Russians had a much better sense of what a tank should be like in 1939-1941

The Russians who issued the specifications that led to the development of the KV-1 and T-34 tanks had a much better understanding what a battle tank should be like than their counterparts anywhere else. Germany was still building tanks that automotively were adequate but which were underarmed and underprotected. They still had too many Pzkw I and II tanks even by June 1941. If the Russians had had a good professional army, they would have slaughtered the Germans in 1941, but instead, Stalin had killed most of the competent soldiers, so they were run over by the Germans. When the Germans attacked, the front collapsed.

Rommel's initial reaction to Crusader

In November 1941, Rommel had been preparing to attack Tobruk. General Cunningham had wanted to hit Rommel after he had attacked, but the political pressure from Churchill was overwhelming. When Rommel recognized the tremendous British buildup, in preparation for Crusader, he altered his dispositions. He stationed the 21st Pz. Div. at Gambut. He had the 15th Pz. Div. be ready to reinforce them. From Bardia to Sidi Omar, he built a defensive position manned by the Italian Savona division and German anti-tank units. The area was heavily mined. The Italian armoured division, the Ariete, was positioned at Bir Gubi, which Rommel expected would be on the British flank. Churchill sent Generals Auchinleck and Cunningham a message (quoted in The Desert Generals):

For the first time British and Empire troops will meet the Germans with an ample supply of equipment in modern weapons of all kins [sic]. The battle itself will affect the whole course of the war. Now is the time to strike the hardest blow yet struck for final victory, home and freedom. The Desert Army may add a page to history which will rank with Blenheim and Waterloo. The eyes off all nations are upon you. ALl our hearts are with you. May God uphold the right!

Correlli Barnett wrote that Cunningham was not fit to command, as he was near a nervous breakdown, from the strain of combat since February. Being thrust into an unfamiliar environment, mobile warfare in the desert, simply increased the strain.

The 8th Army at the start of the Crusader battle

The 8th Army was deployed, ready to attack, by late November 15, 1941. They had about 100,000 troops at the ready, along with 453 cruiser tanks (or equivalent) with the 7th Armoured Division. 166 of these were American M3 Stuart tanks with only the 37mm gun. The rest were mostly Crusader I and II tanks with the 40mm 2pdr gun. There were still a few A13 Cru.Mk.IV and Cru.Mk.II tanks, but they left the scene after Crusader. The American Stuart tanks could make 40mph, if they were ungoverned, but along with the Crusaders, they had governors to increase their mechanical life and reliability.

British intelligence thought that the opposing forces had 272 German tanks and 138 Italian tanks. Of the German, they thought that there were as many as 96 Pzkw II's, with only a 20mm gun. The British assumed that there would be an "armour-to-armour" battle, and that they had superior forces. To bring the Germans to such a battle, the British intended to occupy a position that would bring Axis forces to counterattack. At 6am on November 18th, the 8th Army set out around the Axis flank. They crossed "The Wire" south of Bir Sheforzen, headed towards Gabr Saleh, and then to Bir Gubi and the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. As they moved forward, the British command was perplexed that Rommel had not responded. What did they have to do to bring Rommel into a battle?

This is based on Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals, augmented with what I know from other sources.

Correlli Barnett said that Battleaxe was the antithesis of Sidi Barrani

Correlli Barnett argues, in The Desert Generals, that Battleaxe was lost on the first day. They had attacked Halfaya Pass and had been repulsed, primarily by the dug in 88mm guns. Correlli Barnett puts the blame on the lack of inspired leadership. At Sidi Barrani, the British were lead by General O'Connor, who was a brilliant leader in the field. In Operation Battleaxe, they had mediocre leadership, and failed. Still, the real cause of failure was Churchill's pressing Wavell to attack too soon. The result was that most of the tanks pushed through the Mediterranean in the Tiger Convoy were left on the battlefield when the British retreated. Churchill was in his worst manic-depressive mode, and when Battleaxe failed, he reacted by relieving General Wavell. I am an admirer of Churchill, but the 1940-1942 period in the Mediterranean and Middle East shows him at his worst. O'Connor's gains were lost because of going into Greece. Up until the Greek operation, General Wavell had waged a successful campaign against Italian interests in Africa, and was close to defeating them. After Greece, the Germans came in and the British position was in sharp decline, despite the British having a sense that they could beat the Germans, if properly armed and supplied.

More about Operation Battleaxe

This duplicates, to some extent, what I had written on May 20, 2005. Churchill had badgered General Wavell to immediately attack using the tanks that had arrived from the Tiger Convoy. The attack took place starting on 15 June 1941. The British and Commonwealth forces consisted of about 25,000 troops and 180 tanks (cruiser and infantry tanks). The divisions involved were the 7th Armoured Division (Gen. Michael Creagh) and the 4th Indian Division (Gen. Frank Messervy). The armoured brigades were the 7th with cruiser tanks from the Tiger Convoy and the 4th with Inf. Mk.II Matilda tanks. The Matildas could make about 8 mph, except on smooth roads. They were desparately short of transport for troops and supply. This is from Correlli Barnett's book, The Desert Generals. Churchill had pressed to have a convoy of tanks sent through the Mediterranean Sea by fast transport vessels. He felt that he could affect the outcome by immediately sending tanks, which seemed to be the key weapon of war in the theater. A15 Crusader tanks were just coming off the assembly line, so it is not clear that they were included. More likely, the tanks sent were A13 Cru. Mk.IVA's. There was also a regiment of light tanks, presumably Lt.Mk.VIC's. I believe that there were also newly produced Inf.Mk.II's, as well. They took at least one transport loss on the way, so some tanks were lost. I can imagine that Churchill's political position was deteriorating with the events of early 1941. The next year went as badly, except for the American entry into the war in December.

The aftermath of "Battleaxe"

Operation Battleaxe went badly for the British. The Germans used anti-tank guns to kill tanks while using tanks against infantry and trucks. The British had thought that you needed to use your tanks to kill other tanks. They had the disadvantage of having a small tank gun (the 40mm 2pdr). The Germans had a very small number of 88mm FlAK36 guns that were used in the anti-tank role. During Battleaxe, there were about 5 at Halfaya Pass, 4 "at Hafid ridge", and 4 operating with one panzer regiment (the 8th). After the battle, the British assumed that the Germans must have tanks that had a better gun than they did, and that accounted for their many tank losses. In fact, it seems that they were mostly killed by anti-tank guns. The Germans also had the advantage of good tank recovery equipment and organization. The British had almost none. When the British were forced to withdraw, they left behind knocked tanks that were repairable, because they had no way to recover them.

The impression taken away from Greece (in 1941)

The British and Commonwealth forces in Greece were not acclimatized to mountain combat. They face specialist German mountain troops, so they were at a disadvantage. As the political situation in Greece declined along with the military, the British were left with only one option: to withdraw. The Germans attacked at the "Monastir Gap", which was the junction between the Greek and British forces. Overhead, the Germans dominated the air. The collapse happened swiftly, so the British and Commonwealth forces had to rush to the south, to reach evacuation beaches. Somehow, they succeeded, and lost less than could have been expected. The Official History says that they left with the impression that they could beat the Germans, if they had the forces, despite the Germans being quite able and strong. This is my summary and paraphrase from the Official History.

April 25, 1941 in Greece

The Germans moved forward on April 25, 1941. General Wilson considered the possibilities. The Germans could stage an attack with airborne troops on either Athens or the Straits of Corinth. General Wilson decided that the withdrawal needed to be made from southern beaches, to buy time. He ordered the 16th and 17th Australian Brigades to Kalamata. The 6th NZ Brigade was sent to Tripolis, rather than Marathon. They were to guard the roads to the beaches in the south. He sent 4th NZ Brigade to the Corinth Canal to embark with the troops guarding the canal. The 1st Armoured Brigade would be sent to Raphina to withdraw, rather than crossing the Corinth Canal. The operation was extended, due to the distance to the Peloponnessus beaches. Also on April 25th, the amphibious transport Ulster Prince was bombed and wrecked. Another transport, the Pennland was also bombed and sunk. The navy sent three destroyers so that all but 500 troops were embarked from Megara. This is my paraphrase of the paragraphs in the Official History.

There is an interesting story about Eric Dorman-Smith

After Generals O'Connor and Neame had been bagged by the Germans, General Wavell decided that Tobruk needed to be held. He believed that was a good way to slow Rommel's advance eastwards. At that time a Brigadier, Eric Dorman-Smith was ordered to fly to Tobruk and give the commanders there Wavell's plan for the defense of Cyrenaica and Egypt. He flew in a ubiquitous Westland Lysander, an early STOL aircraft. The pilot flew through a sandstorm to a what Correlli Barnett called a perfect landing at Tobruk's airfield. He delivered Wavell's orders to Brigadier John Harding and Australian General Leslie Morehead. Dorman-Smith had the impression that the two had the situation under control. As he flew out, Brigadier Dorman-Smith noticed what appeared to be German troops east of Tobruk, astride the road to Bardia. Rommel attacked Tobruk on April 13 and 14, 1941, and was repulsed by the Australians. He attacked again on the 16th and 17th. While he was doing that, his advance forces were blitzing towards Egypt. They arrived on the border on April 28th, a started to mop up the local British and Commonwealth positions.

O'Connor hoped that the victory at Beda Fomm would gain him permission to take the rest of Libya

The odds were stacked against him, but General O'Connor hoped that winning at Beda Fomm would gain him permission to advance further. The Italians were is disarray, and had taken considerable losses in the process. They had lost 20,000 prisoners, 112 medium tanks (M11/39 and M13/40), 216 guns, and 1500 cars and trucks.

The problem was Greece. Churchill was eager to go into Greece and to help them fight Germans, if and when they were attacked. Churchill warned General Wavell that his overriding priority needed to be to aid Greece and possibly Turkey. He was to halt his advance into Libya, so that he had resources to send to the Balkans. Just possibly, O'Connor might have been able to advance far enough to forestall any German reinforcements, but it was not to be. Within a month, Rommel, and his advance forces, were in Libya, scouting out the British positions.

What happened in early 1941 was incomprehensible

The British reaction to driving the Italians from Cyrenaic (eastern Libya) was to disband the force that took the area. We can imagine that Churchill's Greek (mis-)adventure played a role. General O'Connor, the victor of Beda Fomm, went to Egypt. He was still having stomach problems. In his place, General Neame was put in charge of a "static area command". The 7th Armoured Division was withdrawn and scattered about Egypt. 13th Corps was disbanded. The newly arrived 2nd Armoured Division and an Australian brigade occupied the front facing Libya. Rommel attacked on March 31, 1941. When he realized that there was no organized resistance, he pushed harder. One group advanced up the coast road. Another crossed over the route used by O'Connor from Msus and Mechili. Another crossed further south, along a line connecting Mechili and Derna. For anyone who has followed this action, these names are quite familiar. Wavell ordered General O'Connor forward to help General Neame. They got lost and were bagged by the Germans.

Churchill could not resist fighting Germans, so he jeopardized the North African front

Churchill wrote to General Wavell saying:

"Neither of these [action in the Sudan or the Dodecanese] ought to detract from the supreme task of inflicting further defeats upon the main Italian army." (quoted in Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals).

The Germans planned to go into Greece from Bulgaria, although not until March 1941. They were on a tight timetable, as the plans for attacking Russia in June were quite advance. To Churchill, defending Greece became more important than holding the gains in North Africa. He was ready to pull strong forces out of Libya and send them to Greece,w there they were expended, with only a portion being retrieved.

Churchill apparently felt that he had to contest every German attack

The Greek adventure where the British and ANZAC forces went into Greece, starting as early as late 1940 can be rationalized since they quite rightfully believe that they would only face Italians. In fact, the Italian assault was blunted, which was the excuse for the Germans to come in and rescure the situation. Still, the whole operation into Greece and the withdrawal to Crete was part of the overall collapse of Churchill's strategic vision. He was really geared to fighting Italians, not Germans. His forces could mop up the Italians in East Africa and eastern Libya with considerable ease, although with a sustained effort. The expedition to Greece dashed the opportunity to take all of Libya before the Germans arrived in strength. After the Germans, lead by Rommel, arrived in Libya, the British and Commonwealth forces were set back on their heels, as there was no one on the British side commanding armies in the field who had the skill and energy of Rommel. General O'Connor might have done well, but he was bagged early in the German attack. Auchinleck could do well, but he was tied up as theater commander.

More about the British withdrawal from Greece

The army depended on the navy for being able to evacuate Greece in later April 1941. The RAF was pursuing an independent plan, as the situation went into collapse. As long as they could use airfields near Athens, they flew out the pilots and technicians. When the Blenheims were moved to Crete, they took as many as they could. Others were flown out by No.216 and 267 squadrons flying Bombays and Lockheed Lodestars. Flying boats, probably Sunderlands, were also used. The Wellingtons had already been withdrawn, s they were too vulnerable on the ground. Remaining RAF personnel would leave with the army.

The army plan was to move at night, as the Germans were not operating at night, to the relief of the British. Troops would move into position during the dark, and hide. Towards night, they would destroy equipment that they planned to abandon, and then move to the beach. Admiral Pridham-Whipple's force included the amphibious transports Gelnearn and Glengyle, which were equipped with landing craft. There were also 19 troopships and four "A-lighters". The A-lighter was an early LCT.

The ANZAC corps had been in a defensive position at Thermopylae since 19 April.

As the situation progressively got worse, partly due to the collapse of the Greek army, German air dominance became increasingly a factor. Not only did it complicate the withdrawal, but over the next month wrote off many of the Royal Navy's assets in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This is from Vol.II of the official history.

The defense of Post 11 at Bardia

The last Italian position to surrender at Bardia was "Post 11". Post 11 had put up the most resolute defense of Bardia's defenders. Two tanks and some carriers from the 6th [Australian] Divisional cavalry attacked Post 8, shortly after Post 13 had been taken when carriers and soldiers with grenades had attacked. 70 prisoners were taken. from Post 13. Post 8 was taken with little effort besides a perfunctory attack. That stopped anti-tank gun fire that had been harrassing the attackers of Post 11. When the tanks appeared, Post 11 surrendered. The 2/6th Battalion took their surrender. It turned out that there had been 350 Italians in Post 11, along with two field guns, two 3in mortars, six anti-tank guns (presumably 47mm/L32), 12 medium MG, 27 LMG, and 325 rifles. Gavin Long remarked that two days earlier, Post 11 had been attacked by about 50 Australians with rifles and grenades. No wonder they had been repulsed. This is my recounting of what is in Gavin Long's To Benghazi, an essential source of information about the successful campaign against the Italian forces prior to the German's arrival.

Operation Battleaxe: a lost opportunity

Churchill had pressed to supply General Wavell with a shipment of tanks pressed through the Mediterranean on fast transports (the Tiger convoy). Churchill immediately started pressuring Wavell to use the newly arrived tanks. Apparently, some of the shipment were newly build Crusader I tanks (A15). Wavell's response was to mount Operation Battleaxe, starting on 15 June 1941. They had about 25,000 troops and a mix of 180 tanks, including cruiser and infantry tanks. They were extremely short of transport. As I have written, truck shipments to the Middle East were way below what was both promised and required. General Beresford-Pierse had planned the operation and led it. The formations involved were the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division. The two armoured brigades were the 7th, equipped with cruiser tanks, mostly newly arrived, and the 4th, with infantry tanks. The hastily planned attack failed, with needless losses in tanks, and Churchill relieved Wavell and replaced him with Claude Auchinleck. This happened on June 21st. We can only imagine that Churchill acted on a whim or for political reasons, as Wavell had performed well as theater commander. Most problems were caused by pressure from Churchill and his effect on operations and plans.

Truck shipments to the British in the Middle East in 1941

The War Office had told General Wavell in October that 3,000 3-ton trucks would be shipped to the Middle East, every month, from North America, and that 7,000 would be shipped by the end of 1940. The reality was pretty grim: in early 1941, the shipments were only 616 in March, 863 in April, and 1,276 in May. Much of the Middle East transportation had been shipped to Greece, and was lost there. I imagine that this includes what was sent to Crete before the German attack. The distances in the Middle East were vast, and demanded large numbers of vehicles to move supplies and fuel. It was logistic nightmare for both sides. This is from the Official History of the Second World War The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol.II.

Auchinleck's strategy at the First Alamein

The winning strategy used by General Auchinleck, in the First Battle of El Alamein, was to attack the Italian formations with his infantry, which he had in abundance. Both German and Italian units were weakened by the action from May 1942 until July, besides having their supply lines stretched to the breaking point. Rommel felt powerless, as he lacked the means to stop Auchinleck. The Germans were too few to hold the front, and he relied on his Italian allies to provide the "boots on the ground" to maintain their position. Correlli Barnett puts the victory date at July 17, 1942. The Axis advance had been stopped, and nearly broken. The offensive launched in May at Gazala had failed, and now Rommel was forced to prepare defenses to hold what he had gained, with little hope of advancing further. This is based on Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals.

More consideration of General Auchinleck and Montgomery

General Claude Auchinleck had gained his military experience largely in India. He was born in Northern Ireland (Ulster), and graduated from Sandhurst at the age of 20. That may explain his affinity for Eric Dorman-Smith, another Irishman. He joined the 62nd Punjab Regiment, after graduation and served in the Middle East. In 1933, he had served with Harold Alexander, fighting tribesmen and imposing order. He commanded the abortive operation at Narvik, after which Winston Churchill criticized him as being too cautious. That didn't stop Churchill from appointing Auchinleck to succeed Archibald Wavell as the theater commander in the Middle East and North Africa. Churchill was forever hounding his commanders to fight, as Churchill's political situation demanded action, often before his forces were ready.

The charge that Auchinleck made poor choices in his subordinate commanders is certainly valid. One defense was the lack of talent available, but that does not excuse him from what we see in hindsight as indefensible choices. Alan Cunningham simply did not have the relevant experience to be successful. His entire time in command of the 8th Army was so stressful to him that he was physically and mentally exhausted by the time he was relieved by Auchinleck. Neil Ritchie was a stolid organization man without any apparent original thoughts or ability. He was suitable as someone to take orders, not to be the key decision-maker.

The irony is that Bernard Law Montgomery was even more cautious than Auchinleck, and delayed the next offensive beyond the date that had been planned by Auchinleck. Unlike Auchinleck, Montgomery could only win with overwhelming forces, unimaginably applied. He came close to misfiring at the Second Alamein. The things that allowed him to prevail were his material superiority and the extreme difficulty with supplies that the Axis forces experienced. That allowed Montgomery to wear down Rommel's army until he was forced to withdraw them. Montgomery made such a feeble pursuit that he was never able to catch Rommel's army until they reached Tunisia, when they had no place to go.

General Ritchie planned to stake the entire Middle Eastern Theater on the battle at Mersa Matruh, circa June 25th, 1942

General Ritchie, after the collapse following Gazala, designed what he considered a blocking position at Mersa Matruh. The 8th Army was now reduced to 10th Corps and 13th Corps. The 10th Corps had the 10th Indian Division and 50th Division located within the perimeter at Mersa Matruh. Facing west on the coastal road, there was a minefield. South of that was a gap patroled by two small battlegroups, Leathercol and Gleecol. South of that, on the escarpment, protected by a minefield at the west end was 13th Corps, with the New Zealand diviosn and the remnants of the 1st Armoured Division. There was an incomplete position at the east end of the southern force at Minquar Quaim. General Auchinleck had succeeded in reinforcing the 1st Armoured Division, so that it had 159 tanks, including 60 Grants. How this was going to block the Axis forces, when the center was empty, is baffling. General Auchinleck arrived in the afternoon to review the situation and relieved Ritchie as army commander. This is based on Correlli Barnett's book The Desert Generals.