Late on 20 May and beyond

 The commander at Retimo did not what the situation was on Crete. He sent a wireless message to General Freyberg requesting reinforcements for Retimo. He also ordered attacks at dawn. The 2/1st Battalion would attempt to rid Hill A of Germans. The 2/11th would attack Germans in the area between Hill A and the sea. Greek battalions would help the Australians. Campbell, the Australian commander at Retimo, sent Major Hooper with the Greek battalion on the east side. Major Ford, from the Welch Regiment, would be with the group on the west side. 

The Germans on Hill A attacked the Australian posts during the night. They overran part of the "isolated platoon". The rest traveled to the company headquarters. The Germans pushed onto the airfield at Retimo.

Tthey captured the men from the stranded tanks. Most Germans pulled back by dawn, but forty soldiers were sheltering behind the "bank of the beach". By dawn, when the Australians had planned to attack, there was only one section still "holding out". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

Fighting in the afternoon of 20 May

 Germans were located on Hill A, on the top and east. The Germans were unable to leave the vineyards and move down the slopes because Australians were bringing accurate fire on the Germans. German paratroops had landed in Australian positions, so German aircraft had to be careful not to attack their own men. 

The Australian battalion commander sent two tanks forward, but they were soon out of action. Towards tyhe left, the 2/1st and the 4th Greek Battalion had killed or captured paratroops that were near by, as well as the paratroops in the 2/11th Battalion on Hill B. 

There were some German paratroops, perhaps 500 or more, traveling to the west towards Perivolia. They were beyond the range of Australian machine guns. Before it became dark, Australians tried to finish off the Germans nearby. By 10:30pm, the Australians took 84 prisoners and took a considerable supply of German weapons. 

Sandover, an Australian officer, could speak German, and he interrogated the prisoners. Sandover also translated coded messages, so they were able to tell aircraft to drop mortar bombs.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The attack began on 20 May

 German aircraft carrying troops flew over Retimo and turned towards Canea. This was at 9am on 20 May. At noon some 20 more transports flew overin the direction of Heraklion. At 4pm, a German air attack hit Retimo near the air field. The defenders had excellent camouflage, so the attackers hit only two or three men. The almost untrained 4th Greek Battalion started back up the ridge although they had not been attacked. Some Australian NCO's were sent from the two battalions to "steady the Greeks". The moved the Greeks back to the starting position and stayed there to reassure the Greeks. One Australian cporporal led a Greek patrol to themain road, where they took some 20 prisoners. 

After the air attack, about 24 transport aircraft were seen. Eventually, they saw as many as 161 transports. They flew south and then flew east. Some paratroops jumped east of the airfield. They landed in an area from the olive oil factory to the east end of the airfield. A second group landed along the coast from the west end of the air field to the edge of Retimo. The paratroops all had landed in 35 minutes. 7 troop transports and two other aircraft were shot down by ground fire. There were some intense fights between Australians and German paratroops. The Germans took most of Hill A. The German paratroops were under cover from the "vines and terraces".

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The situation at Retimo

 The other airfields had ant-aircraft guns , both heavy and light. They also had no armor-piercing capability. Cerman aircraft could fly low over Retimo fairly safely. They could shoot at German soft vehicles. The Australian 2/1st Battalion had no wireless and only had three telephones. Tgeir cables were supplied by the gunners. Campbell used the telephones to connect with hills A and B. Some signallers were used to run the telephones and as runners. The rest became riflemen. The other Australian battalion, the 2/11th, had telephones for each company, but had very little cable. The two Australian battalions communicated by runner. They were well-equipped with barbed wire, so they had barbed wire for the whole front and the airfield.

Food could be an issue. Tthey had enough fot ten days, but enough for four days had been sent to Mesi at the end of the road. If the Germans took the ridge above the airfield, they would withdraw to Mesi. The soldiers also bought food locally, such as pigs, eggs, goats milk, and vegetables. Aswe mentioned, the 2/11th Battalion hired goats to milk and kept them in their positions. 

Because olive trees blocked the slopes of the ridges, the field guns and most machine guns were positioned on hills A and B so they were able to fire to the north, east,and west. Two medium machine guns were sitting on the ridge above Hill B. 

Hill A had a company from the 2/1st along with 2-100mm, 4-75mm, with one platoon "of machine gunners". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The terrain at Retimo

 The area near Retimo  had olive trees with many leaves. This gave the defenders good cover. The sides of the hills were terraced with the steps being as high as 20 feet, Someone higher up would notbe able to see men "moving around". The 2/1st Battalion had arrived at Retimo on 30 April. The took the place of Greek soldiers, More British soldiers arrived over time. On 19 May, the defense of Retimo was equivalent to a brigade group. The Australians were equipped with "small arms" but they were short of ammunition. They had about five rounds per anti-tank rifle and some 80 mortar bombs per 3-inch mortars. Tthe Vickers machine guns were limied o 16-belts of ammunition per machine gun. Uniforms and boots wee showing wear. There were no anti-aircdaft guns at Retimo. They also lacked armor-piercing ammunition for small arms.

The 2/1st Battalion had but three telephones and some cable that the gunners had brought to Retimo. The 2/11th Battalion had a telephone for each company but little cable. Communication relied on runners. They had about ten days of food. The 2/11th Battalion relied on goats milk from goats they had hired. . The men were Weat Australians. so they were apparently used to living that way and kept goats in their positions. The also bought "pigs, vegetables, and goat's milk from nearby farms and villages, 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Defending Retimo from 19 May

 Retimo had an airfield. Retimo was a town of some ten thousand population. The airfield was about five miles to the east and ran along the beach. behid the air field was a ridge that varied from 100 to 200 feet. 

Lt. Col. Ian Campbell had been appointed the commander of the soldiers defending Retimo. What the Australians had named "Hill A" ran from the ridge to within 100 yards from the sea. "From one thousand yards east of Hill A lay "a small village named Stavromenos". Stavromenos was home to an olive oil factory with a tall chimney. Between the ridge and the mountains was a valley. The valley had the villages Pigi and Adhele. To the west, the ridge ended at the village Platanes. To the east, the ridge joined the mountains. At Platanes, the roaqd that ran from Kirianna through Adhele connected to the coast road. 

On the south, Hill D overlooked the air field. Hill D lay "between the Wadi Bardia on the east and the Wadi Pigi on the west. The ridge continued on from the Wadi Pigi and another wadi, the Wadi Adhele. Hill B was past the Wadi Adhele. Hill B was wider at the west and overlooked Platanes. 

This based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Continued German action on 27 May

 A German soldier climed that ever German wounded soldier ha]d been killed by being shot or stabbed. There was a report that some German dead had been stabbed or had "broken skulls". A German officer had reported not seeing any Australian or New Zealand soldiers that had been stabbed or hit in the head by a rifle butt. 

Lt-Col. Walker wrote about this incident in 1952. He said tat the Germans had a large number of "automatic weapons forward.".These were overrun and captured and used against the Germans.  There had been a wall that been rushed by Germans who were not able to climb the wall, but they were running away and did not surrender. Col. Walker thought that could be an explanation.

There was "close fighting in the olive trees". Any machine gun fire would be fatal as would bayonet wounds. The New Zealanders only captured three German soldiers. You would imagine that many wounded Germans escaped to the German lines. Cpl. Walker said that no wounded German soldiers or unwounded Germans trying to surrender were shot. 

At 10am on 27 May, the 3rd Parachute Regiment had reached the "wireless station". The entered Canea at 2pm, along with 100th Mountain Regiment, along with Ramcke's unit. They captured some 40 guns and a thousand prisoners.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

German plans on 27 May

 General Ringel lntended to keep trying to surround Canea. After that, they would push east towards Retimo. There wee now five German columns moving East. One column that was the furthest south was moving towards the Ayia Marina. Tis was to the south of 42nd Street. The 141t Mountain Regiment was the next column to the north. North of that was the 3rd Parachute Regiment. North of that was the 100th Mountain Regiment. Finally, on the coast, was Ramcke's group. 

The 141t Mountain Regiment "had fought the 19th Brigade in Greece", which had been acting as a rearguard. This was at Brallos. in Greece. They were also the unit which had been engaged at 42nd Street. At 6:45am, they were ordered to move to "the head of Suda Bay". The idea was to block the British retreat. J Battalion had been at the front. After 11am, the commander had the impression that the lead battalion had been scattered by a counter-attack. The  commander ordered the following battalion to stop. 

The 1st Battalion commander came to the regiment headquarters and reported that had been surprised by British soldiers some 2.5km west of the village at Suda. WThis was in a rather thick olive area. The Germans had run into a minefield and had taken casualties.The British were close to surrounding the battalion.He ordered the German soldiers to pull back.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Freyberg reacts to advice from Cairo

 Freyberg sent a message to Wavell about the real situation. He informed Wavell that Retimo was almost out of food. Retimo was almost out of ammunition. They had lost all the guns from Suda and Maleme because they had no gun tractors. They desperately needed food. Freyberg asked food to be sent to Sfakia at once. They needed to send the fighting force to Sfakia so it could be withdrawn. The Greek army commander sent a message to Freyberg saying that the Greek army was starting to "disintegrate". 

In the afternoon, Wavell ordered Freyberg to "abandon Crete". That morning, Wavell had asked the commanders in London for guidance, but had not received any by 3:50pm. At that point, Wavell tld Freyberg to leave Crete. Some hours later, the commanders in London agreed with that plan. Colonel Campbell at Retimo was without ciphers, and an alternate plan failed. They were forced to ask Cairo to have a plane drop the message to Campbell. 

Freyberg moved his headquarters to Sfakia. He only learned later that his attempts to communicate had failed.

From another source, we were under the impression that Freyberg was exhausted after leaving Greece, but he seems to have done well as was possible in Crete. 

The Germans were having a lot of success on 26 and 27 May. The Assault Regiment reached a point about 2 km to the west of Canea. The 100th Mountain Regiment captured Karatsos while the 3rd Parachute Regiment captured Perivolia. The Germans flew in reinforcements to replace some of their losses.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The move to the south a retreat or a rout

 General Freyberg described the situation. There were units of soldiers that stayed to gether and marched with their guns. They were from composite groups that withdrawn from the line. Mostly it was a mass movement of men not organized imto units. They dominated the ruad and slowly moved to the south. 

There were thousands of unarmed soldiers on the road to the south. They were very diverse, as there were Cypriots and Palestinians. There were no leaders and they were without discipline. They largely were untrained as soldiers. Men had heard Sfakia mentioned and that gave them direction. Lt. Stephanides later wrote that he was aware that they were part of a retreat. He thought that it bordered on a rout. Soldiers moved quickly along the road. Many soldiers had dropped their rifles. The road and ditches had items abandoned by their owners. You would occasionally see officers valises and open suit cases.

Someone Cairo replied to Freyberg's pessimistic message from 26 May. Yhe reply said that General Evetts would arrive to function as a liaison officer. Te reply suggested that force from Suda and Maleme should travel to Retimo with the aim of holding the eastern end of Crete.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Continuing events on 27 and 28 May

 During the 27th, Hargest and Vasey had met with one of Laycock's battalion commanders, as we had already said. That was when Hargest and Vasey had decided to move toNeo Khorion during the night. They hoped that the commandos of Layorce would cover them. They decided to send the 5th New Zealand Brigade to Stilos. They would send the Australian 19th Brigade to Neo Khorion, alon with the 2/8th Battalion to occupy the road junction at Kalives with the 2/7th Battalion in contact with the New Zealand force at Stilos. At the 42nd Street, the rearguard was supposed to pull out and start the march to Stilos. At 9pm, it was light,so they waited until 10pm. The lead soldiers had marched the 14 miles to arrive at Stilos. They reached Stilos at 3:30am on May 28th. 

Weston ordered Laycock and his D Battalion to the Babali Innin the south. They would function as a rearguard. Laycock had only recently landed. added two infantry tanks along with three carriers. 

It seems that General Weston had traveled south to see the route that they would use to withdraw. Weston had tried to turn back, but the route was crowded by vehicles, soldiers, and civilians moving along the road towards the mountains at Sfakia.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

More charges on 27 May

 The Maori's, along with the 19th and 21st Battalions, charged the Germans as had the Australians. The New Zealand charge went for about 699 yards. The Germans ran when faced with the charge. The Maoris saw about 80 German dead. Tghe Australians counted some 200 German dead and they had captured three Germans. The Australian 2/7th Battalion had ten men killed and 28 men wounded. That was from the charging. 14 Maori's had been hit in the charge. 

The Australians were stopped because of the scarcity of cover from air attack. Lt. Bolton brought a Vickers machine gun forward. He fired on the retreating Germans and caused casualties. The Germans did not attack on the 27th. In the afternoon, the Germans were close by along the whole front. DCuring the 27th, they could see Germans around the hills in the south. They were effectively encircling the Australian ans New Zealand soldiers. 

Weston was nominally in command of the rearguard, but no one had any communication with him. May, they were in contact with a battalion commander from Laycock's group. Weston had ordered him to sit on the road to Sfakia. After hearing that, Hargest and  Vasey decided to move to Neo Khorion. That was south of Stilos. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Action during the night on 27 May

 Some 80 tons of supplies were unloaded on the pier at Suda. The Maori battalion was commanded by Col. Dittmer. He spoke with Col. Walker and Col. Allen. Col. Dittmer told them that if the Germans came in close, his men would fire on the Germans and charge them. Allen and Walker agreed to support the Maoris. 

  GThe Australians saw about 400 Germans moving forward on the Suda Bay road. The 2/7th Battalion had two companies in front. The company on the right sent a patrol forward to watch the Germans. Gthey were planning an attack. Major Miller was moving forward when gunfire started. Two platoons came up next to the patrol. The Germans were intent on looting a unmanned depot, so the Germans were surprised.

After a few minutes fight, the Germans "broke and ran". The two companies charged the escaping Germans. The Germans were pushed out of the depot. On the left, a charging private armed with a sub-machine gun, Caused Germans in a wadi to run. Gthe Germans threw away their guns as they ran. The Australians were able to move forward more than a mile. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The battle continuing on 27 May

 The Gernans attacked the Welch, starting at dawn. Of the two front companies, one had been surrounded while the second had heavy losses. Lt-Col. Duncan decided to withdraw the Welch to the KIadhisos Creek. He ordered the two companies at the rear to move to the west of Suda to provide cover to the rest of the battalion. From there, they could hear "heavy firing" near 42nd Street. This was some five miles back from their original location. The two rear companies commanded by Major Gibson were successful in reaching Suda. A snall group from the Welch, commanded by a sergeant, managed to hold out until the morning on the 28th. When the Germans realized what a small group they were, they were captured.

When the Australian and New Zealand soldiers arrived at 42nd Street, General Weston was not there. Outtick and Vasey decided where to position their brigades along 42nd Street. 42nd Street was a dirt road than ran straight through the olive groves. The line was held by Australian and New Zealand soldiers. The Australians included the 2/7th and 2/8th Battalions. The New Zealand battalions included the 19th, 21st, 22nd, and 28th. Fretberg paid a visit to the Australians overnight, and saw they were in good spirts.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The battle from 27 May

 The Composite Brigade seems to have been commnded by Lt-Col Duncan of the Welch. He did not know that the Suda Brigade had pulled out and had left them with no one on the left. During the night, the 5th and 19th Brigades past the wreckage in Canea. They were now just to the west of Suda Bay, One battalion of Layforce was nrar Suda village, As the Australians withdrew, they saw mothing of the British brigade which was supposed to be the rearguard. "It seemed that the British had been on the coast road while the Australians had been on the inland road". In the nght, the 4th Brigade travelled to Stilos. Inglis was not able to find the Composite Brigade, he decided to go back to commanding the 4th Brigade. Howard Kippenberger was back to commanding the 20th Battalion. 

By 1am, Weston realized that tht Welches' position was in danger, so Weston ordered Lt-Col Duncan to withdraw. By the time Duncan got the order, it was too late. The Welch were on the left with the Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars. The Germans attacked at dawn and surrounded one company while an n another company took losses, 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The withdrawal from early 27 May 1941

 The older commanders seem to have a more negative view of the situation than the men in thr battalions. Weston had said that he had forces on the new line and did not want Hargest and Vasey's brigades in that line. Puttick then informed Weston that his brigades would hold the "new line" until Weston ordered them to leave. At thes point, communications were difficult and moving slowly. The command structure was making things worse, because if the need to ask permission. Apparently, orders went from Freyberg to Weston, and then to Puttick and then to Vasey. 

Weston had gone from Puttick at 6:10pm. By 11:15pm, Puttick got an order from Weston. Weston sent an order to Vasey with out tellinf Puttick. seven hours passed where Puttick had ordered a withdrawal without informing Weston. That withdrawal was carried out while the men in the rear areas were shaken. When the 5th and 19th Brigades were known to have withdrawn, the Suda Brigade was ordered to withdraw. The Suda Brigade had "S Battalion from the Royal Marines, the 2/2nd Field Regiment, the Royal Perivolians, and the 106th Royal Horse Artillery". They had been in reserve at Mournies. At the same time, the Composite Brigade was moving to a new spot something like a mile to the west from Canea. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

26 to 27 May on Crete

 Freyberg seems to actually have been in charge on 26 May. Freyberg and Weston had met twice in thr evning, at 7:30 and 10:15. At the earlier meeting, Weston told Freyberg that the New Zealand Division could not hold any longer. Freyberg ordered the Composite Brigade to move in. At 830, the composite Brigade were told to be ready to move. 

At this time, Weston told Freyberg wrong information. He said that the New Zealand troops were holding their position but that the Australians were moving out. Freyberg responded by sending the Australian Vasey a message saying that he needed to keep holding a line some one thousand yards to the east in the wadi in the morning where they had been until it was dark on 27 May. . 

Vasey on learned this by 11pm, after he had ordered his men to withdraw. When Vasey contacted Puttick, he found that they had not gotten orders to hold. Puttick had ordered the New Zealand Division to withdraw. Vasey had just two battalions. With the Greeks in disarray and the New Zealand Division gone on the right, his battalions would be taken. Vasey contacted Puttick, who approved his withdrawal. Vasey learned that the 2/7th Battalion had started to move back with Germans following. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

Action late on 26 May

" Weston had returned to Canea, heavy bombing forced him out of the town. Puttick had expected to hear from Weston. When time had passed withot any communications frum Weston, Puttick tried contacting Freyberg's headquarters. 

Finally at 10:10, Puttick received a message from Freyberg saying Weston would be giving him orders. After that, Puttick talked Vasey. Puttick then decided that they should move to a position to defend at the "head of Suda Bay" as he had suggested to Weston. The Australian 19th Brigade would be ro the right and the 5th New Zealand Brigade would be to the left. He would have the 4th Brigade move to Stilos, which was on the way to Sfakia. 

Puttick issued orders that included all these actions. Puttick sent an officer to inform Freyberg and Weston. In response, Vasey ordered his battalions to pull back and informed the nearby Greeks and British.

We are left with the impression that there was a political explanation for Freyberg wanting Weston to issue orders. Weston seems tolack the information and the expertise neededfor him to be acting as commander.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The situation is worsening on 26 May

 Puttick's trip to Freyberg's headquarters and back took about three hours. The Germans continued to move around the left. While Puttick was still traveling, Vasey went to see Hargest. Vasey told Hargest that Germans were surrounding his left flank. There were German machine guns to his rear, firing at his position from behind. Vasey asked Hargest when he thought that he would need to withdraw. Vasey expected that he would also need to withdraw. Puttick joined them quite soon. Puttick considered that the situation was getting worse. They had talked about Inglis providing relief, but that now seemed not possible. Puttick decided to meet with Weston to discuss the situation. Puttick suggested that the Welch provide cover in position from Kristos to Tsikalaria. The commandos would add to the line to the south at Ayia Marina. At about 6pm, Weston visited Puttick. Weston wanted to talk with Freyberg before allowing a withdrawal. At 6:10, Weston left to visit Freyberg. 

When Weston arrived at Canea, German bombing caused him to abandon the town. Puttick had expected to hear from Weston, but he heard nothing. Given that, Puttick sent messages to Freyberg. Freyberg replied that uttick would receive orders from Weston.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More action from 26 May

 Puttick's New Zealand Division headquarters was moving to a position about a mile south of Canea. While the headquarters was moving, Puttick got a letter from Freyberg saying that he and Weston were to have a joint headquarters. Somewhat later sent Inglis a message appointing him as commander of a "Composite Brigade". Te new brigade would have 1/Welch, the Northumberland Hussars, and the 1/Rangers. These had all been commanded by Weston. After dark, the Composite Brigade would replace the 5th New Zealand Brigade. Puttick expected that the 5th Brigade would be forced to withdraw before there was time for the replacement, Puttick thought that the men were close to being worn out. The battalions had taken losses that left them as company size. They were now under constant air attack. Vehicles that tried to drive on the road were strafed. They had no working communications. Puttick walked over to talk with Freyberg. At 3:15pm, Freyberg told 

puttck that they had to hold teir positions, because there were two destroyers heading to Suda Bay that  night carrying commandos and some 80 tons "of food and ammunition". With the New Zealand Division near Canea and Suda Bay, they would be under commad of Weston. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.