The airfields at Gambut

On 15 June 1942, the Axis forces were getting very close to Gambut, where the Desert Air Force was based. Air Vice-Marshal Coningham decided to stay there with his aircraft, so that they could continue to support the forces defending El Adem. At Gambut, there was an armoured car screen from the No.2 Armoured Car Company, RAF. Behind the screen, Gambut was defended by "four infantry battalions and three and a half anti-aircraft batteries (ready to engage tanks if necessary)". Bostons attacked the "El Adem-Sidi Rezegh area" seven times. Fighter bombers attacked twenty times. The Germans had thought that they were taking 20mm cannon hits on their forces, but it was actually Hurricane IID's with 40mm guns. Some Bostons were attacked by Me-109s, but took no losses. The Kittyhawk escorts drove off most of the Me-109s. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Air operations were intense on 15 June 1942

On 15 June 1942, the Desert Air Force was still able to operate from the airfields at Gambut. Gambut was just 30 to 35 miles east of Tobruk, so Boston's and fighter bombers had just a short hop to where the fighting was happening to the west. The fighters needed to provide escort to them as well as to the Vigorous convoy to Malta. The Germans had flown 193 sorties against the ship in the convoy on 14 and 15 June. That actually gave the 8th Army some relief, as the bombers that might have hit them were attacking the convoy, instead. The British had sufficient fighter strength so as to have intercepted them, anyway, if they had attacked the 8th Army formations. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Withdrawal from El Adem

On 16 June 1652, General Norrie, 30th Corps commander, realized that El Adem could not be held much longer. He did not want to lose the 29th Indian Brigade, so he ordered the brigade to withdraw to the frontier. They were able to successfully withdraw early on 17 June. General Ritchie had been out of touch, so General Norrie made the decision with consultation with General Messervy. The withdrawal from El Adem left the Tobruk defenses without the southern end. That allowed the mobile Axis forces to turn the defenses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

El Adem on 15 and 16 June 1942

The 29th Indian Brigade had two battalions holding El Adem and one battalion holding a position to the northwest. The 7th Motor Brigade was giving support to the Indian brigade. By 7:30pm on 15 June 1942, however, the 21st Panzer Division had taken the detached battalion at point B 650. By the morning of 16 June, the 30th Corps commander, General Norrie realized that he would not be able to effectively support the remaining two Indian battalions at El Adem and the force holding Belhamed, either. General Norrie told the 7th Armoured Division commander, Frank Messervy, that he expected that they would need to withdraw to the Egyptian frontier. General Ritchie was out of touch at this critical period. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Axis plans

On 15 June, Rommel was told by the high command that they were going to withdraw air forces in late June and that he had to take Tobruk, because the current plan could not support an investment of Tobruk for a long period. The priority was to take Malta, because Malta was interfering with the supply route to North Africa. Rommel wanted to move east towards Egypt as fast as possible, so his thinking was not incompatible with the high command. The British response to Axis movements and possibilities was limited by the depleted forces that were available. That led General Ritchie to consider the use of "Jock Columns". General Auchinleck disapproved of them, because they were too weak to fight a serious battle and dispersed what forces were available. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

14 and 15 June 1942

The "Vigorous" convoy was sailing to Malta on 14 June 1942, between the island of Crete and Cyrenaica. This diverted German aircraft that might otherwise have been bombing the retreating British forces. Some Bostons and Wellingtons bombed the airfields, including at Derna, on the night of 13/14 June to disrupt bombing of the convoy during the day. There were dust storms on 14 June that all but eliminated any air operations. Both British and Axis air operations were affected. The situation on 15 June was pretty grim for the British. Rommel calculated that he had won the battle and that what he was seeing was the disassembly of the British forces before Tobruk. The British tank forces were reduced to "one weak brigade of compositie regiments". Rommel's next objective was to take Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Backup to the night of 13/14 June 1942

The 201st Guards Motor Brigade withdrew from Knightsbridge during the night of 13/14 June 1942. There were still some defended points that were resolutely held by Commonwealth and British small units. They were equipped with artillery as well as infantry. The remnants of the British armour were positioned to the "south and west of Acroma". Rommel tried to get his troops to cut the coast road, by that was beyond their capabilities at this time. The Axis forces succeeded in taking Pt. 187, but the 15th Panzer Division was held at bay while the 21st Panzer Division was eventually driven back at Eluet et Tama. By early on 14 June, the 1st South African Division and the 50th Division wre ordered to withdraw from Gazala towards the Egyptian frontier. The South Africans withdrew on the afternoon of 14 June, under cover of a dust storm. They left rearguard troops behind to slow the German advance. The 50th Division rearguard broke through to escape, but the South African's did not follow and were captured. Most of the 50th Division withdrew to the Egyptian frontier by 16 June, but some moved into Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Ritchie had no confidence that he could make Auchinleck's plan work

General Ritchie was concerned about the losses they would take if he ordered the Tobruk garrison to fight its way out to the east. He thought that the prospects were better to simply withdraw more forces into the Tobruk fortress and hold it under siege. The problem was that General Auchinleck was opposed to that course of action, although that was what Churchill expected them to do.

Churchill opposed abandoning Tobruk, as Auchinleck was prepared to do. He had seen the ability of troops in the fortress to resist assault and thought that they could do the same thing again. Auchinleck still wanted to hold a line west of Tobruk and fight there, outside of Tobruk. Auchinleck, in the face of questions from the Prime Minister accepted that Tobruk might be surrounded, if only temporarily. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

More from 14 June 1942

By late in the day on 14 June 1942, General Ritchie, the 8th Army commander, had issued an instruction that his intentions were to withdraw to the Egyptian frontier. The 5th Indian and 10th Indian Divisions actually had orders to that effect. By 8:30pm, General Ritchie gave the 30th Corps commander guidance that they should not be caught in Tobruk and surrounded. They needed to protect the escarpment and cover the 13th Corps. General Ritchie was concerned that the exits from Tobruk might be blocked by Rommel's forces. When Churchill heard about the intentions that were issued, he told the commanders in the Middle East that he hoped that they did not intend to withdraw from Tobruk, leaving it to the Axis forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A disconnect between commanders

General Ritchie asked if General Auchinleck would be willing to risk Tobruk becoming surrounded and under siege, in order to be able to not have to withdraw to the Egyptian border. This was on 14 June 1942. General Auchinleck had not been aware of just how desperate the situation near Tobruk had become. Auchinleck still believed that the Germans and Italians had suffered as well in the battle and could still be fought west of Tobruk. Auchinleck wanted to hold Tobruk, but did not want the fortress isolated and put under siege by the Axis forces. General Ritchie did not see this reply until 4pm on 14 June, after he returned to his headquarters after meeting with the corps commanders. Ritchie wanted to allow Tobruk to become besieged and told that to General Auchinleck. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

14 June 1942: the British had lost the battle

Early in 1942, General Auchinleck had decided that he would not try to hold Tobruk while it was under siege, if such a situation arose. By late in the day on 13 June, 1942, General Ritchie realized that they had lost the battle on that day. Early on 14 June, he ordered a withdrawal to the Egyptian frontier. General Ritchie wanted to withdraw the divisions in the Gazala line before they were surrounded. With Tobruk not an option, he could only withdraw to Egypt. In previous battles, the British would have just withdrawn into Tobruk and setup to defend the fortress. General Ritchie telephoned headquarters and then sent a long dispatch in the early afternoon. He was directed to defend Tobruk, but to not allow his forces to be pinned there and put under siege. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The abortive attack on Ploesti in June 1942

The Americans sent a group of B-24 Liberator bombers to Egypt in preparation for a raid on the oil fields at Ploesti, in Rumania. This group of bombers and their men was called the Halverson Detachment. A attack force flew from Fayid (close to the Suez Canal), taking off before dawn on 12 June 1942. The plan to form up and make a concentrated attack failed, and worse yet, the weather was cloudy when they arrived near Ploesti. They had planned a high level attack, so most bombers dropped their loads into the clouds. A few dropped below the clouds, but dropped their bombs without really aiming. The planes scattered after the attack. Four planes landed in neutral Turkey, two landed in Syria, and the rest landed in Iraq, as was the original plan. One British Liberator and the seven American planes participated in the "Vigorous" convoy action, which happened right after the attack on Ploesti. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Wellingtons in action in late May and early June 1942

Wellingtons, operating from airfields on Malta were active during late May and early June 1942. Malta was just starting to recover from the severe pounding and could not do much in North Africa. Wellingtons mostly operated against ports and airfields. No.205 Group flew 403 sorties from 26 May until 13 June. They mined the harbour at Benghazi (four times) and hit airfields at Tmimi, Martuba, Berka, and Derna.From 8 June, they hit Italian ports prior to the next two convoys to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Belhamed forward base had to be abandoned

A great deal of effort had been expended to extend the rail head to Belhammed, the forward supply base. The work was finished on 12 June 1942, as the situation near Gazala and Tobruk deteriorated. By 14 June, the order was given to removed from Belhamed. Most had been cleared by 16 June, as there was a plan in place that was executed. General Ritchie ordered the remaining petrol to be dumped on 16 June. Tobruk still had a large supply of stores, fuel, and ammunition. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

13 June 1942, a bad day for the British

On 13 June, Rommel planned to send the 15th Panzer Division west and the 21st Panzer Division east to "cut off Knightsbridge". He also ordered the 90th Light Division into the battle from near El Adem. In the morning, the 2nd Armoured Brigade and 22nd Armoured Brigade, with some infantry tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade fought and resisted east of Knightsbridge. At 3pm in the afternoon, the attack by 21st Panzer Division on the 2nd Scots Guards, one battery of the 11th RHA, and the 6th South African Field Battery at the west end of Maabus er Rigel created a crisis. The 2nd Armoured Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade were sent to help fight the 21st Panzer Division.

There were constant dust storms which greatly limited air action. In one case, some Kittyhawks attacked a Ju-88 formation that had a heavy escort. The result was four lost Kittyhawks.

At the end of 13 June, the British only had about fifty cruiser tanks and twenty infantry tanks remaining. They had lost possession of so much ground that there was no possibility of recovering and repairing lost tanks. As many as 417 tanks had been recovered up to this point. A full 210 had been repaired and another 122 were sent back to base workshops. Another 138 13th Corps infantry tanks were recovered during this period, as well. This left the British with little option but to withdraw from Knightsbridge, which General Gott ordered during the night of 13/14 June. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British plans for 13 June 1942

Late on 12 June 1942, General Ritchie believed that the battle would now center on the infantry divisions in the 13th Corps. He hoped to place the 1st Armoured Division under the command of 13th Corps to support them better. He was out of communication with General Lumsden, the 1st Armoured Division commander, however. General Ritchie was not able to pass orders to General Lumsden until the 13th. The British plan included the 7th Motor Brigade at El Adem to hit the Axis forces from behind. At El Adem, the 10th Indian Division was also supposed to engage the Axis forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

General Ritchie starts to anticipate Rommel's moves

Later on 12 June 1942, General Ritchie learned of the British tank losses and he realized that Rommel might well decide to move north and pin the 1st South African Division and the 50th Division against the sea. General Ritchie thought that his only options were to continue the battle or withdraw to the Egyptian frontier. The latter would leave Tobruk cut off and vulnerable. General Ritchie decided that standing and fighting would be better than risking a running battle and withdrawal. General Auchinleck, who had come forward, agreed with his decision. Churchill learned of the situation and agreed that they should stand and fight. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

12 June 1942 at Knightsbridge

British tactical communications seem to have been atrocious as the time of the Gazala battle. Conditions were hazy with a lot of dust in the air. The German anti-tank gunners used this as cover to push their guns forward. The deadly guns were the 50mm PAK38's, which had an extremely low-silhouette. They chewed up British armour on 12 June 1942, near Knightsbridge. General Lumsden, the 1st Armoured Division commander, was out of communication with his corps commander, General Norrie, so he was left to make his own decisions. General Lumsden knew that he had taken heavy losses and was in no place to go on the offensive. General Norrie, who had lost touch with the battle, still was thinking of offensive operations. General Lumsden decided to continue to hold Knightsbridge, inspite of his heavy losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air battle on 11 and 12 June 1942

The British air forces saw the Axis movements north from Bir Hacheim later in the day on 11 June 1942. By the morning of 12 June, they knew that the 90th Light Division was near El Adem and commenced to attack them from the air, almost continuously. The 90th Light Division found these attacks to be non-effective and only a minor nuisance. There were about twenty low-level attacks by British aircraft during the day. The British had the air to themselves, however, on 12 June, as the Axis air forces were absent from the battle near El Adem. They were busy near Knightsbridge and Acroma. The biggest attack was a 100 plane raid at about 8pm which was intercepted by six British fighter squadrons. A huge air battle ensued. British fighters flew 583 sorties on the day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Gazala Battle on 12 June 1942 turns against the British

The 30th Corps commander, General Norrie, decided to go on the offensive, early on 12 June 1942, since he believed that the Axis forces were dispersed. He wanted the 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades to head south and then attack the 15th Panzer Division. The 7th Armoured Division commander, General Frank Messervy, disagreed with this move, and decided to go and talk with his corps commander in person. Near El Adem, he encountered Axis forces and was "out of touch with everyone". Since they never got the order to advance, the two armoured brigades sat and fought off a half-hearted attack by the 15th Panzer Division, which was supposed to keep a defensive posture. At noon, Rommel decided to hit the 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades from front and rear with his two panzer divisions. Since General Norrie could not find General Messervy, he put the 7th Armoured Division brigades under the command of the 2nd Armoured Division commander, who brought forward the understrength 22nd Armoured Brigade. At this point, the 2nd and 4th Armoured Brigades were hit by the 15th Panzer Division. The 4th Armoured Brigade went over the escarpment, partly by mistake and partly because of the Axis attacks. The British had sustained heavy tank losses due to skillful use of anti-tank guns, which were pushed forward. General Norrie did not know about the losses that had been taken, and assumed that they armour was still intact. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.