The fight during 21 and 22 April, south of Lamia

 The Australians watching to the north could see many vehicle lights moving into Lamia. It was early on 22 April that the Australians started taking what seemed to be German medium gun fire. The medium guns seemed to e located in the woods located to the southeast of Lamia. They were beyond the range of the Australian 25 pounders. They could see vehicles moving south on the road to Sperkhios. every time the Australians fired on the vehicles at the fron of the line the German medium guns fired. Over time, the large shells were falling closer to the Australian guns. At one point a sGerman shehh hit an australian truck loaded with "smoke shells". For the following 30 minutes the Australians were shrouded by smoke. After that a trailer loaded with high explosive rounds was hit. A dump "of charges" was hit, causing an explosion. That set the "scrub" on fire. 

The Germans next moved some field guns closer. The started a gun battle with the Australian 25 pounders. By 1pm, one Australian had a defect that kept it from firing. 

The Australian artillery commander realized that the Germans had unloaded infantry on the left. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

Events in Greece from 21 to 22 April 1941

 For some reason, in lateApril 1941, the Germans did not attack the British in Greece. Brigadier Herring, the 6th Australian Division artillery commander was watching the 2/2nd Field Regiment as it was in the Brallos Pass where they were climbing higher. Brigadier Herring ordered that two guns be put in position "on the forward slope of the escarpment. They would be able to fire over and command the wreckage of the bridge that had been demolished. The guns were put 15feet apart on what amounted to a ledge. This was an area held by the 2/4th Battalion. They had a captured Italian Breda "machine gun" used in an anti-aircraft role. 

"It was at about 6pm on 21 April that they noticed German vehicles heading south from Lamia. The guns that had been put in position opened fire and hit the first German vehicle. The following vehicles turned around and headed back towards Lamia. 

The Australian gunners and observers watched many vehicles moving south into Lamia. There seem to have been hundreds of vehicles driving into Lamia. 

Early on 22 April, what seemed to have been German medium guns started firing at the 25pdrs on the escarpment. They seem to have only fired when the 25pdr guns were firing at the moving vehicles. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Greece had problems

 By 1940 to 1941, Greece was politically unstable while there aspects of Greek society that were degrading their ability to resist the German attack. The Greek Royal family were German. The Greek civilian government had fallen and had been replaced by a dictatorship. General Metaxis may have been more competent than the civilian government. 

Greece had this problem that there was a segment of society that seems to have been infected with bad ideas as well as what seems like corruption. This caused problems with armies either disintegrating or surrendering. These problems were happening in April 1941 and later. 

General Metaxis was in poor health, so when he died, they were left to cobble together a new government. You had the British theater commander, General Wavell, as well as Churchill's appointee, General Wilson. It seems that Wavell was a much better commander than Wilson. 

You also had British political instability, at least iin Australia, where Churchill's misadventures in 1940 and 1941 brought down governments in Australia, where they ended up with a Labour government, although as good a one as you could hope for.

You had been through the fall of  France and Dunkirk in 1941. They eventually removed General Dill as CIGS. Alan Brooke eventually became CIGS. He eventually saw his role as keeping Churchill from causing trouble. 

The British attempt to aid Greece

 Before the British went in to Greece, British senior officers said that the move into Greece was a bad idea. The problem with the Greek operation was that it was strictly a political demonstration. The only senior official who wanted the Greek operation was Churchill's rather young foreign secretary, Anthony Eden. Anthony Eden is also known for being Prime Minister during the Suez crisis. President Eisenhower acted to stop the British, French, and Israeli effort. 

Eisenhower seems to have been anti-colonialist as well as anti-Israelist. We also suspected Eisenhower of being anti-Jewish. While we  are not admirers of the Kennedy's, they had a view of the world and events that were more aligned with modern views than Eisenhower. We say things like that knowing that we are not experts on the topic. 

The opinions given before the event were proved by the results that were seen. The military result was of little value, Men and units were lost as well as tanks, guns, and transport. The lost material was left in Greece. We believe that the Germans ended up with much of what was left in Greece 

The British tanks that were lost were mostly due to poor design. The metal tracks proved to be very fragile. What Robert Crisp wrote in Brazen Chariots describes that problems that were present in the British tank equipment. You might be led to believe that British tanks were largely useful for providing shelter to Greek refugees in the mountains. 

Thinking about the withdrawal from Greece

 General Wavell let General Wilson set the date for the start of the withdrawal from Greece. By lateon 20 Aoril, the men "in the field" had not heard about the planned withdrawal. Generals Freyberg and Mackay still expected that they would stand and fight, with "no more withdrawals" Mackay expected to be overwhelmed by the Germans. 

There had been a "roadside meeting" near Thebes. This was during the night of 21 April. Blamey drove to Levadia, getting there "before dawn on 22 April". General Mackay and his senior officers arrived aat Blamey's headquarters by about 8am. 

Wilson had not issued a detailed order about the withdrawal until early on 23 April. Wilson had some forces in the Athens area that he could use, if needed, to actually fight. 

As this was happening, there was a brisk artilley fight happening along the total front. The weather was clear and they could see German vehicles moving. The British realized that the "Germans were not ready to attack". British observers sitting up high could see the German vehicles driving south into Lamia. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

21 April and later in Greece

 Back on 20 April, the men in the field had not heard anything about a pendin withdrawal from Greece. General Wavell drove up to Blamey's headquarters at about 2am on 21 April. They learned that the Greeks had surrendered and that the British were going to be loaded onto ships to leave. Wavell eventually gave General Wilson a written order to withdraw using the prepared plan. He would cooperate with the navy. 

They might end up "embark some Greek troops". 

British troops would carry as much equipment that they could. British troops should not surrender but should try to travel into the Greek islands, where they might eventually be rescued. The plan might end up failing so that British troops might need to implement the option to travel into the Greek islands. One of the backup plans was to rescue British troops from the islands.  

They would embark men from the island beaches or ports. They would plan on evacuating not just troops, but also guns and transport from the islands. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Inaccurate maps

 The situation on 21 April left the units sitting on very rough territory. They also found roads on maps that were incomplete. They also found roads that were missing from the maps they had. There was also reason to think that the enemy forces were low in strength. 

The left seemed to be vulnerable to attack. 

The Australians were  also found to be in a greatly reduced state. 

New Zealand division was found to be vulnerable to shells fired from across the strait.

The New Zealand artillery were poorly positioned. 

Thebes had a plain that seemed to be perfect for landing German paratroops.

They would land in the rear of the British forces which would leave them in an inconvenient position.

The New Zealand force was left with little in the way of men and carriers to respond to attacks.

The left seemed vulnerable to attack from Epirus and the Dephi Pass.

They received news that the Adolph Hitler division was now at Yannina. They had also heard that the Greek army of Epirus had surrendered. "The area of the Gulf of Corinth seemed to be open". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More moves on 21 April and before

 On 21 April, Brigadier Savige got new guidance. He was to have the 2/11th Battalion replace the 2/5th. This would be in rough country on the right of the 19th Brigade. Savige would need to guard roads and tracks from the mountains "to the west". They would also be in position "to cover" the Lamia Brallos road.

Brigadier Savige was to take responsibility for defending the "left flank". By the time of dusk, Savige received an order from "Rowell". Would get "part of Vasey's left flank". He would also get responsibility for "covering the gorge". The railroad line ran through the gorge". 

He also now needed to be concerned with the "high ground to the west". He was also to "refuse  his left flank". He had now inherited some six miles of front to defend. 

After a conference with Wilson, Blamey, and Baillie-Grohman near Thebes, Mackay, Sutherland, and Colonel Prior, Blamey created and outline of a plan to distribute to officers who needed to know. The objective now was to get into position to withdraw from  Greece. The forces were reorganized with Anzac Corps, 80 Base Sub-area, 82 Base Sub-area and other units reporting directly to Wilson. The situation was not very tense and difficult. They were trying to keep some units available if they actually needed to fight. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events on 21 April 1941

 General Freyberg positioned his reinforcements when they arrived. The ant-tank guns were grouped with the machine-gun battalion at Longos. They faced "the western end of Euboea". The tank brigade had very few running tanks, after more had been abandoned. Robert Crisp's 3rd RTR were ordered to Athens "to povide local defense" Wilson sent the 2nd RHA to join the New Zealand Division. 

After that move, the armored brigade had almost nothing left. There had been a report that the enemy had moved onto Euboea (apparently an island). They speculated that the enemy might move to the mainland at Khalkis. That might cut off the British at Thebes. Because of that possibility, the Rangers were sent to Khalkis. The way that Wilson functioned, he adjusted the "front" of the New Zealand Division.

That caused the 6th Brigade to move to the East of Molos and to take the 28th Battalion position. The 24th Battalion was now north of Molos. They now were responsible for protecting the anti-tank guns. The 25th Battalion was not to cover the road from the Alamanas bridge to Molos. The 26th Battalion was still in reserve. The 5th Brigade was adjusting battalions. They assigned the 22nd Battalion was now sitting on the left of the 25th Battalion. They were now connected with the Australians of the 2/5th. 

This based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Australian infantry from 19 to 20 April 1941

 The first Australians to reach Brallos was the 19th Brigade. The brigade had two battalions, including the 2/4th and the 2/8th. The 2/8th was mentioned as being in bad shape, with little strength. 

On the 19th, two more battalions were added to the brigade. They were the 2/1st and the 2/5th battalions. Early the next day, another battalion joined: the 2/11th Battalion. 

During the afternoon, General Mackay gave orders about "defending the new line". The 19th Brigade with the five battalions in hand would have an area from a hill to the railroad tunnel. Vasey told the 2/5th on the right to connect with the New Zealand Division. The 2/1st would sit on the "loop on the main road". The 2/4th would sit on the railroad tunnel. 

There were units sitting way forward of the brigade's assigned area. 

The 2/8th Battalion would for the reserve. They would occupy the "top of the pass". Also in reserve, he had the 2/11th Battalion, a machine gun company, along with carrier platoons. 

In the next move, the armored brigade was ordered do drive to Thebes. Their anti-tank regiment was ordered to join General Freyberg. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The Australian historian points out that the retreat in 1941 was in a historic neighborhood

 There is a road that is "between the foot of the escarpment and the sea. This was the road traveled by Xerxes towards Athens. It is also close to the road taken by Leonidas and his Spartans. 

The area by "Mollos" and the "Brallos Pass" is a very small piece of  "the Peninsula". Part of this area has high (6000 feet) mountains. "A modern defender" of the pass, would "be in a position like where Leonidas stood. There were two passes that could be held, but an enemy could easily outflank them. 

New Zealand held one side. Thet could be outflanked along the island Euboea. The Australian side was vulnerable to being outflanked through the mountains, especially near Brallos but also down from Epirus. 

You had the 5th NZ Brigade along the coast road. The 4th NZ Brigade was to the right. They had become coast watchers. The third NZ brigade, the 6th, stood in reserve. 

They way that Wilson worked,  he had decided to leave on the 20th, but had not fhought to inform Blamey. 

The 19th Australian Brigade reached the Brallos The Australian Vasey picked up several battalions on 19 April. 

It was on 19 April in the afternoon that Mackay issued orders to defend the new line.

The 1st Armoured Brigade was now sent to Thebes. They lost anti-tank guns to Freyberg. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More events from 19 April 1941 and later

 Early on 19 May 1941, commanders realized that a train of fuel and ammunition was sitting in a vulnerable position. The Australian train men were suggested as a way to get the train to Athens. In the event, it was just not possible, with the presence of German air attacks. Corporal Taylor was fortunate to survive a bombing attack that destroyed the train. The explosion was felt by men located two miles away. 

One company of men from the 2/7th Battalion along with some from the 2/6th Battalion were along the road. German troops were landed close by from aircraft. There were men from Australian rear guards located nearby. 

There were German motorcycles operating along the road. There also seem to be British tanks close by but were-concealed.

A sudden rain storm happened that allowed German mortars to be deployed near by.

Commanders realized that driving by night was problematic. They ended up sitting through the night. Another factor was the congestion on the roads that influenced decision=makers. Meanwhie Units were sitting near Thermopylae, waiting for evens to play out. they were aware of German vehicles moving towards Thermopylae. 

The plans included the New Zealanders defending the "coastal pass" and the Australians near Brallos. 

Wilson's headquarters was at Thebes. Freyberg was at Longos. Somone high on the mountains can look down on Lamaia, some 4,000 feet up. The road from Lamia was quite straight. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria, by Gavin Long.

Some of the last moves from 19 April 1941 and beyond

 The ANZAC force retreated in a column of some ten miles in length. They were on the road from Larisa to Lamia. Unfortunately, the vehicles were traveling "bumper to bumper". That made the vehicles very vulnerable to air attack. The men were stuck in their vehicles "and were not able to return fire". 

Progress was slow. The historian gives the example of the 2/1st Battalion. They were in position at dawn at about "ten miles north of Lamia." They drove through Lamia by 10am. Tkey ended up stopped by an air attack. The situation was rather strange because they did not see many German aircraft early in the day. 

The good news was that the column was moving to the south. By "early in the afternoon, the Domokos rearguard and the road south" were attacked. The 2/1st Battalion did not reach thr Brallos Pass until 5pm. 

Many vehicles seem to have been hit. The good news was that few of the vehicles were disabled.  

One officer in the column "only saw six vehicles abadoned along the road". That was along the stretch from Larisa to Lamia.  

This is bases on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Where things stood on 20 April 1941

 Churchill wrote about how he thought that the British evacuation from Greece should be handled. He wrote that note on 18 April. Churchill's participation in Greece had been colored by his interaction with Anthony Eden, who had been a strong proponent of going into Greece. Anthony Eden thought that the British had a strong moral obligation to help the Greeks. Anthony Eden thought that they had might have a legal oligation, based on treaties.

Churchill was encouraged by how well the withdrawal to Thermopylae was proceeding. That had colored Churchill's letter to Anthony Eden on 20 April.

The Australian historian commented that by 20 April, it was too late to think of making a stand at Thermopylae. While all this was considered, there was a change in the Greek command, where General Pitsikas was removed. 

By early on 21 April, General Wavell arrived at Blamey's headquarters and told him that he needed to evacuate his units "as soon as possible". 

Blamey would need to get his troops to the beaches by 24 April. They would need to board ships by 25 April. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The decision to withdraw from Greece

 I was interested to read that General Wilson expressed the opinion that his men could "hold Thermopylae indefinitely". My reaction to that is that the Germans should have been able to bring up a strong enough force that they could break through the line at Thermopylae. 

The British senior commanders were a strong group with great experience. Their opinion was that they should take the consequences of a withdrawal and should go ahead and execute the plan. None of what it would have taken to stand and fight was realistically available. The Greeks were in a state of collapse by late April 1941.

The British commanders thought that they "would be lucky to pull out 30 per cent of the force". I don't remember the exact figures, but I think that they did much better than that in reality.

There was a final meeting of the key players, including the Greek King. General Wavell offered to fight "as long as the Greeks fought." If the Greek government asked, the British would go ahead and pull out of Greece. 

Churchill really did not want to withdraw without further fighting. That was not possible at this point, given the facts on the ground. The Greek arm was about to surrender. There was one last battle fought by the RAF in Greece. They were hit by a German air attack, but managed to fight successfully one last time in the air. 15 Hurricanes sortied and intercepted the German attack. They lost five Hurricanes but show down many German aircraft This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The next moves in Greece from 18 April 1941

 General Mackay gave his next orders to Brigader Savige. Mackay wanted the 2/11th Battalion moved to a new position. He wanted them to leave Zarkos and move to a spot "on the west bank of the river. They would stay there until "3am on 19 April." Savige had some concerns. There were empty vehicles sent to Larisa. They eventually realized that there was a bridge that had not been blown or even prepared for demolition. 

There was still a fight in progress at Pinios. There was a long column stopped in place but for some reason the enemy was not in a position to hit them from the air. 

It seemed that  18 April was the critical day. After that  day, with the example set by their leadership, there was no danger of panic setting in among the men. 

As it was, the German air force failed to hit the column, when it have well caused trouble. Later on, the Germsn air force operated more effectively than they did during April 1941.

It was on 19 April that General Wavell came to Athens and had a meeting in General Wilson's headquarters. Leaders in London thought that they had decided to withdraw from Greece, but the officers involved in Greece had yet to consier the issues involved. The Greek government was ready for the British to leave, to keep from  damaging the country by serious fighting. 

The British consensus favored holding and fighting longer. The commanders realized that they would probably be unable to remove equipment during the withdrawal. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Loog.

Fighting Germans on 18 April

 The Germans were moving forward as the New Zealand cavalry pulled back. Enemy vehicles were located in the "hills north of Elasson". The Germans were taking "accurate fire". The Germans also had the problem of how to put their vehicles across river. Still, by later on 18 April, the Germans were able to ready for an attack. 

Large groups of German dive bombers (forty to sixty) flew over. Only one dive bomber went after the 6th Brigade. The medium guns had fired all their ammunition and left the scene. Almost by accident, a large amount of ammunition was moved to the "pass". The 2/3rd Field Regiment did most of the firing. They were given good targets and fired some 6,500 rounds.

Late in the day, tanks were driving up a road and the leaders hit mines. The guns were firing into the mass of tanks and did damage. Infantry dismounted and moved towards the 24th Battalion. The field guns stayed in action until about 11:30pm, when they pulled back. They blew up culverts as they withdrew. By 3am, they were at Larisa. The 24th and 25th Battalions drove to Volos on the road. The 26th Battalion left Larisa by train. 

It turns out that Brigadier Savige's units were in action that day. He had a rearguard "commanded by Lt-Col. King". They were located about five miles from Kalabaka. They drove to Zarkos "by dawn". By 11am, they were blowing up "sections of the road". Some of Savige's units crossed the Pinios River using a bridge that was still intact. By 11:30, three German aircraft bombed the bridge. The bridge was already ready to be demolished. The demolition charges were fired, perhaps by the bombing. Engineers made a ferry, and men crossed using it. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The 6th New Zealand Brigade on 18 April 1941

 By 18 April, the 6th New Zealand Brigade was sitting "south of Elasson". There were two road to Larisa, by southeast and by a southwest track. The 24th Battalion protected the road to the east. The 25th Battalion protected the road to the west. The 26th Battalion was the brigade reserve. 

The 6th Brigade had artillery support. There was an Australian field regiment with 20-25pdrs. There was also a troop from the 64th Medium Regiment. There was also some New Zealand 25pdrs "operating in an anti-tank role". There were also some New Zealand 25pdrs in reserve and not so far committed. The 25th Battalion also had some supporting 2pdr anti-tank guns. The 24th Battalion lacked any guns in support. There were also some field guns in position so that they could fire into the area. 

It turns out that there were some German tanks advancing as the New Zealand cavalry withdrew. Some German tanks and motorcycles surprised the New Zealand cavalry from the road to Katerini. 

German tanks attacked again along both roads. Anti-tank guns lay in wait and knocked out tanks, an armored car, and a truck. By 10:30am, some medium guns were firing on German vehicles to the north of Elasson. 

This is based on the account in "Geece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More ongoing action from 18 April 1941

 New Zealand cavalry was surprised to see German tanks and motorcycles driving down the road from Katerini. They had expected that the demolitions that were done would have delayed the Germans. The guns on portees starting firing. They got two tanks and drove off the motorcycles. 

Howard Kippenberger's rearguard group took fire from German tanks. They men were "driven off, were killed, or captured". Kippenberger led some men "on foot" to the 25th Battalion. 

There was another German tank attack "along both roads". The anti-tank gunners were ready for this attack and got "four tanks, two armored cars, and a truck". This rearguard pulled back when they had received word that "other troops were protected by the 6th Brigade".  The 6th (presumably New Zealand) Brigade was located south of Elasson. There were two separate roads that connected to Larisa. 

To the East was the 24th Battalion. The 25th Battalion was on the West side. The 26th Battalion was located at Domenikon, where it was in reserve. There was some artillery in support. There was the Australian 2/3rd Field Regiment. There was "part of the 64th Medium Regiment." There were also some New Zealand field artillery "in an anti-tank role". They were backing up the 25th New Zealand Battalion. There were as well seven two pounders near the 25th Battalion. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More happening on 18 April 1941

 A German machine gun kept firing at the men near the road. A New Zealand officer decided to attack the mchine gun and asked for help. It took close to an hour to overrun the machine gun position. Thw machine gun sat "between the rails" and was protected by stones.The men eventually destroyed the machine gun after killng the four crewmen.

The attackers had taken casualties, so thy chose to not attack the second macine gun. The attackers moved back onto "flat ground" and decided to move around to Larisa,

Leaders checked vehicles, looking for their men, but there wete none. Those men present joined small groups and moved around to avoid the Germans. By dawn, Allen's men were dispersed into small groups, trying to move across country and along back roads. By then, a Germans force had moved to "block" the Larisa road. 

There were three rearguard groups on the move. It turns out that there small roads that tended to circumvent the rearguards. The men observed German troops moving into the New Zealand rear area. 

It was dawn on 18 April when the New Zealand cavalry with anti-tank guns, were guarding a critical junction. By then, the 4th New Zealand Brigade rearguard was reduced to Howard Kippenberger, "his batman and driver, with sixty sappers and three Bren carriers". The rearguard had taken time to sweep up stragglers while they moved. The rearguard had a two-pounder portee "sitting on the road to Servia" and three portees sitting on the road to Katerini. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.