Negotiations

The British delegation to Greece included the CIGS, General Dill, General Wavell, and Anthony Eden. The British and Greeks negotiated most of the night. Finally, at about 3am, the Greeks accepted the British offer of assistance. Oddly, Anthony Eden was said to be "buoyant", after the Greeks accepted. Lt. Col. de Guingand, who accompanied the delegations says that Anthony Eden asked the the number of men be inflated beyond what was possible, presumably to ensure that the Greeks would agree. Considering that there was little possibility of success, Anthony Eden's attitude towards the outcome of the negotiations is telling. He apparently was more interested in having a successful negotiation to his credit than being involved with an operation that had almost no chance of success. The British military understood the situation, but that was ignored by Mr. Eden. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek plan

The Greek general Papagos explained the plans to the British delegation about 22 February 1941. There were four Greek divisions east of the Axios River. That is located south of the border with Bulgaria. They formed the Eastern Macedonian Army. If the Yugoslavs decided to fight the Germans, then the Greeks should attempt to hold Salonika. That was the natural supply source for Yugoslavia. If the Yugoslavs stayed neutral, or worse yet, cooperated with the Germans, then the Greeks would leave only fortress troops in Eastern Macedonia and would withdraw to the passes at Olympus, Veria, and Edessa. That withdrawal would take the Greeks up to twenty days. The Greeks calculated that it would take eight divisions, along with a reserve division, to defend that line. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British force for Greece

The British plan included about 100,000 men for Greece. This would include three infantry divisions and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. There would also be one armoured brigade, with another one a possibility. That would mean a force "with 240 field guns, 202 anti-tank guns, 32 medium guns, 192 anti-aircraft guns and 142 tanks." The intent was to ship the units in three groups. The first group would include one infantry division and an armoured brigade. Each group included one infantry division, with the Polish Carpathian Brigade included in the second shipment. The last might possibly include a second armoured brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Doing the wrong thing for political reasons

Even the CIGS, General Dill, had been involved in the decision to send a force to Greece, but had doubts that doing so would serve any useful purpose. Anthony Eden hoped to pressure the Greeks to take the help immediately, to increase the chance that it could be successful. All Anthony Eden hoped for was to be able to hold a line against the coming German attack. Mr. Eden thought that the lack of air power would preclude holding Salonika, which is what General Wavell wanted to do. They decided to "offer the command" to General Maitland Wilson. At the start of discussions between the Greek government and the British delegation, the Greek prime minister, Alexander Koryzis, expressed his government's intent to fight the Germans when the attacked. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Wavell in February 1941

General Wavell could see that for the British to hold Salonika and provide an air force to raid Rumanian oil fields would be desirable. He thought, though, that they were likely not to arrive in time to do either. Another possibility was that they could help the Greeks hold the Aliakmon River line. But Wavell had doubts about whether the Greeks would fight the Germans when the time came.

While all this was being discussed, the British air strength in the Middle East was declining. Losses exceeded what was being sent to North Africa. In the first three months of 1941, the British lost 184 aircraft and received 166. Also, there seemed to be no army units available for North Africa. The only division that had arrived from the UK after June 1940 was the 2nd Armoured Division, which was poorly equipped. There was a plan to send the 50th Division around the Cape of Good Hope, but they had not been dispatched as of February. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

New Australian units in the Middle East

Two Australian brigades arrived in the Middle East from Britain. They were the 18th and 25th Australian brigades. They were diverted to the 7th Australian Division since they were better equipped than other units. They joined the 21st Australian Brigade, which was already part of the 7th Australian Division. The 9th Australian Division was left with the 20th, 24th, and 26th brigades. The 8th Australian Division was in the Far East, in Malaya and Australia.

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, was in Egypt from 5 February to 14 February 1941. He met with General Wavell about the plans for Greece. After the meeting, General Wavell sent a telegram expressing his misgivings about sending a force to Greece when Greece and Turkey were hesitant to accept British aid. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The tentative plan for Greece

The tentative plan was that the experienced 6th Australian Division would be withdrawn from the desert and sent to Greece. They would be replaced in the desert by the 9th Australian Division. The 9th was poorly equipped and lacked combat experience. They gamble was that the Italians were beaten, so the British could afford to strip the desert of experienced troops and the best equipment and they could send them to Greece. The 2nd Armoured Division had just arrived in the desert in January 1941, but they had tanks with worn tracks that could not be replaced with what was available in the desert. Wavell's plan was to send half of the division to Greece and keep half in North Africa. This was a period where an armoured division had two armoured brigades and a support group with infantry and artillery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek commander was pretty savvy

The Greek commander, General Papagos, seemed to have more sense than the British leadership team. His assessment was that to mount a successful defense on the border with Bulgaria would take 9 divisions with air support. He thought that the British offer of three divisions drawn from North Africa was inadequate and was a strategic mistake for the Briitish. General Papagos thought that the three divisions offered should stay in North Africa, where they would have the greatest effect. General Wavell apparently agreed with General Papagos's assessment, because he was quoted as saying that sending three divisions was a "dangerous half-measure". Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff in Britain would hear nothing of it, and were hell-bent on sending the three divisions, even though it was the worst plan. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A forelorn cause: fighting the Germans in Greece in early 1941

The British had opened a successful campaign against the Italians, and by early January 1941, were driving the Italians back to the west. At the same time, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff concluded that they could not make an effective effort against the Germans in Greece. Perversely, they decided that they had no choice and must send forces to aid the Greeks in the fight. They would be entering the country on what was known to be a lost cause. Despite the continuing successes against the Italians, the army would be stripped of troops to be sent to Greece. The air forces would also be reduced and what was withdrawn would accompany the troops to Greece. A small force was offered immediately: an infantry tank squadron, a cruiser tank regiment, and several artillery regiments. General Wavel and Air Chief Marshal Longmore were sent to inform the Greek General Metaxis of what they could to to help. They told him that they could send two or three divisions in the next two months. General Metaxis declined the offer, as what could be sent seemed inadequate and he did not want to offend the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The two British issues to consider in late 1940

At home, the primary British concern was to defend the home islands from German invasion. The Germans had triumphed in the west and had their army available for an invasion of the British isles. In the Middle East, the goal was to defend the Mediterranean theater and Africa from Italian attack. The Italian invasion of Greece did not bring the Germans into the battle in the Middle East and southeastern Europe. The Greek Army was able to successfully defend against the initial Italian attack from Albania. Everyone was concerned about the German presence in Hungary and Rumania. Everyone knew that on a whim, the Germans could change the complexion of the war in the Mediterranean Theater. On 6 January 1941, Anthony Eden informed Churchill that they had intelligence that indicated that the Germans were planning an attack on Greece. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Into a new volume: Greece, Crete and Syria

In the volume "Greece, Crete, and Syria", we go back to 1941, starting in the spring and going into early summer. This was a period when Australia became much more involved with decision making. This was also a period when Australians commanded significant forces in the field. We start in Greece, in March 1941. At the beginning, the Greek and British forces had defeated the Italian army. As the Italians faltered, the British and Commonwealth forces knew that they would soon face the Germans in combat. The Italian attack on Greece in October 1940 eventually brought the Germans and British into battle against each other. The Italians had hoped for a quick and cheap victory in Greece, but they found themselves in a very different situation. After the Italian attack, the British deployed aircraft to Greece in support of the Greek army. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

We are going to be summarizing Greece, Crete and Syria, by Gavin Long

My son gave me several volumes of the Australian Official History. I plan on summarizing, next, Gavin Long's Vol.II: Greece, Crete and Syria. This volume is from the Army Series of the Australian Official History of World War II. As you may remember, we summarized Vol.I, To Benghazi, some time ago. Volume II starts with the disastrous Greek campaign, where the 6th Australian Division served in the ANZAC Corps under the command of General Blamey. After the withdrawal from Greece, a few Australian units fought in the battle for the island of Crete in May 1942. The volume concludes with the Syrian campaign, where the Commonwealth forces captured Syria from the Vichy French. I find the process of summarizing interesting volumes to be very educational. I end up doing a detailed reading that I would have not otherwise done, and a pace where I can absorb the material.

The Gazala front, in retrospect

When the two armies faced each other at Gazala, they were both well-supplied and of similar strength. When the Axis forces were at Gazala, they could be supplied by road from Tripoli and by supply ships arriving at Benghazi. The British were also well-supplied from Tobruk, by the rail line, and by road from the east. With the British being defeated in the Gazala battle, the situation became fluid and Rommel was able to take Tobruk and then, ultimately, to push all the way to El Alamein. At El Alamein, Auchinleck was able to fight a defensive battle, where he was able to stop the forward progress of Rommel's army. As the British fell back to the east, they were more easily supplied, plus new equipment, units, and reinforcements arrived in greater quantity. They started to receive the new American Sherman tanks, with a good medium velocity 75mm gun in a turret. From the UK, they started to receive the 6pdr anti-tank gun in increasing numbers, along with newer marks of British tanks. This marked the turning point in the war in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The period from November 1941 to September 1942

Volume Three of the Official History (The Mediterranean and Middle East) covers the period of November 1941 until September 1942. The volume started with the Crusader battle and ended with the Battle of Alam el Halfa. At the beginning, General Auchinleck was forced to intervene in the battle and defeat Rommel's forces. At the end, he was no longer theater commander, being replaced by Harold Alexander, and the 8th Army commander was now Bernard Law Montgomery. The advantage of having Montgomery was that he knew how to win battles and how to find them in very static, very confined battle fields, such as was the situation at El Alamein. Montgomery closed out this volume with a victory, where his plans were based on those of Auchinleck, and where dug-in British tanks, mostly Grants, outfought the Germans. The pace of change in the Desert was very great by September 1942. A great deal of new equipment was arriving and there were fresh units and reinforcements arriving in time for the next battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Infantry tanks

The Battle of Alam el Halfa, in early September 1942, was the swan song of the Matilda infantry tank in the desert. The Matilda had a cast hull and could not be easily given a larger turret ring and gun. The easiest thing to do was to obsolete the tank and move on to newer designs. The Valentine, on the other hand, was a different situation. Like the Matilda with the 2pdr gun, the 2pdr Valentine was also obsolete. In the case of the Valentine, the tank could be modified with a larger turret ring and could be given a 6pdr or 75mm gun. The Valentine VIII and IX were armed with the 57mm 6pdr gun. The Valentine XI had the 75mm gun. The Valentine was gradually withdrawn from British service, but continued in service with the Russian army. The Russians appreciated the good armour and like the small size, as they were smaller targets and may have been more easily concealed. Chamberlain and Ellis say that 8.275 Valentines were built. The Valentine X was built in 1943 and the XI built in 1943-1944, also according to Chamberlain and Ellis. This is based on Vol.III of the Official History and Pictorial History of Tanks of the World 1915-45 by Peter Chamberlain and Chris Ellis.

An assessment of the Battle of Alam el Halfa

For the Axis forces, the Battle of Alam el Halfa indicated that their hopes of breaking through to the Nile Delta were at an end. For the British, the battle inspired new hope and confidence. The British army had a new commander, had beaten the Axis forces in a battle, and were pleased with the performance of the air force. The Navy, for their part, in conjunction with the air force, were inflicting great damage on the Axis supply line. The Axis forces were being starved of all the supplies and reinforcements that would have kept them competitive. Instead, they were slowly starved of resources, which meant that it was only matter of time before they were pushed back. This sort of battle, on a fixed front, with little movement was where Montgomery excelled. To fight his sort of battle, he needed a strong force, but that was what he would have for the battle that would bust the front open and push the Axis back to the west. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History, along with my analysis.

The battle ends after a week of fighting in early September 1942

At the end of the Battle of Alam el Halfa, we can compare the losses of the combatants:

Germans:  
  1,859 men killed, wounded, or missing
  33 guns, 298 vehicles, and 38 tanks lost

Italians: 
  1,051 men killed, wounded, or missing
  22 guns, 97 vehicles, and 11 tanks lost

British:  
  1,750 men killed, wounded, or missing
  15 anti-tank guns and 67 tanks lost or damaged 
     (31 Grants and 21 Valentines used as infantry tanks)

This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A costly attack

The attack by the New Zealand Division, in the end, achieved little except to cause heavy losses to the units involved. The enemy hardly noticed the attack, being much more affected by the air effort during the attack. The attempt to close the minefield gaps failed miserably. The 132nd Infantry Brigade had 697 killed, wounded, and missing. The New Zealand losses were smaller, but still considerable. The one bright spot was the air operations during 2 and 3 September 1942 over the battlefield. The five hundred Allied aircraft engaged flew an average of five sorties per aircraft. The Americans used their B-24 Liberators, B-25 Mitchells, and P-40F Kittyhawk IIs in support of the British air effort. The attacks were followed by an Axis wirhdrawal to the most western minefields. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The New Zealand Division attacks

The New Zealand Division attack to close minefield gaps started with raids by the 6th New Zealand Brigade, starting at about 11pm on 3 September 1942. The raids, however, put the enemy on notice that something was happening. The 132nd Brigade was slow to reach the starting line, and when they did, the enemy was waiting for them. The 132nd Brigade commander, Brigadier Robertson, was severely wounded. The 6th New Zealand Brigade commander, Brigadier Clifton, was captured when he drove into an enemy position. The only bright spot was the 5th New Zealand Brigade, which not only reached its objective but penetrated beyond, thanks to the 28th Maori Battalion. In the early afternoon of 4 September, the enemy launched a counter attack, which was repelled. Another attempted attack was broken up by the New Zealand Division artillery, with bomber help. With the pitiful results of the attack, General Freyberg proposed a withdrawal, which happened in the night of 4th/5th September, with more losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The battle after the Battle of Alam el Halfa

General Montgomery realized at the end of the Battle of Alam el Halfa that the Eighth Army was not ready for an attack with the aim of busting open the front. He still wanted time to prepare for the big attack. After the end of the last battle, he wanted to only harass the enemy, although he would proceed with General Freyberg's planned attack to close the minefield gaps.

That attack would begin late on 3 September 1942. The 132nd Infantry Brigade had been replaced in the line by the 5th Indian Brigade, so it became available for the planned attack. The attack would consist of two three mile advances. The second would have the 151st Infantry Brigade by 4 September. The 7th Armoured Brigade would attack to the west in support of the operation.
The attackers on 3 September consisted of the 132nd Infantry Brigade and the 5th New Zealand Brigade with supporting Valentine tank squadrons. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.