Trying to get some clarity on 27 November 1941

General Godwin-Austen's message very early on 27 November 1941 had the problem that it sounded like the XIII Corps should cut loose and move into a general chase of the enemy forces. By midday, General Godwin-Austen had visited the New Zealand Division and could observe the state of the New Zealand Division and could see the battered division for himself. There was also the news of approaching German armored divisions headed towards the area of his corps from the Egyptian frontier. General Godwin-Austen cautioned General Scobie that the best that the New Zealand Division could do was to hold the ground that they had taken. The Tobruk force was given responsibility for holding open the corridor from Tobruk to Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed.
The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion were described as being "in the last ditch at Pilastrano". This reminded me of William III having coined the "last ditch" phrase, where he said that they would find his dead body in the "last ditch" of the defenses. They had been about to be ordered to handle more prisoners, but that was canceled and they were ordered to meet with Brigadier Martin, General Scobie's deputy commander. They received word that they were to be ready to move out in an hour. They would leave the fortress and move out to Gambut, following the Bardia Road. There were assorted rumors of mass Italian surrender.
When the time was almost 5pm, Colonel Burrows was called to meet General Scobie. He heard that the Tobruk fortress had been told to be prepared for a German attack, coming from Bardia. The 2/13th Battalion had become Tobruk's last reserve force. They needed to be ready to stage a counter-attack against German forces. They would be a blocking force on the Bardia Road. If the German attack did not happen, they would be in position to join a push to the east by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 2/Queens battalion south of the Bardia Road and the 1/King's Own on the north side. This move was planned to commence at 7am, if the German attack had not materialized.
As Colonel Burrows was leaving the meeting with General Scobie, he was informed that his battalion had been sent to a position across the Bardia Road, near King's Cross. Colonel Burrows reached his battalion in time to direct they dispositions. Conditions then radically changed and they were "miserable" because they had to endure 24 hours of rain. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Scobie has a bad impression of the New Zealand Division on 27 November 1941

During the 70th Division occupation of Ed Duda and the attempt at cooperation with the New Zealand Division, General Scobie was very irritated with the New Zealand Division and General Freyberg. General Scobie had ordered two of his senior staff officers to drive to Ed Duda. He had expected that the New Zealand Division would have created a controlled corridor from the rest of the division to Ed Duda. That had not happened and that indicated to General Scobie a sloppiness on the part of the New Zealanders.
Early during 27 November 1941, XIII Corps gave orders to the Tobruk Fortress, the New Zealand Division and to armored units. As soon as the situation had stabilized, they were to advance to the line of Tobruk, El Adem, and the Bir el Gubi track. Those orders went to the Tobruk headquarters, the New Zealand Division, and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The orders were that the New Zealand Division would continue west on the escarpment. The Tobruk sortie force would continue along in parallel on the north side. The Tobruk sortie force was asked to accomplish a great deal. They were to send "columns", approximating to the German battle groups, to the west to clear away the enemy from between Tobruk and Gambut. They were to occupy all the "landing grounds" in the area.
General Scobie responded that his troops holding Ed Duda needed to be relieved. That needed to happen so that they could provide enough strength for the clearing operation. General Freyberg sent a message that angered General Scobie. General Scobie replied that there were no New Zealand Division troops at Ed Duda on "square 424409." General Freyberg had said that his troops firmly held Ed Duda, when that was clearly not the case. He also had no idea where the Tobruk troops were located and he hoped that they would tell him.
At this point, General Scobie asked point blank if the New Zealand Division held :"Sidi Rezegh and the hill to the north". He also asked if his troops and tanks were under General Scobie's command. That at least got a reply from General Freyberg that the 44th RTR was needed to return to the New Zealand Division, but the 19th Battalion was available to help defend Ed Duda.
The Australian historian gives both the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk sortie force having lack of information about each other that caused severe miscommunication. The Tobruk sortie force was stretched across forty miles with out considering the clearing mission. General Scobie was also not aware of the condition of the New Zealand units and how close they were to the breaking point. He described them as "near exhaustion".
While General Scobie did not want to risk weakening the Tobruk defenses, he also thought that the enemy were close to "cracking" and that that they might see the enemy go into a general retreat back to the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. After General Godwin-Austen visited the New Zealand forces at lunchtime. He got a sobering view of just how shakey they were and that there was still the threat of approaching German armored divisions. General Godwin-Austen informed General Scobie that they New Zealand Division was only capable of holding their territory and that the Tobruk sortie force would have to lear a corridor to the New Zealand DIvision. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand plan for the fighting at SIdi Rezegh and Belhamed

The New Zealand plan for the battles at Sidi Rezegh, Belhamed, and Ed Duda were over-optimisitic. General Freyberg had expected to attack Belhamed and at Sidi Rezegh during the night of 25-26 November 1941. After Sidi Rezegh was captured, the 6th New Zealand Brigade would move forward and take Ed Duda. The two Zealand Brigades would move along each side of the Trigh Capuzzo. In the event, the New Zealanders were not ready to go at 9pm.
The 4th New Zealand Brigade easily took Belhamed, as they had not realized how little strength was holding the place. The Australian historian mentioned that the New Zealand division had not done any serious planning, and that contributed to the delays. The 6th New Zealand Brigade had trouble. The enemy was in the process of relieving some of the forces at Sidi Rezegh while they were reorganizing the defenses. That meant that the 6th Brigade was confused by what they were seeing. They had two sets of two battalions involved. The 21st and 26th New Zealand Battalions would move down the escarpment to the Trigh Capuzzo and then move to Ed Duda. The other two battalions, the 24th and 25th would move into a position and form a box defense above the escarpment.
One immediate issue was that there enemy units sitting in the way on the route to Ed Duda. There was not time prior to dawn to clear the way, so the move to Ed Duda was cancelled. At dawn on 26 November, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were disorganized and were under fire by the enemy. With trouble, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were able to hold onto their positions.
Once General Freyberg learned that the Tobruk sortie force had taken Ed Duda, he ordered the 4th Brigade to move to Ed Duda to join forces with the Tobruk force that was there. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was left to strengthen their hold on Sidi Rezegh. An ad hoc group of tanks from the 44th RTR were ordered to Ed Duda, to set off at 9:30pm. At 9:45pm, the 19h Infantry Battalion and six more tanks followed. They arrived at Ed Duda without any real opposition.
The night at Sidi Rezegh had been filled with desperate fighting, including charges with fixed bayonets. Two German strong points remained. One was at Sidi Rezegh and the other was between Behamed and Sidi Rezegh.General Scobie was dismayed to find that the New Zealanders did not control the area between Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed. We can only think that the New Zealand Division was still affected by the losses in the Battles for Greece and Crete. They were still not the old New Zealand Division that existed at the start of the Greek Campaign. Another possibility is that General Freyberg was overrated. His poor performance at Crete almost makes us think that could be the case. He may have had Churchill's complete confidence, but that does not mean much, sadly. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The plan for Ed Duda on 26 November 1941

The plan was to move forward at 12:05pm on 26 November 1941. Shortly before the Tobruk sortie force headed for Ed Duda, they got a message from the New Zealand Division saying that they were held up at Sidi Rezegh and at a hill aboutr 2 miles to the north-northeast. Despite that, the Tobruk force was committed to moving forward as planned. The 4th RTR was equipped with Matildas. They led the movement, followed by cruiser tanks and light tanks from the 1st RTR. They had artillery support from the 1st RHA. They crossed the four or five miles of desert in a short time. They reached the top of Ed Duda and then intended to run down to the "by-pass road", when they found themselves facing enemy guns at point-blank range. The tanks carried Besa machine guns, and they used them to fight the closest guns. The 1st RHA did what they could to engage the other guns.
After about 45 minutes, Brigadier Willison sent the 1/Essex forward. They had their carrier platoon in the lead Brigadier Willison thought that they made a "find spectacle". When the men had reached within about two hundred yards from the edge of the escarpment, they were hit hard ("bombed"). Despite taking heavy losses, the advance carried forward and took their objectives. The armored brigade drove to the "left flank" where they were ready to support the infantry if they were needed.
They found out that the 1/Essex had been mistakenly bombed by the RAF. The 1/Esses were in a position with the ability to defend in all directions. They were bothered by some German 210mm guns. Some German infantry attacked, but were driven back and about seventy prisoners were captured. Since the British controlled the access road now, they were able to set  ambushes that caught some German and Italians by surprise.
It turned out that the New Zealand Division were having trouble reaching Ed Duda, which the armored brigade had already occupied at about 1:30pm. General Scobie sent a message to General Freyberg that they had occupied Ed Duda and asked if they would please not have them bombed.
The New Zealand plan had been to make a night attack during the night of 25-26 November. The 4th and 6th New Zealand Brigades would take Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. They would then push on to Ed Duda. Belhamed turned out to be easy to take, but the fight for Sidi Rezegh did not go so well. The 6th Brigade was the one having a lot of trouble. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Scrambled cipher messages and misunderstandings and an attack on Ed Duda

The use of manual cipher systems that were laboriously applied seems to have created confusion in communication, not security. The communications in question were between General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander, and General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander. The plan seems to have been for the New Zealand Division to actually capture Ed Duda, but General Scobie had thought that his men would have to taken Ed Duda. General Freyberg and the New Zealand Division hoped to advance to Ed Duda during the night of 25-26 November 1941. They hoped that General Scobie's men would be able to move forward to Ed Duda sometime after daylight on 26 November.
General Godwin-Austen wanted Scobie to know that he did not need to take Ed Duda, as that was for the New Zealand Division to do. They did expected General Scobie and his men to make a diversionary attack that would divert attention from the New Zealand Division. General Scobie had a meeting prior to the planned diversion and ordered the Polish Brigade to make a feint in the west very early in the day. The enemy was not bothered by the feint. In fact, they attacked from the "twin pimples" area. The alternate plan then was to make the diversion in the sortie corridor and would be made against the eastern side.
In the evening at the Tobruk headquarters, they read that they New Zealand Division would attack Ed Duda at about 9pm. General Scobie's forces attacked the enemy outposts at Butch and Wolf. Men of the 2/Leicester and one squadron from the 7th RTR had a degree of success near the wrecked plane landmark. The operation near outpost Wolf did not do so well. The attack near Wolf involved the 2/Yorks and Lancs along with tanks from the 4th RTR. They took some 150 prisoners but the enemy counter-attacked and recaptured part of the area. At 7am the next morning, they attacked and took Wolf and some 150 prisoners. As many as 300 more enemy soldiers were able to escape across the escarpment. They could hear fighting some time after midnight, and they thought that they could hear 25pdrs firing.
The fortress troops got the codeword to attack Ed Duda by about 11am on 26 November. General Scobie seems to have decided to attack on his own. Communications were so bad, that the Tobruk forces had to intercept communications not directed at them in order to learn what was happening. They learned that a New Zealand brigade had taken Sidi Rezegh and was moving towards Ed Duda. Another message had wondered when the Tobruk sortie force would attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck replaces General Cunningham on 25 November 1941

The British seemed to be oblivious to what was actually happening, which saved them from losing the battle. Rommel had an opportunity to hit the British rear areas where there were administrative organizations as well as "supply bases". General Auchinleck had no idea what the actual situation was on the ground, so he ordered the commanders to keep attacking. The New Zealand Division also was in position to hit Rommel's vulnerable rear areas, but didn't know they were there.
General Auchinleck was a notorious poor judge of people. He had lost confidence in General Cunningham, so he removed him and replaced him with a very bad choice, Neil Ritchie, who was promoted to Lieutenant General for his new post. General Smith, "Chief of the General Staff in the Middle East" brought Ritchie to meet Cunningham, and informed him that he was being replaced.
Most of the New Zealand Division with "most of the 1st Army Tank Brigade" were moving towards Tobruk on the Trigh Capuzzo. back on 23 November, New Zealand units and the 8th RTR had taken Point 175 from the 361st Africa Regiment. 25 November saw the 4th New Zealand Brigade pushed out enemy troops from the escarpment above the Trigh Capuzzo. They also took Zaafran. The 6th New Zealand Brigade captured the blockhouse and moved onto the edge of the Sidi Rezegh airfield. Since the British had no idea of what the real situation was, they could make plans that were at odds with reality. General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander, was cut off from information, although his signal intercept people were able to give him better information than his superiors had bothered to give him.
When General Scobie found that he was to cooperate with XIIIth Corps to Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh, he ordered a group to consist of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade with the 1/Essex, to comprise all arms, to assembled during the night. General Scobie's plan was seemingly for the armored brigade to charge some seven thousand yards to Ed Duda, with an infantry battalion, and hold the place. Oddly enough, General Godwin-Austen assumed that his troops from the frontier would take the place, instead. Long messages were sent encoded, so that they had to be decoded to be read. General Godwin-Austen wanted the New Zealand Division to take Ed Duda prior to the sortie force from Tobruk would move towards the place.
In the evening, the fortress attacked strong points Butch and Wolf. The attack on Wolf was not successful until 7am on 26 November, when it was taken. There seemed to be fighting at Belhamed and beyong, towards El Adem. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Conflicting plans in the continued battles for Sidi Rezegh and the Egyptian frontie

We have to think that General Auchinleck was only vaguely aware of the risks he was taking in continuing the battle against the enemy forces on 24 November 1941. Auchinleck took full responsibility for the operations from that point. He still intended to defeat the German armor and drive the enemy back to the Tripolitanian frontier. He intended to recapture the ridge from Sidi Rezegh to Ed Duda. They would then make contact with the Tobruk sortie force. He depended on two New Zealand brigades and some Valentine infantry tanks to accomplish the task. That matched quite well what the commanders on the spot were doing. The 6th New Zealand Brigade moved up to Sidi Rezegh on 23 November. Their field artillery and anti-tank guns accounted from some of the German tank losses. The 26th New Zealand Battalion as only near the battlefield, wihile the 25th and 26th New Zealand Battalions were heavily engaged fighting German infantry from the 361st Regiment. The fighting took place near point 175.
The XIIIth Corps Commander was informed by General Cunningham on 24 November that he was took take charge of the relief effort for Tobruk, including the 70th Division and the Polish brigade. General Godwin-Austen had considered using the South African Division, but only one brigade was still uncomitted. By the end of 23 November, the Sidi Rezegh battlefield seemed to be a bad situation. The British felt defeated and were waiting to be gathered up by the enemy. The British 7th Armoured Division started 24 November in tatters.
Rommel's next move was typical of how he functioned. His mobile forces would drive to the southeast and turn and catch the British on the Egyptian-Libyan Frontier in the rear. By the evening of 24 November the 21st Armored Division had crossed into Egypt and was making for Halfaya Pass. The 15th Armored Division, though, had stopped while still in Libya. The Italian armored division, the Ariete was still near Bir el Gubi. By 25 November, the 21st Armored Division headquarters had reached the Halfaya area. they were having trouble getting fuel for making a move on Capuzzo. Their armored regiment had been spent by attacking Indian troops in the vicinity of the Omars. The 15th Armored Division was also low on fuel and had made moves against the New Zealand Divisiion rear. The Ariete Division accomplished little while sparring with the 1st South African Brigade near Gabr Saleh.
The German Africa Corps had spent much of 26 November working their supply problems. The 15th Armroed Division was near Bardia. The 21st Armored Division was still near Halfaya. The each sent a battle group to hit New Zealand battalions near Capuzzo, Musaid, and "upper Salum". The New Zealand battalions were able to hold onto their positions. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

70th Division and XIII Corps infantry and tanks were still effective from 22 November 1941

The events of 22 November 1941 left General Scobie with the impression that there was something wrong with the Crusader Operation. He decided to strengthen the position of the Tobruk Sortie force. They would go after nearby enemy outposts keep the pressure on the enemy.
In the afternoon, 32nd Army Tank Brigade along with infantry and the 1st RHA took outpost Lion. This lay to the right from outpost Tiger. General Scobie read a report that evening that the enemy had taken Sidi Rezegh. He also interpreted a message to mean that the New Zealand Division was moving to the "Tobruk front". On 23 November, the sortie force took Dalby Square. The enemy staged a counter-attack, but they British were able to hold onto Dalby Square. They captured some three hundred prisoners. The Tobruk force also captured the west part of Outpost Tugun.
The Tobruk sortie force had fired a lot of rounds of ammunition so far. General Scobie had asked to be resupplied with ammunition, but he received a reply that they could not send one to his force. That meant that the sortie force needed to conserve what ammunition it had. The Tobruk anti-aircraft guns did counter-battery firing..
At the start of the sortie from Tobruk, the Australian 2/13th Battalion was split into two parts. One part created a defensive position at the pass near Pilastrano. Two other companies were employed to continue to hold the Wadi Schel. They were involved with other tasks, such as grave digging at Tiger and guarding prisoners at the prisoner-of-war camp. Early on 23 November, they could see a wrecked ship on the coast. This was the wreck of the Maria Giovanni schooner, which had missed the harbor entrance and had run on the shore. The wreck was out of field gun range, so they tried to use anti-aircraft guns to destroy the wreck, but failed.
During the night on 24 November, Polish soldiers relieved the Australians at the Wadi Schel so that they were able rejoin the Australians near Pilastrano. That left the Australians with little to do for the time. That lasted for about two days.
General Scobie and his staff were studying message traffic. That seemed to show the enemy position becoming critical. The received orders to attack Ed Duda the next day with the New Zealand Division. They had been still short of ammunition, but then heard that they would receive some 600 tons from a ship that was due to arrive during the night on 26 November.
The situation early on 23 November was cause for General Cunningham to ask General Auchinleck to join him at the front. The Eighth Army staff had compiled British and enemy tank losses. The actual situation was even worse than they thought. During the first four days, the British ahd lost about 530 tanks. The enemy was thought to have lost only 100 tanks. The 7th Armoured Division had started with 500 cruiser tanks. After the four days, they had less than 90 runners. They thought that the enemy still had 250 tanks, of which 170 were German.
General Auchinleck ordered General Cunningham on 24 November to keep attacking, even fighting to the "last tank". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 November 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

22 November 1941 was a bad day for the British. Fighting near Sidi Rezegh, the British armor was defeated. The German 21st Armored Division moved into a position at Belhamed. They were engaged by the 7th Armoured Brigade and the artillery from the 7th Support Group. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades fought with the 15th Armored Division rearguard. By mid-morning, General Scobie was ordered to move the sortie force to Ed Duda and "shoot up the enemy tanks on the Trigh Capuzzo". The 7th Armoured Division was not in a position to support the attack at Ed Duda, but there was nothing that indicated that such an attack would be the wrong thing to do.
About this time, the 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to the Trigh 175, which lay on the north escarpment. The 5th South African Brigade was sent to the Trigh 178. Eventually, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was also sent to the Trigh 178 area.
By midday, General Scobie was informed that the situation had improved so that he did not need to attack. The situation near Sidi Rezegh seemed to be compatible with that assessment. The 5th South African Brigade was ordered to clear enemy forces from the from the south escarpment by the Trigh 178. Rommel overrode the British plans by ordering the 21st Armored Division to attack and recapture the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. The division was split into tanks and infantry, with the tanks to attack from the west and the infantry would attack from the north. They had the support of the army artillery group that was located near Belhamed.
The German infantry attack hit the 7th Support Group and pushed it off the escarpment above the airfield. The German tank attack hit the remains of the 7th Armoured Brigade. The 22nd Armoured Brigade launched a counter-attack. British tanks fired mainly at German tanks. The Germans used 88mm and 50mm anti-tank guns to shoot the British tanks to pieces. The 4th Armoured Brigade came up after the initial battle. By the time night had fallend, the 7th Armoured Brigade had only ten tanks left. The 22nd Armoured Brigade still had 24 tanks, about half a battalion. One German tank regiment overran the 4th Armoured Brigade headquarters and captured the entire headquarters except for the brigade commander. The Germans also captured 35 tanks and some guns.
This day saw the XIII Corpss in operation for the first time in the battle. General Freyberg had rodered the 6th New Zealaad Brigade to the Trigh Capuzzo to reinforce the British near Sidi Rezegh. General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander and 70th Division commander realized that something was wrong. His reaction to that was to strengthen his forces hold on the corridor out of Tobruk.
General Freyberg realized that he wanted the whole New Zealand Division near Sidi Rezegh, not just one brigade. They did leave some units behind to hold what they had captured, but the main division force would move to Sidi Rezegh. General Godwin-Austen agreed with the move.
On 23 November 1941, "Totensonntag" (Sunday of the Dead), The Germans had some 160 tanks, infantry battalions and assault engineers to attack the forces at Sidi Rezegh. British armor there was only 34 tanks, the remains of the 7th and 22nd Armoured Brigades. The 5th South African Brigade was also present. The Germans started the attack with about 170 tanks and ended the day with about 100 tanks. The British forces were decimated. The armored units had lost most of their remaining tanks. The 5th South African brigade was overrun and dispersed. By the next day, the 7th Armoured Division was reduced to ten running tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation was close to being changed for the better on 21 November 1941 near Tobruk

Early on 21 November 1941, General Norrie had proposed to General Cunningham that this might be a good opportunity to use XIII Corps against enemy positions near the Egyptian frontier. General Norrie had a mistaken impression about the previous day's situation, which was overly optimistic. General Cunningham knew about the German armored divisions move to the west, so this suggestion made sense to him. Cunningham told General Godwin-Austen that he could go into action, which is what he wanted to do anyway. General Godwin-Austen thought that his corps would be better utilized fighting rather than sitting, not in action. The proposed operation ultimately had the benefit of distracting Rommel at a critical point when he was within reach of winning. This eventually led to the tide of event turning in the British favor.
Not that long after the Support Group had taken a position on the ridge, just south from Belhamed, they were attacked on the eastern end by the German 21st Armored Division. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group fought the two German armored divisions. During the battle, Brigadier "Jock" Campbell was able keep from being destroyed, although they were pretty badly beaten by superior force. The Australian historian says that the British lost 15 to compared to the Germans. By night time, the 7th Armoured Brigade was reduced to 28 tanks still in operation. The other two British armored brigades had not joined the battle, as they had not been able to keep up with the Germans.
General Cunningham was at his command post that was far from the scene of the battle. Communication was slow, and those reports that he did see, were often inaccurate. He attempted to influence the course of the battle, but because his understanding was based on a mistaken impression of earlier information. He thought that the German armored forces were retreating and the sortie from Tobruk was about to approach Ed Duda. He thought that the force at Sidi Rezegh was not trying to move to Ed Duda to link up with the Tobruk sortie. Cunningham's appreciation was that a short move at night to Ed Duda would join the two groups. Generals Norrie and Gott were more focused on the events at Sidi Rezegh and to them, they thought that it was more important to clear German infantry that were on the escarpment to the southwest. The 5th South African Brigade was moved close to do the clearing.
The enemy commanders had some disagreements as to the best moves to make. They eventually decided to send the 21st Armored Division to Belhamed to join the 155th and 361st Regiments. They would be in position to block any move from Sidi Rezegh to meet the Tobruk sortie. They sent the 15th Armored Division into the desert some "7 miles south of Gambut". They thought that the division would be in position to hit the British flank. They were in difficult ground, which left them in a spot that would prove to be dangerous to the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From 20 to 21 November 1941 and the fighting for Sidi Rezegh

General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, was involved with the battle for Sidi Rezegh. He had been at Sidi Rezegh earlier in the day. After that, he had ordered the South Africans to send a brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They had dispatched the 5th South African Brigade. They were to be at Sidi Rezegh by 7am on 21 November 1941,, but they stopped at nightfall, we believe. They were still 17 miles away from Sidi Rezegh.
The South African division, although only one brigade was present, stayed at El Gubi with XXXth Corps' only medium regiment. The force at El  Gubi was to "mask" the Italian armored division, the Ariete. That seems to be an odd command to give a division, as masking was not explained.
General Gott arrived back at Sidi Rezegh in the evening of 20 November. He ordered the 7th Armoured Brigade and the Support Group to attack the enemy on the ridge above the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. They were supposed to open a path to the Trigh Capuzzo and Ed Duda. They would meet the Tobruk sortie force at Ed Duda. They attacked the morning of 21 November at 7:45am. The 70th Division group had started their sortie from Tobruk. The South African brigade had not arrived yet, as they were slowed by mud. Infantry from the Support Group captured the ridge. Tanks from the 6th RTR were able to push through, anticipating that they would be able to travel to Ed Duda. There was a problem, though. Rommel was present and sent four 88mm guns with the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to stop the tanks. The 6th RTR "was shot to pieces". They had managed to save enough tanks to form a squadron from the remains of the battalion.
General Gott traveled to meet the South African brigade. He stopped them some ten miles from Sidi Rezegh. Gott stayed with the brigade for much of the day. For some reason, he did not tell the brigade commander about the plan to send his brigade to Ed Duda to meet the sortie group from Tobruk.
The successes of the first part of Operation Crusader were the capture of the ridge at Sidi Rezegh and the captured of posts Tiger and Jack by the Tobruk sortie forces. The situation took turns for the worse quite soon after those successes. At Gabr Saleh, the enemy tanks pulled back and headed for Sidi Rezegh. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades chased the Germans,m who were thought to be fleeing. The British were able to catch the Germans and started a tank battle until the British started to run out of fuel. The German armor kept going, so that by 8am, they were getting close to Sidi Rezegh. The Germans attacked the Support Group on the ridge, who were desperately trying to hold the captured ground. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More nonsense by the British from 20 November 1941 onwards

As we mentioned, General Freyberg had offered the services of the New Zealand division to the 4th Armoured Brigade, but Brigadier Gatehouse was not interested. The New Zealand division had its complete complement of artillery, plus had a battalion of infantry tanks, besides. General Cunningham knew that the German armored divisions had concentrated and planned to attack the 4th Armoured  Brigade. He ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to join the 4th, but that did not happen until "late afternoon". The XIIIth Corps commander had approved the participation by the New Zealand division, but didn't want to have infantry involved.
The Germans were only able to bring one armored division to attack the 4th Armoured Brigade and the attack started at about 4:30pm. The battle continued until night ended the fight. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had arrived during the battle. The Germans were left in possession of the battlefield, where they were free to recover and repair their knocked out tanks. The 4th Armoured Brigade had lost 67 tanks since they had moved into Libya.
Rommel considered the 4th Armoured Brigade as being eliminated, so he ordered his two armored divisions to Sidi Rezegh. The BBC had helpfully informed the Germans about the objective of the Crusader Operation.
The Tobruk garrison got the message with the code word for them to sortie the next morning. If the British and German plans had both been executed, the Tobruk sortie would have encountered the two German armored divisions at Ed Duda.
The German infantry division, zbV, established a defensive position toward the south when they learned about the British attack from the Egyptian frontier. Because of the length of the line, they had to settle for a set of defensive spaced out over a large distance. The 361st Infantry Regiment was to the east of Sidi Rezegh, which had an airfield. They were on the escarpment, where they looked down on the Trigh Capuzzo to the north. The 153rd Regiment was to the southwest on a different escarpment. They could look down on the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. Another group, consisting of artillery with a battalion of the Bologna Division was located on escarpments near Belhamed. They were able to fire on the British all day on 20 November.
General Gott had visited Sidi Rezegh earlier in the day. After that visit had had requested that the South Africans send an infantry brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They did not arrive on the 20th and had stopped at night. They were wanted at Sidi Rezegh by 7am. The one medium artillery regiment from XXXth Corps was left at El Gubi. The South African brigade was also near El Gubi. They were now ordered to "screen" the Ariete Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Another look at the start of Operation Crusader

As we said, Operation Crusader achieved complete surprise when they attacked on 18 November 1941. The first moves saw the British take their initial objectives without meeting any serious opposition. General Cunningham's plan for Crusader actually hoped to get a response from the enemy. That did not happen partly because Rommel was focused on attacking Tobruk and also because the weather had grounded reconnaissance aircraft. That left General Cunningham thinking about what to do next. While he was thinking, his commanders took action on their own.
General Norrie decided that XXXth Corps would have Bir el Gubi and Sidi Rezegh as their objectives to start 19 November. 7th Armoured Division sent the 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack the Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi. The Ariete Division was in a good defensive position. The 22nd Armoured Brigade lost 25 tanks while the Ariete Division lost 34. The Italians were left in possession of the battlefield, so that they were in position to recover knocked out tanks.
7th Armoured Division, commanded by General Gott, sent the 7th Armoured Brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They overran the airfield and captured 19 Italian aircraft. They occupied a position at Sidi Rezegh.
The 4th Armoured Brigade, equipped with American Stuart tanks, sent the 3rd RTR (with Cricketeer Robert Crisp) to the northeast along with some King's Dragoon Guards Marmon-Herrington armored cars. They encountered the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit and chased them. That action finally elicited a response from the Germans. The 21st Armored Division commander requested the German Africa Corps commander to take action. General Cruewell got permission from Rommel to send a tank force to Gabr Saleh. With the Germans splitting their tank forces, the British might have taken advantage to concentrate and fight the Germans, but the British only had a tank battalion and a 25pdr battery with four 2pdr anti-tank guns at Gabr Saleh. They started fighting at about 2:30pm and kept going until it was getting dark. The 5th RTR came up to support the 8th Hussars. The British tanks suffered somewhat from the better German field artillery.
The Germans concentrated their armored divisions and planned to hit the frontier "from Sidi Omar northwards". If that had not happened, the enemy might have attacked Tobruk at the same time that the 70th Division sortie was planned. The British were scattering their mobile forces while the Germans were concentrating. The 7th Support Group was ordered to Sidi Rezegh to join with the 7th Armoured Brigade. They sent the South African division to Bir el Gubi so that the 22nd Armoured Brigade could be sent to Sidi Rezegh. That did not actually happen because the situation had changed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Ed Duda on 21 November 1941

The original time to start the operation to take Ed Duda was set a 1pm. The time had to be postponed to 2:30pm because of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. Some of the brigade's tanks had become involved in a fight against a counter-attack and "mopping up" operations. Brigadier Willison, the brigade commander, then came back with a comment that he needed to have his attack be at the same time as a move by the South African brigade. Then, there was a surprise announcement by XXXth Corps right before 4pm that they would not be able to support the Ed Duda attack because of a tank "battle 16 miles to the south-east". General Scobie responded to that news by cancelling the Ed Duda operation.
The battle had gone well on 21 November 1941. The Tobruk force had driven through about three miles of the surrounding positions. The way now seemed open for the Tobruk forces to punch through the enemy positions to the "open desert". They had taken some five hundred German prisoners and 527 Italians. That had been achieved at high cost. The Black Watch, alone, had about 200 dead.
22 November started with a message from XXXth Corps saying that their force at Sidi Rezegh was under heavy attack. They asked for the attack on Ed Duda right away to draw off some of the attackers. They hoped for enemy tanks on the Trigh Capuzzo to be "shot up". The 70th Division plan only expected to attack Ed Duda when the enemy armor had been "reduced". The failure of the attack on Ed Duda could put Tobruk at risk.
General  Scobie came back with the reply that they would attack Ed Duda if that is what XXXth Corps wanted. He asked XXXth Corps for instructions. By afternoon, they told him not to attack and that their situation had improved.
The plan for Operation Crusader had the prerequisite for the Ed Duda that the enemy tank forces be defeated. In fact, the 7th Armoured Division seemed likely to be defeated. They expected to be finished off the next day ("executed").
When the 8th Army crossed the Egyptian-Libyan frontier at the beginning of the operation, the same storms that had flooded wadis in Tobruk had flooded airfields in the area. That kept German aircraft on the ground so that they did not observe the movements of the British units. The attacking British units had taken their "first objectives" without much resistance. The large operation had achieved total surprise, thanks to the weather. The British had hoped to cause the enemy to respond, but they enemy was unaware of what was happening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action near Tobruk on 21 and 22 November 1941

The 4th RTR formed up on the battlefield, ready to proceed, but they were blocked by minefields "north and west" of the Tiger outpost. The unit was told to create havoc on the battlefield, with the assistance A/E Battery guns. They had at least stunned the defenses and by 8:30am inside of Outpost Tiger. Outpost Tiger had been transformed into about one thousand yards of infantry positions, dug in "flush with the ground". Sadly, the Black Watch were not able to take advantage of the situation, as they were too spread out.
British sappers and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards were busy "clearing minefields". There was finally enough space cleared for C Squadron of the 4th RTR attack the defenses. B Squadron of the 4th RTR were able to push all the way through Tiger. The survivors of the Black  Watch, about 200 men, charged and took Tiger. They were taking heavy machine gun fire from Outpost Jack. Enough men with 4th RTR tanks were able to take Jack. To the south west, they hit the Lion Outpost with artillery fire and overran it with tanks, but did not try to capture the outpost. Captain Jones from the 104th RHA arrived at Jack to set up a artillery observation post. There were very few men left there. Captain Jones took charge of what was left. A reinforcing company arrived eventually.
When the enemy positions were searched, they found that Jack had been a German battalion headquarters and "communications center". The successful attack had disrupted Rommel's plan to attack the 7th Division in Tobruk. The enemy had been getting ready to attack Tobruk the next day. The attack had created a breach between the Africa zbV Division and the Italian Bologna Division. They found that Rommel had warned his men of a pending British attack. They suspected that Rommel's battlefield signals intelligence unit had found out about what was being planned by the British.
There had been another attack on the right against Outpost Tugun by the 2/Queens but they had been stopped, as they had insufficient strength. The 2/Queens was augmented by a company from the "Beds and Herts" and attempted another attack, supported by a 7th RTR squadron. They managed to take the eastern end of Tugun. They were not able to take the western end.
The Eighth Army issued a situation report at about 9am on 21 November. The report described the positions of the 4th Armoured Brigade and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. They were said to be following the "retreating enemy armored forces". They were moving to the northwest. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group were located at Sidi Rezegh, hoping to hit the retreating enemy. Later, XXXth Corps reported that the 5th South African Brigade. General Scobie, the 70th Division commander decided to attempt to capture Ed Duda. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk's sortie during Operation Crusader in November 1941

The sortie by Tobruk's garrison during Operation Crusader began early on 21 November 1941. The Polish brigade's attack followed the plan. They got the enemy's attention, although did not mislead anyone. They drew enemy fire, but not an extreme amount. The 23rd Brigade attack also followed the plan, but was not able to capture the outpost Plonk. They did create a stir and attract the enemy's attention.
The force from Tobruk was able to form-up successfully. The enemy did not interfere with the operation. The artillery firing and the demonstration by the 23rd Brigade created enough noise that the enemy was not able to hear the noise from the vehicles driving into position. The enemy had responded to the 23rd Brigade activities with counter-battery fire that helped to mask vehicle noise. The infantry would set off at about 6:30am. To the left, the enemy had occupied outpost Butch, so Butch would need to be "neutralized". For the sortieing force would pass Butch on the way to the Tiger outpost. The 2/King's Own was ordered to take Butch. The 2/Black Watch would attack Tiger after overrunning outpost Jill. On the left, the 2/Queen's would attack Tugun. This was "far on the left flank".
Artillery started firing at outpost Butch at 6:20am. The 2/King's Own only took ten minutes to capture outpost Butch. They were supported by nineteen Matilda tanks from the 7th RTR. They killed 30 Germans at Butch and took ten prisoners. The British had expected that Butch would be near the boundary between two Italian divisions and would be backed by a few "strong points". In fact, the area was a defended position held by German infantry. They had apparently only moved into the area about six days before being attacked. The captors found documents describing a system of defensive positions with code names that were concealed. There were minefields that had no markings. There were enemy positions north of Butch which were not attacked for a number of days.
The Black Watch attackers moved forward at 6:30am. They were to take heavy casualties, as they lost half of their men. They were not accompanied by any tanks. The only tanks nearby were a "squadron of cruisers" which were being saved for later. They found that they took longer to pass over the bridges across the anti-tank ditch. The infantry commanders had decided to conduct their assault without tanks, as they wanted to take advantage of the artillery supporting fire that would be fired on a timed schedule.
The attack did not go as planned, although brave soldiers led by good men did the best that could be done. The plan assumed that Jill could be easily overrun, but Jill was actually strongly held. The men of the Black Watch tried to move forward, but were shot. The Matilda tanks and a company of the 2/King's Own eventually arrived and that allowed them to overrun outpost Jill. The Black Watch had lost a company in the process of attacking Jill. That left them without the force needed to attack outpost Tiger. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The planned sortie from Tobruk during Operation Crusader in November 1941

For Operation Battleaxe, General Morshead and Brigadier Wooten, the 18th Australian Brigade commander, had planned a sortie that resembled what was planned for Crusader. The objective for the sortie was Ed Duda. General Cunningham spoke with General Scobie and Brigadier Martin at a meeting in mid-October 1941. General Scobie was still on his way to Tobruk at the time to take command. He promised the South African General Brink that he would provide a squadron of cruiser tanks when they moved to meet them in Ed Duda. General Scobie had no way of knowing that the cruiser tanks in Tobruk were in bad mechanical condition. What happened was that only eight of the cruiser tanks were runners as of the end of the first day of the sortie from Tobruk.
The Australian historian said of the sortie plan that "it worked". Some plan features were unfortunate. They were planning to send their tanks off along with artillery so far away that the Tobruk garrison would not be able to support them. Another unfortunate choice was to promise a corridor with vulnerable flanks that would be held. They would be forced to conduct operations to hold the flanks.
The planners assumed that they would be unable to surprise the enemy. A feature of the supporting operations that were proposed was that they would succeed in alerting the enemy at various points about the fortress perimeter. The sortie would first break through the enemy defensive line and occupy captured positions. That would be followed by combined arms of tanks and infantry to push out to Ed Duda and take that feature. The tanks would lead the column in the attack.
The details were that the initial objective, a location named Tiger, was 2-1/2 miles out from Tobruk. The mechanized force was such that they would use eight bridges to cross the anti-tank ditch at night. The force would deploy in "No-Man's Land". Before they could attack Tiger, they had to overcome outposts "Butch, Jill, Tugun, Lion, Cub, and Jack". They had to at least "neutralize" "Tugun, Lion, Cub and Jack". If they could accomplish all that, they would still have to drive another five miles to reach Ed Dudaa.
The first move would be taken by the Polish Brigade at about 3am. They would mount raids with artillery bombardment. The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion would join the operation with a patrol. They would act as if they were going to attack an Italian defensive position "Twin Pimples". Two Polish battalions would move out to the left of the Australians. The 23rd Brigade would create a diversion near the road block at El Adem. This was all starting early on 21 November 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The operation to relieve Tobruk gradually progressed from 18 November 1941

We learn that the Eighth Army movement forward built confidence in the men that their force was strong and could beat the enemy. The men were isolated and without information about the attack progress. All they would hear were rumors. They would occasionally be in a fight with the enemy, but they lacked knowledge about the larger picture.
The men in Tobruk were especially isolated. Their impression was that the operation was behind schedule and that there was a great deal of confusion. All the men knew was their own situation, without knowing anything about what the grand design included. They thought that they knew about a proposed connection with the relief force at Ed Duda. That seemed like a main objective, so that when they received news about developments, they had trouble making sense of what they heard or read.
Tobruk got the "Tug" code word on both 18 and 19 November. "Tug" meant that they were not to attack. The 2/13th Battalion only received some news about the battle late on 19 November. The information that they did receive was old, since the date was from 10:45am on 18 November. The information was useless, because the location of British tanks was wrong. There were still no British tanks anywhere near Ed Duda, at least not within 30 miles.
Early on 20 November, they received a message about British tank locations early on 19 November. The 7th Armoured Brigade was moving to Sidi Rezegh. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was moving towards Bir el Gubi. The 4th Armoured Brigade, equipped with Stuart tanks, fought a battle with sixty enemy tanks and had driven then to the north. The men in Tobruk had expected that the South Africans would take Sidi Rezegh, but they were reported to be at Ed Gubi, very far to the south. The men in Tobruk saw forty British fighters fly over. The diarist from the 104th RHA wrote that he had not seen anything like it before. Somewhat later, the men in Tobruk could see the flashes of guns firing and tracers into the sky from near Sidi Rezegh. They men also heard about a large tank battle the previous day where the British had knocked out 27 enemy tanks for the loss of 20 of their own. The men knew that there were units from the frontier close to the Tobruk perimeter. The attackers seemed to be achieving what was desired.
The next thing that the men in Tobruk learned was that the "Pop" code word was finally issued by XXXth Corps. They would sortie from Tobruk the next morning. More detailed instructions were issued by telephone from the Tobruk phone network. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

No information for Tobruk from 15 November 1941 onwards for some days

From the afternoon of 15 November 1941, Tobruk was informed that there seemed to be a danger from an enemy attack on Tobruk at "the western beaches". They also heard that the attack could include an attack by paratroopers. The Polish chief of staff notified the 2/13th commander about the possible attack. The 2/13th Battalion would be supported by the 1st RHA, which had received more vehicles so that the regiment was very mobile. The 2/13th were "stood to arms" from dusk. They sent patrols along the beaches and "the headlands". In the event of an attack, they would send a code word and one company would be in position to block any advance into the fortress.
In the event, nothing happened. They were not even told of how the British operation was faring. The next night, the 2/13th Battalion again were prepared for action. This night, the 1st RHA was pulled back to support a sortie from Tobruk. The only noteworthy thing that night were rain showers.
The 2/13th Battalion again was ordered to guard the beaches during the night of 17-18 November. The Australians were still without any word as to the British attack or any German "combined operation". The lack of information about how the Crusader Operation was progressing seemed all too much like what had happened during Operation Battleaxe, which had eventually failed. They could only speculate as to what was happening in the absence of messages.
The summer had been rain-free at Tobruk, but so far after 15 November, the skies were cloudy with some showers and lightning. There was sufficient rain that anything dug into the ground was soon filled with water. The defenses were not designed to deal with water. The men from the 2/13th Battalion at the Wadi Schel pumping station made a quick withdrawal. The men were in carriers and their withdrawal was not what was planned. The rain triggered flares and rockets. By morning, there were Australians on the enemy side of the Wadi Schel, where they were waiting for the rain water to drain.
By morning, men on both sides stood around in groups, driven from their positions by rain water. Only in the Salient did the Poles set up machine guns and start firing at the enemy. The enemy raised white flags, asking for the firing to stop. When the firing ceased, the work started to remove water and dry their clothes. The enemy soldiers set fires in their improvised blanket tents. The Polish soldiers stopped firing and the Australians started brewing tea. The ceasefire allowed officers from the RHA to visit the Salient area to observe the enemy positions. The 17th was the Operation Crusader delayed start. In the Polish brigade, they noted that 18 November 1941 was a day of not action on either side. By the night, the situation changed back to normal. That mean that they now shot to kill, their "old habits". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
.

The run-up to the battle in November 1941 near Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier

In November 1941, the Axis supply situation for Rommel's army was getting worse. Despite this, Rommel was determined to mount an attack on Tobruk. Rommel felt that he could attack in three days. Intelligence kept him informed about the British increase in forces that was occurring. Rommel thought that if they could take Tobruk in three days, the British would not be able to counter-attack from Egypt.
The British planned to launch their offensive at almost the same date as when Rommel planned his attack. In early November, he had planned to attack on November 15, the same date that Crusader was scheduled to start. Rommel's Qusrtermaster-General sent a report to Rommel saying that they had enough supplies to attack Tobruk, but not to advance further east. British surface forces had destroyed a convoy on 9 November.
The German intelligence staff at headquarters reported the same as Rommel's intelligence staff that the British were not going to attack soon. The Italian commander, General Bastico, had intelligence information that the British were about to attack. This was the correct information. The Italians thought that the British would attack when Rommel's army was busy attacking Tobruk.
Rommel attended a meeting in Rome where he was authorized to mount the attack on Tobruk. Rommel won his point by engaging in a shouting match with his detractors, which may have been his usual style of operation. They set the date for Rommel's attack as 21 November. Coincidentally, the British attack was also postponed. The South African commander disliked the low priority given training. He insisted on more time to train his soldiers. General Brink asked for a postponement to 21 November, but the date was only changed to 18 November. That way, the British attack would start prior to Rommel's planned attack date.
Forces in Tobruk did not learn about the postponement from 15 November 10 18 November. They were to be ready to move out from Tobruk early on the day when the operation would commence. The plan, over-optimistic as it was, expected that British armor would defeat the German armor in the first day. 30 October was significant because Tobruk would come under 8th Army command on that date. Once the operation started, they would report to XXX  Corps. The corps would issue a code word to indicate that the sortie from Tobruk should start. At 6pm, the night before, XXX Corps would send a code word to the headquarters at Tobruk. "Tug" would indicate that they should not attack the next day. "Pop" would indicate that they should attack the next morning.
When the fortress troops were ordered to attack, some troops would "either fight or feint". The men in Tobruk had a practice held on 13 November. The infantry saw the tanks that would support them during the real attack. The fortress commander addressed the troops and told them that they would only attack when the British armor had beaten the German armor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.