Tobruk's sortie during Operation Crusader in November 1941

The sortie by Tobruk's garrison during Operation Crusader began early on 21 November 1941. The Polish brigade's attack followed the plan. They got the enemy's attention, although did not mislead anyone. They drew enemy fire, but not an extreme amount. The 23rd Brigade attack also followed the plan, but was not able to capture the outpost Plonk. They did create a stir and attract the enemy's attention.
The force from Tobruk was able to form-up successfully. The enemy did not interfere with the operation. The artillery firing and the demonstration by the 23rd Brigade created enough noise that the enemy was not able to hear the noise from the vehicles driving into position. The enemy had responded to the 23rd Brigade activities with counter-battery fire that helped to mask vehicle noise. The infantry would set off at about 6:30am. To the left, the enemy had occupied outpost Butch, so Butch would need to be "neutralized". For the sortieing force would pass Butch on the way to the Tiger outpost. The 2/King's Own was ordered to take Butch. The 2/Black Watch would attack Tiger after overrunning outpost Jill. On the left, the 2/Queen's would attack Tugun. This was "far on the left flank".
Artillery started firing at outpost Butch at 6:20am. The 2/King's Own only took ten minutes to capture outpost Butch. They were supported by nineteen Matilda tanks from the 7th RTR. They killed 30 Germans at Butch and took ten prisoners. The British had expected that Butch would be near the boundary between two Italian divisions and would be backed by a few "strong points". In fact, the area was a defended position held by German infantry. They had apparently only moved into the area about six days before being attacked. The captors found documents describing a system of defensive positions with code names that were concealed. There were minefields that had no markings. There were enemy positions north of Butch which were not attacked for a number of days.
The Black Watch attackers moved forward at 6:30am. They were to take heavy casualties, as they lost half of their men. They were not accompanied by any tanks. The only tanks nearby were a "squadron of cruisers" which were being saved for later. They found that they took longer to pass over the bridges across the anti-tank ditch. The infantry commanders had decided to conduct their assault without tanks, as they wanted to take advantage of the artillery supporting fire that would be fired on a timed schedule.
The attack did not go as planned, although brave soldiers led by good men did the best that could be done. The plan assumed that Jill could be easily overrun, but Jill was actually strongly held. The men of the Black Watch tried to move forward, but were shot. The Matilda tanks and a company of the 2/King's Own eventually arrived and that allowed them to overrun outpost Jill. The Black Watch had lost a company in the process of attacking Jill. That left them without the force needed to attack outpost Tiger. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The planned sortie from Tobruk during Operation Crusader in November 1941

For Operation Battleaxe, General Morshead and Brigadier Wooten, the 18th Australian Brigade commander, had planned a sortie that resembled what was planned for Crusader. The objective for the sortie was Ed Duda. General Cunningham spoke with General Scobie and Brigadier Martin at a meeting in mid-October 1941. General Scobie was still on his way to Tobruk at the time to take command. He promised the South African General Brink that he would provide a squadron of cruiser tanks when they moved to meet them in Ed Duda. General Scobie had no way of knowing that the cruiser tanks in Tobruk were in bad mechanical condition. What happened was that only eight of the cruiser tanks were runners as of the end of the first day of the sortie from Tobruk.
The Australian historian said of the sortie plan that "it worked". Some plan features were unfortunate. They were planning to send their tanks off along with artillery so far away that the Tobruk garrison would not be able to support them. Another unfortunate choice was to promise a corridor with vulnerable flanks that would be held. They would be forced to conduct operations to hold the flanks.
The planners assumed that they would be unable to surprise the enemy. A feature of the supporting operations that were proposed was that they would succeed in alerting the enemy at various points about the fortress perimeter. The sortie would first break through the enemy defensive line and occupy captured positions. That would be followed by combined arms of tanks and infantry to push out to Ed Duda and take that feature. The tanks would lead the column in the attack.
The details were that the initial objective, a location named Tiger, was 2-1/2 miles out from Tobruk. The mechanized force was such that they would use eight bridges to cross the anti-tank ditch at night. The force would deploy in "No-Man's Land". Before they could attack Tiger, they had to overcome outposts "Butch, Jill, Tugun, Lion, Cub, and Jack". They had to at least "neutralize" "Tugun, Lion, Cub and Jack". If they could accomplish all that, they would still have to drive another five miles to reach Ed Dudaa.
The first move would be taken by the Polish Brigade at about 3am. They would mount raids with artillery bombardment. The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion would join the operation with a patrol. They would act as if they were going to attack an Italian defensive position "Twin Pimples". Two Polish battalions would move out to the left of the Australians. The 23rd Brigade would create a diversion near the road block at El Adem. This was all starting early on 21 November 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The operation to relieve Tobruk gradually progressed from 18 November 1941

We learn that the Eighth Army movement forward built confidence in the men that their force was strong and could beat the enemy. The men were isolated and without information about the attack progress. All they would hear were rumors. They would occasionally be in a fight with the enemy, but they lacked knowledge about the larger picture.
The men in Tobruk were especially isolated. Their impression was that the operation was behind schedule and that there was a great deal of confusion. All the men knew was their own situation, without knowing anything about what the grand design included. They thought that they knew about a proposed connection with the relief force at Ed Duda. That seemed like a main objective, so that when they received news about developments, they had trouble making sense of what they heard or read.
Tobruk got the "Tug" code word on both 18 and 19 November. "Tug" meant that they were not to attack. The 2/13th Battalion only received some news about the battle late on 19 November. The information that they did receive was old, since the date was from 10:45am on 18 November. The information was useless, because the location of British tanks was wrong. There were still no British tanks anywhere near Ed Duda, at least not within 30 miles.
Early on 20 November, they received a message about British tank locations early on 19 November. The 7th Armoured Brigade was moving to Sidi Rezegh. The 22nd Armoured Brigade was moving towards Bir el Gubi. The 4th Armoured Brigade, equipped with Stuart tanks, fought a battle with sixty enemy tanks and had driven then to the north. The men in Tobruk had expected that the South Africans would take Sidi Rezegh, but they were reported to be at Ed Gubi, very far to the south. The men in Tobruk saw forty British fighters fly over. The diarist from the 104th RHA wrote that he had not seen anything like it before. Somewhat later, the men in Tobruk could see the flashes of guns firing and tracers into the sky from near Sidi Rezegh. They men also heard about a large tank battle the previous day where the British had knocked out 27 enemy tanks for the loss of 20 of their own. The men knew that there were units from the frontier close to the Tobruk perimeter. The attackers seemed to be achieving what was desired.
The next thing that the men in Tobruk learned was that the "Pop" code word was finally issued by XXXth Corps. They would sortie from Tobruk the next morning. More detailed instructions were issued by telephone from the Tobruk phone network. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

No information for Tobruk from 15 November 1941 onwards for some days

From the afternoon of 15 November 1941, Tobruk was informed that there seemed to be a danger from an enemy attack on Tobruk at "the western beaches". They also heard that the attack could include an attack by paratroopers. The Polish chief of staff notified the 2/13th commander about the possible attack. The 2/13th Battalion would be supported by the 1st RHA, which had received more vehicles so that the regiment was very mobile. The 2/13th were "stood to arms" from dusk. They sent patrols along the beaches and "the headlands". In the event of an attack, they would send a code word and one company would be in position to block any advance into the fortress.
In the event, nothing happened. They were not even told of how the British operation was faring. The next night, the 2/13th Battalion again were prepared for action. This night, the 1st RHA was pulled back to support a sortie from Tobruk. The only noteworthy thing that night were rain showers.
The 2/13th Battalion again was ordered to guard the beaches during the night of 17-18 November. The Australians were still without any word as to the British attack or any German "combined operation". The lack of information about how the Crusader Operation was progressing seemed all too much like what had happened during Operation Battleaxe, which had eventually failed. They could only speculate as to what was happening in the absence of messages.
The summer had been rain-free at Tobruk, but so far after 15 November, the skies were cloudy with some showers and lightning. There was sufficient rain that anything dug into the ground was soon filled with water. The defenses were not designed to deal with water. The men from the 2/13th Battalion at the Wadi Schel pumping station made a quick withdrawal. The men were in carriers and their withdrawal was not what was planned. The rain triggered flares and rockets. By morning, there were Australians on the enemy side of the Wadi Schel, where they were waiting for the rain water to drain.
By morning, men on both sides stood around in groups, driven from their positions by rain water. Only in the Salient did the Poles set up machine guns and start firing at the enemy. The enemy raised white flags, asking for the firing to stop. When the firing ceased, the work started to remove water and dry their clothes. The enemy soldiers set fires in their improvised blanket tents. The Polish soldiers stopped firing and the Australians started brewing tea. The ceasefire allowed officers from the RHA to visit the Salient area to observe the enemy positions. The 17th was the Operation Crusader delayed start. In the Polish brigade, they noted that 18 November 1941 was a day of not action on either side. By the night, the situation changed back to normal. That mean that they now shot to kill, their "old habits". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
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The run-up to the battle in November 1941 near Tobruk and the Egyptian frontier

In November 1941, the Axis supply situation for Rommel's army was getting worse. Despite this, Rommel was determined to mount an attack on Tobruk. Rommel felt that he could attack in three days. Intelligence kept him informed about the British increase in forces that was occurring. Rommel thought that if they could take Tobruk in three days, the British would not be able to counter-attack from Egypt.
The British planned to launch their offensive at almost the same date as when Rommel planned his attack. In early November, he had planned to attack on November 15, the same date that Crusader was scheduled to start. Rommel's Qusrtermaster-General sent a report to Rommel saying that they had enough supplies to attack Tobruk, but not to advance further east. British surface forces had destroyed a convoy on 9 November.
The German intelligence staff at headquarters reported the same as Rommel's intelligence staff that the British were not going to attack soon. The Italian commander, General Bastico, had intelligence information that the British were about to attack. This was the correct information. The Italians thought that the British would attack when Rommel's army was busy attacking Tobruk.
Rommel attended a meeting in Rome where he was authorized to mount the attack on Tobruk. Rommel won his point by engaging in a shouting match with his detractors, which may have been his usual style of operation. They set the date for Rommel's attack as 21 November. Coincidentally, the British attack was also postponed. The South African commander disliked the low priority given training. He insisted on more time to train his soldiers. General Brink asked for a postponement to 21 November, but the date was only changed to 18 November. That way, the British attack would start prior to Rommel's planned attack date.
Forces in Tobruk did not learn about the postponement from 15 November 10 18 November. They were to be ready to move out from Tobruk early on the day when the operation would commence. The plan, over-optimistic as it was, expected that British armor would defeat the German armor in the first day. 30 October was significant because Tobruk would come under 8th Army command on that date. Once the operation started, they would report to XXX  Corps. The corps would issue a code word to indicate that the sortie from Tobruk should start. At 6pm, the night before, XXX Corps would send a code word to the headquarters at Tobruk. "Tug" would indicate that they should not attack the next day. "Pop" would indicate that they should attack the next morning.
When the fortress troops were ordered to attack, some troops would "either fight or feint". The men in Tobruk had a practice held on 13 November. The infantry saw the tanks that would support them during the real attack. The fortress commander addressed the troops and told them that they would only attack when the British armor had beaten the German armor. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Rommel's counter-plan that collided with Operation Crusader in late 1941

We judge that Rommel's reconnaissance raid named something like "Mid-Summer's Night Dream" (the Australian historian didn't like the Mid-Summer's Night part of the name and only called it the Summer's Night Dream. Rommel hoped to take the Tobruk fortress in his attack.His main concern was with his supply situation. Rommel's plan for the attack was dated about 26 October 1941. Three days later, Hitler issued his plan to reinforce the Mediterranean area. He appointed Field Marshal Kesselring as "Commander-In Chief South". Since Kesselring was an air force officer, we get a hint that the main reinforcements would be to the air force. The goal was to provide protection for the supply line feeding Rommel's forces in North Africa. They would also move against the island of Malta that was a base for ships and aircraft targeting the Axis supply line.
Improving the supply lines for North Africa was not to be an easy task. In November, the supplies delivered decreased considerably from what had been achieved. Only some 30,000 tons were delivered in November, while 70,000 had been a typical supply delivery achievement. In December, the Axis forces managed to deliver 39,000 tons, an improvement over November, but worse than what had been typical. The rest fell victim to British aircraft, surface ships, and submarines.
Most of the Axis losses at sea in November were caused by British surface warships. Force K operated from the island of Malta. Force K consisted of the cruisers Aurora and Penelope, along with the destroyers Lance and Lively. That situation changed, so that British submarines sank most of the supply ships.
German submarines were operating against the Tobruk seaborne supply line. They also caused some major warship losses. They sank the aircraft carrier Ark Royal on 14 November. Eleven days later, one submarine sank the battleship Barham. These losses made the urgency for tanking more western airfields of greater priority.
Rommel followed his plan as he had designed it. They would attack sometime between 15 and 20 November. The Africa Division (later renamed the 90th Light Division) would attack the Tobruk perimeter between the Barida Road and near El Adem and Pilastrano. Both the British and Axis forces used Italian maps that showed this in bold, apparently. They map showed a defensive position near the connection between the Bardia and El Adem roads. Once the Africa division had broken the perimeter, the 15th Armored Division would push through to the coast. They had some 100 gun-armed tanks, including ten captured Matildas and 38 light tanks (Pzkw I and II). The Italian XXI Corps would move to the elevated ground The 21st Armored Division would guard the frontier, but be close enough to move to Tobruk, if needed. They were positioned to satisfy General Halder, who wanted the frontier guarded. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about Cunningham's plan for Operation Crusader

We have seen that putting the British armored forces near Gabr Saleh was decided so that the three brigades were near each other, but in position so that they could support the XIII Corps infantry divisions that would try to hold the Axis forces near the frontier. XXX Corps had fighting the enemy armored forces as their priority. They would at least start the battle with the British armor concentrated. They had the advantage as well of having a force of all-arms, since they had the 1st South African Division and the 22nd Guards Brigade.
Only after defeating the enemy armored forces would XXX Corps try to lift the Tobruk siege. Once that they were ready to break through to Tobruk, the South Africans would move to Sidi Rezegh, and the nearby ridges. The Tobruk garrison would take Ed Duda. XIII Corps would move from the Egyptian Frontier and move towards Tobruk, clearing the enemy from the area. This seems like a decent plan. Of course, we know now that the British forces did not follow the plan.
The battle started to go wrong when the enemy armored forces defeated XXX Corps. However, the plan already had been abandoned. One British armored brigade with the support group moved to Sidi Rezegh, but without the South African division. The tank battle was fought near Sidi Rezegh and the result was that the enemy armor beat the British armor and also overran a South African infantry brigade. The British were forced from the vicinity of Sidi Rezegh.
The next phase of the battle consisted of the German armor flitting around the battlefield and taking heavy losses while attempting to attack XIII Corps. XIII Corps had the infantry tank brigade, equipped with Matildas and Valentines, which were well protected. XIII Corps was able to conduct combined operations with tanks and infantry. They were able to control the frontier, while connecting up with the Tobruk garrison. XXX Corps was reduced to rebuilding its tank strength through replacements and recovery and repair.
There was a third phase of the Crusader battle. XXX Corps and restored its tank strength, but was again defeated by the German armored divisions. The Germans had been pushed back to the narrow area between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The Germans rebounded right back to the Gazala area where the opposing armies were holding positions and readying for the next battle.
Rommel was always looking for opportunities to exploit. He was always looking to infiltrate into the enemy area and throw them off balance. The British often were easy to panic, so infiltration tactics worked well against the British as they had worked well for Rommel in the Alps during the Great War. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

General Cunningham's plan for Operation Crusader

General Cunningham's plan for Operation Crusader, intended to launch in November 1941, followed the usual British system for the desert. They dispersed their forces, rather than concentrating them. The Australian historian mentions that the command structure provided to General Cunningham supposed that the tanks and infantry would be separated. The army headquarters controlled the XXX Corps, the main tank organization, and the XIII Corps, the main infantry organization. The XXX Corps with the fast tanks were in the south, while the XIII Corps with two infantry divisions was in the north, near the Mediterranean coast.
The actual story is somewhat different. The southern force had the 7th Armoured Division with two armored brigades. They did have an infantry division, the 1st South African Division with two brigades and the third brigade being the 22nd Guards Brigade. They were augmented by extra medium artillery and anti-tank gun regiments. The role of what was nominally the center group was actually the army tank brigade whose role was to support the northern group, which was the XIII Corps, which had the New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division.

General Cunningham's idea was that if the two German armored divisions were concentrated, they would have a superiority in tanks over the 7th Armoured Division. The answer had to be that the British would have the third armored brigade with infantry tanks located within a shorter distance to the XXX Corps, so they could close with them and concentrate against the two German armored divisions. General  Cunningham said, as the Australian historian mentions, that if the Germans used their two armored divisions separately, the British could still concentrate against one of them.Some critics had said that Cunningham had said that if the Germans split their armored divisions, the British would split their tank force in two.
General Cunningham's plan in final form was that the three British armored brigades would be together near Gabr Saleh. Gabr Saleh was located near the intersection of the track from Bardia and the Trigh el Abd. The reason for this location is that the brigades were concentrated, but still within supporting distance to the XIII Corps in the north. The Australian historian pointed out that Gabr Saleh was behind the enemy's fortified line between Salum in the north and Sidi Omar to the south. They were centrally located so that they could move out in a number of different directions, including towards Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

"Only a week": the 2/13th Battalion departure was only to be delayed by a week

The 2/13th Battalion was told that they would leave Tobruk on "the night of 19-20 November" 1941. The British fortress commander, General Scobie was the one who told the battalion of the new plan. Their departure was to be delayed by just a week. The Australian historian thought that the British were being grossly over-confident in their estimation of the chances of success. While during past defeats, the British had been out-numbered by the enemy forces, this time they expected to have a larger army than the enemy and would have better equipment. The Australian historian, though, thought that this time, they were excessively over-confident, much more so than they were  a year later at the Second El-Alamein.
The next piece of information was Churchill's letter to the men prior to the coming operation, where he mentioned the King's confidence that the men would all do their duty. Looking back, on the night of 26-27 September 1941, the Western Army Headquarters was re-designated as the 8th Army. The army commander was the victor of the East African campaign,m General Alan Cunningham, the Mediterranean Fleet commander's brother. At the same time, the Western Desert Force was renamed XIII Corps. The XIII Corps was primarily and infantry unit. The armor was put under the control of XXX Corps on 21 October. The army now had a headquarters and had two corps under its command.
General Cunningham had drafted the plan for Operation Crusader initially on 28 September 1941. The plan was worked and reworked as time progressed, but the basic plan lasted up until the start of the operation. Cunningham's plan was a good approximation of Auchinleck's original suggestion. His plan included an operation to pin the enemy's forces on the coast and then and to stage a demonstration that appeared to be an advance towards Benghazi. The main striking force would strike across the way south from  Fort Magdelana.
The northern attack to pin the enemy forces on the coast had the infantry tanks of the 1st Army Tank Brigade. They had an assortment of 145 tanks, including both Matildas and Valentines. The infantry component included the New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division. They were the divisions in the XIII Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-General Godwin-Austen.
The mobile tank force Rommel's army in the south. They had some 500 fast tanks. They included three brigades with American M-3 Stuart tanks, British Crusader tanks, and some older British cruiser tanks, such as the Cruiser Mark IVa (A.13), Cruiser Mark II (A.10), and possibly a few surviving A.9, Cruiser Mk. I's.The American tanks were originally governed down to about 32 miles per hour, but when the governers were removed, they could reach 40 miles per hour. The American tanks only had a 37mm gun, while the British had the standard 40mm 2-pounder gun. The support tanks, often used as headquarters vehicles had a 3-inch howitzer, firing high-explosive shells. XXXth Corps ended up being commanded by Lieutenant-General Norrie. He had been the 1st Armoured Division commander. He replaced General Pope as the mobile corps commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History, as well as our general knowledge of the British forces in Operation Crusader.

The run up to Operation Crusader in November 1941 at Tobruk

The units in Tobruk in November 1941 were focused on learning as much as possible about the plan for the impending Operation Crusader. The Australians assumed that they all would be leaving prior to Crusader. They were more interested in what the enemy forces might be planning. Everyone still expected that the 2/13th Battalion would be leaving Tobruk in November. They were told to plan on half leaving on 13 November and the other half after they were relieved by the Polish Officers Legion. The enemy air units restarted their high-level and dive bombing attacks. They targeted the artillery and the front line defenses. The enemy was also engaged in probing the defenders in the perimeter defenses.
suddenly, the 2/13th Battalion commander was called to the fortress headquarters. When he returned, he met with the company commanders. He informed him that the withdrawal from Tobruk was postponed for another week. The battalion's role would change, so that they would form part of the reserve for the attack from Tobruk towards the Egyptian frontier. They would stay in Tobruk, with half of the battalion on the coast and the other half at Pilastrano. The new plan was for the 2/13th Battalion to leave Tobruk by road, rather than by ship.
By now, the Australians had trouble taking the schedule seriously. They would believe dates when they saw the events happen. Over two nights, all the Australians but the 2/13th Battalion were4 removed by sea. The decision to leave the 2/13th Battalion in Tobruk for Operation Crusader is still something of a mystery. Speculation was that the Polish general had requested that the Polish Officers Legion be held in Egypt as the nucleus of complete Polish divisions in the Middle East. That meant that the 2/13th Battalion was still needed in Tobruk until after Operation Crusader. Middle East GHQ was discussing the possibility in early November.
The situation was that with the Tobruk garrison launching a sortie towards the Egyptian border, the forces available to General Scobie were stretched to a breaking point. He could not afford to lose the 2/13th Battalion due to the scarcity of the defensive forces. The situation was such that the British did not bother to sonsult the Australians about the need to keep the 2/13th Battalion. They just kept them and there was no discussion about the decision. Mr. Churchill invoked the authority of the King in a message to the troops involved with Operation Crusader. Mr. Churchill told the men that the King had expresed confidence that the men would "do their duty" in the coming battle. This was a battle where the British forces were well armed with the most modern weapons, putting them in a position of equality of weapons with the enemy forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australian 2/13th Battalion in Tobruk from late October through November 1941

There seemed to be greater activity among the enemy that were besieging Tobruk. There were artillery operations under way. The British gunners could tell what the enemy were doing. The enemy was bombarding the Salient from 28 October 1941. The 1st RHA noticed that the enemy gunners were busy "registering targets" while the Salien was being hit.
While the artillery was more active, there were enemy patrol operations in the southeast of Tobruk. Since Brigadier Murray was still in Tobruk, he suggested that they form up the 2/13th Battalion and the two 2/15th Battalion companies into a force to hold the area by the El Adem and Bardia Roads. The Brigadier was concerned that the enemy might push into the fortress from the southeast. The British disagreed with his suggestion and took no action.
For the first two weeks of November, the situation seemed to have stabilized. The Polish brigade ran an operation that triggered an visual enemy response. The Polish brigade had artillery support and a smoke screen, and this triggered an enemy pyrotechnic display. The enemy fired multi-colored flare displays and then fired many rounds from artillery. The British had been prepared to plot gun positions by gun flashes, so they had accomplished their goal. Then the 1/Durham Light Infantry attempted to attack the Plonk post. They had a tank squadron in support as well as three 25-pdr regiments, but the attack went badly. They were caught in flanking small arms fire and ran into booby-traps. The battalion had 8 men missing and another fourteen wounded.
The enemy seemed to be giving the southeast perimeter of Tobruk some increased attention. When the moon was full, a group of thirty to forty men came up to the perimeter wire. The anti-tank ditch in the area was only four feet deep. They reached the ditch but pulled back when the British counter-attacked. Another group of men crossed the perimeter on 10 November. The happened near Post R53. Men from the 2/Queens attacked and drove the enemy back. Tanks were also active. The 21sr Armored Division had been seen about nine miles to the south of the southeast Tobruk perimeter. The 1st RHA noticed them and thought that they might be both observing the fortress and also getting into position for a possible attack.
By the second week of November, Tobruk was abuzz over the expected offensive towards Tobruk. One thing that happened was that the 1st RHA now was pulled into reserve and given transport so that it was "fully mobile". To achieve that, other units were stripped of vehicles. The men could see that work was underway to allow for a sortee from Tobruk from the southeast. The Battleaxe Operation had a similar plan. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australians still at Tobruk in October 1941

The Australians of the 2/13th Battalion had moved into their new positions on the fortress perimeter from the sea to Post S33 apparently on the night of 26-27 October 1941. A captured spy had predicted an attack the next day, so the battalion sat ready to fight. The fight never happened, happily. The Czechoslovakian battalion was holding the perimeter on the left. The 2/13th Battalion had two companies holding the line. They were also in the three Cocoa posts. The left company also held the Cheetah posts. The third company was held in reserve. During the evening of October 28, another company moved into reserve at the Wadi Magrun. The 2/13th Battalion enjoyed their time in the best place they had occupied in Tobruk. There were wadis and hills, so the men got needed exercise. The men stuck on the actual perimeter missed out in bathing on the beaches. By the end of October, the weather was cooling and they no longer were in the scorching sun. The men were not so involved with long patrols, but there was  still some of that activity. They even went out during the day, such as one long patrol to the Wadi Bu Dueisa.
The 2/15th battalion had two companies at Fort Pilastrano. They were not involved with patrolling, the area was not as pleasant as the area where the 2/13th Battalion was located. After the end of October, they moved to the Wadi Auda, which was much nicer. The downside was that the area was a target for enemy bombers, but there was much water there and it was green. The 20th Brigade headquarters and part of the 9th Australian Division headquarters were located nearby. They were located in a wadi just to the west of Wadi Auda.
During this time, the enemy continued to focus on the area to the south and east of Tobruk. There had been a outpost Cooma, but the enemy had overrun it. The men from Cooma during the night of 27 October, after being missing for two days. That was some action to the left of the Essex Battalion. Enemy infantry and tanks were seen on the move. This was near the El Adem Road. Once the enemy force had gotten to within 300 yards, they took fire from the British infantry.
Another development saw some enemy soldiers enter the perimeter  near post R51. They moved around for about a half hour before they left. Somewhat later, other enemy soldiers were seen working on the perimeter wire near Post R47. The British also noticed that the enemy force in the Salient now seemed to be Italian rather than German. The German artillery units that had been there were thought to now be in the southeast of Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The last days of the Australians at Tobruk in October 1941

With Australians stuck temporarily at Tobruk, they needed to be provided for. The 2/13th Battalion had given their equipment to the British "Yorks and Lancs" battalion. We already saw that they were given the equipment that had been intended for the Polish Officers Legion. The battalion would be under the control of the Polish Carpathian Brigade for the last acts in Tobruk. The Polish Cavalry Regiment was holding a front in the Salient. Three companies of the battalion were sent out to the area, while the fourth company waited for the area that they would be assigned to be visited.
This was part of the Western Sector, which had traditionally been over-extended. There was some effort made to shorten the front to improve the situation. The plan had been to put the cavalry regiment in the center. On the right, the Polish battalion would get the new group. A new Czechoslovakian battalion was in the spot that the 2/13th would occupy. Where the 2/13th Battalion would hold, there was a deep wadi with posts cut into a cliff. The wadi was some 150 feet deep. If it rained, there would be water ata the bottom.
Tobruk had depended for a long time on water from wells in the no-mans land. There was even a pumping station in the wadi. That was only made possible first by the Indian cavalry and then the Polish cavalry. Their aggressive operations had kept the enemy from causing problems over the wells. There were some of the usual named outposts that guarded the water supply. They were named "Cocoa 1,2  and 3, Big Cheetah and Little Cheetah". They were located on the wadi side near the enemy.
The first men from the 2/13th Battalion went to the area during the night of 25-27 October 1941. In the morning of 27 October, Major Colvin visited the Polish Cavalry Regiment headquarters. There was still a great deal of dust in the air following the previous days' dust storm. The Polish brigade commander stopped by the cavalry regiment headquarters at about 10:30am. He told Major Colvin, of the 2/13th Battalion, that a prisoner had told them that the enemy planned to attack near the wadi on the next morning. Two Libyans had been captured. One was a civilian spy who had been sent to scout the area. General Kopanski, the Polish commander, met with Colonel Burrows and General Scobie to talk about the news. They considered not having the 2/13th move into place, but decided to go ahead with the planned move. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Seeing the last Australians off from Tobruk

Supply operations for Tobruk continued in August 1941. More petrol and supplies were carried into Tobruk. We have already mentioned operation Treacle involved a cruiser covering force, two fast minelayers, and the usual destroyers. They had transported some six thousand men into Tobruk and removed about 5,500 men. Septembere saw the important operation named Supercharge. Supercharge also included a cruiser covering force and a larger RAF fighter force. The actual numbers of men carried into Tobruk were 6,308. They removed 5,988 men, including 544 wounded. The ships carried in more petrol andd supplies. They also brought 29 tanks to add to the tank force. One last operation named Cultivate received more unwanted attention from the enemy. The last night of Cultivate saw the fast minelayer Latona sunk and the destroyer Hero damaged. Larger numbers of men were moved both in and out. Some 7,138 men were carried into Tobruk and 7,234 were removed. The naval force lost heavily in the process. Ships, including the petrol carrier, Pass of Balmaha, and others were sunk and more were damaged.
The Inshore Squadron was involved in the last operation to remove Australians from Tobruk, starting on 13 November 1941. The only Australian unit left in Tobruk was the 2/13th Battalion. In operations involving ships near Tobruk, from 11 April until 9 December 1941, 26 navy ships and 5 merchant ships were lost. Another four navy ships and four merchant ships were damaged. Australian destroyers were involved in the runs to Tobruk and back. Two Australian sloops were also involved with the Parramatta being lost.
The last Australians at Tobruk, the 2/13th Battalion were witness to a heavy dust storm. The Durham Light Infantry managed to provide breakfast to the Australians. It turns out that there were also two companies from the 2/15th Battalion left, as well. They were located near Fort Pilastrano. The Australian brigade commander, Brigadier Murray met with General Scobie to talk about what they would do with the remaining Australians. The Australians had turned over all their equipment, except what they personally carried. The new plan  was for them to use equipment that had been intended for use by the Polish Officers Legion. There was work to be done to plan where to go and how they would move into place. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History

Problem with supply ships for Tobruk, starting in June 1941

A supply run to Tobruk that left Alexandria, Egypt, on 23 June 1941 had severe problems. The petrol carrier Pass of Balmaha was escorted by two sloops, the Auckland and the Parramatta. There was also a store ship, the Antiklia that was escorted by the sloop Flamingo. The promised fighter cover did not arrive. A bomb hit the Auckland and the ship was sunk. The Pass of Balmaha took damage from a near miss. The destroyer Waterhen arrived on the scene and started to tow the Pass oof Balmaha. The Parramatta turned around and took the survivors of the Auckland back to Alexandria. The Antiklia was diverted to Mersa Matruh until a fighter escort could be provided. The Antiklia finally got underway, heading for Tobruk, but turned back when heavy weather was encountered. The Antiklia set out again on 29 June accompanied by the supply ship Miranda. They had a three ship escort of small warships. The destroyer Waterhen was hit by a bomb off of Sidi Barrani in the evening of 29 June. Another destroyer, the Defender, took the crew off from the Waterhen and attempted to tow the ship. The Defender noticed an Italian submarine and fired on her. The Italian submarine dove to escape. The Waterhen eventually took on so much water that she rolled over and sank. During the afternoon of 30 June, a large force of bombers with fighter escort was driven off by RAF and South African fighters. The store ships arrived safely at Tobruk. Two escorting ships were damaged. The petrol carrier, Pass of Balmaha arrived safely at Tobruk, as well. Her cargo of petrol was successfully delivered.
A change of plan was tried following this operation. Eight "A" Lighter landing craft were provided for cargo runs to Tobruk. Two were able to reach Tobruk on 7 July. The first time used three days. They arrived at night. They would unload on the next night. They would sail on the third night. They decided to experiment with a faster turn around. They would arrive at night. They would unload under "camouflage nets" during the day. Then they would sail on that night. In parallel, the destroyer supply runs would continue. They also experimented with running the fast minelayers Abdiel and Latona. They were capable of making 40-knot speeds and had considerable space for cargo, since they were designed to carry mines.The month of July was very successful for supplying Tobruk. Ships brought in some 5,000 tons. They managed to run some small merchant ships and sailing vessels to carry ammunition and treats for the soldiers.
They experimented again with using schooners. They had first tried them to see if they could be sailed by volunteers. They found that the needed to put the service on a more regular basis, so they created the Western Desert Schooner Flotilla and put Lieutenant-Commander Duff in charge. They tried some foreign vessels and crews on the run, but the best were the British vessels and crews. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Supply runs for Tobruk in 1941

Ships bringing supplies to Tobruk left ports in Egypt. The ships involved were generally small and they included the 40-knot fast minelayers. Some of the supply ships used sail power. The ships faced danger from air attack and from submarines. The wakes of ships at night were very visible in moonlight.
Captain Poland commanded the inshore squadron. He took command on 5 February 1941 and continued until the siege was lifted. At the beginning, the squadron included "two destroyers, three river gunboats and other small craft. They originally were employed for protecting shipping and for attacking enemy targets. Merchant ships entered and exited the Tobruk harbor both in daytime and nighttime. The Tobruk harbor accumulated ship wrecks over time.
Tobruk-bound shipping could not be protected by fighter aircraft. This was partly due to the scarcity of fighters and because the RAF had abandoned western airfields. The inshore squadron took heavy losses. Between 12 April 1941 and 1 June, they lost "a whaler, 2 armed boarding vessels, 2 minesweepers, a gunboat, a sloop and an anti-submarine trawler, and had four other ships damaged". Starting in early May 1941, the decision was made to employ ships of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla to carry supplies to Tobruk. The flotilla included five Australian destroyers. The first run was made on 5 May by two of the V-class destroyers. Once the battle for Crete commenced, destroyers were mostly involved in that operation.
Once the Germans had captured Crete, air attacks increased on shipping that was supplying Tobruk. Admiral Cunningham issued an order to only use destroyers on the run to Tobruk, and then only at night. That started as of 7 June 1941. The destroyers ran supply missions until 15 June, when Operation Battleaxe caused the end of the runs. They were restarted on 18 June. The Inshore Squadron now had four destroyers, three sloops, two gunboats, along with other smaller ships. They also now had some "A" Lighters, which were early landing craft. For a period, two destroyers would run into Tobruk, unload, and then leave during the night. This typically happened two nights out of three.
To send adequate supplies to Tobruk, slower ships had to supplement what was sent by destroyer. Supporting air power included "three Royal Air Force and two South African Air Force Squadrons. The closest air field for supporting Tobruk was one hundred  miles a way at Sidi Barrani. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More about bombing attacks on Tobruk in 1941

Apparently, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft barrages across the line of flight greatly effected daylight high level bombing attacks. After July 1941, bombing attacks mostly switched to the night. They still might attack during the day if there were inviting targets, but mostly, they found that they could more effectively bomb at night. There is another table giving the numbers of night bombers employed per month in 1941.

                                              Night Bombers employed
Last 21 nights of April          32
May                                       74
June                                     132
July                                      126
August                                 205
September                           187
First 9 days of October       152

The night raids in April and May 1941 were mostly low-level attacks to drop "thermos" bombs. By June, all night raids but one were made with high-level bombing. A major change started with 21 July, when night bombers dropped mines hoping to block the harbor entrance. Two more mine laying attacks occurred in the last week ofo July. The night bombing intensified, and this became a serious matter. Some raids were as large as fifty aircraft at night. The enemy also mixed bombing and minelaying to attempt to confuse the defense. Attacks did not occur every night, but were mostly during nights with moon light. Up through July, night bombers would attack singly. As many as 30 to 50 per cent were turned back by barrages. Anti-aircraft gunners were hard pressed by lack of sleep. To counter aircraft dropping mines, listening devices were used and they fired a barrage in conjunction with searchlights center and ends of the harbor. The barrage, when it could be fired in time, was so effective that the enemy would avoid it.
To understand the effort involved, from 10 April to 9 October 1941, some 3,525 aircarft were fired on by anti-aircraft guns. They lost 40 gunners killed and 128 men were wounded. They fired greater than 49,000 rounds of 3.7in anti-aircraft rounds. The available guns can be seen by the rounds fired. Another 3,700 40mm rounds were fired. The scale of 20mm guns meant that they fired some 75,000 rounds. There were also captured Italian guns in use, so there were even more than these fired. The guns were thought to have definitely destroyed 74 aircraft. Another 59 aircraft were probably destroyed. finally, another 145 aircraft were thought to have been damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Bombing attacks on Tobruk in 1941

The enemy air attacks on British anti-aircraft guns at Tobruk were primarily with dive bombers. The gun crews quickly learned that they could be most effective by staying with their guns during attacks rather than taking cover. The dive bombers were apparently all Ju-87 Stukas. Of the dive bombing attacks at Tobruk from the last twenty days of April 1941 until October 9, nineteen of these attacks were against the anti-aircraft guns. The last attack on the guns was on 1 September 1941 after commencing on 10 April. When you look at the chart you can see that the number of aircraft involved decreased over time, as the raids became more dangerous to the attackers. Frequently, at least one dive bomber took a direct hit during an attack on the anti-aircraft guns. This is from the chart on Page 411 of Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Month                      Dive bombing raids     numbers of aircraft involved
April (last 20 days)  21                                386
May                          17                                277
June                           6                                 123
July                            4                                  79
August                      11                                217
September                  1                                  46
October (first 9 days) 2                                  57

As the enemy realized that dive bombing raids were too ineffective for the effort involved, they switched to high level bombing raids. The level bombers generally flew at between 18,000 and 25,000 feet. The defenders on the ground had trouble seeing the attacking aircraft. Even though the defenders were hampered by the high altitude attacks, the attackers were able to bomb effectively. Initially, the defenders could not see the aircraft until they dropped their bombs. To try to improve their ability to see the high level bombers, the defenders started listening for the sound of aircraft so that they could predict where to point their telescopic lenses. This was not a very successful tactic. The next tactic tried was to fire a barrage of shells into the expected aircraft path. The barrages were designed to be in the course flown to known targets in the harbor area.  They had 16 heavy anti-aircraft guns, so they were used in four-gun groups. By September, the guns had a position officer who had the authority to decide when to fire. They had to be watching for the attacking aircraft to fly deceptive routes to attempt to outwit the guns. The use of the barrages was very effective and caused the attacking bombers to have problems hitting targets. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Air attacks on Tobruk and the anti-aircraft defenses

Brigadier Slater commanded the 5th Anti-Aircraft Brigade at Tobruk during the siege. The harbor and base were priorities for anti-aircraft defense. This was a constant struggle as the enemy continued to evolve their operations. The units involved were typically below strength and guns were in constant need of repair. That meant that they needed spare parts for the guns, as well as spare guns. They also relied on laborers to help with digging and the like. The enemy targeted guns, so that they would repair.
Early in the siege, the enemy staged daylight air attacks, often with dive bombers. As the defense capabilities improved against dive bombers, the enemy switched more to night bombing attacks. The air attacks were constant, with only one day during the 9th Australian Division's time at Tobruk when there were no air raids. All these dates are from 1941.

                      Dive bombing      Total                 Night Raids  Total Bombing  Day Reconnaissance
                                                Daylight raids                             Raids
April 10-30      21                       41                       11                   73                      27
May                 17                       60                       22                   99                      58
June                  6                        58                       76                 140                      39
July                   4                       91                        43                 138                     46
August             11                      55                        77                  143                    30

The defenders took a while and had to experiment to find tactics to deal with dive bombers. The enemy made a first heavy dive bombing attack on 14 April 1941. The guns fired a fixed barrage to explode at 3,000 feet. They found that some aircraft had gotten in before the barrage was fired. to counter that danger, they set up an observation post on the escarpment where they could look down on the harbor. There were problems found with inadequate depth to the barrage. The guns often fired too soon in the attack. The barrage had to spread from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and was fired to swing across the harbor area. They had four Italian 102mm anti-aircraft guns which were repaired and employed. By August, they had found three more of the Italian guns and added them to the defense. The static 40mm guns were used to engage aircraft that survived the barrage. The 12 40mm static guns were manned by the 40th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery.
The defenses added three 20-barrel parachute rocket launchers provided by the navy. The rockets had parachutes and trailed long wires. Small bombs were attached to the end of the wires. They were first used on 18 August against a dive bombing attack. They successfully disrupted the attack.
The enemy resorted to attacking the anti-aircraft gun positions. They damaged six guns that were all repaired. The gunners quickly learned that they were safest by staying in action and shooting at the attacking aircraft. That was a lesson learned in May and June 1941. Dive bombers were used against the guns. They started on 10 April and ended on 1 September 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Aggressive patroling near Tobruk from April to October 1941

Aggressive patroling, mostly at night, was a feature of the Tobruk defense from April 1941 up until the Australians had left in late October 1941. Much of the work was done by Australians from the 9th Australian Division, but there were others as well. They included the Indians of the 18th Cavalry and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards. In mid-April, a German soldier's diary spoke of the stress and effect of attacks on the motorized infantry by night. They had taken losses and the attacks had a negative effect on morale. For example, in one night, six officers and 57 other men were captured.
Some thirteen Australian battalions were involved in defending Tobruk. They took losses as killed, wounded, and as prisoners. The German success in breaking into the perimeter resulted in 259 men being captured then, and later from the 2/24th Battalion of the 26th Brigade. The 2/23rd Battalion lost  as many as 79 men as prisoners. No other battalions lost prisoners as many as those. The 2/9th Battalion had suffered 205 men wounded. Both the 2/23rd and 2/24th Battalions had many men killed. The 2/23rd Battalion had 78 men killed while the 2/24th Battalion had 70 men killed.
In the vicinity of the Salient, when the enemy had penetrated the perimeter in a surprise attack, the area became one of the most dangerous areas of the fortress. Near the wire there was a chalk mound that they named Forbes Mound. In one incident on the night of 24-25 July 1941, six men were going after German machine gun and mortar crews. The Germans were moving in a truck to fight another Australian patrol. The Australians had been surprised to find German sangers close to the wire.
During the summer of 1941, there were no photographs from the air and the artillery depended on information gathered by patrols operating at night in enemy territory. There was a period when some successful patrols were made using carriers. In early May, a daylight raid was made with carriers. Despite being lightly armored, they were able to attack a working party and fight tanks and guns. They succeeded in returning without loss.
Because of the inshore squadron operations by the navy and the success of the anti-aircraft gunners, Tobruk was kept adequately supplied, so that there were not any extreme shortages of supplies or food. The anti-aircraft gunners had to deal with four types of air attacks. They would be hit by daytime dive bombing attacks against the harbor and installations. There were also daylight level-bombing attacks from higher altitude. The enemy would also bomb at night and would drop mines at night. Early in the siege, they would have large dive bombing raids. As the anti-aircraft defenses improved, the enemy moved to mostly night bombing raids.
Early in the defense of Tobruk, there were 16 mobile 3.7in anti-aircraft guns actually in use. There were other guns not yet available for use. There were also 40mm and 20mm Breda guns in use. They had as many as 42 of the captured Italian Breda guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A retrospective of the 9th Australian Division after their departure from Tobruk in October 1941

The British politicians, particularly the prime minister, were very angry about the Australian government's insistence on withdrawing the 9th Australian Division. To rub salt in the wound, the fast minelayer Latona was sunk and the destroyer Hero was damaged in an attempt to bring out the last 1200 Australians from Tobruk. They were very fortunate that the Germans did not start aggressively bombing the shipping earlier, because the situation would have turned out much worse. The Australian government insisted that the last group of men be withdrawn at the next moonless opportunity.
The defense of Tobruk certainly was made possible by the efforts of the field artillery units, which were largely British. The anti-aircraft gunners were another important factor in the successful defense force. The anti-aircraft units were often the targets of German air attacks. General Auchinleck praised the defenders of Tobruk for their efforts in holding a strong enemy force in place away from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. The enemy had committed four Italian divisions and three German motor battalions to besieging the fortress of Tobruk. They had held the place from sometime in April until November 1941 when the enemy was beaten and pushed back to the border between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
General Morshead often asked more of his men than was possible. His insistence on aggressive patrolling and never allowing the enemy to take and hold territory was an important feature. That was not always possible, as the capture of the Salient showed, but it was still a guiding principle. The mutual respect between the defending units showed a recognition of the roles played by the various players.
There were two factors that caused the Australian demand for the withdrawal of their division. One was the hidden agenda behind General Blamey's manipulation of his government to cause the withdrawal. He was waging a battle against his personal rival in the Australian army, General Lavarack, who was more qualified than General Blamey. General Blamey spent part of the time keeping General Lavarack from gaining more prestige and power than he had, and also did at times promote General Lavarack, such as recommending his appointment as corps commander in Syria and Lebanon.
The other issue was the political turmoil in Australia, that cause some rapid changes. There were three prime ministers in 1941, the last of which was the Labour Party leader, John Curtin. The misadventures of Winston Churchill must have had an influence in Australia, you have to expect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

FInal relief of the 9th Australian Division in October 1941

The relief of Australian units by British units was well-planned. Relief convoys used one minelayer and three destroyers. The final relief started on 12-13 October 1941. An arriving unit was generally given a day before the unit that was being replaced left Tobruk. That was to give the newly arrived men time for a transition. Also, that allowed for no reduction in strength defending the fortress of Tobruk.Convoys generally brought in one thousand men and removed slightly less than that number. Men of the 26th Brigade Group were the first to leave.
General Scobie became the new fortress commander, taking over from General Morshead. General  Scobie arrived at Tobruk on the night of 20-21 October. General Morshead introduced General Scobie at all the brigade headquarters. One of the first changes was that the division reserve was moved from the 26th Australian Brigade to the 23rd British Brigade. The next move was for the 23rd Brigade to replace the 20th Australian Brigade in the south of Tobruk. General Scobie formally took over as commander at 5pm on 22 October. General Morshead then bade farewell to units that were to stay, and then ate dinner with the naval staff. He then left Tobruk on HMS Endeavor. On the 22nd, more of the 20th Australian Brigade was removed from Tobruk. The 23rd British Brigade assumed the duty of protecting the Southern Sector on 23 October from the 20th Australian Brigade. The Australians moved into division reserve. A feature of the relief process is that the Australian units passed all their equipment to the arriving units. On the night of 24-25 October, the 14th British Brigade took command of the division reserve. Before night fell, an air attack by dive bombers hit the harbor.
During the relief process the enemy had fired artillery against the harbor. There was still no indication that the enemy realized that the relief was proceeding. One hazard that was not immediately recognized was that German submarines had arrived in the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic. The first ships sunk were "A-Lighters". The submarines were assigned to attack ships supplying Tobruk.
The British gunboat Gnat was able to hit the guns that fired on the harbor at Tobruk. The relief convoy cruiser escorts, the Ajax, Hobart, and Galatea were alsos able to fire at the guns. The Gnat was torpedoed on 21 October. The ship was not sunk, but was stopped. The destroyer Griffin was able to tow the Gnat to Alexandria. One final mishap was that the minelayer Latona was bombed and eventually sunk. That ended the Australian relief, because they had reached the end of the moonless period. The remaining Australians were stuck at Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battle for the outposts at Tobruk, from 12 October 1941

Sunrise on 12 October 1941 showed some 19 German tanks and about six vehicles facing the 2/17th Battalion area. Perhaps most were near Plonk, which the Germans had reoccupied since it had been left vacant. The Australians could discern a line of sangars on both sides of Plonk. Workers could be seen during the day extending this new defensive line. The enemy had setup wire around Plonk by mid-morning on the 12th. Later in the afternoon showed that the enemy had laid more wire from Plonk out to the sangar line.
After these developments, the decision was made to provide tanks for Cooma for the night hours. They would drive through the perimeter at dusk and return there by dawn. During the day, troops of infantry tanks would be kept available to drive to Cooma, if needed. The 4th RTR initially provided these tanks, and then for two days, the 7th RTR provided the tanks.
In the evening, the Australians could see enemy tanks near Plonk and Cooma. Several tanks drove near the perimeter wire. The Australians sent out "tank hunting patrols", but they did not make contact with the enemy. The scheduled British tank presence set out at 1am. They did not see any enemy tanks, but they fired on the enemy working parties. The enemy had about twenty anti-tank guns set up and they fired at the British tanks. To the Australians within the Tobruk perimeter, there seemed to be a tank battle happening, but it was just the anti-tank gun fire and the tanks shooting. The Australians moved back into the Cooma outpost and went to work on strengthening the defensive positions.
After the last battle over Plonk, the enemy was content to work on extending their defenses. The Australians continued to occupy Cooma and the arrangements for tanks were continued while the Australians were still in the southern sector. Their remaining time was limited, because they were to be withdrawn while more units were carried in to replace them. The enemy now had some 100 guns available. The largest were the 210mm howitzers, one battery of 149/35 guns, and another battery thought to be 155mm. The enemy was thought to have 10 field batteries, 12 medium batteries. and the three heavy batteries. The enemy strength in the south was so dominating that the options for raiding at night were greatly reduced. In other sectors, the Australians were still strong enough to carry out aggressive patrolling. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A night tank battle on 11-12 October 1941 near the Plonk outpost

The attack on the Plonk outpost was late to start, partly to the late arrival of the infantry tanks. The supporting artillery barrage was repeated for the real attack. The attack on Plonk was set to launch about 15 minutes after midnight on 12 October 1941. They could hear digging and voices at Plonk before the barrage started. Enemy artillery responded to the British artillery fire. This time, the Matilda tanks were moving up to attack Plonk. The Australian infantry patrol moved closer to Plonk as all this happened. A little before 1am, the infantry tanks commenced firing at enemy tanks that were visible. The range was very short, about 100 yards. There were the tank guns firing as well as the tank machine guns. The enemy was described as firing their tank guns wildly, and not well-aimed. The British tanks were able to move towards the objective. The German tanks retreated in front of them. The tank firing was across the infantry path and kept them from moving into Plonk.
They could see German tanks advancing from the west, but were driven back by the British tank gun fire. The Australian infantry patrol did not enter Plonk, as there was too much risk to the men from occupying Plonk.The Australians did fire their "Very light signal" to communicate that they had achieved their desired objective. That triggered the enemy to open artillery fire on Plonk, as the expected that the signal meant that Plonk had been occupied. By 1:25am, the enemy troops had pulled out of Plonk. Firing stopped after they left. After a brief respite, the enemy resumed firing at Plonk. An extraordinary barrage, the largest yet seen at Tobruk, descended on Plonk. While the firing continued, more enemy tanks drove towards Plonk, but the British tanks in Plonk fired at the enemy tanks, causing them to pull back.
The Australian patrol that had been sent to Plonk pulled back after sending one small group back with a wounded man. The patrol went looking for the machine gun that had fired on them earlier, but didn't find it. The patrol commander then sent the other men back, but he stayed until 2am, when he fired the Very light signal. After he gave the signal, the enemy started another artillery barrage on Plonk.
While Plonk wss receiving enemy artillery fire, the men working on creating an outpost at Cooma had been busy. The British tanks had driven on to Cooma from Plonk. They had fired on some enemy tanks that had gotten close, but they eventually drove back to the perimeter and reentered Tobruk.The 32nd Army Tank Brigade commander had ordered his tanks back to Cooma, but while the sky was getting lighter, the tanks had not reached the gap in the perimeter. The Australian 20th Brigade commander had suggested that the tanks return to the "forward assembly area". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

More action near the 2/17th Battalion from 11th to 12th October 1941 at Tobruk

Early on 11 October 1941, Tobruk artillery fired on the outpost Plonk that had been occupied by enemy troops. The Australians could hear "yelling and screaming" after the artillery fire on Plonk. They heard tools tossed into trucks and then the trucks drove off. Again, at 6am, Tobruk artillery fired on Plonk. A patrol investigated Plonk after that and saw men walking about the area. They drew more artillery and machine gun fire. About this time, the enemy artillery fired on the 2/17th Battalion defenses, as was usually the case. Right before 8am, the Australians observed more men at Plonk and fired on them. The enemy responded with more artillery fire on the Australians. Between haze and dust, the Australians could no longer see Plonk.
Between 8:30am and 9am, increasing numbers of tanks were seen near the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion positions were machine-gunned. They were not used to having so much activity near them. They found that the enemy troops had moved back into the Tugun outpost. The Australians were concerned that the enemy might make a major attack on the 2/17th Battalion front. A practice attack near Carmusa by 2/15th Battalion soldiers and tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade was cancelled due to the enemy activity. All of the 20th Brigade was kept at the ready, rather than proceeding with training. By 9:45am, they saw twelve enemy tanks "hull-down" near Plonk. Despite the activity, no attack was launched by the enemy.
By the next night, the 11-12 October 1941, General Morshead ordered the 20th Brigade to attack and retaked Plonk. They would no use Plonk but would create a new outpost to be called Cooma. The plan was to keep the enemy from advancing their line towards the Australians. The infantry directly involved would be from the 2/17th Battalion with support from the 4th RTR in the form of one squadron. The 2/17th Battalion would have one company of the 2/13th Battalion in reserve. The attack would have the 107th RHA firing a bombardment to soften up the enemy. If possible, the 1st RHA would fire smoke in the area of the enemy minefield.
Two platoons from the 2/17th Battalion made the attack. They expected to see tanks coming up in support, but the plan for the tanks was to move at 5 mph with a mile between tanks. That meant that they were not immediately available. At the time of the infantry attack, the tanks were just at the perimeter wire. The enemy artillery fire was so heavy, that two other Australian battalions, the 2/23rd and 2/24th were readied for use. The attacking platoons would then attack without the tanks. After some fits and starts, the new plan was to attack at 12:15am. The artillery would fire in support, again. The tanks that were still running would join in the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operations from 10 October 1941 at Outpost Plonk

General Morshead became involved with the defense of Outpost Plonk on 10 October 1941. He was not ready to allow territory to be ceded to the enemy without a fight. General Morshead ordered the 2/17th Battalion to defend Plonk. The brigade commander told the battalion that they should hold Plonk with two sections of infantry and with an anti-tank gun section. The guns would be supplied by the 20th Anti-Tank Company. The battalion commander was free to add to the defensive force as he saw fit.
The 2/17th Battalion commander decided to send out working parties to accompany the "standing patrol", They would build additional defense with wire and mines. They would also dig gun and weapon pits. A platoon was positioned about 300 yards south to provide cover. The standing patrol had "four light machine guns and two mortars". The men arrived at outpost Plonk at 7:50pm. The enemy started firing artillery at the general area. The firing lasted "more than half an hour". They took some casualties from the artillery fire. The working parties were pulled into the position. The artillery fire did not stop, so the working parties tried to work while under fire. The explosions raised dust which reduced visibility "to five yards". By about 9:20pm, they had lost communication with the battalion. The 2/17th commander heard that tanks had been seen moving. The trucks that carried the anti-tank guns had been disabled. The command of the working parties decided to attempt to recover the anti-tank guns. Tanks were reported to be circling Plonk. A reconnaissance patrol had seen 11 large tanks and five armored infantry carriers, presumably half-tracks. The infantry were recognized as being Italian.
The trucks with anti-tank guns were recovered. One gun was disabled but was eventually repaired. The standing patrol had been forced to leave Plonk to the enemy. When the 9th Australian Division headquarters learned of the situation, they had no further orders for the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion was taking heavy artillery fire by around 3am. From then until about 7am, the battalion received about 2,000 rounds of artillery shells.
The 2/Queens also also received heavy artillery fire. They had wanted to work on a new outpost, but they were taking too much artillery fire to work. The enemy had had active tanks near the old Tugun outpost. They had departed by 5:30am. Normally, the Australians were dominant at night in "no-man's land", but that was only the case in the west side of Tobruk. Men from the 2/43rd Battalion had decimated some Italian infantry near the "White Knoll". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British and Australians respond to the enemy activity near Plonk and Bondi

The response to the enemy tank activity near the outposts of Plonk and Bondi was to send out sixteen infantry tanks and two light tanks to Plonk. This was at 9:45pm apparently on 7 October 1941 at Tobruk. They were to fight any enemy tanks that they encountered and defeat them. Men from the 2/17th Battalion and "an engineer party" were to remove anti-tank mines near the Plonk outpost. Other mines laid near the path that enemy tanks had taken were also removed. The minefield on the perimeter would have two gaps created. Anti-tank guns would be sited to protect the gaps. The gaps were for the British tanks to drive through on their return.
Two men set out from Plonk "to the enemy minefield to the south". They noticed that a forty yard gap had been created and tape laid to mark the gap. The Australian men removed the tape that they had found. They also fired on a working party they encountered. They were followed by ten enemy soldiers as they walked back to Plonk.
As it got dark, the men at Plonk could hear engine noises from the direction of Bondi. They called in artillery fire on the area around Bondi. That kept enemy tanks from entering the post. Communication failed with Bondi sometime after 9pm. By a little after 10pm, two men arrived who had escaped from Bondi. They heard the news that Plonk had been overrun by German tanks and infantry.
The Matilda infantry tanks drove slowly to Plonk to reduce the engine noise. As they approached, they heard that Bondi had fallen. They also heard that the enemy had fired on Plonk with artillery. After the tanks reached Plonk, they heard German tanks moving closer. The British tanks drove out towards the German tanks and started firing at 100 yards distance. That was fairly close range for a tank battle, and the infantry tank squadron commander was wounded when his tank was disabled. The fight lasted about 15 minutes. The German tanks drove off with the British in pursuit. The German tanks were faster than the Matildas, so the Matildas quickly fell behind. One Matilda had mechanical problems, so it drove into Plonk. That tank fought a battle with five German tanks and drove them off from Plonk. About this time, the men at Plonk were called back to the perimeter. Some time after midnight, a patrol came back to Plonk and found that the enemy had not taken possessiion, so they stayed in occupation of the post. During the rest of the night, they could hear enemy tank engines, but they did not attack Plonk.
The 2/17th Battalion policy was to hold outposts, but they would not attempt to hold the ground between the outposts and the perimeter. The commander decided that they would hold plonk and defend the area. They would have anti-tank guns as protection against tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action in early October 1941 at Tobruk

During the night of 2 to 3 October 1941, the 16th Brigade was involved in fighting when a patrol from the 2/Queens had contact with an enemy patrol south of the Tobruk perimeter. The enemy soldiers threw grenades and the British fired at them. The enemy soldiers withdrew faster than the British chased them. In the evening, men from the 2/Leicester took machine gun fire from Italian positions some 600 yards away. The British fired back with artillery and mortars, stopping the machine gun fire. This action occurred on the west side of Tobruk.
Australians were in action on the night of 5 to 6 October in the south. A small patrol from the 2/17th Battalion moved out some 2,400 yards to a position near an enemy minefield. They observed two groups of men being led through the minefield. A third group was following behind. They alternated crawling and then walking fast. The Australian patrol lay low to escape being seen. Then they moved close to an Italian "working party". They opened fire on the Italians with great effect. Machine guns and "light automatic weapons" opened up on them. The Australians "scattered towards the north" and finally reached their listening post through a "pipe-line ditch".
The action at this point seemed to all be at night. During the next night, up until dawn, the 2/17th Battalion could see tanks on the move. They were near the pipeline and to the west of outpost Plonk. Plonk had three observation posts, one of which was occupied. Outpost Bondi was some 3,000 yards west of Plonk. Men from the 2/Queens were at Bondi. Tanks were seen further west from Plonk. The tanks approached to a mile from the perimeter. The Australian battalion commander guessed that the tanks were operating to defend working parties.
Men at Plonk reported five tanks moving towards them at 12:25am. They saw more tanks near the pipeline. The Australians employed tank-hunting patrols armed with "68" grenades. This time, they got some hits against one of the tanks. Due to the concern about tanks, the men at Plonk were withdrawn and not replaced. The 107th RHA opened up on the tanks near Biir el Azazi at dawn. In response, enemy artillery fired on the perimeter. Divebombers hit the positions occupied by the 104th and 107th RHA. They knocked out two guns and killed three gunners.
The Australian brigade commander ordered the 2/17th to move back into Plonk. Right before it got dark, sappers moved out to lay  mines on the route the tanks had taken. An infantry patrol moved towards Plonk, hoping to move back into the post. The patrol had to take cover when tanks were seen, but after they moved off, the men moved back into Plonk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The new situation after the British 16th Brigade arrived in September 1941

The newly arrived British 16th Brigade went in with an aggressive spirit and a positive attitude. They were going to take the Australian outposts and set them up as Observation Posts. They would then concentrate on "offensive patrolling". Despite that plan, the truth was that the outposts outside the wire ended up being taken by the enemy soldiers and setup as "defended localities". The plan was still to plan on dealing with enemy attacks. There was cause for concern, because the enemy outgunned the 104th RHA, which was supporting the 16th Brigade when they would take over from the Australian 20th Brigade. The 104th RHA had 24 guns, two of which were anti-aircraft guns. The anti-aircraft guns were only there in case of a tank attack, when they would be manned and available to fire on enemy tanks. They only had 16 25-pdr guns, 4-60pdr medium guns, and 2-Italian 149mm guns. The enemy was thought to have 52-field guns, 16-medium guns, and two heavy guns. Given that the enemy had much more artillery, the 104th RHA expected that the enemy could be expected to attack.
The 20th Brigade really did not understand the situation very well, because all they saw made the enemy seem to be at a considerable distance. Still, the 20th Brigade commander expected that any attack would be likely to come against the line south of the Bardia Road. The 20th Brigade didn't like the defenses, because the secondary line were small enough that when there were two battalions, one from the division reserve and one from the brigade reserve, the second line was "congested". The second line of defense was too far back from the perimeter, so that the brigade reserve battalion was remote from the perimeter. They wanted to build a new position that was closer to the perimeter.
The 16th Brigade arrived to replace the Australian 20th Brigade on 25, 26, and 27 September. The next day, 16th Brigade took responsibility for the defense of the area. Two British battalions were in the line and one was in reserve on the secondary line. During the first two days of October 1941, the Polish Carpathian Brigade replaced the Australian 26th Brigade in the west. The 26th Brigade then was made the division reserve brigade. They had spent 8 weeks in the high-pressure Salient.
The western sector had four battalions. When the Polish Carpathian Brigade arrived, the 2/43rd Battalion stayed in place. The Polish cavalry had been in the Wadi Schel, so they now were back with their parent unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Who was right? Into the last days of the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk

In retrospect, we can now say that Churchill's complaints about the 9th Australian Division removal were overblown. There were no great effects by the removal. If the German air force had been attacking during the withdrawal, the situation could have been critical, but they were not. Operation Crusader was not materially affected by the Australian relief operation. The issues that caused the operation to be in jeopardy had nothing to do with the Australians. The issues were British problems, not Australian. Churchill was more concerned about the political impact of delaying the offensive in North Africa. The British at the time were unaware of the impending Japanese attack planned for December 1941. That was going to cause the most trouble for Churchill and the British forces.
Towards the end of the Australian participation in the defense of Tobruk, the Salient was the most dangerous area. From August to September 1941, the 2/24th Battalion worked to re-position the wire to help the 2/13th Field Company. They did the work on the left side of the Salient from "18 August to 1 September". They moved the wire on the right side of the Salient starting on 8 September and finishing on 25 September. When moving the wire, the presence of German anti-personnel mines took a toll.
We find that by September, there were some peculiar behaviors in place. For one thing, there was what the Australian historian called "live and let-live" to some extent by the Australian and Axis troops. Most of the time, German patrols were defensive in nature. They only rarely made attempts to penetrate the Australian positions. One exception occurred on 11 September, when a German patrol was spotted and ambushed. They killed three men and eventually captured a man who seemed to be lost. He was a member of what eventually was called the 90th Light Division. In September 1941, they were known as the Division Afrika zbV. The 9th Australian Division intelligence view on this was that the new division had been brought in to free up the armored division motorized infantry, so that they could go back to providing support to their divisions.
When the British 16th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, they had already served with the Australians in three previous campaigns. They had participated in the first campaign in the desert when they had defeated the Italians and captured Cyrenaica. They had also fought in Crete and finally in Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Considerations involving the Australian relief and Operation Crusader in October 1941

We have seen that the whole issue about relieving the 9th Australian Division and removing it from Tobruk were something initiated by General Blamey, the senior Australian officer in the Middle East. We have the sense that he was not totally candid about his reasons for the move, but rather he provided excuses for what he wanted that he felt would get results. He had found a way to overcome the British bad habits of extremely short-term thinking to meet the day's crisis. That approach had led to breaking units into small groups and dispersing them across great distances.
There was also Churchill's influence at work. Churchill always figured himself to be a great military expert, based on his early years and his experience in the Great War. The truth was that Churchill was a politician, and based his actions on political considerations. That often led to disasters, such as the Greek Campaign and the Crete debacle. Churchill was at his best as a political leader, with his ability to communicate and inspire people.
The Australian historian and author wondered if General Blamey would have been vindicated by the events of 1942, if the Japanese had not entered the war in dramatic fashion. That obviously is something about which we can only speculate.
We can also examine the arguments for keeping the Australians in Tobruk, rather than withdrawing them, and they still look like excuses for what Churchill wanted to do. He liked getting his way and having everyone agree with him. He ran into General Blamey, who was also a schemer, like Churcill, we suspect. In this case, General Blamey found a way to override Churchill, much to Mr. Churchill's distress.
Operation Crusader was eventually delayed to 18 November 1941, greatly angering Churchill, who wanted the attack on the enemy forces as early as possible. An interesting note is that Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 20 November. Churchill's anxiousness for an early attack was based on the larger view of the war, not just issues surrounding the situation in North Africa.
The most important real issue was the demands made on the RAF. The Australian historian again notes that during the run up to the offensive, the RAF "was not in the even unduly extended". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the situation.

Churchill tries to bulldoze the Australian government in late September and October 1941

The British prime minister, Mr. Churchill, was determined to get the Australian government to agree not to withdraw their last two brigades from Tobruk during the moonless period in October 1941. Churchill's argument did not really have any firm basis in fact, but it was the principle of the thing that drove him to press the Australians. Churchill sent a telegram to the Australian prime minister, now  Mr. Fadden, telling him that General Auchinleck had wanted to resign over the Australian government's lack of confidence in him. Churchill told the prime minister that he was asking him to not withdraw the two brigades in the interest of comradeship with the British forces. The timing was bad, because Mr. Fadden's government had fallen and the Labour party was assembling a new government at the time that Churchill's telegram had arrived on 30 September 1941.
Mr. Curtin, the leader of the Labour Party was busy forming the new government. Mr. Fadden consulted with him and then answered Churchill's telegram with a refusal to stop the withdrawal. Mr. Fadden told Churchill that it was not the case that the Australian government lacked confidence in General Auchinleck. Churchill then notified Auchinleck of the Australian response.
Mr. Curtin, the new Australian prime minister, responded to yet another message from Churchill, saying that the previous government had considered all the issues when arriving at a decision, and the new government would make no changes. Churchill replied that he regretted the Australian decision, but he notified General Auchinleck to proceed with the relief of the remaining two brigades. Churchill was very unhappy that other issues caused the start of Operation Crusader to be postponed to 18 November 1941.
Churchill then sent a stern note to General Auchinleck complaining about the delay, when there had been some 4-1/2 months since any other major operation. Meanwhile, the Russians were thought to be getting battered severely by the Germans and the British were not doing anything to help, Churchill believed. The Australian governments felt obligated to follow the advice from their senior officer in the Middle East, General Blamey, rather than submit to pressure from Churchill that would have caused them to have to ignore General Blamey.This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The British tried to keep from having to remove the rest of the Australians from Tobruk in September 1941

Upon the completion of Operation Supercharge, there were still two Australian brigades left in Tobruk. Churchill, in particular, wanted to not withdraw the brigades, at least not prior to Operation Crusader. The last two Australian brigades fully expected to be withdrawn during the next moonless periods. The British 16th Brigade had arrived and advance group from the 6th Division headquarters were in place in Tobruk. The British units were already being familiarized with the ground that they would defend. The British soldiers met the Australians and socialized with them.
Churchill and his military leadership planned to complain about the impact of the further withdrawal on Operation Crusader. Churchill was always optimistic about the possibilities for future operations. He could visualize announcing in Parliament that the new 8th Army had pushed through and relieved Tobruk and had destroyed the enemy armored forces on the way.That vision seemed much more important than the Australian government's insistence that the division that had been in Tobruk for about six months needed to be withdrawn.
The British thought that they could plead that establishing an ascendancy in the air over the Axis air forces would be compromised by having to provide air cover for the final Australian removal from  Tobruk. The unmentioned reason for the British low capability in the air was that they were still unwilling to send Spitfires to the Middle East. That left the RAF in North Africa with Hurricanes and Tomahawks, which were outclassed by Bf-109 fighters.
The truth was that despite having to provide air cover for the relief convoys removing Australians from Tobruk, They already were committed to provide air cover for the regular supply convoys. These were mainly carried in destroyers which had a limited capacity for cargo. To unload at the Tobruk harbor, some ships were moored to jetties while others were tied up to sunken ships and others were simply anchored while lighters moved the cargo ashore.
Air Marshal Tedder wrote a message to the Chief of the Air Staff. The gist of the message that if the enemy continued to refrain from attacks on shipping, the continued relief could proceed without having a great impact. If they did decide to attack the convoys, then the burden on the RAF would greatly increase due to the continued removal of the Australians from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol. III of the Australian Official History.

Operation Supercharge in September 1941

The British had expected that the enemy air forces would attack the relief convoys that were carried out as part of Operation Supercharge. The attacks either did not occur or were ineffective. The only air attack occurred on 19 September 1941 on a convoy of landing craft coming from Mersa Matruh with a cargo of tanks. At this point in the war, the landing craft were called "lighters".  Bombs were dropped by the attacking aircraft, but they fell into the sea about a half a mile from the landing craft. The only problems encountered during Operation Supercharge occurred when the small craft involved had some defect that prevented them from sailing to Tobruk. The day after the air attack, there were three schooners had sailed for Tobruk. None of them arrived at Tobruk due to various problems.
During Operation Supercharge, not quite six thousand men were transported out of Tobruk. This number included 544 wounded soldiers. Their replacements in the number of 6,300 men arrived at Tobruk. The operation interfered with supplies for Tobruk, so more than 1,000 tons less than had arrived during July and August 1941. This was partly due to the destroyers having to make room for soldiers and partly because the landing craft were carrying tanks rather than supplies. They also had restricted shipping to and from Tobruk to periods when the RAF could provide air cover.
Shipping traveling to Tobruk was stopped pending a conference to be held on 30 August to discuss supplies for Tobruk. Shipping continued to be suspended for a time following the conference.
The importance of restricting convoys to days when there was no moon was demonstrated on the night of 8 to 9 September when a convoy of destroyers ran in to Tobruk during time when there was moonlight. The destroyers were bombed while entering the Tobruk Harbor and when they departed. Two of the destroyers narrowly missed being hit by bombs. As soon as three days later, another convoy sailed when there was moonlight and it was bombed very early in the day.
Tobruk needed some 1,500 tons of supplies per day. That included about 20 tons a day of petrol. The supply that arrived averaged about 32 tons a day less than was needed. The situation was actually better than the figures would indicate, because "actual ration strength" was less than the nominal figure of 25,000 that was used for planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Preparations to withdraw from Tobruk from 17 September 1941

Since preparations were to be secret, only rumors hinted at the entire 9th Australian Division would be removed from Tobruk as the 18th Brigade had been. There were necessary warnings to units that would be pulled out during the next moonless period. The units that received notice were the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion, the 24th Brigade except for the 2/43rd Battalion, the 2/12th Field Regiment, the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, along with several batteries from the 3rd RHA. The 2/7th Field Company was attached to the 24th Brigade, so they would leave as well. The British 16th Brigade would replace the Australian 24th Brigade. There was further shuffling of units to free up the units that would leave Tobruk.
The 2/12th Field Regiment had been very active during their time in Tobruk. They had fired off some 56,000 rounds and had lost 24 men killed and 24 wounded. A group of the 2/12th left Tobruk on the night of 18 September. The 2/12th would trade places with the 144th Field Regiment at Amiriya in Egypt. The 144th took over the odd collection of guns from the 2/12th Field Regiment and a disreputable set of gun tractors. In Egypt, the 2/12th Field Regiment received good 25pdrs and gun tractors left behind by the 144th Field Regiment.
The way things worked in the topsy-turvy world of the British military family, some men in Tobruk were stuck with Great War-vintage 18pdr guns, while other units away from the enemy were equipped with the latest gear. The men in Tobruk did not know of this situation so they had no problem using whatever guns they could get.
When the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion left Tobruk, that was their last association with the 9th Australian Division. They had been involved in heavy action since 1 May 1941, when they had built a line to defend against the German attack that penetrated the Tobruk perimeter. They would be replaced in the future by the 2nd/3rd Pioneers.
During the dark nights in September, 29 tanks were transported to Tobruk by A-lighters. The old 3rd Armoured Brigade headquarters was replaced by the 32nd Army Tank Brigade. The incoming tanks belonged to the 4th RTR. At their arrival, the tanks were still under the control of General Morshead, the fortress commander. He only had limited control, however, since General Morshead was required to request that the tanks be made available for attacks. The request was always granted, however.
Tbe relief operation was called "Operation Supercharge". The British Royal Navy excuted the withdrawal from 17 September until 27 September 1941. They used two fast minelayers of the Abdiel class and about 11 destroyers. Only any one night, one minelayer and three destroyers would enter and leave Tobruk's harbor. They stayed only two hours each night. Three cruisers of the 7th Cruiser Squadron provided cover for the withdrawal. They were concerned that Axis air power would be used against the evacuation, but that did not happen. This is based on account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.