A review of the situation, particularly that of Brigadier Savige

 AS we remember, Brigadier Savige and his force were sitting at Kalabaka. He disliked the position that his force was in because he thought that it gave too many opportunities to the Germans. He decided to hold a line that was some 2-1/2 miles long with its "left on a wide stream, the upper Pinios river". 

You may also remember that General Wilson had visited Savige on 15 April. General Wilson had warned Savige that he might need to hastily abandon his position near Kalabaka. 

Kalabaka was interesting, because it had a superficial resemblence to Gibraltar. British medium artillery had been positioned east of Kalabaka, "at the foot of the Gibraltar-like cliff. At night, there were lights on the cliff that were turned on and off. The gunners began to suspect some sort of "fifth column".

It seemed that Greek troops were robbing the civilians while the civilians were stealing guns to protect themselves. 

The 1st Armoured Brigade was located to the north, and so far, Savige had no communication with the brigade A liaison officer associated with General Wilson told Savige that a 1st Armoured Brigade column would drive past Kalabaka on 16 April. They were bound for Larisa. 

Savige started to worry that someone would blow up the bridge over the Venetikos. Actually, Savige wanted to be sure that the bridge would be blown. He sent a group commanded by an British engineer officer to check the bridge and blow it if it had not already been blown. They found that the bridge was still standing and so they destroyed it. This is based on the  account in "Greece, Crete, and Sytia" by Gavin Long.

Further movements from 15 to 17 April 1941

 The 2/2 Field Regiment was ordered to move to the flank guard at Zarkos. They were supposed to go by way of the Servia Pass, but that did not happen. A New Zealand officer warned that vehicles moving along the road by Prosilion were being shelled by German artillery. The 2/2 took a long way around to get to Zarkos. General Mackay was unhappy about the detour. Still, the 2/2arrived at Zarkos during the early afternoon, so the effect was minimal. Later, after dark, the 2/3rd was sent to Elasson. They were sent there to support the 6th New Zealand Brigade. During the night drive, the 2/3rd lost a gun that fell over a cliff. That was the third gun gthat the 2/3rd had lost. 

The New Zealand 20th Battalion was sent off during the night of 16 to 17 April. They were sent to Lava to be ready to support the brigade movement on the next night.. The 19th Battalion then swung "its left flank south of Prosilion". 

Savige's men were spotted high in the mountains. They were on the "left flank". Savige disliked the area where he had been told to deploy. He decided to do something else, to hold a 2-1/2 mile long line to the west of Kalabaka. His new position had his left against the Pinios River. His right in this position was "tender" but could be "defended in depth".

General Wilson warned Savige that he might need to move quickly, and would need to have vehicles for all his men. Wilson recommended that Savige keep in touch with the convoy that was carrying Greek soldiers into his area. Savige did that and made a deal to get about 80 vehicles from the convoy. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Weather continues to be a factor on 16 April 1941

 What you had were German mountain troops against Maoris. They were now in twilight. The Germans had overlapped the New Zealand line. The ravine feature was still influencing the action. Germans were on the far side of the ravine. The Germans now had access to the road and were moving along it. German mountain troops hit the most "forward Maori section" and started to overrun them, but at heavy cost. The few German survivors were "pushed back into the Ravine". 

"British reinforcements" arrived in time to provide stability ro the situation". The night was now "pitch dark" and "the battalion was over an hour and a half late in starting to withdraw". The New Zealand troops were beginning to move out. They were stuck in trying to move through very high elevations. Nine 2pdr anti-tank guns could not be saved and the men had to push them "over the cliffs". The men were forced to abandon ten carriers and 20 trucks as well.

The cratered the road to make it less usable to the Germans. They constructed a new position at the top of the pass, some seven miles towards the south-west.

The brigade would attempt to hold the position through the next night, prior to moving to Thermopylae. General Freyberg had gathered a force tasked with covering the "withdrawal from the Servia and Olympus Passes".

They would be in position "north of Elasson". The Germans had enough trouble that they would not try and infantry attack. You still had artillery duelling and the ever-present air attacks. 

By dark on 16 April, an Australian field regiment arrived at Elasson. They were there to support the 6th New Zealand Brigade. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The situation from 15 to 16 April 1941

 There were some dangerous possibilities available for German advances,  At Platamon, the New Zealand 21st Battalion was under attack. As for the 22nd Battalion, there had been Germans "calling in English". The New Zealand trrops ignored the German voicees. The Germans had been "lifting mines and cutting wire". 

By dawn on 16 April, the Germans made a "light attack". The attack drew artillery and mortar fire. Behind them were  tanks and "waggons". The 22nd Battalion was in the center of Hargest's brigade. During the attack, the Germans used this as cover to move mortars and infantry guns forward. These weapons made things difficult for the New Zealand troopps.

The commander of a field regiment came up and directed fire that took out a troublesome mortar.There were Maoris "on the left" could see for 14 miles and could see German vehicles as far as Katerini. The front of the column for three mile consisted of "tanks, TRcar troop carriers, and motor cycles". 

By 8:30am, the lead vehicles were moving quickly forward. A New Zealand artillery observer called in fire that stopped the German attack. The artillery destroyed 14 German vehicles, including two tanks.

Rain and mist from 11am until 3pm reduced visibility to something like "a few hundred yards". Once the percipitation stopped, the Maori troops were able to see German forces "streaming into a deep ravine at Mavroneri. This was on the left flank and was out of range.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria", by Gavin Long.

Planning to withdraw the Anzac Corps

 Generals Mackay and Freyberg would be involved with the move back to Thermopylae. Mackay would be responsible for protecting the New Zealand Division flanks as far as the line through  Larisa. He would also be in command of the move of Savige Force, Zarkos Force, and Lee Force. 

The 1st Armoured Brigade would protect Savige Force at Larisa as well as the 6th Australian Division. The armored brigade would be under the command of the 6th Australian Division.

General Freyberg would command Allen Foree, which would be following the route of the New Zealand Division. General Blamey took command of all of the engineers.  

He planned to have a meeting at the junction of the roads to Katerini and Servia. The meeting would include Brigadier Steele, Colonel Lucas, and Colonel Clifton. Blamey's plan was based on the expectation that they would be able to slow the enemy enough to allow the 4th New Zealand Brigade to leave the Servia Pass, the 5th New Zealand Brigade to leave the Olympus Pass, and the 6th New Zealand Brigade would then leave Elasson on the night of 18 and 19 April. Savige Force and Allen Force moves would be coordinated with Generals Freyberg and Mackay.

You had the snow-covered peak of Mount Olympus lying between Allen's force "on the south bank of the Pinios". and the 5th Brigade, some 20 miles distant in the Olympus Pass. The 5th Brigade was sitting "on the north slope". There was a fighting force at Tempe that was "in the gorge".

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria", by Gavin Long.

The next problem: finding reinforcements on 16 April 1941

 Brigadier Savige's brigade had been the intended reserve for the ANZAC Corps. The brigade had been used for two jobs: "a flank guard at Kalabaka and to help the force at Domokos".

The next crisis seems to have been to take "the first battalion from the 16th Brigade to be sent to Pinios Gorge". It was left to the 2/2nd Battalion to fight this new fire. It was Lt-Col. Chilton who would have to command his battalion in this new crisis situation. Chilton would get artillery and carriers to reinforce his battalion.

Chilton set off in a car. He found himself meeting Brigadier Clowes. He learned that the 21st Battalion still existed and was moving into the Gorge. Chilton had his adjutant "collect his vehicles" and find a way to guide the vehicles through the crowded roads at Larisa. 

Chilton set off with his carriers to Tempe. He met with the 21st Battalion commander, who said that his battalion had only lost 35 "casualties in the gorge". They mostly had lost equipment. The rest of the 21st Battalion connected with the Australians while the artillery also arrived.

Blamey, at his headquarters, sent Brigadier Allen to command th 2/2nd and 21st Battalions, the artillery, and other "detachments" that were in the Pinios Gorge. The unit would form a Brigade Group. The reality was that Brigadier Allen was in the foothills of Olympus on 16 April. He arrived at Blamey's headquarters on 17 April when he received his new orders.

Brigadier Rowell, who had been trying to sleep, used a flashlight and a map to show Allen how he was to move into the Pinios Gorge. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

 

From 16 April 1941 and beyond

 General Blamey wanted a man with good judgment and a lot of experience watching over the New Zealand 21st Battalion. He sent his artillery commander, Brigadier Clowes to check out the situation and take any action he thought was necessary.

Brigadier Clowes drove through the night to the New Zealand Division headquarters and then on to Larisa. Traffic on the roads was bad, so Brigadier Clowes only left Larisa at 8am to drive on to Platamon. By 11am, he reached the east end of the Pinios Gorge. He found theh 21st Battalion there heard the news that "one company and part of another were missing".

Clowes ordered the battalion commander to hold the gorge until 19 April and do so essentially "at all cost" (even if they had to fight to the last man). The battalion commander was also told that support was on the way. 

He was also told to sink the ferry boat once all his men had crossed. He was to hold the west end of the gorge "to the last". Brigadier Clowes also ordered Lt-Col. Macky to move back to a spot seven miles to the south if the Germans broke through.

By late afternoon, the 21st Battalion had crossed. They had four guns that were too heavy for the "barge". The trucks drove across the railway bridge. The guns were man-handled across. They only sank the ferry at this point. They only did that after they ferried across a "large flock of goats and sheep, with two shepherdesses. 

Clowes had done the job that they had hoped he would do. At that point, General Blamey and his staff worked to find reinforcements to send "as a stop-gap". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

 The German forces facing the British were very strong. "Field Marshall List had three corps, including armored, infantry, and mountain divisions". To the east of the Pindus mountain range, there were six Greek divisions in poor shape. There were also the Australian and New Zealand Divisions in the ANZAC Corps.

By 16 April, the British forces were seen to be vulnerable to attack from the east. They had assumed that they could hold the Olympus Passes long enough to withdraw the ANZAC Corps. It now seemed a possibility that the Germans could move quickly south to Thessaly so fast as to reduce the possibility that the British forces could move to Larisa.The New Zealand 21st Battalion "at the Platamon tunnel" reported seeing 150 German tanks and that they were pressing an attack. 

The Germans sent motorcycle troops against the 21st Battalion, which mauled the motorcyclists. At the evening of 15 April, a unit of German armor came up to the vicinity of the 21st Battalion. 

The battalion was attacked from the direction of the coast and from the inland direction. The battalion was able to hold out against the attacks they had faced so far.

The German attacking force was strengthened during the night of 15 to 16 April. By dawn on 16 April, the leftmost company of the 21st Battalion was attacked by infantry. By 9am, they were attacked by the tanks "along the coast". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events in Greece from 15 April 1941

 The German 40 Corps was facing the Greek front. The Greeks had been abandoned by a commander and his staff, but they had not "disintegrated" and were still fighting well.

The German commanders moved up an infantry division to protect the flank of th 40 Corps. The German mountain corps that had been at Salonika was to attack the Edessa Pass as well as the Veria Pass. The British and Greek withdrawal made that unnecessary. Instead, the Germans were "to pursue the enemy south". The German 6th Moutain Division then crossed the Aliakmon River and started up Mount Olympus. This had happened back on 14 April. 

The Germans were following the 16th Australian Brigade and the armoured force. They had moved through the Olympus Pass. This was the route to take to go from Olympus "to the sea". This was on the "weak flank" of the New Zealand Division. 

By now, the Germans were in control of Yugoslavia from a line "north and west" of Zagreb, Belgrade, Nish, and Skoplje by 13 April. We hear that the Italian army had moved to Ljubljana.  The Croatians "welcomed the Germans to Zagreb". They announced that there would not be any resistance "in Croatia Dalmatia, or Bosnia". 

What little effective Yugoslav forces remained had moved into the mountains to the west. By 15 April, the Yugoslav command "had asked for an armistice". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

General Wilson in Greece from 15 April 1941

 General Papagos had sent a message to General Wilson, asking for a meeting at Lamia at 6am on 16 April. General Wilson had left his headquarters at Soumpasi at about 1am, hoping to arrive at Lamia in time for the meeting. He had about fifty miles to travel. A German air raid made trffic on the roads even worse, so General did not arrive at Lamia until 10am. 

In the meeting, General Papagos outlined the Greek situation. A feature of the situation was that the component divisions of the Western Macedonian Aemy had "taken to the mountains." It might take a couple of days for them to arrive at "Metsovon or Kalabaka". General Papagos approved of the British units with drawing to Thermopylae.

It seemed that General Papagos did not know that the British forces were already "on the move". 

As early as 13 April, the Leibstandart Adolf Hitler had been ordered "to the Klisoura Pass". General Stumme was more interested in the Servia Pass. He hoped to outflank the British. The 9th Armored Division was on the move and passed through Kozani. .By 14 April, the Germans had patrols across the Aliakmon River. By 14 April, the Germans thought that the British were "in full retreat".

The Germans had attacked Servia with an infantry regiment and had taken losses. "The Aolf Hitler Division" had pushed to the "Kastoria-Grevena Road" by 15 April. That cut off the Greeks that were retreating from Albania. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Trouble with the Greek Soldiers from 15 April and later

 Brigadier Savige probably drove to the bridge at the Kalabaka[Pindus road. He was to meet Lt-Col. King at the bridge. King gave Savige a report prior to Savige meeting with the Greek General. There was a problem with the Greek soldiers that were present, to the pont that the Australians fixed bayonets so as to intimidate the Greeks. The Australians wanted to force the Greeks back to the mountains.

The Australians were blocking each end of the bridge. They wanted to clear the Greeks out of the way. While Brigadier Savige was meeiing with Lt-Col. King,  convoy of luxurious Greek vehicles loaded with Greek officers arrived. The convoy was planning on crossing the bridge. The third car carried the Greek general, wwho waved at Savige.

It was about 6pm on 15 April that the Germans reached "the Kastoria-Grevena road". This was at Argos Orestikon. This had the effect of separating "the Greek Cavalry Division, the 9th, 10th, and 13th Divisions. These were the bulk of the Greek Maacedonian army. The army started to move to the west, towards the Pindus mountains. 

The remains of the 12th and 20th Divisions crossed the Aliakmon River. Their were going to Neapolis and Grevena. By the time Brigadier Savige met with the Greek general, the Greek army was left with the remaina of two divisions by Grevena. There was also a mass of inorganized Greek soldiers trying to move through Savige's force.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria", by Gavin Long.

Problems caused by Greek approach

 General Wilson visited Brigadier Savige and informed him about taking units for the new rear-guard and also told Savige that some 3,000 Greek troops would be dumped into his area. The men were unarmed and unequipped. It became evident that there was nothing that had been done to re-arm the Greeks.

Savige wrote of the Greeks: they "cluttered my forward area and added weight to the stream of refugees." The traffic on the road from Grevena to Trikkala. 

Brigadier Savige met with Lt-Col Barter, who was a liaison team leader with a Greek general with a bad reputation. The General was well-connected and that kept him out of trouble. Lt-Col Barter spoke fluent Greek, which was useful and unusual. He set up  a meeting between Savige and the Greek general.

Brigadier Savige later wrote about his experience. Savige talked about his concerns with the large number of unarmed Greek soldiers in the forward area. It is not surprising, sadly, that the Greek general suggested to Savige that he "machine gun them". Savige instead asked for some Greek officers to be sent to organize the men, 

The Greek general was assembling his army of Macedonia in the Pindus moutains. 

Savige felt that the Greek general was "double-crossing". His real opinion of the Greek general was pretty low. Savige applied pressure to get the general to remove his troops from Savige's "forwared area". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

In Greece from 14 APRIL 1941

Later in the day on 14 April, the Germans were pushing against the Greeks near the Aliakmon River. The Greeks were holdin the passes, but were under pressure. At one point, the Germans had reached within 200 yards ofr the Grevena Pass. The British armored brigade was situated  in the pass. The commander, Brigadier Charrington, decided to move "back to the Venetikos". The road was jammed with traffic and slowed the move. The vehicles were in both lanes, headed the same direction. They were moving very slowly.

By 7am, the German air force found them. There were Stuka dive bombers and probably fighters straffing the road. Considering the effort, the air attacks achieved surprisingly little results. The British force had reached the river by 5pm.

From the armored brigade, the 3rd RTR had to "abandon 7 tanks". The regiment had started with 52 tanks, but was now left with just six. The brigade still had the 2nd RHA, still in good shape. The 102nd Anti-Tank Regiment was fortunate to have only lost six guns. 

Brigadier Charrington had heard that the Central Macedonian Army was in bad shape. Tht was a worrisome report. Things were not as bad as they seemed. The 4th Hussars had sent out a patrol that found that the Germans had not yet crossed the river. The Germans also had not reached Grevena. General Wilson made a visit to the armored brigade on 14 April and ordered them to drive to Kalabaka.

It was on the night of 14-15 April that Savige Force was getting organized. They were not as strong as had been planned. They had the armored brigade headquarter squadron with 7 cruiser tanks. and a collection of other combat units. General Wilson arrived and informed Savige that he would need to supply units to a new rear-guard. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The surprise withdrawal

 The engineers had been ordered to complete the timber bridge by 9pm, but they were fortunate to finish the bridge by 10pm. The 19th Australian Brigade was to cross by 9pm. The engineers had been helped by men from the 26th New Zealand Battalion. 

As the bridge was being completed, the 19th Brigade were gathering "on the opposite bank". Vasey had only received his orders to withdraw by 5pm. He apparently had a warning at 1pm. The men were forced to abandon their vehicles at the river as there was no way to get them across the river. There was a similar problem with artillery. At least the Australian machine gunners were able to carry their 12 guns across the river.

A side effect of the failed attempt to aid Greece was that vehicles and artillery as well as other equipment was abandoned in Greece. That should not have been a surprise, as it was a forseeable situation. 

Thw 26th New Zealand Battalion acted as the rearguard for the retreating forces. The rearguard stayed in position until the two Australian battalions crossed. They waited for a missing company, but they never arrived. A guide left at the track to the river seems to have left his post. 

The company reached the river and crossed it using a boat they had found They joined some artillerymen, who gave the a ride in their vehicles, so they were able to withdraw. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

There were difficulties during the planned withdrawal to Thermopylae

 At one point, the New Zealanders took German prisoners. They captured some 147 officers and men, as well as thirty to forty wounded Austrian infantrymen. They eventually thought that the Germans had lost some four hundred men. The New Zealand units lost only eight men. 

The Australian historian pointed out that this was an unsupported frontal attack. Still, the Germans continued attacking the New Zealand troops. The enemy forces had the use of Servia, and could assemble their men in buildings. 

The British kept Servia under constant fire "from artillery., mortar and small arms fire." During 13 and 14 April, German aircraft  were divebombing the New Zealanders. The Stukas were equipped with sirens that generated enough noise to upset the men being bombed.

After dark, some of the New Zealanders pulled back from exposed positions. Some men from the 19th Battalion made a counter-attack and pushed back some forty Germans from the vicinity of Prosilion village.

"Early in the afternoon of 15 April, General Blamey ordered Mackay to reposition the 19th Australian Brigade to the other side of the Aliakmon River. There was no bridge in place. Men from the 2/1st Field company were ordered to build a timber trestle bridge. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events on the mountain on 15 June 1941

 The 2/1st Battalion was in a position that had some two feet of snow on the ground. They could expect to be fighting German mountain troops here. The Australians could not see the New Zealand unit that was closest, as they were actually some "six miles to the northeast". The Australians had spent the time since 12 April, climbing moutains. They had little rest in that time, and had little protection from the cold weather. 

The 2/2nd Battalion had occupied Hill 1628 on the southeast side of Moskhokorri. Their fellow battalion, the 2/3rd, was serving as the reserve. They were "to the south from the village". 

Allen's headquarters now had to find a way to tell the battalions to pull back to Thermopylae. They were not in telephone communication, so the only way was to travel paths along the "slopes of Olympus". 

A staff officer road a pony to deliver the orders to the 2/2nd Battalion. They had an order to turn over their position to the 2/3rd Battalion and then march down to the "southern end of the pass". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syia" by Gavin Long.

Events involviing the 16th Australian Brigade

 The plan being followed was to have the 16th Australian Brigade "fill the gap between the 5th and 6th New Zealand brigades. It was during the night of 15 to 16 April that the tail end of the 16th Australian Brigade moved across the Aliakmo River. 

The night of 15 to 16 April also saw the front half of the 2/2nd Battalion advanced to Moskhokhori. The next day saw the rest of the battalion joined the front half. After midnght of the next day, the whole battalion had moved to  spot past the village.

By early on 14 April, thet the 2/1st Battalion har advanced to a position past Volvendos and stopped "at the foot of the mountains". The other battalion, the 2/3rd stayed at Volvendos. 

During the night, the moon provided light from 10:15pm. Taking advantage of the moonlight, first the 2/1st Battalion managed to climb up to Moshkokhori followed by the 2/3rd Battalion.

By dawn, officers from Allen's headquarters were able to find the 2/1st Battalion and handed them ther orders where they were to climb between five or six miles into position "on the right of the brigade's front".

Some sappers who were in the village were told by villagers that Germans "behind them" had crossed the river. The sappers ans the one infantryman headed out  During the morning, the 2/3rd Battalion arrived at Moskhokori. The men were now almost out of the food they had brought from the Veria Pass. The food they had left tasted bad, almost like dog food.

The 2/1st Battalion arrived at their planned position by 9am on 15 April. They now were at something like 5,500 feet elevation  This is based on the account given in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

Continued action from 14 April 1941 in Greece

 During 14 April 1941, you had the 5th New Zealand Brigade sitting in the Olympus Pass.  The Katerini-Elasson road ran through the Olympus Pass. The brigade was deployed with the 23rd Battalion to the right of the brigade. The 22nd Brigade was sitting in the center of the front. The Maori's of the 28th Battalion were on the left. The 28th Battalion was located at Skoteina. The brigade had some artillery in support. They had the 5th Field Regiment and an anti-tank battery. 

There was a plan to move the 6th Brigade into a spot on the left of where the 5th Brigade was located. They saw some German vehicles "at 5pm on 14 April. By the time the artillery was given permission to fire on the vehicles, they had moved out of sight."

During the night ofo 14 to 15 April, the New Zealand troops could see German vehicles bringing troops forward. Sometime around 11pm, German motorcycles drove up the pass. They drew machine gun fire, and the next morning they found five motorcycles lying next to the road. 

During 15 April, there was more German vehicle traffic. They drew artillery fire, but were not fired upon by British artillery. It was only by 4:30pm that the Germans started to return artillery fire. The Germans did not make any attempt to attack on 1`5 April. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events in Greece from 13 to 15 April 1941

 We now look at the Greek armies during this period in April 1941. During 13 April, "the Greeks were holding the Pisoderion and Klisooura Passes". You had the Western Macedonian Army moving to the Venetikos Position during 13 April. The Epirus Army move started that night. "At noon on 14 April, the Germans drove the 20th Greek Division from the Klisoura Pass". The remnants of the 20th Division were ordered to "block the Grevena Road father south". 

During the 14th and the night ofo 14 to 15 April, divisions of the Western Macedonian Army were able to withdraw. 

The 11th Division had been sent to the Metsovon Pass and were able to move into their positions. 

It was on 14 April that the Germans "began probing the Anzac Corps positionns oh the Aliakmon line." We note that he New Zealand Division was now holding passes "on either side of Olympus. Some New Zealand engineers were given the task of "demolishing the tunnel and road at Platamon. The demolitions "were blown on 14 April, but were not successful". 

As a last resort, the engineers laid an anti-tank minefield on the "road over the saddle". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events proceed in Greece from 16 April 1941

 All British men who were not in mobile units and who otherwise were considered "marching units" were provided with motor transport.

Staff in Athens were doing advanced planning for a withdrawal of all British forces from Greece. As early as 13 General Wilson's staff told the naval staff that the army would soon begin to withdraw their forces from Greece. The naval staff were informed that the withdrawal could begin as soon as 15 April. 

In Egypt, General Wavell's staff did preliminary planning for a withdrawal. Around the time that General Wilson's withdrawal order was sent, the Germans had achieved virtual air control over the forward areas

The Germans made a dawn attack on airfields in the Larisa area and were able to destroy ten British Blenheim bombers on the ground. The British air commander witnessed the artack and ordered the surviving aircraft be flown to Athens  After their success, the Germans bombed the Larisa air field durin the day. 

The Germans also bombed Elasson, site of General Blamey's headquarters. British troopa loar their air support and only saw German aircraft in action. British aircraft had been operating effectively, often wthout their soldiers seeing them in action. 

During this period, Greek unts were able to hold the Germans in the "Pisoderion and Klisoura Passes. The "Western Macedonian Army moved into the Venetikos Position. It had "been about noon on 14 April when the 20th Greek Division had been driven out of the Klisoura Pass". This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.