The Cauldron and British and enemy issues on 1 December 1941

The Australian historian was critical of Brigadier Gatehouse and his timidity in the fight on 1 December 1941. Certainly, if Gatehouse's armored brigade had attacked, they would have taken losses. The historian thought that constantly yielding the battlefield to the Germans was not a way to win a battle. The German armored divisions were free to concentrate against the British infantry, particularly the New Zealand Division. We also notice that the Germans were hard-pressed to pull together a force to fight the battle at the Cauldron. The 90th Light Division was reduced to organizing a battalion from soldiers freed from a New Zealand prisoner of war camp. They were not able to fight at this point in the battle. The 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment was attempting to regroup after being beaten in battle at Sidi Rezegh. The 21st Armored Division was also in poor shape. They were said to be taking a very pessimistic view and were "sending alarming reports". The German Africa Corps did have the advantage of a strong medium and heavy artillery force. Besides the artillery, the main German strength were the 8th Armored Regiment with some forty tanks, "the 2nd Machine Gun Battalion, and the 15th Motorcycle Battalion." Before the British armored brigade had joined the battle, this force had fought a hard fight with a New Zealand battalion and the 6th Field Regiment. While the Germans had perhaps 24 Pzkw III and Pzkw IV tanks, Gatehouse's brigade had 115 tanks. But the British tanks had pulled back, leaving the Germans to continue to batter the New Zealand Division.
The Germans planned an attack at 4:30pm on the New Zealand artillery, which had planned to withdraw at 5:30pm. To help the artillery were five Matildas from the 44th RTR and a few Valentines from the 8th RTR. This was a close-fought battle with artillery firing at point-blank range. Some guns were abandoned at the withdrawal. The Germans were very tired so they rested when the British and New Zealanders withdrew. They were admonished by General Cruewell for stopping, because he wanted them to move on Zaafran. He ordered them to take Zaafran at "daybreak".
At 6:45pm, the remnants of the New Zealand Division formed up into a traveling order and then drove east and south their was back to Egypt to rest and rebuild. On the way, they had traveled to Bir Gibni by 3:30am on 2 December 1941. The 1st South African Brigade was in position at Taieb el Esem. The 4th Armoured Brigade was in a night leaguer, as they wre wont to do. This night, they were at Bir Berraneb. This was a far as 24 miles from Ed Duda. The attempted relief of Tobruk had failed.
Rommel had not succeeded in restoring the situation to what it had been prior to the start of Operation Crusader. The Tobruk force, mainly 70th Division, was still at Ed Duda. British forces on the Egyptian frontier were attacking the German and Italian positions at Salum, Bardia, and the "Omars" (such as Sidi Omar). There was also a strong British force on the Trigh el Abd that was a potential threat. The outcome would depend as much on British moves as on anything Rommel would decide to do. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle near Sidi Rezegh and Ed Duda playes out on 1 December 1941

The Australian historian remarks that Brigadier Gatehouse did not feel that he had to "charge" the enemy when encountered. Rather, he could use his judgement about how to conduct the action to protect his tanks and personnel from unnecessary loss. Gatehouses brigade drove down from the escarpment near the Sidi Rezegh airfield. There may have been times when they might have engaged the enemy under risky circumstances. By this time, the New Zealand Division had been driven from Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. The 1st South African Brigade had made a strong attack on Point 175, but had failed to penetrate the enemy shield. The 21st Armored Brigade had blocked the attack. North of the British armored brigade, the remains of the 6th New Zealand Brigade manned a defensive position. Their 25th Battalion was still at the blockhouse in the Sidi Rezegh area. They had two groups of infantry tanks to their north. The 8th RTR had five tanks left. Even further north were seven infantry tanks of the 44th RTR. They were there to shield anti-tank guns and field artillery, located in a wadi. They still had about 40 25pdr Field Guns left. They represented the main fighting force that survived from the New Zealand Division. There were a handful of other units or groups left, in addition.
Rommel had pulled in most of the German Africa Corps. They were closing in on the New Zealand Division and the other units. Rommel called the situation "the Cauldron". New the 6th New Zealand Brigade and Brigadier Gatehouse's armored brigade were the German 8th Armored Regiment and the 200th Motorized Infantry Regiment. They lay north of the Trigh Capuzzo. On the south side were the "Mickl artillery group" and the 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment. The German force outgunned the New Zealand Division artillery. The 90th Light Division was also on the north side of the Cauldron. The Italian Ariete Armored Division was east of the Cauldron. The 21st Armored Division was sitting on the Trigh Capuzzo.
Brigadier Gatehouse was very uncomfortable with the situation he found himself in. Gatehouse was aware of the strong enemy artillery force that was present. He also believed that they were too late to keep the New Zealand Division from having to withdraw.He knew about the enemy heavy artillery that was nearby. Given the disparity in tank strengths, Brigadier Gatehouse was not ready to attack the enemy tanks. The 6th New Zealand Brigade commander had decided that they needed to withdraw to Zaafran. Brigadier Gatehouse had been in communication with General Gott about the situation. His brigade was caught in a fight with Italian tanks "in front" and some German tanks on the right. The New Zealand transport had disappeared, so Gatehouse considered that his responsibility to them had ended.
Tanks from the 15th Armored Division had expected that Gatehouse's brigade would attack. By early afternoon, the British armored Brigade had driven off towards the south so that they could resupply. The situation had left the 6th New Zealand Brigade wondering what had happened. They were thankful for the presence of the brigade, but were surprised when the brigade suddenly disappeared. They had also expected that the British tanks would have had more of an effect on the course of the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The critical point in the Crusader battle, 1 December 1941

When General Scobie found that the New Zealand troops from Belhamed were withdrawing towards the Tobruk sortie force, he had them diverted and employed in the "forward posts". The enemy had staged an attack from the east against the "corridor". This attack was driven back. They apparently had killed fifty of the enemy and had taken another fifty as prisoners.
The one New Zealand battalion at Belhamed, the 18th, had been facing Ed Duda. They had been able to hold their ground, but eventually started to pull back to the west. Major Loder-Symonds had finally been able to get two mobile artillery observation posts in place. He had been able to call in artillery fire to support the New Zealand withdrawal. B/O Battery were able to drive back a group of German tanks that had been trying to cut off the New Zealand battalion. Major Loder-Symonds was able to speak to the New Zealand Battalion commander, who seemed to be very able. The major told the New Zealand commander that the artillery would stay and provide anti-tank protection, if his men could take positions "just in front of the guns". He also showed the New Zealand commander the enemy minefield that they could use as part of their defenses. The New Zealand battalion moved onto the ridge "west of Belhamed". Very soon, a column of vehicles approached with the remnants of the New Zealand Division artillery. This included one troop from the 6th New Zealand Field Regiment. Major Loder-Symonds was able to incorporate them "alongside B Battery". That gave them a line of eight guns that could fire as a unit. There was some concern that B Battery could be forced to withdraw, so "Rocket Troop" was sent to a position at Belhamed where they would be in a position to provide support. Rocket Troop was shelled and took some casualties, but where able to hold on "until after dark".

The 2/13th Battalion was still in place on the ridge by Belhamed and Ed Duda. They were able to observe the German attack on Belhamed with tanks. The also observed the 18th New Zealand Battalion pull back. By 10am, they heard about a German group. Later, they could see what might have been Germans "beyond the bypass road". The 2/13th Battalion heard at 10:30am that Belhamed had fallen to the enemy. A conference was planned for 11am at Brigadier Willison's headquarters.
They were now at the critical point in the Crusader battle. They had almost been defeated on Totensonntag, but 70th Division,, the New Zealand Division, and the army tank brigades had kept the British forces from being defeated. On 1 December, the New Zealand Division had taken important losses. The German armored divisions had been ordered to attack and to defeat them.
In the German Africa Corps, the custom was to move in to attack while the sky was still dark. They planned an attack on Belhamed at 6:30am. Brigadier Gatehouse had been ordered to check out the situation at dawn, which would have been later than the planned German moves. The time was 9am when the composite armored brigade approached over the "northern Sidi Rezegh escarpment. Brigadier Gatehouse had been given orders that would have been bad to have executed as given. He was to attack and be relentless, fighting to the last tank, if necessary. Gatehouse had the 5th RTR commander contact the New Zealand Division and plan hoow to  attack the enemy tanks. Brigadier Gatehouse did not feel required to  make reckless charges against the enemy. His responsibility was to make the best use of his resources in tanks and men and not throw them away. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 30 November 1941 to 1 December 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

The situation late on 30 November 1941 saw the 1st South African Brigade sitting on the escarpment where General Norrie had led them. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was all but destroyed. The Italian Ariete Armored Division was on the Trigh Capuzzo, with the 21st Armored Division behind them. The South Africans sent out a strike group towards Point 175, but they were stopped by units from the 21st Armored Division, including the 3rd Recennaissance Unit. The Australians were sitting on the ridge, with two New Zealand companies to their east, near the place where the bypass road crossed the ridge.
Eighth Army senior officers were busy during the night.. They had different amounts of information about the situation, and their personalities shaped how they responded. General Freyberg was prepared to ask his men to sacrifice themselves, as needed, for the good of the division. General Freyberg believed that his division was still obligated to hold the ground they defended. For one thing, the corridor to Tobruk depended on them. The commander of the 6th New Zealand Brigade had proposed withdrawing, but that was unacceptable to General Freyberg. General Freyberg's view was that the 1st South African Brigade and the British armor would need to participate in the battle to hold the ground they occupied. General Freyberg sent his chief artillery offcier to Tobruk to talk with General Godwin-Austen about Freyberg's view of what was needed. General Freyberg also sent two officers to talk with the South African brigade comander. "He beileved that the South Africans had been placed under his command." They were to tell him that Sidi Rezegh had been captured by the enemy. The New Zealand Division needs Sidi Rezegh recaptured prior to dawn on 1 December. The South Africans were ordered to retake Sidi Rezegh immeditately.
The New Zealand artillery commander, Brigadier Miles only reached XIII Corps headquarters after midnight. The officers sent to the South African brigade arrived at 1:40am. The South Africans were quite close to General Norrie, so when they received the message relayed from General Freyberg, the South African commander went to talk with General Norrie. They decided that capturing Point 175 was not possible prior to dawn. The attack could restart at dawin, at best.
General Godwin-Austen sent out encoded wireless message to the major unit commanders. The 7th Armoured Division needed to concentrate and focus on defeating the German armored units. If the South Africans could take Point 175 and Sidi Rezegh, then they should try to establish themselves in controll of those positions. If that failed, then the New Zealand Division needed to move "behind Ed Duda". They would also need to hold onto Belhamed. Anything else can be given up, if all elsle failed. They might have ordered the New Zealand Division to withdraw immediately, but there was not realy time for that to be a realistic possibility.
Geenral Scobie was paying xlose attention to events and plans. He was aware ofo the rishs of having 70th Division soldiers from Tobruk outside of the fortress defenses when the situaion was in doubt.  Infantry tank runners were not more than twenty by now. He was intent on holding onto Ed Duda and Belhamed. General Gott told Brigadier Gatehouse that he needed to attack the enemy tanks. They were very close to morning and the enemy forces were clearly on the move, intent on causing them trouble.
The 32nd Army Tank Brigade dealt with an enemy group between outposts Butch and Tiger. at dawn, there was heavy mist. While there still was mist, they started to receive incoming artillery fire at Belhamed. The New Zealand Division units near Belhamed were being attacked. They had support by the 1st RHA, but some British tanks were knocked out by mines and anti-tank gun fire. The New Zealanders "were without tank support and being overrun."  This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

On the brink of disaster at Sidi Rezegh and the general area on 30 November 1941

Late on 30 November 1941, the men at Ed Duda could tell that there was fighting at Sidi Rezegh, but they could not see what was actually happening. The men at Ed Duda were concerned that the situation was about to take a major turn for the worst. A planned change of companies was canceled. They were so concerned about the situation and their prospects for survival that they spent the night digging emplacements and laying mines. Up until the end of the day on 30 November, the XIII Corps headquarters and the men in Tobruk had no idea of what was happening at Sidi Rezegh.
The one British cruiser tank brigade, the composite 4th/22nd Brigade, wasted time playing games with the Italians of the Ariete armored division. They also may have seen and fired at some German Africa Corps men and tanks, but took no serious action. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, had wanted the brigade to be engaged with keeping the corridor open from the outside to the New Zealand Division, near Point 175. In fact, the Germans were positioning themselves to attack the New Zealand Division and remove them from the battlefield. There wax Italian artillery positioned near Point 175 that was firing on the New Zealanders.
The XXX Corps commander, General Norrie, took personal of the 1st South African Brigade. They reached the escarpment at about 4pm, near Trigh Capuzzo. They did not try anything, but were preparing to attack the dressing station at Point 175.
The 15th Armored Division was intent on capturing Sidi Rezegh and surrounding the New Zealand Division so that they were out of touch with Tobruk and the Egyptian Frontier. They made mistakes, however, as one was for the division to head off to El Adem. They were eventually stopped at Bir Salem. The men at Ed Duda could see the 15th Armored Division move to the north, near Bir Bu Creimisa.
Bir Bu Creimus had become the headquarters of the German Africa Corps. Later in the afternoon, Rommel ordered the attack on the New Zealand Division. The little Mickl Group, a battle group of five tanks, was to hit Sidi Rezegh. The Italians of the Ariete Division were to hit the east side. The 90th Light Division would hit Belhamed to the south. General Cruewell had suggested that the 15h Armored Division should move to the "saddle" between Ed Duda and Belhamed. They would end up moving along the foot of the ridge where the 2/13th Battalion was located. The Australians planned to patrol to the "bypass road.
From 4pm to 5pm, the German and Italian tanks moved in on the New Zealand Division. The 4th/22nd Brigade had done nothing useful to interfere with the enemy tank movements. The 15th Armored Division commander, General Neumann-Silkow led his division to join the attack on Sidi Rezegh, rather than waste his time at the "saddle"The 6th New Zealand Brigade, located near the Sidi Rezegh mosque was in trouble. Two New Zealand battalions were overrun and a third was pressed hard by the Ariete Division. The brigade commander wanted to salvage what he could from the wreckage. He wanted to move in behind the "Tobruk sortie force". With the 6th New Zealand Brigade all but destroyed, that left the New Zealand Division artillery unprotected at Belhamed, and nearby. From the east, you now had the 21st Armored Division closing in and blocking the Trigh Capuzzo. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Norrie's priority task for 30 November 1941: the South African brigade

The South African brigade was weighing heavily on General Norrie's mind. He wanted to help them make contact with the New Zealand Division without them being attacked by German tanks. The Australian historian thought that what General Norrie needed to do was to get the help of  Brigadier Gatehouse's composite armored brigade, not just freeing his schedule so that he could concentrate his thinking. Appatently, General Norrie personally accompanied the South African brigade on their trip to join the New Zealand Division.
30 November was one week after Rommel wanted to bring the German Africa Corps against the New Zealand Division. We see now that General Ritchie had ordered the 7th Armoured Division to harass the rear of the 15th Armored Division. General Gott told Brigadier Gatehouse to keep the corridor open from Tobruk to the New Zealand Division. They were also to protect the South Africans. XIII Corps told the New Zealand Division to move west as soon as the South African Brigade arrived.
Ed Duda was now left with a mixture of infantry units to continue to hold the place. There was the 1/Essex, the Australians, and the New Zealand companies. The 2/13th was left in command of the units. The Australians were surprised to find that German armor continued to drive around on the desert without anyone interfering. The only anti-tank capability they had were field artillery from the 1st RHA. They had no anti-tank guns at all. One response from the Australians was to request a large number of mines to build defenses. When the sun came up on 30 November, the Australians could see a busy German temporary encampment on the desert flat. They had everything from kitchens, to repair workshops, tanks, and men being marched around. The forward observer from the 1st RHA was anxious to all in artillery fire on the camp. The Germans replied with accurate artillery fire. The Australians could see some forty tanks to the west. A group of twelve drove close and were shelled. By 8am, they could see about 35 tanks, which eventually were bombed by the RAF. Two German tanks drove into an Australian position and asked the men to surrender, but they didn't fall for such as game. They could see the German tanks drive around as if to approach the New Zealand Division.
The British and Australians were able to nab some German vehicles from the bypass road. Brigadier Willison held a meeting at about mid-morning, where he proposed consolidating Ed Duda under the 2/13th Battalion and giving back the spare companies to their owners. Later in the day, men from the 1/Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire moved into the area. They were in a position just below the escarpment with a company on either side of the road.
The lack of resolute command of the forces near by left the men in precarious positions. They did not know what was British and what was enemy, because of the careless way that business was being conducted. You have to think that some of the problem was General Ritchie's lack of experience at the level of command he was at. Men near Ed Duda could hear firing from the general direction of Sidi Rezegh, but they could not actually see what was happening. No one bothered to tell them, either. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events on 30 November 1941 near Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh

A portion of the 2/13th Battalion (Australians) were still on "the ridge to the east". They were reinforced by two companies from the 19th New Zealand Battalion, and operated under the Australian command. The New Zealanders were in place alongside the Australians, another "ANZAC" formation.
Commanders from both sides had some fundamental misunderstandings about the current situation. What little ground had been taken by mainly German forces under Rommel's command had been recaptured by two squadrons of Matildas and two infantry companies. Rommel had already fought and defeated the armor and infantry of XXX Corps. Rommel expected that the British knew how badly they had been beaten and that the New Zealand Division would pull into Tobruk for protection. General Ritchie, 8th Army Commander, however was unaware of the real situation. He thought that the German armored forces had been so battered that they would attempt to flee to the west. Rommel also expected the main British armored force to join the battle. Because of that impression, Rommel decided to attack the New Zealand Division where they were sitting, south of Tobruk.
General Ritchie wanted the 7th Armoured Division to attack the Germans that night, but instead, they went into a protective night leaguer some distance away. They were reorganized so that they had one composite brigade composed from the remnants of the division. Rommel, on 30 November, wanted to surround the New Zealand Division, although he neglected to consider Ed Duda in his plan. Rommel was focused, instead, on retaking Sidi Rezegh. One change that Rommel made was appointing General Boettcher, the heavy artillery commander, to take command of the 21st Armored Division.
General Ritchie's orders to the 7th Armoured Division were to "harass with petty attacks" against the 15th Armored Division. He revised his orders later to be to both harass and destroy the enemy as the opportunity prsented itself. The goal being to protect the 1st South African Brigade. The South African's had their orders modified to take them towards Ed Duda, south of the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. General Norrie got involved and ordered the South Africans to move to Sciafsciuf way east of Point 175 before they got up on the escarpment. They would then be attacking Point 175 from the east.
XIII Corps plans for 30 November were similar to his previous plans. General Godwin-Austen ordered 70th Division to take some action to divert Rommel's attention from the New Zealand Division. At the same time, General Godwin-Austen asked the New Zealand Division to help 70th Division. Once the situation at Ed Duda seemed to have been stabilized, General Godwin-Austen was thnking again of a forward move to El Adem. When the New Zealand Division had connnected with the South Africans, and they were confident in their ability to hold their present position, they should push forward to the El Adem-Bir el Gubi road.
General Norrie and XXX Corps were concerned with helping the South African Brigade join with the New Zealand Division. They had hoped to have completed that movement prior to 30 November, but the enemy armored forces returning from the Egyptian frontier had mde that impossible, as the South African brigade was not in a position to deal with armored forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A surprise attack that worked at Ed Duda

The situation was rather ironic. The 7th Armoured Division, designed to be able to successfully fight the German Africa Corps lay in a leaguer at night, while the 32nd Army Tank Brigade, which had been tested repeatedly during the Crusader battle, was being asked again to fight the German Africa Corps, this time at Ed Duda.
The tank battle at Ed Duda lasted about three hours while the infantry was engaged for about fifteen minutes. Eight Matilda tanks drove up to the escarpment at Ed Duda. They came from the lower ground below. The German tanks stood out against a backlit view. There were tracers from machine gun fire and shots were fired from German 50mm guns and British 2pdr tank guns. There were also German 20mm tank guns fired from light tanks that added to the fireworks. Many shots ricocheted from the Matilda tank hulls. There were many more German tanks, perhaps three-to-one in numbers versus the British infantry tanks. The observing British infantry could see Matildas withdrawing and then returning to fight. The Germans seemed to be winning, but the German tanks withdrew, leaving the British tanks in possession of Ed Duda.
The Australian infantry were going to wait to attack, but ended up being sent forward at 1:30am. The German tanks were thought to have withdrawn before this time. What had actually happened was that by the British attacking without artillery support, they achieved complete surprise. Colonel Burrows, though, ordered his men to call out "Australians coming" as they attacked. The British tanks were also making as much noise as possible, revving their engines as they moved. They were also firing on the move, just to create more confusion. Sadly, the British tanks mistakenly fired on the Australian infantry. The Germans thought that they were facing British infantry, as they called "Englander kommen".
An account written after the battle gave better information about the situation. The Australian infantry attacked with two companies from B Company on the left and C Company on the right. The men from C Company had to recognize who was in front of them. They were apparently German infantry. Once they got close, the shouted and charged with bayonets fixed. The enemy morale collapsed  Their infantry either dropped to the ground or else held their hands up in surrender. They could hear Germans running ahead of them, calling "Englander kommen". The Austtslisnd stopped after they comvered five hundred yards. The Australians took small groups of Germans prisoner.
They could hear German motor transport moving in the distance. They were not close enough to capture any except for a motor cycle that was stopped by Thompson sub-machine gun fire. They captured the rider.
The Australian infantry leaders were very experienced at patroling and fighitng at night. The company commanders maintained control of their units. They only encountered German resistance twoards the edges. The Australians were so accomplished at this sort of activity that they stayed on top. When one group of Germans opened fire, an Australian sergeant led a charge and that stopped the enemy fighting. They encountered two Australian stretcher-bearers who were German prisoners and freed them. They almost had bayoneted them by mistake. On the other side, an Australian firing a hand-held Bren gun forced the surrender of 25 German infantry. The attackers took 167 enemy prisoners. The Australians had two  men killed and five wounded. The men needed to be able to dig in before morning, but there was no equipment. They were fortunate enough that there was not an immediate counter-attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Fighting at Ed Duda from 1pm on 29 November 1941

While the first attempt by the Germans to take Ed Duda failed, they came back. The 1/Essex and anti-tank guns had held. At that point, the tanks available to the 4th RTR were ordered to climb to the top of Ed Duda. There were about 8 tanks, of which some, as we have said, were used as observations points by the 1st RHA. At first, the Germans held back, and the dug in positions of the 1/Essex. Their machine guns and anti-tank guns were disabled. The German patrols were able to lift the protective mines. The time was about 4:30pm when the enemey approached from the west. As the time got later, the enemy had teh sun behind them. The British Matilda tanks came up and then started withdrawing by twos. The heavier German tanks approached, while the lighter German tanks, Pzkw II's drove up to the side, to a flanking position. They opened up with machine guns on the British. Now, there were as many as twenty German tanks lined up across the position held by the British infantry. The Matilda tanks were still close by and were in a hull-down position. Darkness fell, but the British tanks were far enough back to be out of the range of German tanks.
Colonel Burrows, the 2/13th Battalion commander, was summoned to a tank that was talking with Brigadier Willison at the 32nd Army Tank Brigade headquarters. Colonel Burrows told them that he was not prepared to attack tanks without having tanks in support. The British agreed that was the best decision. They wanted the 2/13th Battalion to launch a counter-attack at Ed Duda with two companies. They would provide a third company to protect 1st RHA guns near Belhamed. The rest of the battalion would just try to hold their present positions.
Colonel Burrows headquarters was located up on the escarpment. They were about one thousand yards to the northeast of thet pass at Ed Duda. They planned to use companies C and D for the counter-attack at Ed Duda. The situation was such that D company probably would not be ready in time, since they had been farther away. Colonel Burrows made an adjustment so that company B would attack with company C, instead of company D.The two companies gathered at the north side of the escarpment at the bottom. Some 25pdr guns were firing over the men as they gathered. Except for that, the night was quiet. The 25pdrs stopped firing, but a German shell landed in the middle of a platoon and caused immediate casualties to everyone present.
The other men were forced to march past the platoon that he been decimated. They walked around the corner to a starting point for an attack towards the southwest.  Ed Duda had "pimples", so the men were on both sides of the pimples. Looking through binoculars, they could see German tanks about five hundred yards away. Colonel Burrows declined to attack with the tanks in front of them. He needed tank support so that they could fight on an equal footing. Colonel Burrows took time to visit Brigadier Willison's headquarters to discuss the situation. They would either get tank support or they would not attack. The new plan was to get the Australian infantry and the British tanks in close with the enemy, and recognize that they would not be able to have artillery support, due to the close contact. Battery A/E of the 1st RHA had already left for outpost Tiger as the sky got dark. They had also ordered B/O Battery to head back in the belief that the road was not blocked. In fact, though, the 4th RTR had three tanks blocking the road, just forward of the 2/13th Battalion positions. To the east, the 44th RTR had another road block using tanks.
The 7th Armoured Division tanksk were sitting in the desert, not very far away, but were not involved in the criitical fight. Instead, Brigadier Willison and his brigade had been carrying the load, fighting German tanks over the last nine days. And here they were ready to fight the main German armored force, the German Africa Corps. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Activity from 11:30am on 29 November 1941 in the Crusader battle

A large enemy force was seen approaching Sidi Rezegh at about 11:30am. This was to the west of the earlier planned operation. The British changed their minds about what they were seeing. Now, the enemy seemed to be intent on taking Ed Duda, or at least the escarpment just to the west. The New Zealand Division seemed to be the target of the enemy forces. They were about to surround the division.
The relatively inexperienced General Ritchie, the new 8th Army commander, figured that the German Africa Corps were intent on saving as much of their forces as they could, while the Australian historian suggested that the Germans were intent on defeating what we call the "British" forces, which included New Zealand, Australian, and Polish, as well as real British units.
The Australian historian thought that the British goal should have been to concentrate as great a force as possible to fight the largely German forces that were engaged. He criticized the army commander for not trying to build a concentrated defensive position. The New Zealand Division, at least, kept the priority of holding a corridor open between Tobruk and Ed Duda. They were intent on holding the two ridge lines, including the Ed Duda, Belhamed, and Zaafran, and the Sidi Rezegh ridge line. Part of the New Zealand Division motivation included the information that they were to be joined by the 1st South African Brigade on 30 November.
In the event, the South African brigade was not able to join the New Zealand Division, because the 7th Armoured Division was not able to protect and move the South Africans. The 7th Armoured Division was also not in a position to protect the New Zealand Division from attack. Despite the orders given by the army commander and the corps commanders, the armored division was unable to help the Tobruk force (70th Division) or the New Zealand Division.
The Germans were intent on executing a plan made by the German Africa Corps commander, General Cruewell starting on 29 November. He hoped to make the Tobruk forces that were south of the fortress have to pull back into the fortress perimeter. In this case, the results were not what were desired. General von Ravenstein, the 21st Armored Division commander, was captured by New Zealand Division forces "near Point 175". That caused 21st Armored Division operations to be disrupted for the rest of 29 November.
The German plans had changed by Rommel, who had arrived at the scene of the fighting and had taken charge. He now hoped to cut off the New Zealand Divisiion from communication with Tobruk. He was going to use the 15th Armored Division to take Ed Duda and then push to the east. He hoped that the 21st Armored Division would be able to push west and connect with the 15th Armored Division. They also relied on the Italian Ariete Division to captured the east side of Sidi Rezegh.
By this time, the 15th Armored Division had the bulk of the surviving German tanks. The 115th Infantry Regiment, a motorized unit, were "bogged down" close to Bir Salem. The 200th Infantry Regiment, also a motorized unit, attacked outpost Doc (formerly known as Dalby Square) instead of attacking Ed Duda. Ed Duda was attaced by a much smaller force than had been intended by the plan. The 15th Armored Division was assembling a force to attack Ed Duda at about 1pm. We have access to the communications from Captain Salt, from Chestnut Troop of the 1st RHA. Germans attacked the 1/Essex from the west, but where stopped. The 4th RTR was able to summon 8 infantry tanks. Some of the tanks were used by the 1st RHA, including Captain Salt. He was killed when his tank ws hit. The artillery lost two tanks, which disrupted the artillery support. That left the enemy approaching by 4:30pm. This is based onthe account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle of 29 November 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

After the transport convoy took off for Tobruk, after crossing over the Ed Duda pass, the German heavy artillery switched targets to the Australians of the 2/13th Battalion. The Australians were not dug in, but were sitting in exposed positions. Fortunately, Colonel Burrows was quick to recognize what they should do. He pointed out an area towards the east to Lieutenant Maughan. This was at the base of the escarpment on the far side of the pass. He had him point the men to defensive positions looking towards the south. The battalion headquarters would be located at the escarpment foot. They would be deployed with two companies forward and two behind them. This just happened to put the men in the right place for the Sidi Rezegh attack that was planned.
The enemy artillery soon found the battalion. Fortunately, there were some positions dug by previous inhabitants, and there were also deep tracks from the infantry tanks. The fact that many shells were duds didn'r hurt.
About 7:30am, Colonel Burrows rode in a light tank that was covering the route that was planned for the attack. They captured two wounded Italians while they were driving. Burrows initial impression was that they were in for trouble, because the ground was flat, had no cover, and the distance to the objective seemed rather great. The recent rain had turned the area into a bog. The only relief came when the attack was postponed for four hours. At a 10am meeting, the company commanders learned of the postponement, and that the 19th New Zealand Battalion would make the attack. The 2/13th Battalion would be in a support role, rather than being the attackers.
General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander had made the decisions. His new headquarters was at the El Gubbi airfield in the Tobruk fortress area. Brigadier Willison learned that General Godwin-Austen wanted to extend the corridor that stretched from outpost Grumpy north beyond Prince Town. He wanted to use the 2/13th Battalion for the task. For that reason, they were spared any direct involvement at Sidi Rezegh. They also learned that the 1st South African Brigade would move to the north to solidify the situation at Sidi Rezegh.
They soon noticed enemy vehicles and tanks moving towards the Sidi Rezegh area that would be attacked. They could see them approaching Ed Duda. To counter that movement, a squadron of Matilda tanks moved towards them. That was enough to cause the enemy force to pull back from where they had been headed. The Matilda tanks thought that the enemy pulling back might have been intended to draw them into a trap with guns, so they pulled back.
The enemy forces continued to move around at Sidi Rezegh. They seemed to be heading for the feature that the 2/13th Battalion had been going to attack. The picture now looked to be that the enemy force was driving towards the escarpment west of Ed Duda. The commanders thought that the enemy forces were going to concentrate on the New Zealand Division.
The new Eighth Army commander, General Ritchie, interpreted what the enemy intended as trying to drive the British forces back from the Axis lines of communication. The British needed to concentrate their tanks, guns, and infantry, along with bomber aircraft, into position to fight the enemy forces. Sadly, the British commanders did not react that way. General Ritchie had been a staff officer who was not as knowledgable about mechanized warfare as even General Scobie. The fault likes not so much in General Ritchie as in General Auchinleck's incompetence at judging people. Auchinleck was good as a field commander, but was a failure as a theater commander. Churchill constalby begged Auchinleck to take command of the Eighth Army. He was the best army commander around until Bernard Law Montgomery arrived in North Africa. We dislike Montgomery as a p0erson but respect him as an army commander, even with all his faults. This is based on Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the topic.

The night of 28 to 29 November 1941 near Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Tobruk

The convoy to transport the 2/13th Battalion had arrived. They then moved on carrying the Australians through the perimeter defenses. This was somewhat emotional affair for the Australians who had been trapped in Tobruk since early in 1941. They stopped at the Tiger outpost (which had been renamed as Sneezy). The 32nd Army Tank Brigade had a command center located at Tiger. The Australians learned at Tiger that they were to be involved with an attack by Brigadier Willison's armored brigade in the morning. They were supposed to attack Sidi Rezegh along with the armored brigade and a New Zealand battalion. They would receive formal orders about the operation when the 2/13th Battalion arrived at Ed Duda. The plan was mentioned in the 70th Division operations report. Apparently, the goal was to occupy a position on a spur at Sidi Rezegh that lies to the east. They would be operating with the 32nd Army Tank Brigade as well as the New Zealand Battalion.
The convoy grew in size while sitting at Tiger. They now had a supply column carrying supplies for the New Zealand Division and an augmented escort force. They did not need to wait long before they drove off to Ed Duda, which was relatively nearby. They had reached Ed Duda not long after midnight. The men climbed down off their trucks and were shown to their assigned spots on the eastern slopes of Ed Duda. This was a cold November night. The air was so cold that many men were not able to sleep. The passage from Tobruk to Ed Duda was very visible. You could see long lines of vehicles that were part of British and New Zealand convoys. They had driven in from the outposts in the desert and had turned onto the bypass road and then headed for the Tobruk corridor.
Colonel Burrows, of the 2/13th Battalion, was summoned to a meeting at Brigadier Willison's headquarters. The topic was to plan the details of the attack on Sidi Rezegh. They quickly realized that the 19th New Zealand Battalion commander and at least hald of the battalion were not there for the meeting and would not participate in the attack. The revised plan was that the Australians would attack and then take the ground that they would occupy. Colonel Burrows pointed out that he would need time to look over the situation in daylight before trying to attack. The guns from the 1st RHA would also need to be moved up to where they could be fired to support the 2/13th Battalion. That all meant that the attack needed to be postponed until 11am. The orders noted that the enemy forces were on the southwest slope down from Sidi Rezegh. The 2/13th Battalion would be under the operational command of the 4th RTR, which would provide tank support. The New Zealand forces would take over the rest of Sidi Rezegh. They desired that the Australian battalion would take the highest ground, designated by three grid squares. The men who had guided the Australians to their night positions at Ed Duda warned them to watch for gunfire early in the day. The veteran Australians didn't take the warning seriously, but this was different from what they were used to seeing. The German heavy artillery ws involved.
A New Zealand truck convoy stopped at the Ed Duda pass, right before dawn. The trucks were following good dispersal tactics, and they started to move again. German heavy guns opened fire on them. The bursting shells caused a high column of dense, black smoke. The trucks were now moving at high speed towards Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle on the afternoon of 28 November 1941

At outpost Freddie, some of the tanks that attacked got on top of Freddie. They drove around the outpost and took some 300 prisoners. They turned out to be mostly German soldiers. In the process, though, about five tanks were lost, mostly mined. The forward artillery observer was killed during the attack. The negative results were enough to cancel the proposed exploitation. As the time got closer to night, the infantry that were involved were withdrawn. The fact that the Tobruk force was able to attack the enemy forces was a sign that the situation could improve over time. The troops that were attacked in this case were from the 90th Light Division, and were units that had not taken losses prior to this battle.
General Scobie was getting increasingly concerned about his men at Ed Duda. The one cruiser squadron from the 1st RTR had now been used at outpost Freddie and had felt the effects. The one squadron of Matilda infantry tanks of the 4th RTR that remained had been sent to Belhamed. The diversions had left the 1/Essex with little support. Pretty late in the afternoon saw enemy troop movements on the escarpment. Right before 6pm, General Scobie received a message from the New Zealand Division about the enemy movements. General Scobie ordered the 16th Brigade to transport the Australians of the 2/13th Battalion to Ed Duda. He directed the battalion commander to report to Scobie for instructions. The purpose of the move was to strengthen Ed Duda.
Colonel Burrows, of the 2/13th Battalion was driving towards Post R69 when Brigadier Willison stopped him and told him that General Scobie was in route to speak with him. General Scobie was there to meet Colonel Burrows about 15 minutes later. General Scobie was riding in the back of a truck. He showed Colonel Burrows a map of the Ed Duda position. He pointed out that the area between Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed had the advantage of sitting on the enemy's retreat path. It also was a good spot to join forces with British units from the Egyptian Frontier. With the corps headquarters moving into Tobruk, it became increasingly important to keep the corridor to Ed Duda unobstructed. To stir things up further, there was a false report that the enemy had taken Sidi Rezegh during the afternoon. There would be a New Zealand move to recapture Sidi Rezegh the next day. Still, the main concern was to continue to hold Ed Duda.
When Colonel Burrows meeting with General Scobie had ended, General Scobie emphasized that they must continue to hold Ed Duda (at all costs).
The Australians had all sorts of emotions when the time came to drive out of Tobruk. There were armored cars leading the column and on the sides. They drove until they reached the Tiger outpost. The outpost had since been renamed as Sneezy. They stopped at that point. Tiger was a sort of headquarters or communications center for the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. This si based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle continues near Tobruk on 28 November 1941

28 November 1941 saw the New Zealand Division conducting attacks to clean up pockets of enemy troops. There had been two groups of German troops located along the Trigh Capuzzo that were troublesome. The group that stretched between Sidi Rezegh and Belhamed faced a squadron of tanks from the 44th RTR and troops from the 18th New Zealand Battalion. Two platoons attacked and took the defensive position near the tomb. The infantry were from the 26th New Zealand Battalion.
There was another enemy force looking down on the airfield and plateau from the second escarpment. This was the Artillery Command 104, commanded by Major-General Boettcher. They had reestablished themselves after the forward movement by the New Zealand Division. While the other attacks were happening, enemy troops attacked 24th New Zealand Battalion from the escarpment. The enemy was able to push the battalion back from their previous position. A counter-attack by tanks from the 8th RTR were unsuccessful in pushing the enemy back.
The German armored divisions had supply problems and were scattered. The British armor were not causing the German tanks any problems early in the day on 28 November. The 7th Armoured Division main accomplishment was to escort the 1st South African Brigade so that they joined the New Zealand Division. They wasted some strength while exchanging fire with the German 15th Armored Division. They accidentally helped the New Zealand Division by drawing the 15th Armored Division further south. During the afternoon, the Germans overran the New Zealand Division "main dressing station". They allowed them to continue to function, however. Towards dark, the German leading forces fought the New Zealand Division headquarters. By night, the German 21st Armored Division was close to the New Zealand Division headquarters as well as XIII Corps. Part of XXX Corps headquarters were also present. The two corps commanders decided during the night to move into Tobruk. Somewhat to the south were the 7th Armoured Division leaguer. The 1st South African Brigade was also close by.
By the end of 28 November 1941, the enemy seemed not ready yet to collapse. The situation had delayed any possible move to push through to the Bardia Road. The push to the Bardia Road was to commence with capturing outposts Freddie and Walter. Freddie alone proved to be a tough place to attack. Two companies of the 2/Queen's and 7th RTR D Squadron. The infantry was bothered by enemy fire. A tank force was sent from Ed Duda to help. hey consisted of some light tanks and nine cruiser tanks, all from the 1st RTR. They did take twenty prisoners and roced 11 enemy tanks back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.>/p?

27-28 November 1941 near Tobruk

The men in command decided late on 27 November 1941 that the 1st South African Brigade was going to be given to the New Zealand Division. They found that they could make that decision, but actually making that work was to be more difficult. Not being able to have a third brigade created problems, as well, since the South Africans were slow to join.
From the perspective of the Tobruk force, they began to hope that they could cause the enemy forces to withdraw. The proposed move to move forward along the Bardia Road was thought to be likely to succeed. Progress was delayed by rain, and misinterpreted news about enemy tank operations near Ed Duda also caused the progress forward to be pushed out into the future. By dawn, the situation at Ed Duda seemed less threatening. The enemy had pulled out of the positions on the west side of Ed Duda. The 19th New Zealand Battalion furnished two companies to move forward to create an outpost south of the Trigh Capuzzo, located on the escarpment to the south. This was also on the west side of Sidi Rezegh. They were to determine if nearby troops were friends or enemies. They were ordered back before they could do that.
From the perspective of the 1st RHA, they thought that the enemy must have troops at Belhamed, despite the claim that there were New Zealand troops in possession of the place. In the morning light, the troops there were seen to be enemy. They were on the northwest side of the Belhamed. The enemy would have a great view of the planned move forward by the 2/Queens through the enemy forces on the east side of the Bardia Road.
XIII Corps notified the Tobruk Fortress commander that they needed to take an area designated by map position. This included the Belhamed pocket of enemy troops. This was east of the corridor that the Tobruk sortie force had created. They needed to take the place at 2pm and hold the position starting from that time. This may have just to have been needed to help the 4th New Zealand Brigade protect their northern side. The New Zealand Division would be preoccupied with clearing enemy troop pockets from the south.
The 19th New Zealand Battalion, minus the troops involved elsewhere, were designated for the operation along with a 4th RTR squadron. They started late, but when they approached enemy troops with tanks, they surrendered. Those that surrendered were a mixed force of German and Italian troops. Typically bad practice in this case allowed the force that General Scobie had sent to do the task had been appropriated by the New Zealand Division. The culprit in this case was the XIII Corps headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Continued action in the Crusader Battle on 27 and 28 November 1941

One problem created by Rommel sending the German Africa Corps to the Egyptian Frontier for three days is that he provided time for the 7th Armoured Division to regroup and recover. General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander heard the report from the King's Dragoon Guards armored cars that a column was headed for Gasr el Arid. General Gott ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack the front of the column and told the 4th Armoured Brigade with Stuart tanks to attack the flank.
The 22nd Armoured Brigade made contact with the German 15th Armored Division close to Bir el Chleta at about 1:30pm. They were both about the same strength in tanks. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was short of artillery, though, as they only had one 25pdr battery and one 2pdr anti-tank gun battery. The Support Group artillery had been scattered among a large number of Jock columns, so that few gun were available when they were needed.
After a while the 4th Armoured Brigade made contact. They were better equipped with tanks at this point. The British armored brigades had kept the Germans from taking a position on the escarpment, overlooking the Trigh Capuzzo. The British threw their advantage away at dark, when they pulled to leaguer away from the important ground. The Germans responded after dark by taking  the important pass that went up the escarpment.
In the dark, at the 2/13th Battalion, the land to Gambut was studied by the light of a lamp. At Gambut, Rommel and the Africa Corps Commander were meeting. Rommel apparently wanted to attack either to the west or southwest. The Division zbV Africa was renamed to the 90th Light Division, they name that they made famous over time. The 90th Light Division would participate in Rommel's proposed attack.
At this point in the Crusader Battle, the British continued to "do the wrong thing". General Blamey had repeated criticised the British practice of breaking up divisions and scattering their units across the desert. The New Zealand Division was a victim of this practice in the Cruader Battle. General Freyberg wanted his 5th New Zealand Brigade returned to his control. The British, instead,wanted him to use the 1st South African Brigade.
During the night of 27-28 November 1941 the decision was mzde by the British command to send the 1st South African Brigade to the New Zealand Division. The New Zealand DIvision at this point in time was short of strength to clear out the groups of enemy troops that were still present. They also needed to better prepare defensive positions on the most important of its territory. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Crusader Battle turns on 27 November 1941

27 November 1941 saw enemy forces turn from the Egyptian frontier and return to the Tobruk area. The big operation by British forces had dwindled over three days. The action was reduced to what three infantry brigades and three tank battalions could achieve. Even though the British strength was fading, they brought enough pressure on the enemy to cause Rommel to change the focus back to the Tobruk area from the frontier.
The Africa Corps commander, General Cruewell, wanted to turn the armored divisions back to Tobruk to counter the pressure from the British forces. Rommel was reluctant to make the move, because he hoped to obtain some cheap successes on the Egyptian frontier. The German armored forces typically started the day about two hours before dawn. Early in the day, the 8th Armored Regiment crushed the headquarters of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, which was located at Sidi Azeiz. After that, most of the 15th Armored Division drove along the Trigh Capuzzo. If they were not opposed, they would first overrun the XXX Corps Headquarters followed by the XIII Corps Headquarters, and then the New Zealand Division, and finally, the 1st Army Tank Brigade.
At the same time, the 21st Armored Division left Bardia and drove along the coast road. They hit the 22nd New Zealand Battalion, which was holding Menastir. They succeeded in holding up the armored division. The division changed to a different route on the following day so as to make some progress. The 23rd New Zealand Division successfully blocked an attack at Capuzzo by the German 33rd Engineer Battalion with some other detachments under Rommel's close control. The Germans penetrated the New Zealand position, but where finally blocked. After dark, the Germans backed off from the attack and drove west to rejoin their division.
Both the British and the Germans made extensive use of signals intelligence from their enemy. The British were able to warn the New Zealand and the Tobruk force that the enemy armored divisions were driving back to the Tobruk area. The Eighth Army had dismissed the enemy forces on the frontier simply as roaming columns of motor vehicles and tanks that were not accomplishing much. The British command also portrayed the enemy moves toward Tobruk more as a move to escape rather than a threatening attack at a critical point. Earlier, the move towards the Sidi Rezegh area had also been misinterpreted as a retreat while they were chased by the British armor.

While the Germans had been on the Egyptian frontier not accomplishing much, the 7th Armoured Division was able to recover strength from a number of different sources. They were successful in recovering damaged tanks which were repaired. Other tanks were sent from workshops. There were also new tanks recently received. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was rebuilt up to 40 cruiser tanks from almost nothing. The 4th Armoured Brigade was back up to 77 Stuart tanks. The 7th Armoured Brigade was pulled back so as to be rebuilt. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Trying to get some clarity on 27 November 1941

General Godwin-Austen's message very early on 27 November 1941 had the problem that it sounded like the XIII Corps should cut loose and move into a general chase of the enemy forces. By midday, General Godwin-Austen had visited the New Zealand Division and could observe the state of the New Zealand Division and could see the battered division for himself. There was also the news of approaching German armored divisions headed towards the area of his corps from the Egyptian frontier. General Godwin-Austen cautioned General Scobie that the best that the New Zealand Division could do was to hold the ground that they had taken. The Tobruk force was given responsibility for holding open the corridor from Tobruk to Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed.
The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion were described as being "in the last ditch at Pilastrano". This reminded me of William III having coined the "last ditch" phrase, where he said that they would find his dead body in the "last ditch" of the defenses. They had been about to be ordered to handle more prisoners, but that was canceled and they were ordered to meet with Brigadier Martin, General Scobie's deputy commander. They received word that they were to be ready to move out in an hour. They would leave the fortress and move out to Gambut, following the Bardia Road. There were assorted rumors of mass Italian surrender.
When the time was almost 5pm, Colonel Burrows was called to meet General Scobie. He heard that the Tobruk fortress had been told to be prepared for a German attack, coming from Bardia. The 2/13th Battalion had become Tobruk's last reserve force. They needed to be ready to stage a counter-attack against German forces. They would be a blocking force on the Bardia Road. If the German attack did not happen, they would be in position to join a push to the east by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade and the 2/Queens battalion south of the Bardia Road and the 1/King's Own on the north side. This move was planned to commence at 7am, if the German attack had not materialized.
As Colonel Burrows was leaving the meeting with General Scobie, he was informed that his battalion had been sent to a position across the Bardia Road, near King's Cross. Colonel Burrows reached his battalion in time to direct they dispositions. Conditions then radically changed and they were "miserable" because they had to endure 24 hours of rain. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Scobie has a bad impression of the New Zealand Division on 27 November 1941

During the 70th Division occupation of Ed Duda and the attempt at cooperation with the New Zealand Division, General Scobie was very irritated with the New Zealand Division and General Freyberg. General Scobie had ordered two of his senior staff officers to drive to Ed Duda. He had expected that the New Zealand Division would have created a controlled corridor from the rest of the division to Ed Duda. That had not happened and that indicated to General Scobie a sloppiness on the part of the New Zealanders.
Early during 27 November 1941, XIII Corps gave orders to the Tobruk Fortress, the New Zealand Division and to armored units. As soon as the situation had stabilized, they were to advance to the line of Tobruk, El Adem, and the Bir el Gubi track. Those orders went to the Tobruk headquarters, the New Zealand Division, and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. The orders were that the New Zealand Division would continue west on the escarpment. The Tobruk sortie force would continue along in parallel on the north side. The Tobruk sortie force was asked to accomplish a great deal. They were to send "columns", approximating to the German battle groups, to the west to clear away the enemy from between Tobruk and Gambut. They were to occupy all the "landing grounds" in the area.
General Scobie responded that his troops holding Ed Duda needed to be relieved. That needed to happen so that they could provide enough strength for the clearing operation. General Freyberg sent a message that angered General Scobie. General Scobie replied that there were no New Zealand Division troops at Ed Duda on "square 424409." General Freyberg had said that his troops firmly held Ed Duda, when that was clearly not the case. He also had no idea where the Tobruk troops were located and he hoped that they would tell him.
At this point, General Scobie asked point blank if the New Zealand Division held :"Sidi Rezegh and the hill to the north". He also asked if his troops and tanks were under General Scobie's command. That at least got a reply from General Freyberg that the 44th RTR was needed to return to the New Zealand Division, but the 19th Battalion was available to help defend Ed Duda.
The Australian historian gives both the New Zealand Division and the Tobruk sortie force having lack of information about each other that caused severe miscommunication. The Tobruk sortie force was stretched across forty miles with out considering the clearing mission. General Scobie was also not aware of the condition of the New Zealand units and how close they were to the breaking point. He described them as "near exhaustion".
While General Scobie did not want to risk weakening the Tobruk defenses, he also thought that the enemy were close to "cracking" and that that they might see the enemy go into a general retreat back to the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. After General Godwin-Austen visited the New Zealand forces at lunchtime. He got a sobering view of just how shakey they were and that there was still the threat of approaching German armored divisions. General Godwin-Austen informed General Scobie that they New Zealand Division was only capable of holding their territory and that the Tobruk sortie force would have to lear a corridor to the New Zealand DIvision. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand plan for the fighting at SIdi Rezegh and Belhamed

The New Zealand plan for the battles at Sidi Rezegh, Belhamed, and Ed Duda were over-optimisitic. General Freyberg had expected to attack Belhamed and at Sidi Rezegh during the night of 25-26 November 1941. After Sidi Rezegh was captured, the 6th New Zealand Brigade would move forward and take Ed Duda. The two Zealand Brigades would move along each side of the Trigh Capuzzo. In the event, the New Zealanders were not ready to go at 9pm.
The 4th New Zealand Brigade easily took Belhamed, as they had not realized how little strength was holding the place. The Australian historian mentioned that the New Zealand division had not done any serious planning, and that contributed to the delays. The 6th New Zealand Brigade had trouble. The enemy was in the process of relieving some of the forces at Sidi Rezegh while they were reorganizing the defenses. That meant that the 6th Brigade was confused by what they were seeing. They had two sets of two battalions involved. The 21st and 26th New Zealand Battalions would move down the escarpment to the Trigh Capuzzo and then move to Ed Duda. The other two battalions, the 24th and 25th would move into a position and form a box defense above the escarpment.
One immediate issue was that there enemy units sitting in the way on the route to Ed Duda. There was not time prior to dawn to clear the way, so the move to Ed Duda was cancelled. At dawn on 26 November, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were disorganized and were under fire by the enemy. With trouble, the New Zealand units at Sidi Rezegh were able to hold onto their positions.
Once General Freyberg learned that the Tobruk sortie force had taken Ed Duda, he ordered the 4th Brigade to move to Ed Duda to join forces with the Tobruk force that was there. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was left to strengthen their hold on Sidi Rezegh. An ad hoc group of tanks from the 44th RTR were ordered to Ed Duda, to set off at 9:30pm. At 9:45pm, the 19h Infantry Battalion and six more tanks followed. They arrived at Ed Duda without any real opposition.
The night at Sidi Rezegh had been filled with desperate fighting, including charges with fixed bayonets. Two German strong points remained. One was at Sidi Rezegh and the other was between Behamed and Sidi Rezegh.General Scobie was dismayed to find that the New Zealanders did not control the area between Ed Duda, Sidi Rezegh, and Belhamed. We can only think that the New Zealand Division was still affected by the losses in the Battles for Greece and Crete. They were still not the old New Zealand Division that existed at the start of the Greek Campaign. Another possibility is that General Freyberg was overrated. His poor performance at Crete almost makes us think that could be the case. He may have had Churchill's complete confidence, but that does not mean much, sadly. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The plan for Ed Duda on 26 November 1941

The plan was to move forward at 12:05pm on 26 November 1941. Shortly before the Tobruk sortie force headed for Ed Duda, they got a message from the New Zealand Division saying that they were held up at Sidi Rezegh and at a hill aboutr 2 miles to the north-northeast. Despite that, the Tobruk force was committed to moving forward as planned. The 4th RTR was equipped with Matildas. They led the movement, followed by cruiser tanks and light tanks from the 1st RTR. They had artillery support from the 1st RHA. They crossed the four or five miles of desert in a short time. They reached the top of Ed Duda and then intended to run down to the "by-pass road", when they found themselves facing enemy guns at point-blank range. The tanks carried Besa machine guns, and they used them to fight the closest guns. The 1st RHA did what they could to engage the other guns.
After about 45 minutes, Brigadier Willison sent the 1/Essex forward. They had their carrier platoon in the lead Brigadier Willison thought that they made a "find spectacle". When the men had reached within about two hundred yards from the edge of the escarpment, they were hit hard ("bombed"). Despite taking heavy losses, the advance carried forward and took their objectives. The armored brigade drove to the "left flank" where they were ready to support the infantry if they were needed.
They found out that the 1/Essex had been mistakenly bombed by the RAF. The 1/Esses were in a position with the ability to defend in all directions. They were bothered by some German 210mm guns. Some German infantry attacked, but were driven back and about seventy prisoners were captured. Since the British controlled the access road now, they were able to set  ambushes that caught some German and Italians by surprise.
It turned out that the New Zealand Division were having trouble reaching Ed Duda, which the armored brigade had already occupied at about 1:30pm. General Scobie sent a message to General Freyberg that they had occupied Ed Duda and asked if they would please not have them bombed.
The New Zealand plan had been to make a night attack during the night of 25-26 November. The 4th and 6th New Zealand Brigades would take Belhamed and Sidi Rezegh. They would then push on to Ed Duda. Belhamed turned out to be easy to take, but the fight for Sidi Rezegh did not go so well. The 6th Brigade was the one having a lot of trouble. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Scrambled cipher messages and misunderstandings and an attack on Ed Duda

The use of manual cipher systems that were laboriously applied seems to have created confusion in communication, not security. The communications in question were between General Godwin-Austen, the XIII Corps commander, and General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander. The plan seems to have been for the New Zealand Division to actually capture Ed Duda, but General Scobie had thought that his men would have to taken Ed Duda. General Freyberg and the New Zealand Division hoped to advance to Ed Duda during the night of 25-26 November 1941. They hoped that General Scobie's men would be able to move forward to Ed Duda sometime after daylight on 26 November.
General Godwin-Austen wanted Scobie to know that he did not need to take Ed Duda, as that was for the New Zealand Division to do. They did expected General Scobie and his men to make a diversionary attack that would divert attention from the New Zealand Division. General Scobie had a meeting prior to the planned diversion and ordered the Polish Brigade to make a feint in the west very early in the day. The enemy was not bothered by the feint. In fact, they attacked from the "twin pimples" area. The alternate plan then was to make the diversion in the sortie corridor and would be made against the eastern side.
In the evening at the Tobruk headquarters, they read that they New Zealand Division would attack Ed Duda at about 9pm. General Scobie's forces attacked the enemy outposts at Butch and Wolf. Men of the 2/Leicester and one squadron from the 7th RTR had a degree of success near the wrecked plane landmark. The operation near outpost Wolf did not do so well. The attack near Wolf involved the 2/Yorks and Lancs along with tanks from the 4th RTR. They took some 150 prisoners but the enemy counter-attacked and recaptured part of the area. At 7am the next morning, they attacked and took Wolf and some 150 prisoners. As many as 300 more enemy soldiers were able to escape across the escarpment. They could hear fighting some time after midnight, and they thought that they could hear 25pdrs firing.
The fortress troops got the codeword to attack Ed Duda by about 11am on 26 November. General Scobie seems to have decided to attack on his own. Communications were so bad, that the Tobruk forces had to intercept communications not directed at them in order to learn what was happening. They learned that a New Zealand brigade had taken Sidi Rezegh and was moving towards Ed Duda. Another message had wondered when the Tobruk sortie force would attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck replaces General Cunningham on 25 November 1941

The British seemed to be oblivious to what was actually happening, which saved them from losing the battle. Rommel had an opportunity to hit the British rear areas where there were administrative organizations as well as "supply bases". General Auchinleck had no idea what the actual situation was on the ground, so he ordered the commanders to keep attacking. The New Zealand Division also was in position to hit Rommel's vulnerable rear areas, but didn't know they were there.
General Auchinleck was a notorious poor judge of people. He had lost confidence in General Cunningham, so he removed him and replaced him with a very bad choice, Neil Ritchie, who was promoted to Lieutenant General for his new post. General Smith, "Chief of the General Staff in the Middle East" brought Ritchie to meet Cunningham, and informed him that he was being replaced.
Most of the New Zealand Division with "most of the 1st Army Tank Brigade" were moving towards Tobruk on the Trigh Capuzzo. back on 23 November, New Zealand units and the 8th RTR had taken Point 175 from the 361st Africa Regiment. 25 November saw the 4th New Zealand Brigade pushed out enemy troops from the escarpment above the Trigh Capuzzo. They also took Zaafran. The 6th New Zealand Brigade captured the blockhouse and moved onto the edge of the Sidi Rezegh airfield. Since the British had no idea of what the real situation was, they could make plans that were at odds with reality. General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander, was cut off from information, although his signal intercept people were able to give him better information than his superiors had bothered to give him.
When General Scobie found that he was to cooperate with XIIIth Corps to Ed Duda and Sidi Rezegh, he ordered a group to consist of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade with the 1/Essex, to comprise all arms, to assembled during the night. General Scobie's plan was seemingly for the armored brigade to charge some seven thousand yards to Ed Duda, with an infantry battalion, and hold the place. Oddly enough, General Godwin-Austen assumed that his troops from the frontier would take the place, instead. Long messages were sent encoded, so that they had to be decoded to be read. General Godwin-Austen wanted the New Zealand Division to take Ed Duda prior to the sortie force from Tobruk would move towards the place.
In the evening, the fortress attacked strong points Butch and Wolf. The attack on Wolf was not successful until 7am on 26 November, when it was taken. There seemed to be fighting at Belhamed and beyong, towards El Adem. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Conflicting plans in the continued battles for Sidi Rezegh and the Egyptian frontie

We have to think that General Auchinleck was only vaguely aware of the risks he was taking in continuing the battle against the enemy forces on 24 November 1941. Auchinleck took full responsibility for the operations from that point. He still intended to defeat the German armor and drive the enemy back to the Tripolitanian frontier. He intended to recapture the ridge from Sidi Rezegh to Ed Duda. They would then make contact with the Tobruk sortie force. He depended on two New Zealand brigades and some Valentine infantry tanks to accomplish the task. That matched quite well what the commanders on the spot were doing. The 6th New Zealand Brigade moved up to Sidi Rezegh on 23 November. Their field artillery and anti-tank guns accounted from some of the German tank losses. The 26th New Zealand Battalion as only near the battlefield, wihile the 25th and 26th New Zealand Battalions were heavily engaged fighting German infantry from the 361st Regiment. The fighting took place near point 175.
The XIIIth Corps Commander was informed by General Cunningham on 24 November that he was took take charge of the relief effort for Tobruk, including the 70th Division and the Polish brigade. General Godwin-Austen had considered using the South African Division, but only one brigade was still uncomitted. By the end of 23 November, the Sidi Rezegh battlefield seemed to be a bad situation. The British felt defeated and were waiting to be gathered up by the enemy. The British 7th Armoured Division started 24 November in tatters.
Rommel's next move was typical of how he functioned. His mobile forces would drive to the southeast and turn and catch the British on the Egyptian-Libyan Frontier in the rear. By the evening of 24 November the 21st Armored Division had crossed into Egypt and was making for Halfaya Pass. The 15th Armored Division, though, had stopped while still in Libya. The Italian armored division, the Ariete was still near Bir el Gubi. By 25 November, the 21st Armored Division headquarters had reached the Halfaya area. they were having trouble getting fuel for making a move on Capuzzo. Their armored regiment had been spent by attacking Indian troops in the vicinity of the Omars. The 15th Armored Division was also low on fuel and had made moves against the New Zealand Divisiion rear. The Ariete Division accomplished little while sparring with the 1st South African Brigade near Gabr Saleh.
The German Africa Corps had spent much of 26 November working their supply problems. The 15th Armroed Division was near Bardia. The 21st Armored Division was still near Halfaya. The each sent a battle group to hit New Zealand battalions near Capuzzo, Musaid, and "upper Salum". The New Zealand battalions were able to hold onto their positions. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

70th Division and XIII Corps infantry and tanks were still effective from 22 November 1941

The events of 22 November 1941 left General Scobie with the impression that there was something wrong with the Crusader Operation. He decided to strengthen the position of the Tobruk Sortie force. They would go after nearby enemy outposts keep the pressure on the enemy.
In the afternoon, 32nd Army Tank Brigade along with infantry and the 1st RHA took outpost Lion. This lay to the right from outpost Tiger. General Scobie read a report that evening that the enemy had taken Sidi Rezegh. He also interpreted a message to mean that the New Zealand Division was moving to the "Tobruk front". On 23 November, the sortie force took Dalby Square. The enemy staged a counter-attack, but they British were able to hold onto Dalby Square. They captured some three hundred prisoners. The Tobruk force also captured the west part of Outpost Tugun.
The Tobruk sortie force had fired a lot of rounds of ammunition so far. General Scobie had asked to be resupplied with ammunition, but he received a reply that they could not send one to his force. That meant that the sortie force needed to conserve what ammunition it had. The Tobruk anti-aircraft guns did counter-battery firing..
At the start of the sortie from Tobruk, the Australian 2/13th Battalion was split into two parts. One part created a defensive position at the pass near Pilastrano. Two other companies were employed to continue to hold the Wadi Schel. They were involved with other tasks, such as grave digging at Tiger and guarding prisoners at the prisoner-of-war camp. Early on 23 November, they could see a wrecked ship on the coast. This was the wreck of the Maria Giovanni schooner, which had missed the harbor entrance and had run on the shore. The wreck was out of field gun range, so they tried to use anti-aircraft guns to destroy the wreck, but failed.
During the night on 24 November, Polish soldiers relieved the Australians at the Wadi Schel so that they were able rejoin the Australians near Pilastrano. That left the Australians with little to do for the time. That lasted for about two days.
General Scobie and his staff were studying message traffic. That seemed to show the enemy position becoming critical. The received orders to attack Ed Duda the next day with the New Zealand Division. They had been still short of ammunition, but then heard that they would receive some 600 tons from a ship that was due to arrive during the night on 26 November.
The situation early on 23 November was cause for General Cunningham to ask General Auchinleck to join him at the front. The Eighth Army staff had compiled British and enemy tank losses. The actual situation was even worse than they thought. During the first four days, the British ahd lost about 530 tanks. The enemy was thought to have lost only 100 tanks. The 7th Armoured Division had started with 500 cruiser tanks. After the four days, they had less than 90 runners. They thought that the enemy still had 250 tanks, of which 170 were German.
General Auchinleck ordered General Cunningham on 24 November to keep attacking, even fighting to the "last tank". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 November 1941 near Sidi Rezegh

22 November 1941 was a bad day for the British. Fighting near Sidi Rezegh, the British armor was defeated. The German 21st Armored Division moved into a position at Belhamed. They were engaged by the 7th Armoured Brigade and the artillery from the 7th Support Group. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades fought with the 15th Armored Division rearguard. By mid-morning, General Scobie was ordered to move the sortie force to Ed Duda and "shoot up the enemy tanks on the Trigh Capuzzo". The 7th Armoured Division was not in a position to support the attack at Ed Duda, but there was nothing that indicated that such an attack would be the wrong thing to do.
About this time, the 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to the Trigh 175, which lay on the north escarpment. The 5th South African Brigade was sent to the Trigh 178. Eventually, the 22nd Armoured Brigade was also sent to the Trigh 178 area.
By midday, General Scobie was informed that the situation had improved so that he did not need to attack. The situation near Sidi Rezegh seemed to be compatible with that assessment. The 5th South African Brigade was ordered to clear enemy forces from the from the south escarpment by the Trigh 178. Rommel overrode the British plans by ordering the 21st Armored Division to attack and recapture the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. The division was split into tanks and infantry, with the tanks to attack from the west and the infantry would attack from the north. They had the support of the army artillery group that was located near Belhamed.
The German infantry attack hit the 7th Support Group and pushed it off the escarpment above the airfield. The German tank attack hit the remains of the 7th Armoured Brigade. The 22nd Armoured Brigade launched a counter-attack. British tanks fired mainly at German tanks. The Germans used 88mm and 50mm anti-tank guns to shoot the British tanks to pieces. The 4th Armoured Brigade came up after the initial battle. By the time night had fallend, the 7th Armoured Brigade had only ten tanks left. The 22nd Armoured Brigade still had 24 tanks, about half a battalion. One German tank regiment overran the 4th Armoured Brigade headquarters and captured the entire headquarters except for the brigade commander. The Germans also captured 35 tanks and some guns.
This day saw the XIII Corpss in operation for the first time in the battle. General Freyberg had rodered the 6th New Zealaad Brigade to the Trigh Capuzzo to reinforce the British near Sidi Rezegh. General Scobie, the Tobruk fortress commander and 70th Division commander realized that something was wrong. His reaction to that was to strengthen his forces hold on the corridor out of Tobruk.
General Freyberg realized that he wanted the whole New Zealand Division near Sidi Rezegh, not just one brigade. They did leave some units behind to hold what they had captured, but the main division force would move to Sidi Rezegh. General Godwin-Austen agreed with the move.
On 23 November 1941, "Totensonntag" (Sunday of the Dead), The Germans had some 160 tanks, infantry battalions and assault engineers to attack the forces at Sidi Rezegh. British armor there was only 34 tanks, the remains of the 7th and 22nd Armoured Brigades. The 5th South African Brigade was also present. The Germans started the attack with about 170 tanks and ended the day with about 100 tanks. The British forces were decimated. The armored units had lost most of their remaining tanks. The 5th South African brigade was overrun and dispersed. By the next day, the 7th Armoured Division was reduced to ten running tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation was close to being changed for the better on 21 November 1941 near Tobruk

Early on 21 November 1941, General Norrie had proposed to General Cunningham that this might be a good opportunity to use XIII Corps against enemy positions near the Egyptian frontier. General Norrie had a mistaken impression about the previous day's situation, which was overly optimistic. General Cunningham knew about the German armored divisions move to the west, so this suggestion made sense to him. Cunningham told General Godwin-Austen that he could go into action, which is what he wanted to do anyway. General Godwin-Austen thought that his corps would be better utilized fighting rather than sitting, not in action. The proposed operation ultimately had the benefit of distracting Rommel at a critical point when he was within reach of winning. This eventually led to the tide of event turning in the British favor.
Not that long after the Support Group had taken a position on the ridge, just south from Belhamed, they were attacked on the eastern end by the German 21st Armored Division. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group fought the two German armored divisions. During the battle, Brigadier "Jock" Campbell was able keep from being destroyed, although they were pretty badly beaten by superior force. The Australian historian says that the British lost 15 to compared to the Germans. By night time, the 7th Armoured Brigade was reduced to 28 tanks still in operation. The other two British armored brigades had not joined the battle, as they had not been able to keep up with the Germans.
General Cunningham was at his command post that was far from the scene of the battle. Communication was slow, and those reports that he did see, were often inaccurate. He attempted to influence the course of the battle, but because his understanding was based on a mistaken impression of earlier information. He thought that the German armored forces were retreating and the sortie from Tobruk was about to approach Ed Duda. He thought that the force at Sidi Rezegh was not trying to move to Ed Duda to link up with the Tobruk sortie. Cunningham's appreciation was that a short move at night to Ed Duda would join the two groups. Generals Norrie and Gott were more focused on the events at Sidi Rezegh and to them, they thought that it was more important to clear German infantry that were on the escarpment to the southwest. The 5th South African Brigade was moved close to do the clearing.
The enemy commanders had some disagreements as to the best moves to make. They eventually decided to send the 21st Armored Division to Belhamed to join the 155th and 361st Regiments. They would be in position to block any move from Sidi Rezegh to meet the Tobruk sortie. They sent the 15th Armored Division into the desert some "7 miles south of Gambut". They thought that the division would be in position to hit the British flank. They were in difficult ground, which left them in a spot that would prove to be dangerous to the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

From 20 to 21 November 1941 and the fighting for Sidi Rezegh

General Gott, the 7th Armoured Division commander, was involved with the battle for Sidi Rezegh. He had been at Sidi Rezegh earlier in the day. After that, he had ordered the South Africans to send a brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They had dispatched the 5th South African Brigade. They were to be at Sidi Rezegh by 7am on 21 November 1941,, but they stopped at nightfall, we believe. They were still 17 miles away from Sidi Rezegh.
The South African division, although only one brigade was present, stayed at El Gubi with XXXth Corps' only medium regiment. The force at El  Gubi was to "mask" the Italian armored division, the Ariete. That seems to be an odd command to give a division, as masking was not explained.
General Gott arrived back at Sidi Rezegh in the evening of 20 November. He ordered the 7th Armoured Brigade and the Support Group to attack the enemy on the ridge above the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. They were supposed to open a path to the Trigh Capuzzo and Ed Duda. They would meet the Tobruk sortie force at Ed Duda. They attacked the morning of 21 November at 7:45am. The 70th Division group had started their sortie from Tobruk. The South African brigade had not arrived yet, as they were slowed by mud. Infantry from the Support Group captured the ridge. Tanks from the 6th RTR were able to push through, anticipating that they would be able to travel to Ed Duda. There was a problem, though. Rommel was present and sent four 88mm guns with the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit to stop the tanks. The 6th RTR "was shot to pieces". They had managed to save enough tanks to form a squadron from the remains of the battalion.
General Gott traveled to meet the South African brigade. He stopped them some ten miles from Sidi Rezegh. Gott stayed with the brigade for much of the day. For some reason, he did not tell the brigade commander about the plan to send his brigade to Ed Duda to meet the sortie group from Tobruk.
The successes of the first part of Operation Crusader were the capture of the ridge at Sidi Rezegh and the captured of posts Tiger and Jack by the Tobruk sortie forces. The situation took turns for the worse quite soon after those successes. At Gabr Saleh, the enemy tanks pulled back and headed for Sidi Rezegh. The 4th and 22nd Armoured Brigades chased the Germans,m who were thought to be fleeing. The British were able to catch the Germans and started a tank battle until the British started to run out of fuel. The German armor kept going, so that by 8am, they were getting close to Sidi Rezegh. The Germans attacked the Support Group on the ridge, who were desperately trying to hold the captured ground. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More nonsense by the British from 20 November 1941 onwards

As we mentioned, General Freyberg had offered the services of the New Zealand division to the 4th Armoured Brigade, but Brigadier Gatehouse was not interested. The New Zealand division had its complete complement of artillery, plus had a battalion of infantry tanks, besides. General Cunningham knew that the German armored divisions had concentrated and planned to attack the 4th Armoured  Brigade. He ordered the 22nd Armoured Brigade to join the 4th, but that did not happen until "late afternoon". The XIIIth Corps commander had approved the participation by the New Zealand division, but didn't want to have infantry involved.
The Germans were only able to bring one armored division to attack the 4th Armoured Brigade and the attack started at about 4:30pm. The battle continued until night ended the fight. The 22nd Armoured Brigade had arrived during the battle. The Germans were left in possession of the battlefield, where they were free to recover and repair their knocked out tanks. The 4th Armoured Brigade had lost 67 tanks since they had moved into Libya.
Rommel considered the 4th Armoured Brigade as being eliminated, so he ordered his two armored divisions to Sidi Rezegh. The BBC had helpfully informed the Germans about the objective of the Crusader Operation.
The Tobruk garrison got the message with the code word for them to sortie the next morning. If the British and German plans had both been executed, the Tobruk sortie would have encountered the two German armored divisions at Ed Duda.
The German infantry division, zbV, established a defensive position toward the south when they learned about the British attack from the Egyptian frontier. Because of the length of the line, they had to settle for a set of defensive spaced out over a large distance. The 361st Infantry Regiment was to the east of Sidi Rezegh, which had an airfield. They were on the escarpment, where they looked down on the Trigh Capuzzo to the north. The 153rd Regiment was to the southwest on a different escarpment. They could look down on the airfield at Sidi Rezegh. Another group, consisting of artillery with a battalion of the Bologna Division was located on escarpments near Belhamed. They were able to fire on the British all day on 20 November.
General Gott had visited Sidi Rezegh earlier in the day. After that visit had had requested that the South Africans send an infantry brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They did not arrive on the 20th and had stopped at night. They were wanted at Sidi Rezegh by 7am. The one medium artillery regiment from XXXth Corps was left at El Gubi. The South African brigade was also near El Gubi. They were now ordered to "screen" the Ariete Division. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Another look at the start of Operation Crusader

As we said, Operation Crusader achieved complete surprise when they attacked on 18 November 1941. The first moves saw the British take their initial objectives without meeting any serious opposition. General Cunningham's plan for Crusader actually hoped to get a response from the enemy. That did not happen partly because Rommel was focused on attacking Tobruk and also because the weather had grounded reconnaissance aircraft. That left General Cunningham thinking about what to do next. While he was thinking, his commanders took action on their own.
General Norrie decided that XXXth Corps would have Bir el Gubi and Sidi Rezegh as their objectives to start 19 November. 7th Armoured Division sent the 22nd Armoured Brigade to attack the Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi. The Ariete Division was in a good defensive position. The 22nd Armoured Brigade lost 25 tanks while the Ariete Division lost 34. The Italians were left in possession of the battlefield, so that they were in position to recover knocked out tanks.
7th Armoured Division, commanded by General Gott, sent the 7th Armoured Brigade to Sidi Rezegh. They overran the airfield and captured 19 Italian aircraft. They occupied a position at Sidi Rezegh.
The 4th Armoured Brigade, equipped with American Stuart tanks, sent the 3rd RTR (with Cricketeer Robert Crisp) to the northeast along with some King's Dragoon Guards Marmon-Herrington armored cars. They encountered the 3rd Reconnaissance Unit and chased them. That action finally elicited a response from the Germans. The 21st Armored Division commander requested the German Africa Corps commander to take action. General Cruewell got permission from Rommel to send a tank force to Gabr Saleh. With the Germans splitting their tank forces, the British might have taken advantage to concentrate and fight the Germans, but the British only had a tank battalion and a 25pdr battery with four 2pdr anti-tank guns at Gabr Saleh. They started fighting at about 2:30pm and kept going until it was getting dark. The 5th RTR came up to support the 8th Hussars. The British tanks suffered somewhat from the better German field artillery.
The Germans concentrated their armored divisions and planned to hit the frontier "from Sidi Omar northwards". If that had not happened, the enemy might have attacked Tobruk at the same time that the 70th Division sortie was planned. The British were scattering their mobile forces while the Germans were concentrating. The 7th Support Group was ordered to Sidi Rezegh to join with the 7th Armoured Brigade. They sent the South African division to Bir el Gubi so that the 22nd Armoured Brigade could be sent to Sidi Rezegh. That did not actually happen because the situation had changed. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Ed Duda on 21 November 1941

The original time to start the operation to take Ed Duda was set a 1pm. The time had to be postponed to 2:30pm because of the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. Some of the brigade's tanks had become involved in a fight against a counter-attack and "mopping up" operations. Brigadier Willison, the brigade commander, then came back with a comment that he needed to have his attack be at the same time as a move by the South African brigade. Then, there was a surprise announcement by XXXth Corps right before 4pm that they would not be able to support the Ed Duda attack because of a tank "battle 16 miles to the south-east". General Scobie responded to that news by cancelling the Ed Duda operation.
The battle had gone well on 21 November 1941. The Tobruk force had driven through about three miles of the surrounding positions. The way now seemed open for the Tobruk forces to punch through the enemy positions to the "open desert". They had taken some five hundred German prisoners and 527 Italians. That had been achieved at high cost. The Black Watch, alone, had about 200 dead.
22 November started with a message from XXXth Corps saying that their force at Sidi Rezegh was under heavy attack. They asked for the attack on Ed Duda right away to draw off some of the attackers. They hoped for enemy tanks on the Trigh Capuzzo to be "shot up". The 70th Division plan only expected to attack Ed Duda when the enemy armor had been "reduced". The failure of the attack on Ed Duda could put Tobruk at risk.
General  Scobie came back with the reply that they would attack Ed Duda if that is what XXXth Corps wanted. He asked XXXth Corps for instructions. By afternoon, they told him not to attack and that their situation had improved.
The plan for Operation Crusader had the prerequisite for the Ed Duda that the enemy tank forces be defeated. In fact, the 7th Armoured Division seemed likely to be defeated. They expected to be finished off the next day ("executed").
When the 8th Army crossed the Egyptian-Libyan frontier at the beginning of the operation, the same storms that had flooded wadis in Tobruk had flooded airfields in the area. That kept German aircraft on the ground so that they did not observe the movements of the British units. The attacking British units had taken their "first objectives" without much resistance. The large operation had achieved total surprise, thanks to the weather. The British had hoped to cause the enemy to respond, but they enemy was unaware of what was happening. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action near Tobruk on 21 and 22 November 1941

The 4th RTR formed up on the battlefield, ready to proceed, but they were blocked by minefields "north and west" of the Tiger outpost. The unit was told to create havoc on the battlefield, with the assistance A/E Battery guns. They had at least stunned the defenses and by 8:30am inside of Outpost Tiger. Outpost Tiger had been transformed into about one thousand yards of infantry positions, dug in "flush with the ground". Sadly, the Black Watch were not able to take advantage of the situation, as they were too spread out.
British sappers and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards were busy "clearing minefields". There was finally enough space cleared for C Squadron of the 4th RTR attack the defenses. B Squadron of the 4th RTR were able to push all the way through Tiger. The survivors of the Black  Watch, about 200 men, charged and took Tiger. They were taking heavy machine gun fire from Outpost Jack. Enough men with 4th RTR tanks were able to take Jack. To the south west, they hit the Lion Outpost with artillery fire and overran it with tanks, but did not try to capture the outpost. Captain Jones from the 104th RHA arrived at Jack to set up a artillery observation post. There were very few men left there. Captain Jones took charge of what was left. A reinforcing company arrived eventually.
When the enemy positions were searched, they found that Jack had been a German battalion headquarters and "communications center". The successful attack had disrupted Rommel's plan to attack the 7th Division in Tobruk. The enemy had been getting ready to attack Tobruk the next day. The attack had created a breach between the Africa zbV Division and the Italian Bologna Division. They found that Rommel had warned his men of a pending British attack. They suspected that Rommel's battlefield signals intelligence unit had found out about what was being planned by the British.
There had been another attack on the right against Outpost Tugun by the 2/Queens but they had been stopped, as they had insufficient strength. The 2/Queens was augmented by a company from the "Beds and Herts" and attempted another attack, supported by a 7th RTR squadron. They managed to take the eastern end of Tugun. They were not able to take the western end.
The Eighth Army issued a situation report at about 9am on 21 November. The report described the positions of the 4th Armoured Brigade and the 22nd Armoured Brigade. They were said to be following the "retreating enemy armored forces". They were moving to the northwest. The 7th Armoured Brigade and the 7th Support Group were located at Sidi Rezegh, hoping to hit the retreating enemy. Later, XXXth Corps reported that the 5th South African Brigade. General Scobie, the 70th Division commander decided to attempt to capture Ed Duda. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.