such as light and medium machine guns and several flame-throwers. Posts S8, S9, S10, and S11 were out of touch and may have been captured. The Australians were reluctant to investigate further in the dark. When a platoon was sent out at 6am, they found that posts S11 and S11A were still in Australian hands. When they approached Post S10, they were fired on by machine guns. They supposed that the enemy now held post S10. They still did not know anything about Posts S8 and S9.

General Morshead met with Brigadier Wooten at 11am. They planned an attack with the 2/23rd Battalion. The commander was brought into a meeting at 2pm. A planned attack on Post S10 was still in the plans. The attack was made at 12:15 and Post S10 was retaken along with German prisoners. The attack had been supported by the 51st Field Regiment. They found two wounded Australians who had been prisoners and they were released. Posts S8 and S9 were quiet at this point. At 3pm, the order was given to proceed with the plan to attack Posts S8 and S9. The attackers were the 2/23rd Battalion, "three troops of infantry tanks, a troop of anti-tank guns and a company of machine guns". There were 39 field guns available to support the attack. They were not yet ready to make the actual attack. They held a conference at 8:30pm to distribute orders. The 2/23rd Battalion was not yet in place, so they had to move to the start line. One surprising development was that the 2/12th Battalion had just retaken post S8.

This fighting at Tobruk was part of greater plans on both the British and Axis commands. The British intended to launch a minor operation, Operation Brevity, to see if they could cause Rommel to pull back from the frontier and let transport into Tobruk. General Beresford-Peirse was more concerned about the larger plan that would be executed once Churchill's Tiger Convoy tanks had arrived at Alexandria and had been readied for use. The British were wrestling with how to employ the slow, but heavily-armored infantry tanks and the faster, but more lightly armored cruiser tanks. The compromise was to use the two types separately and fight separate battles. That would continue to be the plan in future tank actions fought against the German and Italian tank forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Taking action on the Egyptian Frontier in May 1941

We know that General Wavell had lost the confidence of the Prime Minister after the fall of Greece and the siege of Tobruk. Chuchill had the advantage of not knowing much about what was happening in Libya and the rest of North Africa. He saw General Auchinleck as positive and taking action. HE saw Wavell as not doing those things. Eventually, Churcill replaced Wavell as theater comcander with General Auchinleck. The proposed British force consisted of four columns. There was the 7th Support Group Headquarters and four troops from the 12th Battery of the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment (Australian).

The Germans were at this same time were making plans for defenses at Gazala. General von Paulus was the driving force behind this measure. The British were encouraged by reading this intercepted message. The German forces opposing the attack included the 33rd Reconnaissance Unit, a Trento Division battalion, and a motorcycle battalion sent to Salum. The Germans made a move on 12 May, but pulled back to Salum on 13 May.

The Australians at Tobruk only received notification on 13 May in the forc of a letter. The letter arrived as there was a major relieving operation underway at Tobruk. There was action tnat involved carriers and cruiser tanks. The cruiser tanks had track defects that limited their participation. We saw action from the 3rd Armoured Brigade and artillery. Another infantry unit waited for tank support, and by doing so, lost artillery support that was timed. At 9pm, some success was achieved by killing a gun crew, attacked machine gun positions, and altogether had a successful patrol. Included in the bag was one tank destroyed. After 2am, the Germans brought forward two tanks. At about 2:30am, the Germans attacked the 18th Cavalry Regiment. The Indian regiment was able to repel the attack without losing any ground. Another attack was launched on Posts S15, S13, and S11. The towed flame-throwers were used in this attack. The attack had been contained by 3:30am.

A company in Posts S8, S9, and S10 was made by Germans. as well as Italians in Post S11. This was a case where the attackers used five tanks and more towed flame-throwers. Post S10 was taking fire from a bothersome anti-tank gun on the ridge near Post S7. There was close-in fighting. They called in fire from the 51st Field Regiment. Communications with Vincent's company were lost, an ominous sign. Usually, that meant that the unit had been overrun.

At the same time, the enemy attacked Forbe's Mound, located in the Salient. Four tanks moved forward towards the 2/9th Battalion. Two tanks were stopped by the wire, although they were subsequently towed away by the other two tanks. There was more tank activity, as further west, there were reports of five tanks looking for an opening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The new phase at Tobruk in May 1941, and Operation Brevity

The "new phase" at Tobruk involved replacing the units in the salient captured by the enemy and a new an more aggressive posture. This would prove to be very hard on the Australian infantry, but it was what General Morshead thought was the most appropriate stance to take. The cost in casualties would be large, as they would be constantly probing and testing the enemy. The plan was to push ever more forward and to be on the move after dark, hoping to capture enemy outposts and more ground that had been lost. Brigsdier Wooten, commanding the 18th Brigade was to site his headquarters farther forward than anyone had previously done. Early on 14 May, he had been ordered to stage an operation that would give the impression that it was part of a larger attack. The reason being that the British had launched Operation Brevity on the Egyptian frontier.

Operation Brevity was planned by General Wavell, without prodding by Churchill in London. The Tiger Convoy was expected to arrive in Egypt about 12 May 1941. Once the Tiger tanks were unloaded, they expected some two weeks of work to ready them to equip units. The men in Egypt understood that, but Churchill really had no idea what was involved. He expected that they would unload the tanks and that they would be instantly ready for action. Wavell, though, was ahead of the game. He had some equipment and units that he could use immediately to strike at the enemy forces just to the west of the frontier. He knew that Rommel's forces were stretched thin. He would strike right away and try to push past Sollum and run up to Tobruk. That would enable the British forces to coordinate with the Australians in Tobruk. The flaw in the plan was that any chance of success was in hands of Brigadier Gott.

Rommel was an admirer of General Wavell. Rommel credited Wavell with a strategic judgment that could make forces available that could move despite any German and Italian possible moves. The Greek campaign was in the process of ending in a disastrous way. Many of the units evacuated from Greece were transported to the island of Crete in great disarray, as we have seen. The British fully anticipated that German airborne forces would attack Crete. Before the battle for Crete started, Churchill was boasting confidently of their ability to defeat and airborne attack. We have seen that the German airborne forces were unready for a real fight after landing from the air. What won the battle of Crete for the Germans was the airborne troops that were flown in by transport aircraft. They landed on beaches and in dry river beds. The Australian, New Zealand, and British forces in Crete were in great disarray and were unready for a serious fight. Still, if they only had to beat the German airborne forces, they could have done that much.

General Wavell was thinking about the situation in North Africa and the Levant, and he worried that the Vichy French in Syria and Lebanon might be a factor on the norther side of eastern Mediterranean. He asked what forces might be brought into Syria from Europe. The British had only a brigade of cavalry available to fight in Syria. Iraq was another concern, as a putsch by Rashid Ali, who was an Axis ally, had destabilized the situation in Iraq. There were many issues to concern General Wavell as theater commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.