The end of the line at Sfakia: 31 May 1941 on Crete

On the night of 30-31 May 1941, some 1,550 men were embarked from the beach at Sfakia by destroyers. After the embarkation, there were something like 1,250 Autralian, 1,200 New Zealand, and 1,550 British troops. Some of the latter were infantry improvised from artillery units. There were also as many as 5,000 depot troops. General Weston hoped to get about 2,000 off the beach on the night of 31 May to 1 June 1941. After a bad fight on 30 May, the Germans held back from attacking the rear guard above Sfakia. Brigadier Vasey knew that the Germans were forming a line, boxing in Sfakia so that there would be no other way out then ships from the beach. By the evening of 31 May, there was no longer water available to the men and there was no food. By now, there were few ships left in the Mediterranean. Crete had been a disaster, following closely on the disaster in Greece. Early in the morning on 31 May, a force under Admiral King's command sailed for Sfakia. The force consisted of the cruiser Phoebe, the fast mine layer Abdiel, and two destroyers. After the ships arrived off Sfakia at 11:20pm, they started loading men. They were able to lift 4,050 by the time they sailed at 3am. The commandos of Layforce and the Australian 2/7th Battalion had to be left. They should have been able to be evacuated, and a few were, but through bad management and maybe even ill-will, they were held up until it was too late. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Freyberg stayed on Crete with the New Zealand division

The higher commanders had ordered General Freyberg to leave Crete, but he chose to stay on the island as long as there were substantial numbers of men, including the New Zealand division. He sent a message asking for more ships to come and remove men on the night of 30 May 1941. Four destroyers would come to evacuate men, and that meant that only 2,000 could be embarked. They were also sending some flying boats (Short Sunderland). General Weston, the Royal Marine, decided that they would embark the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades. They were forced to leave the strongest battalion, the 21xt, as rearguard. They were left under Brigadier Vasey's command. In the event, the naval officer in charge only would take 1,000 men, so the 5th Brigade was left and the 21st Battalion was put under their command. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The embarkation from Sfakia in May 1941

The hope was to embark all the troops at Sfakia onto warships and carry them to Egypt. Four destroyers were present at Sfakia on the evening of 28 May 1941. They removed 230 wounded men and some 800 British troops, including some RAF personnel. In the north on 28 May was when the force at Heraklion was loaded onto three cruisers and six destroyers. That was almost all the British and Commonwealth troops there. Since the convoy from Heraklion was heavily attacked and took losses, that influenced plans for further withdrawals. The Glengyle and three extra destroyers besides what had already been sent were at Sfakia on 29 May. By early on 30 May, Sfakia was being hard-pressed by attacking German troops. Late on 29 May, ships arrived to take more men off the beach at Sfakia. They had removed some 6,000 men, including 550 wounded by 3:20am. At that point, the ships sailed. Even thought the situation was tense, the commanders had to deal with the fact that most of the New Zealand Division was still in Crete. Were they going to abandon them? This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian OFficial History.

At the rearguard position on 30 May 1941 at Sfakia

Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, commanded the rearguard position protecting Sfakia on 30 May 1941, as the day began. He had the 2/7th Battalion blocking the road. The 2/8th, which was very weak, was in a wadi on the left. He also had Royal Marines, which he held in reserve. As for artillery, he had the two 75mm guns of the 2/3rd Field Regiment. They were commanded by Capatain Laybourne-Smith. They were the only artillery pieces that they had been able to carry over the mountains. There were also two machine guns belonging to the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion. This was now commanded by Lieutenant Bolton. The plan was for the 19th Brigade to hold the rearguard position through 30 May and 31 May and be evacuated by ship. To the north about a mile where the 3rd Hussars with three light tanks. They were accompanied by men of the 42nd Field Company (engineers). The engineers would explode craters into the road after the tanks withdrew. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The night of 29 May 1941 near Sfakia on Crete

After the 23rd Battalion had passed through the rearguard position held by hte 4th New Zealand Brigade, they began to move south. The 4th Brigade reached the road above Sfakia by 10 or 11pm. The 5th Brigade only reached that point by the morning of 30 May 1941. Thy had reached a critical point where the shortage of food and water as an issue. Most of the men headed for the beach at Sfakia came through a "sheeprace" setup by the men of the 2/3rd Field Regiment (Australians, fitting enough). The sheeprace was at Komitadhes, where men were routed to the beach. Ships reached the beach at Sfakia by 11:30pm on 29 May. Men were ferried out to ships by landing craft from the Glengyle. They left behind three landing craft for use in later embarkations. Interestedly enough, the cruiser Perth also carried two landing craft that were used in carrying troops out to ships. The ship had loaded about 6,000 men by 3:20am and then sailed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

29 and 30 May 1941 near Sfakia

On 29 May 1941, hile the Australians were to hold the rear-guard position near Vitsilokoumos in the hills, there were still the New Zealanders of the 5th Brigade to talk about. The 5th New Zealand Brigade remnants were to move to the area above Sfakia. Layforce would then move to Komitadhes. Early on 29 May, the 23rd New Zealand Battalion was still at the entrance to the Askifou plain. They were down to a company-sized group of men and they were faced at 7:15am with a large number of Germans advancing towards them. They were short of water, but the 5th Brigade Major collected containers and water to them by truck. The battalion was withdrawn late in the day by truck and were carried across the plain and passed through the rear-guard position at the south end by late evening. The 4th Brigade then started to move back. The 5th Brigade reached the road about Sfakia by 10 and 11pm on 29 May. The 4th Brigade only reached theat by daylight on 30 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the Sfakia withdrawal from Crete

Major-General Evetts, who Wavell wanted to oversea the final withdrawal from Sfakia, flew from Alexandria to Cairo to meet with Wavell. General Cunningham had wanted to use the Glen ships and cruisers for the withdrawal, but Wavell insisted that only destroyers be used to remove the men. We can suppose that Wavell was concerned about the mounting naval losses from air attack. As it was, the Glengyle didn't receive the message in time, and Admiral Cunningham decided that the ship should continue towards Sfakia. Admiral Cunnningham sent another three destroyers, these being the Stuart, Jaguar, and Defender to Sfakia. The Royal Marine, General Weston, was still involved. He ordered the 4th New Zealand Brigade to the beaches from Askilou, where they had been in a rear-guard position. The plan was for Vasey's 19th Australian Brigade to hold a rear-guard position in the hills over Sfakia, with the two Australian Battalions, the 2/7th and 2/8th, along with the Royal Marine battalion, two guns from the 2/3rd Australian Field Regiment, and three light tanks from the 3rd Hussars. There were also three carriers from the 2/8th Battalion. This is based on the account from Volume II of the Australian Official History.

General Wavell gets involved

When the Major General was about to be dispatched to Crete on 28 or 29 May 1941, he was briefed by General Wavell, the theater commander. Thinking about the situation, I had some new insights that I wanted to share. General Wavell had a streak of "bad luck" that was only broken by the success against the Italians in Libya in late 1940 and into early 1941. The success against the Italians happened almost in spite of General Wavell. The great blitzkrieg campaign in western Egypt into Cyrenaica was due to Richard O'Connor and his assistant Eric Dorman-Smith. The 7th Armoured Division and the 6th Australian Division threw the Italians into disorder and captured large numbers of infantrymen. The offensive was halted by General Wavell, so that the resources could be diverted to the ill-conceived Greek campaign. I suspect that Wavell did not believe that there was any chance of the Greek campaign succeeding, so he lied to the Australian Prime Minister and the senior Australian officers to get them to agree to participate. Again, I suspect that Wavell thought he would be removed from his command if he opposed the Greek adventure, and that was probably true. He was not going to be able to persuade the Australians with the truth, so he lied. Wavell hung on through a series of disasters, the last being the operations against Rommel at the Libyan border that failed. Churchill had pushed to rush tanks to the Middle East through the Mediterranean Sea only to see them wasted. Wavell was finally fired and Churchill brought in another Indian Army officer, Claude Auchinleck.

28 and 39 May 1941 on Crete

While the troop movement to the south was underway, by 28 and 29 May 1941, the Royal Marine officer, General weston, was making preparations for the troop withdrawal. By the afternoon on 28 May, General Weston made arrangements for a group of men from the 2/4rd Field Regiment to be available to guide troops to the beach for embarkation. They had to climb from the top of the escarpment down to the beach to be ready. The plan worked and on the night of 28 May, they embarked 230 wounded and 800 British troops, including RAF, on four destroyers. At the same time, three cruisers and six destroyers were embarking the troops at Heraklion. Practically the entire group there was withdrawn. A force including four cruisers, some small, left Alexandria at 9pm on 28 May, heading for Sfakia. The plan was to embark more men on 29 May. Major General Evetts was to command the withdrawal, although he was new to the process and to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian 2/7th Battalion, moving at night on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

On the night of 28 and 29 May 1941, the Australian Battalion, the 2/7th, was moving at night. They had a plan that they executed for what to do if a German reconnaissance aircraft dropped a flare. They had marched until they reached the Askifou plain. This was apparently just north of the village. They moved in sections along the side of the road. When a flare was dropped, the battalion commander blew his whistle, and the men were to lay face down off the road. The idea was to only show the empty road to the air, in the flare light. Afterwards, they resumed their march. Following them, the 2/8th Battalion marched towards Kerstes. They arrived there at about 5am on 29 May. Layforce came along behind and moved to Imvros, on the south side of the plain. The German mountain regiment that had captured A Battalion of Layforce waited all day on 28 May and planned to restart the pursuit in the morning of 29 May. The mountain division was still intent on cleaning up at Retimo, where they bagged the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard on the march south on 28 and 29 May 1941 on Crete

The Australian battalion, the 2/8th, arrived at Babali at about 2pm in the afternoon and took a defensive position with the commandos of Layforce. Once that happened, the 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters moved south to Vrises. They were accompanied by the 5th New Zealand Brigade and the Australians in the 2/7th Battalion, which had been in the rearguard. The Germans had reached Babali as early as 1:35pm and had started firing at Layforce troops. While the rearguard had seen air attacks, by this time, the Germns were concentrated against Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard headed for Vrises. The 5th New Zealand Brigade and the rest of the 19th Australian Brigade were together at Vrises. The New Zealanders headed south, over a pass, starting at6pm. They were heading towards Syn Ammondari, which was a further 12 miles to the south. An unnecessary disruption happened when the engineers set off explosives to destroy the road before the rearguard had arrived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on 27, 28, and 29 May 1941 on Crete

Even though the Germans knew of the British movement towards the south coast of Crete on 27 and 28 May 1941, General Ringel, the German commander, had two mountain regiments moving towards Retimo. One mountain regiment was pursuing the retreating British forces (British, Australian, and New Zealand). At Stilos, they had a hard fight and captured most of a battalion and destroyed two tanks. The battalion must have been A Battalion of commandos from Layforce. The regiment at Stilos was content to let the forces in front of him withdraw in the night, as the commander expected. General Ringel apparently expected a fight at Retimo, which is why he had two thirds of his mountain division moving in that direction. In fact, the commander at Retimo was ready to surrender in the face of overwhelming force. Only by 29 May was the 100th Mountain Regiment sent to chase the retreating force heading for the south coast. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the road: 28 May 1941, heading to the south on Crete

On 28 May 1941, the plan agreed upon was that after the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters reached the Babali Inn and Layforce, the 5th Brigade battalions and Brigadier Vasey's Australian would march south to Vrises, where the men would hide out during the hottest part of the afternoon. After the Australians of the 2/8th Battalion reached Babali, the 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters moved south towards Vrises. The New Zealand battalions and the 2/7th Battalion then followed the headquarters to Vrises. The problem was that the Germans were fast approaching and attacked at Babali at 1:35pm. Layforce was under fire at Babali until dusk, but the German air attacks were diverted to the fight at Heraklion. By later in the evening, the rearguard withdrew towards Vrises. The troops rested at Vrises before moving onwards. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The airborne attack on Crete in 1941

With our hindsight, we can see that the German airborne force was insufficient to achieve a successful attack on Crete. We might say that in May 1941, everyone was a novice at mounting large airborne attacks. Crete was an opportunity for the Germans to have analyzed the battle and learned from the battle so as to better be able to make airborne attacks in the future. Instead, the Germans were afraid to mount another attack of the scale of Crete. The Allies were the ones who learned from Crete and built and used effective airborne forces. They were first used on a large scale in the attack on Sicily in 1943 and then again at Normandy. In many ways, the attack on Normandy repeated some of the German mistakes from 1941. Making the assault at night was asking for trouble, and then they made little attempt to drop the paratroops on the planned locations. That was one of the major mistakes at Heraklion on 20 May 1941. Most of the German paratroops were dropped in the wrong locations. Those who were dropped onto defended areas with troops ready to respond took heavy losses, as paratroops in the air in daylight with a long drop time were easily killed. By late 1944, there was no excuse for the bad planning involved with Operation Market Garden, the "A bridge too far" operation at Arnhem.

The withdrawal to the south from Suda Bay on 28 May 1941

The 5th New Zealand Brigade let a group of Italian prisoners through on the road to the south. The prisoners were under a white flag. The brigade commander let them through on the road, although they only reached Stilos, where they were scattered by German mortar fire. The Australian, Brigadier Vasey, attended Brigadier Hargest's conference with his battalion commanders. The consensus was that they needed to start moving south that morning, 28 May 1941, rather than waiting for dark. They did not think that the men could fight all day and have a chance at marching all night. Brigadier Vasey agreed with the decision and offered the 2/7th Battalion as a rearguard for the movement. The 5th New Zealand Brigade Headquarters would move south and reinforce the point held by the commandos of Layforce. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More thoughts on the defense of Maleme at Crete in 1941

When we review the events at the beginning of the German attack on Crete, we can see what seems to indicate a failure of command at the highest level. In the west, at Maleme in particular, there seems to have been an opportunity to defeat the initial attack. That the defense failed was due to the lack of experience or expertise of the New Zealand commanders on the spot and the lack of oversight by General Freyberg. Lt-Col. Andrew, who commanded the western-most battalion lost control of the situation and his battalion was beaten and driven from the battlefield. The other commanders were not even aware of what was happening at the time. The 5th New Zealand Brigade commander was a civilian without very much experience and was more of a political appointee. They were the commanders at the spot at Maleme, and the Germans applied sufficient force and resorted to operating Ju-52 transports from the beach and from dry river beds until they took control of the airfield at Maleme. Instead of knowing that the situation was in doubt and sending reinforcements, the higher commanders were slow to respond, and General Freyberg was particularly hands-off at this time. Only during the withdrawal to the south was General Freyberg very involved in operations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History. There is apparently a book that criticizes General Freyberg's performance in the Battle for Crete.

28 May 1941, the force at Suda in route to the south

By early 28 May 1941, troops were heading south, hoping to be embarked eventually at Sfakia. General Freyberg had taken command of the troops that had been under General Weston's command. General Freyberg had a headquarters established at Akisfou, a plain. They hoped to embark as many as one thousand men that night and more on succeeding nights. On 28 May, there were still units within a half mile of Suda Bay. Early on 28 May, the rearguards were overwhelmed and surrounded. That was not a good sign for the plan. By 9am, the commanders on the scene decided to move out, as the men were not up to a day long fight and then a withdrawal. The Australian 2/8th Battalion arrived at Babali in the afternoon. The time was about 2pm. They were free from air attack, but the Germans were after the rearguard at Babali. By 9:15pm, they withdrew towards Vrises. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Assessment of the German attack on Heraklion from 21 May to 29 May 1941

The German attack on Heraklion was based on a series of errors, both by the German High Command, and by the local commander. Heraklion was another case where paratroops were dropped onto a strongly defended area with trained troops waiting for the assault. That was an error by the High Command that happened in most paratroop attacks in Crete. The High Command also seriously underestimated the strength of the defending force. They also did not realize the danger to transport aircraft by ground fire, mostly from 40mm Bofors light anti-aircraft guns at Heraklion, but also 3 inch anti-aircraft guns. That caused heavy losses of transports in the first wave and caused the following waves to be understrength and delivered in small groups. The plan was also flawed in that the force was given too many objectives: the communications stie at Gurnes, the town of Heraklion, the airfield, and the protection on the west side. There was also the problem that Colonel Brauer did not concentrate his force and attack at a single point. Even after being reinforced, he was struggling to even concentrate his force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German overview for Heraklion in May 1941

The successful defense at Heraklion disrupted the German plans for the attack on Crete. The German attack at Heraklion failed due to the combination of greatly underestimating the defending force, allocating too few resources, and then scattering what attacking force was provided. The grand German plan had been to take the town and port of Heraklion and the airfield, and then bring part of the 5th Mountain Division in by sea and by air. The small vessels that had been destined for Heraklion were turned back and returned to the Piraeus. What German forces that survived from the 1st Parachute Regiment at Heraklion were to prevent British aircraft from being able to operate from the airfield. After seeing British aircraft on the airfield on 23 and 24 May, General Student decided to send in reinforcements to try and take the airfield. To try and get the force on the ground safely, the reinforcing battalion-sized group was dropped to the west. They killed or captured a British platoon after landing. The commander, Major Schulz, directed his troops to take Apex Hill in the morning of 26 May and then beat off Greek attackers from Knossos. On 37 May, another improvised battalion was landed at Gurnes. The original commander was not ready to attack on 28 May, but the British were withdrawn by sea on the night of 28-29 May and left the airfield and town for the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Losses on the way to Egypt from Heraklion: 1941

The first loss on the way to Egypt from Heraklion in late May 1941 was the destroyer Imperial. The Imperial had taken damage from what must have been a near-miss by a bomb. The crew and troops were moved to the destroyer Hotspur. The Imperial was then sunk by a torpedo. This was early on 29 May 1941. At 6am, about 100 German dive bombers attacked. Another destroyer, the Hereward, was damaged had to be beached while passing through Kaso Straight at the east end of Crete. The crew and troops were captured by the Germans. The two cruisers were hit by bombs. The Orion took three bomb hits and the Dido was hit by one bomb. There were 100 men killed and 200 wounded on the Orion. The Dido had 103 men from the Black Watch killed out of the 240 on board. The ships neared the Egyptian coast by 2pm and the bombing attacks stopped. They finally reached the shelter of Alexandria harbor by 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal from Heraklion

To get a message to General Freyberg, Brigadier Chappel, commander of the troops at Heraklion, had to send the message by way of Egypt. This was in the night of 26 and 27 May 1941. He stated that the Germans were in control of heights that commanded their position at Heraklion. The road to the south was controlled by the Germans, and more paratroops were being landed outside of his position. They were starting to run short of food and ammunition at Heraklion. He asked if they should try to break out to the west or south. He received a reply on 27 May that Crete was to be abandoned. He informed his commanders early on 28 May of the situation. The troops would be embarked at night. Early on 28 May, ships sailed from Alexandria, including the cruisers Orion, Ajax, and Dido with destroyers. Ajax was damaged and had to return to Alexandria. The rest arrived off Heraklion at 11:30pm. The destroyers entered the harbor in groups of four and embarked troops. Everyone was embarked but troops holding a road block at Khoudesion and those left at the aid station at Knossos. No attempt was made to inform or embark the Greek troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more intense at Heraklion from 26 May 1941

There was concern that the German moves were intended to cut off the troops at Heraklion to keep them from being able to move to the south. After all, it would be the Knossos road that would be the natural route to reach Pirgos in the south. There was actually cooperation between Australian and German medical staff where the Germans would put wounded Australians where they could be recovered and carried into the Australian position. There was frequent fighting near the village of Babali, where there were but twelve houses. The Germans would often raid there looking for food. There was a situation where there were Greek civilians fighting as guerrillas and killing Germans. The Germans, for their part, would retaliate and kill Greek civilians in retaliation. The German paratroopers seem to have been particularly atrocity-prone for some reason, perhaps due to training. The Germans would drop pamphlets making threats of violence in Greek and English. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation becomes more serious on 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

The Agylls were attacked early on 26 May 1941 by some 300 Germans. They were on Cemetery Ridge, just east of Heraklion. The situation was restored by the Leicesters, who attacked along the ridge. They had beat back the Germans, but took some heavy losses in the process. The Argylls became confused about the situation and started shooting at the Australians of the 2/4th Battalion. The Australian Intelligence sergeant made contact with the Argylls and corrected the situation. The Germans had moved onto Apex Hill and were between the 2/4th Battalion and Kesteven's platoon. Germans were on the move with some 500 moving through the Wadi and another 200 moving north toward the ridge. Kesteven had been ordered to fight his way out, if he encountered overwhelming force. Kesteven's platoon attacked the smallest German group, while moving down the rocky north face of the hill. Kesteven was among the wounded early in the fight. They charged the Germans and overcame them. They were able to reach the Black Watch and then to rejoin the 2/4th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 to 26 May 1941 at Heraklion

Information had been received on 24 May 1941 at Heraklion that there were large numbers of Germans moving through the hills towards the east. The assumption was that they were preparing to attack Heraklion from the east. The defenders at Heraklion also learned that German transport aircraft were landing on the beach at Mallia. Mallia was on the coast, about fifteen miles east of Heraklion. Early on 25 May, the Germans attacked the town of Heraklion from the west. Heraklion was defended by "two companies of the York and Lancasters and one of the Leicesters". The lead troops of the Argyll and Sutherland reached the Heraklion defended area. The rest, about two companies, arrived on 25 May. They arrived on foot, having moved throough the hills. They were positioned in the line previously occupied by the Leicesters. The Leicesters that were then available became the reserve. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The bombing attack on Heraklion on 24 May 1941

As we saw, the British took over the defense of the town of Heraklion on 23 May 1941 after ordering the civilians to leave. The Greeks were no longer responsible for the defense of the town. The surviving Greek troops were organized into two one thousand man battalions. They were positioned around Arkhania. They were to protect the hospital at Knossos and hold the road and keep that open for traffic. Note that Arkhania is to the south of Heraklion, on the way to the south coast.

The bombing attack on Heraklion started early in the day and continued. That morning, more paratroops and supplies were dropped to the west by forty transport aircraft. They were caught in a battle between the 1/Argyll and Sutherland and Germans that were occupying the road. The British troops had taken losses and were forced to retreat. Still, during the day, a British truck convoy succeeded in passing to the south towards Ayia Deka where they were to build a landing ground for aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Hurricanes at Heraklion on 23 May 1941

An attempt was made on 23 May 1941 to bring some Hurricane fighters to Heraklion so as to be able to attack the transport aircraft landing at Maleme. Six Hurricanes arrived at Heraklion, but it was a surprise and two were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns. One landed at Heraklion while three returned to their base. Even later in the day, another six Hurricanes arrived, engaged the attacking bombers and then landed. Four of those that landed had their tail wheels damaged, so they were not operable. Meanwhile, the town of Heraklion was hit hard by a bombing raid. The Germans sent a message threatening to destroy the town if they did not surrender. The bombing raid had started fires on the dock where chemicals were stored. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

23 May 1941 at Heraklion

One feature of 23 May 1941 at Heraklion was that there was a great deal of German air activity. This included dropping bombs and strafing the British troops. The Germans were also busy dropping supplies to their troops on the ground. Since the Germans were in strong positions on the east side of the airfield, the supply drops were concentrated in that area. There was also a report that German transport aircraft were operating at a suitable location to the east of "East Ridge". Two companies from the Leicesters made a reconnaissance raid to the east. They reported that the Germans were weak, but heavily armed with machine guns. The defenders of the airfield at Heraklion worked at expanding the perimeter of their defended area. Also on 23 May, two Inf.Mk.II Matilda tanks arrived from the south coast. They were to proceed to Suda Bay. The only surviving Matilda at Heraklion, along with two field guns were sent on to Suda Bay by lighter. The Germans staged a destructive bombing raid on the town of Heraklion and demanded the surrender of the town. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

John Pendlebury, the archaeologist, at Heraklion on 22 May 1941

John Pendlebury was a British archaeologist who was working on reconstructing the bronze age on the island of Crete. During the war, he was apparently working for British intelligence. He had been in Britain for training from the outbreak of the war until May 1940, when he returned to Heraklion. He was near Heraklion during the initial attack on 20 May 1941. He spoke Greek like a native and was assimilated into Cretan society. With his Cretan companions, he was going to participate in an attack on German troops. Along the way, he fired on some Germans. There were Ju-87 divebombers overhead and John Pendlebury was shot in the chest. He was taken to a house. He was eventually treated by a German doctor, but some passing German paratroops took him outside and executed him. His body was eventually transported to the cemetary near Suda Bay. This is based on the account in the Wikipedia.

More about 22 May 1941 at the town of Heraklion

During the day on 22 May 1941, at the town of Heraklion, there were no attacks by either the Germans or the Allies. This was a day when the Allies worked at collecting and burying the dead Germans in particular. What you would think would become a major complication was that the Greek civilians armed themselves with German weapons and started firing them. West of the town, the Germans were reported to be driving women and children in front of them. When the Greek commander heard this, he warned the Germans to stop or he would kill the German prisoners. Not only was there the town of Heraklion, but there were small villages, as well, in the area. When there were German air attacks, the women and children would take cover in the British and Australian trenches. In the 2/4th Battalion area, there were two families living near the battalion headquarters. There were also caves nearby where there were some 200 civilians taking cover. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 at Heraklion

The York and Leicesters cleared the last Germans from the town of Heraklion on 22 May 1941. There had been Germans on the east end of the airfield, but the Black Watch cleared them. They found, though, that the German defensive positions "at Rattling Bridge, in East Wadi, amd on A.M.E.S Ridge" were too strong to be attacked. Brigadier Chappel hoped to be able to attack the ridge, but the Black Watch battalion commander thought that he did not have enough strength to attack them. The British looked to find and bury the German dead. They found some 950, which they buried, and in the Greek area found about 300 more. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Developments at Heraklion on 21 May 1941

Part of the I/1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Count Bluecher, arrived at the eastern edge of the airfield at Heraklion shortly after midnight on 20/21 May 1941 and found that the airfield was still under British control. They had assumed that the plan had worked and that a parachute battalion would be in control. The regimental commander, Col. Brauer, had decided to attack the airfield from east and west on 21 May. The attack was made in small pieces and failed. Count Bluecher held a position on the eastern side of the airfield. Count Bluecher was killed and the Germans withdrew to the edge of a ridge. Col. Brauer sent a radio message to Major Schulz did not get the message, but did hear that an air attack was planned on the town of Heraklion from 9am to 10am. The Germans succeeded in penetrating the town, but were pushed out. The Greeks had been ready to surrender but were forced by the British to no surrender. By the morning of 22 May, the British were still in control, but Brigadier Chappel had concerns about the strong German position on the ridge to the east. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German intelligence failure or British deception success?

General Student and others had complained after the capture of Crete that their intelligence about the defenders greatly underestimated their strength. This was especially true of Heraklion. There, the defenders included the 14th Infantry Brigade, consisting of three regular British infantry battalions, one Australian battalion of about 500 men, the 7th Medium Regiment fighting as infantry, and three Greek battalions with many untrained men. The commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier Chappel, was in overall command at Heraklion. Brigadier Chappel's plan was to have his men dug in with overhead cover. This not only concealed their presence, but also protected them during the bombing attacks. At this time, the Germans assumed that bombing infantry would automatically disrupt or destroy them, although this was not the case. Given that the German information about the troops on Crete, including Heraklion, was from aerial reconnaissance, the effective concealment was probably the reason for the German intelligence failure. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A bad day for paratroops: 20 May 1941 at Heraklion

Due to the problems with getting aircraft over Keraklion on time and in sufficient numbers, the German paratroops suffered heavy losses. The II/1st Battalion was dropped in small numbers, scattered geographically and in time. The last men dropped were two-and-a-half hours late. Several of the transport aircraft were shot down and burnt on impact. Many of the men were killed during the descent, because they had to be dropped at 200 meters because of the terrain. In the east, they were dropped on the East Wadi. They lost all the officers but the battalion commander. He was able to gather sixty survivors under his command. The western group only had five survivors. The battalion lost 12 officers and about 400 men killed. Another eight officers and 100 men were wounded. The I/1st Battalion was dropped to the east and occupied the wireless station. Due to the shortage of aircraft, one company of the battalion was left in Greece on the first day. Two battalions landed west of the position and one moved up near the town of Heraklion and then backed off to the ridge just to the west of town. Another battalion was landed further west, but half of its companies were left in Greece, also due to the shortage of flyable transports. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The power of the Bofors 40mm Light AA gun

The defenders of the Heraklion airfield on 20 May 1941 had well-sited Bofors 40mm light anti-aircraft guns. There were three troops of four guns each. Two were Australian and one was British. They also had troops who were dug in with overhead cover. The Ju-52 transport aircraft flew from airfields in Greece. They approached at low altitude and then climbed high enough to drop their paratroops and then would descend again and fly back to Greece. One problem was that the light anti-aircraft guns were so well-sited that they were able to shoot down fifteen transports of the approximately 240 that were seen. In some cases, the ground was such that the transports had to drop the paratroops from a higher altitude, which was dangerous for paratroops due to the long time in the descent. Many of the transport aircraft were hit by the Bofors guns but were only damaged. After the initial attack, the airfields in Greece had many damaged Ju-52 aircraft scattered about. Another factor which inhibited air operations was that there was a great deal of dust in the air at the Greek airfields and this effected fighter, bomber, and transport aircraft operations. Refueling was slowed and this delayed the arrival of reinforcements at Heraklion. Thi sis based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Attackers at Heraklion on 20 May 1941

The Germans apparently underestimated the strength of the defense at Heraklion on Crete in May 1941. They attacked with four battalions of paratroops. The German commander was Colonel Brauer. He had all three battalions of the 1st Parachute Rifle Regiment, of which he was commander. He also had one battalion from the 2nd Regiment. He also had some detachments, including a machine-gun anti-aircraft unit. General Student, the famous paratroop commander and commander of the XI Air Corps, complained later that his intelligence officer had underestimated the strength of the defenders at Heraklion. The British and Greek defenders (counting Australians in the mix) consisted of eight battalions. The anti-aircraft fire at Heraklion had been very effective and had done great damage to the fleet of transport aircraft. As many as 600 paratroops were left in Greece due to lack of transports. The plan had been to drop the four attacking battalions at geographically separated locations. One was to take the airfield, one to take the town of Heraklion, one to capture the wireless station to the east, and one to provide cover from reinforcements coming from the west. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

21 May 1941 at Heraklion

At the start of 21 May 1941, the main concerns at Heraklion were the Germans in the town and the Germans to the east of the defended area by the airfield. The Germans had attacked with four battalions of paratroops, but they were inadequate to deal with a larger Allied force. The Australian Official History refers to the defended area around the town and airfield as a fortress, and this was a very strong defensive area, if not a fortress. General Student later complained that his intelligence unit greatly underestimated the strength of the defenders. During the course of the day, the British had helped the Greeks to clear most Germans out of the town. The Greeks had to rearm themselves with captured German weapons, because they were running out of ammunition for what they had prior to the attack. We can see that Heraklion was the most strongly held of the airfields in the north of Crete. That was largely due to the presence of Brigadier Chappel and the 14th Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Heraklion on 20 May 1941

The attacking paratroops not only dropped in the fortress area around Herkaklion, but also to the west and to the east and southeast. There was a bombing attack at 7:20pm on 20 May 1941 and then the defenders could see paratroops dropping to the east, outside of the defended areal. There was pretty desperate fighting happening, where no quarter was asked or given on either side. The German force at the Buttercup Field was cleared by 9:30pm on 20 May. This was near the shore and the airfield. In the west, the Greeks were fighting in the streets of Heraklion against German paratroops who had landed nearby. By 21 May, the defenders felt confident that they had defeated the attack. The defenders had armed themselves with captured German weapons and ammunition. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The initial attack at Heraklion on 20 May 1941

The air attacks started on the defenders of Keraklion on 19 May 1041. A group of German aircraft made a strafing attack in the morning with another attack with fewer aircraft in the evening. On 20 May, the air attacks started early and continued. Word arrived at 11am of paratroops being dropped near Suda Bay. A heavy bombing attack began at 4pm. By 5pm, the defenders could see Ju-52 transports approaching from "the north and north-east". The men counted 240 transport aircraft dropping paratroops and supplies. The aircraft approached at about 100 feet over the water and then climbed to 250 feet to drop their cargo. The defending anti-aircraft artillery shot down at least 15 transport aircraft. There were mishaps such as the paratrooper caught on the tail and carried out to sea behind the aircraft. There were also cases where the parachute failed to open and the men fell to their deaths. The defenders thought that they had killed at least 200 men either as they descended or as they hit the ground. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Why the battle for Heraklion in 1941 is interesting

We have seen the unfortunate outcome at Retimo, where Lt-Col. Campbell surrendered most of his remaining force to the Germans on 29 May 1941. Lt-Col. Campbell was a newly promoted battalion commander who was thrust into the overall command role at Retimo airfield on Crete. Campbell was a regular Australian officer. He was greatly distracted from the overall command role by concern about his own battalion. To some extent, he was also the victim of the overall command problems on Crete. In retrospect, the highly respected General Bernard Freyberg did not do a very good job of commanding the overall operation. To some extent, the job was hampered by communication problems. The excuse that was used for not communicating key information with Campbell at Retimo was about ciphers. That left Campbell ignorant of what was happening on the rest of Crete. The larger force at Heraklion was commanded by a British brigadier, Brigadier Chappel, commander of the 14th Infantry Brigade. To some extent, his force was better equipped with anti-aircraft artillery which allowed them to shoot down Ju-52 transport aircraft on 20 May. We are about to examine in detail the battle for Heraklion which seems to have had a better outcome with the troops withdrawn from Crete. This is based on information from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 14th Brigade

The 14th Brigade was a British infantry brigade that had fought in the Great War. Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, the brigade's battalions provided garrisons in the Middle East. The 14th Brigade, at the time of the battle for Heraklion, was part of the 8th Infantry Division. The battalions assigned to the 14th Brigade, as mentioned, were the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch, the 2nd Battalion, York and Lancaster Regiment, and the 7th Battalion, The Royal Leicestershire Regiment. The Brigade acquitted itself well at Heraklion against German paratroops and was evacuated from Greece to Egypt. The 14th Brigade became part of the 70th Division in North Africa. The brigade's most notable service in North Africa was in the breakout from Tobruk. The brigade was transferred to India after that. Brigadier Chappel commanded the 14th Brigade at Heraklion and then for another year in North Africa. This is based on the information available from the 14th Brigade Wikipedia page.

The units at Heraklion at the time of the German attack on 20 May 1941

Volume II of the Australian Official History has a note on page 280 that gives the details of the force defending Heraklion at the time of the German attack on 20 May 1941:

Headquarters, 14th Infantry Brigade
2/Blackwatch with 867 officers and men
2/York and Lancasters with 742 officers and men
2/Leicester with 637 officers and men
2/4th Australian Bzttalion with about 550 officers and men
7th Medium Regiment with about 450 officers and men armed as infantry
a detachment from the 3rd Hussars with six light tanks (apparently Lt.Mk.VIb tanks)
a squadron from the 7th RTR with two infantry tanks (probably Inf.Mk.II)
234 Medium Battery with 13 field guns
two troops of the 7th Australian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery with eight 40mm Bofors AA guns
one troop of 156 Light Anti-Aircraft Battery with four 40mm Bofors AA guns
two sections of C Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery with four 3 inch AA guns with some 2pdr AA guns
a section from 42 Field Company, Royal Engineers
a detachment from 189 Field Ambulance
one Greek garrison battalion
3rd Greek Recruit Battalion
7th Greek Recruit Battalion

Heraklion, leading up to the attack on 20 May 1941

The defense of Heraklion seems to have been well-organized and was on alert, expecting a German attack by air. They had a "heavy tank", presumably Inf.Mk.II Matildas, at opposite ends of the airfield. The six light tanks, presumably Lt.Mk.VIb tanks, were sited to the southeast. The artillery was not to fire on the airfield until ordered to do so. The anti-aircraft guns were allowed to fire as they thought necessary. The other troops were to stay hidden, so as to not disclose their positions prior to the attack. The Germans launched bombing attacks on Heraklion starting on 12 May 1941. A very small number of British aircraft, a Gladiator and several Hurricanes, occasionally operated from Heraklion. The defending troops were dug in and had overhead protection. The air attacks helped to build confidence that they were well-protected. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Heraklion on Crete in May 1941

A very large infantry force with very little artillery defended the port and airfield at Heraklion on Crete in May 1941. There were three regular British battalions, the 2/4th Australian Battalion, and the 7th Medium Regiment fighting as infantry. There were also three Greek battalions that were of low capability as they were essentially recruits. The Greeks included a Greek garrison battalion and two recruit battalions. In addition, there were 13 old field guns, 14 anti-aircraft guns, two infantry tanks, and four light tanks in the defense. The commander was Brigadier Chappel. The anti-aircraft guns included twelve Bofors 40mm guns. There were located around the airfield. The artillery consisted of what were apparently Italian guns: nine 100mm and four 75mm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

An interesting site: www.my-crete-site.co.uk

I saw this interesting website: www.my-crete-site.co.uk. There is a page that shows the tanks that fought at Retimo for the British and Australians. The photograph shows a knocked out Light Mk.VIB tank. The tank in the picture was one knocked out at Galatas. The tanks were repaired and used at Retimo. The website calls the town Rethymnon, perhaps a Greek spelling. The author also says that the German force dropped at Retimo was too weak to overcome two Australian and two Greek battalions. That is also my assessment, because if all the paratroops had been successfully dropped, which they were not, they only had two battalions and were of lesser strength. What really sabotaged the German attack on Retimo was the poor execution by German Air Force pilots. For one thing, they took heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire, apparently, and then largely dropped the paratroops in the wrong locations. Many were killed in the air before landing. The German regimental commander was experienced and capable, but the operation had gone so wrong that he was captured early in the battle. This is based on the account in the www.my-crete-site.co.uk and from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More thoughts on Retimo in 1941

The Australian War Memorial was loathe to criticize Lt-Col. Ian Campbell, the Australian commander at Retimo airfield on Crete in May 1941. Lt-Col. Campbell was a regular army officer, unlike Major Sandover, who was a civilian before the war. Lt-Col. Campbell was a new battalion commander, taking over command of the 2/1st Battalion shortly before the German attack on Crete on 20 May 1941. Major Sandover commanded the other Australian battalion, the 2/11th. Lt-Col. Campbell felt a heavy responsibility for both his own battalion and for being the overall commander at Retimo. The Australian Official History praised Lt-Col. Campbell for keeping his battalion intact and surrendering them to the Germans. From his perspective, he was preventing needless bloodshed and would not put the Greek civilians on Crete in a bad position trying to help his men. I have much more sympathy for Major Sandover, who led a group from his battalion that left Retimo with the idea of keeping away from the Germans and ultimately escaping from the island. This is based on the information on the Australian War Memorial website and in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Summary of the German situation at Retimo

The Allied defenders at the Retimo airfield at the time of the attack on Crete on 20 May 1941 were two Australian battalions and about 3,000 Greeks. The best of the Greeks were an improvised battalion of Cretan police. They acquitted themselves well during the battle. The Australians were good troops, although they had taken some losses in Greece. The Germans dropped two veteran parachute battalions commanded by what they described as an elderly commander (Colonel Sturm). The parachute drop was poorly executed by the German air force, as they did not execute the planned drop. The failure to execute left the attackers in disarray, so that by the second day, the commander was captured, and many men were killed or captured. There were two groups of paratroops left. One on the east was on the defense, and would eventually be overcome. The other group in Perivolia were also on the defensive, but they managed to hold out until a relief column arrived from Suda Bay. Of the Australians at the Retimo airfield, 13 officers and 39 men from the 2/11th Battalion and 2 officers and 14 men from the 2/1st Battalion were able to eventually reach Egypt. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans at Retimo on 21 May 1941

On Hill A, at 5:25am on 21 May 1941, Major Kroh's troops on Hill A at Retimo were attacked from the west. They were able to repulse the attack, but at 9am, they were attacked by Captain Moriarity's company and were pushed off Hill A. They escaped to the east to the Olive Oil Factory. The Olive Oil Factory was a strong defensive position, so for the time being, Major Kroh's troops were able to beat back attacks. At Perivolia, Major Wiedemann's group consolidated their hold on the town, extending their lines in the process. Eventually, the force at the Olive Oil Factory was overcome, but the German account does not include that information. Mountain troops, commanded by Lt-Col. Wittman, set off for Retimo from near Suda Bay during the night of 27/28 May 1941. They only reached the Retimo area on 29 May. They joined Major Wiedemann at Perivolia after fighting off Greek troops and police at Retimo. Two light tanks joined the force and attacked Australians east of Perivolia. Some 1,200 Australians surrendered to the German force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At Retimo on 29 May 1941

Lt-Col. Campbell had decided to surrender his force defending Retimo to the Germans, as to resist at that point seemed to risk needless casualties. Early on 29 May 1941, the Germans were arriving at the airfield at Retimo, including light tanks. The Australians at Retimo were low on food and ammunition, and Lt-Col. Campbell thought that trying to escape to the south coast would not be possible without supplies. Not everyone agreed, though. Major Sandover, commanding the 2/11th Battalion offered his men the opportunity to escape with him and try and leave the island. They were able to evade capture for about two months following the collapse and some were able to leave the island. Of the some 600 Allied soldiers who were able to leave Crete after the end of fighting, some 60 were from the 2/11th Battalion. This is based on the Australian War Memorial web site.

More of the German story at Retimo on 20 and 21 May 1941

Many of the German paratroops on 20 May 1941 were dropped in the wrong area in the attack on Retimo. Some of the men from the III/2nd Battalion were dropped into the area held by the 2/1st Battalion, the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion, and 2/3rd Field Regiment. Major Kroh had been able to collect the remnants of his battalion and half of the other battalion and was able to take most of Hill A. Two of the companies from the III/2nd Battalion were dropped as planned. They also had the artillery and heavy weapons. Wiedemann led these men and captured the village of Perivolia. They were also up to the edge of the village of Retimo. Wiedemann pulled back from Retimo and set up a defensive position at Perivolia, defending in all directions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German attack at Retimo had gone awry

The German plan for the attack on Retimo went awry due to how the paratroops were dropped. The high level plan was that two battalions would be dropped at Retimo and the men would capture the airfield and the harbor. The I/2nd Battalion, without two companies, but with added weapons, would land east of the airfield and capture it. Colonel Sturm would have his headquarters, a company, and a platoon, and would land near the Wadi Platanes and the airfield. The III/2nd Battalion would be dropped near Perivolia and the Wadi Platanes and would capture the village of Retimo. What happened instead of the plan was that the I/2nd Battalion had the commander, headquarters, and on rocky ground three miles too far to the east. Many men were injured on the rocky ground. Most of the battalion were dropped east of the airfield, where they came under fire. The battalion commander, Major Kroh headed west as fast as he could to reach the remains of the battlion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

29 May 1941 at Retimo

On 29 May 1941, as the German tanks approached the 2/11th Battalion position, two main groups formed who were determined to stay free and escape the Germans. One group was led by Major Sandover and the other my Captain Honner. Captain Honner had the one map, although it was in Greek. A wounded soldier who had left the aid station had heard of landing craft on the south coast at Ayka Galini. About this time, Lt-Col. Campbell raised a white flag on Hill D for a surrender. The Australians had about 500 German prisoners who were freed. The Germans who attacked Retimo were from the 2nd Parachute Rifle Regiment, which only had two of the normal three battalions. The commander, who the Australians had captured, was Colonel Sturm, who had led the attack on the Corinth Canal and bridge. Colonel Sturm was 52 years old at the time of the attack. The Australians losses were about 120 men while the Germans had lost at least 550 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Sandover's battalion on 29 May 1941 at Retimo

While Lt-Col. Campbell proposed to surrender to the Germans to save lives in the face of overwhelming force, Major Sandover thought that he would try to get his men out and heading south to the coast. Captain Honner pulled his men to the ridge, with the remnants of his company down to 40 men with some more men added. Honner was eventually able to lead his men back to the headquarters with Sandover. Sandover intended to escape and take his chances. Captain Honner had a group of men with him. He had a Greek map, so they used that for the next couple of months. Meanwhile, Lt-Col. Campbell was arranging to surrender the remainder of the defenders of Retimo airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The troops at Retimo did not receive the message about withdrawal from Crete

A lighter arrived at Retimo during the night of 27-28 May 1941. The lighter, commanded by Lieutenant Haig, brought two days' supplies. The lighter left Suda Bay prior to the orders for withdrawal being received. Aircraft dropped cases of food and ammunition, presumably with the message about withdrawal, but it was not seen. The plan was to move to Plakias Bay at the east end of the island and withdraw on the night of 31 May to 1 June 1941. Another message was dropped to the forces at Retimo to move to the south coast for withdrawal, but they did not receive the word. Lt-Col. Campbell did now want to leave their defensive position without orders, so they were stuck at Retimo while the Germans approached from east and west. Given the situation, Campbell proposed to surrender the force to the Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History

Jackson's company escape from Perivolia 28-29 May 1941

As we saw, the Australians Jackson's company was left in Perivolia when the officers had not seen the signal to withdraw on . The safest thing seemed to be to occupy houses in Perivolia and wait until dark to leave. The Germans bombed one house and fired machine guns at the houses, but no one was hit by the fire. This was during the day on 28 May 1941. They captured a German airman who had run into one house. His aircraft had crashed in the sea and he was the only survivor. Jackson decided to try to withdraw after dark by going to the beach and walking east. Sandover correctly estimated that they would break out after dark and fired all the remaining artillery rounds at the German front lines. Jackson's company moved at 9pm and made their way to the beach. They turned around and moved west to the edge of Retimo, when they sheltered in a large villa. Two wounded men could not be moved, so a medical orderly stayed with them in the villa. They moved south and then east, reaching Sandover's battalion on 29 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Perivolia early on 28 May 1941

One company, commanded by Captain Jackson, commenced their move on Perivolia at 3:20am on 28 May 1941. They had moved forward some 400 years when the Greeks had opened fire on the church. The Australians came under heavy fire. They pushed onwards anyway and reached the crossroads. They pushed further into the wadi in the direction of the sea. Wood's company took heavy fire from grenades and mortars. Wood was wounded as were his two platoon commanders. Wood was mortally wounded, but told Lt. Scott to fire two Very lights. This was the signal that they were withdrawing. The two companies that lay just east of Perivolia started receiving machine gun fire. They were able to withdraw before daylight, but Wood's company only had 43 men left. Jackson did not see the signal and thought that it was too late to withdraw before light. He decided to take some houses just west of the crossroads in Perivolia and wait until darkness to withdraw. Sandover, the battalion commander, guessed that Jackson and his men would attempt to leave Perivolia once it was dark. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Knocked out tanks at Retimo airfield

The two tanks had been moving forward at dawn o9n 27 May 1941. They were both commanded by Ausralian infantry officers. Lt. Lawry's tank on the left was the one hit by a shell and set on fire. Lawry and one of his crew managed to escape the tank, although they had wounds and burns. The other crew, where Bedell had lost fingers due to a mortar bomb hit, stayed in the tank until darkness fell. Honner had decided that without the tanks, he should not attack Perivolia. What changed his mind was that he was missing Robert's platoon. The platoon was either in trouble or had succeeded in breaking into Perivolia. In either case, Honner decided to attack, knowing that there would be losses. There were, and they ended up going in with a Red Cross flag to get the wounded out. Most were killed, it turned out. Campbell decided that the 2/11th should attack Perivolia in the dark. They immediately had a problem when the Greeks started shooting at St. George's church. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Campbell's tanks: 24 May to 27 May 1941 at Retimo airfield

As we saw, Lt-Col. Campbell's troops had been able to recover the two lost tanks by 24 May 1941, after securing Hill A and the ground stretching north to the beach. Lt. Mason drove the tank east to the Olive Oil Factory and then past to a house which the Germans had occupied. Eventually, at 9 O'Clock on 26 May, the Australians used the tank to help capture the Olive Oil Factory. They took 80 Germans prisoner, 40 wounded and 40 unwounded. They now had 500 German prisoners. The attack to the west towards Perivolia was strongly resisted and the tank used there had its turret jammed. By late on 26 May, they had repaired the second tank. Campbell provided the tank to Sandover to support a planned attack towards Perivolia at dawn on 27 May. When the attack started, one tank was hit and set on fire. The other fired on some Australians who had gotten farther than expected and caused some casualties. The remaining tank then moved forward and hit a mine that broke the track, stopping the tank. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More action near the Retimo airfield on 23 May 1941

When the Greeks had promised to take the Church of St. George in Perivolia, the Australians had used a captured German anti-tank gun (presumably, a 37mm) to shell the churchyard. They succeeded in forcing the Germans from the church, but the Greeks did not follow up with an attack. During the afternoon, the Australians were attacked by some 50 aircraft. The Germans from Perivolia had planned and carried out an attack right at sunset on the Australians. They were driven off by the forward Australian troops who stood up and fired with good effect on the attackers. They had heard about the Rangers being headed for Retimo, but they did not appear. In any case, when the Australians were able to recapture Hill A and the surrounding area, they were able to recover the two tanks, which proved to be in running condition. The carrier crewmen found them and figured out how to drive them. They had plans for the next day on 24 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

23 May 1941 at Retimo

On 23 May 1941, the Australians captured the German medical aid post and the personnel. After that, the Australian and German medical staff treated everyone. A truce was declared so that the wounded could be recovered and treated from the area between Hill A and the Olive Oil Factory. It was towards the end of the period that a blind-folded German officer appeared who demanded that they surrender, since everywhere else, the Germans were winning. Lt-Col. Campbell had the artillery reply by firing some of their few artillery shells on the factory after the truce ended. The Greeks had promised to capture the Church of St. George, but did not follow through. The two western Australian companies were bombed by German aircraft apparently requested by the Germans in Perivolia. Honner's company and the mortar platoon took the most casualties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On the left end of the position at Retimo air field on 22 May 1941

Sandover's battalion, the 2/11th, benefited a number of times from Sandover's ability to read and speak German. On 22 May 1941, Captain Honner was able to call in German bombers to hit the village of Perivolia that was occupied by German paratroops. During the precious night, the Germans that had been in the rear of the battalion withdrew. In the afternoon, Captain Honner's company was able to advance and capture some of the houses that had been held by Germans. The company stopped at the point where the land slowed down and would have exposed the men to German fire. Perivolia was a strong position due to the many stone buildings, including the church and walled yard for the Church of St. George. Captain Jackson's company of the 2/11th was to advance in support of Honner's company. Honner was concerned that they might accidentally encounter Greek forces again in the night. He decided that the two companies would stand where they were and dig in. During the night, they heard gunfire and other noise from near Perivolia. The Greeks had apparently attacked, taken some prisoners, and then had withdrawn. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At the Olive Oil Factory east of Retimo airfield on 22 May 1941

The forty Australians who had moved up a wadi to be close to the Olive Oil Factory east of the Retimo airfield were supposed to have support from Greek troops. The plan was that 200 Greek troops would move up another wadi to be close to the factory. The Greeks did not arrive, but the forty Australians, led by Captain Mann, made a desperate charge at the factory. They took many casualties, including Mann, who had been previously wounded at Bardia during the victory over the Italians. With Lt-Col. Campbell right there, directing operations, he told the Australians to wait for the Greeks. There were further communication, after Lt-Col. Campbell realized how badly the attack had gone, told them to hold off any further action. After dark, the Australians were able to pull back from the position near the factory. Lt-Col. Campbell ordered the remains of his two companies to withdraw back to their positions above the airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the Retimo area on 22 May 1941

Lt-Col. Campbell's plan for 22 May 1941 near the Retimo airfield was to attack the two strong groups of German paratroops. One was located in the east by the Olive Oil Factory and by the road to Heraklion. The other, in the west, was near Perivolia and the road to Suda Bay. The two Australian battalions would attack. The 2/11th would attack to the west and two companies of the 2/1st would attack to the east. The eastern attack included Greeks moving up from the south. The Olive Oil Factory had buildings with thick walls, so it made a strong defensive position. Campbell had ordered an attack at 10am, but the officers for the attacking company were killed or wounded, so the attack never happened. Lt-Col. Campbell planned another attack on the factory at 6pm. Some 200 Greeks would go through a wadi, under cover while 40 Australians would crawl through another wadi. As Campbell watched, the Greeks did not move and the Australians took heavy losses. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation near the airfield at Retimo from the evening of 21 May to morning of 22 May 1941

As we saw, the German commander at the Retimo airfield had been captured by the Australians of the 2/11th Battalion. The German plan had been to drop one battalion of paratroops east and one west of the airfield at Retimo. By mistake two companies that were intended to be dropped west of Hill B were dropped east of Hill A. Greek battalions were sent to the west and east ends of the airfield. Major Ford was the liaison officer with the battalion that had moved to the ridge south of Perivolia by late on 21 May 1941. There was a large group of Germans near Perivolia that were only partly contained by the Australians on Hill B and the Greens to the south. There was also a group of 800 Cretan police at Retimo that had taken the town and blocked the road to Perivolia. There were two strong German groups left that needed attention. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Germans on the prowl after Hill A at Retimo airfield was recaptured

After the successful recapture of Hill A overlooking the Retimo airfield on the morning of 21 May 1941, there were only small groups of German paratroops left in the area between Hill A and Perivolia. Those small groups often caused trouble, however. One group of Germans captured everyone at a dressing station at Adhele. They started off towards the 2/11th Battalion position, but were captured by a force of West Australians, who set the prisoners free. Two of the Germans in this case were killed while changing into Greek uniforms. Another group had taken Lt. Willmott. Lt. Willmott had been sent by Lt-Col. Campbell to help motivate the Greeks to action. He was released when the group ran into the "engineers and transports sections". In the cleanup after the initial attack, the Australians had captured Colonel Sturm, the commander of the attacking paratroopers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Early on 21 May 1941 at the Retimo airfield

At dawn on 21 May 1941, Captain Channell led his company in an attack on Hill A overlooking the Retimo airfield on Crete. To the Australians, it seemed like the Germans had planned a simultaneous attack. The Germans let loose an barrage of mortar fire on the Australian company. Channell and his lieutenant were both wounded in the attack and their company was pushed back just on the western side on the hill neck. A company from Hill D arrived to support the attack. They quickly found out that the attack had failed. The company commander, Captain Moriarity, called Lt-Col. Campbell for help. Campbell brought a company through a route that kept them under cover across a wadi, and joined Moriarity. Captain Moriarity organized his new force into four groups and led an attack northwards that "succeeded brilliantly". Some of the Germans escaped to the beach and sheltered there. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The night of 20/21 May 1941 and the morning of 21 May at Retimo airfield

We need remember that Lt-Col. Campbell, the commander at the Retimo airfield, was a very new battalion commander who now commanded a brigade-sized force at the Retimo airfield. He had almost no staff, because he did not want to take officers from the fighting units. By the first evening of the attack on Crete, Campbell was left with no information about what was happening elsewhere on Crete. This was largely due to the abysmal British communications equipment and the scarcity of what they had. Campbell had sent a wireless message to General Freyberg asking for reinforcements. He also planned attacks in the morning at Hill A and to clear the enemy from the low ground near the sea. He planned attacks with the Australian battalions paired with Greek battalions. The Greek battalions had officers with them to help. In one case, it was the Australian Major Hooper and the other case a Welch Regiment officer. During the night, the Germans tried to overrun the remaining Australians. This was when they captured the crews of the two stranded tanks near the airfield. Only one section, commanded by Corporal Johnston, was still holding out on Hill A. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/11th on Hill B at Retimo

Sandover had commanded the 2/11th Battalion since Greece as a Major. He organized the defense of Hill B overlooking the Retimo airfield. There were Germans along the lower side of Hill B, outside the wire, that Sandover hoped to be able to deal with, but when night came, that became more difficult. Prior to darkness falling, the Australians had done well killing or capturing Germans. They were forced to quit when in the dark, the Germans were able to ambush the Australian patrols. They took 84 Germans prisoner. Sandover spoke German, so he talked with the prisoners and examined their documents. In the morning, he put out the signal asking for mortar bombs to be dropped which a German aircraft obligingly did. Not only did they take the prisoners, but they also collected a good number of weapons, which were needed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The next events at Retimo on 20 May 1941

The Germans on Hill A anticipated an effort to push them off the hill, and they pressed the remaining Australians. They also captured the crews of the two Matilda tanks, which were from the 7th RTR. On the left, they had effectively dealt with all the paratroops which fell near their area. The 2/1th and 4th Greek Battalions were still in control of their area. The wired area controlled by the 2/11th Battalion on Hill B was also able to kill or capture all the paratroops who descended. There were 500 paratroops that were able to concentrate and move on Perivolia. The 2/11th tried to push north to clear the low area. Once night fell, the Germans were able to put any stop to Australian activity. The 2/11th pulled its men back into their wired area, once they realized that they would not be able to make progress in the darkness. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Hill A near the Retimo air field on 20 May 1941

Hill A looked down on the east end of the air field at Retimo. In the initial attack by paratroops, a considerable number landed on Hill A. Hill A was an area of about 200 by 300 yards. The hill was held by one company of Australians along with six guns and four machine guns. The artillery were 75mm guns. Machine gun crews were repeatedly killed and the gunners were forced to retreat with their breach blocks. The Vickers machine guns were eventually disabled by a German mortar bomb. Lt-Col. Campbell ordered two platoons from one company to defend against a German advance west from Hill A. The defenders on Hill A still held part of the ground and they received a platoon of reinforcements. With the Australians and Germans mixed together on Hill A, German air power was neutralized, because they did not want to attack their own troops. Lt-Col. Campbell had ordered to tanks to help his troops on Hill A, but they both encountered mishaps which neutralized them. One stuck in a drain and the other fell into a Wadi. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Retimo attacked on 20 May 1941

The attack on the airfield at Retimo started at 4pm when bombers and fighters strafed and bombed. The Greek 4th Battalion was not attacked, but they responded by moving back up the ridge overlooking the airfield. Australian senior enlisted were sent to them and led them back to their original positions and encouraged them in the initial battle. The initial attack came from 24 troop carriers dropping paratroops. Eventually, there were 161 troop transports (Ju-52's presumably). There were four areas with German paratroops. One was at Perivolia, just east of Retimo. Another, smaller group, was at Platanes to the east of the first. A third and larger group landed overlapping the 2/11th Battalion and the 4th Greek Battalion on the airfield. The fourth, and largest group of paratroops landed overlapping the 2/1st Battalion area and east to the olive oil factory. The troop transports dropped their paratroops from about 400 feet as they flew parallel to the coast. The drop was completed in 35 minutes. They counted seven troop transports shot down along with two other aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about Retimo in May 1941 on Crete

The 2/11th Battalion was the closest to Retimo on the west end of their position located by Hill B. To their right was the 4th Greek Battalion. About a mile to the south at Adhele was the 5th Greek Battalion. The 2/1st Battalion was on the far east of the position. They were spread from Hill A west to the 4th Greek Battalion. Hill A had two 100mm guns, four 75mm guns, and a machine gun platoon. Hill B had two 100mm guns and another machine gun platoon. The two tanks were hidden under the olive trees in the Wadi Pigi. The defenders of the Retimo apparently made good use of camouflage, because they found pictures on a crashed German reconnaissance aircraft that only showed one of the positions, which they altered. The assault on the airfield at Retimo began on 20 May 1941. The first 14 aircraft that they saw turned towards Canea. At noon, twenty aircraft flew over towards Heraklion. At 4pm, the Germans staged an attack with fighters and bombers on the airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Retimo from 30 April 1941 onwards

Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Campbell became the commander of the forces defending the airfield at Retimo. He was an Australian commanding the 2/1st Battalion which arrived on the scene on 30 April 1941. His force was built up with another Australian battalion, the 2/11th and with the 4th Greek Battalion. They were woefully equipped in every respect. They had no anti-aircraft artillery, their communications equipment was minimal, and they had very little ammunition, and of that, none was armour-piercing. The airfield that they were trying to defend ran parallel to the shore, 100 yards from the beach. A ridge overlooked the airfield on the side away from the sea. They initially had but ten days food. They had to buy food locally from the market. The ridges had southern slopes covered with olive trees that masked any view. The field guns and most medium machine guns faced northward towards the sea. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Retimo, on Crete, starting from 19 May 1941

Retimo, and the airfield about five miles to the east, were still in the western half of the island of Crete. Retimo was on the north shore, a ways east of Suda Bay. The land near Retimo was very mountainous, and sloped down to the sea. The town of Retimo had a population of about 10,000. Due to the difficulty of the terrain, the town was concentrated. The airfield was dominated by the ridge to the south. The airfield was almost on the beach and ran parallel to the shoreline. The 2/1st Australian Battalion arrived on 30 April 1941. They relieved the previous Greek defenders. The hills were terraced and had vineyards. Additional men arrived at Retimo between 30 April and 19 May so that the force grew to brigade group size. They had four 3 inch mortars, but only 80 mortar bombs for each. They had some anti-tank rifles, but only had five rounds each. Overall, they were short of ammunition, so they started the campaign with difficulties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More from 27 May 1931 on Crete

The German 3rd Parachute Regiment had reached the wireless station by 10am. They eventually entered Canea by 2pm, along with Ramcke and the 100th Mountain Regiment. In the process, they captured about one thousand men and forty guns. During the day on 27 May 1941, the rest of the 5th Mountain Division, along with a battalion of the 6th Mountain Division were flown into Maleme. The rearguard, consisting of the 5th New Zealand Brigade, the 19th Australian Brigade, and the commandos of Layforce had fought their way to the road leading to Sfakia on the south coast of Crete. The road to the south was packed with retreating men and vehicles. The Official History is about to jump to talking about the troops defending Retimo and Heraklion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the alleged massacre at 42nd Street on 27 May 1941

Lt-Col. Walker commanded the 2/7th Battalion, one of Brigadier Vasey's Australian battalions. His battalion was the one accused by Major Forster of committing a war crime by shooting and stabbing unarmed men who would have surrendered. A number of battalions, including the New Zealand Maori battalion, who used a special knife as their personal weapon in addition for guns, had charged the Germans. Lt-Col. Walker wrote about the incident in 1952 to address the charge made by the Germans. The probable explanation was that the Australians had captured German machine guns and turned them on the Germans and quickly killed or wounded many men. I also thought that the Maoris could have knifed some Germans. The Australians did capture three wounded Germans after the fight. Lt-Col. Walker thought that other wounded Germans might have been able to retreat to their own positions. There was one instance where there were unarmed men shot at the foot of a wall. To the Germans, it appeared that they might have been lined up and shot. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Alleged war crimes on 27 May 1941

Major Forster, commander of the I Battalion engaged with the Australian 19th Brigade west of Suda reported to his regimental commander that he thought that war crimes had been committed. He had found 121 dead Germans and he felt sure that some had been wounded and then had been knifed or shot when they were helpless by the Australians. Forster's battalion had been advancing towards the east in heavy olive trees when they ran onto a minefield which stopped the advance. He thought that they were in danger of being surrounded, so he had pulled his men back. His battalion was then withdrawn into an existing defensive position on high ground. He reported that some dead Germans had been stabbed or had broken skulls. When they checked the battle field, they found about 20 Australian and New Zealand dead, none with stab or butt wounds. Lt-Colonel Walker, reported that there had been automatic weapons forward for the Germans. These had been captured and they inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans nearby. He said that no one who wanted to surrender was shot, after the fighting slowed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans on Crete on 25 and 27 May 1941

The Germans had considerable success in their advance on 26 and 27 May 1941 on Crete. They were intent on still encircling Canea and pushing through to Suda Bay. Just like the Australians and New Zealanders, the Germans were taking losses. For example, the 3rd Parachute Regiment was now of battalion strength and had been reorganized accordingly. The Germans were planning on continuing to circle Canea on the 27th of May. From there, they planned to head for Retimo. At this point, they had five columns of troops headed east. It was the 141st Mountain Regiment which had fought the Australian 19th Brigade in Greece. They were the victims of the action at 42nd Street, near Suda. Early on 27 May, they were ordered to attack towards Suda Bay, at least partly to cut off the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The decision to withdraw from Crete on 27 May 1941

Because of the situation on the roads to the south of Crete, General Weston had lost his ability to control the rearguard action until Thursday, 29 May 1941. That anything good could happen was due to the efforts of the Australian and New Zealand brigade commanders and Colonel Laycock. By this time, the Greek forces had practically ceased to exist. The rout that had occurred spontaneously included men discarding their rifles and even their tunics due to the heat. The sort of input that General Freyberg received from General Wavell's headquarters in Egypt was totally useless. They had no idea of the situation on the ground and had responded to General Freyberg's message from 26 May by calling for withdrawing to the east and defending that part of the island. Freyberg's message on 26 May was that the situation was hopeless. Early on 27 May, General Freyberg informed the headquarters in Egypt that there was no food at Retimo, in the east, as well as no ammunition. They had lost all their artillery at Suda due to the lack of gun tractors. By the afternoon of 27 May, General Freyberg was told to abandon Crete by Wavell. General Wavell had asked London for guidance, as well he might, due to Churchill's involvement, but got no reply. General Wavell eventually received a message from London agreeing to withdrawing from Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rout begins: 27 to 28 May 1941 on Crete

General Weston was thinking in terms of withdrawal from the island of Crete when he went south, later on 27 May 1941. He intended to scout out the route that would be taken to the south of the island for withdrawal. Once he got south, he was trapped, because of road congestion. The mostly unarmed, disorganized groups of men were in a panic and were clogging the roads to the south. General Weston was unable to travel back north to Suda.

Before he had left for the trip south, General Weston had ordered Laycock, the D Battalion commander of Layforce, to occupy the Babali Inn as a rearguard position. He had assigned him two of the remaining infantry tanks, along with three carriers.

The men walking or riding vehicles to the south included base troops from Suda Bay, Cypriots, Palestinians, and improvised infantry units. What vehicles they had, they eventually abandoned. What had started as a spontaneous retreat from the Suda Bay area had turned into a rout due to the panic of the men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Further developments at Suda on 27 May 1941

Despite the local success in the counter-attack on the Germans west of Suda, the situation was getting worse on 27 May 1941 as the day progressed. For one thing, the New Zealand and stustralian troops just west of Suda were out of touch with their commander, General Weston, the Royal Marine. Worse yet, the group now styled as the "rear-guard" could see German troops moving around the southern part of the line, as if to encircle them. The two brigadiers, Hargest of the 5th New Zealand Brigade and Vasey of the 19th Australian Brigade planned to withdraw during the night. They had met with a battalion commander of Layforce, the commandos, who was occupying a blocking point on the road. They had planned to withdraw from 42nd Street at 9pm, but it was not dark yet, so they waited until 10pm. We now find that General Weston had gone south to look at the retreat path and got caught in the flight of vehicles and could not make his way north. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The men charged the enemy on 27 May 1941 near Suda Bay

It was late in the morning, about 11am, when the Australians had seen the Germans advancing. There were two companies of the 2/7th Battalion deployed forward. Major Miller commanded the northernmost company on the far right. The company on his left charged when Miller's company charged. Miller had sent a patrol forward to observe the Germans, who were busy taking things from an abandoned depot they had found. Shots were eventually exchanged and Miller moved his company forward. When the second company arrived, they charged the Germans. The charge caused the Germans to turn and run, often dropping their weapons. The Australians eventually advanced a mile from their start. The New Zealanders made a similar charge, with the Maoris in the center and with the 19th and 21st Battalions on each side. They advanced about 600 yards and observed some 80 dead Germans. The Australians thought that they had killed as many as 200 Germans and also took three prisoners. The Australian and New Zealand losses were small. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The morning of 27 May 1941 at "42nd Street" near Suda

What the soldiers called "42nd Street" was a dirt road that ran towards the south-southeast through olive groves. The position was near the southwest corner of Suda Bay. General Weston was not at 42nd Street when the remnants of the New Zealand Division and the 19h Australian Brigade arrived. The Australians occupied the northern end of the line with the New Zealand battalions stretching to their south. The front they held depended on their remaining strength. General Freyberg was very anxious about getting the supplies delivered, so he was present during the night when the destroyers delivered the 80 tons of supplies at the pier. By 11am on 27 May, there were some 400 Germans heading towards the position, following the Suda Bay road. The Australians surprised the Germans, who were intent on looting an abandoned depot. They exchanged fire and then the Germans "broke and ran". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the night of 26-27 May 1941 in front of Canea

The commander of the Suda Brigade was Colonel Hely, an artillery-man. He had commanded the 106 RHA from 1939 to 1941. During 1941 to 1942, he commanded the 60 Field regiment. After the 5th New Zealand Brigade and 19th Australian Brigade withdrew, Colonel Hely thought that the Suda Brigade needed to withdraw, as well. That left the Composite Brigade without any support. They had followed orders that were a bad idea and advanced west of Canea about a mile. The withdrawal left the 5th and 19th Brigades just west of Suda. The commandos of A Battalion of Layforce were near the village of Suda. By the morning, the Australians were surprised that they did not see the Composite Brigade troops coming up as their rear-guard. When the Composite Brigade had been misplaced, Brigadier Inglis took back his command of the 4th New Zealand Brigade and Howard Kippenberger moved back to being the 20th Battalion commander.

When General Weston realized that the Composite Brigade was in trouble, he ordered the 1/Welch to withdraw, but they probably never got the order or it was too late in arriving. They were too far forward with the 1/Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars. As the Germans started to encircle the Composite Battalion, Two companies eventually reached Suda. They later found out that a sergeant and a few men from the 1/Welch had held up the German advance until early on 28 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Communications and command gone wrong: the night of 26-27 May 1941 near Suda and Canea

Because of the command and communications situation, Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander, and Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, were forced to act to keep their troops from being overrun by the advancing Germans. By 2:15am, General Weston thought that the New Zealand Division was acting independently, regardless of what he told them. When the New Zealand 5th Brigade and the Australian 19th Brigade withdrew, that triggered the withdrawal of the Suda Brigade, which had been in reserve at Mournies. The Composite Brigade had no idea about the withdrawals, especially of the Suda Brigade, and went on with their advance to a position west of Canea. The 5th and 19th Brigades were then in position to the west of Suda. One battalion of commandos were near Suda. General Weston realized at 1am that the Composite Brigade was in a dangerous position and sent orders to withdraw. Those orders were probably not received and the most forward companies were caught. One was caught and the other took heavy losses. The latest move left the surviving units at "42nd Street", preparing for the next day's action. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The defense in front of Canea collapsed: late on 26 May 1941

Both the Australians and New Zealanders in front of Canea were being pressed so hard that they felt the need to withdraw, later in the day on 26 May 1941. The command structure had been made more complicated when General Weston had been given command over the New Zealand Division. Worse yet, General Weston felt like major decisions about withdrawals were beyond what he was allowed to make. When the Australian Brigadier Vasey told General Weston that he would not be able to hold on overnight, General Weston felt like he needed to consult General Freyberg before agreeing to a withdrawal. Communications were so bad that the discussion meant a trip where General Weston was out of touch with the troops in the line for hours. The result of that issue was that by late in the day on 26 May, unilateral decisions were made which put the New Zealand and Australian troops into a withdrawal from the front before Canea. Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander, kept trying to contact Weston, but General Weston had been forced to leave Canea due to the heavy bombing. Brigadier Puttick tried to contact General Freyberg by radio, but was told to take his orders from General Weston. From the distance of time, we can see that the situation before Canea was at the point of collapse, at least partly due to the command and communication arrangements that were in place. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

"The New Zealand Division can't hold another night": 26 May 1941

By the afternoon of 26 May 1941, the command structure for Crete was "showing cracks". The New Zealand Division commander, Brigadier Puttick read that General Freyberg intended that a new Composite Brigade would be commanded by Brigadier Inglis. The brigade was intended to relieve the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the line. Brigadier Puttick's opinion was that the New Zealand Division troops were at the end of their ability to fight. General Freyberg's headquarters were within walking distance, so Brigadier Puttick walked over to talk with him. General Freyberg told Puttick that they had to hold, because two destroyers were heading for Suda Bay with commandos and supplies. He also told Brigadier Puttick that since they were now in the area of Canea and Suda, that the New Zealand Division would fall under General Weston's command. While Brigadier Puttick was walking, which took three hours, the Germans continued to advance around the left of the line. Later that evening, General Weston informed General Freyberg that he thought that the New Zealand Division could not hold their positions for another night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Further events on 26 May 1941 in front of Canea

Later in the afternoon of 26 May 1941, the pressure on the Australian 2/8th and 2/7th Battalions on the left of the line in front of Canea was so great that they were withdrawn. They were moved back to their original positions with the Marines at Mournies. Earlier in the day, their brigade commander, Brigadier Vasey, had thought that they would be able to hold, but by 5pm, he recognized that the situation had become critical.

Also in the afternoon, Brigadier Puttick, the acting New Zealand Division commander, was in the process of moving his headquarters to a point south of Canea. While that move was happening, he received a letter from General Freyberg that asked him to co-locate his headquarters with General Weston. Freyberg also plotted to take Weston's best units and for a composite brigade from them. He wanted to use the Composite Brigade to replace the remnants of the 5th New Zealand Brigade in the line. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

26 May 1941 in front of Canea

The 5th New Zealand Brigade now was very much a scratch organization. They had company-sized battalions under their command, including the 19th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and the 28th (Maori) Battalions. They also had small groups of engineers and cavalry to help hold the line. At one point, an attack on the engineers in the 21st Battalion line were pushed back by a strong German attack. They were able to stage a counter-attack and push the Germans back. By 2pm, the 19th Battalion was under heavy pressure. Several platoons were pushed back and the battalion had to pull back 150 yards to a new line. They mustered enough force to retake the positions that were lost by 3pm. To the left, the Maori's were able to hold against German attacks. The next German attempt was to push between the Australians and the Greeks. Two Australian platoons were forced to withdraw towards Perivolia, but were able to hold their position at that point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg reported to General Wavell on 26 May 1941

General Freyberg sent a cable to General Wavell, the theater commander, on 26 May 1941 that said that the situation on Crete was now hopeless and that only the Welsh Regiment and the Commando were able to conduct offensive operations. He said if the strategic situation demanded it, they would try and hold on for a while longer. Freyberg expected that the Germans were close to being able to fire on Suda Bay. He also reported that most of their artillery had been lost due to lack of mobility. General Freyberg also made a reorganization. He put Brigadier Inglis in charge of the reserve and promoted Howard Kippenberger to 4th Brigade commander. The 4th New Zealand Brigade now consisted of the 18th and 20th Battalions. The forward troops, including the 5th New Zealand Brigade were under heavy attack. The Official History says that the 5th Brigade battalions were reduced to company strength at this point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg basically gave up on 26 May 1941

We can only guess that during the night of 25/26 May 1941, that Brigadier Puttick and General Freyberg had a mistaken idea of what was actually happening on the ground in front of Canea. We know that Howard Kippenberger had led the troops and had successfully recapatured Galatas. The Greek troops were doing well. So what did the higher level command think? On 25 May, Brigadier Puttick had told General Freyberg that the line at Galatas was "obviously broken", which seems to have not been the case. An order arrived at 1am on 26 May that agreed with the Puttick's decision to pull the New Zealand Division back to a line closer to Canea. A liaison officer to the Greeks had reported that the Greeks were close to breaking, which also seems to be not the case. The 21st Battalion would now be the unit on the right, with some of the cavalry, some engineers, and one company of the 29th Battalion. To their left was the 19th Battalion. To their left were the Maori's (the 28th Battalion). By the dawn, the 5th New Zealand Brigade was in the new position. The Australian 19th Brigade was to their left. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Other action in front of Canea on 25 and 26 May 1941 on Crete

During the day on 25 May 1941, the Australians of the 19th Brigade were not challenged. They were to the left of the New Zealanders in front of Canea. During the night of 25/26 May, they continued to take casualties, and there were New Zealand troops mixed into the Australian front lines. The troops continued to experience heavy air attacks during the night. The New Zealand Division commander, Brigadier Puttick, decided to pull the 4th and 5th Brigades back to line up to the north on the right of the Australian 19th Brigade. The Greeks of the 8th Greek Regiment were actually doing very well. They were fighting the German 85th Mountain Regiment, and had kept them from encircling the defenders of Canea. They were actually reinforced by Cretan villagers. They had successfully fought the German Utz group and pushed them out of Aliakmon and to pull into a defensive position by the reservoir. At the end of the day on 25 May, Brigadier Puttick warned General Freyberg that he did not expect to be able to hold his position against constantly increasing German forces. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation in front of Canea turns nasty on 25 May 1941

Lt-Col John Russell commanded the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry in front of Canea. He reported to Howard Kippenberger that there were many men in retreat coming past his unit. The cavalry itself was being pressed by the Germans. Kippenberger sent his brigade major to tell Brigadier Inglis about the situation and to ask for help. Many men were being wounded and were taken by truck to the aid station. The situation worsened when Wheat Hill, just west of Galatas, was abandoned without orders. They were under attack by German mountain troops. The retreat was increasing and could easily have turned into a rout. Kippenberger tried to rally the men, shouting whatever he could think of to try and halt the retreat. Brigadier Inglis was sending reinforcements, and Kippenberger sent them into the weak spots in the line. When the 23rd Battalion arrived, Howard Kippenberger thought that they needed to retake Galatas if they were going to stop the Germans. He sent the 23rd off with two light tanks against Galatas. The attack succeeded in driving the Germans from Galatas. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation turns for the worse on 25 May 1941 for the New Zealanders on Crete

The 2nd New Zsaland Division forces on Crete were all massed to defend Canea when the day started on 25 May 1941. The 4th New Zealand Brigade was taking the brunt of the attack with the 5th Brigade in reserve, ready to be used. Ramcke's group was attacking along the coast against the 18th Battalion and the Composite Battalion. The Composite Battalion rapidly ceased to exist. The 18th Battalion was also in dire straits. The company nearest the sea was being swamped by the enemy. The center company was surrounded and under fire from all directions. The battalion commander took up a rifle with bayonet and led a group from his headquarters to attempt to restore the situation, but failed. Colonel Howard Kippenberger was in command at the front. The two companies from the 20th Battalion ordered forward to occupy the ground held by the remnants of the Composite Battalion. 2nd-Lieutenant Upton distinguished himself again in the effort. They were up against too many German troops and the situation was getting progressively worse as the Germans were pushing up the road from the prison towards Canea. This si based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.