The Western Desert

The area where the combatants moved and fought in 1940 would become known as the Western Desert. The Western Desert actually refers to the Western Desert of Egypt, but the British forces came to call the entire area on either side of "The Wire" as the Western Desert. "The Wire" was what the British forces called the Italian-erected triple barbed wire fence that marked the border between Egypt and Libya. From the sea to the Libyan plateau, the land rose to 500ft above sealevel. The rise was called the escarpment, as it was a rough stretch that restricted movement from the shore to the plateau. The terrain is covered by a thin layer of "clay or fine sand" over "limestone rock". The land is very rocky, which could make travel difficult. What water there was could be "found in deep wells and those cisterns known in service Arabic as 'birs', which date from Roman times". This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History, and the quotes are from page 115.

The RAF was active following the commencement of war with Italy

Flying from Egypt, Blenheim I's had a limited reach into Libya. For example, Benghazi was beyond their range. Right before they were at war, the British moved No.202 Group to Maaten Gaggush. 26 Blenheims attacked an airfield at El Adem. Three of the attacking aircraft were lost. In a repeast attack, 18 Italian aircraft were destroyed or damaged. In a dawn attack the next day, nine Blenheims attacked Tobruk and among other targets, damaged the old cruiser San Giorgio. A few days later, when the Army took Fort Cappuzo, just beyond the border, the RAF supported the attack with Gladiators and Blenheims. After the initial burst of activity, the limited resources of the RAF caused them to have to drop back to harrassing attacks with single aircraft. Short range reconnaissance over Italian lines was done by Lysanders, while longer range reconnaissance was handled by Blenheims. Fighter support was still limited to Gladiators, as Hurricanes had not yet arrived in the desert. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Count Ciano on the Italian ultimatum to Greece in 1940

In a note quoted in Vol.I of the British Official History, Count Ciano noted in his diary on October 22, 1940 that "Naturally it (the ultimatum) is a document that allows no way out for Greece. Either she accepts occupation or she will be attacked." Despite the Italian charges in the ultimatum, the Greeks had maintained a strick neutrality prior to the Italian note. Because of that, the British had no real idea about Greek troop deployments or what they planned. In Alexandria, the British commanders met to plan what to do about establishing a British presence in the strategic island of Crete. The initial plan was to establish a fueling station. The fleet would escort store ships and auxiliaries to Suda Bay, in the northwest. This is based on the account in the Official History.

On August 15, 1940, Italy attacked Greece

Hostilities opened between Italy and Greece with the torpedoing of the Greek cruiser Helle on August 15, 1940. The Greeks suspected an Italian submarine, but had no proof. General Metaxis asked what help Greece could expect from Great Britain on August 22. At that date, Britain didn't have any available forces to deploy to Greece. British forces, such as they were, were committed to defending Egypt. The actual Italian invasion was delayed, while they inquired what the German reaction would be. The Italian note was only delivered on October 28, 1940. Within hours, Greece and Italy were at war "through no fault of her own". This based on the account in the British Official History.

RAF planning in early August 1940

The decision was made that the highest priority was to rearm existing squadrons rather than divert aircraft to new squadrons. By the end of September, the plan was to have "five medium bomber squadrons, three fighter squadrons, and one bomber transport squadron would be reamred with modern aircraft: a total of 84 Blenheim IVs, 60 Hurricanes, 12 Wellingtons and a small quota of replacements." The SAAF would receive 24 Hurricanes, where they would form new squadrons. From the French orders from the Glenn Martin company, there were 150 Marylands available. The Middle East and the SAAF would divide these. Immediately, three Marylands would be diverted to use for long-range reconnaissance. Three more Marylands were sent to Malta to use for spares. More aircraft were in transit. 24 Hurricanes had been sent around the Cape. They were close to arriving in Egypt. 36 were in transit to Takoradi. 24 Blenheim IVs had arrived in Egypt by way of Malta. Antoher 24 were in transit to either Takoradi or Egypt. Six Wellingtons were newly arrived in late August. Desperate measures were required after the fall of France. One step was to use Takoradi as an arrival point in Africa for aircraft. They were then sent on to Egypt by air. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Air Chief Marshal Longmore's srequirements in 1940

Air Chief Marshal Longmore took over command of RAF forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East in May 1940. The Air Ministry informed him in July about what they might be able to send him. They would send him 12 Hurricanes, 12 Lysanders, and 12 Blenheim IV aircraft immediately. The target shipments every month were:

• 12 Hurricanes
• 12 Blenheim IVs
• 6 Lysanders

In three weeks, he had lost 10 Blenheims and 11 Wellesleys. The Wellesleys were being replaced by Blenheims, and the Wellesley was disappearing from the inventory. Longmore sent his estimate to the Air Ministry of his requirements: 35-50 Blenheims and at least 24 Hurricanes every month. He also needed a long range reconnaissance aircraft. The American Glenn Martin Marylands eventually filled that need. He also needed a torpedo-reconnaissance aircraft for use from Malta, and needed a replacement for the Lysander, which had proved to be unsuitable for the conditions. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

The Italian attack on September 13, 1940

On September 13, 1940, the Italians attacked British forces in Egypt. They bombarded Musaid with artillery, and then advanced up the coast road. The British had expected the Italians to outflank them from the desert, but the Italians were concerned that the British were more at home in the desert than they were, so they didn't make the attempt. Count Ciano wrote that "Never has a military operation been undertaken so much against the will of the Commander" (quoted in the Official History). He was writing about Marshall Graziani.

British opposition was limited to the following units:

• 3rd Coldstream Guards,
• C Battery RHA
• later, a portion of F Battery, RHA
• one section of 25/26th Medium Battery, RA
• one company 1/KRRC
• 1 machine gun company from 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
  

They were commanded by Lieutenant-Coloonel J. Moubray. They were able to inflict some casualties with artillery fire, along with air attacks, but the Italians easily captured the barracks and then to advance along the road to Sollum. This is based on the account in Vol.I of the Official History.

Major-General Percy Hobart

Correlli Barnett criticizes Major-General Percy Hobart as the source of the mistaken idea that "tanks should fight other tanks". That was not the German way, although they often did fight other tanks, at least on the Eastern Front and later, on the Western Front, after there was one. Rommel used the "Sword and Shield" approach where armour was the sword and the shield was his anti-tank weapons. The 88mm FLAK36 was his key weapon in the shield, although the 50mm PAK38 was also highly effective, at least against the British cruiser tanks that Rommel's forces faced.

But Percy Hobart was a maverick and a champion of mechanized warfare. I would treat him better than Correlli Barnett. He was tossed out of the British Army by Archibald Wavell, after Hobart's commanding officer wrote an "adverse report" about him. When confronted on this incident later, Wavell could not adequately explain his dismissal of Hobart. This was the same mindset that later forced out Eric Dorman-Smith, another mechanized warfare expert.

Through the efforts of Winston Churchill, Hobart was returned to the army, although only in an organizing and training role, for which he was well-suited.

Trevor Constable has a paper about Hobart in the Journal of Historical Review. I have drawn upon that, as well as Correlli Barnett, in my discussion here.

Operation "Brevity"

The Brevity was planned to have an attack by three columns commanded by Brigadier Gott. The column that would cut through the desert to flank the German positions on the border would have the 7th Armoured Brigade Group with only two squadrons from the 2/RTR totalling 29 cruiser tanks. They were to advance to Sidi Azeiz, WSW of Bardia. The 22nd Guards with 2 squadrons from the 4/RTR (with 24 Inf. Mk.II's) would attack Halfaya Pass. The 2/Rifle Brigade and the 8th Field Regiment would block the coast road, stopping any eastward advance from Sollum. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Tiger Convoy ships (May 1941)

The actual fast (15 knot) transports used for the Tiger Convoy were the Clan McChatton, Clan Lamont, Clan Campbell, Empire Song, and New Zealand Star. The Empire Song was mined and sunk, taking with it 57 tanks and 10 Hurricanes. The original totals for the convoy were 295 tanks and 53 Hurricanes. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

There are some good websites about the war in the Western Desert in 1940-1943

I went looking for information about the Tiger Convoy with a new search engine (Temoa) and found some good sites. For example, there is this page titled "Engagements-1941" that must be 7th Armoured Division-centric, given the red desert rats insignia at the top. The Tiger Convoy tank list that I am seeing is something like this:

1. 135 Matildas
2. 82 Crusader tanks
3. 21 light tanks (I believe that these were Lt.Mk.VIC's)

I need to keep looking, as I am not certain about the cruiser tanks being all Crusaders.

British tank strength in Egypt in September 1940

The British official history points out something that I had not realized, but should have, that the Italian medium tank designations included their size in tons. For example, the M11/39 was an 11 ton tank and the M13/40 was a thirteen ton tank. British intelligence knew that they were facing Italian medium tanks of both sorts, but didn't know numbers. The British, in the September 1940 timeframe had something like 85 cruiser tanks, of which 15 were in the shop. The British tanks were 12-1/2 and 14 ton vehicles. British offensive operations by air, at this time, had been limited to a nightly bombing raid by a single Bristol Bombay aircraft on targets at Tobruk. Typically, these were ships and fuel tanks. As Italian air operations increased in tempo, the RAF started bombing with their three available bomber squadrons, Nos. 55, 113, and 211. The British had grand plans for reinforcing Egypt and the Middle East, but shipping the men, equipment, and supplies around the Cape would take time. This set the scene for the consideration to ship immediate reinforcements with the Hats operation.

Operation Hats in August 1940 and other reinforcements for the Middle East

The decision was made to send reinforcements to the Middle East. Churchill was presented with a list of units and equipment that would be included in the shipment. They included the following:

• 3rd Hussars with light tanks
• 2nd battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment with cruiser tanks
• 7th battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment with 50 infantry tanks
• 48-2pdr anti-tank guns
• 20-Bofors 40mm light anti-aircraft guns
• 48-25pdr guns
• 500 Bren guns
• 250 0.55in Boys anti-tank rifles
• 50,000 anti-tank mines
• 300 tons of spare parts and equipment

The navy was preparing an operation to reinforce the Eastern Mediterranean, so the plan was to include four 16 knot transports carrying the supplies and vehicles. The operation was called "Hats", and involved the Mediterranean fleet and Force H, based at Gibraltar. The navy became increasingly concerned about risking the fleet to escort a convoy at 15 knots, and their view eventually prevailed, causing the army convoy to be sent around the Cape, to arrive in late September at Suez. After the Prime Minister saw the success of Hats, minus the tanks and equipment, he insisted in 1941, on sending them through the Mediterranean in the Tiger Convoy. This is based on Vol.I of the Official History and Winston Churchill's Their Finest Hour.

Correlli Barnett referred to General Godwin-Austin as an "eighteenth century kind of general"

We now jump back to the crisis in the Crusader battle. General Cunningham, the Eighth Army commander had lost his nerve, on understanding that he had lost control of the battle, and that the British situation was increasingly desperate. British tank doctrine was fatally flawed, since the British view was that "tanks fought tanks". The Germans, as I have already written, used their tanks against the opposing soft transport and infantry, and used their anti-tank guns to engage the British armour. Cunningham's BGS was Brigadier Galloway. He had sent him to speak to one of his corps commanders, Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austin, who commanded 13th Corps. Galloway broached the subject of a withdrawal to Egypt, and Godwin-Austin reacted violently, saying that he couldn't ask Bernard Freyburg and the New Zealanders to stop their attack. The officers and men under Cunningham's command conspired to keep the attack going until General Auchinleck could arrive and stabilize the situation. Cunningham could no longer function as army commander. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

This should be helpful

I have seen this, and have probably mentioned it previously, but I continue to be pleased with the existence of war diaries for units such as the 11th Hussars, who were stalwarts in the war in North Africa against Rommel. I'm not sure that I understand who is behind this site, but it seems quite useful. I've not spent too much time reading it yet, but I can see where it might answer some questions about the individual units.

December 1940 in Libya

In the attack on Camp Nibeiwa, soemthing like 20 Italian medium tanks were caught outside the camp and shot up by the passing Inf. Mk.II's. They moved into the camp and created chaos. The Italians were caught by surprise, and some troops immediately surrendered. Most fought well, but by 8:30am, the fight was over. Over 2,000 men were prisoners and 35 medium tanks were captured. The attacking forces then headed for the Tumman camps. General O'Connor left his BGS at headquarters and headed for the action. Brigadier Caunter was left to command the 7th Armoured Division as General Creagh had been forced into the hospital because of "an abscess on his tongue". After the initial attack on December 9th, only 8 Inf. Mk.II Matildas still were runners. Selby Force did not do as well, and "allowed the Italians to escape from Maktila". This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.

Operation Compass in December 1940

General Wavell gave his approval on December 5, 1940, for the attack on the Italians in Libya. The field commander was General O'Connor, who had prepared his troops for this moment. The army had trained for 6 months with the attack in mind. The attacking force was not large. They had the 4th Indian Division and the 7th Armoured Division. The 4th Indian Division was provided with 57 infantry tanks (Inf. Mk. II Matildas). There was also a battlegroup called "Selby Force" after its commander, Brigadier Selby. The attacking force consisted of 36,000 troops. The attack was launched on December 7th, 1940. O'Connor's plan was to move forward in two moves. The first would put them part way into the desert. The second would position them for the attack. In the strange happenings of the times, in five days, General Wavell intended to withdraw the 4th Indian Division for use in Eritrea. He didn't want to spoil O'Connor's concentration by letting him know ahead of time. On the morning of December 9th, the attack began with the 4/7 Rajput Regiment assaulting Camp Nibeiwa.

The race to Sidi Barrani

General O'Connor and Eric Dorman-Smith struck out across the rough ground behind the 7th Armoured Division. O'Connor wanted to be present to assure that the 7th Armoured Division was sufficiently active and pursuing opportunities. As they crossed the broken ground, they saw a trail of broken down tanks, and O'Connor became increasingly concerned. Eventually, the ground smoothed out, but the dust got worse. The 11th Hussars reached Msus first, 60 miles from the road. Brigadier Harding visited General Creagh's headquarters, now located at Msus. They decided that they needed to send out another group, headed further south, to increase the odds of cutting off the Italians before they escaped. The 11th Hussar's commander, Colonel Combe, led the new group that included some of his armoured cars. They headed for Antelat. O'Connor caught up the the 7th Armoured division HQ at Wadi Azzin. He received the news that Colonel Combe and his group had reached Antelat at 10:34am. It was empty, so they moved on to Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals.

The situation in February 1941

The Italian commander, Marshal Graziani, concluded that they must abandon Cyrenaica and evacuate their forces to defend Tripolitania. They would fall back to Syrte and concentrate there. General O'Connor's forward headquarters was located at Bomba. His staff included his Brigadier General Staff, Brigadier Harding and Brigadier Eric Dorman-Smith, who had arrived on January 29th. General Wavell had send Brigadier Dorman-Smith to document the campaign and write a study for future reference. The situation was getting tense, as reinforcements had not arrived and they were down to 50 cruiser tanks as runners. O'Connor dispatched Brigadier Dorman-Smith back to Cairo to ask permission to advance further. The goal was to cut off the Italian retreat. General Wavell gave permission to move forward, and Brigadier Dorman-Smith arrived back at Bomba to witness the action. On February 4th, the 7th Armoured Division with 50 cruiser tanks and 8 light tanks advanced from Mechili. They headed out across the rugged terrain towards the coast near Beda Fomm. This is based on Correlli Barnett's account in The Desert Generals.

General Cunningham in East Africa in early 1941

General Cunningham attacked Italian Somaliland from Kenya, starting on February 10th, 1941. He had four infantry brigades in his force. On February 22, he fought a battle against six Italian brigades and indiginous troops, and beat them. When his enemy melted away, Conningham advance 200 miles to capture Mogadishu (a familiar name to us, as this point). Since he had no opposition, he marched his troops 700 miles to Ethiopia (which the British called Abyssinia). The British were already attacking the Italian positions in Eritrea, so this put Cunningham's forces in the Italian rear. After resting three days, he set off again. After itermediate stops at Harrar (March 26th) and Diredawa (March 29th), his troops entered Addas Abab on April 6th. General Auchinleck was so impressed by Cunningham's performance that he appointed him to command the 8th Army. The problem was that Cunningham was thrust into a role and environment with which was new to him. He had not commanded mechanized troops, and the desert was different from East Africa. This is based on the account in Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.