The Prime Minister is angered

Churchill, as always, was pressing for a premature offensive in the desert. General Auchinleck presented the reasons why such a move would be risking disaster. Churchill, in fit of pique, wanted to bring Auchinleck back to Britain to confront him. Auchinleck argued that he did not want to be absent from the theater, as he did not want anyone but himself to be responsible for even a short period. In a compromise, Sir Stafford Cripps, who was travelling to India, was diverted to the Middle East to meet with Auchinleck and his commanders. The Vice-CIGS, General Nye, was also present. They met with Auchinleck and were convinced that he was correct. One factor ignored by the Prime Minister and others in Britain was the urgent need for training of raw troops. Churchill was extremely displeased, but he grudgingly accepted the date of mid-May 1942 for the offensive against Rommel's forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Middle East was to be further stripped of forces

The Middle East was informed on 17 February 1942 that they would lose the 70th Division, which was to be sent to the Far East, in the face of Japanese advances. They were also warned that they were likely to lose the 9th Australian Division, as well. At the same time, Alan Brooke, the CIGS, warned General Auchinleck that a division in Iraq would be withdrawn to India. At best, one more division was would be sent from Britain to the Middle East before the fall of 1942. The Chiefs of Staff in London was ready to assume a defensive posture in the Middle East in order to stop the Japanese offensive in the Far East. In response, General Auchinleck replied that an offensive in the Western Desert prior to 1 June would put the entire enterprise in North Africa at risk. The one spot that the Chiefs of Staff were determined to protect was Malta. They were prepared to commit a considerable force to pass a convoy through with supplies and arms. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A shortage of Ordnance Workshops in the Middle East

One of the continual complaints in the Middle East from mid-1941 onwards was the long period required to return damaged tanks to action. Besides the inherent shortcomings of the Crusader and other tanks, a major factor was the scarcity of Ordnance Workshops. This shortage was acknowledged, but a series of events thwarted sending more to the Middle East. In October 1941, the commanders had decided that replacement drafts were more important than Ordnance Workshops, so they were bumped from several convoys. Only two were in transit by March 1942. Another workshop was blocked by the intended convoy being diverted to the Far East. The ongoing battle between the commanders and staff in Britain, who desired an attack as quickly as possible and the commanders and staff in the Middle East, who did not want to attack until they had prospect of success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British plan for an offensive in 1942

Because of the pressing need for the British to base aircraft in western Cyrenaica, a plan was prepared that envisioned a force of "three armoured divisions, two armoured brigade groups, one army tank brigade, and three infantry divisions" by mid-April 1942. This plan was made as early as February 1942. A tank superiority of 3:2 was needed to fight the Germans, due to the inferiority of the Crusader tank. There was increasing pressure from the staff in Britain to launch an early offensive, but the commanders in North Africa, including General Auchinleck resisted an attack before a superior tank force could be assembled. The goal was not just to take Cyrenaica but to advance into Tripolitania. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan with respect to Tobruk

In February 1942, General Auchinleck had told General Ritchie to do everything possible to keep Tobruk from capture. What General Auchinleck resolved not to do was to have a division in Tobruk and have the Axis forces surrounding the fortress. The intent was to withdraw to the frontier rather than allow a division to be tied down and put at risk. The commanders in chief concurred, apparently, at least in February. February to May would be spent in building up the tank forces for a new offensive that would reconquer the western Cyrenaican airfields. They were desperately needed to allow convoys to run to Malta and to operate against Axis shipping. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan to invade Malta in early 1942

Taking the island of Malta would have been a much more difficult task than taking Crete, a year before. While Crete was taken by airborne forces, Malta would require troops and equipment landed from sea. The first stage would have 8300 men landing on the island by landing craft. These initial troops would be supported by artillery and tanks also landed. Supplies and reinforcements would follow, also by sea. The Italian fleet would prevent British surface ships from reaching the island. There would also be a flotilla of German submarines to protect the attacking forces and to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Malta. Germany would also supply Italy with "40,000 tons of oil fuel and 12,000 tons of aviation spirit". Three corps were allocated for the attack. The one Airborne Corps had one German and one Italian airborne division. Of the other two corps, one had two Italian divisions and the other would have three. Additional forces included six independent Italian battalions, "two tank battalions, some armoured cars, self-propelled artillery, motor-cyclists and ancillary units and a few German tanks". Between 370 and 470 tranport aircraft would carry the airborne forces. These would include 155 Italian SM.82's, the rest being German Ju-52's. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Rommel decides against attacking Malta

Back in March 1942, Rommel still thought that taking Malta soon should be a priority. He changed his mind, along with everyone else in authority on the Axis side. Field Marshal Kesselring had wanted to attack Malta early because he knew that the German air strength would be greatly reduced to meet other needs. The Italians knew that they would not be ready for an amphibious attack before July, so they opposed an early attack. By April, Rommel realized that he would need to attack in the desert before the British, who were planning to attack in May. Taking Tobruk was now the top priority for the Axis side. While the focus shifted to the western desert, a joint staff with Germans and Italians continued to plan for a later attack on Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Submarine losses in April and May 1942

One reason that the Axis convoys to North Africa were safer was that the British had lost three submarines. Two U-class submarines, the famous Upholder and the Urge were both lost in April 1942. Lt-Cdr Wanklyn's luck had run out when the Upholder was sunk by an Italian torpedo boat on 14 April. The Urge was lost without a trace after sailing from Malta on 27 April. The Official History suggests that she was mined. The third submarine, the Olympus, was mined a short distance from Malta on 8 May.

The Germans lost three submarines during May. A Lockheed Hudson from No.233 Squadron attacked U.573 and forced her into internment in Spain. A Consolidated Catalina from No.202 Squadron and the destroyers Wishart and Wrestler sank U.74 a day later. A Short Sunderland from the same squadron damaged a submarine late in May. U.568 was sunk by the destroyers Eridge, Hero, and Hurworth northeast of Tobruk. The air connection, in this case, was that a Blenheim from No.203 Squadron had sighted the submarine and alerted the destroyers.

This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Some analysis

From what we have seen so far in 1942, following the Japanese attacks in the Far East, the British and Commonwealth forces were stretched to the breaking point. We can say with hindsight that the Middle East was stripped down too far and the British paid dearly during the spring and summer, because of that. The situation in the Pacific was stabilized not by the force of arms on the ground but because of naval successes at the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway. The battle that was spread across 1942 into 1943 in the Solomons was what finally wore down the Japanese enough that the Allies were able to go on the offensive. Because of that overreaction, which is understandable but regrettable, North Africa was almost lost. Another factor as the Axis air superiority, partly due to their geographical advantage in Cyrenaica and partly due to better aircraft in the Bf-109f. More Spitfire V's had to be sent to the Mediterranean theater to restore the situation in the air. The great influx of American-built aircraft also helped, even when the fighter aircraft were inferior, initially. It was only when the P-51B's entered service that there was a better aircraft available.

British naval operations in May 1942

After the destruction of three of four of Captain Poland's destroyers, no further surface operaations could be mounted from Alexandria in May 1942. The destroyer division had been attacked by several waves of aircraft, mostly Ju-88 divebombers, but also some He-111's. The Ju-88's were based at Heraklion and had just completed training in anti-shipping operations. In mid-May, the Italians had mounted another "human torpedo" attack, but this one was ineffective. Meanwhile, submarine operations continued unabated, but submarine losses rose on both sides. The submarine ace Lt-Commander Wanklyn and the Upholder were lost in May to an Italian torpedo boat. One factor would ease the dire British naval situation. The Germans were forced to shift combat aircraft to Russia in increasing numbers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Admiral Harwood arrives in the Mediterranean

A replacement for Admiral Cunningham finally arrived on 20 May 1942. The new commander was Admiral Sir Henry Harwood, the commander of the cruisers that fought the Admiral Graf Spee in 1939. Admiral Harwood agreed with the commanders that what was needed were long range aircraft with endurance sufficient to allow them to find Axis convoys at sea so that they could be attacked. Just between 1 April and 13 April, there had been 26 convoys that passed east of Malta. Only five were seen by reconnaissance aircraft soon enough to allow them to be intercepted. Admiral Harwood wanted 12 Consolidated Liberators for this role, but they were not available for this sort of role. In early May, a destroyer force from Alexandria was almost wiped out by air attack while they stalked a convoy. They put to sea on 10 May, but where attacked by air on 11 May. Only the Jervis eventually returned to Alexandria, while the other three destroyers, the Lively, Kipling, and Jackal, were all sunk. The Jackal was torpedoed by the Jervis after an attempt was made to tow the ship. The Jackal had a fire in one boiler room that could not be extinguished, so the decision was made to torpedo the ship so that the lone survivor might escape back to Alexandria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The war against Axis shipping to North Africa in April and May 1942

With Malta being so heavily bombed, all anti-shipping sorties had stopped by April and into May 1942. Because of this, the Axis forces were able to ship supplies in relative safety during this period. In all of April and May 1942, only 13 German Italian merchant ships were sunk in the Mediterranean Sea, and all but one of these were due to British submarines. A large number of RAF anti-shipping sorties were flown in April and May, but the 750 sorties only sank one ship. The German air superiority over the Mediterranean, coupled with the Axis advance to Gazala meant that less of the Mediterranean could be searched for targets by the British aircraft. One disastrous attack mounted on 14 April 1942 cost the RAF five Beauforts and one Blenheim with no targets sunk. By the middle of May, 2,500 tons of supplies reached Benghazi every day. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Status and some idle thoughts

In case you had figured this out, I have a situation going that is leaving me with little time to write. I would hope that I will eventually have more time again. My plan includes acquiring more of the Official History books from the war in North Africa, if not other theaters, as well. I would summarize those and comment on them, as well as books such as Harry Klein's Springboks in Armour: The South African Armoured Cars in World War Two. I also would like to acquire some more of the basic source books for the war in North Africa, as well as more information about British armoured fighting vehicles, if not German, French, Italian, American, and Russian.

The changed situation in early 1942

As the daylight Axis air raids on Malta grew fewer and smaller, there were more raids at night. These were opposed by Beaufighters of No. 1435 flight, acting as night fighters. By May 1942, the tonnage of bombs dropped on Malta had fallen to 520 tons, which still as great as the highest month in 1941. Probably the greatest hazard in this period were Axis minefields laid by "fast German motor-boats". They had laid 600 mines and 400 anti-minesweeping devices around Malta since February 1942. These were effective, as one or two British submarines were lost to mines. While the Welshman trip had helped the ammunition supply, the island was still in danger and could be lost if the June convoy failed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The action involving Malta in May 1942

One the night of 8 to 9 May 1942, the fast minelayer Welshman had made a run to Malta bringing precious supplies to the island. The Welshman had been disguised as a French large destroyer and had sailed past Sardinia early on 9 May. Welshman was speedily unloaded and sailed by 8:40pm, having been refueled with 300 tons of oil fuel from Malta's store.

The situation in the air over Malta turned to the British advantage, as so many German aircraft were withdrawn and so many Spitfires had been flown in, that the British had air superiority for the immediate future. The Eagle brought another 17 Spitfires on 18 May, after the island had received 123 in about a month. By late May, Fliegerkorps II only had 42 bombers, 36 fighters, and 13 reconnaissance aircraft. The Axis lost about 40 aircraft over Malta, while the British only lost 25 in combat. Six of those were caught on the ground, but that was much better than the 30 lost on the ground in April. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Early May 1942

The next big operation to supply Malta took place in early May 1942. The American aircraft carrier Wasp and the aircraft carrier Eagle brought 64 Spitfires, which were flown to Malta early on 9 May. They arrived at Malta without interference and the Wasp arrived back at Scapa Flow on 15 May. The first Spitfires landed at 10:30am and had an hour-and-a-half time before the first Axis air attacks. Only 60 of the Spitfires actually landed at Malta. One of them crashed during takeoff, one diverted to Africa, another went down at sea, and the fourth crashed at Malta. The intent had been to send six Albacores to Malta, but they all had malfunctions that necessitated landing back on the Eagle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The new condition from May 1942

On 15 May 1942, Lord Gort as appointed as "Supreme Commander of the Fighting Services and of the Civil Administration" of Malta. The Malta Defence Committee was concerned that an airborne invasion of Malta was planned. There were indications from Sicily that airfields that were suitable for gliders were being prepared. The authorities in Britain disagreed, as they had no intelligence that an invasion was planned. More Spitfires were going to be sent by the USS Wasp and the aircraft carrier Eagle which was available again. The minelayer Welshman, capable of very high speeds and with a great amount of internal volume, would arrive on 10 May with 340 tons of supplies. Dispersal pens were readied for the arriving Spitfires and every preparation was made to prevent them from being caught unprotected on the ground. The Welshman was bringing more AA ammunition that would allow freer fire from the ground. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Malta saved

Just when the situation on Malta had been grimmest, after 28 April 1942, the Axis bombing slowed considerably. Primarily, this was because German air attacks had slowed greatly. The Italians continued attacks, but with smaller numbers of aircraft. In recognition of the sacrifices made by the people of the island, King George VI awarded the island the George Cross. Such awards to a locality had been made right after the Great War to Dunkirk, Verdun, and Ypres. The island leadership was changed at this time and Lord Gort was appointed to command and to be governor. He served as governor from 1942 until 1944. He previously had been governor of Gibraltar and at the start of the war in 1939, he commanded the BEF. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The naval situatuation outside the Mediterranean Sea in late Spring 1942

The overall British naval situation looked bleak in the late Spring of 1942. The Germans were having a successful war against Allied shipping in the Atlantic. The German battleship Tirpitz and other major warships were positioned in Norway and posed a double threat against both the convoys to Russia and in the Atlantic. The threat from German naval forces above and below were causing convoys to not sail, out of fear of unacceptable losses. The British were feeling intense pressure to provide arms to Russia, but had experienced some disasters in the northern waters. The United States had sent reinforcements to the Home Fleet, but that just allowed other ships to be shifted to the Indian Ocean. An operation was underway to put forces into Diego Suarez and the ships involved were just now rounding the Cape of Good Hope. The Japanese still looked to be very dangerous in the southwestern Pacific, so there were many worries for the planners and policy makers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Plans for Malta in May 1942

The lack of warships and commitments elsewhere had meant that no convoys could be run to Malta in May 1942. The best that could be done would be to send more Spitfires and to run AA ammunition by fast minelayer (the Manxman class ships) and by submarines. The British commanders in Britain pinned their hopes on General Auchinleck's planned offensive in June. They were already planning for success and hoped that German air strength would be drawn back to southern Russia. If the situation in the Indian Ocean seemed favorable, they would run a convoy from Alexandria with a minimum of 12 fast supply ships escorted by the battleship Warspite. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.