The Italian fleet menaces the Vigorous convoy

A Martin Baltimore based on Malta was on a maritime reconnaissance mission when the crew spotted the Italian fleet leaving Taranto at 6:45pm on 14 June 1942. The battleships were misidentified as Cavour class, when they were actually the faster Littorio class. The harbor at Taranto was photographed by a reconnaissance aircraft at 8pm. The photographs showed that the Cavours were still at Taranto, so that meant that the battleships that the Baltimore saw were Littorios. Admiral Vian could see, by 11pm, that he might be intercepted by the Italian fleet in the morning. At Admiral Harwood's orders, they continued west until 2am and then turned east. Right after this, the cruiser Newcastle was torpedoed by a motor torpedo boat, but was able to continue at 24 knots. A bit later, the destroyer Hardy was torpedoed and had to be sunk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

14 June 1942: the Vigorous Convoy

During the day on 14 June 1942, the Vigorous Convoy was in range of shored-based fighter cover. Late in the afternoon, they passed out of range so that only long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufighters were providing cover. Between 4:30pm and 9:15pm, seven different air attacks were mounted by Ju-87's and Ju-88's. At about 6pm, the merchant ship Bhutan was hit and sunk. The merchant ship Potaro was damaged but stayed with the convoy. As the sun set, the destroyer Pakenham had a near miss from a submarine-fired torpedo. A little while later, six motor torpedo boats were seen. After sunset, aircraft dropped flares to help the submarines and torpedo boats.

Earlier on 14 June, the main Italian fleet sortied from Taranto, intending to attack the convoy. The fleet was substantial: two battleships, 2-8-inch gun cruisers, 2-6-in gun cruisers, and 12 destroyers. They were on course to intercept the convoy at 9am on 15 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Decoy Convoy

A day-and-a-half ahead of the Vigorous convoy, 11 ships sailed with an escort as a DecoyConvoy. The idea was to draw the Italian fleet to the decoy convoy and keep them away from the main body of the Vigorous Convoy that sailed later. The Decoy Convoy had an escort consisting of the old cruiser Coventry and 8 destroyers. Early in the game, the merchant ship, City of Calcutta, was bombed and had to be sent into Tobruk. They rendezvoused with the main body on 13 June 1942. One more merchant ship, the Elizabeth Bakke, was not able to maintain the speed of the convoy. That left the Decoy Convoy with 9 merchant ships. Early on 14 June, the Dutch ship Aagtekirk was also left behind as the ship was not able to steam the convoy speed. The Aagtekirk and her escort were attacked by 40 aircraft. The Aagtekirk sank about 12 miles from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Allied air power in support of the Vigorous convoy

A torpedo striking force was based at Malta and on the Libyan border in Egypt. Torpedo-armed Wellingtons and Beauforts were at Malta. More Beauforts were based just inside Egypt from Libya. American B-24 Liberators from the Halverson Detachment were based at Fayid. they had raided Rumania on 12 June 1942 and then were kept in the Middle East for use against the Italian fleet. There was also fighter cover for part of the run to Malta. The short range fighters based behind the front would provide cover at the beginning of the voyage and then Kittyhawks with external fuel tanks and Beaufighters would provide air cover when the Vigorous convoy was beyond the range of the short range fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official history.

The Vigorous convoy: June 1942

In parallel to the Harpoon convoy in the west, the Vigorous convoy was commenced from the east. Admiral Harwood and Air Marshal Tedder commanded from shore. Rear-Admiral Philip Vian commanded at sea. Rear-Admiral Vian had commanded the convoy in March and intended to generally follow the earlier plan. This time, the convoy and escort were both larger than before. The escort consisted of the former battleship Centurion, armed only with AA guns, seven cruisers, one AA cruiser, 26 destroyers, four corvettes, two minesweepers, four motor torpedo boats, and two rescue ships. There was also a screen of nine submarines that would defend the convoy to the north and would move with the convoy. There were also about forty aircraft available. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon Convoy arrives at Malta

By the late afternoon on 15 June 1942, the Italian surface force had turned for home. They were low on ammunition and were in danger of attack by Malta-based aircraft. There was a further air attack, but no ships were damaged. The escort as well as the two surviving merchant ships arrived at Malta. In the confusion about what channel to take to enter Malta, five ships were mined. One, the Polish Kujawiak, sank. Still, 15,000 tons of stores had arrived at Malta. A heavy price had been paid to get them there, though. Two destroyers were sunk, a cruiser was damaged, as were three destroyers and a minesweeper. Late on 16 June, the convoy escort sailed for Gibraltar where they arrived late on 17 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More British ships lost

As noted, the British were very fortunate that the Italian commander, with the two cruisers, had broken off the action. He could have easily destroyed the survivors. This all was happening on 15 June 1942. The Italians, later in the day, swept through the scene of the previous encounter and found the destroyer Hebe, all by itself. The British commander turned back with the cruiser Cairo and three fleet destroyers. When the British could see the Italians in the distance, the Italians turned to engage some unseen targets. These would almost certainly have been the destroyers Partridge and Bedouin. The Partridge had been able to tow the Bedouin. They were headed for the coast of Tunisia, hoping to elude the Italians. Italian aircraft found them and torpedoed the Bedouin, sinking her. They also probably sank the tanker Kentucky and the cargo ship Burdwan about this time. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy loses two ships

The Ju-87 attack at about 9:30am disabled the tanker Kentucky. The minesweeper towed the Kentucky, but the convoy was now reduced to 6 knots. The merchant ship Chant was sunk in the attack. The convoy was very fortunate that the Italian cruisers had left, as they could easily have destroyed the convoy. Still, the convoy was without air cover, except for a period when long range Spitfires were present and repelled an air attack. Another air attack at 11:20am disabled the merchant ship Burdwan. The convoy was reduced to two merchant ships, Troilus and Orari, as the convoy commander, Captain Hardy, decided to have the Kentucky and Burdwan sunk, as they were a burden on the convoy, being disabled. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

15 June 1942: a desperate fight

By 7am, the British had two fleet destroyers disabled: the Bedouin and Partridge. The British destroyers had disabled one Italian destroyer, the Vivaldi. The Italian admiral sent his three other destroyers to help the Vivaldi, leaving the two cruisers to fight the remaining British ships. The cruiser Cairo and the Hunt class destroyers were able to shield the convoy, but were unable to join the action at this point. The Cairo and destroyers headed back towards the convoy and laid down smoke to shield the merchant ships. By 8:40am, the Italian admiral ordered a withdrawal and the Harpoon convoy survived for a while longer. The convoy had maneuvered, however, and that had slowed progress by three hours. When the AA defence ships had been drawn into the surface battle, that left the convoy exposed to air attack. That came in the form of 8-Ju-87 divebombers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy runs towards Malta

While the Harpoon convoy had a quiet night on the night of 14/15 June 1942, they would face a strong Italian surface force the next morning. A fast surface force had been sent to intercept the convoy. The VII Division consisted of the cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli (named after the 17th Century Austrian general Raimondo Montecuccoli), with five destroyers. The Harpoon convoy was 30 miles south of Pantelleria when they heard that the Italian ships were close. The AA cruiser Cairo only had 4inch guns, so the fight was left to the fleet destroyers with 4.7in guns and 21inch torpedoes. The Italians opened fire at 6:40am on 15 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More air fighting over Harpoon on 14 June 1942

As noted, when the Harpoon convoy got within 150 miles of Sicily, the main body was attacked by Ju-88s and a few Ju-87s. the old aircraft carrier Argus managed to maneuver and avoid torpedoes from the SM-79 torpedo bombers. The FAA fighters fought valiantly, although 7 were lost on 14 June 1942. The Italians and Germans lost 17 aircraft to AA fire and British fighters. After dark, the convoy picked up a Beaufighter escort from Malta. The main escort force turned back when the convoy reached the Skerki Channel and the much smaller Force X (AA cruiser Cairo, 9 destroyers, 4 minesweepers, and 6 minesweeping motor launches) were the sole escort in the final run to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The first air attack on the Harpoon Convoy: 14 June 1942

The Italians were known to have 20 bombers and 50 torpedo bombers based on Sardinia. The Harpoon convoy was within range by dawn on 14 June 1942. The British had the disadvantage of having the wind from the rear, which meant that the Argus and Eagle would have to turn to launch aircraft. The first wave of attackers consisted of "two groups of Italian fighter-bombers" at 10:30am. At 11am, the convoy was attacked by 28 SM79 torpedo bombers and 10 Cant bombers. The cruiser Liverpool took a torpedo as did the Dutch merchant ship Tanimbar. The Tanimbar quickly sank. The Liverpool had sustained an engine room hit and was reduced to 3 or 4 knots. The Liverpool was towed by a destroyer and escorted by another. The plan was to send her back to Gibraltar. The convoy was not attacked until evening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon Convoy Ships

The Harpoon convoy consisted of the American tanker Kentucky, the British merchant ships Troilus, Burdwan, Orari, the American merchant ship Chant, and the Dutch merchant ship Tanimbar. The main covering force, which would not go all the way to Malta, consisted of the battleship Malaya, the aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus, the cruisers Kenya, Liverpool, Charybdis, and 8 destroyers. The main covering force would turn back at the Skerki Channel, leaving just the AA cruiser Cairo (an old C-class cruiser converted as an anti-aircraft ship), 5 destroyers, and 4 Hunt class escort destroyers to accompany the convoy to Malta. There were also 4 minesweepers and 6 "minesweeping motor launches" to clear the way into Malta. Another tanker, the Brown Ranger, sailed independently to refuel the escorts to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Harpoon convoy sails

The operation to run the two convoys to Malta was designed to put the western convoy, Harpoon, the day before the Vigorous convoy arrived. They plan envisioned bombing the Axis seaports and air fields before the convoys sailed. The fast minelayer Welshman was to run more ammunition to Malta, and would sail independently upon reaching the narrows. The Harpoon convoy consisted of six ships with a heavy escort, including the battleship Malaya and aircraft carriers Eagle and Argus. The Harpoon convoy was eventually intercepted by Italian surface forces on 15 June 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air forces to support the Harpoon and Vigorous convoys

A note in Vol.III of the Official History lists the squadrons available in Malta and Egypt to support the Harpoon and Vigorous convoys being run to Malta in June 1942:

                      Malta                   Egypt
Albacore              No.830 (FAA)           Nos. 821 and 826 (FAA)
Baltimore             No.69
Beaufort              No.217                 No.39
Blenheim                                     Nos.203 and 13 (Hellenic)
Hudson                                       No.459 (RAAF)
Maryland                                     No.203
Spitfire              No.2 PRU
Sunderland                                   No.230
Swordfish (A.S.V.)                           No.815 (A.S.V.)
Wellesley                                    No.47
Wellington (torpedo) No.38
Wellington (A.S.V.)  No.221 (Detachment)     No.221

There were also 95 Spitfire fighters on Malta after 9 June 1942
divided between Nos.126, 185, 249, and detachments from Nos.601 and 603 squadrons.
There were also night fighter Beaufighters in No.1435 Flight
and a No.235 Squadron detachment from the U.K.

As we indicated, this is based on the notes in Vol.III of the Official History.

The irony of Malta and June 1942

Tbe hope had been that the 8th Army would be victorious and move forward so that land-based aircraft could better support the defense of Malta. Instead, as the battle went badly for the army in June 1942, Malta had to support the defense of Egypt. The plan to resupply Malta was to run a convoy from either end of the Mediterranean Sea. The western convoy was called Harpoon and the eastern was Vigorous. A feature of the latest convoys was that there were more British maritime aircraft available. Malta had "six Baltimores, four Wellingtons fitted with A.S.V. and three P.R.U. Spitfires for reconnassaince". There were also six Wellingtons with torpedoes, a Beaufort squadron, and an Albacore squadron for anti-submarine work. There was also a larger maritime air force in Egypt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The situation right before the 1st Battle of El Alamein

The navy had done a remarkable job, supplying the army at Mersa Matruh right up until the withdrawal took place. The situation rapidly shifted, as Rommel's intent was to roll over the British troops that were retreating to the east. That did not happen, first due to the core of the units remaining intact and the support of the air force and navy. The harbours at Sollum and Mersa Matruh were mined from the air on 23 June and 28 June 1942. The water storage facilities at Mersa Matruh were destroyed and the water was contaminated. The navy was prepared to do shore bombardment in support, as well, but the fighting took place too far inland for this to be useful. The action rapidly moved east to El Alamein, where Rommel was stopped from further advance. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Action in the air from 29 June 1942

The Desert Air Force had kept fighters forward at El Daba while 10th Corps withdrew on 29 June 1942. That night, "Wellingtons, Bostons and Blenheims" hit Sidi Barrani and transport on the roads. By 30 June, they put a large number of aircraft up in reaction to the Axis arrival at El Alamein. The 8th Army as providing little useful information, so the Desert Air Force had to rely upon their own reconnaissance to decide where to bomb. The commander, Air Vice-Marshal Conyngham was actually choosing targets for his bombers to hit. Baltimores and Bostons made a few attacks, but mostly it was the Kittyhawk fighter-bombers doing the work. Most of the attacks were against the 90th Light Division, to good effect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The 10th Corps Plans breaks out

13th Corps had succeeded in withdrawing from Mersa Matruh, but 10th Corps had been left in a tenuous position, as the Axis forces had blocked the road to the east about 17 miles. The 13th Corps had already reached their withdrawal objectives on 28 June 1942, but that was when the 10th Corps breakout was to occur. 50th Division and the 10th Indian Division would breakout to the south, travel 30 miles, and then turn east to Fuka. 10th Corps broke out in brigade group size units. The brigade groups invariably ran across Axis leaguers in the night. The Indians suffered the worst losses in the breakout. The corps headquarters, with General Holmes, was sent back to command "Delta Force" on their arrival in the rear. 10th Indian Division and the 50th Division were in no position to execute Auchinleck's plan to use them at El Alamein. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Gott orders the withdrawal on 27 June 1942

General "Strafer" Gott was the 13th Corps commander in the Eighth Army. At 7:20pm on 27 June 1942, General Gott issued the pre-arranged code word to his units telling them to start the withdrawal from the Mersa Matruh vicinity. He reported the news to Eighth Army headquarters which promptly issued a similar code word to 10th Corps.

Brigadier Inglis decide to use his best unit, the 4th NZ Infantry Brigade, to lead the breakout. The rest of the New Zealand Division would follow. As luck would have it, Brigadier Inglis took the division headquarters and the 5th NZ Brigade on a separate route that took them into the 21st Panzer Division leaguer, causing chaos. The New Zealand Division headed east to their rendezvous, reaching it on 28 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.