14 to 15 July 1942 at El Alamein

Some of the tanks that had been engaged at Point 24 cut across the front of the 2/48th Battalion near the Tel el Eisa rail station. When no one fired on the tanks, they continued on towards Point 26. Field guns opened fire on the tanks and turned west where Australian anti-tank guns fired on the tanks. Nearby infantry also fired on the tanks. Some of the tanks exploded and burnt. The survivors withdrew under fire. The Australians of 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment claimed seven tanks knocked out, four by one gun and three by the other. In the morning, the 1st Army Tank Brigade sent tanks forward to support the Australians. In the light, they counted ten German tanks knocked out!
Rommel had planned an attack on 15 July, but Auchinleck's attack on Ruweisat Ridge caused Rommel to have to reduce what he would do at Tel el Eisa. Auchinleck had planned to break through the enemy forces in the center and wipe out the enemy north of Ruweisat Ridge. He also wanted to destroy the enemy forces that lay to the east from the track from El Alamein-to-Ab Dweis. XXX Corps would capture the eastern portion of Ruweisat Ridge and then attack south and capture Miteiriya Ridge. XIII Corps was also in the plan and was to push to Trig 63 in the west of Ruweisat Ridge and then move to the northwest. Auchinleck decided on 14 July to attack that night. The corps were to achieve their objectives by 4:30am on 15 July. The orders to "XIII Corps and 1st Armoured Division" show that Auchinleck had actually decided on a more limited set of objectives. They realized later that the conferences that were held did not successfully communicate how the cooperation between units was to occur. For example, the New Zealand Division had expected to have close armor support. General Lumsden understood that his armor only needed to come forward when requested. The lack of support by two armored brigades had unfortunate consequences.
The XXX Corps attack was launched by the 5th Indian Brigade. One battalion was held up by fire, while another was pushed back.
2nd New Zealand Division attacked from the XIII Corps area. They had two brigades engaged, the 4th and 5th, They moved forward starting at 11pm. They moved until they encountered minefield. They bypassed enemy positions and kept moving forward. The New Zealand brigades had reached their objectives, but were not in good condition. They expected to have two armored brigades ready to support them and the Indian brigade, but they were instead sitting stopped, in the rear, waiting for orders. Some German tanks had been bypassed, and these attacked the New Zealanders. New Zealand anti-tank guns engaged the tanks, but the New Zaaland Division lost 350 prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Offiicial History.

Fight in the north of the El Alamein position from 12 July 1942

On 12 July 1942, the 9th Australian Division had been in a holding posture until late afternoon. The enemy prepared for an attack on Australians on Hill 33 with increasingly heavy artillery fire. The Germans sent their infantry forward in waves starting at 6pm. This was directed at the 2/24th Battalion positions. The German infantry faced fire from the 2/8th Field Regiment and some British howitzers, possibly the 6in BL 26cwt used by medium regiments. A company from the 2/23rd Battalion, reinforcing the 2/24th Battalion, was heavily attacked. A Bren gunner and a machine-gun platoon inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans. The company commander, however, was killed "when his trench was hit".
The German infantry attack had ended by about 9pm. The Germans had lost some 600 casualties in the attack, perhaps most to the machine-guns. The Australian infantry company had also taken many casualties. Captain Harding was now the company commander for the men from the 2/23rd Battalion. He commanded the company over the next five days while defending their position.
Early on 13 July, the men of the 26th Brigade received word that the 21st Armored Division was planning an attack. Rommel apparently hoped to push into the Australians rear and isolate them. East Point 24 was attacked twice, but was protected by artillery fire from five artillery regiments. Rommel's attack hit the South African Division, which was holding positions south of the El Alamein Box. The South Africans were able to beat off the attack.
General Auchinleck was already planning for an attack on Ruweisat Ridge. At first, he considered moving the whole 9th Australian Division to a new position "south-east of Jevel Bein Gabir." This original plan would leave the 26th Brigade with the South African Division. After some preliminary moves and some reconnaissance, Auchinleck decided to only send the 20th Brigade. They would be in a box just behind Auchinleck's headquarters, which was so close to the front as to be very vulnerable. Because of that, the position of Auchinleck's headquarters was kept secret. No one was allowed to mark the position on a map.
Rommel's latest plan was to hit the Australians on 14 July. During the night before, the Australians could see infantry and artillery movements. That drew Briitsh/Australian artillery fire. By "mid-morning" they could see enemy infantry moving close, while three tanks drove up near a company of the 2/24th Battalion to provide cover for engineers who were lifting mines. The Australians were not able to fire on the tanks with anti-tank guns and infantry weapons were ineffective. The Australians finally were able to call in artillery fire, which slowed the enemy progress. By mid-afternoon, German infantry supported by tanks attacked two Australian companies at East Point 24. The tanks looked for weapons pits and drove over them to crumble them when they were found. The defenders kept the tanks under heavy fire with infantry weapons, forcing the tanks to keep closed up. The Australians beat off a second attack, killing time until dark, when the tanks couldn't see well enough. The Australians were in desperate straits, so they eventually walked out to keep from being taken. The anti-tank gunners took their breach blocks, but were able to bring in vehicles later and towed the guns out of harms way. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A dangerous business, being so far forward into enemy territory on 11 to 12 July 1942

Traveling in the dark when you were so far into enemy territory was very dangerous. 26th Brigade held a conference at their headquarters very late on 11 July 1942. They were returning to their units early on 12 July, driving in the dark. They were all in a jeep. They left the meeting but never arrived at their destinations. They found that the driver had missed the turn "just east of battalion headquarters" and had driving straight into enemy positions. They were put in the bag by the Germans. The same thing happened again "three nights later".
The XXX Corps attacks in the north had been very effective and had turned into a crisis for the enemy. The attacks started early on 11 July after heavy artillery fire falling on Italian units. Two Italian positions that were thought to be strong, as the had held on 10 July. They "fell very soon". They sent a Trieste Division battalion to "plug the gap", but it was "wiped out". The situation was so dangerous, that the enemy had to commit most of the army-level artillery to the fighting in the north. The remaining battalions from the Trieste Division had to be used at Point 21 to stop the British attack. The situation with the Italian forces was so bad that Rommel got all his German soldiers out of bed and sent them to the fighting. The Reconnaissance Unit 3 was ordered to the area southwest of point 237 to keep the British from breaking through the front and pushing to the west.
Sometime on 11 July, Rommel decided to attack the British force in the north with the 21st Armored Division. Rommel ordered the division to move north on 12 July to be ready for a battle on 13 July. Rommel wanted to capture the El Alamein Box and isolate the Australians at Tel el Eisa. Rommel put a high priority on the operation so he allocated "every gun and every aircraft". As you can imagine, what was eventually named "The First Battle of El Alamein" turned into an extended affair.
General Auchinleck was very aware of the German movements. With German armor moving north, Auchinleck put in motion a plan to attack Ruweisat Ridge from the south and middle. The 21st Armored Divsion had some thirty tanks, which amounted to  about two-thirds of the remaining German armor. Despite that, the bulk of the German armored force, included in the German Africa Corps, was still in south, now commanded by General Nehring. They were armored, but without many tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of hte Australian Official History.

More action in the El Alamein area from 10 July 1942

Later in the afternoon on 10 July 1942, the enemy launched three more tank attacks on the 2/48th Battalion. Two companies were engaged, but managed to hold their ground. During the last attack, tanks actually got near the train station, but were engaged by anti-tank guns. Six of the ten attacking tanks were knocked out. When one tank crew tried to escape, a machine-gunner picked up the gun, with another man's help, and fired over a rise at the enemy crew. They surrendered rather than take the fire.
"Just after dusk" the enemy attacked again with tanks and infantry. The attack was preceded with "two hours of shelling". The tanks broke into the right-most company positions. A counter-attack stepped off at about 8:30pm. The counter-attack was made by one company with two more platoons. The company charged and "fired from the hip". They pushed the enemy force back beyond the railroad. One group commanded by a sergeant attacked machine-gun positions. They took "many prisoners" and damaged two tanks with sticky bombs. By morning on 11 July, the 2/48th had "39 causalties" but took 89 Germans and 835 Italians. They captured 27 guns of various types. To the south, the South Africans had attacked Tel el Makh Khad and pushed out the enemy that had occupied it. They then pulled back into the El Alamein Box.
The enemy had been greatly affected by the attacks. Lt-Col. von Mellenthin had been left in charge at the headquarters while Rommel was elsewhere. He dealt with a bad situation. The news was that the Italian Sabratha Division was panicked and had fled. The division only had two regiments each of two battalions. Their artillery had been captured. Lt-Col. von Mellenthin had seen the fleeing Italians "rushing past". von Mellenthin pulled together a scratch group from "headquarters troops" with "machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns" and some additional infantry. His goal was to "close the road to the west". A regiment from the 164th Division had just arrived at a convenient time.
Rommel was in the south, hoping to launch an attack that would push through to Cairo. Rommel heard the gunfire to the north and immediately took action. He pulled together a battle group from the 15th Armored Division and from his headquarters battle group. The Africa Corps was located in the south, where they were ordered to limit their operation. The battle groups sent north only had 15 or 16 tanks. The Germans were hampered by heavy shell fire from the El Alamein area.
A mixed force of all arms, "Daycol", left the El Alamein fortress area at 5:30am. Before they could reach Miteiriya Ridge, they ran into two infantry companies. They overran them and took them prisoner. By afternoon, they were taking artillery fire and withdrew at 1:30pm. They had taken over one thousand Italian prisoners and destroyed eight guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Trig 33 and beyond on 10 July 1942

the White Knoll was a feature on the coast. The White Knoll was home to a machine-gun nest. Lt. McNamara's platoon, supported by carriers, and reinforced by soldiers from the reserve company overran the White Knoll. Trig 33 was in Australian possession by 6:35am. From there, another platoon moved forward and captured four heavy guns and took about one hundred Italian prisoners.
One company, mounted in trucks, was supposed push forward to Point 24, but their supporting tanks and machine-gunners were "hopelessly bogged" in the salt marshes. The company commander had his  men dig in on the Point 33 "reverse slope". At about 5pm, the enemy sent 18 tanks against the Australians. The ubiquitous salt marshes created obstacles to motorized vehicles, so most of the tanks got bogged down in the marsh. Artillery and anti-tank guns knocked out 14 of the 18 tanks. One gunner rolled his anti-tank gun forward of Trig 33 and commenced firing. It was a hazardous occupation, since the gunner and three of his men were wounded. He bagged two tanks with his gun. Another nine tanks attacked Trig 33 on the southern side. The Australian anti-tank gunners knocked out five of the nine. The 2/24th Battalion was heavily engaged. They had six men killed and 22 wounded, but they did well, as they took over 800 prisoners and much equipment.
Tanks also attacked the 2/48th Battalion positions. At about 11am, five enemy tanks moved forward from the south of the train station. The supporting British tanks were driven back by the attack. The infantry was heavily shelled where they were, on rocky ground that prohibited digging very deep.
At about 11:30am, the 9th Australian Division Cavalry was sent forward. They did not get far, because of artillery fire and the tanks that were attacking the 2/48th Battalion. Some three hours later, they were bombed and lost a carrier. They eventually gave up and were pulled back.
Tanks attacked again at 2:30pm towards the 2/48th Battalion. The tanks rolled over some of the shallow trenches occupied by the Australian infantry. After the tanks passed by, they were attacked by men with sticky grenades. The tanks were stopped at the rail line by field and anti-tank gun fire. The tanks eventually had to pull back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More from the Australian attack on 10 July 1942

The Australian historian had fun saying "Before dawn broke, the Italians garrisoning Point 26 awoke to discover that they had been captured." After that, the British laid down a barrage reminiscent of Great War "drum fire". The Africa Corps diary is where the drum fire reference can be found. They fired on Point 23 and laid down smoke on Trig 33. After the firing stopped, the two 2/48th Companies "passed through" and captured Point 23 with "only light opposition". Not surprisingly, they took prisoners, some were still in bed. The advance had moved some 4,500 yards forward from the start.
 
Two companies executed the planned turn to towards the southwest, towards the Tel el Eisa station. The charge by the two companies was executed so well that they "overran a battery of four guns", taking 106 prisoners. The men attacked with bayonets fixed against two guns manned by very determined men that held out until the Australians were in among them. After reaching the station, the men dug in and "patrolled forward". They were accompanied by the tank squadron attached. By 9am, six Australian anti-tank guns had joined them. The Germans commenced dive bomb attacks on the battalion. They hit the headquarters at 9:45am. Since the Australians were well-dug in, they only took one casualty. The Germans kept up the attacks, hitting the 2/48th Battalion five more times that day.
The 2/24th Battalion was also moving forward. Despite bogging down in "soft sand", the energetic battalion commander got his men in place early. Their attack started at 4:30am. They moved past Point 26, now held by the 2/48th Battalion. The 2/24th Battalion had one platoon scouting ahead, Their carrier platoon also charged forward. They were able to overrun machine guns and anti-tank guns. The Italian-manned anti-tank guns never fired. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian attack on 10 July 1942

The 9th Australian Division attack on 10 July 1942 was supported by artillery and air power. The division had the 7th Medium Regiment firing in support, along with the divisions three field regiments and guns from the South African division that were able to bear on targets. Starting at 7:30am, the air force was set to sweep over the battlefield. There were to be bomber and fighter-bomber attacks. There was also the division cavalry regiment ready to advance at 8am with a field battery in company.
General Morshead and the division headquarters were located in the El Alamein "fortress" from 9 July. The attacking battalions were sent to their starting positions on the west side. The battalions were well-supported. They each had an anti-tank gun troop, a machine gun platoon, some engineers, and a tank squadron (presumably infantry tanks).
The 2/48th Battalion was assigned to take Point 26. The battalion commander was Lt-Colonel Hammer. He served in Greece as the brigade major of the 16th Brigade and afterwards. He was appointed to command the battalion in January 1942. Colonel Hammer called his battalion "Hard as Nails" based on his name. His men came to respect his abilities.
Colonel Hammer planned to attack Point 26 with two companies forward. To surprise the enemy, he would attack with artillery preparation. They would advance as quietly as possible. Artillery would fire on Point 23, the next objective, and the other half of the battalion would advance to Point 23. After that, the leftmost two companies would wheel towards the Tel el Eisa train station and take and hold it.
The 2/48th was transported in trucks which got stuck in the salt-marshes that lay next to the rail tracks. That burned time that might have been used for men to sleep. The move forward while being quiet started at 3:40am. There was an aircraft overhead, presumably enemy, that dropped a "parachute flare" that lit every thing for the attackers. The 2/48th men expected to be fired on but they were relieved that none came at them. They were able to see to move quickly. Point 26, with its Italian defenders, were captured before dawn. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck decides to attack in the north from 8 July 1942

To implement his plans for an attack, General Auchinleck ordered General Ramsden to capture Tel el Eisa and Tel el Makh Khad. These features were located south of the coast road. Once these were taken, Auchinleck wanted to move south to Deir el Shein. He would send raids towards landing grounds near el Daba. The 9th Australian Division was given the task of capturing Tel el Eisa. The South Africans were asked to capture Tel el Makh Khad. The 9th Australian Division had the 44th RTR with 32 Valentine tanks in support. The South Africans were given 8 Matilda tanks to support their attack. The raid to El Daba was composed of a tank squadron, an armored car troop, and troops of field guns and anti-tank guns.
The coast road was apparently asphalt, so it appeared to be black. West of the El Alamein Box, there was a flat area with a salt marsh. Beyond that was Hill 86, which stood but eighty feet high. The hill appeared to be white, perhaps from the salt. Beyond this was a feature with hills that rose to Trig 33, which had a steep slope side. South of Trig 33, there was rolling ground that crossed the railroad. The ridge was usually called Tel el Eisa. Trig 33 was actually part of a two-hill hump, with Trig 33 and Point 26. What the 9th Australian Division was asked to accomplish seems to have been to take Trig 33 and Point 26 and then push down to Tel el Eisa, which was across the railroad.
General Morshead met on 8 July with General Ramsden and General Pienaar, the South African commander. Morshead issued orders to his division on 9 July for an attack starting early on 10 July. The 26th Brigade would take the ground discussed. The brigade would take Point 26 and then move to the saddle. That was the responsibility of the 2/48th Battalion. Trig 33 was the objective of the 2/24th Battalion with tank support. They would move over the sand dunes and turn to the left to take Trig 33. From there, they would turn to the left and travel to "East Point 2 south of the railway". The Australian cavalry with artillery was also ready to move out on 10 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian raid on 7 July 1942 had an effect

While the raid on the Germans on the evening of 7 July 1942 encouraged the 9th Australian Division and nearby units, the real effect was on the enemy. In reality, the attack was just "play" to exercise the troops. The Germans took the attack seriously and the 15th Armored Division commander was concerned about a breakthrough into their rear areas. He ordered his division reserve forward. Before dawn on 8 July, the 21st Armored Division sent some 19 tanks forward in response to the same threat. Rommel was so concerned that he ordered all officers in the area near the British forces to stay awake all night to keep from being surprised.
The inaction on the enemy side of about two weeks came to an end. Mussolini had visited in late June to be present when the Axis forces captured Egypt, which in the event never happened. Mussolini liked the idea of taking Alexandria, but Rommel and the Italian Cavallero preferred Cairo as an objective, because of the advantages of cutting "the Red Sea supply route". Rommel's army had been able to increase the tank strength to about fifty German and sixty Italian tanks. Rommel had positioned the 21st Armored Division, 90th Light Division, and the Italian Littorio Armored Division in front of the XIII Corps. They were given the two German reconnaissance units that had been re-positioned from their previous location in the south. Rommel's plan was for them to push forward to Alam Nayil and then turn north on 9 July. The 15th Armored Division and Trento Division were sitting on Ruweisat Ridge. This seems unclear, but the Australian historian says that to their north were the the Trento and Sabratha Divisions, where the Trento was mentioned as being on Ruweisat Ridge.
During the night of 7 to 8 July, the New Zealand Division, acting on Auchinleck's orders, had abandoned the box at Bab el Qattara. The Germans only realized that the box had been abandoned during the evening of 8 July. Despite that, Rommel had ordered an attack on the box, which was unopposed, while the 5th Armored Regiment was sent to Alam Nayil, but was stopped by New Zealand artillery fire. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck's new plan for El Alamein on 7 July 1942

By 7 July 1942, General Auchinleck had given up on his original plan for two columns to cut around the enemy's southern flank and move into his rear areas. Something about the separation between his two corps worried Auchinleck. He now decided that there were vulnerable Italian formations in the north that the fresh Australian soldiers could attack. 5 and 6 July had seen the 26th Australian Brigade moved up along the coast, behind the defended areas. By 8 July, the majority of the 9th Australian Division had been pulled up from Alexandria. The plan for the division from then onward was to keep a skeleton force for each battalion so if a battalion was destroyed, there was a base to rebuild from.
When General Morshead visited XXX Corps headquarters, he learned that General Norrie was leaving for England. The new XXX Corps commander was to be General Ramsden, the 50th Division commander. At 6pm on 7 July, General Ramsden phoned General Morshead to inform him of his new assignment. This meant that General Morshead would report to a general who had less responsibility than Morshead, a short time before. At the time of the call, General Ramsden was still a Major-General, while Morshead, as AIF commander, was a Lieutenant-General. It turned out that during the remainder of First El Alamein, Ramsden and Morshead disagreed and had a poor relationship. The situation was created by the fact that Morshead was not impressed by Ramsden's performance and that affected his attitude.
7 July 1942 saw 24th Brigade ordered to stage a raid with one infantry company with engineers. The strength involved 4 officers, 64 infantrymen, 20 engineers, with six stretcher bearers. The force was assembled at Point 71 at 10:30pm. They moved out by 11pm. They walked about 1400 yards, the front of the group could see enemy troops at about 800 yards. They attacked while the other platoons spread out left and right and also moved in.
The raid seems to have been successfull. The engineers destroyed one M3 Stuart and two Grant tanks, along with a gun and its gun tractor. One man recaptured a British carrier and drove it out. The enemy had fired wildly and inaccurately. The raiding part returned to point 71 by 3am and had a positive affect on 9th Division morale as well as nearby troops. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From 5 to 6 July 1942, an impression of chaos

The 24th Australian Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey, stated at a conference, that the alternative scenario, where his brigade would stand on the ground that it had taken, with tanks and anti-tank guns moving forward in support, could not be executed. He requested a 24 hour delay. Given the state of command in Eighth Army, 4th New Zealand Brigade did not receive word of the cancellation and the brigade went ahead and executed their portion of the plan. At the same time, the New Zealand Division received a message that the enemy might be ready to "withdraw westwards". The result was that the 4th New Zealand Division had been "shooting up the Littorio Armoured Division in its leaguer before breakfast". The situation at the army headquarters was such that they suddenly ordered the New Zealand Division to pull back from the Qattara Box where they could fire their guns at the Ruweisat Ridge. There had apparently been a sudden change in plan by Auchinleck.
On 7 July 1942, Auchinleck had decided that he would move the 9th Australian Division up to the north to be in position to attack what he believed were mostly Italian forces. Two battalions of the 26th Australian Brigade were ordered to the coast, and passed command of both the 24th and 26th Brigades back to the 9th Australian Division. Division headquarters moved up to a position near El Imayid Station. There was now just a "reserve group" defending Alexandria. The division now had a "tentacle" from Army Air Support Control with another "tentacle" accompanying 24th Brigade. The tentacles both provided timely air support and better communications of reconnaissance information.
The group defending Alexandria originally had the 20th Brigade. The 20th Brigade (or at least two battalions) was called to move near El Alamein. That left three infantry battalions and a pioneer battalion near Alexandria, along with other bits and pieces. A week later, the infantry battalions were ordered to rejoin their brigades. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Germans were pulled back and the Italians were holding the front from 5 July 1942

Auchinleck was the one who had requested an Australian brigade because he believed that when Rommel had withdrawn the German divisions from the front that he might be preparing to withdraw to the west. General Morshead had decided to use the 24th Brigade because they were the only Australian brigade to have trained for mobile operations. Auchinleck's optimistic plans were to push west to El Daba. The push to the west never happened in this time frame, because Rommel was still thinking that at some point he could break the British front and push on to Cairo. By 5 July, Auchinleck had decided not to attempt to flank the enemy front with XIII Corps and push into the enemy rear areas. He decided to use XXX Corps and XIII Corps to push to Deir el Shein. By then, the German divisions had been withdrawn, as well as XX Corps (Italian mechanized divisions). Italian infantry from the X and XXI Corps now held the front. The German divisions were left to "rest and reorganize". Rommel still hoped to stage a new attack and push through the British front.
The Australian 24th Brigade was ordered to occupy Ruweisat Ridge. Their duties were to hold a strong defensive position that would allow the 1st Armoured Division and mobile columns from "Wall Group" (Brigadier Waller)to operate. 24th Brigade now reported "directly" to XXX Corps. They replaced the 50th Division headquarters and "Stancol" which was sent "back to the Delta for reorganisation". The commander of Wall Group was from the 10th Indian Division. When General Morshead visited the front, he did not like the improvised organization based on mobile columns.
By 6 July, a plan was in the works for 24th Australian Brigade to stage a raid "on a ridge west of Alam Baoshza. Perhaps they would attack and then withdraw. An alternative version of the plan had them staying and holding the area with tanks and 6pdr anti-tank guns arriving at dawn. This idea was part of an ongoing planning session about a attack on the enemy positions with the goal of breaking through. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck wants to take action, makes plans, and wants to pull the 9th Australian Division into the fight at El Alamein in early July 1942

From early July 1942 (at least from 4 July), Auchinleck was making plans that he was not able to execute. He had sent a message late on 4 July that the army "would attack and destroy the enemy in his present position". Auchinleck's initial idea was to use XIII Corps to outflank the enemy on their southwest and push towards across their rear towards the coast road. Nothing was accomplished, though, on 5 July. While the British wasted time, the enemy forces were reorganizing and digging on their positions. The New Zealand historian remarked that plans were made but were never executed.
Back on 3 July, the senior staff officer, Brigadier Walsh, phoned the 9th Australian Division headquarters. They were ordered to reorganize into battle they were ordered to send one battle group (minus one battalion) forward to El Alamein. Using the division in battle groups was contrary to what General Blamey wanted to see. The message got General Morshead to travel to Auchinleck's headquarters. Morshead had an unpleasant conversation with Auchinleck, but before he left the 9th Australian headquarters, he ordered that the 24th Brigade, minus the 2/28th Battalion, should be ready to move by 5am on the next day. That was if they were able to build up the brigade to fix the "deficiencies". Auchinleck backed off and requested that the entire 9th Australian Division be brought forward with General Morshead in command. Morshead did agree to let the brigade group be sent to the XXX Corp if the whole division was to be brought forward so as to fight as a division.
Morshead met with General Norrie, the XXX Corps commander and then flew back to Alexandria in a Westland Lysander. While all this was happening work was underway to add equipment to the 24th Brigade. By noon (apparently) on 3 July, the 9th Australian Division came under XXX Corps command, because on 4 July, the 24th Brigade began moving forward, although roads were clogged with eastbound traffic. 24th Brigade battalions were digging in at tel El Shamama. XXX Corps told the 24th Brigade to be ready for a quick move, meaning that they needed to be ready to start driving their vehicles. The 2/28th Battalion was till back at El Amiriya. 20th Brigade was now in the position defending Alexandria that had been occupired by the 24th Brigade. The Australians now at El Alamein were happy to see the "Allied air superiority". There were still dogfights, and you never knew who would win. A feature of July 1942 was that there were new American light bombers in action, Douglas Bostons and Glenn Martin Baltimores. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck tries to make things happen and pulls the 9th Australian Division into the mix from 3 July 1942

The Australian historian's assessment after the fact was that General Auchinleck did not perceive just how desperate the Axis situation was, circa 3 and 4 July 1942. Almost immediately, the New Zealanders noticed that Auchinleck had little confidence in his men's ability to stand and fight. On the bright side, during the night from 4 to 5 July 1942, Auchinleck said that the army would "attack and destroy the enemy in his present position". On the 5th, apparently, the New Zealanders received orders about withdrawing if the
"line collapsed", which was a very unlikely possibility. The plan for a retreat was for XXX Corps to go along the coast to Alexandria. XIII Corps, which included the New Zealand Division would go cross-country to Cairo.
The Eighth Army was a dull sword, so that while General Auchinleck designed operational plans to attack the enemy, the army in its present state was ill-suited to perform tasks that were needed. Still, Auchinleck was able to control the situation while the enemy was reduced to responding to his attacks and movements. During 1941 and 1942, no one with the expertise of General Auchinleck had been making decisions about the army, its procedures and communications mechanisms. That redesign did not happen until the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery, who instituted report centers that allowed for accurate information to flow to the army commander. Also, when Auchinleck issued orders to Generals Gott and Lumsden, then rewrote the orders into something other than what Auchinleck had intended.
Because of the commanders involved, 4 July progressed in a way that little resembled what Auchinleck had intended. The 22nd Armoured Brigade sent their tanks moving forward along the Ruweisat Ridge. the infantry regiment of the 15th Armored (Panzer) Division was partly overrun. It appeared as if a large number of German soldiers would surrender, but the British armor took artillery fire and pulled back, leaving the would-be prisoners still free. They diarist for the Africa Corps noted that the 15th Armored Division was in a "serious situation". IF there had been more competent British command of the attack, it would have been a fine success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action at El Alamein from 3 July 1942

Rommel found that the Eighth Army under General Auchinleck's command, would not panic and run when confronted with infiltration tactics. Rommel hoped that on 3 July 1942, his forces might be able to achieve some success against the British. The 90th Light Division was allowed to dig in where they were and not try to attack. The remnants of the German Africa Corps were ordered to push their 26 running tanks to the east to isolate the South Africans. The British were in somewhat better condition, because the 1st Armoured Division still had 100 running tanks. Rommel still wanted the Italian XX Corps to "deal with the Qattara Box". Auchinleck's plan was for XXX Corps to sit in the coastal region and be ready to fight any attack. XIII Corps would turn the enemy flank and go after their rear areas from Deir el Shein.

On the morning of 3 July, the Africa Corps was looking for a weak spot to attack when they found the 1st Armoured Division. The British tanks moved into hull-down positions, which were not the usual British mode of fighting. The armored units fought all day long on the Ruweisat Ridge. Rommel was pushing the Africa Corps to push past the South African Division on the south side, but they only covered a short distance and stopped.
The 1st Armoured Division was not able to make the move around the enemy flank, but the New Zealand Division achieved a great victory. The Italian Ariete armored division moved out from Alam Nayil, between the Qattara Box and the Ruweisat Ridge. They had a brief encounter with the 4th Armoured Brigade and then were fired on by four New Zealand field batteries.
The Italians reacted so strongly to the artillery fire that 4th New Zealand Brigade attacked "from the south". The 19th New Zealand Battalion was in the lead. Their carrier platoon led an attack with fixed bayonets and captured an outlying Italian group. They then made a "systematic attack" on a larger group of Italians. They Italian morale must have collapsed, as some 350 men surrendered and about 44 medium and field guns were captured. They also captured a large number of vehicles. The New Zealand Division was commanded by Major-General Inglis on a temporary basis. With the Italians being in such serious trouble, he ordered Howard Kippenberger to attack with his 5th Brigade at El Mreir. The Brescia Division was located at El Mreir, and they fired on the 5th Brigade, which eventually dug in where they had arrived.
By the end of 3 July, Rommel had to admit that his army could go no further in its present state. He decided that they needed time to regroup and recover "for at least a fortnight". His army was in a sad state with divisions being down to 1200 to 1300 men. He only had about 36 German tanks still running. They also were "short of ammunition" and we would imagine that they were also short of supplies. We are very familiar with Friedrich von Mellinthin and his book Panzer Battles. On 4 July 1942, he was a staff officer with Rommel. In his book, von Mellinthin called the German-Italian situation "perilous". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Axis attack on 1 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Axis attack did occur on 1 July 1942, although the Axis forces were very tired. The German Africa Corps had been held up due to a variety of reasons. The ground was very difficult, causing "heavy going" as they said. There was also a dust storm causing problems. On top of all that, the British were able to launch a substantial air attack on the attacking forces. The Africa Corps had not expected to find any units at Deir el Shein. Deir el Shein turned out to have the 18th Indian Brigade and nine Matilda tanks. A fierce, eight-hour battle was fought against the Indians, who were unsupported, as was the typical British situation. The Germans were able to "overrun" the brigade, which was "virtually destroyed". The battle had slowed down the German advance and they were reduced from 55 tanks down to 37 tanks still runners.
During the afternoon on 1 July, the South African Division artillery fired on the 90th Light Division. The initial German response was to "dig in". By 3:30pm, the Germans were losing their nerve and "many men fled". The 90th Light Division diary had an entry saying that they had stopped what could have turned into a rout. The artillery fire had brought the division's advance to a stop. By early on 2 July, Rommel called off the southern move by the Africa Corps and ordered them to the north to support the 90th Light Division attack on the El Alamein Box.
General Auchinleck took the 18th Indian Brigade loss in stride. He had already decided to narrow the front to a size more easily defended. He thought that they should pull out of Naqb Abu Dweis and Bab el Qattara. During the night of 1 July to 2 July, General Auchinleck ordered the 1st Armoured Division and the New Zealand Division to be ready for a counter-attack from the south.
In the north, the 90th Light Division made a half-hearted attack on the South African troops. The morale of the 90th Light Division was so bad that they never seriously attacked. The Italians of X Corps had also been ordered to attack, further north, but they were  also ineffective and probably dispirited. By the middle of 2 July, General Auchinleck had decided to hit the enemy "flank and rear" with XIII Corps. That caused a tank battle between the 1st Armoured Division and the Africa Corps. The battle lasted until night and was "inconclusive". The Italian armor was in the south but air attack kept them from making any moves. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans would push on "as fast as he could drive" them from 30 June 1942 on wards

As was almost always the case, Rommel's only play in his book was to use infiltration tactics to try and upset the enemy morale. Rommel's men were in bad shape and were short on supplies. They also did not know when they might receive any more. Rommel issued orders to the German Africa Corps and the 90th Light Division to push into British territory before daylight in the area "between the El Alamein position and Deir el Abyad." Rommel ordered the 90th Light Division to turn towards the sea and cut off the El Alamein Box. The German Africa Corps would turn to the south would hit the rear areas of XIII Corps. The Italian Trento Division would attack El Alamein from the west side. The Italian Brescia Division would move forward behind the German Africa Corps. They also had the Italian XX Corps with the Ariete Armored Division and the Triested Motorized Division. They were ordered to attack the Qattara Box. The attack would be on new territory and would be in the dark, so that there would be no real chance to do any reconnaissance prior to attacking.
The British, following Auchinleck's latest ideas and trying to imitate Rommel's battle groups. The South Africans formed up two columns, leaving only one brigade in the box they had occupied. That meant that there were no units facing east from the box. The 50th Division formed three columns, each with eight field guns. The 10th Indian Division and the 5th Indian Division also created columns.
looking back at 30 June 1942, the British rearguard drove through the El Alamein Box. They were closely followed by the 90th Light Division. The Germans stopped short of the box and opened fire with artillery. German aircraft also started bombing the box. The 90th Light Division needed to prepare for the "big attack" planned for the next morning. Being in such a hurry had left the German staff with a mistaken idea of where the British units were deployed. The XXX Corps was actually in the north, but the Germans expected to see the X Corps there. The facts were that both sides were confused and not prepared. Auchinleck at the army headquarters was out of touch with what the situation was on the ground, so was Rommel. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Differing opinions regarding El Alamein and the blocking battle to be fought there in July 1942

There were some very pessimistic opinions among British and Commonwealth commanders in early July 1942. The British were fortunate that they had the best field commander in the Middle East at that time in command of the Eighth Army (General Auchinleck). Not only that, but Auchinleck was optimistic about their chances of beating Rommel at El Alamein. Fortunately, General Norrie, XXX Corps commander, also was optimistic and he took the stand that fighting at El Alamein was a real "last ditch"defense of Egypt. Many others had defeatist attitudes that were unfortunate. You expect that General Gott would be one of those with such a bad attitude, and that he had. He was the last man that you would want to have as a decision-make in the battle to stop Rommel.

The Australian historian said if Auchinleck that he had "an exceptional talent for perceiving his enemies difficulties". Rommel was always an opportunist, trying to surprise his enemies and use infiltration tactics to throw them into a panic. What that meant, was that Rommel was often without a plan and he relied on finding a weakness in his enemy that he could exploit and throw them into a retreat. That meant that Rommel was often at risk for "overreaching" when he was trying for a surprise. His superiors at the "German High Command" were very aware of this weakness and were concerned.

The force that drove up to the British defenses at El Alamein was a skeleton force. They had but "1,700 first-line infantry and 55 tanks forward." The German-Italian force was very short on supplies. They pretty much only had what they had captured from the British in the collapse after the defeat at Gazala. They also knew that the British were being resupplied with tanks and guns that were superior to what the Germans and Italians had in inventory. The British were receiving new medium tanks built in America and armed with 75mm guns. The Lee and Grant tanks had the gun mounted in the hull, but they had Sherman tanks in the pipeline that carried a 75mm gun in a turret. They also were receiving 6pdr anti-tank guns which compared well with the 50mm PAK38 and were probably superior to them. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our knowledge of the topic.

On to Alexandria from 1 July 1942

You have to think that at the end of June and early July 1942, the British were in a panic. Plans kept changing every few days (it seemed). General Morshead left Cairo early in the morning of 1 July and drove from there to Amiriya. He initially was going to have his headquarters at El Mex, but that was such a bad place that he decided to try camping at Sidi Bishr (which was "an awful place"). General Morshead put the 24th Brigade on the coast and the 26th Brigade to their left. 24th Brigade inherited a "motley force" that had been cobbled together to provide some defense to Alexandria near the sea. That included the 150th Brigade Headquarters, the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers machine gun battalion, and a group of about six hundred men from odd units, such as Czech and sailors. They had some naval guns that they believed might be useful against tanks. The 24th Brigade was to occupy a line built by the Polish brigade in 1940 and 1941. The 24th Brigade was in place on 1 July while the 26th Brigade moved into position on 2 July. Both btigades immediately began digging positions. The men were thought to be working in shifts, allowing some to sleep while others were digging.
General Morshead spent 2 July looking over the land with his brigade commanders and chief of staff. They had too much territory to defend for the men that they had. General Morshead ordered that all Egyptian civilians be removed from the area. They would take steps that would interfere with civilian concerns. He wanted to flood areas that would conflict with the civilian salt industry, as on example. They would also cut dfown palm and fig triees to clear fields of fire.
General Auchinleck had his priorities. He wanted to stop Rommel's advan ce to the east at El Alamein, but a higher priority was to keep his force from being destroyed. If they were forced out of El Alamein, they would fight further ot the east. They would try to fight on the approach to the Nile Delta. It that fell, they would fight on the Suez Canal, and prepare to fight on the Nile. With men knowing about contingency plans, that had negative affects on morale. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The "Cairo Flap" and succeeding events in 1942

To a degree, General Auchinleck was the cause of many of his own problems. For example, he was suspicious of the Minister of State, the Australian Mr. Casey, when in fact, Mr. Casey was very eager to be of help. Instead, Auchinleck kept Mr. Casey in the dark about events. But in any case, events were in flux during late June and early July 1942.
General Morshead got new orders on 30 June now putting his division at Alexandria, not Cairo. GHQ took the step of ordering the 26th Brigade Group to Amiriya. Brigadier Tovall had not yet received Morshead's orders about defending Cairo.
The withdrawal of the 8th Army to El Alamein and Rommel's initial attacks had panicked the administrative force in Egypt. They also planned for the Mediterranean Fleet to leave Alexandria, expecting a further collapse. The state of things is indicated by orders to prepare for withdrawal to the east and massive burning of documents. When reading General Morshead's notes of the meeting on 30 June, you can see that such a move to the east was thought to be a real possibility. That was because the collapse of the army from Gazala in May to the point in 30 June, no one had any confidence in the 8th Army or in army commanders. It turns out that General Auchinleck was a better man than anyone realized.
Part of Morshead's notes were that he was unsure if General Holmes had been captured. If he had, Morshead planned to assume command of Delta Force. In fact, General Holmes arrived and took command of Delta Force. On 1 July, when the 9th Australian Division moved to Alexandria, they were caught in traffic moving in the opposite direction. The panic in the area was very real. Traffic was moving against them "note-to-tail". There were tanks, guns, armored cars, and other vehicles, all moving out, ultimately to the east. To make matters worse, there was low visibility that cause accidents in the congested traffic. The Australians were caught in the traffic which moved very slowly due to the density. They were fortunate to not be attacked by German aircraft. The passengers and even drivers slept in their seats in their vehicles. This is base on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Delta Force in June 1942

When Mersa Matruh was abandoned, X Corps, commanded by General Holmes, was sent to the Nile Delta area. Their orders were to defend the naval base at Alexandria and the western side of the Nile Delta. They were the backstop in case the army was beaten farther west. The 9th Australian Division was assigned to Delta Force.
The assignment seemed like a mistake, because the men of the 9th Australian Division were seasoned veterans with long experience in fighting the enemy forces commanded by Rommel. The excuse for the assignment might have been that while they had the men, they were short of all kinds of equipment and supporting units. For example, the division only had one field regiment equipped with the full complement of vehicles The cavalry regiment was short of tanks, and what they had were an obsolete type. "Only one anti-tank battery had 2-pounders and their were no 6-pounders".
General Morshead and his staff officer, Colonel Wells arrived in Cairo and found that things were in disarray and that they needed to step in and take charge. They were to defend Cairo and there were no plans in place. Morshead conducted a reconnaissance of the area and then drew up plans using the map that they had.
Colonel Wells was a very experienced staff officer who had been with General Morshead for about seven months. He had served in both Greece and the campaign in Syria against the Vichy French. At least Morshead spent the day on 29 June with Mr. Casey, an Australian who had British cabinet status. He was the "British Resident Minister in the Middle East". He was the man who was present when the military situation turned for the worse, standing in for the British Government. Interestingly, he became in involved during the 2nd Battle of El Alamein when Montgomery's initial attack failed to break into the enemy positions. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the British Official History.

The situation in early July 1942 at El Alamein

El Alamein had been recognized as a natural blocking point. Three boxes had been planned, but only the northern box at the El Alamein railroad station had progressed. The box had been dug and had been partly fitted with wire and mines. The box planned for Bab el Qattara had been dug, but had no mines or wire. The box intended for Naqb Abu Dweis had not had any work done. That box sat on land that was passable north of the escarpment on the edge of the Qattara Depression. The boxes each was located on a The depression actually was very wet, but had a dried sand crust that was deceptive. "The Qattara Box [lay] astride the Barrel track leading from Fuka to the Cairo-Alexandria road". You also had the two ridges, Miteiriya and Ruweisat.
Since early June, the Eighth Army strength had been greatly reduced in strength. They started June with two armored divisions, four infantry divisions, and two army tank brigades (infantry tanks). The army had three new formations ordered to join: "the 10th Indian Division, 1st Armoured Brigade and 11th Indian Brigade". At 1 July, the 2nd New Zealand Division (as it was now designated) was the only intact infantry division. They also had the 1st South African Division, which had taken losses and had not been reinforced. The armored division (the 1st) was deemed "fairly effective". They had two Indian groups (9th and 18th). Tjere were also battle groups or columns formed from the remnants of the 7th Armoured Division, 5th Indian Division, and 50th (British) Division. The 9th Australian Division, which was complete, was under orders to join the army.
The army dispositions as of 1 July 1942 are of interest, as this was just prior to the First Battle of El Alamein. The 1st South African Division was "on the right", the most northern division. The 3rd South African Btigade sat in the El Alamein Box. You had the 18th Indian Brigade providing all-around defense at Deir el Shein. They sited the 1st Armoured Brigade between the El Alamein area and Ruweisat Ridge. The south was designated as the XIII Corps area. The 6th New Zealand Brigade sat in front of the Bab el Qattara Box. The rest of the division sat ten miles east. The 9th Indian Btigade from the 5th Indian Division was located at Naqb Abu Dweis. The 7th Motor Brigade, operating as  battle group, lay between the 9th Indian Brigade and the 6th New Zealand Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division move to Egypt in late June 1942

The 26th Brigade had left for Egypt on 26 June 1942. They traveled in vehicles, going by way of "Homs, Baalbek, Rayak, Tiberias, Tulkarm, Gaza, across teh Sinai Desert to the Canal and Cairo". The initial orders had been that the 9th Australian Division would defend Cairo, but the orders were changed. The division-level units, such as the headquarters, followed the "coast road" and went across the "Sinai Desert". They arrived at "Amiriya at about the same time as the 26th Brigade". The 24th Brigade left a day later and traveled to Tiberias. A road party continued to follow the way that the 26th Brigade had taken, but most were sent to Haifa where they traveled Alexandria by train. They arrived on 1 July in the afternoon.
The 20th brigade had to wait until the 17th Indian Brigade arrived to relieve them. The 2/15th Battalion went to Tripoli where the battalion commander became the fortress commander. A change again late on 29 June ordered the 20th Brigade not to wait but to travel to Egypt, starting early on 30 June. The 9th Divisional Cavalry left Latakia on 30 June as well. They headed for Egypt.
The Australians were glad to leave Syria where they had been the garrison. 9th Army and "British line-of-communications organizations" had organized the move out of Syria.
At El Alamein on 30 June 1942, the enemy was pushing against the position. This was the last defended position "west of the Nile Delta". There was a thirty mile gap between teh sea and teh Qattara Depression. The work at El Alamein had started as long ago as before the Crusader battle. Positions were dug, mines were laid as was barbed wire. While the men worked, the remnants of the 8th Army drove past them in retreat.
At El Alamein were defended locations. In the parlance of the time, they were called "boxes", as they were designed for "all-around" defense. The best box surrounded the train station and then south, containing the road and across some desert land. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Discussions and decisions made as events progressed in May to June 1941

The Australian envoy, Dr. Evatt was still in Britain in May 1942. There was a suggestion that Dr. Evatt be asked to discuss the 9th Australian Division situation with Mr. Churchill, but Dr. Evatt replied that such a discussion needed to be conducted from Australia. By 30 May 1942, General Blamey was agitating for the return of the 9th Australian Division to Australia, using a sham argument about the need to make decisions about "organization and the allocation of manpower in Australia" based on whether they had to send replacements to the Middle East or not. Mr. Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister held his war conferences at the beginning of June. You now had both General Blamey and General MacArthur pressing for the return of the 9th Division to Australia. We can imagine Mr. Churchill's discomfort with having to deal with General MacArthur, the highly experienced and decorated general officer.
The situation in the Middle East was in rapid change, as was the war in the Western Pacific. The Battle of Midway greatly improved the Allied situation, as the Japanese naval forces suffered severe losses in aircraft carriers, the new naval capital ship. By 11 June, General MacArthur was able to announce that due to the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway, that Australia's defense was now secured. The situation in the Middle East now looked very bad, where the enemy was likely to seize major objectives by the end of June 1942. Generals MacArthur and Blamey now communicated that the 9th Australian Division should stay in the Middle East. The Australian government adopted that position on 30 June.
The 9th Australian Division was notified on 25 June to be ready to move to Egypt. The move would be in secret and an effort would be made to simulate the presence of the division in Syria, using communications. The cover story was that the move was a "training exercise". Some of the soldiers thought that they might be heading for Australia, but they could soon see that their destination was Egypt. The local citizenry knew about the Australian tan boots and wished them well: "Good Luck Australia". The 26th Brigade left first, heading for Cairo. They traveled by motorized transport. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

High-level developments regarding Australia March to June 1942

General MacArthur arrived in Darwin, Australia from the Philippines on 17 March 1942. MacArthur, his family and his staff were evacuated from Corregidor by American motor torpedo boats (PT boats). The Australian prime minister, Mr. Curtin, appointed General MacArthur as "Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific Area". By 26 March, they appointed General Blamey as the "Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army", which had long been one of Blamey's goals. Mr. Curtin took the opportunity to speak with General MacArthur about the 9th Australian Division. General MacArthur suggested that they might allow the 9th Australian Division to stay in the Middle East for now if Australia were strengthened by additional air and naval strength. General Blamey still insisted that the 9th Australian Division be returned to Australia as soon as possible. He understood that shipping resources were a constraint. Mr. Curtin sent a message to Winston Churchill presenting the Government's desire to have all Australian soldiers back in Australia, but that they understood that there were shipping and replacement issues that kept that from being immediately possible.
A message from Churchill on 1 April 1942 almost sounds like an "April Fool trick", but Churchill promised that if Australia were invaded on a large scale, the British would send first an infantry division and then an armored division. If such an invasion happened, they would also send more air and naval forces to the Southwest Pacific. General MacArthur wanted to have the two divisions Churchill had mentioned be sent to Australia immediately. The British would not agree to that, however. General MacArthur reacted to that news by saying that he would "press" for the early shipment of the 9th Australian Division back to Australia.  This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Planning for the future from March 1942 onwards

Back on 10 March 1942, Winston Churchill had sent the Australian prime minister, Mr. Curtin, a message regarding the 9th Australian Division. He quoted a communication from Franklin Roosevelt about an American commitment to send more divisions to the Western Pacific. In particular, he would send divisions to Australia and New Zealand. Roosevelt considered that would allow the 9th Australian Division to remain in the Middle East. Roosevelt was concerned about the "security of the Middle East, India and Ceylon." Retaining the Australians in the Middle East would economize on ship resources. Churchill also committed to sending on to Australia the two 6th Australian Division brigades that were soon to arrive in Ceylon.
The Australian Chiefs of Staff recommended to Mr. Curtin that he accept Mr. Churchill's offer. They were "being good citizens" and were concerned about global issues such as shipping resources and having to shift divisions about. They also approved of getting the 6th Australian Division brigades back to Australia soon. Mr. Curtin and his government, however, were not ready to make a snap decision. The Australian historian suggested that the government was playing a delaying game to give time to get General Blamey's input on the subject. The plan was to appoint General Blamey as "Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces". At this date, General Blamey was still in Capetown in the Queen Mary, soon to depart for Australia. He would only arrive by 23 March 1942. Another issue that bothered the Australians was Churchill's habit of trying to "push the Australian Government around." That seems to have been triggered in this case by Churchill's message. The Australian minister who arrived in Washington on 20 March 1942, Dr. Evatt, spoke with Franklin Roosevelt about the Australian Government's concern about how these matters were being negotiated. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Auchinleck in command and high-level consultation between Churchill, the Australian Government and the United States

The position established at El Alamein involved the XXX Corps Headquarters, still commanded by General Norrie, the 1st South African Division, and the 2nd Free French Brigade Group. Brigade groups were infantry brigades that were augmented at least by artillery and possibly engineers or cavalry. One major change instituted by Auchinleck was the breakdown of units into battle groups. Auchinleck and his associate, Eric Dorman-Smith, theorized that part of Rommel's success was due to his use of battle groups ("kampfgruppen"). In Auchinleck's scheme, artillery became the primary arm and infantry was relegated to defending the guns.
General Auchinleck's priority "was to keep his force intact".  He disassembled his units into battle groups, which were to operate independently between Mersa Matruh and El Alamein. Auchinleck wanted to have a mobile defense in place, but the reality was that there was a precipitous retreat to El Alamein.
The Germans attacked during the evening of 26 June 1942. The New Zealand Division (two brigades) was located at Minqar Qaim. The 21st Armored Division attacked the New Zealand Division from the east. The 15th Armored Division attacked from the west. The 90th Light Division cut the connecting road between XIII Corps and X Corps. I am sad to say that General Gott withdrawing XIII Corps and abandoning X Corps was typical of him. That left X Corps cut off in Mersa Matruh, a situation that Auchinleck had wanted to avoid. New Zealand Division was able to break out and withdraw on El Alamein. 50th Division and the 10th Indian Division broke out from Mersa Matruh the following night. In the process, the divisions took heavy losses that meant that they had to be withdrawn to "regroup".
When the Australians heard of Tobruk's fall, they were shaken. Seemiingly, all their work in 1941 to defend Tobruk had gone for nothing. Given the news of recent events in the desert left many Australians to expect to be sent back to the desert to rejoin the New Zealand Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk attacked as the British force collapses in June 1942

Rommel planned a quick attack to capture the Tobruk fortress. The attack by the German Africa Corps hit the southeast sector of Tobruk. They used only forty tanks with accompanying infantry. Tobruk was no longer defended by the seasoned crew that had mounted a credible defense in 1941. Instead, they had a temporary force commanded by a South African. The pre-attack softening up came with dive bombers and artillery fire. The tanks easily broke through the defense line and broke through to the defending guns. By "early afternoon" they hit the harbor with guns firing from the escapment. They had taken the harbor by evening. The garrison commander, Major-General Klopper surrendered when the defenders were totally defeated. They took some 35,000 prisoners, four "infantry brigadiers", and a tank brigade.
The Australian historian says that there were more than one hundred tanks were in the attack that captured Tobruk. Veterans of the 1941 Tobruk defense debated the defensive arrangements that had failed in 1942. Apparently, in June 1942, the enemy attacked on  broad front and the defense was too slow to bring reserves forward. The defenders were also not prepared to defend against a large tank attack. That alone was enough to succeed.
Once Tobruk fell, the Eighth Army withdrew to Mersa Matruh. Rommel continued to use infiltration tactics against the British who were not able to cope with the speed of his movements. Rommel was up on them by 25 June 1942. That forced Auchinleck's hand and he relieved General Ritchie of command and took over as Eighth Army commander. That was apparently what Mr. Churchill had wanted for some time.
X Corps had responsibility for holding Mersa Matruh. They had the 10th Indian Division and 50th Division. General Gott, now a Lieutenant-General, commanded XIII Corps. He held the left. He had the remainder of the armored divisions and a newly configured New Zealand Divisiion. They were now motroized but with just two brigades. XXX Corps was back at El Alamein, over a hundred miles away. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Officials in Britain intervene in the Middle East with bad effects in May to June 1942

In order to help Malta, the Prime Minister and his commanders in Britain ordered General Auchinleck and his commanders in the Middle East to stage an attack at Gazala before the moonless period in June 1942. The order was sent on 10 May 1941. In the event, Rommel's forces attacked on 26 May. They swept around the southern flank of the Gazala line. The British failed to respond in an effective way, but the Germans had failed to break the Gazala line after a week. The Germans had lost a third of their tanks in the process.
The Eighth Army attacked on 5 June 1942 with the aim of cutting the enemy supply line. The attack failed to achieve its goal. Rommel thought that the British were having problems and attacked. He started with Bir Hacheim in the south, occupied by the 1st Free French Brigade. The Free French were cut off for five days and had to fight their way out on 10 June.
The British held well-located strong points in front of Tobruk. The Germans attacked that defensive system on 12 June. They attacked the 7th Armoured Division, which had three armored brigades. They held an area "between the Knightsbridge and El Adem boxes."  The British were "routed" and had lost many knocked out tanks. They also left the Germans "in possession of the battlefield". That meant that the British tanks could not be recovered and repaired. The British lost more tanks on 13 June. The result was that General Ritchie needed to leave Gazala to keep his forces from being destroyed in detail.
General Auchinleck now was giving orders to Ritchie. He ordered Geneal Ritchie to "hold a line west and southwest of Tobruk through Acroma and El Adem." He was also told to keep the Germans from besieging Tobruk. Mr. Churchill, in Britain, was already anxious that they would lose Tobruk. Churchill was thinking that the Auchinleck and Ritchie might pull out of Tobruk. He did not think about the Germans sweeping into and taking Tobruk, which is what happened. The Germans were allowed to "invest" Tobruk without any effort and blocking that move. By 17 June, the 4th Armoured Brigade had been reconstituted, but was "completely defeated". Rommel then prepared to take Tobruk, at a time when they British had not way to counter his move. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation in the Western Desert becomes critical and Prime Minister Churchill interferes

Rommel had been reinforced with tanks that allowed him to push the British back to the Gazala line. In the process, the 1st Armoured Division lost 90 of its 150 tanks. The Gazala line was based on a minefield that extended some 45 miles to the south into the desert. The line was really based on Tobruk. There were ridges that had defensive positions prepared. The Gazala line held for about three months. The struggle to defend Malta was happening in parallel to the fighting in the desert. While the air force controlled airfields in Cyrenaica in early 1942, one convoy was run through to Malta. After that, the situation became much worse. One four-ship convoy dispatched in February lost all four ships. Another convoy was run through to Malta in March, but most ships were lost with their supplies.
While General Auchinleck must have had some idea that his army commanders in the desert were inferior, Winston Churchill was oblivious to that fact. Churchill assumed that everyone was capable and that all that was needed was a new offensive to push the enemy back. It was incomprehensible that an attack not be launched when it was so desperately needed. Therefore, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff in Britain pressured General Auchineleck for a new offensive.
The Eighth Army commander, General Ritchie, was a fine man, but he lacked the experience needed to successfully command an offensive. General Auchinleck had the necessary experience and expertise to command the offensive, but he felt burdened by his duties as theater commander. He only took charge when everything had collapsed and the whole enterprise was about to fail. Auchinleck was the only British commander able to defeat Rommel in battle before Bernard Law Montgomery arrive on the scene. The Australian historian did not give Auchinleck credit for winning the Crusader battle, but it was his intervention that defeated the enemy forces and pushed them back to Tripolitania. Auchinleck again won a critical battle at the First Battle of El Alamein when he stopped Rommel from advancing any further into Egypt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the campaign.

Back to the Western Desert in June 1942

The events in Syria in early 1942 seemed like a side-show. The real action was in the Far East and in the Western Desert. The Far East had a significant effect on the situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East. Formations from the Middle East were sent to the Far East, such as the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions. From the beginning of 1942 up to April, "180 bombers and 330 fighters" were transferred to the Far East.
The facts were, for the British, were that despite winning the Crusader Battle and breaking the siege of Tobruk, they were unable to exploit that success. The reasons were the commanders that they had were inferior as were the methods that they used for employing tanks and artillery. General Auchinleck's personal involvement to some extent could overcome those issues, but they were not really solved until Bernard Law Montgomery arrived in the Middle East to command the Eighth Army. The effort required to supply and arm Malta was also a drain on resources. This primarily affected the navy and air force.
During the middle of December 1941, the Axis forces pulled back from Gazala to Agedabia. This meant that the British were able to move into Benghazi "on Christmas eve". The Guards brigade (presumably the 22nd Guards Brigade) had moved forward to "make contact" with the enemy forces by 22 December 1941. The British 1st Armoured Division moved to the west to be close to the enemy. The Axis forces responded by pulling back to Tripolitania. Early in January 1942, the small groups of Germans "at Bardia, Salum and Halfaya" were captured.
The Italian navy was able to push a convoy through to Tripoli (Libya) on 5 January 1942. The convoy brought armored vehicles and supplies that allowed Rommel to quickly attack the British. Sadly, the British were caught by surprise. Rommel was strong enough to be able to push the British forces back to the Gazala line. Gazala was reached on 6 February 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Training, unrest among the Australians, and a panic in Syria

General Morshead wanted to train his Australians. When 20th Brigade was available with no other distractions, they turned to training. They were involved with battalion and brigade-level "field exercises". You can tell that this was necessary for the 20th Brigade had never had any training since the brigade had been formed 22 months earlier.
There were reports of "unrest" among the Australians. Partly, this was due to their employment in Syria while men were defending Australia at home. No mail from Australia simply aggravated the problem, because no one knew anything about what was really happening in Australia. The men were stuck in the Middle East while their wives and girlfriends were in Australia, possibly meeting American men.
The typical reaction to this sort of thing was almost a parody. They sent the A.I.F. Entertainment Unit to Syria and Lebanon. The review opened in Beirut on 10 March 1941 and played to a VIP audience, including "General Maitland Wilson, General Morshead, the President of Lebanon, the American Counsel-General (Mr. C. van Engert) and other notabilities". The show was called "All in Fun". They eventually played to all the Australian venues in Syria. They also tried showing movies almost nightly for each Australian brigade. They kept someone busy planning events to entertain the troops. They had trips to where there was snow and visited "places of historic interest". Men were allowed to take leave in Beirut and Tripoli. They did things which seem familiar, even thirty years later such as "table-tennis, chess, draughts, boxing tournaments and euchre parties".
The food situation in Syria improved since there had been a "bumper grain crop". Typically, they did not trust the local people to handle distribution, because they assumed that there would be profiteering. The military was to supervise the harvest. We see a warning, that the 9th Australian Division would be gone from Syria before the harvest happened. We suspect that was because the situation in the Western Desert was collapsing.
The cause of panic in late May 1942 was over a report of warships and large transports on the coast when there was no notice of a British convoy. The panic ensued over what was eventually acknowledged as a British convoy sailing north along the Syrian coast. No reason for panic, but they panicked over lack of information. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The food shortage in Syria and wrong-minded British command priorities

Some steps had been implemented as early as Fall of 1941 had helped the food situation. There was the "Spears' Mission wheat plan". We can understand the natural desire to hoard what is scarce. Having a political leader hoarding food, as Suleiman Murshed was thought to be doing, only aggravated the situation. The United Kingdom Convention Commissioner thought that the Alaouite leader was the best person to receive aid and distribute it, but the British military were concerned that he  might just add to his personal cache in his village. A plan was floated that had the commissioner selling wheat to the poor. The comment was that part of the problem were "wartime profiteers" that they thought should be controlled. All these issues were ready grist for the Axis propaganda mill.
Other initiatives included supplying Syrian workers involved with road and defense construction with ten pounds of flour per week. They had started this step when the men were first hired. Another step was handled by the 2/17th Battalion. They were responsible for distributing five thousand pounds of flour to the poor near Raju. The flour was supplied by the American Red Cross, after requests made by the 2/17th Battalion.
One major change happened when most of "the New Zealand Division arrived in Syria". A New Zealand brigade was sent to "the Djedeide fortress". A second brigade was sent to  Aleppo, freeing up the 20th Australian Brigade. That allowed the concentration of the 20th Brigade "around Latakia". The arrival of the New Zealand Divsion allowed the 9th Australian Division to be better concentrated. They did not have to distribute "detachments east of the Orontes River."
General Auchinleck was concerned about the lack of British strength in the north. He felt that they needed to take steps to look stronger than they really were as a preventive measure. This sort of thinking was foreign to General Morshead, who was irritated by the need to "create the illusion of strength". This is based on the account n Vol.III of the Australian Offiicial History.

The situation in the Far East and Australia in early 1942

The Australians had temporarily kept the 9th Australian Division and some corps troops in the Middle East. The rest of the 1st Australian Corps were being sent to the Far East starting on 30 January 1942. General Lavarack, the corps comander, was sent ahead of the bulk of the corps. The men and equipment were embarked on convoys. The original plan was to send the 1st Australian Corps to Java, but the Chief of the Australian General Staff canceled the deployment to Java after the Japanese captured Singapore. The convoys were instead sent to Australia, which would sensibly be seen as a base for future attacks against the Japanese forces in the western Pacific. They really wanted to have the 9th Australian Division in Australia as soon as possible.
As was often the case, Winston Churchill had his own plans. He wanted to send the 7th Australian Division to Burma. The Australian prime minister, now Mr. Curtin, opposed the move and wanted the division in Australia. As early as 18 February 1942, the Australian government was informed that the Pacific War Council wanted the 6th Australian Division and the 9th Australian Division sbe sent to Australia, while the 7th Australian Division was wanted in Burma. They also wanted to send the 70th Division (defending Tobruk) to Burma. The Australian government was being pressured to send forces to Burma, but General Sturdee and Mr. Curtin opposed the move. The British then raised the stakes, offering to send an American division to Australia, if they would agree to the diversion to Burma. The Australians were still opposed to such a step. Winston Churchill was very upset that the Australians opposed his plan. To try to appease Churchill, Mr. Curtin offered to send to 6th Australian Division brigades to Ceylon. That was offered with the condition that the 9th Australian Division be returned to Australia "as soon as possible". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Big changes for Australians in the Middle East from February 1942

The enemy was busy spreading rumors about Turkey and the Syrian coast. The British had heard about the possible German attack through Turkey from sources in the Balkans. Italians in Greece were also heard talking about "small-scale raids on the Syrian coast". The British believed that the main Axis effort was being spent on preparing for a new attack  in Western Cyrenaica. The rumors were sufficient to cause the 26th Brigade to have to supply a "mobile group" with an infantry company, a carrier section, and a machine-gun platoon. They had to be ready to respond with thirty minutes notice. In addition, they had to provide additional strength at the Tripoli port and at Chakka.
Australian security at the Turkish border were preventing couriers with letters from crossing into Syria. There were also deserters from the Turkish army. There was also constant attempts to smuggle items such as sheepskins. They were thought to be intended for the Germans in Russia.
22 February 1942 saw a big Australian milestone. General Blamey informed General Morshead that he was leaving the Middle East for Australia. It turns out that he also had his wife there with hem. Morshead was promoted to Lieutenant-General and "would become G.O.C., A.I.F. (Middle East). They had met in Cairo to talk about the future plans. General Morshead still had his smaller concerns to deal with. He complained to General Wilson that he needed three brigades to adequately defend Tripoli. General Morshead was then called back to Cairo for a three day meeting with General Blamey. He also spent time with ceremony regarding General Blamey's leaving the Middle East. Attendees included General  Auchinleck, General Freyberg and his wife, He wished General Blamey and his wife farewell when they flew from Cairo airport to South Africa on 7 March 1942. Because of security concerns, the general announcement about General Morshead's promotion was not made for three weeks. There were still 45,000 Australians in the Middle East at that date, but some ten thousand were due to leave for Australia. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division in February 1942 in Syria

February 1942 had better weather than January had. There was one day of "torrential rain", but that was just in the 2/13th Battalion area. The temperature grew warmer towards the end of the month. The men were hearing news about the war in the Far East. The Japanese army was advancing and there was "the air raid against Darwin". There had also been a rumor of Sydney being bombed, but that was false. The Australians wondered if they should be "at home" rather than in Syria.
The Free French forces were also in  Syria, but the ordinary soldiers did not meet them. Only commanders had contact. The British had hoped for contact with Turkish troops on the frontier, but that did not happen during the day. At night, they were "friendly and eager" to have some Australian tea.
One concern was the behavior of Australian soldiers during the occupation of Syria. General Morshead had tight control of how the men were dressed and how they behaved. "Leave" followed tight rules. Most of the men naturally were well-behaved. Esprit d'Corps was usually enough to keep men in line. Senior officers in the division staff were kept informed about how things were handled.
The Australians in Tripoli had set a good enough example that the civilians became friendly with them. The situation had improved enough that the string of complaints about Australians coming from "General Auchinleck, General Maitland Wilson and the Spears Mission" had stopped. The main problems became men visiting villages that were prohibited and later by selling "government property" for cash.
The men were more enthusiastic about training than they were about digging defenses at Tripoli. Some useful unit training occurred during the three days a week set aside for such exercises. Men were able to fire their weapons and were acquainted with "wire crushing" and the "spigot anti-tank mortar". The 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment "received 32 guns".  They created a range where they could practice shooting at targets. One feature of February is that small  groups were sent back to Australia to training replacement troops. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British get their way on 4 February 1941 in Egypt and then back to Syria

The cadets from the Officer Candidate Training Unit were informed about the ultimatum given to the Egyptian government and were sent to the palace of King Farouk. They arrived before 9pm and were formed up in parade. The Egyptian royal guard presented arms in response. The British ambassador arrived after 9pm and went to speak to the king. He was there for about 15 minutes and then left. After he left, Nahas Pasha was asked to form a government. He did accept the request, although he wrote a letter for the British ambassador saying that neither the treaty between Egypt and Great Britain nor the fact of Egypt being a sovereign nation should allow the British to force political changes in Egypt. The British agreed that they would treat Egypt as a valuable ally and enter into a collaboration with them. This calmed the political situation. Elections were held that approved of the agreement, although the political opposition disliked the deal. The whole incident was kept secret until after the end of the war. The incident was one of many reasons that ended the British military occupation of Egypt after the war.
Back to Syria, in early February 1942, General Morshead traveled the 20th Brigade area for five days, seeing the situation for himself. He disliked having the 20th Brigade at Aleppo, as it seemed exposed and that they would not be able to withdraw. He remembered his experience in 1941 in the withdrawal from western Cyrenaica into Tobruk. In addition, 20th Brigade was considered to be the 9th Australian Division reserve. He thought that is they really would have six weeks warning, they should blow demolitions immediately. He was also skeptical about how long the air force would use the "covering landing grounds". He thought that they would almost immediately abandon them, leaving 20th Brigade with air cover.
General Morshead was also unhappy with the emphasis on building defenses at the expense of training. The Australians had previously been permitted to traing for three days a week and then build defenses for three days. General Morshead objected to the situation and General Wilson, 9th Army Commander, agreed that training was important. They agreed that they could hire civilians to dig so that Australians could train. Another problem was equipment for the 9th Australian Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tobruk-style defense positions at Tripoli and unrest in Egypt in February 1942

Men from the 2/24th Battalion were located in positions in a curved line that lay on Azge, Kafr, and Aya-Khlaisse. Men from the 2/48th Battalion were "on the plateau behind them". Tobruk veterans immediately recognized that the positions around Tripoli reminded them of Tobruk. They had learned a great deal from their Tobruk experience and used that to improve the Tripoli defenses. Some positions were moved and overall, they used Tobruk-style positions rather than the traditional type.
A Middle-East Officer Cadet Training Unit was maintained in Egypt for the use of British and Commonwealth units. In February 1942, the Australians had men attending the training. They had some additional duties that occurred spontaneously that were not part of the officer training course. The political situation in Egypt deteriorated suddenly. Egypt had a king, Farouk, who was just 22 years old in February 1942. He was considered to have "pro-Italian sympathies". Egypt had a parliament and a prime minister, Sirry Pasha. He had been loyal to the occupying British. In late December 1941, the finance minister resigned. Sirry Pasha resigned on 2 February 1942. There had been "student demonstrations" thought to have been inspired by King Farouk.
The British were aware of the progression of events and had moved a composite brigade into Cairo. The brigade was composed of British, New Zealand, and South African troops. On 3 February, the British ambassador  visited King Farouk and told him that the British wanted him to appoint Nahas Pasha as prime minister. Nahas Pasha was "leader of the Wafdists, the anti-British party". King Farouk did not immediately make the move.
At the officer candidate academy, the men had been practicing with "mobile battle-column tactics, with tanks". Eventually, the  men were told to have live ammunition ready. "At midday" on 4 February, the British ambassador gave King Farouk an ultimatum. The ultimatum was to expire at 8pm on 4 February. Before that time, "the mixed brigade surrounded the palace." At 8:30pm, the officer candidates were assembled and were sent "to the palace to force the issue". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division taking over Syria in January 1941

Since the Tripoli fortress was so important, as we mentioned, two brigades were in residence. The brigades were the 24th and 26th. The 24th was to the "right" or east, we would think. The 24th Brigade was in French-built winter quarters in Tripoli. They did send small groups of section-size forward to the defenses. The 28th Battalion had replaced the 2/14th Battalion near Srar. They had one company extended out of support reach, 24 miles away. They had one company in reserve. The men sent out had to travel by "pack-mules", because there were only tracks made more difficult by constant rain. The tracks were incompatible with vehicles, so that was the only option.
One battalion, the 2/43rd, was located at Arbe. They were to the left of the 2/28th Battalion. By "to the left", they must have meant if you were looking at a map, with the north at the top, left would have been to the west. The 2/43rd were sitting on the slope of the Jebel rtourbol. They were near Kafr Aya, and had a goarge between them and the 2/28th Battalion. The third battalion was held in reserve at El Ayoun. They were also responsible for security for the 24th Brigade.
The 26th Brigade was to hold the coast. They were in the Legoult Barracks, which also held the 2/48th Battalion. The 2/23rd Battalion was housed in the Beit Ghanein Barracks. The battalions were still obligated to send patrols to the forward lines to work on improving the defenses. This travel had to be made on foot. That mean that two to three  hours a day were lost in travel time. This was made necessary by the lack of tents. Once tents became avaiable, men camped near the forward area, saving travel time. The 2/24th Battalion was already living in tents "in the foothills east of Madjlaya. They eventually sent two companies to postions on an arc on the eastern and northeastern "slopes of the Jebel Tourbol". The defenses near Tripoli started to remind the Australians of the defenses that surrounded Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation in Syria in January 1942

With the 20th Brigade Headquarters located in Aleppo, there were also the brigade administrative units. In addition, the 2/15th Battalion had a substantial presence in the barracks at Aleppo Idlib, but was also scattered among three frontier posts. The 2/13th Battalion, which had remained at Tobruk when the other Australians had left, was situated at Latakia. Latakia is about 100 miles distant but was more when you had to travel by road. Latakia put the battalion in a position to block the coast road from Turkey. The 2/13th headquarters and two companies were located near the town. One company was initially put at Bedriye, a village some 40 miles northeast of Latakia. Another company was put a Kassab in the mountains. The two companies were eventually pulled "back to Latakia for training". One platoon was left at Kassab "for show."
Unit commanders were kept busy conducting reconnaissance. That was true down to the platoon leader level. The Australians were interested in learning about the country and the people with their "customs and the novel and sometimes quaint styles of dress". The Australians had good relations with the people. The inhabitants of Afrine were Kurds, and like today, they cooperated with the soldiers.
Unlike Tobruk, the men had very little work to do on contructing defenses. 20th Brigade wanted to concentrate on training, although winter storms and weather in January in Syria impeded training. Storms hit the Syrian coast during the last week of January. Two ships had run ashore at Latakia in the storms. The 2/13th Battalion had huts and tents blown down. 27 January saw a snow storm that made travel difficult and they were unable to travel to the posts on the frontier, except for the groups near the railroad. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Turkey and the MIddle East in late 1941 and early 1942

Turkey was a concern to the British due to their central location and the possible threat of a German attack into the Middle East. Such an attack might come through Turkey. Turkey was considered unable to stop a German attack through their country. The Turkish army was largely equipped with archaic weapons. The British were supplying them with weapons and equipment to improve the situation. Turkey was also concerned about making any commitments to foreign governments. Both Germany and Britain might pose risks to Turkish independence. Turkey was attempting to maintain neutrality in the war, to keep from being drawn into the conflict. You could imagine Germany conquering Turkey while you could imagine the Britain trying to colonize Turkey.
The British were in such a precarious position that all they could do is hope that Germany did not attack from the north. There were natural barriers in the form of mountains and the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. All these issues were on General Auchinleck's mind. At times, we have thought that he spent more time considering how to deal with an attack from the north than was wise, as the risk seems pretty low from our distant perspective.
Ninth Army had responsibility for defending agsinst an attack from the north. They planned for a defense that did not include moving into Turkey. They would simply fight "delaying actions" along the border with Turkey and Syria. They would depend on "fortresses" in Lebanon and Palestine. General Blamey strongly disagreed with what was planned. The I Australian Corps was to be responsible for constructing fortresses at "Tripoli and Djedeide". They were also responsible for defensive demolitions in front of an attacking enemy.
With the 9th Australian Division now occupying Syria, the 20th Brigade had inherited the responsibility for defending the Syrian border with Turkey. They would also have to fight a delaying battle while falling back on the fortress at Tripoli. The 20th Brigade, because of how responsibilities fell, was stretched across 100 miles, not counting the small detachments holding villages. 20th Brigade was supported by the 9th Australian Divisional Cavalry. They were based in Aleppo. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The move to Syria in January 1942

Teams of men left Palestine for Syria on 9 January 1942. The main bodies of units left Palestine starting on 11 January and kept leaving until 18 January. The trips were through very cold, winter weather. They convoys carried men in open trucks, so that they were exposed to the cold. They drove north along the coast road, first to Tripoli. The mountains could be seen in the distance with snow on the peaks.
The 20th Brigade was first to move north. The 2/17th Battalion arrived at Tripoli on 13 January. They immediately continued onwards to Afrine. Afrine was about 20 miles north-northwest of Aleppo. The 2/13th Battalion drove to Latakia as well as "two frontier outposts". Their fellow battalion, the 2/15th, arrived the day after the 2/13th. There was a barracks for them at Idlib, as well some "tin huts". Two of the companies ended up traveling to Aleppo, where the 20th Brigade headquarters was located.
Components of the 24th Brigade came to Tripoli on 15 and 16 January 1942. They put the brigade headquarters at Madjlaya. The 9th Division headquarters was established in Tripoli on 16 January 1942. Brigadier Tovell was temporarily commanding the division. General Morshead was absent, as he was visiting I Australian Corps at Aley. He stayed until General Lavarack traveled to Lake Tiberius to travel by flying boat to the Far East on 19 January. General Morshead was acting as corps commander and traveled to Broumane to 9th Army Headquarters.
The rest of the 9th Australian Division arrived at Tripoli. This was the 26th Brigade, which came to Tripoli on 18 and 19 January 1942. Most of the aritllery also arrived in the area with other division-level units.
The British took Syria to prevent the Germans from pushing between Turkey and Palestine. The British were still concerned about a possible German attack by way of Turkey. The Russian successes in couter-attacking the Germans during the winter helped to ease the concerns, but they were still present. Winston Churchill wrote to President Roosevelt to present his views of the situation. He wrote the paper in December 1941. Churchill's summary said that while there was still a German threat against the Middle East oil fields, that the threat was diminished. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Plans made an overcome by events in December 1941

The British army had suffered in the process of raising the seige of Tobruk. The cost had been very far beyond what had been expected. The Eighth Army was even short of infantry divisions. 9th Army had requested on 10 December a division for the GHQ Reserve in the Nile Delta. 9th Army wanted the 7th Australian Division that was currently in Syria. They wanted to replace the 7th Australian Division with the 9th Australian Division in Syria. General Blamey objected due to the 9th Australian Division never being trained prior to being sent into action in early 1941. The immediate issue was solved because General Freyberg wanted the New Zealand Division to be sent to Syria.
The new situation in the Far East was going to affect the future employment of the Australian infantry divisions. Just on 7 December, the Japanese had landed troops in Thailand, Malaya, and had attacked the United States at "Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, Guam", They also had attacked Hong Kong and Ocean Island. In another two weeks, the Japanese had taken the north of Malaya and had landed in Borneo. They soon would capture Hong Kong and had invaded the Philippines. By 21 December, the Middle East expected to be ordered to send reinforcements to the Far East. 7th Australian Division would be kept in Syria for now. In about a week, the 7th Australian Division was to go to Gaza for "training" while the 9th Australian Division would be sent to Syria, with General Blamey accepting the move.
In early 1942, the British Government sent a message to the Australian Government suggesting that two Australian Divisions should return to the Far East. By 6 January 1942, the Australian Government had agreed with the proposed move. By 7 January, the British issued orders for the 9th Australian Division to relieve the Australian Division in Syria.
The 9th Australian Division would assume responsibility for a large section of northern Syria. This was a some 1,200 square mile area. The area was adjacent to Turkey. The 20th Brigade would move to the area near the Turkish border. The 24th Brigade would move to Madjlaya. This was three miles to the southeast from Tripoli. The 26th Brigade would actually move into Tripoli. Part of the deal would involve sending independent battalions off to remote locations. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Life after Tobruk in the lands east of Cyrenaica from September 1941

Then the units of the 9th Australian Division were withdrawn from Tobruk by sea, they were taken by minlayer and destroyer to the harbor at Alexandria. They had a short stay and then were sent by train to Palestine to the AIF base. The first units arrived in late September 1941. Except for the 2/13th Battalion, which stayed in Tobruk, the rest were the 24th Brigade and supporting units. The other brigades arrived in October, with the 26th arriving prior to the 20th Brigade. General Morshead arrived at the end of October.
The Australians were eased into their new situation. They immediately were given two days off with no responsibilities. They also received treats sent from Australia. After that break, they were put back into a normal routine. After being in Tobruk for so long, the units were re-equipped and prepared for training. One of the benefits of their location is that they were often given day leave to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. They also got longer leave to Haifa. Those who rated, got leave in Cairo.
Shortly after arriving, General Morshead got a tour of Syria. After that, he went to the Nile Delta and then onto Kenya for a month of leave. The general met with Brigadier Murray and representatives of the rest of the division, except for the 2/13th Battalion, newly arrived from Tobruk. While Morshead was in Cairo, he received a medal from General Sikorski, the Polish Prime Minister in exile. The Australian 26th Brigade supplied a band and honor guard.
Because Axis agents were thought to be trying to start trouble in Palestine, the British command decided to start sending patrols to villages. The Ausralians were ordered to send those patrols to Gaza. These were being done for propaganda purposes, to show that there really were strong untis in Palestine. They would hold parades in the center of towns with a band playing music. The patrols were either a company or even half a battalion. They would meet with the local officials to get permission to hold the parade.
The 9th Australian Division sent one company to guard the 9th Army Headquarters in Broumane, Syria. This was the first of many guard requests to which they needed to respond. That had a major effect on training for the division. General Morshead eventually met with General Lavarack and asked if the guards could be provided by "base troops". General Lavarack commanded I Australian Corps. With that settled, 9th Australian Division was able to concentrate on training, their new mission. When the men were not training, they took part in sports. The Australians sent three crews to a regarra in Tel Aviv that included "Jewish and Paletstinian Plice crews." 20th Brigade provided some hockey teams that competed with RAF teams at various gases.
The 2/13th Battalion only arrived in Palestine on 20 December 1941. They had planned to give them a lavish welcome, but their train arrived late, so that didn't happen. The 9th Australian Division had been receiving regular reinforcements, so the division was close to full strength. They got their cavalry regiment back as well as the 2/8th FIeld Regiment. The 2/7ty Field Regiment was still absent, sitting ate the artillery school in Cairo. Except for 2/7th Field Company, their engineers were still in Syria. Brigade anti-tank companies were disbanded and two were combined into the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment. One company were metged into 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.