Defending the Middle East from attack from the north in 1941

The British apparently took the threat of attack by German troops from Russia into the Middle East. If the Germans were to attack through Turkey, either with or without help from the Turkish government, the British thought that they would advance into Turkey to hold the southern mountain passes. They were unsure what the stance of the Turkish government would be in the event of a German move through Turkey. They might fight to oppose the Germans. They might allow the Germans free passage through Turkey. The British thought that they would be able to use four divisions to move into Turkey. They expected that the Germans would move into northern Syria from Turkey. If they reached Syria, they considered that the country was well-suited to armored warfare and that the Germans would have more tanks than the British. The British thought that they would need two armored and five infantry divisions to adequately defend Syria and Iraq from German attack. By the end of July 1941, there were limited forces available. There was the 7th Australian Division, the diminutive Free French Division, the 5th Indian Brigade, the 6th British Division, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade. There was also the 10th Indian Division, but that was considered to be not included in the plan, but the division was a potential blocker to any German advance into the Persian Gulf region. The only complete unit in the scheme was the 7th Australian Division. The 6th Division was lacking much beyond the infantry battalions. They had to rely upon Australian units for artillery and other division supporting units. Sending British infantry battalions to the Middle East without artillery and other support units was considered to be a major error. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in August 1941

Because of the difficulties experienced in Crete with an airborne attack, the Germans declined to mount another airborne attack against Cyprus. The British expected the Germans to attack, as they thought the island was vulnerable. In fact, the Germans expected that Cyprus would be reinforced, and that is what happened in the event. Cyprus had only been garrisoned by the 7th Australian Cavalry, but they were replaced by a British Hussar regiment, which was reinforced by the 50th Division, which had just arrived from Britain. This had all happened by late August. By holding Syria and Iraq, the British had better secured their vital interests in the Suez canal and the oil fields.

The British expected that the Germans might penetrate to the Middle East through Turkey or through southern Russia. They told Turkey that they would support them, if attacked, with four divisions. As 1941 progressed, there was increasingly less likelihood that the Germans would reach the Middle East from the north. General Blamey told his government in Australia that he thought that the year was too late for the Germans to attack to the Middle East. General Blamey was a rather problematic man, exemplified by his treatment of General Lavarack, but he was competent enough to have a good strategic sense. He was also a strong advocate for the Australian government in the face of Churchill and his demands on the Australians. The British had a lot of uncertainty about the Turkish government and their potential attitude towards the Germans. There was no guarantee that they would not allow the Germans to pass through Turkey to reach the Middle East, in some assessments of the prospects. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Concerns in the north after June 1941

As a theater commander in the Middle East, General Auchinleck was focused on the possibility of the Germans attacking from the north, either through Turkey or the Caucasus. He was no longer responsible for Iraq, as that had been given to the Commander in Chief in India. He and General Wavell had switched jobs, so Iraq now belonged to Wavell. A new concern was added when the ruler of Iran decided to become closer to Germany and Italy and get rid of British and Russian influences. In typical Churchill fashion, he insisted on calling Iran "Persia". That was a deliberate show of disrespect for the Iranian government. The British had helped to develop the oilfields in Iran, and felt that the country was a vital interest. General Quinan, in Iraq, was instructed to prepare to go into Iran.

He had limited resources in August 1941, when the order came. He had the 8th Indian Division, whose third brigade only arrived on 10 August. He also had the 9th Armoured Brigade, formerly Habforce. Despite the name, they were without tanks. It was joined with the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade at Kirkuk and Khanaqin. The 10th Indian Division in northern Syria was added to General Quinan's available units. The 10th Indian Division was notable for having General Slim as division commander. They were up against a small Iranian army of ten divisions. They had about 524 artillery pieces and about 280 aircraft. The British and Russians were acting together and presented a joint ultimatum to the Iranian government on 13 August 1941. When the response was received, the invasion was planned for 25 August.

On 25 August, a brigade from the 8th Indian Division was landed at Abadan and took the island and refinery. Also on 25 August, another naval force landed troops at Bandar Shapur. The Iranian army surrendered by 28 August. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The new strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East after the German invasion of Russia in 1941

The Syrian campaign started prior to the German invasion of Russia. Prior to that, Germans and Italians were only fighting in the Western Desert against the British. The British seem to have attributed exaggerated prowess to the Germans, as the British expected that Russia would quickly collapse under German attack. Russia certainly had a dysfunctional government, but did have a better army than the western countries realized. British thinking was that Germany would take Cyprus and Syria after winning the battle for Crete. They imagined that they might see Germans advancing into the Middle East from the Caucasus.

The British were stronger during June to August than they had been. With the German air force diverted to Russia from the Mediterranean, the British were able to add air strength to Malta with the idea that they would be able to operate against the supply convoys to Libya from Italy. General Auchinleck took over as theater commander from General Wavell, who went to India. The army received new units and equipment. They had new aircraft from the United States and new tanks from there as well. They were in the process of forming the 10th Armoured Division and had a the beginnings of the 50th Infantry Division. Forces from East Africa were now available to the Western Desert after the defeat of Italian forces in Abyssinia. African troops were left to finish off the remaining Italian forces in East Africa. The 1st South African Division, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions were sent to the Western Desert.

The British sent Sir Oliver Lyttleton to the Middle East to handle both political issues and to lead a Middle Eastern Military Council. That left General Auchinleck to be able to concentrate on the military issues. He does seem to have focused to much on the dangers from the north from possible German movement into the Middle East from Russia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An assessment after the Syria campaign in June and July 1941

The Australian Official History thought that the British, Indian, and Australian troops showed a better spirit than did the Vichy French and French colonial troops. The situation was complicated by the issues regarding the campaign in France in 1940 and the French defeat, the attack on Syria and Lebanon where the French thought themselves to be morally superior to the attacking forces. The campaign was motivated, supposedly, by concerns that the Germans were using Syria for operations. The French thought that the attack was unjustified. The French fought well, at least the Australians thought so.

While the 6th Australian Division learned valuable lessons about mountain warfare in Greece, the 7th Australian Division learned their mountain warfare lessons in Syria and Lebanon. They had the opportunity to apply that knowledge in 1942 in a much different context. They had seen the importance of controlling the ridges in mountainous territory and saw the value of mortars over artillery in such and environment. They also learned how to fight tanks with guns, both anti-tank guns and field guns firing over open sights. They also gained experience with ambushes in mountain passes.

In the Syrian campaign, air power was mostly of minor importance. The exception was the battle for Palmyra, where the French air force had considerable success. An attempt to use air power at Damour had only small success due to the small numbers of aircraft that were available. The mountainous terrain also impeded the use of air power. There was the problem of finding targets on the ground for one thing. There was also considerable delay between requesting assistance and the actual arrival of aircraft. They also found that the French were very successful in concealing artillery from aircraft. The navy, however, was very well protected by aircraft against air attack. That enabled the ships offshore to provide good artillery support to land forces. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Ham-handed British press censorship about Syria in 1941

Politics was a factor in the news about the fighting in Syria. You had the issue that the Free French were trying to create a larger role for themselves and that they had tried to portray the Vichy French in Syria as going to collapse when attacked. Somewhat in line with that was that the BBC was announcing that the French were not resisting, which was untrue. General Lavarack wanted the truth known back in Australia, and the Australian press reports talked openly of the fighting.

The Australians were the most numerous force in Syria by the end of June 1941. The Australians had 18,000 men, the UK had 9,000 men, the Indians had 2,000 men, and the Free French were 5,000 men. British and Indian losses, in total actually exceeded the Australian. The losses include prisoners of war, killed, and wounded. The British and Indian together lost 1,800 men. The Australians lost 1,600 men, and the Free French lost 1,300 men. For the Free French, most of the losses were taken prisoner, as they had 1,100 prisoners of war.

The Australian Official History put the victory on the Australian infantry who had fought well in mountainous territory. They also praised the 5th Indian Brigade. They were said to be the most experienced troops in Syria except for the Australian 2/3rd and 2/4th Battalions. The 5th Indian Brigade was misused by their brigade commander, we think, and they took unnecessary losses due to being exposed to stronger enemy forces without support. The men engaged in the Syrian campaign were very tired by the end. The infantry had been pushed to an extreme, and the mountainous terrain was very difficult. Only the Australian spirit carried them to success. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An assessment of General Wavell

The Australian Official History has an assessment of General Wavell and the events towards the end of his tenure. For Admiral Cunningham, he had a glowing opinion of General Wavell. They had served together during the hardest of times in 1941. The battle for Crete was perhaps the most trying time. Admiral Cunningham considered General Wavell to be a great general, "if not the greatest".

General Wavell got credit for the brilliant campaign against the Italians conducted by General Richard O'Connor. General Wavell also took responsibility for the loss of Cyrenaica to Rommel. They blamed the loss on an incorrect estimate of the Axis strenght. Really, however, Rommel was an expert in infiltration tactics and the modern embodiment of that tactical idea in Blitzkrieg. With Rommel's arrival, the British commanders on the spot were not prepared to combat him, regardless of his force strength. Richard O'Connor had serious health issues, but he was put in the bag when he appeared as an advisor.

General Wavell backed Churchill's Greek adventure. That is not something to brag about. The campaign was politically motivated and was doomed to failure before the campaign started. General Wavell had to lie to the Australian Prime Minister and senior army officer to get them to agree to participate. The operation was obviously doomed to fail to anyone who understood the issues. The loss of Crete was a foreseeable consequence of the loss of Greece.

Wavell was reluctant to participate in the campaigns in Iraq and Syria. He was pressed to do so by Churchill. Resisting the Iraqi rebellion made sense and was successful, ultimately. As for Syria, there was not a pressing need to intervene when the attack came. Churchill misunderstood the Vichy French position and he was blinded by his hatred of them. There were really not the forces needed to invade, but they invaded anyway because that was what Churchill needed, politically. We suspect that he was looking for a quick victory over someone that he could brag about. Both the Germans and French were reluctant to do anything in Syria to prompt the British to invade. The French had briefly cooperated with the German attempt to aid the insurgent Iraqis, but quickly backed off. The Germans were particularly concerned about the possibility that the British would be provoked into invading. Because there was a political need, the Australians went into Syria with inadequate strength. They ultimately succeeded due to the quality of the men and their leadership, but they took heavy casualties in the process that might have been avoided. In any case, General Wavell's usefulness to Churchill had come to an end and he was sacked. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History and our editorial comments.

More about General Catroux

There is a good Wikipedia article about General Catroux.

He was an older man by August 1941. He eventually lived to be 92 years old in 1969. He was born in 1877, so he was older than many officers. He was 64 by the time of the armistice meeting at Acre. He seems to have been a very fine man. I liked how he handled losing his kepi at Acre, where he figured an Australian soldier had taken it as a souvenir. He had extensive experience in the Middle East and the Far East. His nature was such that he gravitated towards the Free French. He had met General de Gaulle in the Great War, when they were both prisoners of war. By October 1940, he was on General de Gaulle's staff in London. This is based on the Wikipedia article.

A look back at the events of May to July 1941

The campaign in Syria and Lebanon had lasted five weeks. It closely followed the disaster in Crete and the campaign in Greece. We might also include the breakout into the Atlantic of the battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen in March that resulted in the loss of the battle cruiser Hood and damage to the new Prince of Wales. The common thread was the involvement of the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill. We find that Churchill did not accept any responsibility for the outcomes and blamed General Wavell for the mishaps in his theater, the Mediterranean and Middle East. That is unfair, because Wavell should have opposed the campaign in Greece, because it caused the disaster in Libya, due to the withdrawal of troops that were diverted to Greece and then to Crete. That opened the way for General Rommel to practice blitzkrieg tactics in Libya. Churchill was also unhappy with General Wavell over Wavell's opposition to diverting troops to Iraq from the Middle East when there was trouble and to the invasion of Syria. The Australian Official History puts the blame for the loss of Benghazi where it belongs, on Churchill, not General Wavell. General Wavell had held back one Australian division in the Middle East that might have been thrown away in Greece after the battle was already lost.

On June 21 1941, Churchill informed General Wavell that he would go to India and replace General Auchinleck, who would take over as the theater commander in the Mediterranean and Middle East. We will see that the swap did not go well, because General Auchinleck was both a brilliant field commander and a flawed theater commander. Auchinleck had commanded the operations Norway in May and June 1940. He had overseen the portion of the Middle East that fell under the India government and had become involved in Syria at the end.

The Australian Official History also points out that the battle in Western Desert and the attack on Syria and Lebanon were made with reduced forces which affected the outcomes. In the Western Desert, a premature attack was made with tanks right off the ships with untrained crews. Churchill had the ability to push the Tiger Convoy through the Mediterranean with newly manufactured tanks (in one case). He had a naive view of things that all he had to do was provide the tanks and that they would be immediately ready for battle. One vessel was lost with about fifty tanks. They sent Cruiser Mk.IV, Light Mk.VIC, and Crusader I tanks. The first fifty Crusader I tanks were sent before they were mechanically reliable. It was the sort of interference by the Prime Minister that could cause sudden disaster through the war, as was mentioned by Alan Brooke, who became the CIGS after General Dill. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A New Difficulty in Syria in August 1941

By August 1941, there were still Australian, Indian, and British prisoners in French and Italian hands. This became an issue between the British command in Jerusalem and the Australian officers in charge in Syria and Lebanon. The control committee demanded that these prisoners be returned by 5 August 1941. Three sets of letters were drafted. One was for General Dentz and two others were for two other French generals. Brigadier Savige was to arrest General Dentz. He asked for freedom to handle the situation as he felt best. He substituted a French-speaking junior Australian officer for the Free French Lieutenant-Colonel. Eventually, General Dentz was arrested and the situation was handled as well as was possible. General Dentz was at first uncooperative, but the courtesies offered to him by the Australians impressed him that he should cooperate.

When the officers sent to arrest General Jennequin, they found he was absent. They eventually found him in Tripoli. He eventually cooperated and was taken to Jerusalem by Colonel Stevenson. Brigadier Plant had a good relationship with the other general, General Arlabosse. He took him to General Lavarack's headquarters and then he went on to Jerusalem. There 35 French officers there under guard by the time all had arrived. The Allied prisoners from France arrived in Beirut by ship on 15 August. The prisoners from Scarpanto arrived by 30 September. General Dentz and the other senior officers then were sent to France in September. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The political situation in Syria in late July to August 1941

The Free French seem to have been a creature of Churchill. The Australians were very cool towards the Free French organization and had better feelings for the Vichy French than they did for the Free French. As early as 21 July 1941, the Free French wanted access to more of Syria. General Wilson broached the subject with General Lavarack, the Australian corps commander. In fact, the Free French were moving troops without permission. General Lavarack informed General Wilson that many Vichy troops would join the British, but wanted nothing to do with the Free French organization. General Lavarack told General Wilson that the Free French movements were jeopardizing the "security situation". One particular problem was that the Free French thought that they should have the civil administration of Syria under their control, which was not what had been agreed upon for obvious reasons. The Vichy French were obeying the terms of the Armistice, but the Free French were not. The British were apparently ready to undercut General Lavarack's authority to satisfy Churchill and General De Gaulle. Another sticking point was that the Free French wanted to take over all Vichy French war materials for their use, while General Lavarack wanted to be able to resupply the Australians from the Vichy French supplies and arms. Eventually, eight convoys sailed from Syria to France with some 37,500 passengers, mostly troops. 5,668 Vichy French troops joined the Free French out of 37,700 troops. By late August, the Free French division was disbanded due to lack of men. The Free French troops were divided into districts, instead. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After the Armistice in Syria and Lebanon in 1941

After the armistice in Syria and Lebanon, the area was divided up between various authorities. The area north of the road from Beirut to Damascus came under the control of the 1st Australian Corps. Within that area, the 7th Australian Division was on the coast. The Free French forces were in the east, which included Damascus. Habforce would occupy the desert areas in the northeast. The 10th Indian Division occupied the farthest portion of the northeast. That was "beyond the Euphrates".

One feature of the armistice was that prisoners taken to metropolitan France were to be set free. Another feature was that Vichy French troops would be allowed to join the Free French. They were also allowed to choose to return to France. The Allies were not to pressure the French troops to join the Allied cause.

A commission was set up in Beirut to administer the armistice. The commission had a number of committees. The one on prisoner release was headed by Colonel Blackburn, who had coaxed the Free French into Damascus. His civilian vocation was being an attorney. He was a South African.

The British goal was to transfer General Dentz and his army from Syria. Of course, General De Gaullea and General Catroux wanted to have many Vichy French troops join the Free French forces. That immediately created a source of strife and conflict. The Vichy authorities and officers wanted to return to France as quickly as possible, so that meshed well with the British goals. The Australians thought well of the Vichy officers and troops, as they had fought well and fairly. The Australians were less friendly to the Free French, who they considered had painted the campaign in rosier condition than was what was actually found. They also considered that the Free French had not performed well in the battle for Syria.

The Syrian people, who had been living under French rule, would have liked to be free from European rule, but were astute enough to realize that freedom would not be coming soon. The Australians were well aware of the position of the Syrian people. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Catroux lost his kepi to an Australian on 12 July 1941

The Free French General Catroux was the barracks at Acre for the armistice signing on 12 July 1941. He had left his Oak Leaf kepi on the seat of his car. When he returned, he noticed that it was gone. He knew about the Australians and figured that an Australian soldier had made a trophy of the hat. He did tell the camp commandant and others about the kepi, but he figured it was gone for good. He was good-natured enough to not be bothered by the incident. He had a lot of experience with the Foreign Legion, and they were very much like the Australians. As the general said: "what was taken by them was taken for good." General Wilson was "delighted" by the news. General Lavarack smiled when he heard about the missing kepi. The Vichy officers talked among themselves and thought that General Latroux was the victim of the bad company he kept. The Vichy General de Verdilhac returned to his side after midnight, at 1:30am on 13 July 1941. A column moved forward on the coastal road on 15 July. The column consisted of the 2/5th Battalion, some artillery, and some cavalry troops. They were not to enter Beirut, but to bypass the city on their way north to Latakia. The 2/16th Battalion and part of the 6th Cavalry Regiment got to enter Beirut on 15 July. They were cheered by the populace who assumed that they would have independence. The ceremonial entrance by the Allied generals happened at 10:30am on 16 July. They had 24 Bren carriers and some field guns. The next step would be spreading out the force to occupy Syria and Lebanon. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

French troops performed well in Syria and Lebanon in June and July 1941

General Dentz had a surprising low opinion of French troops defending Syria and Lebanon. In reality, French troops performed very credibly in the campaign. There was a mix of troops, Europeans, North Africans, and Africans from Senegal.

French R-35 tanks and armored cars, even if just improvised, provided a very tough opponent for British and Australian troops. Until they received sticky bombs, they had no answer for when they encountered French tanks in particular. The only anti-tank weapons that the British and Australian troops had at the beginning of the campaign in June 1941 were 2-pounder anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles. The anti-tank rifles were not able to damage an R-35 tank, and it is unclear how effective the 2-pounder was against the R-35 either.

A small band of Foreign Legion troops held out for a long period at Palmyra against the cavalry brigade and the Arab Legion. They were apparently in good positions that gave protection and allowed them good fields of fire.

At Kuneitra, Merjayoun, and Jezzine, French infantry, machine guns, and artillery, gave British and Australian troops a tough fight. The 5th Indian Brigade was decimated in the fighting and a British battalion, the Fusiliers, was all but destroyed. That area continued to be a problem, even for British troops, right up until the Armistice.

We must assume that General Dentz was not familiar with the French troops under his command. Otherwise, how could he have had such a low opinion of them? When the attack commenced in early June 1941, he expected that the French army would collapse, when that was not the case at all. Even French colonial troops, with professional French officers, performed extremely well in the tough battles on the mountain ridges in Syria and Lebanon. We found, though, that the Australian troops in particular achieved results beyond what might be expected. This is based on our assessment of the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Dentz wants to stop fighting from 22 June 1941 until 12 July 1941

As early as 22 June 1941, General Dentz, the French commander in Lebanon and Syria, expected that his forces would be defeated. In France, on 28 June, Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan agreed that they should stop fighting in Syria and Lebanon. At the time, though, they did not tell that to General Dentz. The next day, on 29 June, British bombers partly destroyed the General's residence in Beirut. General Dentz had already left the place prior to the bombing. Some French officers said that they should bomb the residence of the high commissioner in Jerusalem, but General Dentz was not prepared to bomb Jerusalem. By 30 June, General Lavarack sent a message to General Dentz, but he did not realize at the time that the British had bombed General Dentz's residence. After he found out about the bombing, he thought it had nullified his message. Palmyra was finally captured by 3 July. There was now nothing to stop an advance to Aleppo. By 8 July, General Dentz heard the news that his government was prepared to stop fighting. General Dentz sent a message to the British through the American Consul in Beirut. The British sent back a list of conditions under which they would agree to a cease fire. General Dentz then sent back a message that he agreed, with the cease-fire to happen at midnight on 11 July. The news was broadcast in Australia, which was a bad idea. General Lavarack sent an angry note to General Blamey. General Dentz replied to a wireless message from General Wilson with another wireless message. The French would stop fighting at 12:01am on 12 July 1941. The French envoys came to the Australian outpost on the road to Beirut, as requested. They were transported to Acre, where they met with General Wilson, General Lavarack, and General Catroux. They reached an agreement that allowed the Allies to occupy Syria and Lebanon. The French soldiers would be treated with full honors. They could keep their "personal weapons", but all other weapons would be stacked and controlled by the Allies. By midday on 15 July, the Australians moved forward to occupy the key locations in Syria and Lebanon. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The fighting in Syria and Lebanon ended at midnight of 11 to 12 July 1941

To the east, the fighting overlapped the armistice at midnight of 11 to 12 July 1941. The cavalry had sent out patrols to the west from the 6th and 7th of July. The 4th Cavalry Brigade was actually on the move on 11 July. The Brigadier was attacked on 12 July, nominally after the armistice. After the armistice, when the French records became available, the British were able to learn more about the defending French forces near the end. When the initial attack at Damour started, the Vichy French had about seven battalions defending Damour and Jezzine. A similar-sized force held Merdjayoun and Jebel Mazar. There were also two battalions holding Jebel Druse. Just as the Australian battalions were short of men, the French battalions were also short. The French battalions were between 250 and 450 men when the fighting stopped. That would put them stronger than many of the Australians, which were very shot of men. During the fighting at Damour, two units were pulled out, which left a cavalry regiment and three battalions holding the road to Beirut from Damascus. The French said that they took 194 men prisoner during the initial attack at Jebel Mazar. The second attack quickly came to a stop. To achieve that, the French took heavy losses, enough to cause the French general to order a withdrawal to a further line to the north. The French showed in the fighting that they had good troops who were well-led, even if the troops were Senegalese. We have constantly suspected that Churchill had ordered the attack on Syria and Lebanon, hoping for a cheap victory to aid his political fortunes after a very difficult first six months of the year. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Merdjayoun front from 9 to 11 July 1941

On 30 June 1941, the British 6th Division took over command on the Merdjayoun front in Syria. The British 23rd Brigade was actually in place at Merdjayoun when they realized that the Vichy French forces to the immediate north were withdrawing. This was on the night of 9 to 10 July. By 11 July, the 23rd Brigade moved north to the Bekaa Valley, a very familiar name in the 20th Century. The French had made demolitions and had left booby traps, so that slowed the British advance. General Evetts had planned an attack by the 16th Brigade on 10 July against the Jebel Mazar. They would have the Free French Marine Battalion with them. They attacked at 2am and made some progress. The next night, they advanced again. The situation on the ridge was very unstable, and General Evetts considered a withdrawal to more secure positions. However, he heard that there had been an armistice requested by the French, so he had his men hold their present positions. The French that they had been fighting had decided to withdraw, so suddenly, the 16th Brigade was on Jebel Mazar at midnight. General Evetts had planned for success and had a pursuit force ready to move north. The pursuit force included most of the 9th Australian Cavalry, the 2/Queen's battalion, artillery, machine guns, and four Free French tanks. The Free French marines were stopped on the right, so General Evetts sent them help from the pursuit force. At midday on 10 July, they moved out and came under fire. Much of the fire came from Jebel Mazar. The vehicles from the pursuit force moved up and down the road and came under fire. Every one of their 33 vehicles had been hit at some point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack on the heights at Badarane on 9 and 10 July 1941

Starting in the evening of 9 July 1941, a company from the 2/31st Battalion was ordered to take the heights at Badarane. This was especially challenging because there was a deep wadi between the Australians and the Badarane heights. They might have had support from their battalion carrier platoon and a troop from the 6th Cavalry, but there was a bridge out that blocked them from participating. The wadi was 800 feet deep. The heights were 600 feet above the wadi and were terraced. The attacking company had only some sixty men. The platoon leaders were a lieutenant and two sergeants. The men left Niha at 9pm on 9 July, which was about three miles away. They started out with four mules and their drivers, but they were left behind because the terrain was too difficult for mules. They had progressed to within 400 yards of Badarane by 2:30am on 10 July. They came under machine gun fire that was fired over their heads and was landing behind them. The company commander led his men to the left of the heights into olive trees. One man alone bayoneted the four defenders in one position. 43 Australians attacked and 13 were killed in the fight. They found some forth or fifty dead Senegalese soldiers. There were also many wounded that they took prisoner. There had been about 200 defenders of the heights when the Australians attacked. By 5am, the company had won the battle. They eventually got orders to destroy the French equipment and to withdraw back to the company headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Back to Jezzine from 6 July 1941

The 25th Australian Brigade had started to make progress at Jezzine while the battle for Damour was being fought. From 6 July 1941, the 2/31st Battalion moved north to Beit ed Dine. The 2/31st had advanced to Niha and beyond by early 7 July. The Cheshire Yeomanry was also active and had taken some French prisoners in Mrousti. They had talked with a Swiss member of the French Foreign Legion who told them that the French had withdrawn from Bater because of the intensity of the artillery fire. The current commander of the 25th Brigade, Brigadier Plant, ordered the left battalion group (because they included artillery) to take Beiqoun and Mazraat ech Chouf. One company was to take the commanding heights near Mazraat ech Chouf. The 2/25th Battalion with support from the 2/6th Field Regiment would move north. By 3pm on 8 July, they started to receive French artillery fire. They called in artillery support from the 2/6th Field Regiment. One platoon then was attacked by African troops. By 7pm, one platoon was in an exposed position and had taken casualties. The platoon was withdrawn, leaving the French in possession of the high ground. To the east, a company of the 2/31st Battalion was attacked twice on 8 July. Their losses left them with only 20 men. By 4:30, they were reinforced by an 18 man platoon from another hill. One company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to take Hill 1054 from the French. The attackers were left in exposed positions and were unable to move. Fortunately, some of the Pioneers came up in support. Men with Bren guns were able to take out three French machine guns. Artillery fire was called in. The guns fired for about 50 minutes and then the Australians charged the French with fixed bayonets. The French broke and ran. The French withdrew in confusion, but the Australians had lost communication with their artillery. Otherwise, they could have taken out the French vehicles. That withdrawal left the Australians on the heights at Mazraat ech Chouf. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Near the coast on 11 July 1941 approaching Beirut

Early on 11 July 1941, French fire had slowed and stopped. Lt-Col. King ordered men to probe north from the roadblock. The men did not see any French forces, but they found that the French had merely allowed the probing men to pass through their lines and return without disturbing them. During the early afternoon, the French were active and present again. They also sent a tank squadron out along the sand dunes. This was just beyond the wireless antenna. Brigadier Savige, on hearing the news, told Lt-Col. King to stay in place in their current positions. Brigadier Savige was planning an attack for the morning of 12 July. At the same time, Brigadier Savige, commander of the 17th Australian Brigade, had ordered the 2/3rd Battalion to move forward onto the ridges that dominated the land near Aramoun. The land was so rough that supplying the forward troops with food was a problem. They survived on goat and also got horse meat from the local villagers. Hutchison's company, now of only about thirty men, came under French fire. They pulled back and set up a mortar that they used to fire back at the French machine guns. On the right, the 2/14th Battalion moved forward. They found four French 155mm guns and 200 rounds at Daqoun. They eventually moved forward to Ain Kaour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.