Plans changed on 24 April1941

 The original plan had been to destruy the guns belonging to the 2/2nd Field Regiment. The new plan was now to keep the guns operable and to take them to the south. Each gun would have thirty rounds. At this point, they couldn't take 30 rounds, because they were still firing and there were fewer than 30 rounds per gun.

To preserve some ammunition, they fired the guns less often. By 8:30pm, the guns were pulled out. They had to be taken on the main road. That road passed trhough Brallos. The engineers of the 2/1st Field company managed to make a three mile long track from Brallos to the position for the guns. The 2/2nd Field Regiment was moved along the track. After they had arrived, the engineers destroyed the track. 

One company from the 2/11th Battalion traveled along the main road. A second company moved around the right end of the Battalion. The group from the 2/8th Battalion was ordered to Brallos to load onto vehicles. One company from the 2/1st Battalion to strengthen the position. 

The "main rear-guard" was now not being pressured. The commander of the "forward companies" moved them back using leap-frogging. Loading the men on vehicles was quite slow, due to the ned to turn around on a "side track".

This is based on the account [n "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Action from 24 April 1941

 5:40pm saw a gun fight where German were hit at a 30 yard range "at the edge of the scrub". After this, the companies that were furthest out were pulled back. Brigadier Sandover ordered his "reserve company" to a hill to the south, where machine gunners and the reserve company could cover the ground from which they had withdrawn. 

The 2/1st Battalion had made the planned move to the main road. They were positioned so that they could look at the "mountain road" that they had travelled. 

By 6pm, there were some German infantry on the west side of Gravia. While there was still some light, there was a gun fight between the Germans and a company of the 2/1st Battalion. 

There was now a change of plans. At about 6pm, General Vasey was concerned about the 2/11th Battalion's situation. He ordered 2/1st and 2/4th Battalions, with a groupof extra soldiers, to load onto trucks at 8pm, instead of a half-hour later. He also told Brigadier Sandover that he needed to hold his ground until 9pm, instead of a half-hour later. 

Once the 2/1st Battalion had mostly pulled out, German infantry was shooting at the right end of the 2/11th  Battalion and at a part of the 2/8th Battalion. They were on the higher ground to the right. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Fighting on 24 April 1941

 As we recall, the Australian 2/4th was sitting, blocking the road at about five miles beyond Brallos. Vasey then ordered the 2/1st Battalion to ove along the main road until they reached the 2/4th Battalion position, which they reached by about 6pm. 

The guns of the 2/2nd Regiment had come under air attack on 23 April. The regiment commander ordered that during the night, the guns should move back some 1,000 to 1,500 yards. He had them leave the camoflage nets over the old gun positions. That was in the area held by the 2/11th Battalion. The infantry stayed away from the old gun positions. 

That morning, the Germans made a dive-boming attack on the old gun positions. A captain and four men were there, acting as artillery observers. 

On the 24th, early in the day, they could see trucks driving over the bridge across the Sperkhios, which had been repaired. There were also tanks on the main road driving south. At one point, the tanks turned to the east, so as to attack the New Zealand positions.

Australian machine gunners opened fire on German infantry who were oving forward. They were on the "near side of thr rails". They would occasionally fire, during the day. Suddenly, at about 4:50pm, the Germans opened fire with motars on the Australian infantry. This preceded a bigger attack. 

This is bases on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

In Athens and back "in the hills"

 With men in Athens in battle-scarred vehicles, General Freyberg was feeling bad that the commaner's efforts had worked so badly. The vehicles driving through Athens showed damage from the last day and then "the drive through the night". Still the Greek people gave the soldiers a rousng greeting, inckuding flowers. 

Back in the hills, the Australian 19th Brigade was hit by a German attack. The 2/11th Battalion was sitting on the main road. The battalion waqs now commanded y Major Sandover. One company was located on the east side of the road and two companies on the westside. A fourth company was "in support". The battalion had only moved into its place at about 5am. They had had a long march from their previous spot in the hills "on the right". 

To their right were an officer and 48 men from the2/8th Battalion. About half of the 2/1st Battalion was protecting "the right rear" of the 2/11th Battalion. There were "tracks" that passed through Kalothronion up to the 2/11th Battalion position.

One company from the 2/1st Battalion had been sent to cover men engaged in demolition at Gravia (where there was a defile). The road which passed through the defile came from Amfissa. There had been a report of German soldiers comng from Epirus. The 2/4th Battalion was sitting across the road at a postion about five miles south from Brallos.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Withdrawal from Molos

 One good thing was that on 24 April, German air attaack had not been a factor. Once it was dark, trucks were driven "boldly" on thr road, driving past the destroyed German tanks. The crews of the guns that were now in front of the infantry were picked up and carried out.

General Freyberg learned on the afternoon of 24 April that the ammunition trucks that he had been counting on to bring out part of the infantry were lost, or at  least were in some unknown location. Freyberg then directed Brigader Miles to use the available artillery vehicles to carry out as many of the infantry as could be carried. The rest of the infantry would have to march.

During the night, the German nfantry forward while the artillery fight continued. At 9:15pm, they learned that the ammunition trucks had been located and were on the road, moving towards Molos. After the trucks arrived, the men thinned out as they boarded the trucks. Theyeventually set about destroying the artillery.  The destroyed the medium guns and then the field guns. The last to be destroyed were the field guns of the 2nd RHA. That was completed at about 11:50pm.

All vehicles had left Molos by midnight. That meant that there was a long column of vehicles driving south. They moved through the rearguard at Cape Knimis and then on to Atlandi. The vehcles all had their lghts on as they moved on the main road. When the arrived at "the main rearguard" at Erithrai, the passed through. 

By the middle of 25 April, they had covered 100 miles. That meant that they were driving through the streets of Athens. Brigadier Miles was already in Athens, because he was arrange with the "Force headquarters" to fix the corners for easy passage and "to guide the column through". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Fighting tanks

 At least one troop of the 5th Field Regiment sat right in front of the infantry of the 25th Battalion. Knocked out tanks were partially blocking the road. Besides knocked out tanks, smoke was becoming a factor. Some surviving tanks tried to maneuver past the blockage, but they were largely unsuccessful. 

The blocked tanks started to fire on the25th Battalion, which "suffered heavily". "By 5:15, 14 tanks had driven to the right end of the 25th Battalion." Another two tanks followed, but the first was knocked out by the field guns when it had approached "a little bridge" that formed the rightmost edge of the 25th Battalion. There were knocked out tanks for six miles on the road. The field guns apparently destroyed about fiftee tanks during the fight.  One gun and crew had knocked out nine tanks abd set them on fire. Another gun had hit two more tanks. 

Brigadier Miles, the artillery commander, ordered three artillery regiments to fire "on the road by Thermopylae". This measure stopped the Germans from bringing in any mor tanks to the battle scene,.

Later in the day, an attack to the rear of the 25th Battalion was dangerous. To counter this threat, two carrier platoons drove "into the hills". Two companies from other battalions were used to make the 25th Battalion longer.

This is based on the account n "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The fight began on 24 Aprl 1941 at the Molos Bottleneck

 The fighting at "theBottleneck" started "at about 2pm" on 24 April. Two German tnks that started

across the swamp were knocked out by long-range field gun fire. Since that didn't work, they sent a force down the road.  They sent motor cycle troops first. Next came four tanks. 

The next move was sendind infantry "into the hills south of the road". The 25th Battalion then opened fire 

on the German infantry. Soon, Germans then hit the left end of the 25th Battalion with "heavy fire". 

That was enough to cause the 25th Battalion to have to pull back. 

A larger German attack started by 3pm. A column started down the road with some tanks in front.

After that were infantry in trucks with more tanks following. In response, heavy, aimed artillery frre was called in. After an hour, German tanks were near the 25th Battalion. 

An attack at 4pm was pushed back, but a larger tank attack followed. After that, tanks had reached the25th Battalion positions. The 5th Field Regiment had knocked out some of the tanks.

This is based on the account in Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Trying to work through the results of Wilson's errors

 General Wilson owed his position as British commander in Greece to his relationship with Churchill, not his experience or ability. GGeneral Blamey was no longer in Greece, so General Freyberg had to fill the role of wise and experienced commander. Freyberg's performance during the rest of 1941 exposed his shortcomings. 

General Blamey wasnot a professional soldier, but he performed better than many of the professional soldiers in Greece. If we would criticize Blamey, it would be for his playing Australian army politics to ensure that he was as senior as possible and ssuing orders to his chief rival, John Laverack.

The revised plan was for embarkation on dats 24 and25th (5th Brigade),

25th and 26th (19th Brigade and part of the 1st Armoured Brigade),

26th and 27th (6th Brigade as well as part of the 1st Armoured Brigade).

The plan shows that Athens beaches were to be utilized despite previous statements 

that they would not be used, 

The 4th Brikade would be embarked at Magara,

The Corps and RAF as well as some other units would be embarked from Navplion.

Some base units, Robert Crisp's unit, the 3rd RTR with the 4th Hussars would embark from 

Navplion on 26th and 27th. 

Brigadier Allen and his group would not embark at Magara, but from a distant beach, about  hundred miles away. Allen, at this point, had almost no staff.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More happening from 24 April 1941

 It was on 24 April 1941 that the Greek army surrendered. A late order to the army had been to tell them to stay off the roads, to help the British to withdraw. The Greek King and some of the government flew to Crete in a flying boat. You wold expect the aircraft to be a Short Sunderland. This was the latest and best British flying boat.

A New Zealand Brigade was sitting at the "Molos bottleneck" Two battalions were forward, the 24th to the right, the 25th to the left, witht he 26th as the reserve. The main road, which ran to the sea, To the west of the 25th Battalion, The main road ran towards the Alamanas bridge. The road came to within three miles of the bridge. 

There was a gap between the 25th Battalion and the Australians was large enough that artillery fire could coer the gap. The Australians were at the Brallos Pass. To the north, there were dried marshes that seemed to be passable to German tanks. They might come that way so as to attack the Molos defensive position. 

To make preparation for such an attack, they positioned field guns to be able to fire towards a tank attack across the marsh area. supporting the foward battalions were "one medium regiment, and four field regiments". One of these was "Royal Horse Artillery and three New Zealand field regiments". In addition, there were "two anti-tank regiments and a light anti-airraft battery".

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

.The embarkation from Greece

 General Wilson's headquarters took control of the embarkation after ANZAC Corps ceased to exist. On the afternoon of 24 April, Wilson's staff ordered Generals Freyberg and Mackay, along with their staffs, to embark that night. This seems strande, gicen that considerable forces were still in Greece, with only command organization left being Wilson's staff, which we would consder to be less experienced than Freyberg and Mackay's staffs.

Mackay's staff headed for the "Argos area" after receiving Wilson's order. Mackay and his aid flew to Crete in a flying boat. The rest of his staff boarded a cruiser. Freyberg disagreed with the order, at least partly due to the issues we mentioned z'but also because of fighting with German tanks at the Thermopylae Pass".

It seemsa that Wilson quit trying to order Freyberg's movements. It is clear that Freyberg better understood what was needed than Wilson.At this time, there were still thee New Zealand brigades, thrr Australian brigades, one British brigade, and many base units. There were also labor battalions, 

During April 24, yhe plan for embarkation was modified, They wanted to move more men to the south, and to make greater use of destroyers.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

General Blamey moves to Egypt

 General Blamey ended up at Alexandria, Egypt by the middle of 24 April, 1941. Upon arriving, General Blamey met with Admiral Cunningham. The way that the commanders in the Mediterranean and Middle East did business in April 1941, Admiral Cunningham had not realized that the army was about to evacuate from Greece, and expected to be transported by the navy. It seems that General Blamey was a lot more capable of commanding significant forces with a good understanding of the issues, and with sufficient knowledge to make decisions that could be trusted.

Admiral Cunningham responded by ordering every ship to sea, heading towards Greece. It was true, though that by 24 April, Admiral Cunningham had been told that by 22 April that the operation was now 24 April, and enough ships had been ordered to sea, heading for Greece, to carry the first group that would be carried. 

General Blamey had earned a great deal of respect by late April 1941. Once Blamey was in Egypt, "he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Middle East. The Australians had mentioned that General Blamey should command the force to be withsrwn from Greece, since the Australians predomonated. That suggestion was not acceptedby thr British. Another suggestion was made that Blamey should command "the Western Desert Command, later called the 8th Army. What Wavell wanted was to have Blamey as his deputy. That appointment was accepted.

Thia ia based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The withdrawal from Greece starts

 There was action  "on the night of 23-24 April 1941. The 17th Australian Brigade had been on the left end of the Thermopylae line. The combiation of the 16th and 17th Brigades were to travel to Megara. Their instructions were to wait at Megara to be embarked on ships. The comment was made that the movement had gone "remarkably smoothly".

Rather detailed orders were given at the battalion level about how the movements shoul proceed. By "daybreak", ordered the column to stop at Elensis, where it was thought there was an area that had cover to reduce the chances of being seen. For the entire day on 24 April, "Allen Group" stayed in "olive groves" on both sides of the "Athens road". "It was thought that traveling with lights dimmed was smart. Dimmed lights had been General Mackay's idea. 

Traffic on the road was very heavy, but the use of traffic control allowed the vehicles to arrive at the desired time. The orders giving instructions about the embarkation were the last orders issued by the ANZAC Corps. The ANZAC Corps headquarters shut down at 8pm on April 23 where it had been at Levadia. The headquarters immediately reopened at Mandra. The headquarters was disestablished at midnight of 23-24 April.  Athens beaches, The plan would need to be updated. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More events in Greece from 22 April 1941

 The Germans attacked all the airfields used by rhe British in the Athens area. The British air commander, Air Vice-Marshal D'Albiac sent all the surviving Hurricanes to Argos. The Germans were determined to keep pressure on the British, so they hit Argos on 23 April. They succeeded in destroying 13 aircraft. The survivors were ordered to fly to Crete. 

The Greek King announced that he would move his government to Crete. The British base in Athens settled their accounts, and gave the supply depot to the Greeks. They gave the "canteen stores" to the American Red Cross. 

They had "mostly Palestinians, Arabs, and Cypriots" in the Pioneer Corps. They were moved out by train. They also had "middle-aged British offcers." Some New Zealand Nurses and semi-mobile wounded had been "sent to Argos". "More wounded were sent to Megara".

Some officers sent by General Blamey to General Wilson's headquarters arrved at "3am on 23 April". The idea was that these men were available for duties relating to embarkation of troops to be withdrawn from Greece.

Finding anyone from Wilson's headquarters proved to be difficult. They finally located Major Packard. He "seemed to be involved with communicatng with the Navy". They learned from Major Packard that the plan for Australians was that they would provide men to be used in beach parties",

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Wilson's concerns during 22 and 23 April 1941

 General Wilson's staff was looking at risks that might impact the withdrawal from Greece. They seem to have been concerned about a German movement, usihg the Delphi Pass. They worried that the Germans might block thr path for the retreat from Greece. The Greek headquarters issued orders to a protective force. They were sent to Navpaktos. An officer training unit was sent to Patras with "some field guns". The remnants of the 4th Hussars was also ordered to Patras. Air reconnaissance noticed vehicle movement from Yannina. Late-breaking news reported "hundreds of vehicles moving south". 

General Blamey decided that the needed to "demolish the road at Delhi" and put troops in place to "defend the demolitions." He also had Brigadier Steele "to damage the road". Lt-Col. King's column travelled all night with their vehicle lights turned on, apparentlt to draw attention to themselves. At dawn, they were located "three miles west of Levadis". They were protecting the denmolition work.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, ans Syria" by Gavin Long.

22 and 23 April at Thermopylae

 The weather on 23 April was fair, Since the weather was good, that mean t that there was both British and German air activity, particularly, reconnaissance aircraft. In the evening, some Germans were seen moving towards the Sperkhios Bridge. Men from the 22nd and 23rd battalions stopped the movement, The infantry involved moved to Molos. The carriers ended up with a rearguard group,

One ongoing effort involved thinning out was being implemented. During 23 April, yhe 19th Brigade traveled to Brallos. A rearguard was "formed" at a pass that overlooked Lamia. Colonel Campbell checked out a "mountain road" that thy might use very soon. 

They were thinking about withdrawal, the 5th Brigade moved to an area near the beach at Marathon, where they might be embarked. By 23 April, the 19th Brigade was in position at Brallos. They expected that they might use the mountain road for withdrawal.

They planned to "damage the road" to try and impair German movement. There was concern that the Germans might "cut across the line of retreat". That possibility created "nervousness" in General Wilson's staff.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. We expect to include content from a New Zealand reference, as well.

The campaign to sink the Bismarck

 The movie "Sink the Bismarck" is based on a novel "The last nine days of the Bismarck" by C.S.Forester. I thought that the movie made a good story. The battle for the island of Crete started about the same time as the Bismarck operation. The story is about the events in a command center beneath the city of London, blow street level. A very senior British navy captain commanded the command center. His assistant was played by Dana Wynter. She is in the navy and wears the woman's uniform with jacket and skirt.

The captain's son was a Swordfish pilot.

Rear Admiral Wake-Walker's two cruisers, Norfolk and Suffolk found the two German ships and followed them. Admiral Holland's ships, the Hood and Prince of Wales, found the Bismarck and Prins Eugen. Admral Tovey, in the King George V, headed for the area.

Hood and Prince of Wales opened fire, but assumed that thr lead ship was the Bismarck, but it wasactally the heavy cruiser Prns Eugen. That was eventually corrected. It was the Prince of Wales that got the first hits in the Bismarck. At about 6am, the Bismarck got the fatal hit on the Hood that caused the explosion that sank the Hood. The Prince of Wales changed course to miss the Hood's wreckage. The Prince of Wales took hits that disabled the armament for a time.

The captain's son was shot down by the Bismarck's anti-aircraft guns while he attempted a torpedo attack. The captain and his assistant saw a report about the son's plane being shot down.

A crew member of a Catalina flying boat saw the son in the water and rescued him.

before that, the Battleships Rodney and King George V made contact with the Bismarck. The Rodney armed wth nine high-velocity guns firing light shot. By 1941, that was considered to be a bad design. Still, the Rodney managed to reduce the Bismarck to a sinking wreck.

A British cruiser torpedoed and sank the wreck that was the Bismarck.

Before they left the command center, the Captain and his assistant saw the report that the Captain's son had been rescued. When the captain and his assistant climbed to street level, they had no idea of the time of day. They found it was morning and found a place to have breakfast. 

The situation on 23 April and beyond

 It seems that weather on 23 April was good. During the day, there was a report saying that the Germans had landed on the island Euboea. British reconnaissance aircraft did not see any sign of Germans on the island. 

The initial report was enough to cause Wilson's staff to worry about the crossing at Khalkis.They ordered General Freyberg to do somethng to reinforce the 1/Rangers at Khalkis. Brigadier Charrngton was ordered to hold the crossing at Khalkis until 9pm on 25 April. They expected by that tme, the 6th New Zealand Brigade would have moved south of the crossing. They were told that the 6th Brigade would have a rearguard in position. The planned to be there long enough to allow the Rangers to have passed that point. 

The Rangers pulled back their company by the crossing. They then blew charges on the bridge. 

On 23 Aprl, British medium guns were attacked from the air by dive bombers. They also fired back at German guns near Lamia. During the evening of 23 April, New Zealand infantry stopped a German attempt to reach the Sperkhios Bridge. 

Thia ia ased on the account in Gavin Long's volume, "Greece, Crete, and Syria".

The 6th New Zealand Brigade situation on 22 and 23 Aprl 1941

 Carriers from were to patrol the "flats" on the north side of the road at night. Durng the night of 22 April, the 5th Brigade was ordered to move to Ayia Konstantinos. The 4th Brigade was also to relocate. In their case, they were to travel to Erithrai, "the covering position". 

The 6th Australan Divsion also had tasks. The 2/2 Field Regiment "rear guns" were to continue firing at the Sperkhios bridge. During the day on 22 April, Germans had occupied "high ground" on the west side of the road. "The Germans were in position that had them looking down on New Zealand inantry. 

Vasey did not le how his posts were separated. He had his men pull back about two miles. That left them North of Brallos. There was a problem with vehicles. As a result, the 2/11th Battalon had to climb back up to where they had been, not long before. On 21 and 22 April, the men moved into postons in thr Thermopylae line. The men had to stand up to an air attack. A sapper, known to be a good shot, held a Bren gun, and shot down a German reconnaissance plane. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

continued action on 21 and 22 April 1941

 We should not be surprised that the Australians had one 25pdr gun out of action by the afternoon of 21 April. The gun had an oil leak. The young gun commander was aware that the Germans had brought up infantry. On the left, they were unloading infantry. The Australian gunners were depressing the the guns and by firing "weak charges" so that they could fire at the infantry. The Australians fired some fifty rounds down the hill.

The German medium guns responded to the Australian fire. They also came under heavy machine gun fire that caused the Australians to take cover. When they came out after a while they realize that the remaining gun was inoperable due to a trail hit. The Australians had been engaged in an eight hour gun battle. None of the men where hit at that point. 

The German medium guns now opened fire and caused casualties among the Australians. By dusk the Australians taking what they needed to take. 

Once the decision had been made to withdraw from Greece, the New Zealand 6th Brigade was ordered to defend Thermopylae Pass. The battalions involved were the 24th,  25th and 26th Battalions. They had seven artillery regiments in support. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, an Syria" by Gavin Long.

The action from 21 April 1941

 It was after 6pm that the noticed German vehicles driving south from Lamia. The Australian gunners were ready for tge Germans. The guns were all set, accurately pointed, so with three shots fired, they could hit the first struck and stop it. The following trucks turned around, set to drive back to Lamia. The "gunners and observers" sitting up high could see what they imagined were "hundreds of vehicles" driving "south into Lamia". 

"It was early on 22 April" that what seemed to be four German medium guns started firing at long range while vehicles were driving towards Sperkhios. When the Australians thought that there were German vehicles in range of the 25pdrs, they fired. The German medium guns fired back. 

The German shells were eventually hitting just 15 feet from the 25pdr guns, It was after this that the truck carrying smoke shells was hit. Smoke covered the scene for abut a half hour. HE shells in a trailer were hit. 

They could see German infantry disembarking from trucks. The Ausstralian gunners plaed some tricks that allowed them to fire at the infantry. 

This is based in the accoun in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.