The situation on 20 March 1941 in Cyrenaica

The British and Australians were left with the original plan for defending Cyrenaica on 20 March 1941. Generals Neame and Gambier-Parry had acted to keep a permanent presence at the fort at El Agheila. They had the 1st King's Dragoon Guards forward. They were "two miles east of Marsa Brega with a squadron to the south at Bir el Ginn". There were some Australian light anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns (very few), and some British light anti-aircraft guns. They patroled with one armored car and one anti-tank gun. From 20 March, one platoon of motorized infantry would stay at the El Agheila fort at night. The infantry actually was to the south so that they could watch for a German approach. They also had a plan to ambush approaching Germans. Early on 23 March, they surprised some Germans. The anti-tank guns managed to knock out three German vehicles. They had surprised a larger force with armored cars, tanks, and field guns. The Germans had intelligence that the experienced divisions had been replaced by much less experienced units. Rommel flew to Germany to consult with the "German High Command". He planned a larger attack on 24 March 1941. Rommel was asking for more forces to be sent, but the current plan was only for the 15th Panzer Division to be sent in May. The high command was thinking about all their plans and was not particularly ready for Rommel to do anything to large that might interfere. In late March, both the British and Germans were using dummy tanks to give an illusion of strength. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The British knew that they were in trouble in late March and early April 1941 in Cyrenaica

General Neame, who was the commander for Cyrenaica, was very unhappy with the arrangements that were in place to defend against a German attack. He recognized an immediate need for more motor transport, since without it, the 2nd Armoured Division was very immobile. The tank situation was poor, due to the mechanical condition of what they had. General Neame had a wish list that included a squadron of infantry tanks (Matilda II's), two companies of motor transport, more signals men and equipment, another cruiser tank regiment, a motor infantry battalion, more artillery of all types, and air support. He also noted that what he would really like would be a motorized infantry division to replace the 9th Australian Division, which would train near Tobruk. General Wavell replied that all that was available would be the 3rd Indian Motor Brigade, with just two battalions, and some more transport. Neame's backup plan was to place supply dumps in western Cyrenaica, so that the armored division would have available supplies close to their positions. The priority for the 2nd Armoured Division was to hold onto Mersa Brega. They continued to rely upon intelligence estimates that put any German advance into early April 1941. The 9th Australian Division would try to hold the area east of Benghazi. They would let the Germans onto the plain, but try to hold the escarpment area to contain them. The new British plan was to avoid an armored battle, rather than trying to fight one that they might well lose. The main question was if they should try to block the Germans at El Agheila or at Mersa Brega. El Agheila did have a fort that was some 25 miles to the southwest from Mersa Brega. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Movements from 22 March 1941 to strengthen the 9th Australian Division and the 2nd Armoured Division

The 2/13th Battalion was to move by night to the area east of Benghazi, but the transport missed the meeting point, so they ended up traveling by day. They had been the target of air attacks which were ineffective. An artillery regiment was moving up to join the 9th Australian Division. Another, the 104th RHA moved forward to the 2nd Support Group. The 9th Australian Division got their engineers back, after they had been assigned to Cyrenaica Command since the middle of January 1941. Most of the 26th Australian Brigade moved up to Gazala. The Australian Official History criticizes the armored regiment arrangements with the captured Italian tanks and worn-out cruisers and light tanks. This meant that when the Germans attacked, the tanks were not really ready for action. The most reliable armored vehicles were the Marmon-Herrington Mk.II armored cars. The Official History says that their suspension was unequal to the strain of desert travel. They were only lightly armed, however. They had a Vickers machine gun, a Bren gun, and a 0.55-inch Boyes anti-tank rifle. The German armored cars were greatly superior to the British cars (manufactured in South Africa). The KDG diarist credited them with a 37mm gun, but in fact, they only had a 20mm gun and a machine gun. The Germans had the large eight-wheeled cars with faceted armor and the smaller four-wheeled cars with a 20mm gun that also had faceted armor. The situation in the air meant that the British were also out-matched. The Germans already had 90 fighters and 80 bombers in North Africa by late March 1941. We have seen that on 20 March 1941, the 2nd Armoured Division became responsible for the forward defense in Cyrenaica while the 9th Australian Division was pulled back. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

They expected an attack from the Germans in March 1941

General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander, made a presentation to General Wavell and General Dill, the CIGS. That presentation was well-received and had immediate effect. There was much concern about a coming German attack. The most positive thing happening at this time was the capture of the Giarabub oasis by the 18th Indian Brigade on 21 March 1941. General Wavell had instructed General Neame to fight a delaying battle and not to become involved in a fight. General Wavell was even ready to abandon Benghazi rather than have forces trapped and captured. At this time, on 20 March, Major-General Gambier-Parry had arrived to take charge of the 2nd Armoured Division and the area forward. The 2nd Armoured Division Support Group would replace the 20th Australian Brigade. They would move at night. A single battalion, the 1/Tower Hamlets Rifles was driven from Benghazi on 22 March and the Australian 20th Brigade was driven back to the area east of Benghazi at that time. There was an understandable effort to increase the strength of both the 9th Australian Division and the British 2nd Armoured Division. Oddly enough, the 5th RTR had been sitting at El Adem. They were finally ordered forward where they should already have been located. They were equipped with A.9 and A.10 Cruiser tanks, the only ones not sent to Greece. The problem is that they were to be driven forward. Later, they would have had tank transporters and could have gone that way, but this early, they didn't exist so they were breaking tracks. The 3rd Hussars were also in bad mechanical shape with about 30 Light Mk.VIb tanks (we think). The hope was that they could give the 6th RTR one light tank squadron and two M13/40 tank squadrons. The 3rd Hussars would have two light tank squadrons and one M13/40 squadron. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

On the border in March 1941

The British-Australian force near El Agheila in March 1941 was short of strength. There was the light tank regiment with Lt.Mk.VIb's (we think). There was the King's Dragoon Guards with Marmon-Herrington Mk.II armored cars. Their best weapon was the 0.55-inch anti-tank rifle. There was the Australian infantry brigade that had just arrived. There was the 6th RTR that was just getting captured Italian M13/40 tanks. The anti-tank guns they had were 9-2pdr and 6-Breda anti-tank guns. There were also 16-Bofors 40mm Light AA guns. They also had 3-Breda Light AA guns. There were no British or Australian troops west of El Agheila and none actually holding the place. The KDG went up to the fort at El Agheila in the morning and left at night. What few vehicles they had were breaking down due to overuse and lack of parts. Due to bombing at Benghazi, they were reduced to relying on road transport from Tobruk for their supplies. The length of the drive included half during the day with bombing attacks. The signals equipment was provided by stealing or taking from dumps of Italian equipment. They were short of essential items, even mortars and anti-tank guns. General Morshead worried about leaving the 20th Brigade where they were. He proposed moving them to the Benghazi-Barce area. When General Morshead had written his letter about the situation, he was called in for a meeting with General Dill, the CIGS, and General Wavell, the theater commander. They met near Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The battlefield in North Africa 1940-1942

The area that contained the combat in North Africa stretched from the salt marshes near El Agheila in the west to the Qattara Depression that lay to the south of El Alamein. All the major operations stayed within 50 miles of the Mediterranean coast. To the south lay some prominent oases, like Siwa, Gialo, Giarabub, and also Kufra. In the east, there was the railway that ran to Mersa Matruh from further east in Egypt. The railroad was eventually extended to Tobruk. Otherwise, all supply ran on the coast road. The escarpment was a prominent feature in the landscape. In the western part of Egypt lay the Halfaya Pass. The road climbed from the coastal area to the plateau. In Libya, you had the plateau running from Bardia to Gazala. They would all become familiar names in the war in the western desert, as it was called. General Morshead realized that he faced a complete German armored division and they might well take advantage of the light forces in the west to mount an attack. For the first half of March 1941, we saw a process of German, British, and Australian forces probing each other to try and gain information. The 9th Australian Division was found to be short of signals equipment, as the forces going to Greece had been given priority. There was a need, however, so soldiers found ways of making unauthorized acquisition of the needed equipment, including things like wire, phones, and more. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans are established in Libya in February to March 1941

On 19 February 1941, the German force in Libya was named the "Africa Corps". A few days before, the first elements of the X Air Corps arrived in Libya. They had 60 dive bombers and 20 twin-engined fighters (Bf-110). They would also have support from German aircraft based in Sicily. By late February, the first units of the 5th Light Division were at the landmark that the British called the Marble Arch. That position was about 40 miles from El Agheila. The Italian divisions were spread out with the Savona Division in Tripoli. There were also the two infantry divisions, the Bologna and Pavia divisions. There were also the Ariete Armored Division and the Brescia Infantry Division. With the Free French force from Chad taking Kufra oasis, Rommel decided to move forward. The Germans prepared a position west of El Agheila. By 11 March, the tanks from the 5th Light Division were unloaded from ships in Tripoli. By 13 March, Rommel established his headquarters at Sirte. He ordered his troops to move to Marada, which the British had not occupied. The British were left with a minimal force facing the Germans and Italians in the west of Cyrenaica. The area included the fine Italian road from Tripoli to the Egyptian border. The operations from 1940 until 1943 all were within the confines of the coastal region. A prominent escarpment played an important role in operations during this period. At the east was the Qattara Depression, south of El Alamein. To the west were the salt marshes at El Agheila. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The situation in Libya in February to March 1941

In February 1941, Marshal Gariboldi had become the Italian commander-in-chief in Libya. Theoretically, Gariboldi commanded Rommel, but Rommel operated independently of higher authority. He had learned to operate with a lot of initiative in the Great War, when he was a keen practitioner of the new form of warfare that almost won the war for Germany. Infiltration came close to salvaging the war for Germany. Once Rommel had learned how infiltration tactics were used, he became a keen practitioner. He found in France in May 1940 that they worked with mechanized forces as well as they had with infantry. The British found out that Rommel was to be the German commander in Libya on 8 March 1941. When the Germans landed in Libya, they were not very well prepared for what they faced. They were forced to learn "on-the-job" and adapt to the new conditions. The Germans were forced to modify their equipment for the unexpected aspects of operation in the North African theater, with sand, heat, and rocks. Rommel had visited Rome on 11 February to consult with his allies. Rommel arrived in Tripoli on the next day. The first German units to arrive were an anti-tank battalion and a reconnaissance battalion. Rommel vowed to take immediate command at the front and start pushing against the British. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A German force for North Africa in early 1941

By early March 1941, General Wavell knew that the German plan was to send two armored divisions to North Africa (Libya). He was telling people that due to shipping limitations and the upcoming hot weather that he did not expect the German force to be a concern until late summer. The British did not bother to warn the Australian government about the new threat to the 9th Australian Division. The British were focused on Greece, which from the beginning, seemed like a mistake. Anthony Eden had pushed for the Greek expedition for political reasons, not because it was a good, military idea.

The first German division to be sent to North Africa was an improvised light motorized division, the 5th Light Division. The division had been formed with a nucleus from the 3rd Panzer Division. The initial plan was for a unit similar to a British armored division support group, but the plan was changed to something more like an armored division. The division would have two armored battalions created with light and medium tanks. Hitler decided early in the process to send a complete armored division in addition, later in the process. Rommel was appointed commander on 6 February 1941. Convoys started sailing from Italy bound for Tripoli. There had been a concern that the British might advance to Tripoli and create a problem for disembarking the new division. The British stopped their advance a the frontier between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, so that was not an issue.

As for the Italians, they had four weak infantry divisions of six battalions each, all of them lacking artillery. There was also the 132nd Ariete Armored Division. The Ariete Division had some 80 tanks, but no anti-tank guns. The 102nd Trento Motorized Division was being shipped into Tripoli, but was still partly in transit.

The 5th Light Division would have tanks, infantry, artillery, anti-tank, and some anti-aircraft artillery. There would be 150 tanks, many of them being Pzkw III or IV medium tanks. The anti-tank guns would include both the 50mm PAK38 and 88mm guns. The German armored cars included some of the 8-wheeled type that were much stronger than the Marmon-Herrington Mk.II's of the King's Dragoon Guards. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Elements of the 9th Australian Division at the front in March 1941

From 9 March 1941, elements of the 9th Australian Division moved up to Mersa Brega, near the edge of the frontier from Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The 2/15th Battalion was the farthest west. They were about a half-mile northeast of Mersa Brega. As far as ten miles further east, the 2/17th Battalion had moved into position. The third battalion of the 20th Brigade was at Beda Fomm. There was the one company back at Barce. The 9th Division headquarters had moved to Bir el Tombia. There was only the one 9th Australian Division brigade in Cyrenaica. The other two brigades were still in Palestine. The forward troops were still supported by the 16th Anti-Tank Company. They had moved forward in February to support the 3rd Armoured Brigade. Another unit that stayed in position during the other movements was the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion. The battalion headquarters was back at Derna, while there were men scattered doing road repair work. There was also the 2/4th Field Company with the 9th Australian Division engineers. One early sign that all was not well was that back on 24 February 1941, that a patrol was ambushed by a German patrol near el Agheila. The Germans had tanks, armored cars, and motorcycles. The Germans took three prisoners, including the commander of the anti-tank gun detachment. By early March, General Wavell realized that there were two new Italian divisions and a German mechanized force in place that could be a threat. Wavell characteristically hoped that the lack of transport and water would limit what the new forces could accomplish. That was based on ignorance of how Rommel and German mechanized forces operated. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 3rd Armoured Brigade and 2nd Support Group in March 1941

The apparent British hope was that nothing would happen in Cyrenaica while they launched the Greek campaign. The 3rd Armoured Brigade had three units: the 3rd Hussars, the 6th RTR, and the 5th RTR. Most of the brigade was located at El Adem. The 5th RTR had old cruiser tanks. We believe them to have been A.9 Cruiser Mk.I and A.10 Cruiser Mk.II tanks. They lasted until the Crusader Battle in December. The 6th RTR was to be equipped with captured Italian M13/40 tanks. One squadron was actually at Beda Fomm being reequipped. The plan was to send the rest of the unit to Beda Fomm to get their Italian tanks. Remember that we are talking about March 1941. As we already mentioned, the 3rd Hussars had antiquated light tanks. While there was a newer version, the Light Mk.VIC with a 15mm Besa gun, like the Humber armored car, we believe that the 3rd Hussars had the older Light Mk.VIB tanks with a 0.50in machine gun. As for the 2nd Armoured Division Support Group, they were short of motorized infantry and artillery. They did have two Free French motorized companies as well as the 1/Tower Hamlets Rifles. The Tower Hamlets were very small for a unit that was nominally a battalion. They could field some 250 men to fight. The Support Group also had very little artillery. They had one anti-tank battery, for example. The field artillery was late to arrive. The 51st Field Regiment and the 104st RHA arrived very late in March 1941. The 51st Field Regiment was equipped with Great War vintage artillery. They had 18pdr guns and 4.5inch Howitzers, some of which were under repair. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division relieves the 6th Australian Division in early March 1941

The 6th Australian Division was destined for the Greek operation. That meant that their forward troops in Cyrenaica would be replaced. The 17th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Savige would be replaced by the 20th Brigade. There was one company of the 2/13th Battalion that was left at Barce so that they could protect the Cyrenaica Command headquarters. The rest of the 2/13th Battalion was positioned at Beda Fomm. The rest of the brigade drove through territory still occupied by Italian colonists. They were headed for Agedabia. At 8th March, the 9th Australian Division headquarters was at Tobruk. General Morshead had gone ahead to Cyrenaica Command headquarters. He was temporarily in charge of the forces in the western portion of Cyrenaica. General Morshead heard from General Neame that the plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division to take responsibility for the forces on the frontier as of 19 March 1941. At that point, General Morshead was supposed to move to Gazala. Mersa Brega, the small place in the sand and marshes, was vulnerable to being out-flanked from the south. The 3rd Armoured Brigade had the 3rd Hussars with 32 Light Mk.VIB tanks to protect the flank. The 6th RTR was being equipped with captured Italian M13/40 tanks at Beda Fomm. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

An unfortunate situation in February 1941

General Blamey's desire to send the best Australian troops to Greece meant that the Western Desert was left in a difficult situation. The 9th Australian Division had the most newly-recruited troops and were about to face the Germans. The 20th and 26th Brigades had been taken from the 7th Australian Division, which was their home unit. The Australian Official History mentions that the 18th Brigade wore their 6th Australian Division patches through the rest of the war. Division identity was a meaningful thing, and the former 7th Division brigades had thought that they had lost their better organization and had been moved to a higher numbered division, the 9th. A meeting was held on 26 February where the reorganization was said to be "temporary". The men had been "trained to fight", but their leaders were not yet trained to lead. The 20th Brigade was the first 9th Australian Division brigade to move west. They were mainly moved by train to Mersa Matruh. By 4 March, they had reached Tobruk. Two days later, they were west of Derna. They had passed Benghazi on 8 March. Not much later, the 20th Brigade arrived at Agedabia to take over from the 17th Australian Brigade. The plan was for the 2nd Armoured Division headquarters to be in charge at Agedabia, but they were not in place yet. The 17th Brigade was still in place at Marsa Brega, a name with which we are very familiar, being long-time students of the North African campaign. Marsa Brega had sand dunes, "rolling ground", and marshes. That seems rather unexpected for desert terrain. Brigadier Rimington and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were to protect the area south of Marsa Brega from attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Events in early 1941 as the Greek operation started

Events moved faster in early 1941 as the Greek campaign commenced. After General Wynter's illness, the 18th Brigade commander, Brigadier Morshead, was appointed as 9th Australian Division commander. Lt-Colonel Wooten became 18th Brigade commander in Morshead's place. Wooten became a brigadier and Morshead became a Major-General.

Much of the action for Greece started in February 1941. General Wavell informed General Blamey of the plans for Greece right before Anthony Eden and General Sir John Dill arrived in Cairo to start negotiations with the Greek Government. The Greek Government had agreed to a British expedition on 24 February. General Blamey had gotten his way on sending the 6th Australian Division to Greece and kept the 9th Australian Division in Libya. Almost immediately, elements of the 2nd Armoured Division started the process of replacing the 7th Armoured Division in Cyrenaica, the portion of Libya that the British had taken. Lt-General Neame replaced General Wilson as the Cyrenaica Command commanding officer. Neame had been the 4th Indian Division commander from February 1940. In August 1940, he had been appointed as GOC of Palestine and Transjordan. He had wanted to command in the campaign against Italy in late 1940 until early 1941, but had to watch the successful campaign.

General Blamey announced a reorganization of Australian forces on 26 February 1941. The result was that the 9th Australian Division had three brigades, the 20th, 24th, and 26th Brigades. They got their three field regiments and an anti-tank regiment. The 9th Australian Division then had to move quickly to arrive in the Western Desert, as the 6th Australian Division was to go to Greece and needed to be relieved. The 24th Brigade was short, as they only had two complete battalions. The third battalion was still at Darwin in Australia, and would not arrive until April, according to the plan. This is baed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The 9th Australian Division formed

The two Australian brigades in England in 1940 were the 18th and 25th Australian infantry brigades. The Official History calls them two of the first-enlisted and best-trained of the Australian brigades. General Blamey criticized the decision to combine these brigades with newly formed units. The 8th Australian Division, to be sent to Singapore, lost the 24th Brigade to the 9th Division. They also lost the 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment and field companies to the 9th Division. The 8th Australian Division units were still in Australia in late 1940, but at least they existed. Major-General Wynter, then in England, was appointed as commander of the 9th Australian Division on 23 October 1940. He left England by sea in mid-November 1940. He left the convoy at Capetown and went by air to Cairo. He formed the division headquarters in Palestine on 24 December. They division only had two field regiments and one field company of engineers at first. Even as the units sailed, the division composition changed. When the 25th Brigade arrived in March 1941, it had been reassigned to the 7th Australian Division. General Wynter had to be replaced after he had fallen ill. He was replaced by Brigadier Morshead, who had been the 18th Brigade commander. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Decisions in early 1941 for Greece and Libya

General Wavell, the theater commander in the Mediterranean and the Middle East thought that they would have until May 1941 before they would have to defend against Germans. They did not realize that Rommel would act sooner, even before his commanders were ready. The original plan was to retain the 6th Australian Division in Libya, as they were there best Australian infantry division. They would send the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions to Greece. General Blamey got involved and was able to change the plan, so that the 6th Australian Division went to Greece. General Blamey was concerned that the Greek campaign was so hazardous that they needed their best troops for the mission. The 9th Australian Division ended up being left in Libya on the defensive. The division was formed on 23 September 1940. Most of the units that comprised the 9th Australian Division had been formed for other purposes. There were two Australian brigades in England at this time, and they would be used for the new 9th Australian Division. The division's artillery was found by taking the I Australian Corps field regiments and converting the one medium regiment to field guns. They would form the third brigade in Australia and ship it to the Middle East, along with the other supporting units. Vol.III of the Australian Official History is primarily about the adventures of the 9th Australian Division in 1941 and 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Taking chances in early 1941 in the Western Desert

While embarking on Churchill's and the War Cabinet's latest adventure, General Wavell was ready to take extreme chances with the defense of North Africa. He would lose his bet, in the event. There were many complications. The 2nd Armoured Division had recently lost its commander. Major-General Tilly had died suddenly after arriving in the Middle East. He was replaced by Major-General Michael Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece. He was to become a prisoner of war, along with some notable officers from the campaign against Italy. As we have noted, the 2nd Armoured Division was split into two parts. As the Official History notes, the best part was sent to Greece. The Western Desert defense was left to one weak armored brigade and one-and-a-half motorized infantry battalions. The one infantry division was "static". The 2nd Armoured Division brigades had only two tank battalions or regiments in each. We have the situation where you had the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment and the 3rd Hussars, a cavalry regiment. They were the same sort of unit, in practice, but with different sorts of names. General Wavell's idea for adding strength to the brigade left in Libya was to create the 6th Battalion of the RTR (usually called the 6th RTR). The unit would be equipped with captured Italian tanks, probably M13/40 tanks. Although not mentioned, the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment received a mix of Italian M11/39 and M13/40 tanks. There is a picture that shows them with large, white Kangaroos painted on them. The decision was made to add the 3rd Indian Motor Btigade to the forces in Libya when they had completed their training. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The commanders in Britain and the Middle East were indulging in wishful thinking in February to March 1941

When the 2nd Armoured Division arrived in the Middle East, the commander, Major-General Tilly, remarked that the division's cruiser tanks had worn out tracks and engines. General Wavell's reaction to that information was that perhaps, they would do better in the desert than they would have somewhere else. Of course, the British in the Middle East lacked tank transporters, vehicles that were later considered to be essential. The Germans had to demonstrate their utility before the British could learn. The British were trying to get by with as little effort and expense as possible, yet try to take on large responsibilities. The British solved their tank problem by shipping them to Greece, where they broke down in the mountains. Given the current operations, there were the New Zealand Division, the three Australian Divisions (the 6th, 7th, and 9th), one British division (the 6th, eventually renamed the 70th), and the Polish Carpathian Brigade. For the divisions, they were short of artillery and other supporting arms. Wavell sent the best armor to Greece and kept the worst in the Western Desert. Of course, Churchill and the War Cabinet were driving events, so they were ultimately responsible for the results. Wavell was a man desperate to hold onto his position as the theater commander, so he did whatever was asked, whether it was a good idea or not. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The strategic situation in the Mediterranean Sea in late 1940 and early 1941

From the German perspective, plans were in flux. They had backed off from any attempt to invade Great Britain from the continent in late 1940. They also decided to forego an attack to take Gibraltar and seal the Mediterranean from the west. The biggest decision made in December 1940 was the decision to prepare to invade Russia. At the same time, Hitler decided to occupy Greece and Yugoslavia. Germany was limited to opportunistic changes to plans based on the current situation. One fateful decision was to send a German force to North Africa to retrieve the situation in the Western Desert where the Italians had been pushed back by a successful British offensive. They only hoped to hold Tripolitania and possibly to advance to Benghazi.

Fortunate for the Germans and Italians, Churchill had decided to send forces to Greece, which would have the affect of jeopardizing the recent gains in Cyrenaica in Libya. Before that happened, the forces available included the 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division in the Western Desert. Of the rest, the largest group was in Egypt, in the process of formation: the 2nd Armoured DIvision, the 6th British Division, the New Zealand Division, and the Polish brigade. Also in Palestine were the 7th Australian Division and the 9th Australian Division. They were still incomplete with more troops still in transit. The rest were in East Africa. Two Indian divisions were in Eritrea, the 4th and 5th. The 1st South African Division and two African divisions were in Italian east Africa.

The armoured divisions were both weakened. The 7th Armoured Division had been expended in the attack on Libya. They were not capable of operations without being refreshed. The 2nd Armoured Division was weak and still being formed. The British had tank problems in late 1940 and early 1941. The tanks that they had tended to be in poor mechanical condition. The commander of the 2nd Armoured Division had complained to General Wavell on his arrival of the poor mechanical condition of his cruiser tanks. This is baaed on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume of the Australian Official History

The Tobruk and El Alamein volume covers a long period, from March 1941 until December 1942. The second volume overlaps with this volume, in that it covered the Greek campaign, the battle for the island of Crete, and then the campaign in Syria and Lebanon against the Vichy French. Much of this volume involves the 9th Australian Division, from forming the unit until the division left the Middle East. This volume was published in 1965, so this was a period when anti-war fever was at a peak and some Australians apparently criticized publishing an official history about war. That attitude misses the point, though, because official histories chronicle the operations conducted by men, fighting against an enemy that needed to be beaten. The Australian volumes generally look in greater detail about operations than the British official history. That makes the Australian volumes more valuable, because they are a great learning tool that is available to us. They also describe the achievements and, yes, failures of men struggling in adversity. In this case, we know the outcome, and that it was successful. The author of this volume, Barton Maugham, was a veteran who served in the Western Desert, "mainly in the 2/13th Battalion". As we have said, Chester Wilmot was the intended author of this volume, but he died before he could start. Barton Maugham started the volume in 1955. Writing the volume was apparently a ten-year task. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Finishing Volume II of the Australian Official History

We are now concluding the summary of Volume II of the Australian Official History for the Army in World War II. The author, Gavin Long, says that the Australian Army (the Australian Imperial Force) had shown itself to have grown into an army that was as capable as a long-term, "regular service" force. They were volunteers, as there were no draftees in the army. The Australian units had developed an esprit de corps as the natural result of experience in combat in a variety of campaigns. They had fought in the Western Desert, in Greece, Crete, and in Syria and Lebanon. They had gained the respect of their opponents, at least in Syria.

The force was caught by surprise by the Japanese attack on 8 December 1941, and the men were slow to realize that they might be headed to the Far East. They had shown that there was some wisdom in fighting against the Axis powers, where ever they might be, as they were potential threats to the Australian homeland. They had gained valuable combat experience that would help them in future battles, both in the Middle East and the Far East. We will be moving on to Volume III of the Australian Official History, about Tobruk and El Alamein. The plan had been for Chester Wilmot to write the volume, but Barton Maugham was the eventual author.

Knowledgeable Censors in North Africa in 1941

The Australian Official History suggests that the best censor is someone trained as an intelligence officer who has extensive newspaper experience. Apparently, the British censors lacked both sorts of experience. They were said to have been open to pressure by the large British newspapers. General Blamey's intelligence officer, Lt-Colonel Rogers, had stepped in and had set up a censor for Australian news in Cairo. His choice was Major Fenton, who had experience since 1939 in intelligence and had been a "senior newspaperman" before the war.

Australian news that would benefit the army needed to be aware of Australian issues. There were times when the best solution might be to provide a soldier's name to the press or his Australian state. The concern was to help the news consumers in Australia while not revealing information that would help the enemy. They also did not want someone who lacked Australian experience saying something that would offend people in Australia. South Africa had this sort of problem due to their racial setup and with anti-war activists.

One lesson that is still highly relevant is that a spokesperson needs to know what is being planned and what is really happening. One important goal is to not be seen as either ignorant or as someone being dishonest. In either case, the actual situation might be that the senior officers had not seen fit to share important information or had not trusted the spokesperson with the plans or events on the ground. Another issue was that the powers-that-be in London wanted to describe New Zealand, Australian, and South African troops as "British Imperial troops". The Australians were able to defeat that practice during the Syrian campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australian army officers in 1941

The result of the Australian participation in combat in 1941, was that they had increased confidence in their senior officers. Of the younger officers, General Lavarack was promoted. General Wynter, who had advocated concentrating on defending Australia, had a health breakdown that removed him from a combat opportunity. He had been the Australian commander at first. There were now militiamen commanding Australian divisions. Generals Morshead and Allen had been battalion commanders in the Great War and then were brigadiers and division commanders in 1941. Most of the brigadiers in 1941 were not professional soldiers. One problem was that many Australian officer candidates were not immediately commissioned when they graduated the course. Many officers received as reinforcements from Australia were not as capable as the officer candidate graduates. The success rate for the officer candidates was much higher than that for reinforcement officers.

The Australian army had a successful system for historical records. The system had been started during the Great War. From 1914, C. E. W. Bean had been a war correspondent for Australia. In 1941, the head of the Australian War Memorial had been an assistant to Bean. A photographer and cinematographer were added in 1940. General Blamey also added a war artist, Ivor Hele. They ended up with two organizations, one for immediate news for publication and the other for historical records. The system performed badly in the Libyan campaign against the Italians, because of a flawed system for allocating vehicles for correspondents. The result was late or lost material. General Blamey's intelligence officer established a censor in Cairo, who was the ideal combination of newsman and intelligence officer. That was a system that performed well over time. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Dual responsibilities for an Australian commander in 1941

General Blamey had been the commander of the Australian contingent in the Mediterranean and Middle East in 1941. When he was appointed deputy commander, under General Wilson, that created a problem. Several times during 1941, a Dominion commander as appointed to critical commands. On short notice, General Blamey had been put in charge of the retreat and withdrawal from Greece. General Freyberg, from New Zealand, had been put in charge of the defense of Crete. Sometime during the fighting in the Western Desert, and then again in Syria, General Lavarack was put in charge. General Lavarack was younger than the others and was a more junior officer in the Great War. The Official History suggests that when General Blamey had been appointed as Deputy Commander, that the Australian Government might have put someone else in charge of their forces in the Middle East.

The Australian Official History blames the errors in command, rightly so, on Churchill and his closest advisers in Britain. With General Wavell as the theater commander, he had successfully defeated the Italians in the Western Desert and in Ethiopia (they call it Abyssinia). When the main players in Britain decided to move into the Balkans that they put the Western Desert in jeopardy. They very nearly lost everything due to throwing away army and naval forces in the Greek campaign and the battle for Crete. General Wavell was made a scapegoat for Churchill's errors in policy and planning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Assessing the early war period Australian policies

Prior to the end of 1941, the principal Australian war effort was concentrated in the Middle East and Africa. Australian strategic policy thought was divided between those who wanted to be intimately involved with the British Commonwealth on defense matters and those who were inclined to operating independently, as they disapproved of "British Imperialism". The Australians in 1939 and 1940 had policies that were a mixture of supporting the British Commonwealth and operating independently. One conclusion of the Australian Official History was that either the British Indian Army or the Australian Army were sufficiently strong to have won a campaign against the Italian Army in Africa. They point out that the British did not sufficiently appreciate how good the Indian Army was during this period. We could conjecture that the reason was racism from a faction of the British establishment. Both Generals Wavell and Auchinleck were very knowledgeable about the British Indian Army and we would expect that they could appreciate their capabilities.

The Australians were a much different army. They were based on the militia and were all volunteers at this point. Interestingly enough, of the two Australian political parties, one party was opposed to any participation at all, while the other wanted to limit any involvement to a token force. The Official History proposes that a stronger effort might have helped deter any Japanese attack. Apparently, the Australian militia forces were ready to become involved in the war and welcomed the opportunity. The ordinary people understood the political situation in Europe quite well, so that after the Munich crisis, many Australian men joined the militia.

Having the British in charge created a situation where good officers from the Commonwealth countries were ignored, leaving the top positions for British officers drawn from a rather limited group of officers, not all of whom were really capable of command. We see examples of Churchill's "cronyism" with the advancement of his friends, such as General Maitland Wilson. In the Great War, the war in Africa was commanded by the South Africans, and in 1940, that could have been a precedent to be followed, but instead, the British ignored the possibility and wanted their officers to command instead. The Australian Official History says that Generals Freyberg and Blamey were the "most accomplished and experienced senior soldiers in the Middle East," with the possible exception of General Wavell. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The war changes dramatically from November to December 1941

Some writers have criticized General Auchinleck's concern about a German attack from the north into the Middle East as a mistake. They said that he should have ignored the possibility and concentrated on the war in the Western Desert. We see now, though, that mainstream British opinion was very concerned about dealing with a German attack from Russia, either through Turkey or from the Caucasus. If he had not been planning for such an attack, he might have jeopardized his position as theater commander. The concern about a German attack was largely built on the lack of good information about the fighting in Russia. In fact, although there had been a large part of the Soviet Army that was poorly equipped (just as the Germans and British), the Russians had the best tanks and some of the best artillery in the world. The KV-I heavy tank and the T-34 medium tank were the best tanks in use in 1941. They were small in numbers at first, and some were thrown away in badly chosen situations, but they dominated the battlefield when they appeared in combat. The Germans scrambled to respond to them. In late 1941, the Germans were close to the high-water mark, although there would be further advances in the summer of 1942. The Soviet government and armed forces were not going to collapse. They had a hard core that would carry them through to better times and they started to receive British and American shipments of tanks and aircraft to supplement what they had.

Everything about the war changed after 8 December 1941 in the Far East, when the Japanese attacked. One immediate impact was that some of the Australian brigadiers from the Middle East were sent back to Australia. There were also discussions, very naturally, of sending men from the Middle East back to Australia. In January, the decision was made to send the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions along with the corps headquarters to Australia. The Australians in the Middle East had a hard time taking the Japanese threat seriously, as they could not conceive that the Japanese might invade Australia. One immediate effect was that the decision was made to replace the 7th Australian Division in Syria by the 9th Australian Division. The Australians were destined for Java, so General Lavarack and Allen set off by air. The divisions were sent in convoys for the Far East starting on 30 January. This last part is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force in Syria in late 1941 grows and prepares for a German attack

The threat of a German invasion of Syria from the north was being taken very seriously in late 1941. The mainly Australian soldiers in Syria were kept busy preparing defensive positions. Another corps headquarters, the X Corps, was moved to Syria. When the 18th Brigade was withdrawn from Tobruk, they rejoined the 7th Australian Division, also in Syria. There were many changes. The British 6th Division was renamed the 70th Division and moved into Tobruk. The 6th Australian Division was finally rebuilt. The division had greatly suffered in Greece and the battle for Crete. They took the place of the 70th Division. General Wilson no longer commanded "Palestine and Transjordan", but became 9th Army commander. The army headquarters was located north of Beirut at Broumane.

There were many complaints late in 1941 about Australian troops committing vandalism and stealing. On the lighter side, a proposal was made to train ski troops from each Australian division. There was snow in the mountains to the north and the snow in late 1941 was very heavy. They proceeded with the training, but ultimately, the training was stopped.

By late 1941, the Australian divisions were well-equipped. In another change, since they were amply equipped, they were no longer allowed to use captured equipment. For example, the 2/16th Battalion had captured Breda heavy machine guns at Mersa Matruh in April and May 1941. They were discovered when they fired on by British aircraft on 6 October. They were forced to turn them in, as the no policy no longer allowed their possession. We remember the Australian cavalry using captured Italian tanks in early 1941 and captured French tanks in July, but no longer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A change in the Australian government in late 1941

Mr. Menzies, a Liberal, had been Australian Prime Minister until early October 1941. He was followed by Mr. Curtin, of the Labour Party. General Blamey wanted to return to Australia to confer with the new government, because he was concerned about recent decisions that seemed to be mistaken. He left Egypt in early November and attended a War Cabinet meeting on 26 November 1941. General Blamey argued against disbanding units and told the cabinet that Australia had no need to maintain an armored brigade in Egypt. If they wanted to form an armored division in Egypt, they had adequate corps troops and reinforcements on which to draw. In fact, they were planning to send too many reinforcements to the Middle East, more than would be expected to be needed. He told the cabinet that he expected enough volunteers to keep enlisting so that they would not be concerned about the situation until later in 1942. The cabinet still thought that they would eventually need to reduce the number of divisions.

The New Zealand government was still waiting to hear about the proposed formation of the ANZAC corps. General Freyberg told his government that he thought that with the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk and the 6th Australian Division still not yet rebuilt, that there were insufficient divisions to be able to recreate the ANZAC Corp.

One topic of concern to General Blamey was the possibility of Australians being sent to fight a German attack through Turkey. After the Greek debacle, he was ready to resist without a better plan and adequate forces than were sent to Greece. General Blamey expressed his opinion that Germany would avoid Turkey, and if they attacked the Middle East, they would attack through the Caucasus and Caspian region. They agreed that the Australian divisions might be moved to the Taurus mountains if there were an adequate plan and preparation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An ANZAC Army?

One pet project of General Blamey was to form and ANZAC Army with two corps. The army would include the 6th Australian Division along with the New Zealand Division. When the idea was discussed again in May 1941, General Wavell expressed support for the plan. Wavell's opinion was that General Freyberg, the New Zealander, should command the ANZAC Corps. General Blamey replied that he approved of the idea. He also suggested an Australian Corps consisting of the 7th Australian Division and 9th Australian Division under General Lavarack's command. The idea would also include adding an armored division to each corps. The Australian Government hesitated to support the idea because they were concerned about their ability to find enough men to form the units. The Army staff in Australia assumed that there would be much higher casualties than the divisions ever suffered in combat. There were many men in the pipeline from Australia to the Middle East. They were more than enough to form the units that were proposed. General Blamey thought that 39,000 men a year would be adequate to support the units while the staff in Australia expected more than 100,000 men a year would be required. By 13 August, the Australian War Cabinet balked at the proposed organization in the Middle East. They wanted to just increase the number of men in the existing divisions and not add new units. General Blamey opposed the reduced forces for the Middle East. By the end of 1941, they had fully replaced losses and had completed the divisions with some 16,600 men in reserve. Part of the problem in Australia was the new government that had replaced the Menzies government. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australia and army organizations as of August 1941

When Churchill replaced General Wavell with General Auchinleck, as the theater commander, he apparently had endorsed the use of ad hoc battle groups in the Middle East. The thinking apparently was that if the Germans use ad hoc battlegroups, then the British should imitate them and use them as well. General Blamey, who was a political soldier opposed breaking up divisions to form battle groups. Part of the rationale for battle groups (the German kampgruppe), was to disperse formations to be less vulnerable to air attack. Auchinleck proved that he understood that you have to concentrate your forces at the critical point to win battles when he did just that in the Crusader Battle and pushed Rommel back to El Agheila. Then, after the collapse after the surrender of Tobruk in 1942, Auchinleck took charge and stopped Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. But much of the time, from January 1942 to July 1942, the British wasted their time with Jock Columns and the like. Rommel, the master of infiltration tactics could almost at will panic the British army and cause them to scatter. It was only with the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery that this situation was changed.

General Blamey was appalled that the Australian Government apparently only planned to put four divisions into the field. General Blamey thought that they would eventually have to mobilize many more men that four divisions worth to win the war. He correctly realized that this was to be a very dynamic and mobile war and would require a lot of men on the ground to win the war. And that was before anyone realized that the Japanese planned to enter the war as a combatant. General Blamey also suggested that naval blockade and air attacks would not be the answer to winning this war. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Defensive preparations at Tripoli in July and August 1941

The preparations made at Tripoli in July and August 1941 were based on the assumption that the Germans would enter Syria from Turkey. The plan envisioned that the Germans would use roads and railroads to move forces through Turkey. The planners thought that the German force would include 11 divisions as well as airborne units. While there was some thought that the Germans might move southward along the Mediterranean coast, they thought that a move would more likely be made from Aleppo, to Homs, to Damascus, and by Lake Tiberius, with a flanking movement through Palmyra. Tripoli had a fortress that was made ready for defense in all directions. General Allen, commander of the 7th Australian Division, thought that they would need two infantry divisions and one armored division. General Allen had his men work on building a fortress area large enough to hold that size force. General Auchinleck visited Tripoli in October and informed General Allen that no additional troops, except perhaps an armored battalion were to be added. In response, General Allen redesigned the fortress perimeter to be shorter given the force he had to defend Tripoli. General Blamey disagreed with General Auchinleck about what the Australian troops should be doing. Blamey wanted to see the Australians spending time training, not digging defenses. In the event, some civilian laborers were added to relieve the Australians from having to spend all their time digging. General Blamey, it turns out, agreed with what Bernard Law Montgomery believed, that the divisions and brigades should be kept intact and should not be broken up into ad hoc battle groups. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Defending the Middle East from attack from the north in 1941

The British apparently took the threat of attack by German troops from Russia into the Middle East. If the Germans were to attack through Turkey, either with or without help from the Turkish government, the British thought that they would advance into Turkey to hold the southern mountain passes. They were unsure what the stance of the Turkish government would be in the event of a German move through Turkey. They might fight to oppose the Germans. They might allow the Germans free passage through Turkey. The British thought that they would be able to use four divisions to move into Turkey. They expected that the Germans would move into northern Syria from Turkey. If they reached Syria, they considered that the country was well-suited to armored warfare and that the Germans would have more tanks than the British. The British thought that they would need two armored and five infantry divisions to adequately defend Syria and Iraq from German attack. By the end of July 1941, there were limited forces available. There was the 7th Australian Division, the diminutive Free French Division, the 5th Indian Brigade, the 6th British Division, and the 4th Cavalry Brigade. There was also the 10th Indian Division, but that was considered to be not included in the plan, but the division was a potential blocker to any German advance into the Persian Gulf region. The only complete unit in the scheme was the 7th Australian Division. The 6th Division was lacking much beyond the infantry battalions. They had to rely upon Australian units for artillery and other division supporting units. Sending British infantry battalions to the Middle East without artillery and other support units was considered to be a major error. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in August 1941

Because of the difficulties experienced in Crete with an airborne attack, the Germans declined to mount another airborne attack against Cyprus. The British expected the Germans to attack, as they thought the island was vulnerable. In fact, the Germans expected that Cyprus would be reinforced, and that is what happened in the event. Cyprus had only been garrisoned by the 7th Australian Cavalry, but they were replaced by a British Hussar regiment, which was reinforced by the 50th Division, which had just arrived from Britain. This had all happened by late August. By holding Syria and Iraq, the British had better secured their vital interests in the Suez canal and the oil fields.

The British expected that the Germans might penetrate to the Middle East through Turkey or through southern Russia. They told Turkey that they would support them, if attacked, with four divisions. As 1941 progressed, there was increasingly less likelihood that the Germans would reach the Middle East from the north. General Blamey told his government in Australia that he thought that the year was too late for the Germans to attack to the Middle East. General Blamey was a rather problematic man, exemplified by his treatment of General Lavarack, but he was competent enough to have a good strategic sense. He was also a strong advocate for the Australian government in the face of Churchill and his demands on the Australians. The British had a lot of uncertainty about the Turkish government and their potential attitude towards the Germans. There was no guarantee that they would not allow the Germans to pass through Turkey to reach the Middle East, in some assessments of the prospects. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Concerns in the north after June 1941

As a theater commander in the Middle East, General Auchinleck was focused on the possibility of the Germans attacking from the north, either through Turkey or the Caucasus. He was no longer responsible for Iraq, as that had been given to the Commander in Chief in India. He and General Wavell had switched jobs, so Iraq now belonged to Wavell. A new concern was added when the ruler of Iran decided to become closer to Germany and Italy and get rid of British and Russian influences. In typical Churchill fashion, he insisted on calling Iran "Persia". That was a deliberate show of disrespect for the Iranian government. The British had helped to develop the oilfields in Iran, and felt that the country was a vital interest. General Quinan, in Iraq, was instructed to prepare to go into Iran.

He had limited resources in August 1941, when the order came. He had the 8th Indian Division, whose third brigade only arrived on 10 August. He also had the 9th Armoured Brigade, formerly Habforce. Despite the name, they were without tanks. It was joined with the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade at Kirkuk and Khanaqin. The 10th Indian Division in northern Syria was added to General Quinan's available units. The 10th Indian Division was notable for having General Slim as division commander. They were up against a small Iranian army of ten divisions. They had about 524 artillery pieces and about 280 aircraft. The British and Russians were acting together and presented a joint ultimatum to the Iranian government on 13 August 1941. When the response was received, the invasion was planned for 25 August.

On 25 August, a brigade from the 8th Indian Division was landed at Abadan and took the island and refinery. Also on 25 August, another naval force landed troops at Bandar Shapur. The Iranian army surrendered by 28 August. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The new strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East after the German invasion of Russia in 1941

The Syrian campaign started prior to the German invasion of Russia. Prior to that, Germans and Italians were only fighting in the Western Desert against the British. The British seem to have attributed exaggerated prowess to the Germans, as the British expected that Russia would quickly collapse under German attack. Russia certainly had a dysfunctional government, but did have a better army than the western countries realized. British thinking was that Germany would take Cyprus and Syria after winning the battle for Crete. They imagined that they might see Germans advancing into the Middle East from the Caucasus.

The British were stronger during June to August than they had been. With the German air force diverted to Russia from the Mediterranean, the British were able to add air strength to Malta with the idea that they would be able to operate against the supply convoys to Libya from Italy. General Auchinleck took over as theater commander from General Wavell, who went to India. The army received new units and equipment. They had new aircraft from the United States and new tanks from there as well. They were in the process of forming the 10th Armoured Division and had a the beginnings of the 50th Infantry Division. Forces from East Africa were now available to the Western Desert after the defeat of Italian forces in Abyssinia. African troops were left to finish off the remaining Italian forces in East Africa. The 1st South African Division, and the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions were sent to the Western Desert.

The British sent Sir Oliver Lyttleton to the Middle East to handle both political issues and to lead a Middle Eastern Military Council. That left General Auchinleck to be able to concentrate on the military issues. He does seem to have focused to much on the dangers from the north from possible German movement into the Middle East from Russia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An assessment after the Syria campaign in June and July 1941

The Australian Official History thought that the British, Indian, and Australian troops showed a better spirit than did the Vichy French and French colonial troops. The situation was complicated by the issues regarding the campaign in France in 1940 and the French defeat, the attack on Syria and Lebanon where the French thought themselves to be morally superior to the attacking forces. The campaign was motivated, supposedly, by concerns that the Germans were using Syria for operations. The French thought that the attack was unjustified. The French fought well, at least the Australians thought so.

While the 6th Australian Division learned valuable lessons about mountain warfare in Greece, the 7th Australian Division learned their mountain warfare lessons in Syria and Lebanon. They had the opportunity to apply that knowledge in 1942 in a much different context. They had seen the importance of controlling the ridges in mountainous territory and saw the value of mortars over artillery in such and environment. They also learned how to fight tanks with guns, both anti-tank guns and field guns firing over open sights. They also gained experience with ambushes in mountain passes.

In the Syrian campaign, air power was mostly of minor importance. The exception was the battle for Palmyra, where the French air force had considerable success. An attempt to use air power at Damour had only small success due to the small numbers of aircraft that were available. The mountainous terrain also impeded the use of air power. There was the problem of finding targets on the ground for one thing. There was also considerable delay between requesting assistance and the actual arrival of aircraft. They also found that the French were very successful in concealing artillery from aircraft. The navy, however, was very well protected by aircraft against air attack. That enabled the ships offshore to provide good artillery support to land forces. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Ham-handed British press censorship about Syria in 1941

Politics was a factor in the news about the fighting in Syria. You had the issue that the Free French were trying to create a larger role for themselves and that they had tried to portray the Vichy French in Syria as going to collapse when attacked. Somewhat in line with that was that the BBC was announcing that the French were not resisting, which was untrue. General Lavarack wanted the truth known back in Australia, and the Australian press reports talked openly of the fighting.

The Australians were the most numerous force in Syria by the end of June 1941. The Australians had 18,000 men, the UK had 9,000 men, the Indians had 2,000 men, and the Free French were 5,000 men. British and Indian losses, in total actually exceeded the Australian. The losses include prisoners of war, killed, and wounded. The British and Indian together lost 1,800 men. The Australians lost 1,600 men, and the Free French lost 1,300 men. For the Free French, most of the losses were taken prisoner, as they had 1,100 prisoners of war.

The Australian Official History put the victory on the Australian infantry who had fought well in mountainous territory. They also praised the 5th Indian Brigade. They were said to be the most experienced troops in Syria except for the Australian 2/3rd and 2/4th Battalions. The 5th Indian Brigade was misused by their brigade commander, we think, and they took unnecessary losses due to being exposed to stronger enemy forces without support. The men engaged in the Syrian campaign were very tired by the end. The infantry had been pushed to an extreme, and the mountainous terrain was very difficult. Only the Australian spirit carried them to success. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An assessment of General Wavell

The Australian Official History has an assessment of General Wavell and the events towards the end of his tenure. For Admiral Cunningham, he had a glowing opinion of General Wavell. They had served together during the hardest of times in 1941. The battle for Crete was perhaps the most trying time. Admiral Cunningham considered General Wavell to be a great general, "if not the greatest".

General Wavell got credit for the brilliant campaign against the Italians conducted by General Richard O'Connor. General Wavell also took responsibility for the loss of Cyrenaica to Rommel. They blamed the loss on an incorrect estimate of the Axis strenght. Really, however, Rommel was an expert in infiltration tactics and the modern embodiment of that tactical idea in Blitzkrieg. With Rommel's arrival, the British commanders on the spot were not prepared to combat him, regardless of his force strength. Richard O'Connor had serious health issues, but he was put in the bag when he appeared as an advisor.

General Wavell backed Churchill's Greek adventure. That is not something to brag about. The campaign was politically motivated and was doomed to failure before the campaign started. General Wavell had to lie to the Australian Prime Minister and senior army officer to get them to agree to participate. The operation was obviously doomed to fail to anyone who understood the issues. The loss of Crete was a foreseeable consequence of the loss of Greece.

Wavell was reluctant to participate in the campaigns in Iraq and Syria. He was pressed to do so by Churchill. Resisting the Iraqi rebellion made sense and was successful, ultimately. As for Syria, there was not a pressing need to intervene when the attack came. Churchill misunderstood the Vichy French position and he was blinded by his hatred of them. There were really not the forces needed to invade, but they invaded anyway because that was what Churchill needed, politically. We suspect that he was looking for a quick victory over someone that he could brag about. Both the Germans and French were reluctant to do anything in Syria to prompt the British to invade. The French had briefly cooperated with the German attempt to aid the insurgent Iraqis, but quickly backed off. The Germans were particularly concerned about the possibility that the British would be provoked into invading. Because there was a political need, the Australians went into Syria with inadequate strength. They ultimately succeeded due to the quality of the men and their leadership, but they took heavy casualties in the process that might have been avoided. In any case, General Wavell's usefulness to Churchill had come to an end and he was sacked. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History and our editorial comments.

More about General Catroux

There is a good Wikipedia article about General Catroux.

He was an older man by August 1941. He eventually lived to be 92 years old in 1969. He was born in 1877, so he was older than many officers. He was 64 by the time of the armistice meeting at Acre. He seems to have been a very fine man. I liked how he handled losing his kepi at Acre, where he figured an Australian soldier had taken it as a souvenir. He had extensive experience in the Middle East and the Far East. His nature was such that he gravitated towards the Free French. He had met General de Gaulle in the Great War, when they were both prisoners of war. By October 1940, he was on General de Gaulle's staff in London. This is based on the Wikipedia article.

A look back at the events of May to July 1941

The campaign in Syria and Lebanon had lasted five weeks. It closely followed the disaster in Crete and the campaign in Greece. We might also include the breakout into the Atlantic of the battleship Bismarck and the cruiser Prinz Eugen in March that resulted in the loss of the battle cruiser Hood and damage to the new Prince of Wales. The common thread was the involvement of the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill. We find that Churchill did not accept any responsibility for the outcomes and blamed General Wavell for the mishaps in his theater, the Mediterranean and Middle East. That is unfair, because Wavell should have opposed the campaign in Greece, because it caused the disaster in Libya, due to the withdrawal of troops that were diverted to Greece and then to Crete. That opened the way for General Rommel to practice blitzkrieg tactics in Libya. Churchill was also unhappy with General Wavell over Wavell's opposition to diverting troops to Iraq from the Middle East when there was trouble and to the invasion of Syria. The Australian Official History puts the blame for the loss of Benghazi where it belongs, on Churchill, not General Wavell. General Wavell had held back one Australian division in the Middle East that might have been thrown away in Greece after the battle was already lost.

On June 21 1941, Churchill informed General Wavell that he would go to India and replace General Auchinleck, who would take over as the theater commander in the Mediterranean and Middle East. We will see that the swap did not go well, because General Auchinleck was both a brilliant field commander and a flawed theater commander. Auchinleck had commanded the operations Norway in May and June 1940. He had overseen the portion of the Middle East that fell under the India government and had become involved in Syria at the end.

The Australian Official History also points out that the battle in Western Desert and the attack on Syria and Lebanon were made with reduced forces which affected the outcomes. In the Western Desert, a premature attack was made with tanks right off the ships with untrained crews. Churchill had the ability to push the Tiger Convoy through the Mediterranean with newly manufactured tanks (in one case). He had a naive view of things that all he had to do was provide the tanks and that they would be immediately ready for battle. One vessel was lost with about fifty tanks. They sent Cruiser Mk.IV, Light Mk.VIC, and Crusader I tanks. The first fifty Crusader I tanks were sent before they were mechanically reliable. It was the sort of interference by the Prime Minister that could cause sudden disaster through the war, as was mentioned by Alan Brooke, who became the CIGS after General Dill. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A New Difficulty in Syria in August 1941

By August 1941, there were still Australian, Indian, and British prisoners in French and Italian hands. This became an issue between the British command in Jerusalem and the Australian officers in charge in Syria and Lebanon. The control committee demanded that these prisoners be returned by 5 August 1941. Three sets of letters were drafted. One was for General Dentz and two others were for two other French generals. Brigadier Savige was to arrest General Dentz. He asked for freedom to handle the situation as he felt best. He substituted a French-speaking junior Australian officer for the Free French Lieutenant-Colonel. Eventually, General Dentz was arrested and the situation was handled as well as was possible. General Dentz was at first uncooperative, but the courtesies offered to him by the Australians impressed him that he should cooperate.

When the officers sent to arrest General Jennequin, they found he was absent. They eventually found him in Tripoli. He eventually cooperated and was taken to Jerusalem by Colonel Stevenson. Brigadier Plant had a good relationship with the other general, General Arlabosse. He took him to General Lavarack's headquarters and then he went on to Jerusalem. There 35 French officers there under guard by the time all had arrived. The Allied prisoners from France arrived in Beirut by ship on 15 August. The prisoners from Scarpanto arrived by 30 September. General Dentz and the other senior officers then were sent to France in September. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The political situation in Syria in late July to August 1941

The Free French seem to have been a creature of Churchill. The Australians were very cool towards the Free French organization and had better feelings for the Vichy French than they did for the Free French. As early as 21 July 1941, the Free French wanted access to more of Syria. General Wilson broached the subject with General Lavarack, the Australian corps commander. In fact, the Free French were moving troops without permission. General Lavarack informed General Wilson that many Vichy troops would join the British, but wanted nothing to do with the Free French organization. General Lavarack told General Wilson that the Free French movements were jeopardizing the "security situation". One particular problem was that the Free French thought that they should have the civil administration of Syria under their control, which was not what had been agreed upon for obvious reasons. The Vichy French were obeying the terms of the Armistice, but the Free French were not. The British were apparently ready to undercut General Lavarack's authority to satisfy Churchill and General De Gaulle. Another sticking point was that the Free French wanted to take over all Vichy French war materials for their use, while General Lavarack wanted to be able to resupply the Australians from the Vichy French supplies and arms. Eventually, eight convoys sailed from Syria to France with some 37,500 passengers, mostly troops. 5,668 Vichy French troops joined the Free French out of 37,700 troops. By late August, the Free French division was disbanded due to lack of men. The Free French troops were divided into districts, instead. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After the Armistice in Syria and Lebanon in 1941

After the armistice in Syria and Lebanon, the area was divided up between various authorities. The area north of the road from Beirut to Damascus came under the control of the 1st Australian Corps. Within that area, the 7th Australian Division was on the coast. The Free French forces were in the east, which included Damascus. Habforce would occupy the desert areas in the northeast. The 10th Indian Division occupied the farthest portion of the northeast. That was "beyond the Euphrates".

One feature of the armistice was that prisoners taken to metropolitan France were to be set free. Another feature was that Vichy French troops would be allowed to join the Free French. They were also allowed to choose to return to France. The Allies were not to pressure the French troops to join the Allied cause.

A commission was set up in Beirut to administer the armistice. The commission had a number of committees. The one on prisoner release was headed by Colonel Blackburn, who had coaxed the Free French into Damascus. His civilian vocation was being an attorney. He was a South African.

The British goal was to transfer General Dentz and his army from Syria. Of course, General De Gaullea and General Catroux wanted to have many Vichy French troops join the Free French forces. That immediately created a source of strife and conflict. The Vichy authorities and officers wanted to return to France as quickly as possible, so that meshed well with the British goals. The Australians thought well of the Vichy officers and troops, as they had fought well and fairly. The Australians were less friendly to the Free French, who they considered had painted the campaign in rosier condition than was what was actually found. They also considered that the Free French had not performed well in the battle for Syria.

The Syrian people, who had been living under French rule, would have liked to be free from European rule, but were astute enough to realize that freedom would not be coming soon. The Australians were well aware of the position of the Syrian people. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Catroux lost his kepi to an Australian on 12 July 1941

The Free French General Catroux was the barracks at Acre for the armistice signing on 12 July 1941. He had left his Oak Leaf kepi on the seat of his car. When he returned, he noticed that it was gone. He knew about the Australians and figured that an Australian soldier had made a trophy of the hat. He did tell the camp commandant and others about the kepi, but he figured it was gone for good. He was good-natured enough to not be bothered by the incident. He had a lot of experience with the Foreign Legion, and they were very much like the Australians. As the general said: "what was taken by them was taken for good." General Wilson was "delighted" by the news. General Lavarack smiled when he heard about the missing kepi. The Vichy officers talked among themselves and thought that General Latroux was the victim of the bad company he kept. The Vichy General de Verdilhac returned to his side after midnight, at 1:30am on 13 July 1941. A column moved forward on the coastal road on 15 July. The column consisted of the 2/5th Battalion, some artillery, and some cavalry troops. They were not to enter Beirut, but to bypass the city on their way north to Latakia. The 2/16th Battalion and part of the 6th Cavalry Regiment got to enter Beirut on 15 July. They were cheered by the populace who assumed that they would have independence. The ceremonial entrance by the Allied generals happened at 10:30am on 16 July. They had 24 Bren carriers and some field guns. The next step would be spreading out the force to occupy Syria and Lebanon. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

French troops performed well in Syria and Lebanon in June and July 1941

General Dentz had a surprising low opinion of French troops defending Syria and Lebanon. In reality, French troops performed very credibly in the campaign. There was a mix of troops, Europeans, North Africans, and Africans from Senegal.

French R-35 tanks and armored cars, even if just improvised, provided a very tough opponent for British and Australian troops. Until they received sticky bombs, they had no answer for when they encountered French tanks in particular. The only anti-tank weapons that the British and Australian troops had at the beginning of the campaign in June 1941 were 2-pounder anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles. The anti-tank rifles were not able to damage an R-35 tank, and it is unclear how effective the 2-pounder was against the R-35 either.

A small band of Foreign Legion troops held out for a long period at Palmyra against the cavalry brigade and the Arab Legion. They were apparently in good positions that gave protection and allowed them good fields of fire.

At Kuneitra, Merjayoun, and Jezzine, French infantry, machine guns, and artillery, gave British and Australian troops a tough fight. The 5th Indian Brigade was decimated in the fighting and a British battalion, the Fusiliers, was all but destroyed. That area continued to be a problem, even for British troops, right up until the Armistice.

We must assume that General Dentz was not familiar with the French troops under his command. Otherwise, how could he have had such a low opinion of them? When the attack commenced in early June 1941, he expected that the French army would collapse, when that was not the case at all. Even French colonial troops, with professional French officers, performed extremely well in the tough battles on the mountain ridges in Syria and Lebanon. We found, though, that the Australian troops in particular achieved results beyond what might be expected. This is based on our assessment of the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Dentz wants to stop fighting from 22 June 1941 until 12 July 1941

As early as 22 June 1941, General Dentz, the French commander in Lebanon and Syria, expected that his forces would be defeated. In France, on 28 June, Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan agreed that they should stop fighting in Syria and Lebanon. At the time, though, they did not tell that to General Dentz. The next day, on 29 June, British bombers partly destroyed the General's residence in Beirut. General Dentz had already left the place prior to the bombing. Some French officers said that they should bomb the residence of the high commissioner in Jerusalem, but General Dentz was not prepared to bomb Jerusalem. By 30 June, General Lavarack sent a message to General Dentz, but he did not realize at the time that the British had bombed General Dentz's residence. After he found out about the bombing, he thought it had nullified his message. Palmyra was finally captured by 3 July. There was now nothing to stop an advance to Aleppo. By 8 July, General Dentz heard the news that his government was prepared to stop fighting. General Dentz sent a message to the British through the American Consul in Beirut. The British sent back a list of conditions under which they would agree to a cease fire. General Dentz then sent back a message that he agreed, with the cease-fire to happen at midnight on 11 July. The news was broadcast in Australia, which was a bad idea. General Lavarack sent an angry note to General Blamey. General Dentz replied to a wireless message from General Wilson with another wireless message. The French would stop fighting at 12:01am on 12 July 1941. The French envoys came to the Australian outpost on the road to Beirut, as requested. They were transported to Acre, where they met with General Wilson, General Lavarack, and General Catroux. They reached an agreement that allowed the Allies to occupy Syria and Lebanon. The French soldiers would be treated with full honors. They could keep their "personal weapons", but all other weapons would be stacked and controlled by the Allies. By midday on 15 July, the Australians moved forward to occupy the key locations in Syria and Lebanon. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The fighting in Syria and Lebanon ended at midnight of 11 to 12 July 1941

To the east, the fighting overlapped the armistice at midnight of 11 to 12 July 1941. The cavalry had sent out patrols to the west from the 6th and 7th of July. The 4th Cavalry Brigade was actually on the move on 11 July. The Brigadier was attacked on 12 July, nominally after the armistice. After the armistice, when the French records became available, the British were able to learn more about the defending French forces near the end. When the initial attack at Damour started, the Vichy French had about seven battalions defending Damour and Jezzine. A similar-sized force held Merdjayoun and Jebel Mazar. There were also two battalions holding Jebel Druse. Just as the Australian battalions were short of men, the French battalions were also short. The French battalions were between 250 and 450 men when the fighting stopped. That would put them stronger than many of the Australians, which were very shot of men. During the fighting at Damour, two units were pulled out, which left a cavalry regiment and three battalions holding the road to Beirut from Damascus. The French said that they took 194 men prisoner during the initial attack at Jebel Mazar. The second attack quickly came to a stop. To achieve that, the French took heavy losses, enough to cause the French general to order a withdrawal to a further line to the north. The French showed in the fighting that they had good troops who were well-led, even if the troops were Senegalese. We have constantly suspected that Churchill had ordered the attack on Syria and Lebanon, hoping for a cheap victory to aid his political fortunes after a very difficult first six months of the year. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Merdjayoun front from 9 to 11 July 1941

On 30 June 1941, the British 6th Division took over command on the Merdjayoun front in Syria. The British 23rd Brigade was actually in place at Merdjayoun when they realized that the Vichy French forces to the immediate north were withdrawing. This was on the night of 9 to 10 July. By 11 July, the 23rd Brigade moved north to the Bekaa Valley, a very familiar name in the 20th Century. The French had made demolitions and had left booby traps, so that slowed the British advance. General Evetts had planned an attack by the 16th Brigade on 10 July against the Jebel Mazar. They would have the Free French Marine Battalion with them. They attacked at 2am and made some progress. The next night, they advanced again. The situation on the ridge was very unstable, and General Evetts considered a withdrawal to more secure positions. However, he heard that there had been an armistice requested by the French, so he had his men hold their present positions. The French that they had been fighting had decided to withdraw, so suddenly, the 16th Brigade was on Jebel Mazar at midnight. General Evetts had planned for success and had a pursuit force ready to move north. The pursuit force included most of the 9th Australian Cavalry, the 2/Queen's battalion, artillery, machine guns, and four Free French tanks. The Free French marines were stopped on the right, so General Evetts sent them help from the pursuit force. At midday on 10 July, they moved out and came under fire. Much of the fire came from Jebel Mazar. The vehicles from the pursuit force moved up and down the road and came under fire. Every one of their 33 vehicles had been hit at some point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack on the heights at Badarane on 9 and 10 July 1941

Starting in the evening of 9 July 1941, a company from the 2/31st Battalion was ordered to take the heights at Badarane. This was especially challenging because there was a deep wadi between the Australians and the Badarane heights. They might have had support from their battalion carrier platoon and a troop from the 6th Cavalry, but there was a bridge out that blocked them from participating. The wadi was 800 feet deep. The heights were 600 feet above the wadi and were terraced. The attacking company had only some sixty men. The platoon leaders were a lieutenant and two sergeants. The men left Niha at 9pm on 9 July, which was about three miles away. They started out with four mules and their drivers, but they were left behind because the terrain was too difficult for mules. They had progressed to within 400 yards of Badarane by 2:30am on 10 July. They came under machine gun fire that was fired over their heads and was landing behind them. The company commander led his men to the left of the heights into olive trees. One man alone bayoneted the four defenders in one position. 43 Australians attacked and 13 were killed in the fight. They found some forth or fifty dead Senegalese soldiers. There were also many wounded that they took prisoner. There had been about 200 defenders of the heights when the Australians attacked. By 5am, the company had won the battle. They eventually got orders to destroy the French equipment and to withdraw back to the company headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Back to Jezzine from 6 July 1941

The 25th Australian Brigade had started to make progress at Jezzine while the battle for Damour was being fought. From 6 July 1941, the 2/31st Battalion moved north to Beit ed Dine. The 2/31st had advanced to Niha and beyond by early 7 July. The Cheshire Yeomanry was also active and had taken some French prisoners in Mrousti. They had talked with a Swiss member of the French Foreign Legion who told them that the French had withdrawn from Bater because of the intensity of the artillery fire. The current commander of the 25th Brigade, Brigadier Plant, ordered the left battalion group (because they included artillery) to take Beiqoun and Mazraat ech Chouf. One company was to take the commanding heights near Mazraat ech Chouf. The 2/25th Battalion with support from the 2/6th Field Regiment would move north. By 3pm on 8 July, they started to receive French artillery fire. They called in artillery support from the 2/6th Field Regiment. One platoon then was attacked by African troops. By 7pm, one platoon was in an exposed position and had taken casualties. The platoon was withdrawn, leaving the French in possession of the high ground. To the east, a company of the 2/31st Battalion was attacked twice on 8 July. Their losses left them with only 20 men. By 4:30, they were reinforced by an 18 man platoon from another hill. One company of the 2/25th Battalion tried to take Hill 1054 from the French. The attackers were left in exposed positions and were unable to move. Fortunately, some of the Pioneers came up in support. Men with Bren guns were able to take out three French machine guns. Artillery fire was called in. The guns fired for about 50 minutes and then the Australians charged the French with fixed bayonets. The French broke and ran. The French withdrew in confusion, but the Australians had lost communication with their artillery. Otherwise, they could have taken out the French vehicles. That withdrawal left the Australians on the heights at Mazraat ech Chouf. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Near the coast on 11 July 1941 approaching Beirut

Early on 11 July 1941, French fire had slowed and stopped. Lt-Col. King ordered men to probe north from the roadblock. The men did not see any French forces, but they found that the French had merely allowed the probing men to pass through their lines and return without disturbing them. During the early afternoon, the French were active and present again. They also sent a tank squadron out along the sand dunes. This was just beyond the wireless antenna. Brigadier Savige, on hearing the news, told Lt-Col. King to stay in place in their current positions. Brigadier Savige was planning an attack for the morning of 12 July. At the same time, Brigadier Savige, commander of the 17th Australian Brigade, had ordered the 2/3rd Battalion to move forward onto the ridges that dominated the land near Aramoun. The land was so rough that supplying the forward troops with food was a problem. They survived on goat and also got horse meat from the local villagers. Hutchison's company, now of only about thirty men, came under French fire. They pulled back and set up a mortar that they used to fire back at the French machine guns. On the right, the 2/14th Battalion moved forward. They found four French 155mm guns and 200 rounds at Daqoun. They eventually moved forward to Ain Kaour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Greatly reduced Australian battalions on 9 and 10 July 1941 in Syria and Lebanon

During the afternoon of 9 July 1941, the 21st Australian Brigade was ordered to take "Abey and Kafr Matta" while the 17th Brigade was to advance on Beirut. When men from the 2/27th Battalion entered Abey and were near Daqoun, they found that the French had pulled back from the area. The 2/14th Battalion was to hold the area near Abey, Kafr Matta, along with Hill 903. They also were to block the road to Beirut. When Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade, had moved north through Damour and made contact with Lt-Col. King of the 2/5th Battalion. Savige was unsure of what he should do next, and traveled to the 7th Division headquarters to get guidance. The 2/5th Battalion found themselves in a poor position, so he ordered a move north for about two miles. They reached their new position by 4:20am on 10 July. The 2/5th Battalion was by this time reduced to companies of 45 men or less. They had also moved so far that they were running short of phone wire for signals. Brigadier Savige arrived later in the morning of 10 July. He had Lt-Col. King move his men to the next ridge near Khalde. The 2/5th now had better artillery support. They were in company with the 2/5th Field Regiment and had a group of 6-inch howitzers from the British 7th Medium Regiment. The Australians had a fire plan for a new attack that would start at 3:30m on 10 July. They would have a barrage move forward of the advancing troops. They reached the French road block and block house. One platoon was held up by French mortar fire and machine guns. The 6th Cavalry came forward in support and had cleared the area in front of the road block. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th Cavalry in action on 8 July 1941

On the morning of 8 July 1941, while the 2/16th Battalion was improving their situation on the ridges, more of the 6th Cavalry Regiment crossed the Damour River to join their other part. There were already three tanks (probably captured R-35's) on the north side. They were with two companies from the 2/2nd Pioneers. The Pioneers were now a mile north of the river. Progress had been halted by French fire and the threat of French 75mm guns covering the road. The squadron commander was angry about someone saying bad things about the cavalry being held up and ordered the three tanks forward, which was a bad idea. A tank came around the bend in the road and was hit by fire from a 75mm gun 300 yards away. A second tank came up in support. The damaged tank was set on fire. The crew abandoned the damaged tank and was picked up by the other tank. Lt. Macmeikan, of the 2/5th Field Regiment saw the gun flash and was able to knock it out by artillery fire. By 2pm, the decision was made to pull back and call in an artillery barrage. When the Pioneers pulled back, the French moved forward to be clear of the artillery fire. When the Pioneers attacked again during the night, they moved forward into part of the town. By morning on 9 July, the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour. It was after this event that Brigadier Berryman had arrived and ordered men forward when he saw the situation. Brigadier Savige was put in charge to restore some order around Damour and beyond. During the afternoon on 9 July, men from the 2/27th found that the French had pulled out of Abey and Daqoun. In response, the 2/14th Battalion was ordered to move into Abey, Kafr Matta, and a hill between them. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

After Damour fell on 9 July 1941

Once the Australians realized that the French had withdrawn from Damour and surrounding positions, they exploited the situation. By 7am on 9 July 1941, men from the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion and the 2/16th Battalion met Captain Noonan's company from the 2/14th Battalion. This was on the northeast side of Damour. The 6th Cavalry and some Pioneers moved up to Karacol. The roadblock on the road to Beirut now was held by two companies from the 2/5th Battalion. A local Lebanese told someone on Brigadier Savige's staff that the French had pulled out of Abey. This was to the east. They sent word to General Allen, the 7th Australian Division commander of the situation.

Brigadier Berryman had arrived back in the west from Merdjayoun to resume his role as the 7th Division artillery commander. The commander of the 2/5th Field Regiment had driven north for 3-1/2 miles to a roadblock. Two tanks from the 6th Cavalry were held by the roadblock. Brigadier Berryman gave orders for continued movement to the north and informed the division headquarters of his actions. There was a situation now that the division commander had told the 17th Brigade not to advance until he issued orders. Men with guns from the 2/5th Field Regiment moved quickly north. The guns that were farthest north were around Karacol. They were drawn into a duel with French guns, firing over open sights. From this position, they were also able to shell the southern edge of Beirut. The situation was rather chaotic, and needed someone to bring the situation under control. That task was given to Brigadier Savige, of the 17th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

8 July 1941 at Damour

The situation on 8 July 1941 near Damour was that the town was being threatened on three sides. There were three Australian battalions involved. The 2/5th blocked the road out of Damour to the north. On the northeastern side, the 2/14th Battalion was in position. Then there were the 2/2nd Pioneers "moving up from the south". Artillery support had to be carefully coordinated so as to not shoot at Australians while firing in support. At 5pm, Colonel Chapman brought orders from the division commander, General Allen, proposing that the 21st Brigade would have responsibility for "the area south of the Wadi Daqoun". Brigadier Savige's 17th Brigade would move north along the coast road. The 21st Brigade would move eastward towards Abey. By 7:30pm on 88 July, there were reports of French movement. This was to the north east. During the day on 8 July, two companies were near Damour on the east side. There was some concern that there might be a danger of accidentally firing on Australians.

8 July was a time spent by the 2/16th Battalion on the ridges at Mar Midhail and El Atiqa. They were gradually making themselves more secure. In the morning, three tanks from the 6th Cavalry (probably the captured French R-35 tanks) crossed the river. The 2/2Pioneers were moving north to a point about a mile north from the river. The French were still strong in the banana plantation. One tank caught by a French 75mm gun was knocked out. The 2/5th Field Regiment fired in support and knocked out the French gun. Brigadier Stevens decided to withdraw the men and call in artillery fire on the French. Some ground had been lost on the 8th, but during the night, the Pioneers took back what had been lost and were. A troop of the 6th Cavalry was able to drive through Damour by 4am and they had the town. They found that during the night, the French had withdrawn from where they had been fighting. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

with the 2/3rd Battalion from 8 July 1941 and with the 2/5th

We are now at daybreak on 8 July 1941 with the 2/3rd Battalion. They were on the Kheurbet el Biar ridge. They started to receive French artillery and mortar fire as the day got light. They could see French artillery in the distance, where the wadi cut the hill. By 6am, Captain Parbury could see Australians at Deir Mar Jorjos. At that news, the 2/3rd moved forward to the heights that they were to take. The commander ordered Porbury to tkane hill 569 on the right. He sent a platoon which came under machine gun fire. The Australians were tired and without water. They were able to move along and reached one knoll on the summit. They could see five French field guns some five hundred yards away. By late on the 9th, in the afternoon, they took the guns. They were then in the village.

Meanwhile, the 2/5th was at the wadi near Deir Mar Jorjos. This was just at midnight in the night of 7 to 8 July. The first men to arrive came under fire, but were able to take four 75mm guns and 8 machine guns. By 3am, they were in Deir Mar Jorjos. Just before En Naame, they took the high ground. From there some men entered the village and took "a French colonel of the Foreign Legion and his staff". By 8am, an artillery captain was able to get his 15 mile long wire into the village. That allowed the commander to speak with Brigadier Savige. By dawn on 8 July, they started to receive mortar fire. A small group was sent to take the bridge. There men with two Thompson sub-machine guns and a Bren gun. The bold attack caused the French to flee the bridge. When Lt-Col. King saw a French counterattack forming, he called in artillery fire, which broke the attack, so that the men all ran. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.