The 2/28th Battalion surrendered on 27 July 1942 in the First Battle for El Alamein

The end for the 2/28th Battalion came when they were essentially overrun by the Germans. Up to 10am, they still were not pressed so hard as to consider surrender. The situation was that tanks "were closing in from three directions". The forward company on the left side was overrun by the enemy. A warrant officer from A Company responded by calling for his men to keep firing their weapons. Tanks were coming closer to the battalion headquarters. A Bren gunner ran out and commenced firing, but he was killed by fire from a tank. When the battalion commander witness this event, he called for his men to surrender. Many of the men of the battalion were very emotional as they were lined up to be marched into captivity. British artillery was still firing in support, and some of the men from the 2/28th Battalion were killed by friendly fire. One platoon quite forward was firing until they were overrun by German tanks.

The Australians were marched about five miles to the German rear areas, where they were loaded onto trucks and were driven to Daba. The Australians were prepared for such an event as what happened to the 2/28th Battalion. They "regrouped" the battalion. They had two echelons, one being the operational portion and an administration portion. There were 98 men in the operational portion and 105 men in the administration portion which had drivers and administrators.

The 2/28th Battalion had achieved some success by pushing into the German positions. They had pushed into two units from the 90th Light Division, the I/361st Battalion and the I/200th Battalion. The Australians had pushed in some five to seven kilometers. The units had taken losses, with part of the I/361st Battalion being destroyed. The advance of the 50th RTR was stopped by I/115th Battalion and 33rd Reconnaissance Unit, along with artillery fire. The German counter-attack came to the east and to the north. In part, anti-tank guns came into play to halt the British infantry tanks. The counter-attack was successful, since they "they took about 700 prisoners" (largely Australians) and knocked out "20 to 25 tanks". Rommel's assessment was that his forces would be able to hold their front, but that the "British" forces had stopped his advance. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

27 July 1942 "we are in trouble" from the 2/28th Battalion

The 2/28th Battalion sat on Ruin Ridge, hoping that men from the 2/43rd Battalion, the 69th Brigade, and the 2nd Armoured Brigade would arrive. There was constant anti-tank gun and machine-gun fire all night. At about 3am, the battalion sent out men to destroy a German 50mm anti-tank gun that was hitting vehicles in the minefield gap. They found that the gun was too well-protected by infantry. By 4:30am, they were concerned about not hearing anything about ammunition arriving. They sent out someone at about 4:30am to investigate. The man's vehicle was mined. The men got through on foot to the 2/43rd Battalion. They were able to speak with Brigadier Godfrey, commanding the 24th Brigade and told him of the ammunition situation and the need for anti-tank guns.

Some eighteen German trucks drove up just before dawn and unloaded infantry. They were on the right side. The 2/28th Battalion could not call in artillery support and were running out of ammunition. There was a fight with small arms. The 2/28th was doing pretty well in the fight. ONe company could see tanks and armored cars approaching. They first thought that they must be British, but they proved to be German. The company commander was killed in the fight. The battalion radio was just repaired and they communicated with the brigade headquarters. As the enemy attacked, the Australians sent message about artillery support, which they got. The Australians had anti-tank guns, and they had some success, knocking out eight German tanks and armored cars. A gun on the right was fought by a battery sergeant-major until the gun was knocked out and the man was killed.

They sent a message at 9:43am talking about being surrounded by tanks and asking for artillery fire.

The 50th RTR tried to help, but was hit hard, losing 22 tanks of which only ten were later recovered. The survivors so far from the 2/28th Battalion watched as the tanks were battered. They thought that the 2nd Armoured Brigade would get involved, but typically, they were afraid of fighting and would not venture through they minefield until they had some sort of guarantee from the infantry. By the time that the 2nd Armoured Brigade was ready to get involved, it was too late to help. At 10:30am, the 2/28th Battalion sent a message that they had to "give in". A few men fought on until the afternoon. One group did not hear of the surrender and fought until they were overrun by tanks. They were marched back as prisoners for about five miles and then were loaded onto trucks. Of the 2/28th Battalion, two officers and 63 men were killed or wounded. Another twenty officers and 469 men were missing. They may have well been prisoners. At this time, the 69th Brigade had lost about six hundred men. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The fighting on Ruin Ridge on 27 July 1942

The two front companies of Australians had arrived at Ruin Ridge by 1:10am. At the minefield, enough of a gap had been cleared that vehicles moved forward. The first vehicles were bringing six anti-tank guns, and also had two carriers and a truck with a machine-gun. The enemy hit vehicles following them and four were burning. That blocked further passage through the minefield and lit everything around. Other vehicles drove back to the "assembly area". Five out of ten carriers were left and they started transporting prisoners. They got some 115 Germans and 12 Italians out. The 2/28th Battalion asked for more ammunition. The 2/43rd Battalion got the message. Major Simpson, in charge of 2/28th's supply vehicles decided to try to run the ammunition forward to the battalion. Some seven or eight vehicles "followed the tape" and arrived successfully. Other trucks hit mines and burned. Wounded men were evacuated from those hit during the initial move forward. A medical officer went out to tend wounded men he had heard were lying in the minefield. He did that until Germans took him and 11 patients prisoner.

The artillery observer on the ridge with the 2/28th was unable to use his radio because of interference. He was sent back to the brigade headquarters to ask for ammunition and telephone cable. The observer was killed in a fight with enemy troops. The carrier was knocked out, but the driver got back to the brigade headquarters. The brigade commander ordered the 2/43rd to send its ammunition truck forward to the 2/28th Battalion. They also called in artillery to try and silence the enemy gun covering the minefield. They were unable to get the truck through with the ammunition.

The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey could not get information about what was happening to the 2/28th Battalion. They expected that the 2/28th Battalion would be in trouble by dawn. The 69th Brigade moved forward at about 2am. They got hung up and became disorganized. After what progress was made, the enemy attacked and overran two battalions. The 2nd Armoured Brigade was supposed to move forward at 7am, but the commander decided that there was not a large enough gap in the minefield to pass through. At dawn on 27 July, the 24th Brigade was out of touch with the 2/28th Battalion, so they did not realize just how bad the situation was. When Brigadier Godfrey heard that the armor would not go forward, he ordered the 2/43rd Battalion to try and destroy the gun covering the minefield. The 50th RTR was at first asked to carry ammunition to the 2/28th Battalion, but then to go forward and rescue them. At 8:45am they heard the 2/28th's radio saying that they were in trouble. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The next Australian attack on Ruin Ridge on 26 to 27 July 1942

General Morshead wrote an instruction on 24 July 1942 to the 9th Australian Division. He seems to have been embarrassed by the last attempt to attack Ruin Ridge. The Australians had been at their peak efficiency while they were garrisoning Tobruk in 1941. His instruction addressed reconnaissance by officers, for one thing that they should not be so obvious about their reconnaissance to keep the enemy from being warned. He also told officers that they needed to inform their troops quickly about what they had learned. Another point was that tanks could not sit in support for an extended period, as they would expect to have too many losses. Tanks would, after a period on the objective, "rally" to a position behind the infantry. The purpose of tanks in support was to destroy machine-guns. The infantry's purpose was "to destroy anti-tank guns and artillery", the enemies of tanks.

For the second attempt on Ruin Ridge, the 2/28th Battalion had spent planning and reconnaissance time. The battalion stepped out at exactly midnight of 26 to 27 July. The moon was bright and they attacked with two companies in the front, with a width of some 800 yards. They were trying to move at 100 yards in two minutes. The 2/28th Battalion had a new commander, Lt-Col. McCarter. He told the officers to expect fire from the sides as they moved forward. He suggested that the men "fire from the hip" without changing direction or stopping.

After traveling some 800 yards from the start, the right front and rear companies took officer casualties, including company commanders. They were taking fire from machine-guns, mortars and field guns. There were vehicles in company carrying supporting weapons, but they took anti-tank gun fire and then ran onto a minefield. Five vehicles were knocked out and some were burning.

At least this time, the front companies had reached Ruin Ridge by 1:10am. On the left side, the rear company charged with bayonets and cleared the objective. The 2/28th Battalion commander had moved his headquarters forward to a point some 900 yards from the "ruin" (to the northwest). They were having communication problems because they could not get good wire laid through the minefield while they were receiving fire. To make matters worse, the battalion radio had been destroyed. ON the site, the men tried to dig in, but the ground was too hard to do much. They had three wounded company commanders, another factor. On Ruin Ridge, they were receiving heavy enemy fire. They had been unable to hit the enemy guns that fired across the minefield. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A new offensive at El Alamein to start on the night of 26-27 July 1942

Generals Ramsden and Morshead had decided that the offensive should start during the night of 26 to 27 July 1942. The objective for the offensive was to attack the enemy positions on Miteiriya Ridge and break through to the enemy's rear areas. The 9th Australian Division would use the 24th Brigade. The reliable 2/28th Battalion would capture Ruin Ridge. They would have artillery support for their attack. After taking Ruin Ridge, they would create a position on the left flank of the 24th Brigade and on the right side of the 69th Brigade. The 69th Brigade had their own objective to take. Once the 2/28th and the 69th Brigade had performed their roles, the 2/43rd Battalion would move forward and taken the next ridge to the west of Ruin Ridge. If they needed the help, they could use the 50th RTR. If they did not need the tank help, the 50th RTR should push westward and take ground between Trig 30 and Point 27. This was near someplace called El Wishka. If they caused the enemy to withdraw, the 20th Brigade (Australians) would follow the enemy withdrawal.

General Auchinleck published a "Special Order of the Day" to the men of the Eighth Army, praising their achievement in stopping the enemy advance on Egypt and thrown the enemy on the defensive. The enemy was attempting to resupply their army, but the navy and air force are attacking the ships with supplies. Auchinleck said that they needed to keep fighting, as they were close to breaking the enemy.

British intelligence had an assessment of the enemy strength as of 25 July in the evening. They believed that the Italian strength in the El Alamein area was low, with about 9,100 men, some 70 field and medium guns, 45 anti-tank guns, 15 armored cars, and about 12 tanks. For the Germans, they were thought to have "two battalions of the 382nd Regiment, the Kiehl Group and 33rd Reconnaissance Regiment, the 361st Regiemental Group (two battalions), the Briehl Group and the 200th Regiment. These totaled about 3,580 men and had from 106 to 120 guns in support including 26 to 29 88mm weapons."

The Germans were holding an area north and east of Ruin Ridge. They only had light forces, but were equipped with "machine-guns, anti-tank guns and a few field guns". There were stronger forces south and west of Ruin Ridge. They knew that the enemy (presumably Germans) had tanks available. The British were aware of the existence of a minefield on east side of the Qattara Track. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Sorting things out in the push to Ruin Ridge on 22 July 1942 at El Alamein

The authorities determined that, yes, the advance towards Ruin Ridge had stopped far short of the objective. The 50th RTR was new to battle and they had a hard time, having lost some 23 tanks in the fight. They infantry had told them that they had gone too far forward, which seems to have not to be true. The brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey went forward with Brigadier Richards to the 2/28th Battalion. He ordered them to spread out to the sides, put out patrols and make contact with the 2/32nd Battalion. They also were to advance as far as they could. They did manage to contact the 2/32nd Battalion by 9:23am. They may have been disappointed with their progress, but the enemy was forced to move the 90th Light Division and parts of three Italian divisions to hold their left flank. The Australians had apparently captured almost a entire company of the I/155th Battalion. Tanks from the 21st Armored Division were called upon to attack the Australians and their tank support. They accounted for 23 tanks with 12 of that number knocked out by the Briehl Group (a battle group). The Australian historian called Auchinleck's attack, "costly and abortive". Auchinleck was concerned that the enemy was being reinforced and would be tougher to fight if they waited longer. The Australians were the most effective unit available to Auchinleck. He wanted to attack some more as soon as an attack could be mounted.

The new attack would be by XXX Corps with the 1st Armoured Division, short of one armored brigade, the 4th Light Armoured Brigade, and the 69th Infantry Brigade. The 1st South African Division would go after the enemy mine field south-east pf Miteiriyha Ridge. They would make a gap. The 24th Australian Brigade would attack the eastern end of the ridge and then push north. The 69th Brigade would also push through and move on Deir el Dhib. Two armored brigades would push into the enemy rear area. The Australian historian was again critical of the plan. Auchineleck watnted to attack on the night of 24-25 July, but General Ramsden thought that the South Africans were too tired. The 69th Brigade commander also wanted more rest for the brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Ruin Ridge goes badly

Being in too much of a hurry to bother to do the right things, the attack intended to reach Ruin Ridge did not go well. An infantry platoon was to ride the second "wave of tanks" got on the the first "wave" by mistake. The tanks only had infantry on board, although they were supposed to carry sappers as well. Because of the lack of preparation, the tanks went the wrong way and ran onto a minefield, losing about 20 tanks. The other tanks, traveling with carriers, pushed out to a ridge that the tank commander thought was the right distance for Ruin Ridge, but probably was not. The tanks did manage to scatter some enemy soldiers and they sat and waited for the 2/28th Battalion to reach them. The rest of the 2/28th got a late start. They actually advanced in an "extended line formation." General Morshead was watching the 2/28th Battalion moving forward and he had the impression that they would succeed.

There was no news reporting the situation until 10:45pm. The 2/28th Battalion had lost their wireless van early in the advance. One thing that happened is that an unexpected fifty German prisoners arrived at the 2/13th Battalion. They finally were able to communicate and they got a report at 11:45pm from COlonel Cox that they had reached a ridge with a ruin at the end. The tanks had withdrawn and the infantry "were getting in position on the reverse slope". They could see some ten Italian tanks.

So far, the 2/28th Battalion had taken 59 German prisoners from the 90th Light Division. They also had five Italian prisoners from the Trento Division. They had losses, though, of two officers and 52 other men. Tanks returned in support, but were gathered back further than was wanted. At that point, Brigadier Richards of the 1st Army Tank Brigade went forward to investigate, because he thought that they were not on the intended objective. He returned from his reconnaissance and reported that they were actually about three thousand yards short of Ruin Ridge. A "Forward Observation Officer accompanying the 2/28th Battalion reported that he considered them about 2,500 yards to far from Ruin Ridge. The brigade commander decided that they were "deployed west of the road on a front of 400 yards between Kilos 8 and 9." Officers had been fooled by seeing some ruins into thinking that they were at Ruin Ridge when they were still short of the place. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian OFficial History.

22 July 1942 at El Alamein, General Morshead is involved

During the day on 22 July 1942, General Morshead visited 24th Brigade headquarters a number of times. The general was waiting to hear that the brigade had achieved the first phase goals. "Just before 3:45pm" heard that the 2/32nd Battalion now had solid possession of its ground. General Morshead was thinking ahead to the exploitation phase. The situation was not quite so rosy, as Point 24 was still to be resolved. General Morshead consulted with General Ramsden and they decided not to continue with armor and infantry exploitation some 2,000 and 4,000 yards. They would still push to the south with the goal of reaching Ruin Ridge by dusk and setting up positions on the back side during the night.

They had planned to use the 2/28th Battalion for the westward move that was cancelled, so they decided to use the battalion for the push to the south. The 2/28th would take the place of the 2/43rd Battalion. The 50th RTR would be used for the attack on Ruin Ridge. Two squadrons would transport infantry and engineers. They were to cover six miles in just an hour. The tanks would have some six-pounders and machine-guns following them. Behind all that would be the rest of the 2/28th Battalion on foot, covering two miles in an hour. At the rear would follow the remainder of the 50th RTR. The 50th RTR, with 52 Valentine tanks would move into hull down spots on Ruin Ridge. They were to say there until the main group of the 2/28th Battalion arrived. They would be able to withdraw once the 2/28th Battalion was in place.

Ruin Ridge had been attacked four days earlier, so they hoped that the enemy would not expect another attack so soon. They optimistically expected that they could skimp on preparation, which was a bad idea. Major Cox, of the 2/28th Battalion had just received "oral orders" for an attack starting at 7pm. Here they were leaving the brigade headquarters at 5pm. The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey heard between 6pm and 7pm that a reconnaissance aircraft had seen some five hundred vehicles dispersed on Miteiriya Ridge> They were infantry reported digging positions and the report mentioned twenty gun positions. Brigadier Godfrey reported the news to Colonel Wells as 9th Australian Division headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 July 1942 with the 24th Brigade at El Alamein

Operations on 22 July 1942 had been tough for the Australians in the north at El Alamein. The 2/32nd Battalion was to attack Trig 22. They knew that Trig 22 was well-defended and had anti-tank guns and machine-guns. The 2/32nd Battalion was reduced to three 90-man companies, short of NCO's. The commander got the loan of one 2/43rd Battalion company for the attack. The attack was made with three companies in front. They stepped out at 5:30am with 1,700 yards to travel. They had fifteen minutes of artillery support before the attack started. The 2/43rd Company took the first fire from the enemy. They were stopped by heavy fire and forced to dig in. The company commander was hit and died. The 2/32nd Battalion company in the middle also lost its company commander. The company reached its objective, but was then pinned down by enemy fire. The third company "captured three anti-tank guns". But the company was stopped short, below Trig 22 and had to dig in as well. An Australian commanding a machine-gun section, charged a German machine gun in a sanger. The Lieutenant had only a pistol, but he used it very effectively. One of his men shot the German machine-gunner. They then fired on the Germans with the Spandau which eventually jammed.

On the right, the 2/43rd Company was till pinned down by artillery fire from two field guns. The reserve company was sent out to attack the gun position. They were supported by artillery and mortars. They took the position and forced the Germans to retreat. Later, Australian engineers ventured out and damaged the German guns. Suddenly at 9:45pm, the Germans hit the Australians with artillery and then sent tanks and armored cars at the center company. The company commander was killed and 66 Australians were taken prisoner. Artillery fire finally forced the tanks to withdraw.

The tanks and armored cars, along with several self-propelled guns attacked next at Trig 22. There was a protracted fight where two of the armored cars and the two moblie guns were disabled. The Australians were finally able to position some anti-tank guns to protect Trig 22 from further attacks. They also dug positions "back from the crest". The 24th Brigade had taken 57 German prisoners in the fighting, all from the 1/155th Infantry Battalion. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Australian Official History.

Tough fighting by Australians on 22 to 23 July 1942 in the north at El Alamein

While the 2/248th Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Hammer, was in difficulty. D Company of the 2/48th Battalion was without a commander and the company "had lost coheision". Despite that, small groups of men were able to hold on in their positions. One remaining section was commanded by a private. They had been able to overrun some enemy "posts". Those men noticed a knocked out Valentine tank. Germans had taken the crew prisoner along with two Australians from the section. Private Ashby's aection was able to shoot up the Germans and free the prisoners.

B Company of the 2/48th Battalion was now commanded by a Sergeant. He was able to call Lt-Col.Hammer and told him that they still holding their ground, but he didn't have map, so he didn't know where he was. Lt-Col.Hammer picked men for a force to go help B Company. He got men from his headquarters, the Headquarters Company, and some fifty men who had just arrived as reinforcements. He also pulled A Company from its positions and sent them all, along with some machine-guns and an anti-tank gun troop. B Company called just as the group had moved out. B Company was surrounded but would fight their way out. Only 15 men were able to get out from their positions. Lt-Col.Hammer ordered A Company to re-take East Point 24. They did that and laid wire and mines.

Late in the day on 22 July 1942, the 2/23rd Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col.Evans, they had been involved in desperate fighting. A Company from the 2/23rd Battalion was preparing positions close to the railway. They had lost touch with two platoons and the company commander may have been killed. The 2/23rd Battalion had taken losses. They had some 1oo wounded and had about fifty missing. They had lost 43 NCO's.

The infantry of the two battalions were fine men. They had been pushed back from a great deal of the ground that they had taken. Just holding on as well as they had was all they had been asked to do. As the 23rd of July began, they realized that the had withdrawn from around "East and West Point 24". The 2/23rd Battalion was reorganized based on their surviving strength, so they now had two companies. One of the companies was at East Point 24. The second company was between Esst Point 24 and the 2/24th Battalion. The 2/48th Battalion was stretched along the rail line to the east. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans counter-attack the Australians on 22 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Germans attacked East Point 24 at about 8am on 22 July 1942. The position was occupied by companies of the 2/23rd Battalion. There was a company on the left and one on the right. The left company was threatened, but was able to hold on for three hours. At least one part of the right company was able to keep the enemy back. The battalion commander sent his second-in-command forward in a carrier. He was to inform the the Australians at East Point 24 to hold on, as he was sending his other company (A) forward to provide support. However, the situation changed when the 2/23rd commander learned that the 2/24th Battalion was "withdrawing from the Ring Contour". That left A Company of the 2/23rd Battalion in an exposed position. A Company had started forward at 8:30am. While the situation deteriorated greatly, a Corporal in control of a carrier did a commendable job (he was Corporal McCloskey). The Corporal was originally sent to carry "a mortar detachment forward". After he transported the mortar detachment, he went back to get ammunition. As he traveled, he "stopped to pick up wounded men". He then took the mortar bombs to the mortar detachment. He realized that communications were poor, so he traveled between the companies to contact company commanders. He carried wounded men back to the rear. His carrier was hit and damaged. He was knocked out but recovered consciousness and repaired his carrier and continued to do useful things.

A man from the company on the right was able to reach the battalion headquarters to inform Lt-Col. Evans that the men of the company were pinned down by enemy fire. The company commander had been killed and "the other officers and half the company were casualties". The battalion commander ordered a smoke screen laid down, and some 30 men were able to escape. The acting company commander had been wounded and couldn't walk. He was rescued by a patrol after dark.

The battalion had lost touch with the left 2/23rd Battalion company. They were able to hold their ground until 11am. The company was essentially eliminated, but A Company from the 2/23rd Battalion had arrived and was keeping the Germans back from East Point 24. Lt-Col. Evans of the 2/23rd got 80 men together to the "positions between Trig 33 and Tel el Eisa". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 July 1942 in the north at El Alamein

The 26th Brigade was to attack the enemy positions that blocked the coast road. The understanding by the 2/24th Battalion company was that the 2/23rd Battalion company would attack at the same time. They had some concerns about their ability to make contact. A signal was sent up "over Ring Contour 25" and that was the signal to attack. They tried to move forward, but took "terrible enemy fire".
The main operation for the 2/23rd Battalion had two companies forward with heavy artillery support. Once they reached "East Point 24", the dust churned up made visibility difficult. At that point they became involved in a "fierce fight". They felt able to signal success at 6:20am. They had captured and sent back some 24 German prisoners.

The 2/48th Battalion heard at 5:55am that the other battalions had reached their objectives. On hearing the news, they moved to the left of the 2/23rd Battalion, moving towards West Point 24. They started to take heavy enemy fire. The situation was that they were attacking prepared positions and took heavy losses, especially in leadership, such as officers. Men returning to the battalion headquarters reported that they had taken heavy losses. The battalion commander did not understand the extent of the losses, as he thought that there would have been men left needing support.

They had sent a section of carriers to provide support, but the carriers reported having many men wounded and supporting weapons sent forward on vehicles could not get through. The 2/48th Battalion commander requested help from tanks. From the Australian perspective, the tanks were extremely slow in moving forward. The tank commander had estimated 30 minutes would be enough for them to move up in support. The reality was that they took 4-1/2 hours, which was unacceptable. The tankers were extremely cautious. Then they saw signs of a minefield, they stopped and wanted talk before moving again. While they were moving forward, two tanks were knocked out by an enemy anti-tank gun. At that point, the tanks withdrew, leaving the Australians without support.

An Australian private had been left to guard German prisoners. They were close to their own lines and they were under heavy German fire. He managed to keep control of the prisoners and eventually was able to take them to the battalion headquarters. He had managed to keep the prisoners for some fourteen hours. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operations at El Alamein from 19 to 23 July 1942

The Australians had become very proficient at executing raids during the night during their occupation of Tobruk. During the night of 19 to 20 July, 1942, the 2/28th Battalion sent a company of infantry with "20 sappers of the 2/7th Field Company". They raided enemy positions near Trig 22. They left their unit at 12:25am and were gone over an hour. They returned to their unit at about 3:40am. They found a tank which a sapper destroyed with a "No.73 grenade". They thought that some three or four enemy were killed "in or around the tank".
Despite the planned attack (besides the raid), the 26th Brigade were left to hold "the salient in the north". That meant that the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions had to continue defending their lines. That meant for an offensive operation, they only had two companies each. They had to hope for the best, as they were left without any reserves. Three companies from two battalions would push forward along the coast road. That left the rest of the battalions to take East Point 24 and West Point 24.
What the 26th Brigade was to do was to attack the enemy positions blocking the coast road and be ready to push into the headquarters area and (wishful thinking, we suppose) to push on to Mersa Matruh, Tobruk, and Tripoli. The Australian historian notes that they were attacking the enemy's strongest postions, not their weakest. The historian thought that they should have used a larger force to push along the coast road.
The situation was such that when Major Weir arrived from Alexandria to take command of the 2/24th Battalion, he was surprised to find that his battalion was ordered to make an attack the next morning. The accidental firing of a Very light "probably alerted the enemy". When the attack commenced, enemy artillerty fire hit right away. They men were forced to attack while traveling through "heavy machine-gun fire". The men who took their objectives were then forced to endure heavy enemy fire. Most officers were wounded and a new lieutenant had to find a way to take command.

Major Weir, the new commander of the 2/24th Battalion withdrew two companies that were in danger and he got the brigade commander's permission when he was able to communicate. Some men did not get the word to withdraw and were eventually overrun. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The lead-in to the 9th Australian Division operation, where General Morshead was very unhappy

General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander disliked General Ramsden, the XXX Corp commander. They had a two hour meeting where Morshead told General Ramsden that he disagreed with the plan for the attack on 22 July 1942. After hearing about the conference, General Auchinleck sent for General Morshead for another meeting at XXX Corps headquarters. The meeting attendees were General Morshead, General Auchinleck, General Ramsden, and Eric Dorman-Smith, DCGS. The DCGS took notes for the meeting. Auchinleck laid out the plan for the XIII Corps attack. If you read The Desert Generals, you learn that Eric Dorman-Smith was sort of "co-conspirator" during this period with Auchinleck. They were intent on making radical changes to how operations were conducted with the aim of becoming more competitive with Rommel's forces. Eric Dorman-Smith was disliked by the.
In the meeting, General Morshead objected that his division would be too dispersed to give the necessary support. Morshead told Auchinleck that the Australian objectives were much more difficult than Auchinleck and Ramsden realized. General Auchinleck apparently did not like how Morshead had responded, although he did not let Morshead know that. General Auchinleck told General Morshead that he wanted a willing commander for the operation. General Morshead told Auchinleck that he just wanted tasks that he could reasonably be sure of accomplishing with the goal of minimizing casualties  while performing the needed operation.The Desert Generals book has the time of the meeting wrong, in that the meeting was prior to the attack on 22 July, not for an operation on 24 July.
In the time leading up to the attack on 22 July, the men of the 9th Australian Division, at least those in the battalions facing the enemy, were given no rest. They were involved in active patrolling. The 2/48th Battalion diary noted that the "heat and flies" made  sleep during the day impossible. At night, they were too busy "digging and patrolling". They took to sending one man each day to the beach to be able to sleep. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The XXX Corps battle at El Alamein from 22 July 1942 onwards

The XXX Corps operations on 22 July 1942 involved the South African Division and the 9th Australian Division. Almost typically, General Morshead was unhappy with what General Auchinleck had assigned for his division to accomplish. The South African role in the battle was to capture a depression "to the north of Deir el Shein." The 9th Australian Division was to attack with two brigades. That would then be succeeded by tank and infantry push to the west and then turn to the south. The Australians were to push onto the Meteiriya Ridge in their "turn to the south". The Australians were to have the 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 5th RTR in support. They would also have the South African artillery firing in their support.
The Australian attack would occur in three "phases". After the first phase of the attack, there was a two hour pause planned to allow time for the artillery to more forward. During the first phase, the 26th Brigade would make two attacks. One was straight out to take "Ring Contour 25". The other attack was planned to cross the road and railway to take the high ground associated with Point 24 (which had two high points). The 24th Brigade role was to attack from "the Tel Makh Khad Ridge." They were to take the high ground that dominated Point 24. Once the two Australian brigades had taken their objectives, the 9th Australian Divisiional Cavalry would control the area between the brigades to obstruct any enemy movements.
The second phase of the plan was for the 50th RTR to Point 21 west of the 24th Brigade. The 2/28th Battalion was to come forward to hold Point 21. The third phase would see the 50th RTR would capture "Trig 30 on Ruin Ridge". Another Australian battalion, the 2/43rd, would move forward to hold Trig 30. To make the 2/28th Battalion available for the operation, the 2/13th Battalion was assigned to the 24th Btigade. They were to take over the 2/28th responsibilities prior to the attack. The 20th Australian Brigade was to push forward to exploit the expected successes. They would move towards Daba following the night of 22 to 23 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on 21 July 1942 in the El Alamein area

The Australian historian is quick to criticize General Auchinleck's plans. XIII Corps would attack with the new 161st Indian Motor Brigade to push along the Ruweisat Ridge toward Trig 63. The 2nd New Zealand Division would push north to the El Mreir depression. They would take the eastern portion. After that the 23rd Armoured Brigade, with infantry tanks mounting 2pdr guns would drive forward into the enemy "headquarters and administrative area". They would go between the two German armored divisions and towards the German Africa Corps. The tanks of the mobile British formations would be saved for the push to the west after having broken through.
The attack stepped off on 21 July. The South African division took a depression on the Indian motor brigade's right. The Indian motor brigade attack failed to achieve its objective. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was successful, but they were left without the tank support that they had believed they had been promised. The brigade took 700 casualties and Brigadier Clifton was captured. He was able to escape "later in the day".
The reserve Indian battalion attacked at 8am and was able to "reach" Point 23. The 23rd Armoured Brigade set off to the west, but took heavy tank losses. Still, their move "threw the enemy into confusion". They did not withdraw, howoever. XIII Corps had executed all their plans and had not intention of doing more. The 2nd Armoured Brigade came up to support the 23rd Armoured Brigade to allow them to withdraw. The 23rd Armoured Brigade was reduced to 7 running tanks of the 87 they had started with. At least half of the tank losses were recovered so that they could be repaired.
The Australian historian rated the efforts of 21 July as a disaster. General Inglis, now commanding the 2nd New Zealand Division stated that he refused to take part in another operation like they had just executed. They were supposed to have tank support which was actually absent. He wanted to have his own tanks under his own command. The New Zealand Division lost 904 men, of which 69 were officers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck makes plans and then changes them from 17 and 18 July 1942 and beyond

The evening of 17 July 1942 started with a carrier raid near the Tel el Eisa. The raid was conducted by three carrier sections from the 2/48th Battalion. The raid had artillery, machine-gun, and mortar support. The carriers ended up firing some 3,400 rounds from their guns during the raid. They had crossed the rail line near the station and then drove to the two points of point 24 (East and West). After doing that, they returned to their starting point. On the return there was a mishap where the carriers ran onto their own minefield and took six casualties and had  three damaged carriers.
Far to the south from the 9th Australian Division, the 7th Armoured Division staged several successful attacks on the enemy. Their impression was that the enemy had thinned out their forces in the south.
Auchinleck's first idea, expressed later on 17 July was to attack the enemy flanks at the end of July. Before that, the "British" forces at El Alamein would keep pressure on the enemy. The XXX Corps role was to destroy the Italian forces they faced. On 18 July, Auchinleck changed his mind and issued a new set of orders. Instead, right away, they would attack (by 21 July) the center, near Ruweisat Ridge. The forces in the south would move against the enemy left and rear. XIII Corps would attack near Deir el Shein, Deir el  Abyad, and Buweibat el Raml. They hoped to break through and chase the enemy to "Daba and Fuka". Meanwhile, XXX Corps would attack in the north. Auchinleck's staff made plans for what to do while pursuing the enemy.
The British were reading Rommel's communications for one thing. They also had received two new brigades: the 161st Indian Motor Brigade and the 23rd Armoured Brigade Group. The reality was that the British had a much greater strength than the enemy. The British thought that the Germans had 31 tanks when they actually had 38 (not many). The Italians were thought to have 70 tanks when they actually had 59. The 1st Armoured Division now had 61 Grant tanks, 81 Crusaders and 31 Stuart light tanks. The 23rd Armoired Brigade had 150 Valentine and a few Matilda tanks. The 1st Army Tank Brigade also had infantry tanks. The 23rd Armoured Brigade waws essentially and Army Tank Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

17 to 19 July 1942 at El Alamein

Rommel was very concerned about the situation near El Alamein. He wrote his wife on 17 July 1942, remarking that the "enemy" (the Australians) were using their infantry strength to attack and destroy Italian "formations". There were not enough Germans to fight without Italian support. The 9th Australian Division's attacks caused enough damage to make the enemy decide to not attack at the "center".
Tanks (probably German) attacked the two Australian battalions where they touched. In the attack on the 2/32nd Battalion, a gunner was able to knock out six tanks. Still, the 2/32nd Battalion lost 22 men as prisoners where the front platoons had been overrun. The situation was tense, but they were able to pull back to a firm line some 1500 yards behind the previous position at "the telegraph line". The Qattara track cut across where the two battalions touched each other.
The 24th Brigade "brigade major" went forward to see the situation. He told Brigadier Godfrey that they front was solid. Godfrey then ordered the 2/28th Battalion to attack during the night and take the ground that they had just lost. They moved forward after midnight and pushed forward to the objective, which they reached by 1:30am. The attackers had seen very few enemy infantry and had destroyed one enemy tank. Their only casualties were two men wounded.Australian sappers got busy after that and initially laid 2500 mines. The next night, they laid more mines to the field.
The new situation found the 24th Brigade in a triangle by battalions. The 2/28th was at the forward point with the other two spread behind at the telegraph line. The 2/32nd Battalion was to the northwest and the 2/43rd Battalion was to the southeast. The 2/28th Battalion sent out a carrier patrol at sunrise. They found a German machine gun ("Spandau") firing occasionally. The gun was protected by a mine field. The gun was manned by one man. The carrier patrol also noticed German tanks and armored cars scouting around the Makh Khad Ridge. Soon, enemy artillery was firing "air bursts" over the 2/28th Battalion. The firing was apparently from 88mm AA guns which caused heavy casualties in the 2/28th Battalion.
The enemy held off attacking on 18 July 1942. The German situation was very difficult. The two German armored divisions had very few running tanks. the 15th  Armored Division had 9 tanks while the 21st Armored Division had 19 tanks. The 90th Light Division was sent north to take the place of four Italian divisions that had "collapsed". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australians in action on 17 July 1942 at El Alamein

The 2/43rd Battalion was now under attack by tanks and infantry where they were at Ruin Ridge, but they were without anti-tank support and were also low on ammunition. To make matters worse, they no longer could communicate with the field artillery. The battalion commander wanted to move farther foward some eight hundred yards, but he was informed by the 44th RTR squadron commander that he could not help with such a move. The alternative plan was to withdraw and permission was granted for the move. They ended up on Makh Khad Ridge. They were then located to the left of the 2/32nd Battalion. The 2/43rd had some accomplishments. In their fight, they "had destroyed 13 guns and 12 machine-guns and three heavy mortars".
The fighting at Trig 22 was becoming increasingly tough. They were now taking heavy shelling. The enemy had started to fire "air bursts", which were very damaging due to the positions being very shallow with no cover. The enemy launched an attack with tanks and armored cars at 10am. 2-pdr fire and fire from a captured Italian Breda 20mm forced the attackers to withdraw. The Breda was damaged but the gunner, a corporal, was able to repair the gun. He used the gun to fire at soft vehicles "and low-flying aircraft".
The enemy continued to apply pressure against the two battalions. One issue was that the enemy had been able to put a post on Trig 22. At least, the two Australian battalions were in contact. The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey gave permission for a reorganization of the 2/32nd Battalion positions to form a line "that followed the telegraph poles and linking with the 2/43rd's positions astride the Qattara track".
The 24th Brigade had accomplished enough to draw attention (however unwanted). They had overrun Italian units from the Trieste Division and from the 7th Bersaglieri Regiment and had penetrated the Trento Division front. Rommel had ordered German units to the area. He also ordered General Nehring to change to a defensive posture. Rommel wanted a regiment from the 90th Light Division, but all he got was a battalion. In the north, the enemy forces at near Tel el Eisa were "not happy". That was with the 26th Australian Brigade not pressing them. German armor and infantry pulled back to where they had been on 16 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tough fighting early on 17 July 1942 near Trig 22

The 2/32nd Battalion moved out at 2:30am. In what was just 15 minutes or so, they came under fire from the enemy with "artillery, mortars, and machine-guns". By 5:15am, the right company had gone some 1,500 yards past Trig 22. The other two companies took their objectives. The 2/32nd took about 160 prisoners. The three companies that had attacked were spread wide over a 2,500 yard front. They had left gaps between the companies. Some Australian anti-tank guns and machine-guns were in place on Trig 22. An enemy counter-attack had taken the crest of Trig 22. The 2/32nd Battalion commander sent his fourth company against the crest which it took again by 7:45am. They had taken their objectives by 8:45am. The 9th Australian Division cavalry had seven tanks and 15 carriers. This was their first fight while equipped with tanks. Previously, they had carriers, although they may have had some British light tanks. They were able to knock out "some anti-tank guns and machine-gun posts".
Starting at 6am, the 2/43rd Battalion attacked onto the Qattara track. They had two companies forward with a third following. They experienced heavy enemy fire. They arrived at Ruin Ridge at about 7am. The left company had a fight to break through enemy positions. The ground was "broken", which must have made progress difficult. Everyone man but one in the left section was wounded. The un-wounded man carried a Bren gun and eventually rejoined his platoon after moving another thousand yards. One company captured some four hundred enemy soldiers. They arrived at Ruin Ridge by 7:30am. They could see that there were 19 enemy guns firing from 300 yards away. The company commander led an attack with a scratch group, including men from his headquarters. They added 150 more prisoners to their bag. They were short of anti-tank grenades and wanted to preserve what they could for use against tanks, so they only destroyed three of the guns.
The other foward company from the 2/43rd moved across 2,500 yards under artillery fire until they were fired on from a position. The men attacked while "firing from the hip" which allowed them to overrun the enemy, who surrendered in the face of the attack. They kept going another thousand yards where they reached machine-guns and an anti-tank gun, probably Italian. The Australians attacked from the side and caused the enemy to stand and surrender. After the anti-tank gun fired two more rounds, the gunner was killed. Once they had occupied Ruin Ridge, they could see 7 tanks and some four hundred vehicles in the distance. A corporal moved forward and observed the enemy to "direct his platoon's fire". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australians dominate and are again used for more attacks in July 1942

The 2/23rd Battalion had "overran" the last existent battalion of  the Italian Sabratha Division. They had also hit a German battalion, the I/382nd Infantry Regiment. The situation was desperate enough to cause Rommel to send help from the south that he had planned to use to follow-up on successes at Ruweisat Ridge. So the 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion, the Briehl Group of the 90th Light Division, and a 104th Regiment battalion. By ten to ten, the 21st Armored Division reported that heavy fire from the right made any advance impossible. By 1:40pm, 5th Armored Regiment had to change to a defensive posture. A strong infantry force had moved into position to attack the two Australian infantry companies at Tel el Eisa.
In the fighting leading up to this situation, just one Australian brigade had managed to capture and hold "high ground west of the El Alamein fortress and nogth of the railway." They had hit the enemy so that they had lost some 2,000 killed, wounded and took 3,708 prisoners. They Germans and Italians suffered from Australian artillery fire and machine guns. For once, Australian artillery and machine gun units had been used to support Australian infantry. The Austalians also had "direct air support" for the first time,
Brigadier Ramsey was now the 9th Australian Division artillery commander. Had previously commanded the artillery at Mersa Matruh. He had served as an enlisted artilleryman in the Great War and received a commission after the end of the war. At the start of the second war, Ramsey had been a division artillery commander. He stepped back down and formed the 2/2nd Field Regiment. After that, he had been the corps medium artillery commander. "He wasa schoolmaster and university lecturer and destined to fill the most senior posts has branch of the teaching profession offered."
By 17 July, General Auchinleck planned to attack the enemy forces "in the center" at Ruweisat Ridge. The 24th Australian Brigade would attack from the north. They would try to take Makh Khad Ridge and then push some five thousand yards "towards Ruin Ridge". The 2/32nd Battalion would take Trig 22 without artillery preparation during the night. By dawn, the 2/43rd Battalion "would pass through" with a 44th RTR Valentine squadron to take Ruin Ridge to the south. Most of the 44th RTR with the 9th Australian Divisional Cavalry, equipped with Crusader tanks would guard the flank, and if needed, help with Trig 22. There was heavy artillery support provided. They had the 9th Australian DIvision artillery, the 1st South African Division artillery, along with two British field regiments. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action on 15 July 1942 "in the north" at El Alamein

As early as 4:15am on 15 July, the Germans ordered tanks from the 5th Armored Regiment as well as infantry to stage an attack on the Australians. The infantry that was immediately involved were men from the II;104th Battalion. They pushed ahead and crossed the railroad "north-west of the cutting at 5:50am. By 8am, 12 tanks belonging to the 5th Armored Regiment pushed to the east, running along to the north of the rail line. At 2pm, the unit reported that they had moved back into positions that they had previously held. They were not able to bring up heavy weapons due to the heavy artillery fire.
By later in the afternoon, the Germans were unable to continue forward and in fact had to move against an attack coming from "south-east of the El Alamein Box". The one infantry battalion from the 104th Regiment was left on their own to hold "the northern sector". New orders for the 5th Armored Regiment were to attack starting at 4:30am on 16 July. They were to attack "in the south-east".
On the opposing side, the Australians planned to retake "Point 24", which had two hills connected, as we remember. Half of the 2/23rd Battalion with five tanks were allocated for the attack. The attack was launched in the morning. One company of the 2/23rd Battalion with two  troops from the 8th RTR moved out at 5:20am. The enemy had a position "at the railway cutting". They fired on the leading Australians. A successful attack with grenades and sub-machine-guns took the enemy position (a "post"). The active Australian company was able to take the eastern portion of Point 24 by 6:30am.
The second company from the 2/23rd Battalion moved through the first. They were supported by tanks from the 44th RTR. They were able to take the western part of Point 24 by 7:45am. The company commander had gone to help a wounded man and while returning, he "was killed by a shell". The Australians took 601 prisoners, including 41 Germans. They also took three colonels prisoner, one of which was a German. Of the attacking Australians, they lost some 90 men killed or wounded. That was 90 out of about 200 men who attacked. At 11:30am, Lt-Col. Evans came forward to inspect the situation. The enemy was able to fire on the positions so he ordered the men to withdraw from what he considered to be a valueless area. They had no machine guns, ant-tank guns. They continued to take losses, so they withdrew with no further losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

New plan for 15 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Australian 20th Brigade was organized as a brigade group. During the afternoon of 15 July 1942, they had moved into positions near Auchinleck's "tactical headquarters". The brigade had orders to be executed at 5:30am on 16 July. They were to break into three battalion battle groups "in mobile box formation" and travel to the Mubarik tomb which was "behind the 5th Indian Division".  The British had intelligence that indicated that Rommel was planning to attack the 5th Indian Division. The 20th Brigade Group (as it was) set up a defensive line that was quite hastily constructed. All this happened without General Morshead being informed. When Morshead learned of developments, he immediately phoned General Auchinleck and told him that what had been done was contrary to their agreement and also to Morshead's "charter". At first, General Auchinleck agreed to return 20th Brigade to the 9th Austraslian Division. However, Auchinleck called Morshead back to tell him that Auchinleck was being "heavily attacked". Morshead relented in those circumstances and let Auchinleck continue to use the 20th Brigade. Auchinleck was not able to return the 20th Brigade until 17 July.
Meanwhile, on 15 July, Rommel attacked 26th Brigade. Rommel was handicapped by having sent reinforcements to General Nehring of the German Africa Corps. During the night before the attack, men from 2/48th Battalion could hear vehicles in the area near the Tel el Eisa railroad station. The battalion fired on the force that was close by. By morning, they noticed some 15 German vehicles "near the wire" and that there two machine guns and two anti-tank guns setup close to the rail station. The Australians attacked and took 32 prisoners and captured the vehicles (initially). The vehicles were stripped of "ammunition and equipment" and were then destroyed. During the night of 15-16 July, men from the 2/48th Battalion attacked German engineers engaged in removing the minefield. They took seven of hte engineers prisoner.
Back at dawn on 15 July, the men of the 2/24th Battalion saw ten German tanks and as many as 70 vehicles carrying infantry. They were driving in the direction of Trig 33. The enemy fired a heavy artillery barrage starting at about 7:30am. A significant attack was sent with 35 tanks and "seven companies of infantry". The tanks reached the foot of Trig 33 with 14 tanks having scaled the Trig. The accompanying infantry was beaten back while the tanks eventually pulled back. Another attack was sent forward at 8:15am. They had 25 tanks but they were again repulsed. The 44th Tank Regiment attacked with "light tanks" (presumably Stuarts). The enemy again sent an attack (the third). They did not have any tank support and they were beaten back after about a half-hour fight. Another attack with tanks and infantry "at midday" was stopped by artillerty and machine guns. That day, they destroyed ten German tanks and they took 63 prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

14-15 July 1942 a success "up to a point"

The New Zealand Divsion was "hung out to dry" by the 1st Armoured Division. To a degree, the New Zealand Division created their own problem by bypassing significant German units. In one case, eight German tanks were bypassed. As day broke, the German tanks attacked the 22nd New Zealand Battalion. The New Zealanders had expected to see tanks, but British ones not German. The New Zealand anti-tank guns engaged the tanks, but after a "fierce fight", the New Zealanders surrendered with some 350 taken prisoner, as we previously had mentioned.
On the morning of 15 July, the Africa Corps commander reported the attack at Deir el Shein to Rommel. Rommel ordered German forces to head for the British "penetration". He sent the 3rd Reconaissance Unit and a battle group of 100 infantry with other arms heading south. The Baade Group with 200 infantry and some artillery, along with the 33rd Reconnaisance Unit driving north. An attack started at 5pm from the north that included the available tanks from the 15th Armored Division. One issue was the Baade Group did not reach the battle area. Still, the 4th New Zealand Brigade was overrun due to the non-support by the 1st Armoured Division. Still, a few tanks from the 2nd Armoured Brigade came up to the battle to support the New Zealanders. General Gott told the New Zealanders that they could withdraw to "a line from Trig 63 to to a position south-west of Alam el Dihmaniya". The British armor created some very great anger over their failure to support the New Zealand Division.  They particularly were angry with the Briitsh commanders involved in the bad situation.
Auchinleck's plan for the battle was good enough that "some 2,000 men of the Brescia and Pavia had surrendered, and in Rommel's words, the 'line south-east of Deir el Shein collapsed'". The problem was that the British armor's failure to support the 2nd New Zealand Division caused the loss  of 1,405 "killed, wounded or missing".
The great New Zealand officer at this time a brigadier, Howard Kippenberger not only blamed the British armor but said that the New Zealanders could have done more to get better cooridate support from the armor. Still, this was another example where the British armor seemed afraid to fight the Germans. This is based on the accoiunt in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

14 to 15 July 1942 at El Alamein

Some of the tanks that had been engaged at Point 24 cut across the front of the 2/48th Battalion near the Tel el Eisa rail station. When no one fired on the tanks, they continued on towards Point 26. Field guns opened fire on the tanks and turned west where Australian anti-tank guns fired on the tanks. Nearby infantry also fired on the tanks. Some of the tanks exploded and burnt. The survivors withdrew under fire. The Australians of 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment claimed seven tanks knocked out, four by one gun and three by the other. In the morning, the 1st Army Tank Brigade sent tanks forward to support the Australians. In the light, they counted ten German tanks knocked out!
Rommel had planned an attack on 15 July, but Auchinleck's attack on Ruweisat Ridge caused Rommel to have to reduce what he would do at Tel el Eisa. Auchinleck had planned to break through the enemy forces in the center and wipe out the enemy north of Ruweisat Ridge. He also wanted to destroy the enemy forces that lay to the east from the track from El Alamein-to-Ab Dweis. XXX Corps would capture the eastern portion of Ruweisat Ridge and then attack south and capture Miteiriya Ridge. XIII Corps was also in the plan and was to push to Trig 63 in the west of Ruweisat Ridge and then move to the northwest. Auchinleck decided on 14 July to attack that night. The corps were to achieve their objectives by 4:30am on 15 July. The orders to "XIII Corps and 1st Armoured Division" show that Auchinleck had actually decided on a more limited set of objectives. They realized later that the conferences that were held did not successfully communicate how the cooperation between units was to occur. For example, the New Zealand Division had expected to have close armor support. General Lumsden understood that his armor only needed to come forward when requested. The lack of support by two armored brigades had unfortunate consequences.
The XXX Corps attack was launched by the 5th Indian Brigade. One battalion was held up by fire, while another was pushed back.
2nd New Zealand Division attacked from the XIII Corps area. They had two brigades engaged, the 4th and 5th, They moved forward starting at 11pm. They moved until they encountered minefield. They bypassed enemy positions and kept moving forward. The New Zealand brigades had reached their objectives, but were not in good condition. They expected to have two armored brigades ready to support them and the Indian brigade, but they were instead sitting stopped, in the rear, waiting for orders. Some German tanks had been bypassed, and these attacked the New Zealanders. New Zealand anti-tank guns engaged the tanks, but the New Zaaland Division lost 350 prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Offiicial History.

Fight in the north of the El Alamein position from 12 July 1942

On 12 July 1942, the 9th Australian Division had been in a holding posture until late afternoon. The enemy prepared for an attack on Australians on Hill 33 with increasingly heavy artillery fire. The Germans sent their infantry forward in waves starting at 6pm. This was directed at the 2/24th Battalion positions. The German infantry faced fire from the 2/8th Field Regiment and some British howitzers, possibly the 6in BL 26cwt used by medium regiments. A company from the 2/23rd Battalion, reinforcing the 2/24th Battalion, was heavily attacked. A Bren gunner and a machine-gun platoon inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans. The company commander, however, was killed "when his trench was hit".
The German infantry attack had ended by about 9pm. The Germans had lost some 600 casualties in the attack, perhaps most to the machine-guns. The Australian infantry company had also taken many casualties. Captain Harding was now the company commander for the men from the 2/23rd Battalion. He commanded the company over the next five days while defending their position.
Early on 13 July, the men of the 26th Brigade received word that the 21st Armored Division was planning an attack. Rommel apparently hoped to push into the Australians rear and isolate them. East Point 24 was attacked twice, but was protected by artillery fire from five artillery regiments. Rommel's attack hit the South African Division, which was holding positions south of the El Alamein Box. The South Africans were able to beat off the attack.
General Auchinleck was already planning for an attack on Ruweisat Ridge. At first, he considered moving the whole 9th Australian Division to a new position "south-east of Jevel Bein Gabir." This original plan would leave the 26th Brigade with the South African Division. After some preliminary moves and some reconnaissance, Auchinleck decided to only send the 20th Brigade. They would be in a box just behind Auchinleck's headquarters, which was so close to the front as to be very vulnerable. Because of that, the position of Auchinleck's headquarters was kept secret. No one was allowed to mark the position on a map.
Rommel's latest plan was to hit the Australians on 14 July. During the night before, the Australians could see infantry and artillery movements. That drew Briitsh/Australian artillery fire. By "mid-morning" they could see enemy infantry moving close, while three tanks drove up near a company of the 2/24th Battalion to provide cover for engineers who were lifting mines. The Australians were not able to fire on the tanks with anti-tank guns and infantry weapons were ineffective. The Australians finally were able to call in artillery fire, which slowed the enemy progress. By mid-afternoon, German infantry supported by tanks attacked two Australian companies at East Point 24. The tanks looked for weapons pits and drove over them to crumble them when they were found. The defenders kept the tanks under heavy fire with infantry weapons, forcing the tanks to keep closed up. The Australians beat off a second attack, killing time until dark, when the tanks couldn't see well enough. The Australians were in desperate straits, so they eventually walked out to keep from being taken. The anti-tank gunners took their breach blocks, but were able to bring in vehicles later and towed the guns out of harms way. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A dangerous business, being so far forward into enemy territory on 11 to 12 July 1942

Traveling in the dark when you were so far into enemy territory was very dangerous. 26th Brigade held a conference at their headquarters very late on 11 July 1942. They were returning to their units early on 12 July, driving in the dark. They were all in a jeep. They left the meeting but never arrived at their destinations. They found that the driver had missed the turn "just east of battalion headquarters" and had driving straight into enemy positions. They were put in the bag by the Germans. The same thing happened again "three nights later".
The XXX Corps attacks in the north had been very effective and had turned into a crisis for the enemy. The attacks started early on 11 July after heavy artillery fire falling on Italian units. Two Italian positions that were thought to be strong, as the had held on 10 July. They "fell very soon". They sent a Trieste Division battalion to "plug the gap", but it was "wiped out". The situation was so dangerous, that the enemy had to commit most of the army-level artillery to the fighting in the north. The remaining battalions from the Trieste Division had to be used at Point 21 to stop the British attack. The situation with the Italian forces was so bad that Rommel got all his German soldiers out of bed and sent them to the fighting. The Reconnaissance Unit 3 was ordered to the area southwest of point 237 to keep the British from breaking through the front and pushing to the west.
Sometime on 11 July, Rommel decided to attack the British force in the north with the 21st Armored Division. Rommel ordered the division to move north on 12 July to be ready for a battle on 13 July. Rommel wanted to capture the El Alamein Box and isolate the Australians at Tel el Eisa. Rommel put a high priority on the operation so he allocated "every gun and every aircraft". As you can imagine, what was eventually named "The First Battle of El Alamein" turned into an extended affair.
General Auchinleck was very aware of the German movements. With German armor moving north, Auchinleck put in motion a plan to attack Ruweisat Ridge from the south and middle. The 21st Armored Divsion had some thirty tanks, which amounted to  about two-thirds of the remaining German armor. Despite that, the bulk of the German armored force, included in the German Africa Corps, was still in south, now commanded by General Nehring. They were armored, but without many tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of hte Australian Official History.

More action in the El Alamein area from 10 July 1942

Later in the afternoon on 10 July 1942, the enemy launched three more tank attacks on the 2/48th Battalion. Two companies were engaged, but managed to hold their ground. During the last attack, tanks actually got near the train station, but were engaged by anti-tank guns. Six of the ten attacking tanks were knocked out. When one tank crew tried to escape, a machine-gunner picked up the gun, with another man's help, and fired over a rise at the enemy crew. They surrendered rather than take the fire.
"Just after dusk" the enemy attacked again with tanks and infantry. The attack was preceded with "two hours of shelling". The tanks broke into the right-most company positions. A counter-attack stepped off at about 8:30pm. The counter-attack was made by one company with two more platoons. The company charged and "fired from the hip". They pushed the enemy force back beyond the railroad. One group commanded by a sergeant attacked machine-gun positions. They took "many prisoners" and damaged two tanks with sticky bombs. By morning on 11 July, the 2/48th had "39 causalties" but took 89 Germans and 835 Italians. They captured 27 guns of various types. To the south, the South Africans had attacked Tel el Makh Khad and pushed out the enemy that had occupied it. They then pulled back into the El Alamein Box.
The enemy had been greatly affected by the attacks. Lt-Col. von Mellenthin had been left in charge at the headquarters while Rommel was elsewhere. He dealt with a bad situation. The news was that the Italian Sabratha Division was panicked and had fled. The division only had two regiments each of two battalions. Their artillery had been captured. Lt-Col. von Mellenthin had seen the fleeing Italians "rushing past". von Mellenthin pulled together a scratch group from "headquarters troops" with "machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns" and some additional infantry. His goal was to "close the road to the west". A regiment from the 164th Division had just arrived at a convenient time.
Rommel was in the south, hoping to launch an attack that would push through to Cairo. Rommel heard the gunfire to the north and immediately took action. He pulled together a battle group from the 15th Armored Division and from his headquarters battle group. The Africa Corps was located in the south, where they were ordered to limit their operation. The battle groups sent north only had 15 or 16 tanks. The Germans were hampered by heavy shell fire from the El Alamein area.
A mixed force of all arms, "Daycol", left the El Alamein fortress area at 5:30am. Before they could reach Miteiriya Ridge, they ran into two infantry companies. They overran them and took them prisoner. By afternoon, they were taking artillery fire and withdrew at 1:30pm. They had taken over one thousand Italian prisoners and destroyed eight guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Trig 33 and beyond on 10 July 1942

the White Knoll was a feature on the coast. The White Knoll was home to a machine-gun nest. Lt. McNamara's platoon, supported by carriers, and reinforced by soldiers from the reserve company overran the White Knoll. Trig 33 was in Australian possession by 6:35am. From there, another platoon moved forward and captured four heavy guns and took about one hundred Italian prisoners.
One company, mounted in trucks, was supposed push forward to Point 24, but their supporting tanks and machine-gunners were "hopelessly bogged" in the salt marshes. The company commander had his  men dig in on the Point 33 "reverse slope". At about 5pm, the enemy sent 18 tanks against the Australians. The ubiquitous salt marshes created obstacles to motorized vehicles, so most of the tanks got bogged down in the marsh. Artillery and anti-tank guns knocked out 14 of the 18 tanks. One gunner rolled his anti-tank gun forward of Trig 33 and commenced firing. It was a hazardous occupation, since the gunner and three of his men were wounded. He bagged two tanks with his gun. Another nine tanks attacked Trig 33 on the southern side. The Australian anti-tank gunners knocked out five of the nine. The 2/24th Battalion was heavily engaged. They had six men killed and 22 wounded, but they did well, as they took over 800 prisoners and much equipment.
Tanks also attacked the 2/48th Battalion positions. At about 11am, five enemy tanks moved forward from the south of the train station. The supporting British tanks were driven back by the attack. The infantry was heavily shelled where they were, on rocky ground that prohibited digging very deep.
At about 11:30am, the 9th Australian Division Cavalry was sent forward. They did not get far, because of artillery fire and the tanks that were attacking the 2/48th Battalion. Some three hours later, they were bombed and lost a carrier. They eventually gave up and were pulled back.
Tanks attacked again at 2:30pm towards the 2/48th Battalion. The tanks rolled over some of the shallow trenches occupied by the Australian infantry. After the tanks passed by, they were attacked by men with sticky grenades. The tanks were stopped at the rail line by field and anti-tank gun fire. The tanks eventually had to pull back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More from the Australian attack on 10 July 1942

The Australian historian had fun saying "Before dawn broke, the Italians garrisoning Point 26 awoke to discover that they had been captured." After that, the British laid down a barrage reminiscent of Great War "drum fire". The Africa Corps diary is where the drum fire reference can be found. They fired on Point 23 and laid down smoke on Trig 33. After the firing stopped, the two 2/48th Companies "passed through" and captured Point 23 with "only light opposition". Not surprisingly, they took prisoners, some were still in bed. The advance had moved some 4,500 yards forward from the start.
 
Two companies executed the planned turn to towards the southwest, towards the Tel el Eisa station. The charge by the two companies was executed so well that they "overran a battery of four guns", taking 106 prisoners. The men attacked with bayonets fixed against two guns manned by very determined men that held out until the Australians were in among them. After reaching the station, the men dug in and "patrolled forward". They were accompanied by the tank squadron attached. By 9am, six Australian anti-tank guns had joined them. The Germans commenced dive bomb attacks on the battalion. They hit the headquarters at 9:45am. Since the Australians were well-dug in, they only took one casualty. The Germans kept up the attacks, hitting the 2/48th Battalion five more times that day.
The 2/24th Battalion was also moving forward. Despite bogging down in "soft sand", the energetic battalion commander got his men in place early. Their attack started at 4:30am. They moved past Point 26, now held by the 2/48th Battalion. The 2/24th Battalion had one platoon scouting ahead, Their carrier platoon also charged forward. They were able to overrun machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Italian-manned anti-tank guns never fired. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian attack on 10 July 1942

The 9th Australian Division attack on 10 July 1942 was supported by artillery and air power. The division had the 7th Medium Regiment firing in support, along with the divisions three field regiments and guns from the South African division that were able to bear on targets. Starting at 7:30am, the air force was set to sweep over the battlefield. There were to be bomber and fighter-bomber attacks. There was also the division cavalry regiment ready to advance at 8am with a field battery in company.
General Morshead and the division headquarters were located in the El Alamein "fortress" from 9 July. The attacking battalions were sent to their starting positions on the west side. The battalions were well-supported. They each had an anti-tank gun troop, a machine gun platoon, some engineers, and a tank squadron (presumably infantry tanks).
The 2/48th Battalion was assigned to take Point 26. The battalion commander was Lt-Colonel Hammer. He served in Greece as the brigade major of the 16th Brigade and afterwards. He was appointed to command the battalion in January 1942. Colonel Hammer called his battalion "Hard as Nails" based on his name. His men came to respect his abilities.
Colonel Hammer planned to attack Point 26 with two companies forward. To surprise the enemy, he would attack with artillery preparation. They would advance as quietly as possible. Artillery would fire on Point 23, the next objective, and the other half of the battalion would advance to Point 23. After that, the leftmost two companies would wheel towards the Tel el Eisa train station and take and hold it.
The 2/48th was transported in trucks which got stuck in the salt-marshes that lay next to the rail tracks. That burned time that might have been used for men to sleep. The move forward while being quiet started at 3:40am. There was an aircraft overhead, presumably enemy, that dropped a "parachute flare" that lit every thing for the attackers. The 2/48th men expected to be fired on but they were relieved that none came at them. They were able to see to move quickly. Point 26, with its Italian defenders, were captured before dawn. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck decides to attack in the north from 8 July 1942

To implement his plans for an attack, General Auchinleck ordered General Ramsden to capture Tel el Eisa and Tel el Makh Khad. These features were located south of the coast road. Once these were taken, Auchinleck wanted to move south to Deir el Shein. He would send raids towards landing grounds near el Daba. The 9th Australian Division was given the task of capturing Tel el Eisa. The South Africans were asked to capture Tel el Makh Khad. The 9th Australian Division had the 44th RTR with 32 Valentine tanks in support. The South Africans were given 8 Matilda tanks to support their attack. The raid to El Daba was composed of a tank squadron, an armored car troop, and troops of field guns and anti-tank guns.
The coast road was apparently asphalt, so it appeared to be black. West of the El Alamein Box, there was a flat area with a salt marsh. Beyond that was Hill 86, which stood but eighty feet high. The hill appeared to be white, perhaps from the salt. Beyond this was a feature with hills that rose to Trig 33, which had a steep slope side. South of Trig 33, there was rolling ground that crossed the railroad. The ridge was usually called Tel el Eisa. Trig 33 was actually part of a two-hill hump, with Trig 33 and Point 26. What the 9th Australian Division was asked to accomplish seems to have been to take Trig 33 and Point 26 and then push down to Tel el Eisa, which was across the railroad.
General Morshead met on 8 July with General Ramsden and General Pienaar, the South African commander. Morshead issued orders to his division on 9 July for an attack starting early on 10 July. The 26th Brigade would take the ground discussed. The brigade would take Point 26 and then move to the saddle. That was the responsibility of the 2/48th Battalion. Trig 33 was the objective of the 2/24th Battalion with tank support. They would move over the sand dunes and turn to the left to take Trig 33. From there, they would turn to the left and travel to "East Point 2 south of the railway". The Australian cavalry with artillery was also ready to move out on 10 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian raid on 7 July 1942 had an effect

While the raid on the Germans on the evening of 7 July 1942 encouraged the 9th Australian Division and nearby units, the real effect was on the enemy. In reality, the attack was just "play" to exercise the troops. The Germans took the attack seriously and the 15th Armored Division commander was concerned about a breakthrough into their rear areas. He ordered his division reserve forward. Before dawn on 8 July, the 21st Armored Division sent some 19 tanks forward in response to the same threat. Rommel was so concerned that he ordered all officers in the area near the British forces to stay awake all night to keep from being surprised.
The inaction on the enemy side of about two weeks came to an end. Mussolini had visited in late June to be present when the Axis forces captured Egypt, which in the event never happened. Mussolini liked the idea of taking Alexandria, but Rommel and the Italian Cavallero preferred Cairo as an objective, because of the advantages of cutting "the Red Sea supply route". Rommel's army had been able to increase the tank strength to about fifty German and sixty Italian tanks. Rommel had positioned the 21st Armored Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian Littorio Armored Division in front of the XIII Corps. They were given the two German reconnaissance units that had been re-positioned from their previous location in the south. Rommel's plan was for them to push forward to Alam Nayil and then turn north on 9 July. The 15th Armored Division and Trento Division were sitting on Ruweisat Ridge. This seems unclear, but the Australian historian says that to their north were the the Trento and Sabratha Divisions, where the Trento was mentioned as being on Ruweisat Ridge.
During the night of 7 to 8 July, the New Zealand Division, acting on Auchinleck's orders, had abandoned the box at Bab el Qattara. The Germans only realized that the box had been abandoned during the evening of 8 July. Despite that, Rommel had ordered an attack on the box, which was unopposed, while the 5th Armored Regiment was sent to Alam Nayil, but was stopped by New Zealand artillery fire. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck's new plan for El Alamein on 7 July 1942

By 7 July 1942, General Auchinleck had given up on his original plan for two columns to cut around the enemy's southern flank and move into his rear areas. Something about the separation between his two corps worried Auchinleck. He now decided that there were vulnerable Italian formations in the north that the fresh Australian soldiers could attack. 5 and 6 July had seen the 26th Australian Brigade moved up along the coast, behind the defended areas. By 8 July, the majority of the 9th Australian Division had been pulled up from Alexandria. The plan for the division from then onward was to keep a skeleton force for each battalion so if a battalion was destroyed, there was a base to rebuild from.
When General Morshead visited XXX Corps headquarters, he learned that General Norrie was leaving for England. The new XXX Corps commander was to be General Ramsden, the 50th Division commander. At 6pm on 7 July, General Ramsden phoned General Morshead to inform him of his new assignment. This meant that General Morshead would report to a general who had less responsibility than Morshead, a short time before. At the time of the call, General Ramsden was still a Major-General, while Morshead, as AIF commander, was a Lieutenant-General. It turned out that during the remainder of First El Alamein, Ramsden and Morshead disagreed and had a poor relationship. The situation was created by the fact that Morshead was not impressed by Ramsden's performance and that affected his attitude.
7 July 1942 saw 24th Brigade ordered to stage a raid with one infantry company with engineers. The strength involved 4 officers, 64 infantrymen, 20 engineers, with six stretcher bearers. The force was assembled at Point 71 at 10:30pm. They moved out by 11pm. They walked about 1400 yards, the front of the group could see enemy troops at about 800 yards. They attacked while the other platoons spread out left and right and also moved in.
The raid seems to have been successfull. The engineers destroyed one M3 Stuart and two Grant tanks, along with a gun and its gun tractor. One man recaptured a British carrier and drove it out. The enemy had fired wildly and inaccurately. The raiding part returned to point 71 by 3am and had a positive affect on 9th Division morale as well as nearby troops. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From 5 to 6 July 1942, an impression of chaos

The 24th Australian Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey, stated at a conference, that the alternative scenario, where his brigade would stand on the ground that it had taken, with tanks and anti-tank guns moving forward in support, could not be executed. He requested a 24 hour delay. Given the state of command in Eighth Army, 4th New Zealand Brigade did not receive word of the cancellation and the brigade went ahead and executed their portion of the plan. At the same time, the New Zealand Division received a message that the enemy might be ready to "withdraw westwards". The result was that the 4th New Zealand Division had been "shooting up the Littorio Armoured Division in its leaguer before breakfast". The situation at the army headquarters was such that they suddenly ordered the New Zealand Division to pull back from the Qattara Box where they could fire their guns at the Ruweisat Ridge. There had apparently been a sudden change in plan by Auchinleck.
On 7 July 1942, Auchinleck had decided that he would move the 9th Australian Division up to the north to be in position to attack what he believed were mostly Italian forces. Two battalions of the 26th Australian Brigade were ordered to the coast, and passed command of both the 24th and 26th Brigades back to the 9th Australian Division. Division headquarters moved up to a position near El Imayid Station. There was now just a "reserve group" defending Alexandria. The division now had a "tentacle" from Army Air Support Control with another "tentacle" accompanying 24th Brigade. The tentacles both provided timely air support and better communications of reconnaissance information.
The group defending Alexandria originally had the 20th Brigade. The 20th Brigade (or at least two battalions) was called to move near El Alamein. That left three infantry battalions and a pioneer battalion near Alexandria, along with other bits and pieces. A week later, the infantry battalions were ordered to rejoin their brigades. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Germans were pulled back and the Italians were holding the front from 5 July 1942

Auchinleck was the one who had requested an Australian brigade because he believed that when Rommel had withdrawn the German divisions from the front that he might be preparing to withdraw to the west. General Morshead had decided to use the 24th Brigade because they were the only Australian brigade to have trained for mobile operations. Auchinleck's optimistic plans were to push west to El Daba. The push to the west never happened in this time frame, because Rommel was still thinking that at some point he could break the British front and push on to Cairo. By 5 July, Auchinleck had decided not to attempt to flank the enemy front with XIII Corps and push into the enemy rear areas. He decided to use XXX Corps and XIII Corps to push to Deir el Shein. By then, the German divisions had been withdrawn, as well as XX Corps (Italian mechanized divisions). Italian infantry from the X and XXI Corps now held the front. The German divisions were left to "rest and reorganize". Rommel still hoped to stage a new attack and push through the British front.
The Australian 24th Brigade was ordered to occupy Ruweisat Ridge. Their duties were to hold a strong defensive position that would allow the 1st Armoured Division and mobile columns from "Wall Group" (Brigadier Waller)to operate. 24th Brigade now reported "directly" to XXX Corps. They replaced the 50th Division headquarters and "Stancol" which was sent "back to the Delta for reorganisation". The commander of Wall Group was from the 10th Indian Division. When General Morshead visited the front, he did not like the improvised organization based on mobile columns.
By 6 July, a plan was in the works for 24th Australian Brigade to stage a raid "on a ridge west of Alam Baoshza. Perhaps they would attack and then withdraw. An alternative version of the plan had them staying and holding the area with tanks and 6pdr anti-tank guns arriving at dawn. This idea was part of an ongoing planning session about a attack on the enemy positions with the goal of breaking through. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck wants to take action, makes plans, and wants to pull the 9th Australian Division into the fight at El Alamein in early July 1942

From early July 1942 (at least from 4 July), Auchinleck was making plans that he was not able to execute. He had sent a message late on 4 July that the army "would attack and destroy the enemy in his present position". Auchinleck's initial idea was to use XIII Corps to outflank the enemy on their southwest and push towards across their rear towards the coast road. Nothing was accomplished, though, on 5 July. While the British wasted time, the enemy forces were reorganizing and digging on their positions. The New Zealand historian remarked that plans were made but were never executed.
Back on 3 July, the senior staff officer, Brigadier Walsh, phoned the 9th Australian Division headquarters. They were ordered to reorganize into battle they were ordered to send one battle group (minus one battalion) forward to El Alamein. Using the division in battle groups was contrary to what General Blamey wanted to see. The message got General Morshead to travel to Auchinleck's headquarters. Morshead had an unpleasant conversation with Auchinleck, but before he left the 9th Australian headquarters, he ordered that the 24th Brigade, minus the 2/28th Battalion, should be ready to move by 5am on the next day. That was if they were able to build up the brigade to fix the "deficiencies". Auchinleck backed off and requested that the entire 9th Australian Division be brought forward with General Morshead in command. Morshead did agree to let the brigade group be sent to the XXX Corp if the whole division was to be brought forward so as to fight as a division.
Morshead met with General Norrie, the XXX Corps commander and then flew back to Alexandria in a Westland Lysander. While all this was happening work was underway to add equipment to the 24th Brigade. By noon (apparently) on 3 July, the 9th Australian Division came under XXX Corps command, because on 4 July, the 24th Brigade began moving forward, although roads were clogged with eastbound traffic. 24th Brigade battalions were digging in at tel El Shamama. XXX Corps told the 24th Brigade to be ready for a quick move, meaning that they needed to be ready to start driving their vehicles. The 2/28th Battalion was till back at El Amiriya. 20th Brigade was now in the position defending Alexandria that had been occupired by the 24th Brigade. The Australians now at El Alamein were happy to see the "Allied air superiority". There were still dogfights, and you never knew who would win. A feature of July 1942 was that there were new American light bombers in action, Douglas Bostons and Glenn Martin Baltimores. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck tries to make things happen and pulls the 9th Australian Division into the mix from 3 July 1942

The Australian historian's assessment after the fact was that General Auchinleck did not perceive just how desperate the Axis situation was, circa 3 and 4 July 1942. Almost immediately, the New Zealanders noticed that Auchinleck had little confidence in his men's ability to stand and fight. On the bright side, during the night from 4 to 5 July 1942, Auchinleck said that the army would "attack and destroy the enemy in his present position". On the 5th, apparently, the New Zealanders received orders about withdrawing if the
"line collapsed", which was a very unlikely possibility. The plan for a retreat was for XXX Corps to go along the coast to Alexandria. XIII Corps, which included the New Zealand Division would go cross-country to Cairo.
The Eighth Army was a dull sword, so that while General Auchinleck designed operational plans to attack the enemy, the army in its present state was ill-suited to perform tasks that were needed. Still, Auchinleck was able to control the situation while the enemy was reduced to responding to his attacks and movements. During 1941 and 1942, no one with the expertise of General Auchinleck had been making decisions about the army, its procedures and communications mechanisms. That redesign did not happen until the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery, who instituted report centers that allowed for accurate information to flow to the army commander. Also, when Auchinleck issued orders to Generals Gott and Lumsden, then rewrote the orders into something other than what Auchinleck had intended.
Because of the commanders involved, 4 July progressed in a way that little resembled what Auchinleck had intended. The 22nd Armoured Brigade sent their tanks moving forward along the Ruweisat Ridge. the infantry regiment of the 15th Armored (Panzer) Division was partly overrun. It appeared as if a large number of German soldiers would surrender, but the British armor took artillery fire and pulled back, leaving the would-be prisoners still free. They diarist for the Africa Corps noted that the 15th Armored Division was in a "serious situation". IF there had been more competent British command of the attack, it would have been a fine success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action at El Alamein from 3 July 1942

Rommel found that the Eighth Army under General Auchinleck's command, would not panic and run when confronted with infiltration tactics. Rommel hoped that on 3 July 1942, his forces might be able to achieve some success against the British. The 90th Light Division was allowed to dig in where they were and not try to attack. The remnants of the German Africa Corps were ordered to push their 26 running tanks to the east to isolate the South Africans. The British were in somewhat better condition, because the 1st Armoured Division still had 100 running tanks. Rommel still wanted the Italian XX Corps to "deal with the Qattara Box". Auchinleck's plan was for XXX Corps to sit in the coastal region and be ready to fight any attack. XIII Corps would turn the enemy flank and go after their rear areas from Deir el Shein.

On the morning of 3 July, the Africa Corps was looking for a weak spot to attack when they found the 1st Armoured Division. The British tanks moved into hull-down positions, which were not the usual British mode of fighting. The armored units fought all day long on the Ruweisat Ridge. Rommel was pushing the Africa Corps to push past the South African Division on the south side, but they only covered a short distance and stopped.
The 1st Armoured Division was not able to make the move around the enemy flank, but the New Zealand Division achieved a great victory. The Italian Ariete armored division moved out from Alam Nayil, between the Qattara Box and the Ruweisat Ridge. They had a brief encounter with the 4th Armoured Brigade and then were fired on by four New Zealand field batteries.
The Italians reacted so strongly to the artillery fire that 4th New Zealand Brigade attacked "from the south". The 19th New Zealand Battalion was in the lead. Their carrier platoon led an attack with fixed bayonets and captured an outlying Italian group. They then made a "systematic attack" on a larger group of Italians. They Italian morale must have collapsed, as some 350 men surrendered and about 44 medium and field guns were captured. They also captured a large number of vehicles. The New Zealand Division was commanded by Major-General Inglis on a temporary basis. With the Italians being in such serious trouble, he ordered Howard Kippenberger to attack with his 5th Brigade at El Mreir. The Brescia Division was located at El Mreir, and they fired on the 5th Brigade, which eventually dug in where they had arrived.
By the end of 3 July, Rommel had to admit that his army could go no further in its present state. He decided that they needed time to regroup and recover "for at least a fortnight". His army was in a sad state with divisions being down to 1200 to 1300 men. He only had about 36 German tanks still running. They also were "short of ammunition" and we would imagine that they were also short of supplies. We are very familiar with Friedrich von Mellinthin and his book Panzer Battles. On 4 July 1942, he was a staff officer with Rommel. In his book, von Mellinthin called the German-Italian situation "perilous". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Axis attack on 1 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Axis attack did occur on 1 July 1942, although the Axis forces were very tired. The German Africa Corps had been held up due to a variety of reasons. The ground was very difficult, causing "heavy going" as they said. There was also a dust storm causing problems. On top of all that, the British were able to launch a substantial air attack on the attacking forces. The Africa Corps had not expected to find any units at Deir el Shein. Deir el Shein turned out to have the 18th Indian Brigade and nine Matilda tanks. A fierce, eight-hour battle was fought against the Indians, who were unsupported, as was the typical British situation. The Germans were able to "overrun" the brigade, which was "virtually destroyed". The battle had slowed down the German advance and they were reduced from 55 tanks down to 37 tanks still runners.
During the afternoon on 1 July, the South African Division artillery fired on the 90th Light Division. The initial German response was to "dig in". By 3:30pm, the Germans were losing their nerve and "many men fled". The 90th Light Division diary had an entry saying that they had stopped what could have turned into a rout. The artillery fire had brought the division's advance to a stop. By early on 2 July, Rommel called off the southern move by the Africa Corps and ordered them to the north to support the 90th Light Division attack on the El Alamein Box.
General Auchinleck took the 18th Indian Brigade loss in stride. He had already decided to narrow the front to a size more easily defended. He thought that they should pull out of Naqb Abu Dweis and Bab el Qattara. During the night of 1 July to 2 July, General Auchinleck ordered the 1st Armoured Division and the New Zealand Division to be ready for a counter-attack from the south.
In the north, the 90th Light Division made a half-hearted attack on the South African troops. The morale of the 90th Light Division was so bad that they never seriously attacked. The Italians of X Corps had also been ordered to attack, further north, but they were  also ineffective and probably dispirited. By the middle of 2 July, General Auchinleck had decided to hit the enemy "flank and rear" with XIII Corps. That caused a tank battle between the 1st Armoured Division and the Africa Corps. The battle lasted until night and was "inconclusive". The Italian armor was in the south but air attack kept them from making any moves. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans would push on "as fast as he could drive" them from 30 June 1942 on wards

As was almost always the case, Rommel's only play in his book was to use infiltration tactics to try and upset the enemy morale. Rommel's men were in bad shape and were short on supplies. They also did not know when they might receive any more. Rommel issued orders to the German Africa Corps and the 90th Light Division to push into British territory before daylight in the area "between the El Alamein position and Deir el Abyad." Rommel ordered the 90th Light Division to turn towards the sea and cut off the El Alamein Box. The German Africa Corps would turn to the south would hit the rear areas of XIII Corps. The Italian Trento Division would attack El Alamein from the west side. The Italian Brescia Division would move forward behind the German Africa Corps. They also had the Italian XX Corps with the Ariete Armored Division and the Triested Motorized Division. They were ordered to attack the Qattara Box. The attack would be on new territory and would be in the dark, so that there would be no real chance to do any reconnaissance prior to attacking.
The British, following Auchinleck's latest ideas and trying to imitate Rommel's battle groups. The South Africans formed up two columns, leaving only one brigade in the box they had occupied. That meant that there were no units facing east from the box. The 50th Division formed three columns, each with eight field guns. The 10th Indian Division and the 5th Indian Division also created columns.
looking back at 30 June 1942, the British rearguard drove through the El Alamein Box. They were closely followed by the 90th Light Division. The Germans stopped short of the box and opened fire with artillery. German aircraft also started bombing the box. The 90th Light Division needed to prepare for the "big attack" planned for the next morning. Being in such a hurry had left the German staff with a mistaken idea of where the British units were deployed. The XXX Corps was actually in the north, but the Germans expected to see the X Corps there. The facts were that both sides were confused and not prepared. Auchinleck at the army headquarters was out of touch with what the situation was on the ground, so was Rommel. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.