The 9th Australian Division relieves the 6th Australian Division in early March 1941

The 6th Australian Division was destined for the Greek operation. That meant that their forward troops in Cyrenaica would be replaced. The 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige would be replaced by the 20th Brigade. There was one company of the 2/13th Battalion that was left at Barce so that they could protect the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. The rest of the 2/13th Battalion was positioned at Beda Fomm. The rest of the brigade drove through territory still occupied by Italian colonists. They were headed for Agedabia. At 8th March, the 9th Australian Division headquarters was at Tobruk. General Morshead had gone ahead to Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was temporarily in charge of the forces in the western portion of Cyrenaica. General Morshead heard from General Neame that the plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division to take responsibility for the forces on the frontier as of 19 March 1941. At that point, General Morshead was supposed to move to Gazala. Mersa Brega, the small place in the sand and marshes, was vulnerable to being out-flanked from the south. The 3rd Armoured Brigade had the 3rd Hussars with 32 Light Mk.VIB tanks to protect the flank. The 6th RTR was being equipped with captured Italian M13/40 tanks at Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

An unfortunate situation in February 1941

General Blamey's desire to send the best Australian troops to Greece meant that the Western Desert was left in a difficult situation. The 9th Australian Division had the most newly-recruited troops and were about to face the Germans. The 20th and 26th Brigades had been taken from the 7th Australian Division, which was their home unit. The Australian Official History mentions that the 18th Brigade wore their 6th Australian Division patches through the rest of the war. Division identity was a meaningful thing, and the former 7th Division brigades had thought that they had lost their better organization and had been moved to a higher numbered division, the 9th. A meeting was held on 26 February where the reorganization was said to be "temporary". The men had been "trained to fight", but their leaders were not yet trained to lead. The 20th Brigade was the first 9th Australian Division brigade to move west. They were mainly moved by train to Mersa Matruh. By 4 March, they had reached Tobruk. Two days later, they were west of Derna. They had passed Benghazi on 8 March. Not much later, the 20th Brigade arrived at Agedabia to take over from the 17th Australian Brigade. The plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters to be in charge at Agedabia, but they were not in place yet. The 17th Brigade was still in place at Marsa Brega, a name with which we are very familiar, being long-time students of the North African campaign. Marsa Brega had sand dunes, "rolling ground", and marshes. That seems rather unexpected for desert terrain. Brigadier Rimington and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were to protect the area south of Marsa Brega from attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events in early 1941 as the Greek operation started

Events moved faster in early 1941 as the Greek campaign commenced. After General Wynter's illness, the 18th Brigade commander, Brigadier Morshead, was appointed as 9th Australian Division commander. Lt-Colonel Wooten became 18th Brigade commander in Morshead's place. Wooten became a brigadier and Morshead became a Major-General.

Much of the action for Greece started in February 1941. General Wavell informed General Blamey of the plans for Greece right before Anthony Eden and General Sir John Dill arrived in Cairo to start negotiations with the Greek Government. The Greek Government had agreed to a British expedition on 24 February. General Blamey had gotten his way on sending the 6th Australian Division to Greece and kept the 9th Australian Division in Libya. Almost immediately, elements of the 2nd Armoured Division started the process of replacing the 7th Armoured Division in Cyrenaica, the portion of Libya that the British had taken. Lt-General Neame replaced General Wilson as the Cyrenaica Command commanding officer. Neame had been the 4th Indian Division commander from February 1940. In August 1940, he had been appointed as GOC of Palestine and Transjordan. He had wanted to command in the campaign against Italy in late 1940 until early 1941, but had to watch the successful campaign.

General Blamey announced a reorganization of Australian forces on 26 February 1941. The result was that the 9th Australian Division had three brigades, the 20th, 24th, and 26th Brigades. They got their three field regiments and an anti-tank regiment. The 9th Australian Division then had to move quickly to arrive in the Western Desert, as the 6th Australian Division was to go to Greece and needed to be relieved. The 24th Brigade was short, as they only had two complete battalions. The third battalion was still at Darwin in Australia, and would not arrive until April, according to the plan. This is baed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division formed

The two Australian brigades in England in 1940 were the 18th and 25th Australian infantry brigades. The Official History calls them two of the first-enlisted and best-trained of the Australian brigades. General Blamey criticized the decision to combine these brigades with newly formed units. The 8th Australian Division, to be sent to Singapore, lost the 24th Brigade to the 9th Division. They also lost the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment and field companies to the 9th Division. The 8th Australian Division units were still in Australia in late 1940, but at least they existed. Major-General Wynter, then in England, was appointed as commander of the 9th Australian Division on 23 October 1940. He left England by sea in mid-November 1940. He left the convoy at Capetown and went by air to Cairo. He formed the division headquarters in Palestine on 24 December. They division only had two field regiments and one field company of engineers at first. Even as the units sailed, the division composition changed. When the 25th Brigade arrived in March 1941, it had been reassigned to the 7th Australian Division. General Wynter had to be replaced after he had fallen ill. He was replaced by Brigadier Morshead, who had been the 18th Brigade commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Decisions in early 1941 for Greece and Libya

General Wavell, the theater commander in the Mediterranean and the Middle East thought that they would have until May 1941 before they would have to defend against Germans. They did not realize that Rommel would act sooner, even before his commanders were ready. The original plan was to retain the 6th Australian Division in Libya, as they were there best Australian infantry division. They would send the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to Greece. General Blamey got involved and was able to change the plan, so that the 6th Australian Division went to Greece. General Blamey was concerned that the Greek campaign was so hazardous that they needed their best troops for the mission. The 9th Australian Division ended up being left in Libya on the defensive. The division was formed on 23 September 1940. Most of the units that comprised the 9th Australian Division had been formed for other purposes. There were two Australian brigades in England at this time, and they would be used for the new 9th Australian Division. The division's artillery was found by taking the I Australian Corps field regiments and converting the one medium regiment to field guns. They would form the third brigade in Australia and ship it to the Middle East, along with the other supporting units. Vol.III of the Australian Official History is primarily about the adventures of the 9th Australian Division in 1941 and 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Taking chances in early 1941 in the Western Desert

While embarking on Churchill's and the War Cabinet's latest adventure, General Wavell was ready to take extreme chances with the defense of North Africa. He would lose his bet, in the event. There were many complications. The 2nd Armoured Division had recently lost its commander. Major-General Tilly had died suddenly after arriving in the Middle East. He was replaced by Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece. He was to become a prisoner of war, along with some notable officers from the campaign against Italy. As we have noted, the 2nd Armoured Division was split into two parts. As the Official History notes, the best part was sent to Greece. The Western Desert defense was left to one weak armored brigade and one-and-a-half motorized infantry battalions. The one infantry division was "static". The 2nd Armoured Division brigades had only two tank battalions or regiments in each. We have the situation where you had the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment and the 3rd Hussars, a cavalry regiment. They were the same sort of unit, in practice, but with different sorts of names. General Wavell's idea for adding strength to the brigade left in Libya was to create the 6th Battalion of the RTR (usually called the 6th RTR). The unit would be equipped with captured Italian tanks, probably M13/40 tanks. Although not mentioned, the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment received a mix of Italian M11/39 and M13/40 tanks. There is a picture that shows them with large, white Kangaroos painted on them. The decision was made to add the 3rd Indian Motor Btigade to the forces in Libya when they had completed their training. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The commanders in Britain and the Middle East were indulging in wishful thinking in February to March 1941

When the 2nd Armoured Division arrived in the Middle East, the commander, Major-General Tilly, remarked that the division's cruiser tanks had worn out tracks and engines. General Wavell's reaction to that information was that perhaps, they would do better in the desert than they would have somewhere else. Of course, the British in the Middle East lacked tank transporters, vehicles that were later considered to be essential. The Germans had to demonstrate their utility before the British could learn. The British were trying to get by with as little effort and expense as possible, yet try to take on large responsibilities. The British solved their tank problem by shipping them to Greece, where they broke down in the mountains. Given the current operations, there were the New Zealand Division, the three Australian Divisions (the 6th, 7th, and 9th), one British division (the 6th, eventually renamed the 70th), and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. For the divisions, they were short of artillery and other supporting arms. Wavell sent the best armor to Greece and kept the worst in the Western Desert. Of course, Churchill and the War Cabinet were driving events, so they were ultimately responsible for the results. Wavell was a man desperate to hold onto his position as the theater commander, so he did whatever was asked, whether it was a good idea or not. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The strategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea in late 1940 and early 1941

From the German perspective, plans were in flux. They had backed off from any attempt to invade Great Britain from the continent in late 1940. They also decided to forego an attack to take Gibraltar and seal the Mediterranean from the west. The biggest decision made in December 1940 was the decision to prepare to invade Russia. At the same time, Hitler decided to occupy Greece and Yugoslavia. Germany was limited to opportunistic changes to plans based on the current situation. One fateful decision was to send a German force to North Africa to retrieve the situation in the Western Desert where the Italians had been pushed back by a successful British offensive. They only hoped to hold Tripolitania and possibly to advance to Benghazi.

Fortunate for the Germans and Italians, Churchill had decided to send forces to Greece, which would have the affect of jeopardizing the recent gains in Cyrenaica in Libya. Before that happened, the forces available included the 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division in the Western Desert. Of the rest, the largest group was in Egypt, in the process of formation: the 2nd Armoured DIvision, the 6th British Division, the New Zealand Division, and the Polish brigade. Also in Palestine were the 7th Australian Division and the 9th Australian Division. They were still incomplete with more troops still in transit. The rest were in East Africa. Two Indian divisions were in Eritrea, the 4th and 5th. The 1st South African Division and two African divisions were in Italian east Africa.

The armoured divisions were both weakened. The 7th Armoured Division had been expended in the attack on Libya. They were not capable of operations without being refreshed. The 2nd Armoured Division was weak and still being formed. The British had tank problems in late 1940 and early 1941. The tanks that they had tended to be in poor mechanical condition. The commander of the 2nd Armoured Division had complained to General Wavell on his arrival of the poor mechanical condition of his cruiser tanks. This is baaed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume of the Australian Official History

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume covers a long period, from March 1941 until December 1942. The second volume overlaps with this volume, in that it covered the Greek campaign, the battle for the island of Crete, and then the campaign in Syria and Lebanon against the Vichy French. Much of this volume involves the 9th Australian Division, from forming the unit until the division left the Middle East. This volume was published in 1965, so this was a period when anti-war fever was at a peak and some Australians apparently criticized publishing an official history about war. That attitude misses the point, though, because official histories chronicle the operations conducted by men, fighting against an enemy that needed to be beaten. The Australian volumes generally look in greater detail about operations than the British official history. That makes the Australian volumes more valuable, because they are a great learning tool that is available to us. They also describe the achievements and, yes, failures of men struggling in adversity. In this case, we know the outcome, and that it was successful. The author of this volume, Barton Maugham, was a veteran who served in the Western Desert, "mainly in the 2/13th Battalion". As we have said, Chester Wilmot was the intended author of this volume, but he died before he could start. Barton Maugham started the volume in 1955. Writing the volume was apparently a ten-year task. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Finishing Volume II of the Australian Official History

We are now concluding the summary of Volume II of the Australian Official History for the Army in World War II. The author, Gavin Long, says that the Australian Army (the Australian Imperial Force) had shown itself to have grown into an army that was as capable as a long-term, "regular service" force. They were volunteers, as there were no draftees in the army. The Australian units had developed an esprit de corps as the natural result of experience in combat in a variety of campaigns. They had fought in the Western Desert, in Greece, Crete, and in Syria and Lebanon. They had gained the respect of their opponents, at least in Syria.

The force was caught by surprise by the Japanese attack on 8 December 1941, and the men were slow to realize that they might be headed to the Far East. They had shown that there was some wisdom in fighting against the Axis powers, where ever they might be, as they were potential threats to the Australian homeland. They had gained valuable combat experience that would help them in future battles, both in the Middle East and the Far East. We will be moving on to Volume III of the Australian Official History, about Tobruk and El Alamein. The plan had been for Chester Wilmot to write the volume, but Barton Maugham was the eventual author.

Knowledgeable Censors in North Africa in 1941

The Australian Official History suggests that the best censor is someone trained as an intelligence officer who has extensive newspaper experience. Apparently, the British censors lacked both sorts of experience. They were said to have been open to pressure by the large British newspapers. General Blamey's intelligence officer, Lt-Colonel Rogers, had stepped in and had set up a censor for Australian news in Cairo. His choice was Major Fenton, who had experience since 1939 in intelligence and had been a "senior newspaperman" before the war.

Australian news that would benefit the army needed to be aware of Australian issues. There were times when the best solution might be to provide a soldier's name to the press or his Australian state. The concern was to help the news consumers in Australia while not revealing information that would help the enemy. They also did not want someone who lacked Australian experience saying something that would offend people in Australia. South Africa had this sort of problem due to their racial setup and with anti-war activists.

One lesson that is still highly relevant is that a spokesperson needs to know what is being planned and what is really happening. One important goal is to not be seen as either ignorant or as someone being dishonest. In either case, the actual situation might be that the senior officers had not seen fit to share important information or had not trusted the spokesperson with the plans or events on the ground. Another issue was that the powers-that-be in London wanted to describe New Zealand, Australian, and South African troops as "British Imperial troops". The Australians were able to defeat that practice during the Syrian campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australian army officers in 1941

The result of the Australian participation in combat in 1941, was that they had increased confidence in their senior officers. Of the younger officers, General Lavarack was promoted. General Wynter, who had advocated concentrating on defending Australia, had a health breakdown that removed him from a combat opportunity. He had been the Australian commander at first. There were now militiamen commanding Australian divisions. Generals Morshead and Allen had been battalion commanders in the Great War and then were brigadiers and division commanders in 1941. Most of the brigadiers in 1941 were not professional soldiers. One problem was that many Australian officer candidates were not immediately commissioned when they graduated the course. Many officers received as reinforcements from Australia were not as capable as the officer candidate graduates. The success rate for the officer candidates was much higher than that for reinforcement officers.

The Australian army had a successful system for historical records. The system had been started during the Great War. From 1914, C. E. W. Bean had been a war correspondent for Australia. In 1941, the head of the Australian War Memorial had been an assistant to Bean. A photographer and cinematographer were added in 1940. General Blamey also added a war artist, Ivor Hele. They ended up with two organizations, one for immediate news for publication and the other for historical records. The system performed badly in the Libyan campaign against the Italians, because of a flawed system for allocating vehicles for correspondents. The result was late or lost material. General Blamey's intelligence officer established a censor in Cairo, who was the ideal combination of newsman and intelligence officer. That was a system that performed well over time. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Dual responsibilities for an Australian commander in 1941

General Blamey had been the commander of the Australian contingent in the Mediterranean and Middle East in 1941. When he was appointed deputy commander, under General Wilson, that created a problem. Several times during 1941, a Dominion commander as appointed to critical commands. On short notice, General Blamey had been put in charge of the retreat and withdrawal from Greece. General Freyberg, from New Zealand, had been put in charge of the defense of Crete. Sometime during the fighting in the Western Desert, and then again in Syria, General Lavarack was put in charge. General Lavarack was younger than the others and was a more junior officer in the Great War. The Official History suggests that when General Blamey had been appointed as Deputy Commander, that the Australian Government might have put someone else in charge of their forces in the Middle East.

The Australian Official History blames the errors in command, rightly so, on Churchill and his closest advisers in Britain. With General Wavell as the theater commander, he had successfully defeated the Italians in the Western Desert and in Ethiopia (they call it Abyssinia). When the main players in Britain decided to move into the Balkans that they put the Western Desert in jeopardy. They very nearly lost everything due to throwing away army and naval forces in the Greek campaign and the battle for Crete. General Wavell was made a scapegoat for Churchill's errors in policy and planning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Assessing the early war period Australian policies

Prior to the end of 1941, the principal Australian war effort was concentrated in the Middle East and Africa. Australian strategic policy thought was divided between those who wanted to be intimately involved with the British Commonwealth on defense matters and those who were inclined to operating independently, as they disapproved of "British Imperialism". The Australians in 1939 and 1940 had policies that were a mixture of supporting the British Commonwealth and operating independently. One conclusion of the Australian Official History was that either the British Indian Army or the Australian Army were sufficiently strong to have won a campaign against the Italian Army in Africa. They point out that the British did not sufficiently appreciate how good the Indian Army was during this period. We could conjecture that the reason was racism from a faction of the British establishment. Both Generals Wavell and Auchinleck were very knowledgeable about the British Indian Army and we would expect that they could appreciate their capabilities.

The Australians were a much different army. They were based on the militia and were all volunteers at this point. Interestingly enough, of the two Australian political parties, one party was opposed to any participation at all, while the other wanted to limit any involvement to a token force. The Official History proposes that a stronger effort might have helped deter any Japanese attack. Apparently, the Australian militia forces were ready to become involved in the war and welcomed the opportunity. The ordinary people understood the political situation in Europe quite well, so that after the Munich crisis, many Australian men joined the militia.

Having the British in charge created a situation where good officers from the Commonwealth countries were ignored, leaving the top positions for British officers drawn from a rather limited group of officers, not all of whom were really capable of command. We see examples of Churchill's "cronyism" with the advancement of his friends, such as General Maitland Wilson. In the Great War, the war in Africa was commanded by the South Africans, and in 1940, that could have been a precedent to be followed, but instead, the British ignored the possibility and wanted their officers to command instead. The Australian Official History says that Generals Freyberg and Blamey were the "most accomplished and experienced senior soldiers in the Middle East," with the possible exception of General Wavell. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The war changes dramatically from November to December 1941

Some writers have criticized General Auchinleck's concern about a German attack from the north into the Middle East as a mistake. They said that he should have ignored the possibility and concentrated on the war in the Western Desert. We see now, though, that mainstream British opinion was very concerned about dealing with a German attack from Russia, either through Turkey or from the Caucasus. If he had not been planning for such an attack, he might have jeopardized his position as theater commander. The concern about a German attack was largely built on the lack of good information about the fighting in Russia. In fact, although there had been a large part of the Soviet Army that was poorly equipped (just as the Germans and British), the Russians had the best tanks and some of the best artillery in the world. The KV-I heavy tank and the T-34 medium tank were the best tanks in use in 1941. They were small in numbers at first, and some were thrown away in badly chosen situations, but they dominated the battlefield when they appeared in combat. The Germans scrambled to respond to them. In late 1941, the Germans were close to the high-water mark, although there would be further advances in the summer of 1942. The Soviet government and armed forces were not going to collapse. They had a hard core that would carry them through to better times and they started to receive British and American shipments of tanks and aircraft to supplement what they had.

Everything about the war changed after 8 December 1941 in the Far East, when the Japanese attacked. One immediate impact was that some of the Australian brigadiers from the Middle East were sent back to Australia. There were also discussions, very naturally, of sending men from the Middle East back to Australia. In January, the decision was made to send the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions along with the corps headquarters to Australia. The Australians in the Middle East had a hard time taking the Japanese threat seriously, as they could not conceive that the Japanese might invade Australia. One immediate effect was that the decision was made to replace the 7th Australian Division in Syria by the 9th Australian Division. The Australians were destined for Java, so General Lavarack and Allen set off by air. The divisions were sent in convoys for the Far East starting on 30 January. This last part is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force in Syria in late 1941 grows and prepares for a German attack

The threat of a German invasion of Syria from the north was being taken very seriously in late 1941. The mainly Australian soldiers in Syria were kept busy preparing defensive positions. Another corps headquarters, the X Corps, was moved to Syria. When the 18th Brigade was withdrawn from Tobruk, they rejoined the 7th Australian Division, also in Syria. There were many changes. The British 6th Division was renamed the 70th Division and moved into Tobruk. The 6th Australian Division was finally rebuilt. The division had greatly suffered in Greece and the battle for Crete. They took the place of the 70th Division. General Wilson no longer commanded "Palestine and Transjordan", but became 9th Army commander. The army headquarters was located north of Beirut at Broumane.

There were many complaints late in 1941 about Australian troops committing vandalism and stealing. On the lighter side, a proposal was made to train ski troops from each Australian division. There was snow in the mountains to the north and the snow in late 1941 was very heavy. They proceeded with the training, but ultimately, the training was stopped.

By late 1941, the Australian divisions were well-equipped. In another change, since they were amply equipped, they were no longer allowed to use captured equipment. For example, the 2/16th Battalion had captured Breda heavy machine guns at Mersa Matruh in April and May 1941. They were discovered when they fired on by British aircraft on 6 October. They were forced to turn them in, as the no policy no longer allowed their possession. We remember the Australian cavalry using captured Italian tanks in early 1941 and captured French tanks in July, but no longer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A change in the Australian government in late 1941

Mr. Menzies, a Liberal, had been Australian Prime Minister until early October 1941. He was followed by Mr. Curtin, of the Labour Party. General Blamey wanted to return to Australia to confer with the new government, because he was concerned about recent decisions that seemed to be mistaken. He left Egypt in early November and attended a War Cabinet meeting on 26 November 1941. General Blamey argued against disbanding units and told the cabinet that Australia had no need to maintain an armored brigade in Egypt. If they wanted to form an armored division in Egypt, they had adequate corps troops and reinforcements on which to draw. In fact, they were planning to send too many reinforcements to the Middle East, more than would be expected to be needed. He told the cabinet that he expected enough volunteers to keep enlisting so that they would not be concerned about the situation until later in 1942. The cabinet still thought that they would eventually need to reduce the number of divisions.

The New Zealand government was still waiting to hear about the proposed formation of the ANZAC corps. General Freyberg told his government that he thought that with the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk and the 6th Australian Division still not yet rebuilt, that there were insufficient divisions to be able to recreate the ANZAC Corp.

One topic of concern to General Blamey was the possibility of Australians being sent to fight a German attack through Turkey. After the Greek debacle, he was ready to resist without a better plan and adequate forces than were sent to Greece. General Blamey expressed his opinion that Germany would avoid Turkey, and if they attacked the Middle East, they would attack through the Caucasus and Caspian region. They agreed that the Australian divisions might be moved to the Taurus mountains if there were an adequate plan and preparation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An ANZAC Army?

One pet project of General Blamey was to form and ANZAC Army with two corps. The army would include the 6th Australian Division along with the New Zealand Division. When the idea was discussed again in May 1941, General Wavell expressed support for the plan. Wavell's opinion was that General Freyberg, the New Zealander, should command the ANZAC Corps. General Blamey replied that he approved of the idea. He also suggested an Australian Corps consisting of the 7th Australian Division and 9th Australian Division under General Lavarack's command. The idea would also include adding an armored division to each corps. The Australian Government hesitated to support the idea because they were concerned about their ability to find enough men to form the units. The Army staff in Australia assumed that there would be much higher casualties than the divisions ever suffered in combat. There were many men in the pipeline from Australia to the Middle East. They were more than enough to form the units that were proposed. General Blamey thought that 39,000 men a year would be adequate to support the units while the staff in Australia expected more than 100,000 men a year would be required. By 13 August, the Australian War Cabinet balked at the proposed organization in the Middle East. They wanted to just increase the number of men in the existing divisions and not add new units. General Blamey opposed the reduced forces for the Middle East. By the end of 1941, they had fully replaced losses and had completed the divisions with some 16,600 men in reserve. Part of the problem in Australia was the new government that had replaced the Menzies government. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australia and army organizations as of August 1941

When Churchill replaced General Wavell with General Auchinleck, as the theater commander, he apparently had endorsed the use of ad hoc battle groups in the Middle East. The thinking apparently was that if the Germans use ad hoc battlegroups, then the British should imitate them and use them as well. General Blamey, who was a political soldier opposed breaking up divisions to form battle groups. Part of the rationale for battle groups (the German kampgruppe), was to disperse formations to be less vulnerable to air attack. Auchinleck proved that he understood that you have to concentrate your forces at the critical point to win battles when he did just that in the Crusader Battle and pushed Rommel back to El Agheila. Then, after the collapse after the surrender of Tobruk in 1942, Auchinleck took charge and stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. But much of the time, from January 1942 to July 1942, the British wasted their time with Jock Columns and the like. Rommel, the master of infiltration tactics could almost at will panic the British army and cause them to scatter. It was only with the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery that this situation was changed.

General Blamey was appalled that the Australian Government apparently only planned to put four divisions into the field. General Blamey thought that they would eventually have to mobilize many more men that four divisions worth to win the war. He correctly realized that this was to be a very dynamic and mobile war and would require a lot of men on the ground to win the war. And that was before anyone realized that the Japanese planned to enter the war as a combatant. General Blamey also suggested that naval blockade and air attacks would not be the answer to winning this war. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Defensive preparations at Tripoli in July and August 1941

The preparations made at Tripoli in July and August 1941 were based on the assumption that the Germans would enter Syria from Turkey. The plan envisioned that the Germans would use roads and railroads to move forces through Turkey. The planners thought that the German force would include 11 divisions as well as airborne units. While there was some thought that the Germans might move southward along the Mediterranean coast, they thought that a move would more likely be made from Aleppo, to Homs, to Damascus, and by Lake Tiberius, with a flanking movement through Palmyra. Tripoli had a fortress that was made ready for defense in all directions. General Allen, commander of the 7th Australian Division, thought that they would need two infantry divisions and one armored division. General Allen had his men work on building a fortress area large enough to hold that size force. General Auchinleck visited Tripoli in October and informed General Allen that no additional troops, except perhaps an armored battalion were to be added. In response, General Allen redesigned the fortress perimeter to be shorter given the force he had to defend Tripoli. General Blamey disagreed with General Auchinleck about what the Australian troops should be doing. Blamey wanted to see the Australians spending time training, not digging defenses. In the event, some civilian laborers were added to relieve the Australians from having to spend all their time digging. General Blamey, it turns out, agreed with what Bernard Law Montgomery believed, that the divisions and brigades should be kept intact and should not be broken up into ad hoc battle groups. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.