Greatly reduced Australian battalions on 9 and 10 July 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

During the afternoon of 9 July 1941, the 21st Australian Brigade was ordered to take "Abey and Kafr Matta" while the 17th Brigade was to advance on Beirut. When men from the 2/27th Battalion entered Abey and were near Daqoun, they found that the French had pulled back from the area. The 2/14th Battalion was to hold the area near Abey, Kafr Matta, along with Hill 903. They also were to block the road to Beirut. When Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade, had moved north through Damour and made contact with Lt-Col. King of the 2/5th Battalion. Savige was unsure of what he should do next, and traveled to the 7th Division headquarters to get guidance. The 2/5th Battalion found themselves in a poor position, so he ordered a move north for about two miles. They reached their new position by 4:20am on 10 July. The 2/5th Battalion was by this time reduced to companies of 45 men or less. They had also moved so far that they were running short of phone wire for signals. Brigadier Savige arrived later in the morning of 10 July. He had Lt-Col. King move his men to the next ridge near Khalde. The 2/5th now had better artillery support. They were in company with the 2/5th Field Regiment and had a group of 6-inch howitzers from the British 7th Medium Regiment. The Australians had a fire plan for a new attack that would start at 3:30m on 10 July. They would have a barrage move forward of the advancing troops. They reached the French road block and block house. One platoon was held up by French mortar fire and machine guns. The 6th Cavalry came forward in support and had cleared the area in front of the road block. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th Cavalry in action on 8 July 1941

On the morning of 8 July 1941, while the 2/16th Battalion was improving their situation on the ridges, more of the 6th Cavalry Regiment crossed the Damour River to join their other part. There were already three tanks (probably captured R-35's) on the north side. They were with two companies from the 2/2nd Pioneers. The Pioneers were now a mile north of the river. Progress had been halted by French fire and the threat of French 75mm guns covering the road. The squadron commander was angry about someone saying bad things about the cavalry being held up and ordered the three tanks forward, which was a bad idea. A tank came around the bend in the road and was hit by fire from a 75mm gun 300 yards away. A second tank came up in support. The damaged tank was set on fire. The crew abandoned the damaged tank and was picked up by the other tank. Lt. Macmeikan, of the 2/5th Field Regiment saw the gun flash and was able to knock it out by artillery fire. By 2pm, the decision was made to pull back and call in an artillery barrage. When the Pioneers pulled back, the French moved forward to be clear of the artillery fire. When the Pioneers attacked again during the night, they moved forward into part of the town. By morning on 9 July, the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour. It was after this event that Brigadier Berryman had arrived and ordered men forward when he saw the situation. Brigadier Savige was put in charge to restore some order around Damour and beyond. During the afternoon on 9 July, men from the 2/27th found that the French had pulled out of Abey and Daqoun. In response, the 2/14th Battalion was ordered to move into Abey, Kafr Matta, and a hill between them. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

After Damour fell on 9 July 1941

Once the Australians realized that the French had withdrawn from Damour and surrounding positions, they exploited the situation. By 7am on 9 July 1941, men from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/16th Battalion met Captain Noonan's company from the 2/14th Battalion. This was on the northeast side of Damour. The 6th Cavalry and some Pioneers moved up to Karacol. The roadblock on the road to Beirut now was held by two companies from the 2/5th Battalion. A local Lebanese told someone on Brigadier Savige's staff that the French had pulled out of Abey. This was to the east. They sent word to General Allen, the 7th Australian Division commander of the situation.

Brigadier Berryman had arrived back in the west from Merdjayoun to resume his role as the 7th Division artillery commander. The commander of the 2/5th Field Regiment had driven north for 3-1/2 miles to a roadblock. Two tanks from the 6th Cavalry were held by the roadblock. Brigadier Berryman gave orders for continued movement to the north and informed the division headquarters of his actions. There was a situation now that the division commander had told the 17th Brigade not to advance until he issued orders. Men with guns from the 2/5th Field Regiment moved quickly north. The guns that were farthest north were around Karacol. They were drawn into a duel with French guns, firing over open sights. From this position, they were also able to shell the southern edge of Beirut. The situation was rather chaotic, and needed someone to bring the situation under control. That task was given to Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

8 July 1941 at Damour

The situation on 8 July 1941 near Damour was that the town was being threatened on three sides. There were three Australian battalions involved. The 2/5th blocked the road out of Damour to the north. On the northeastern side, the 2/14th Battalion was in position. Then there were the 2/2nd Pioneers "moving up from the south". Artillery support had to be carefully coordinated so as to not shoot at Australians while firing in support. At 5pm, Colonel Chapman brought orders from the division commander, General Allen, proposing that the 21st Brigade would have responsibility for "the area south of the Wadi Daqoun". Brigadier Savige's 17th Brigade would move north along the coast road. The 21st Brigade would move eastward towards Abey. By 7:30pm on 88 July, there were reports of French movement. This was to the north east. During the day on 8 July, two companies were near Damour on the east side. There was some concern that there might be a danger of accidentally firing on Australians.

8 July was a time spent by the 2/16th Battalion on the ridges at Mar Midhail and El Atiqa. They were gradually making themselves more secure. In the morning, three tanks from the 6th Cavalry (probably the captured French R-35 tanks) crossed the river. The 2/2Pioneers were moving north to a point about a mile north from the river. The French were still strong in the banana plantation. One tank caught by a French 75mm gun was knocked out. The 2/5th Field Regiment fired in support and knocked out the French gun. Brigadier Stevens decided to withdraw the men and call in artillery fire on the French. Some ground had been lost on the 8th, but during the night, the Pioneers took back what had been lost and were. A troop of the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour by 4am and they had the town. They found that during the night, the French had withdrawn from where they had been fighting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

with the 2/3rd Battalion from 8 July 1941 and with the 2/5th

We are now at daybreak on 8 July 1941 with the 2/3rd Battalion. They were on the Kheurbet el Biar ridge. They started to receive French artillery and mortar fire as the day got light. They could see French artillery in the distance, where the wadi cut the hill. By 6am, Captain Parbury could see Australians at Deir Mar Jorjos. At that news, the 2/3rd moved forward to the heights that they were to take. The commander ordered Porbury to tkane hill 569 on the right. He sent a platoon which came under machine gun fire. The Australians were tired and without water. They were able to move along and reached one knoll on the summit. They could see five French field guns some five hundred yards away. By late on the 9th, in the afternoon, they took the guns. They were then in the village.

Meanwhile, the 2/5th was at the wadi near Deir Mar Jorjos. This was just at midnight in the night of 7 to 8 July. The first men to arrive came under fire, but were able to take four 75mm guns and 8 machine guns. By 3am, they were in Deir Mar Jorjos. Just before En Naame, they took the high ground. From there some men entered the village and took "a French colonel of the Foreign Legion and his staff". By 8am, an artillery captain was able to get his 15 mile long wire into the village. That allowed the commander to speak with Brigadier Savige. By dawn on 8 July, they started to receive mortar fire. A small group was sent to take the bridge. There men with two Thompson sub-machine guns and a Bren gun. The bold attack caused the French to flee the bridge. When Lt-Col. King saw a French counterattack forming, he called in artillery fire, which broke the attack, so that the men all ran. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Important actions from 7 July 1941 in the Damour battle

The 2/16th Battalion had a fairly quite day on 7 July 1941 in Lebanon. They found that the French had withdrawn from the El Atiqa ridge. The area had banana plantations and they were cleared. The engineers put a bridge over the river that allowed vehicles to cross. By afternoon, there were two companies of pioneers and three tanks in the plantation area.

In the 2/27th Battalion's area, the action heated up into an intense battle. The French had moved on the east slope of Hill 560. One company was sent to push the French off the hill. Captain Lee's company came under heavy fire and was stopped. After midnight, into 8 July, they had pushed close to the French. They thought that by daylight, the French would surrender. The battle continued and Captain Lee's headquarters came under attack at Er Roumane. The battalion commander committed just about his entire force into the battle. When they took some French prisoners, they learned that the attackers were from the I/French Foreign Legion and one company from the 29th Algerians. The Algerians had been shipped in from France in a roundabout route that came through Greece. Lt.Col. Moten, the commander, made his way forward with an artillery observer. He arrived with the forward troops at 5am on 8 July. They discovered that the French had withdrawn in the night. The attacking Australians had considerable losses, so that companies were now platoon-size. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Finally into Damour on 7 July 1941

One company from the 2/14th Battalion, that commanded by Captain Noonan, was on the north side of the Wadi Daqoun. They were almost into Damour, as they were just 400 yards from the town. From where they were, they could hear heavy firing on the south side of the wadi. However, Noonan's company was so far unopposed. Seemingly, they could just move into Damour any time that they wanted. Captain Noonan agreed that there would be benefits from moving into Damour. He was feeling cautious, though, and sat with his headquarters and one platoon in their position 400 yards from Damour. He let two platoons move into the town. They exchanged fire with some French troops as they moved into Damour. Some of the Australians moved into some stone buildings which would provide good cover. As tehy wainted, they saw ten European French troops moving along the street. The Australians waited until the French were very close and then killed or wounded all ten. By 4pm, Lieutenant Katekar's men, from the 2/27th Battalion, were pushing some Senegalese troops northward towards Damour. The first few men surrendered when the Australians shot at them. A little while later, there were about one hundred more on the hill, across from Captain Noonan's men. Sergeant Mott shouted at them and fired over their heads. The Senegalese troops ran for cover. The Australians soon had 92 prisoners. They could see more groups of Senegalese troops, but they could hear shots being fired in Damour, so they moved eastwards. Captain Noonan's men put the prisoners in one house and occupied others. There was no food. During the night, they could hear vehicles drive nearby. The French knew that they were in Damour, while their own artillerymen did not. As a result, they had to endure both Australian and French artillery fire. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

With Captain Arthur's company of the 2/14th Battalion on 7 July 1941

Captain Arthur's company of the 2/14th Battalion was on the south ridge of the Wadi Daqoun on 7 July 1941. His commander ordered him to take his men along the Daraya ridge. He was to take Hill 225. Hill 225 appeared to be a position that would dominate the town of Damour. At 400 yards from Hill 225, they were under machine gun fire. When Captain Arthur had requested mortar support, that was when he was sent two Vickers machine guns. As we have mentioned, they quickly found the range to the French and allowed the Australian infantry to advance. A group from the 2/27th Battalion arrived and attacked the French from the southwest. A runner from the 2/27th made contact with the Australian artillery observer and called in fire. The men from the 2/27th Battalion were able to move forward towards Hill 225. As the sun set, men from Captain Arthur's company caught two Frenchmen and 16 Senegalese and took them prisoner. There was fighting and the Australians took casualties, but by midnight on 7 to 8 July had taken Hill 225. They captured six machine guns and ten thousand rounds of ammunition and more. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More action on 7 July 1941 with the 2/3rd, 2/5th, and 2/14th battalions

While Lt-Col. King of the 2/5th Battalion had hoped to wait until the next day to attack, Brigadier Savige decided that the men needed to move forward to Deir Mar Jorjos that night, rather than waiting. Three lines of men moved across the wadi, single file. They reformed into a more normal formation once they had crossed. As the sun was setting, the men moved across the Wadi Daqoun. They had to be careful crossing the steep slopes. The men were so tired that when they stopped to rest, the men fell asleep. The 2/5th moved through the position where the 2/3rd Battalion was located. Major Stevenson, commanding the 2/3rd Battalion wanted to stay in place, because he was concerned with the possibility of accidentally fighting the 2/5th Battalion in the dark.

All day long on 7 July 1941, the 2/14th Battalion was moving to the west, where they would move into Damour on the east side. They would make connection with the 2/2nd Pioneers. They advanced untii they were 400 yards from Damour and stopped for two hours. One company on the ridge to the south ran into French troops with machine guns. The commander had asked for mortars to fire in the machine guns, but got two Vickers machine guns from the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion. They quickly dominated the French guns so that the infantry was able to advance. Men from another Australian battalion, the 2/27th, attacked the French from the southwest. They had been pinned down by machine gun fire, but a runner had alerted an artillery observer, who called in fire on the French. By sunset on the 7th, the French defenses were starting to disintegrate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Near El Boum on 7 July 1941

The 2/3rd Battalion straggled into El Boum by about 8:30am, even though the first company arrived as early as 5:30am. The 2/3rd Battalion commander, Major Stevenson, had found the phone wire that they were following by climbing straight up the hill. The commander of the 2/5th Battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel King, would coordinate the two battalions. Stevenson only found King at 9:30am, so they could decide on a plan. The 2/5th Battalion only reached El Boum between 7:45am and 8:45am. A mule train arrived with the wireless equipment. King was able to communicate with Brigadier Savige and give him the current status. The battalions were able to move out by 10:30am in "diamond formation". Once Lt-Col. King arrived at the "start line", he decided that they should wait until the next day, 8 July, to attack, due to the amount of French machine gun fire. He hoped to call in artillery support against the French forces. Major Stevenson learned that there was a French battalion about an hour-and-half-march away on the right. They eventually saw about 100 men and mules arrive and start to unload. They held their fire until they were about 600 yards away. They then opened fire on the French and the mule train, and dispersed the men and mules that survived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More fighting at Damour on 6 July 1941

By the afternoon on 6 July 1941, the fighting near Damour continued. The French staged a series of attacks against the Australians. The Australians had multiple companies of infantry in the fight. They attacked Russell's company, of the 2/14th Battalion, and shouted as they attacked. The Australians were able to stop the attackers and left 20 men dead with no Australian casualties. The French attacked again, but were not as energetic. They were repulsed. There were now two companies in control of El Mourhira. When Brigadier Stevens learned of their success, he ordered the 2/14th less the companies at El Mourhira, to move out to a line north of Daraya. They arrived after midnight on the night of 6 to 7 July. They discussed whether the 17th Brigade should advance to El Boum. Brigadier Stevens cautioned against making such a move in daylight due to the accurate French artillery fire. The plan for the 17th Brigade seems to have been overly ambitious, even as modified. The men were to be heavily loaded, as they would travel over ground too difficult for mules. While the men were moving down to the river, they got rain. The rain made the rocks very slippery and difficult. Men slipped on their backs, down the rocks. The two 17th Brigade battalions were the 2/3rd and the 2/5th. The first men from the 2/3rd Battalion arrived at the Beit ed Dine road after 3am. On 7 July, they men were to follow signal wire to El Boum, but the men of the 2/3rd lost track of it in the dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A fight in the moutains in the east along the Beit ed Dine road on 5 aand 6 July 1941

Two companies from the 2/14th Battalion moved forward late on 5 July 1941. They started at Kramdech. The infantry led the group. Behind them were the mules with mortars and bombs. Last were the signalers, reeling out telephone wire. Captain Russell's company moved across the ridges until they arrived at the Beit ed Dine road. The road, at this point, was cut into a ledge on the ridge side. This was where the men had piled up rocks to block the road. A lieutenant and 12 men were sent up a hill to see if the French were there. They came under fire from a French position in a low point between hills. They had two men captured and withdrew. Captain Russell then attacked, but the French rolled grenades down the hill and put a stop to the attack. By 8:30am on 6 July, three French armored cars drove up to within 200 yards of the stones and stopped. One car was attacked with a sticky bomb, but the bomb failed to stick. The bomb fell off and exploded. Still, the cars pulled back about a mile. The cars carried two-pounder-sized guns and they started firing. Presumably, they were 37mm guns. With the cars present, French infantry tried attacking the road block. A combination of small arms fire and mortars beat back the attack. Three attacks by Captain Russell's company ultimately took Hill 567. The battle continued. The French infantry were mostly Senegalese with French officers and senior enlisted. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More action on 6 July 1941 in the battle for Damour in Lebanon

Lt-Colonel Moten, commander of the 2/27th Battalion, came to the river crossing. This was at about 1:30pm on 6 July 1941. He planned to establish his battalion headquarters at El Boum. They now had a phone line to El Boum, so Moten could talk with Captain Nichols, who had arrived at El Boum at 8am. By midnight, the 2/27th Battalion controlled the planned area. That would allow the 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige, to block the road to the north from Damour. The rear company of the 2/27th, along with the remnants of the fourth company, were spread on a wide front, but were not as far towards Damour has had been hoped.

Another battle was fought at El Atiqa, starting at midnight on 5 to 6 July. There were three weakened companies of the 2/16th Battalion that were attacking. They were supported by an artillery barrage. They had to cross the river and move forward to the Beit ed Dine road. The French replied with their own artillery barrage. The plan included a frontal attack, which seems to be ill-considered. The advance was blocked and they were reduced to exchanging fire with the French. By night, the remnants of the 2/16th Battalion were on the El Atiqa ridge and were holding on to their position.

There was concern that the French might attack along the Beit ed Dine road with armored cars and tanks. As early as 10pm on 5 July, Captain Nichols, commanding one company of the 2/27th Battalion, was in the woods located between the Damour tributary and Ed Dalimiye. Part of the 2/14th Battalion were at Kramdech by 8pm. Another company reached the Beit ed Dine road by 3:15am. They blocked with road with stones and waited for daylight. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The battle for Damour starts: from the night of 5 to 6 July 1941 in Lebanon

The men of the 21st Australian Brigade moved out at about midnight on the night of 4 to 6 July 1941. This was the start of the battle for Damour, in Lebanon. At 12:35pm, the artillery commenced their supporting fire. The ground that the men had to travel was extremely rough. One company from the 2/27th Battalion was in the lead on the narrow track that went down to the river crossing and then up to El Boum. The roughness of the ground meant that they needed to allow resting time along the way. The first platoon was that commanded by Lieutenant Sims, who had found the river crossing. They tried walking in the wadi, so that they would have cover from the French fire, but they decided that they would be safer back on the trail, despite the lack of cover. The wadi had too many places where men might fall. As there started to be light, they reached a barrier of concertina wire. They continued, trying not to be seen. They could hear the French firing. They fixed bayonets and charged into the village. The French were seen running from the attackers. They occupied the village and waited for more men to arrive.

The next company to move out was hit by accurate French artillery fire. Officers were killed and the company commander was wounded. That company needed to be reorganized under the leadership of Lieutenant Thomas. The men at El Boum had expected the second company at 7am. When they did not arrived, the spread out and advanced. By midnight on 6 July, the 2/27th Battalion had taken their objectives, so that the 17th Brigade could move forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The artillery plan for the attack at Damour in July 1941

The plan for the attack at Damour in in early July 1941 was comprehensive. The Australian division commander, General Allen, was able to request naval gunfire support for two days prior to the attack on the day of the attack. He also requested air support for the attack. The primary air role would be to protect the ground forces from French air attack. The Vichy French air force had proven itself to be a major factor. Were the French fighter aircraft superior to the British and Australian fighters involved? The French bombers had also proved themselves to be vert capable. The 21st Australian Brigade would attempt to turn the French flank and take out the foremost French forces. The artillery support would be primarily from field guns, but there was also a medium battery. The 17th Brigade was in place to continue the advance, if the initial attack was successful. The terrain for the attack would be very challenging. On the left was the ridge. Four battalions on the right would try to march through rough terrain where the men would have to carry all the loads. They might or might not be able to use mules. The attack would start during the night of 5 to 6 July 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late in the game in Syria and Lebanon in early July 1941

By early July 1941, the British had accumulated five brigades in Iraq. With the 10th Indian Division now in Iraq, Major-General Slim, the commander, was put in charge of the troops in northern Iraq. At this point, General Wilson was back to issuing orders. General Clark, of Habforce, had orders to advance west to Homs so as to block the road to Tripoli on the coast. They should also advance to the southwest to Baalbek, which threatened Beirut. The 10th Indian Division was to threaten Aleppo. The 21st Indian Brigade was motorized and had the 13th Lancers, an armored car regiment. They were dependent on air support from an improvised squadron. They had twelve aircraft, four Hurricanes, four Gladiators, and four Blenheims. By 6 July, the French had shot down all the Hurricanes. The 10th Indian Division troops were operating in the north, near the Turkish border. Because of the French air attacks, the division was not able to reach Aleppo.

For the defense of Damour, to support Beirut, the French had two French Foreign Legion battalions. They were reduced in strength, as were the five Lebanese battalions. The British believed that the French artillery consisted of four 75mm batteries and two medium guns (probably 155mm). There were also some coast defense guns that might be a factor. Besides the force at Damour, there were two lines behind that at Khalde and then right before Beirut.

The orders for the attack were for the 21st Brigade to clear the enemy from the area south of the river, and then advance to a line from the river mouth to the east. The 17th Brigade would move up behind the 21st Brigade and be ready to move against any other French forces not near the 21st Brigade. The 25th Brigade would move towards Beit ed Dine. The Cheshire Yeomanry would be in the mountains further east. The Australians had their own artillery support. They had some 62 guns, including one medium battery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

From 3 to 5 July in Syria and Lebanon

By 11:30am on 4 July 1941, the Pioneers attacked Mtoulle. They had taken fire, but by afternoon, they held the village, for that was what Mtoulle was. Before this, in the late afternoon of 3 July, an Australian company moved north and east towards Rharife. By the 5th, they had occupied Rharife. During the day on 4 July, the French could be seen withdrawing towards the northeast from Mtoulle. Brigadier Plant, of the 25th Australian Brigade, got his orders from General Allen to exploit the French withdrawal. By 5 July, the 2/31st Battalion, located east of the gorge, was scouting to the north along the road from Jezzine. To the west, the 2/25th was holding a line that included Rharife and Mtoulle. At a higher level, General Lavarack reacted by ordering the British 6th Division to increase their activity both at Damascus and Merdjayoun. He hoped that would indicate to the French that the division was going to attack. ON 3 July, the 6th Division had been situated with the 16th Brigade on the road to Beirut. The remains of the 5th Indian Brigade was holding a position north of Qatana. The 23rd Brigade was at Merdjayoun and Khiam. The 1/Royal Fusiliers (reconstituted) were in the forts near the Beirut road. They had the 9th Australian Cavalry in readiness to respond to any attacks. A yeomanry cavalry unit was on Mount Hermon, near Chebaa. 3 July also saw the French surrender at Palmyra. There were 165 men, mostly not French, as they were from the French Foreign Legion. Another group at T3 surrendered on 4 July. They had been sufficient to defend against a large force, mostly cavalry, for some twelve days. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 25th Australian Brigade from 1 July 1941

On 1 July 1941, the 25th Brigade was holding not a line, but a line of posts. That implies that they had gaps in the front. They were located north of Jezzine and to the east. They were on the road that ran to the north from Jezzine, as well. Patrols were finding evidence that the French were withdrawing from some positions. They found that the French were defending Hasrout, which was on a road that ran do the east. The French had pulled out from what was just a track that led to Jleiliye. They also found that on the night of 2 July, the French had pulled back from Wadi Nagrat and were withdrawing on Beit ed Dine. Brigadier Stevens then decided to send two columns against Rharife. They were mixed battle groups, one from the 2/25th Battalion and the other from the 2/2nd Pioneers. They would converge on Hasrout and then move on Rharife. The Pioneers took casualties on 3 July. Because the company commander was wounded, they were delayed in moving into Jleiliye. The other company was still short of Mtoulle at the end of the day. For the 2/25th Battalion, the plan was for one company to take the town while the other company took the plateau above Hasrout. The terrain was extremely difficult. An Australian bayonet attack routed the defenders. One platoon took Hasrout and set up a road block. When they could see French troops readying for an attack, they called in artillery and forced them to withdraw. By about midday on 4 July, the Pioneers had taken Mtoulle and were in communication with the other column. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the Australian attack in early July 1941 in Lebanon

By late June 1941, Brigadier Stevens, of the 21st Australian Brigade, discussed the plans with General Allen for the attack in early July against the French in Lebanon. Stevens proposed that they form a box around Damour. The sea would be one side, the 21st Brigade would make two sides, and the 17th Brigade would add the fourth side, "the lid". The plan was for the 17th Brigade to go around the right flank of Damour to block the road that was the only exit. We had seen the 17th Brigade commander, Brigadier Savige, in Greece earlier in the year, in April. In a meeting on 2 July, they had decided to attack on either 5 or 6 July. The 2/2nd Pioneers (without two companies) would take part with the 21st Brigade. Brigadier Stevens was also given control of the 2/25th Battalion and the other two companies of the 2/2nd Pioneers in the east. The attack on Damour would have a large artillery force with 16 medium guns and 44 field guns. By 2 July, the force between Jezzine and the Mediterranean Sea had grown to nine battalions. That is somewhat deceiving,as many units were under strength. For example, the 2/16th Battalion had rifle companies of less than one hundred men. The 17th Brigade only had two battalions for the attacks, although they had but 300 men each. The only reassuring factor was the continuing number of French deserters that seemed to indicate that the French were in even worse shape. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Looking for river crossing points near Damour in late June early July 1941

Brigadier Stevens of the 21st Australian Brigade wanted to find a suitable river crossing on the right of his position in Lebanon near Damour. This was during 30 June and 1 July 1941. Stevens wanted to avoid a direct attack, so he wanted to go around the eastern flank, if possible. Some Australians had scouted around the concrete bridge that was guarded by French sentries. One platoon, led by Lieutenant Sims, made an incursion across the river below the bridge. They had set out at 8pm on 1 July and returned at 6am on 3 July. These patrols from the 2/27th Battalion found a way to the El Mourhira hill. A company could make the trek in about four hours, they found. The 2/16th Battalion was on the left, and had looked for crossing points over the river. The French were more concerned about the left, and there was more fighting. They patrolled the area during the nights up to 5 July and gained information from French prisoners. Starting from 26 June, the navy came up in support and fired on French targets that had been identified. Brigadier Stevens had kept his battalions back so that they would avoid casualties from the French artillery fire. Brigadier Stevens had developed his plan over the course of feeling out the French positions. He was reinforced by a third battalion and then the 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige, joined. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.