Wavell and his staff make unrealistic suggestions late on 22 May 1941

General Freyberg received a message from General Wavell in the night of 22 May 1941 that showed just how out of touch Wavell was with the situation on Crete. The purpose was to inform Freyberg that reinforcements could not be landed at Suda Bay. Wavell expressed the hope that the Germans would not be able to stick with the attack much longer. There were plans to land commandos on the south coast who would then move north to assist the defenders. Wavell thought that if the "situation at Maleme is really serious hope to arrange for R.A.F. to send fighters to strafe enemy tomorrow until ammunition and petrol exhausted and then land within your protection." Wavell had suggested major troop movements that were highly impractical due to lack of transport and would involve major moves on foot. General Freyberg sent a message on 23 May that tried to portray the situation in a way that gave Wavell an idea of just how desperate their situation was at this point. Freyberg expected that they would have to fight to the end without any hope of relief, from a reading of what he told Wavell. Wavell's performance during the first half of 1941 is why he ultimately was sacked by Churchill. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The issue about mutilation and reprisals by German troops

The German troops on Crete after 20 May 1941 were quick to react to what they perceived as atrocities or mutilations. Eventually, an investigation was conducted of the alleged incidents during the battle for Crete. The investigation found that British and New Zealand troops always conducted themselves well and when they had German prisoners, protected them from Cretan attacks. There were fewer incidents of actual mutilations than originally were reported. These all seemed to originate with Cretan civilians, not Greek troops. The investigation was conducted in a fair and impartial way to learn the truth of what had happened and was conducted by the Germans. The German troops involved were too quick to resort to reprisals which would likely result in war crimes trials, post-war, if they were pursued. The report was issued by the "Chief Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe". Clearly, the use of reprisal killings by the German airborne troops was a mistake. This is based on the account in Volume II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Kastelli

The first group of German dispatched to protect Maleme on 23 May 1941 had reached Kastelli. There, they fought with troops from the 1st Greek Regiment, who were sniping at the German troops. The 5th Mountain Division commander had decided to do something about Kastelli. In the initial attack on 20 May, 57 paratroops were dropped at Kastelli. Of there they said that some forty were "mutilated" by the Greek troops. The remaining 17 took refuge in the local jail, as it could be defended. By 24 May, the attackers called for dive bomber support. By the afternoon on 24 May, the 95th Engineer Battalion took Kastelli. They had killed some 200 of the Greek defenders. Of the 15 prisoners taken, 2 where New Zealand officers. The Germans shot 200 men at Kastelli in reprisal for the reported atrocities. A New Zealand officer had reported that he had the remaining Germans held in the jail to keep them safe from the Greeks and had some New Zealanders in the guard to protect them. The New Zealand officer said that he had not seen any Germans mistreated by the Greeks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Ringel's plan for 23 May 1941 on Crete

Late on 22 May 1941, General Ringel had organized the German troops into three groups. The plan was to use one group to protect Maleme from attack from the south and west. A second group, with most of the paratroops, would attack Canea along with the third group, the 100th Mountain Regiment. That third group would swing in an enveloping move to take the defending troops to the east by coming from the southern hills. Another 150 men under Colonel Heidrich's command moved north to Stalos to block the coast road. They reached their objective by early on 23 May. While moving west on 23 May, the first group ran into Greeks from the 1st Regiment acting as snipers. This was near Kastelli. They reported that the Greeks had committed "atrocities". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 from the German perspective

During 22 May 1941, two more German mountain battalions were landed by air at Maleme. The fighting was tough and many aircraft were destroyed on the landing field at Maleme, but many were able to land and unload. The Germans had captured some British tanks during the fight for Maleme, and some of those tanks were used to two damaged aircraft off the field. General Ringel was now in charge of the German troops fighting to capture Crete. His charter was to capture Maleme, capture Suda Bay and clear so that it could be used to receive seaborne traffic, and relieve the troops who were hard-pressed at Retimo. Ultimately, he needed to capture the island. The Germans had hoped to attack Canea, but the New Zealand counter-attack had changed the situation. The New Zealand troops were ultimately driven back towards Pirgos, but kept control of the heights to the south. That night, the Germans reorganized in preparation for the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Naval forces involved with the battle for Crete in May 1941

The naval battle for Crete in May 1941 was a case of ships fighting air attacks. The ships were in place to intercept the expected attack from the sea where small vessels would transport German troops to land on Crete. At the start of the battle on 20 May 1941, there was the 15th Cruiser Squadron positioned to the east of the island. The ships included the cruisers Naiad and Perth. They were accompanied by the destroyers Kandahar, Nubian, Kingston, and Juno. The Nubian was the oldest of the destroyers being a Tribal class ship. The others were J and K class, recently built. The ships to the west included the cruisers Dido, Ajax, and Orion. They had destroyers Janus, Kimberley, Hasty, and Hereward. There was also a reserve group consisting of the cruisers Gloucester and Fiji with two destroyers. The battleships were further to the west, ready to intervene if heavier Italian surface forces appeared. This is based on the account in the book A Midshipman's War: A Young Man in the Mediterranean Naval War, 1941-1943 by Frank Wade.

Naval operations in support of Crete on 23 May 1941

When Admiral Cunningham received information about declining anti-aircraft ammunition on ships supporting Crete, he ordered them all to withdraw to Alexandria. Losses had been heavy. The latest incident on the morning of 23 May 1941 involved Lord Mountbatten's destroyer Kelly and the accompanying Kashmir. They were dive-bombed and sunk. Suda Bay was filled with wrecked ships, the most notable being the cruiser York, which had been torpedoed by an Italian MTB on 26 March. Still, the navy continued to carry supplies to Crete. On the night of 23/24 May, two destroyers and the fast minelayer Abdiel carried supplies. They mainly carried ammunition and stored. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More developments on Crete on 22 May 1941

The situation on Crete was very serious by 22 May 1941. There were enemy troops now blocking important roads. A group commanded by Colonel Campbell attacked at Retimo, but was not able to completely clear the road to the east and west. The Germans were reported to be blocking the road to the coast to the south where reinforcements would be landed. Late on 22 May, the 16th Brigade headquarters and one battalion sailed for Crete on the Glenroy. The plan was to land them at Timbakion to remove the Germans who were on the road.

There was a lot of naval action around Crete on 22 May. A force of three cruisers with destroyers attacked ships between Heraklion and a nearby island. They sank one caique, the ubiquitous type of Greek small vessel. Ships were running out of anti-aircraft ammunition and major units were lost. They included the cruisers Fiji and Gloucester. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Nigel Richardson's father: Crete 1941

There is an interesting article in the Telegraph by Nigel Richardson that talks about his father and his fellows in the battle for Crete in 1941. The German invasion had started on Friday, 20 May 1941, as we know. One of those killed on 22 May 1941, which we have been reviewing, was a British spy, John Pendlebury. He had been an archaeologist and had the personal peculiarity of having a glass eye. Nigel Richardson was a member of the Northumberland Hussars. He had been evacuated from Greece when the campaign there was being wound down and the troops withdrawn. He ended up at Suda Bay, where many other soldiers were dropped by the navy.

Nigel Richardson notes that the area of Hill 107 has been a German cemetery. Hill 107 was the place abandoned by Lt-Colonel Andrew's battalion when they were in the process of collapse after being attacked while unsupported by the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The New Zealanders are commemorated by a street at Galatas named the Neozilandon Polemiston. At one spot in an alley, there is a gate made from a piece of a British tank.

Nigel Richardson's father made his way to Sfakia, as the battle gave way to withdrawal. He was one of the about 5,000 men who were left behind to be taken prisoner by the Germans. He spent about four years as a prisoner of war in Germany. This is based on Nigel Richardson's article and what we know from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Other events relating to Crete on 22 May 1941

With Brigadier Vasey, the Australian, given command over troops in the Canea and Suda area, he was now under New Zealand command. He was put under Brigadier Puttick, the New Zealand Division commander. The only Germans in the area were small groups on the Akrotiri peninsula. Troops from the 1/Welch were able to capture some of the Germans on 22 May 1941. Brigadier Vasey had the 2/8th Battalion (Australians) and the 2nd Greek Regiment. Those units now moved west and occupied a line to the west of Mournies. The 2/2nd Field Regiment (Australian) and a mixed force would defend the area south of Canea. Canea was receiving bombing attacks at a scale that caused General Weston, the Royal Marine, to be concerned about the effect on the civilians in Canea. They were able to persuade them to move to the hills from the town. There were villages in the hills that might shelter the people. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation Crete deteriorates during late 22 May and early 23 May 1941

Once the commanders could clearly see that the attack on the airfield at Maleme by the New Zealand troops had failed, there was no other choice but to withdraw to the east. Freyberg wanted another attack on the airfield later in the afternoon, but when they realized that the Germans were attacking the 10th Brigade, that plan was dropped. Not only was there the threat to the 10th Brigade, but they learned that German troops had split the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades by putting troops across the coast road. That evening, they made the decision to move the 5th Brigade to Platanias, perhaps 2-1/2 miles to the east. The 23rd Battalion received their orders at dawn on 23 May. The 28th Maori Battalion provided the rearguard and they had pulled out by 6:30am. At this point, Canea and Suda were still safe from German attack. The few Germans in the area were captured by the 1/Welch during the day. Brigadier Vasey now had troops to command and had moved forward and came under the New Zealand division command. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late on 22 May 1941 in the Prison Valley on Crete

Starting at about 3pm on 22 May 1941, the New Zealand 19th Battalion had attacked towards an old Turkish fort in the Prison Valley on Crete. They were repulsed with the loss of 12 men. In return, the Germans launched counter-attack towards Galatas at about 7pm. Kippenberger's troops immediately attacked the group. Some Greeks that were nearby, commanded by Captain Forrester, charged towards the Germans, yelling and screaming. That broke the German advance and they withdrew.

In the vicinity of the Maleme airfield, an attack had been planned, but when the New Zealand Division commander realized that there was a German group holding the coast road between the 4th and 5th New Zealand Brigades, he changed his mind. That evening, the decision was made to withdraw from the area near the Maleme airfield and to cede the ground to the Germans. The Australian Official History says that this was in recognition that the battle for Crete was lost. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Were the Germans withdrawing? 22 May 1941 on Crete

At Brigadier Hargest's 5th New Zealand Brigade headquarters, there was a suggestion that the Germans might be withdrawing troops by transport aircraft. The suggestion was prompted by thoughts about German troops running to aircraft as they landed at Maleme. Someone had thought that the troops might be running to the Ju-52 transports to board them to be able to leave. The truth seems to be that the aircraft were landing under fire. Brave men were running to the Ju-52 transport aircraft to unload them as quickly as possible, in case that they would be hit by shellfire.

To test out the idea that the Germans were leaving, the New Zealand division commander, Puttick, ordered Brigadier Kippenberger to probe the enemy in the vicinity of the prison. The patrols encountered heavy resistance, indicating that the Germans were in strength, not reducing their forces. The 19th Battalion had also made an attack towards an old Turkish fort, but was rebuffed by a strong German defense. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation at Maleme and who was to blame (Crete 1941)

The more that we learn about the situation near Maleme airfield on 20 to 22 May 1941, we understand that the problems were at root in the 5th Brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest. He was a politician who had been said to not be suitable for overseas service, but through his use of political connections, he was appointed as the commander of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The defense of the Maleme airfield was his responsibility. The battalions of the brigade were spread thinly on the ground near the airfield, with the 22nd Battalion given a large area to defend, too large for the number of men in the battalion. The battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Leslie Andrew, has been criticized for pulling back from a hill near the airfield on the night of 20/21 May, but his battalion was being hard-pressed by the German forces and Andrew had been wounded at that point. He had repeatedly asked Brigadier Hargest for support other battalions nearby, but Hargest did not understand the urgency and did not take action. Part of the problem is that while the New Zealanders had inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking German airborne troops, the fact was that the Germans were able to put a large number of men into the area by the airfield. While the airfield was not yet secured, Ju-52 transports were able to land supplies and mountain troops on the beaches and along a dry riverbed to the west. Within three days, the Germans outnumbered the New Zealanders near Maleme and the battle was lost. This is based on the account in New Zealand History Online as well as from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 28th (Maori) Battalion on 22 May 1941 at Maleme

After the 20th Battalion withdrew on 22 May 1941, this left the 28th (Maori) Battalion holding lines that faced two directions. On the left, they were facing west, while to their right, the line faced north. They touched the 23rd Battalion on the right. Lt-Col. Dimmer, the 28th Battlalion commander sent a message to their brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, describing the situation. Essentially, the plan to counterattack had failed. They had not regained any critical ground and while they might have tried some other plan, the Australian Official History suggests that none could have succeeded due to the German strength at Maleme. Both the Germans and the defenders of Crete had little artillery. The Germans were now benefiting from the air supply from aircraft landing at Maleme and the improvised landing grounds to the west. They were receiving supplies while the defenders on Crete were starting to run low on supplies. At the same time, Brigadier Hargest got the impression from reports that were soon disproved, that Germans were abandoning Crete and running to board aircraft at Maleme. This is based on the account in Vol. II of the Australian Official History.

Sandy Thomas on the defence of Maleme on 20 and 21 May 1941

There is an interesting piece about Sandy Thomas, who was on Crete during the German attack in 1941. Sandy Thomas was a junior officer in the 23rd Battalion of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. The 22nd Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Les Andrew VC, held the Maleme airfield. During the day on 20 May 1941, they killed German paratroops as they descended. What Sandy Thomas, who was not at Maleme on 20 May, did not know is that the 22nd Battalion took heavy losses from the German glider-borne troops that landed to the west of the airfield. The 22nd Battalion had really lost cohesion as a unit. Sandy Thomas's remarks about Lt-Col. Andrew seem to be on the mark, however. Andrew may have had a VC from the Great War, but that did not automatically make him a good battalion commander. We suspect that giving up the hill overlooking the airfield was not that bad of a decision, although the common opinion was that giving up the hill was Andrew's big mistake. Andrew had asked the brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, for help, and was turned down. Hargest had two battalions that he could have sent into Maleme in the night to replace the 22nd Battalion, but he did not. Brigadier Hargest was a politician-turned soldier, and he was unaware of what was happening and the situation of his battalions. We would blame Brigadier Hargest more than Lt-Col. Andrew over the loss of Maleme airfield and eventually the island of Crete. What Sandy Thomas did not know is that the Germans were landing Ju-52 transports on the beach and a dry riverbed to the west and they did not need Maleme to bring in troops and supplies. This is based on the article about Sandy Thomas and also on Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 20th Battalion on 22 May 1941

Interestingly enough, the New Zealand 20th Battalion was formed in 1939 by the later to be famous Howard Kippenberger. The battalion was formed in New Zealand and was transported to the Mediterranean Theater. After arriving, they participated in the ill-fated Greek expedition under General Maitland Wilson's command. In Greece, the 20th Battalion was included in the 4th Infantry Brigade. The brigade attempted to defend the Aliakmon line. They were moved from the Aliaikmon line to the Servia Pass, which was a more defensible positiion. They were able to hold their position for three days before withdrawing. They were evacuated from Greece and transported to the island of Crete. Very quickly, after the German attack on 20 May 1941, when the battalion was pushed out of their position at Maleme, the second-in-command took control for the remainder of the campaign. The 20th Battalion had been in positions a ways away and was only able to participate in the attack on Maleme after being relieved  by Australian troops. Due to the last minute relief, the 20th was late arriving at Maleme. While the late arrival hurt the chances of success, the German strength was such that they were able to rebuff the attack. While the Germans suffered heavy losses, their control of the airfield at Maleme meant that more troops and supplies could be brought in to strengthen the defenses. This is based on the account in the New Zealand official history.

The New Zealanders in action on 22 May 1941 at Maleme

The New Zealand 20th Battalion only arrived near Maleme at 2:45am on 22 May 1941. There were only two companies at first. The attack started at 3:30am with the Maoris and 20th Battalion together. The Maoris had some tank support in the dark and they made good progress. As the sun came up, the tanks were stopped with one being hit. The 20th Battalion was able to get near to the airfield, but were stopped by heavy gunfire. The daylight had made them very vulnerable and they came under attack from both the ground and air. The 21st Battalion was able to capture the wireless station, but then was heavily opposed. By the afternoon, the troops were forced to give ground. With the 20th Battalion withdrawing behind the Maoris, they were forced to hold two fronts. Australian machine gunners in platoon strength were sent forward late in the day but were annihilated. While some other plan might have done better, such as to use the Australian battalion to attack, the Germans were now too strong at Maleme, with two brigades and part of another. Everyone had taken heavy losses, but the Germans had an advantage over the Australian and New Zealand troops. The Germans were able to fly in supplies while the Australians and New Zealanders were starting to run short. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

22 May 1941 at Maleme

The Australian 2/7th Battalion had completed the relief of the New Zealand 20th Battalion by 11:30pm on 21 May 1941. The Australians had suggested that the 2/7th Battalion used for the attack, rather than the 20th Battalion, as they were fresh and ready. The New Zealand attack was to commence at about 11:30pm, but while the Maori's were ready and had been waiting, the 20th Battalion was late arriving. The attack only started at 3:30am on 22 May. The Maori's had moved forward towards the airfield at Maleme, but the 20th Battalion had met stiffer resistance and was held up by German forces. The 20th Battalion had advanced near the airfield, but one company was under heavy fire, so the commander decided to withdraw behind the Maori battalion, so that if they were successful, they 20th could occupy the high ground in the south. There was hard fighting all day. There was air attack and German aircraft flying in mountain troops who got off the plane and went straight into combat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/7th Battalion moves west on 21 May 1941

The Australian infantry battalion, the 2/7th, had been ordered to move west to near Suda on Crete. They were to move starting late afternoon. The battalion commander had been west, looking at the situation, while his second-in-command got the men ready to move. Before the battalion commander had returned, the brigade staff captain had ordered him to get the battalion moving as close to 5pm as he could. They did not get their entire transport right away. The vehicles arrived in small groups. The drivers were very afraid of air attack and wanted to leave their vehicles, which seemed an obvious target. Major Marshall had used the same tactic that they had successfully used in Greece: keep moving fast and don't stop. The 2/7th moved west had a breakneck speed which Major Marshall found exhilarating. Marshall arrived at Suda with the first company and met Lt-Colonel Lunn, the battalion commander. Marshall then turned around to bring the other three companies forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek plan to attack Valona in January 1941

The Greeks decided to attack the Italian port of Valona in Albania, following the failure of the Italian offensive. The Greek army had received captured Italian equipment from North Africa as well as British equipment. The British acquiesced to a Greek request for air support for the offensive. The Greeks committed almost all their army to the attack, leaving six weak divisions facing Bulgaria. Now, the situation changed radically in Greece, as General Metaxas died on 29 January 1941. In response, Churchill stopped the offensive in North Africa, so there would be forces to send to Greece. The British later found that Hitler had decided in November 1940 to attack Greece. The offensive would start in March 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German Strategic Objectives in early 1941

The Germans planned to invade Greece, probably in March 1941 to achieve two aims. One was to secure their rear prior to the planned attack on Russia in May or June 1941. The other was to prevent British bombers, based in Greece, from hitting the Rumanian Oil fields. The Germans felt increased urgency due to the British successes in North Africa and the Greek successes in Albania. The Germans wanted to ensure their success, so they planned to use a larger army than originally envisioned. Hitler was ready to use however large an army that could be supplied over the roads in the Balkans. The initial British force was planned to include the 2nd Armoured Divsiion, the New Zealand Division, and the 6th, 7th, and 9th Australian Divisions. The Australians would have a large role in the move into Greece, when it came. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/7th Battalion on 21 and 22 May 1941 on Crete

The 2/7th Battalion commander was Lt-Colonel Walker. Early on 21 May 1941, his commander, Brigadier Vasey informed Lt-Colonel Walker that they were not to do the planned attack to clear the road to Maleme. Brigaider Vasey thought that they would be part of a counter-attack at Maleme, instead. Brigadier Vasey and Lt-Colonel Walker, with his Intelligence Officer, attended a New Zealand meeting where they heard what the actual plan was for the evening. The 2/7th was expected to move 18 miles in the night to relieve another battalion and they would be out of communication during the trip. The 2/7th Battalion did not have their own vehicles, so they would be carried in someone else's transport. The New Zealand Brigadier Inglis and Lt-Colonel Walker drove forward to see the position into which the 2/7th would be moving. When Walker expressed his doubts about the plan, Brigidier Inglis informed him that a "well-trained" battalion could carry out the operation in an hour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australians on Crete during 21 and 22 May 1941

The commanders on Crete were playing the same sort of games that they played in the Western Desert later in 1941 and during the first part of 1942. They were breaking up brigades, rather than use them as a substantial combat unit. Instead, they took individual battalions and ordered them around, often without support so that they were either depleted or overrun. At least on Crete, the issue was the relative lack of forces to defend the island and the perceived need to provide a fighting force at all the remote points. That practice left the Australian Brigadier Vasey without any fighting battalions. He requested to be given command of the area where the two Australian battalions, the 2/7th and the 2/8th, were located. That only happened late on 22 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Australians on 21 May 1941 on Crete

The plan was for a counter-attack on the Germans at Maleme airfield on the night of 21/22 May 1941. One player in the scheme, the 2./7 Battalion (an Australian unit) had fought at Bardia in the route of the Italians in January. In February and March, they had been positioned at Mersa Brega and had been attacked by air and by Rommel's forces. From there, they had gone to Greece in the ill-fated venture. They were well-enough led that they had not suffered much loss from any of the air attacks. Brigadier Vasey had planned to use the 2/7th to clear the road to Retimo. Instead, higher command had decided to use them elsewhere. The 2/7th would replace the New Zealand 20th Battalion. The problem was that the plan was ill-conceived and didn't allow enough time for the 2/7th to travel and relieve the 20th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German plan for Crete for 22 May 1941

One critical event was that General Student appointed General Ringel, the 5th Mountain Division commander, overall German commander on Crete. The plan would be to take control of Crete from west to east. The Assault Group, the glider-borne troops, would hold the airfield with mountain troop help. The number of mountain troops would be increased by flying in more to the airfield. Once there were enough mountain troops, they would circle through the hills and clear them. The Germans felt that their hold on the airfield was tenuous, but would be strengthened if they could land another battalion of mountain troops. The planned counterattack was to take place on the night of 21/22 May 1941, but without Australian participation. The Australians at Georgioupolis had not been in action. The veteran 2/7 Battalion, which had achieved success in Cyrenaica, would be asked to clear the road to Retimo. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

In the prison valley on Crete on 21 May 1941

Colonel Heidrich was the airborne division commander on Crete on 21 May 1941, after the general commanding the division was wounded. Colonel Heidrich was on the scene, directing operations in the prison valley on that day. He fully expected to face a British counter attack, but none arrived. The British defence of Crete was in great disarray, despite the presence of good men who were in charge, such as General Freyberg, the overall commander of the defence. The great majority of the troops on Crete had been dumped there after the withdrawal from Greece at the end of April 1941, and they had never really recovered from that experience. As well, British communications gear was so bad that Freyberg was often totally out of touch with developments on the island. The two paratroop companies that General Student had dropped near Platanias area ran into trouble. They were again dropped on defenders who were waiting for them and lost heavily. Of these, only 80 men were able to land and occupied a farm near the beach at Pirgos. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German results at sea near Crete by 21 May 1941

The German invasion force for Crete that was dispatched on ships consisted of 2,330 men. They were the 3rd Battalion of the 100th Mountain Regiment, part of an anti-aircraft unit, and a heavy weapons unit. They sailed early on 21 May 1941, but returned to port when there was word of British warships. They sailed again late morning and when they neared Crete, they were intercepted by the Brtish squadron with cruises and destroyers. They were fortunate to only lose 320 men. The Italian destroyer Lupo distinguished itself in the defence. Italian boats and destroyers rescued many men. The British Royal Navy was much better prepared than the land forces defending Crete, although they would pay dearly before the battle for Crete was over. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German plans for the second day in the attack on Crete

On the second day of the German attack on Crete, the Germans decided that they had to secure control of the airfield at Maleme. General Student decided to drop his last two paratroop companies east of Pirgos. This was on 21 May 1941. The plan also included the glider-borne troops attacking from the west. They needed the supporting air force to destroy the artillery battery on the hill that had been shelling the airfield. A mountain battalion was loaded onto Ju-52 transports in Greece in ready to land on the airfield at Maleme. The mountain troops would start landing at 4pm on 21 May. The landing took losses, in that 20 transports were destroyed while attempting to land. The Germans attacked the airfield at dawn, took the hill, and moved across to the east of the airfield. Immediately after taking the airfield, they took the towns of Maleme and Pirgos. The 22nd New Zealand Battalion had abandoned these positions in the night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At sea near Crete on 21 May 1941

British naval forces sheltered south of Crete, preparing to resume sweeps across the northern part of the island. At this point,bombing had intensified, so that one force was continuously under bombing attack from 9:50am until 1:50pm. The air attacks sank the destroyer Juno, of the best new destroyers of the J class. The cruiser Ajax was damaged from near misses that did not directly hit the ship. After receiving reports of more small craft heading towards Crete, the naval forces felt obligated to make another northern sweep. They intercepted the convoy, sinking a steamer and caiques and damaging the Italian destroyer Lupo. This had been accomplished by the British cruisers Dido, Orion, and Ajax. They were accompanied by four British destroyers. By this point, the Germans were wary of any more seaborne attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The planned attempt to recapture the airfield at Maleme

The plan to recapture the airfield at Maleme was to use the Maori battalion and the 20th (New Zealand) Battalion to attack during the night of 21/22 May 1941. The 20th Battalion was to be made available by replacing it by an Australian battalion brought from Georgioupolos. Aircraft from Egypt would bomb the German positions. The troops would have three light tanks on the road to support them. The first objective would be Pirgos and then they would attack t he airfield after resting. The rest of what happened on 21 May 1941 was pretty successful. An Australian battalion took the heights southeast of the airfield at Retimo. At Heraklion, the Germans were driven out of the harbour area by a counterattack. Both at Retimo and Heraklion, the Germans were kept from taking the airfields. At sea, a convoy with German troops was attacked and driven off with losses. The ships with German troops were escorted by Italian destroyers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

21 May 1941 from the Australian Official History

From the Australian Official History, we see that there was a plan to recapture Maleme airfield, but that the situation was deteriorating elsewhere. The German air support was now so important that fighter aircraft on strafing runs were making movement by day difficult. The defenders of Crete were having to deal use battalion-sized units, rather than brigades. The plan was to bring an Australian battalion to replace the 20th (New Zealand) Battalion, which was to be brought to the area near Maleme for an attack on the airfield with the rest of the 5th Brigade. One problem was that German paratroops were infiltrating south of the Maori battalion and might pose a threat eventually. There was some concern that the New Zealand Division could be split into two parts by a German attack towards the north. Meanwhile, a small amount of artillery was ordered to the west to participate in the planned attack on the airfield. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the first day in the invasion of Crete

As we have said, the German forces that were dropped close to the defending New Zealand troops from the 5th Brigade took heavy casualties. Many or most paratroops dropped over the defenders were shot and killed before they touched ground. Some fifty gliders were also dropped. The attack commenced at about 8am on 20 May 1941. The troops on the ground could see the aircraft towing gliders pass overhead and then saw other aircraft dropping paratroops and supply canisters. The gliders were mainly dropped near the Tavronitis dry riverbed. The defensive plan had mistakenly left this area undefended. The gliders were able to unload their troops who moved towards the Maleme airfield and attacked. The immediate area around the airfield was held by the 22nd NZ Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Leslie Andrew. He was a Great War VC recipient. The battle was going badly enough by afternoon that Col. Andrew requested help from the 23rd Battalion. The 5th Brigade commander, Brigadier Hargest, refused the aid, because he mistakenly thought that the 23rd Battalion was fighting paratroops dropped nearby. Col. Andrew ordered an attack by his reserve and the two tanks, but that failed when the tanks broke down. The 22nd Battalion withdrew, with the brigade commander's permission, into the area of the 21st Battalion. This is based on the account in the New Zealand Official History.

When the morning started on 21 May 1941, the remnants of the 22nd Battalion had withdrawn into the defensive positions held by the 21st and 23rd Battalions. They were all part of the 5th New Zealand Brigade. At dawn, stragglers from the Royal Air Force, the gunners for the disabled anti-aircraft guns, and Royal Marine artillery made their way to the New Zealand positions, The brigade was under almost constant air attack and was under attack from the German airborne troops. There had been a machine gun platoon on a height, and these withdrew after they exhausted their ammunition firing at the airfield. At a meeting the plan for 22 May was for the 23rd Battalion to retake the airfield and the surrounding area. By 8:10am, a Ju-52 landed, unloaded, and took off from Maleme airfield. Several aircraft carrying troops landed, unloaded, and took off at the west end of the airfield. Many German paratroops were dropped onto the Maori battalion, who cleared most of the Germans, but not all. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A different topic :Auchinleck versus Rommel

We had a discussion this afternoon about the general topic of the war in North Africa in 1940 to 1943. Prior to the arrival of Bernard Law Montgomery on the scene, the only British general to beat Rommel in battle was Claude Auchinleck. He did it not just once but twice. As we well remember and have discussed in the past, the first occasion was when the Crusader battle, which had been commenced with great hope, had gone wrong. General Auchinleck had made a string of bad appointments in 1941 to 1842. The first time, Alan Cunningham, brother of the great admiral Cunningham, proved himself to be unsuitable for the position of Eighth Army commander. He had just fought a brilliant campaign in east Africa against the Italians. The battle was fast moving an mobile, but with small forces of colonial troops along with regular army units. Alan Cunningham was extremely tired and lacked experience with mechanized warfare in the desert. When Cunningham was ready to cede the battle to Rommel, Auchinleck stepped in and proceeded to beat Rommel, forcing him into a retreat from the area near Tobruk. The second occasion was when Neil Ritchie had lost Tobruk and there was danger of Rommel blitzing into the canal zone. Auchinleck stepped into the command again and after some maneuver, fought the First Battle of El Alamein and left the Axis forces stalled and disabled. The best source on this topic is the British Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East, along with Robert Crisp's book Brazen Chariots.

21 May 1941 in the morning

General Freyberg first learned of the deteriorating situation near Maleme on the morning of 21 May 1941. He had not realized that the Germans had made good progress pushing the 22nd Battalion off their positions. First thing in the morning, the artillery were keeping the Germans from using the airfield at Maleme, but it almost didn't matter, given the other news. The remainder of the troops defending the airfield were attacked by divebombers starting before 9am. Freyberg was then informed that there were more paratroops being dropped near Maleme. Ju-52 transports were also able to land and take off from the riverbed and beaches to the west. That meant that more troops and equipment were arriving. The intelligence officer, Puttick thought that there were two German regiments, one at Maleme and one near Galatas. Puttick thought that they needed to recapture the airfield as the main priority. At an early morning meeting at the 23rd Battalion, the consensus was that the 23rd Battalion should try and hold their defensive position. The 22nd should try to withdraw into the positions of the 23rd and 21st Battalions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Paratroops near the prison on 20 May 1941

Colonel Heidrich, who now command thed the German airborne division, personally led his 3rd Regiment near the prison on the island of Crete on 20 May 1941. His men were all paratroops, and were an example that they could succeed, if properly deployed and led. Colonel Heidrich landed near the prison at about 9am on 20 May 1941. He had almost the full strength of three battalions at his disposal at the start of the fight. The immediate problem was that there were British on the overlooking heights who commanded the battlefield. Two companies, by the afternoon, were able to take the Galatas heights. In error, during the evening, they abandoned the heights, and formed a defensive position. Two battalions of the four that Heidrich had under his immediate command had taken significant losses in the first day's fight. Colonel Heidrich thought that with his remaining strength, they might be able to defend against the expected attack the next day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force for Canea and Suda Bay

For the 20 May 1941 attack, the situation went badly for the force to attack Canea and Suda Bay. The division commander and his staff were in five gliders. One crashed on a Greek island near Athens and General Sussman and the others in his glider were killed. That left Colonel Heidrich, the 3rd Regiment commander, in charge of the division. One battalion of the 3rd Regiment landed near the prison, captured a commanding position overlooking the prison, and advanced to the east. They met a company from one of the other battalions. They were stopped by the "Royal Perivolians" and Greeks. Near galatas, another company of the third battalion of the 3rd Regiment took almost total losses. When Colonel Heidrich landed at 9am, near the prison, he took charge of organizing the forces nearby to make progress. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The West Group attack on 20 May 1941

Glider-borne troops were a key part of the West Group attack in Crete on 20 May 1941. The gliders were able to land where they were intended. They had three initial assignments: capture the camp near the airfield, capture the anti-aircraft guns "at the mouth of the Tavronitis", and also capture the bridge. The bridge was across the river, where the anti-aircraft guns were positioned. The III Battalion, which was to capture the airfield, was landed in the wrong place. They landed in the hills instead, as the aircraft commanders did not want to risk landing the men in the sea. Because of this, 400 of the 600 men were killed. The IV Battalion was planned to land west of the bridge. General Meindl landed with the IV Battalion and organized the attack on the airfield. The General had planned and executed an attack on the bridge, but was soon wounded. A major then took command of the leading troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German force deployment for Crete

The German troops attacking Crete were divided into three groups. General Meindl commanded the West Group. The West Group had the entire Assault Regiment, except for a half-battalion, a mixed light anti-aircraft and machine gun battalion, along with a medical platoon. The West Group was intended to capture the airfield at Maleme and hold it so that transport aircraft could operate from the field. The West Group had other missions, as well. They were to conduct a reconnaissance to the west and to push to the south and east to join with the Center Group. General Sussman commanded the Center Group. General Sussman was commanding officer of the 7th Air Division. Center Group had the 3rd Parachute Regiment, the half-battalion of glider-borne troops from teh Assault Regiment, and the engineer battalion (pioneers). The Center Group was to capture Canea and Suda. Center Group also had most of the 2nd Parachute Regiment, except for one battalion. The 2nd Parachute Regiment was to capture Retimo. Once capturing Retimo, they were to head west to attack Suda Bay. The East Group consisted of four battalions of paratroops. They were to capture the airfield at Heraklion and the town. They were also to aid bringing in troops by sea. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the original attack plan for Crete in 1941

The original German attack plan for Crete for May 1941 was that the 7th Air Division and the 1st Assault Regiment would be dropped on Crete. After the airfields were taken, some of the mountain troops would be flown in by transport aircraft (Ju-52). The rest would be brought by sea, probably carried by Greek caiques. There were 750 glider borne troops in the assault regiment and 10,000 paratroops. Some 5,000 mountain troops would be flown in to the captured airfields. The other 7,000 mountain troops would come by sea. They had enough planes to fly in 70 or 80 gliders and somewhere between 600 and 750 Ju-52 transport aircraft. In one lift, they could bring 5,000 t0 6,000 troops with their equipment. The VIII Air Corps would provide air support to the attack. They would start the operation with 430 dive bombers. There were only 180 fighter aircraft with which to establish control of the air. They were helped by the extreme scarcity of British fighter aircraft. The Germans also had 40 reconnaissance aircraft for the operation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Lohr

When you realize that General Lohr was an Austrian, we can realize that he was an old Balkan hand. He had fought in the Great War, in the Austrian-Hungarian army. Postwar, he became involved with the Austrian air force, a very small organization. Before Austria was annexed into Germany, General Lohr was head of the Austrian air force. The second letter in his name actually was an O with an umlaut over it. General Lohr concocted the scheme to capture the bridge over the Corinth canal and successfully executed the operation. The operation was conducted without the knowledge of General Student, the head of the German airborne forces. General Lohr was the head of the operation to capture Crete in May 1941. He eventually ended up in the Balkans at the end of the Second World War and surrendered to Yugoslav partisans. They did not like his bombing of Belgrade during the initial attack and he was executed in 1947 for his part in the operation.

The XI Air Corps

The German airborne force included the 7th Air Division, which was the paratroops, the 1st Assault Regiment, the glider-borne troops, "and the aircraft group". The aircraft group was equipped with the transport aircraft that were used to carry troops. The glider troops had a regiment of four battalions. Each battalion had four companies (a square organization). The Air Division was not a square organization, as the division had three regiments of three battalions of paratroops. The regiments had an artillery company and an anti-tank company. The 5th Mountain Division was also part of the corps. The intent was that they would largely come by sea, but some would fly into Crete on transport aircraft. In the event, because of the strength of the Royal Navy, the mountain troops were flown into Crete in sufficient strength to overwhelm the defenders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Airborne attack lessons from Crete

The Germans overreacted to the problems with the airborne attack on Crete and decided to not make such an attack again. I would say that at least Hitler misread the situation. Yes, making a daylight parachute attack on defenders who expect the attack does not work well. The casualties among German paratroops at Crete were high because they were dropped onto defending troops who then shot the paratroops during the descent. The Allies were so impressed by the concept that they formed their own airborne divisions, including parachute-equipped paratroops.

The glider-borne troops were much more successful. They were largely dropped and landed near, not on, the targets to be attacked. A few gliders were dropped too far at sea and were lost with their passengers, but most were able to land on the island. They were in numbers large enough to form cohesive units that were able to capture the airfield at Maleme. After the airfield was secured, transport aircraft were able to bring in a large number of mountain troops who were then able to overwhelm the defending force. The defenders were at a disadvantage due to the poor command communications systems. General Freyberg often was uninformed about the course of the battle, until the battle was lost.

The capture of the bridge over the Corinth canal in Greece in April 1941 was a good example where paratroops were used with the element of surprise. There was considerable secrecy involved (apparently), and the paratroops were dropped and caught the largely undefended area by surprise and took the bridge. To achieve a degree of surprise needed for the successful use of paratroops was why the British and American airborne troops were dropped at night at Normandy in June 1944. The operation still went awry due to the air transports totally ignoring the need for navigation. The paratroops ended up being scattered across Normandy in small parties, not able to reform units.

Now, special forces are dropped by parachute with an eye to achieving surprise and a degree of stealth. That is what is needed for any successful use of parachutists.

The German plan for Crete in 1941

The proposal for the airborne attack on Crete had only been made on 15 April 1941. There was only time for five weeks of planning and preparation prior to the attack on 20 May 1941. General Lohr had made the pitch to Field Marshal Goering. General Lohr planned to use General Student's XI Air Corps and General von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps for the attack. The units and aircraft were only in place on airfields in Southern Greece by 14 May. The Germans expected to be fighting one division, plus remnants evacuated from Greece in late April. General Student wanted to make four attacks in Crete, but there were insufficient aircraft to provide air cover for more than three simultaneous attacks. The plan then tried to accommodate that by making two attacks int morning and two in the afternoon on 20 May. That immediately handicapped the attacking force and reduced the chances for success. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Naval support at Crete early in the attack

Admiral Cunningham, the Mediterranean Fleet commander, had a plan in place to keep seaborne invaders of Crete at bay. He had three cruiser-destroyer groups with supporting battleships to their westward. There were more ships at Alexandria, including the aircraft carrier Formidable (with only four aircraft) and two more battleships. On the evening of 20 May-21 May 1941, one cruiser-destroyer group fired on Italian motor torpedo boats and damaged four. The British had expected to see German troops brought to Crete by sea in caiques, but they were absent in the first day or two. So, the initial German attack was left to airborne troops supported by land-based aircraft from the Balkans. General Lohr commanded both the airborne troops and their transports and supporting fighter and bomber aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Retimo and Heraklion on the first day or so

The attacks on Retimo and Keraklon (on Crete) came later in the day on 20 May 1941. At Retimo, the attackers were paratroops. They were countered and most were beaten, but one group held a ridge that commanded the airfield from the southeast. In the vicinity of Heraklion, paratroops that landed in the defended areas were beaten, although there were snipers still at work by the end of the day. The town of Heraklion was being disputed by the end of the day. There was fighting in progress there between the attackers and defenders. The quality of communications was so poor, that General Freyberg was uninformed about the status at Retimo and Heraklion. The General reported to his superiors that he thought that Retimo and Heraklion were still in British hands. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The battle for Crete was really lost on the second day

Informed opinion says that the battle for Crete was lost on the second day, 21 May 1941. By then, the Germans had secured the airfield at Maleme, west of Suda Bay. Having the airfield allowed the Germans to fly in the mountain troops from the 5th Mountain Division. The mountain troops overwhelmed the defenders and ultimately captured Crete. The original German plan may have been to bring the mountain troops in by sea, but the Royal Navy had maintained control of the seas around Crete, although at great cost, so that the mountain troops arrived by Ju-52 transport aircraft at Maleme. Maleme had been a problem since the first day, when the New Zealand battalion designated to protect Maleme had collapsed. The battalion commander, Colonel Andrew, was a Victoria Cross recipient from the Great War, but that did not guarantee success. The remnants of the 22nd Battalion straggled away from the Maleme area leaving the Germans in possession of the landing field. The 21st and 23rd battalions had done better and were left to oppose the Germans.

Near Canea and Suda Bay

On 20 May 1941, some anti-aircraft guns south of Canea were captured by the Germans who landed nearby. The 1/Rangers and some carriere from the 1/Welch were eventually reinforced with two platoons of Royal Marines and some Greek troops from the 2nd Regiment. They were able to recaptured the guns. By late on 20 May, only small groups of Germans were left near Suda Bay and Canea. By late afternoon, reinforcements arrived from Georgioupolis, in the form of the 2/8th Battalion (presumably Australians). They were in line west of Mournies with the Composite Battalion, the 2/2nd Field Regiment, and the 2nd Greek Regiment. Further west, the Greeks were holding the harbor at Kastelli. During the attack, Germans landed nearby and were attacked by the Greek unit. The Greeks were largely successful with only one small German group resisting. A New Zealand platoon that was nearby captured the remaining Germans. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Suda Bay on 20 May 1941

The New Zealand Division was located west of Suda Bay. General Weston commanded the force at Canea and Suda Bay. German paratroops had landed in the wooded area near Perivolia and were dealt with by the Composite Battalion, which had a strength of some 700 men. Paratroops actually landed in the area where the King of Greece was staying, but the New Zealanders and some armed Cretan men were able to extricate the King and keep him safe. He evacuated to the nearby hills. A glider attack had been mounted on the Akrotiri peninsula, but of the 15 gliders released over the sea, only 11 made the land. Some of the 11 were shot down, but most landed. The Northumberland Hussars were able to deal with the glider-borne troops. More gliders landed near some anti-aircraft guns south of Canea. The Germans captured the guns and gunners, but were surrounded by men from the 1/Rangers and carriers from the 1/Welch. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Late on 20 May 1941 on Crete

When they heard on late 20 May 1931 that the Germans were clearing a landing ground near the prison, Colonel Kippenberger suggested to the division commander that they attack the prison area and recapture it. In the event, the attack happened at about 7:15pm. The attack was mounted by the 19th Battalion with three light tanks from the 3rd Hussars. By 8:30pm, they were within 1400 yards from the prison, on the north. Because of the darkness, the tank commander thought that they should stop for the night. The troops formed a surrounding perimeter around the tanks. By morning, the attackers withdrew. Only after the attack was Colonel Kippenberger given command of the 19th Battalion. They thought that the attack failed by being too late in the day and without adequate command from the senior commander in the area. By the night of 20 May, the Germans were left in possession of the airfield at Maleme, although it was under fire from the nearby artillery. The Germans also held the slopes near the prison and the reservoir and would be difficult to dislodge. This force threatened to break the New Zealand Division in two parts. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Command on 20 May 1941 on Crete suffered from poor communications

The British army, in early 1941, suffered from unreliable radio communications. To compensate, they tended to rely on landlines. On 20 May 1941, wire line communications were disrupted by the German attack. That left General Freyberg and his commanders without adequate ability to communicate. We suspect that early during the German attack on Crete, the British were dependent on messengers, as that was all that they had left. Despite the communication situation, General Freyberg had learned enough to understand that the Maleme area was "the danger point". He ordered two battalions of the 4th Brigade to be put under the division commander's control. He also wanted to give him the entire reserve for use at Maleme. Brigadier Puttick, the division commander, was receiving "cheerful and confident" reports from the 5th Brigade, thought that he needed to keep the reserves to use against the expected attack by troops brought in by ship. By afternoon, he decided to attack the prison area, despite the fact that it was late in the day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Galatas area on 20 to 21 May 1941

During the initial German attack on Crete on 20 May 1941, the 6th Greek Regiment quickly ran out of ammunition, with the remnants falling back towards Galatas. Captain Forrester, the British liaison officer, was able to rally some of the troops and linked up with the 19th Battalion and the Composite Battalion. The German attack was heading up the road by the prison and Galatas at 4pm. The defense held and the attack was repulsed for the moment. At the same time, the cavalry had arrived at Galatas. They had been out of touch, north of the reservoir. The cavalry was positioned to support the Greeks to the east, near Galatas, and were connected to the petrol company and the 19th Battalion. The 8th Greek Regiment was fighting, but was isolated. They heard that the Germans at the prison were making a landing field. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The rest of Crete on 20 May 1941

A strong German paratroop and glider force had landed in the area protected by the 10th New Zealand Brigade. They were at Galatas, Alikianon, and the Aghya prison. About 1500 Germans had landed. Colonel Kippenberger went to the small house that he planned to use as a headquarters and found a German sniper, whom he killed. The 6th Greek Regiment quickly ran out of ammunition and was useless as a unit. A British officer was able to rally 400 of them who had fallen back towards Galatas. One bright spot was that the Germans at Galatas were captured by midday on 20 May 1941. By late in the day, the Germans were thought to be in control by the prison and were clearing an landing area to bring in more troops. In the 4th Brigade area, the hospital had been captured by the Germans, but was retaken. The 4th Brigade area included the New Zealand Division headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

At dawn on 21 May 1941 on Crete

The 5th New Zealand Brigade was in a good position at the beginning of the second day of the German attack on Crete on 21 May 1941. They had four battalions, of which only the 22nd Battalion had been disrupted. The NZE Detachment (New Zealand Engineers) was sitting to the east of the others. They had the 27th Battery, which was also partly in the territory of the 21st and 23rd Battalions. The 27th Battalion had a mixture of nine pieces, including two 3.7in Mountain Guns, three Italian 75mm and four classic French 75mm guns. The guns had survived the parachute drop, as did the NZE and the 28th (Maori) Battalion. The Maoris also cleaned out a group of Germans that were in a mill in front of the NZE Detachment. The Germans maintained air superiority over the brigade, however, and could hit the troops by air. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 21st NZ Battalion on the slopes: 20-21 May 1941

Lt-Col. Allen commanded the 21st New Zealand Battalion positioned on the slopes of the higher ground overlooking the 23rd Battalion during the initial German attack on Crete on 20 May 1941. About 100 German paratroops had dropped onto the slopes. They were all either killed or captured. Although he had authorization to move in the event that the 23rd Battalion moved, Allen decided that the 21st Battalion would continue to hold their area on the slopes. He did send one company to the two villages that were close. They were able to clear Xamondhokhori, but not Vlakheronitissa, as the latter had too many Germans. So far, only the 22nd Battalion had totally collapsed. The 23rd and 21st were still in place, holding their ground by early 21 May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 23rd New Zealand Battalion at Crete on 20-21 May 1941

Immediately to the east of the 22nd NZ battalion, the 22nd NZ Battalion was on high ground,looking down on the main road. The 21st NZ Battalion actually was on even higher ground, looking down on the 23rd Battalion. Major Leckie was the 23rd Battalion commander in the fight. The 23rd Battalion managed to kill or at least run off the glider and paratroops that landed in their area. They believed that they had killed as many as 400 paratroops while they were still in the air and helpless. At noon, the 23rd Battalion remained in control of their area and were well positioned to defend themselves. One disquieting thing was that they were out of contact with the 22nd Battalion. Later in the afternoon, one company from the 23rd Battalion and one from the 28th (Maori) Battalion were sent to aid the 22nd Battalion. They eventually found the abandoned 22nd Battalion headquarters and in retreat and then found part of one company with Colonel Andrew. This was at about 2am. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

In the afternoon near Maleme on 20 May 1941

Despite part of the 22nd New Zealand Battalion being overrun in the initial attack near the Maleme airfied, other parts of the battalion were generally holding better. The first group of paratroops who dropped on Pirgos were shot as they dropped. A second group were also overcome. There were small groups, however, that were trying to organize. In response, Colonel Andrew decided to attack to the west along the road. He had two infantry tanks, but one's gun was found to be inoperative and the other was ultimately abandoned. By 9pm, the Germans were holding the edge of the airfield. They were starting to consolidate their hold on Hill 107, which overlooked the airfield. By left the ground that they had held and moved towards the rear troops. By morning, they were moving east along a track towards Pirgos and Xamondhokhori. The 21st and 23rd Battalions were still intact. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 22nd NZ Battalion at Maleme airfield

The 22nd NZ Battalion was trying to protect the Maleme airfield. When the attack came, the dust and smoke obscured the view of the gliders that landed. Some 600 to 800 paratroops landed around the New Zealanders, as well. A few gliders and paratroops actually landed within the battalion, not just nearby. Some of the German airborne troops entered the RAF offices near the airfield and chased the unarmed office workers out of the area. The New Zealand company near the center of the attack withdrew, leaving the Germans in possession. By 3am the 21st, the company was in the process of withdrawing in the face of the attack. The anti-aircraft guns near the field were also taken. Without any support the New Zealand battalion was being beaten by the attackers and men were killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British intelligence predicted an attack on Crete by 17, 18, or 19 May 1941

British intelligence predicted that there was the imminent threat of attack on Crete by the XI German Corps on 17, 18, or 19 May 1941. The corps included the 22nd Airborne Division. The attack was expected to come from air and by sea, with the majority coming by air. They expected the attack to be preceded by air attack by 100 bombers and then there would be transport aircraft dropping paratroops. The expected objectives were thought to be Maleme, Canea, a nearby valley, and Retimo. While the defenders waited for the attack, there were constant air attacks, particularly on Suda Bay against ships anchored there and unloading. Right before the invasion, a new defensive tactic was adopted whereby the anti-aircraft guns would fire an "umbrella of bursting shells" above the pier where ships were being unloaded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans attack on 20 May 1941

The attack on Crete started with a large air raid on the area around Suda Bay, Maleme and the airfield, and Canea. They targeted the anti-aircraft batteries as part of the attack. The number of bombers and fighters was much greater than had been seen previously. The defenders quickly realized that this was the start of the expected attack to take Crete. Because the anti-aircraft guns were specifically targeted by dive bombers, many were knocked out in this initial attack. Immediately after the attack, about 75 gliders landed while the paratroops dropped to the west, south, and east of the airfield. Communications were disrupted, because they relied on signals via landlines, which were broken. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Crete, right before the German attack in 1941

General Freyberg made a tour of the defences for Crete on 16 May 1941 and was pleased with the arrangements that had been made and in the spirit of the defenders. He sent a cable that indicated that there were 45 field guns with ammunition ready. At each airfield, there were two infantry tanks (probably Matildas). General Freyberg thought that with the help of the Royal Navy, they could hold Crete against German attack. Churchill promised that the Royal Navy would do everything it could to aid the defenders. The weak spot was air defence. The remaining fighter aircraft on Crete were reduced to four Hawker Hurricanes, three Gloster Gladiators, and two Fairey Fulmars. While they could have mined all airfields, they did not so that the fighter aircraft could safely land. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Anti-aircraft gunners right before the invasion of Crete in 1941

Once the anti-aircraft gunners at Suda Bay adopted the umbrella system of firing over the unloading ships from 19 May 1941, no ship or jetty was hit by bombs. The anti-aircraft strength at Suda Bay was really insufficient to protect against a really heavy air attack. The batteries at Suda Bay consisted of sixteen 3.7in anti-aircraft guns, the most modern type, ten older 3in guns, and only sixteen 40mm Bofors guns. Retimo did not even have any guns. Heraklion had just four 3in guns and ten 40mm Bofors guns. Up until the invasion, no anti-aircraft guns were permanently damaged and disabled. Miraculously, only six gunners were killed and eleven were wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British intelligence predicted an attack on Crete by 17, 18, or 19 May 1941

British intelligence predicted that there was the imminent threat of attack on Crete by the XI German Corps on 17, 18, or 19 May 1941. The corps included the 22nd Airborne Division. The attack was expected to come from air and by sea, with the majority coming by air. They expected the attack to be preceded by air attack by 100 bombers and then there would be transport aircraft dropping paratroops. The expected objectives were thought to be Maleme, Canea, a nearby valley, and Retimo. While the defenders waited for the attack, there were constant air attacks, particularly on Suda Bay against ships anchored there and unloading. Right before the invasion, a new defensive tactic was adopted whereby the anti-aircraft guns would fire an "umbrella of bursting shells" above the pier where ships were being unloaded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The troop deployment on Crete on 20 May 1941 was unimpressive

At the time of the attack on Crete on 20 May 1941, the troops available were deployed in a manner that someone thought was reasonable. The 5th New Zealand Brigade was trying to defend the airfield at Meleme and the nearby beaches. The newly organized 10th Brigade was facing west on the "coastal plain", west of Galatas. The 4th New Zealand Brigade was deployed to their back, facing east and were to be ready to move where needed. They apparently formed some sort of reserve. The 1st Greek Regiment was deployed at Kastelli, a "little port". The regiment was small and was composed of young men, under-armed, and pretty much untrained. General Weston commanded the force defending Suda Bay. THe Australians under Brigadier Vasey were at Retimo and were to defend the harbour, airfield, and the nearby beaches. Two battalions stayed at Retimo with a third to the west at Georgioupolis Bay. They were seven miles away, so they were unsupported. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand Division expanded on 14 May 1941

On 14 May 1941, the 10th Brigade was added to the New Zealand Division. The brigade consisted of the 20th New Zealand Battalion and the 6th Greek Battalion, along with a composite battalion from men from various organizations that no longer existed as cohesive units. That provided a nominally complete brigade, although there was really only one complete New Zealand battalion in the mix. Colonel Howard Kippenberger had commanded the 4th New Zealand Brigade, but he was appointed as brigade commander for the new brigade. In his place, Colonel Falconer was temporarily commanding the 4th Brigade. Brigadier Inglis was brought in from Egypt to command the 4th Brigade. Brigadier Inglis eventually was promoted to be a Major-General and commanded the 2nd New Zealand Division for a period in 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the invasion of Crete in 1941

Prior to 20 May 1941, the Germans had greatly underestimated the British forces on Crete. The Germans had expected to take Crete cheaply in preparation for the invasion of Russia, since Crete was well-positioned to threaten Turkey. The Germans hoped to capture Crete with a small effort by paratroops. They were shocked by their losses on the first day. They might have responded in many different ways, but their actual response was to throw their entire airborne force against Crete. The Germans were able to make good use of the Greek landing grounds and airfields near to Crete. They were able to make shuttle runs with Ju-87 and Ju-88 bombers and had negligible air opposition from the British. The British did make a strong effort at sea that prevented the Germans from sending the 5th Mountain Division in by sea as planned. They were flown in by air instead and were a key factor in overcoming British resistance, where by British, we mean New Zealand, Australian, and British forces. This is based on the American military attache's report on the battle for Crete.

Shipping and Air Attacks on Suda Bay May 1941

The scale of air attacks on Crete, particularly on Suda Bay, had created a critical supply situation. Dring the period of 29 April to 20 May, some 15,000 tons of supplies were unloaded. That took fifteen ships, of which eight were damaged or sunk. They switched from laborers to unload ships to volunteer Australian soldiers. One of their achievements was to save some Bren carriers from the upper deck of a sunken ship. From the period up to 20 May 1941, the commanders could see that Crete could not be held indefinitely. There were already thirteen damaged ships lying in Suda Bay on 19 May. While using a southern port would have helped, there was no unloading equipment there and the roads to the north were bad or non-existent. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

the sixty 25pdrs in Egypt in late May 1941

As we said, the artillery situation on Crete in late May 1941 was desperate. In Egypt, there were the rive Australian field regiments with old artillery, except for 36 25pdr guns. During the last week, another 24 25pdr guns were issued to two Australian field regiments in reserve in Egypt. If Crete had gotten those sixty 25pdr guns, they would have been much better prepared to face the coming German attack. Instead, the guns were with field regiments held in reserve. Of those guns sent to Crete, 49 French and Italian guns. So many artillery units lacked guns that they were equipped as infantry for the time being. Supposedly, one hundred guns were sent to Crete, but they did not receive any where near that many before the German assault. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The gunners prepare in May 1941 on Crete

There were as many 100 guns sent to Crete before 20 May 1941. What was received was a mixed bag. There was great disarray in what arrived. There were missing sights and instruments. There was ammunition without fuses. The gunners did what they could to overcome the difficulties. In some cases, they improvised sights. In another case, they made charts that enabled them to fire without sights or instruments. The gunners were regular British army, Australian, and New Zealand. Some of the guns were Italian 75mm and 100mm calibers. The smaller arms were also mixed British, American, and Italian. While all this was happening, there were constant air attacks, particularly on Suda Bay, causing great loss. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The artillery situation in early May 1941

Due to having to make a hasty withdrawal from Greece, a tremendous amount of the Middle East artillery resources were lost. Both the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division lost all their artillery. There had also been three British medium regiments and they had also lost all their guns. Since the Middle East had been short of guns, particularly modern guns, making up the loss was going to be difficult. On 20 May 1941, there were five Australian field regiments in reserve in Egypt that actually had guns. The guns included 36 new 25pdr guns, 59 18pdr guns, some of which were in poor condition, and 24-4.5in howitzers. The old system had been to have mixed field regiments with the 18pdr gun and 4.5in howitzer in their inventory. The 25pdr was a "gun-howitzer", so it replaced both the World War One-vintage 18pdr gun and the 4.5in howitzer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British political considerations and leadership

As 1941 progressed, Winston Churchill b became increasingly desperate for something to go well. Early in the year, we saw the successful conclusion of the campaign to seize Italian Cyrenaica. That campaign was abruptly ended because General Wavell was involved in the the planning for the operation in Greece and he knew that the forces to continue the offensive in North Africa would be needed in Greece. We need to remember that General Wavell was the quintessential staff officer, not a fighter. Wavell's successor, Claude Auchinleck, was a fighter and lacked the ability to do the sort of staff work that Wavell could do. the affect of this was that arrangements that Wavell made did not generally fare well when faced with armed opposition. 1941 was filled with examples. The Italian campaign had gone well, but mostly because Wavell was not closely involved. The arrangements that Wavell made in North Africa failed miserably in the face of Rommel's probing attacks from February 1941. We must also remember that there were great events happening concurrently with the Mediterranean theater. We also so the action against the Bismarck and the loss of the battle cruiser Hood. We also saw Rommel's run up to Tobruk and the capture of Richard O'Connor and General Neame, his successor. By the end of April, the Greek operation had failed and some of the troops were ceremonially dumped on Crete. We shall see as we go further into 1942 the lengths that Churchill was prepared to go to make something good happen to aid his political position. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Right before the German invasion of Crete

Right before the German invasion of Crete, there were still some 14,000 Italian prisoners on the island of Crete. The British wanted to transfer them off the island, but the Greeks had hesitated, because they were concerned that the transfer might violate international law. In any case, the prisoners were still there when the Germans invaded.

A small number of reinforcements and equipment had arrived on Crete prior to the German invasion. There were about 2,200 marines and their guns and searchlights. There were also two British infantry battalions, 16 light tanks, and 6 infantry tanks. There were also sent a troop of 3.7in mountain guns. All this was helpful but insufficient to meet the attack that would be launched. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek King and Government

The Greek King and the Greek Government were still located at Canea in early May 1941. General Freyberg thought that the sensible thing would be to withdraw the King and Government since Canea was under constant air attack. Freyberg had arranged for the withdrawal to happen on 14 May 1941, when he received a cable from Churchill's War Cabinet saying that they wanted the King and Government to stay, even if Crete were being invaded. This was another case where politics were at odds with good sense. Given the situation, the Greek King and Government were provided a guard and were put into houses in the foothills. Freyberg wanted a ship or flying boat available to fly the King and Government out of Crete, which was the sensible thing to do, even if it conflicted the political aims of the British government. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British air strength on Crete on 30 April 1941

The British air strength on Crete at the end of April 1941 was very modest. They were based mainly at Maleme, although one squadron was at Heraklion. The extra RAF personnel were flown to Egypt, consistent with the idea that only defenders should be kept on Crete. Everyone was agreed that Crete should not be allowed to be taken without a fight. The problem was that there were inadequate forces available. The air strength was as follows:

At Heraklion: No. 112 Squadron RAF with 12 Gladiator fighters
At Maleme:    No. 30 Squadron RAF with 12 Blenheim day bombers
              No. 33/80 Squadron RAF with 6 Hurricane fighters
              No. 805 Fleet Air Arm Squadron with 6 Gladiator and Fulmer fighters

When you realize that this modest force would be facing Bf 109 fighters and Ju-88 bombers, you can see that this small air contingent was inadequate to resist a strong air attack in support of an airborne invasion.

The Crete garrison plan on 8 May 1941

Many authorities were anxious to reduce the unwanted troops in Crete from what they were. There had been some 5,300 troops in Crete and then 25,300 more were brought from Greece. The plan on 8 May 1941 was to increase the garrison to 5,800 men and reduce the other men to 4,500 New Zealanders, 3,500 Australians, and 2,000 other British troops. The problem was that the navy had suffered such great losses in evacuating Greece that they could not move the desired troops to North Africa. As time passed, the air attacks on Suda Bay increased and it became obvious that the surplus manpower was stuck on Crete. They did succeed in moving to Egypt 3,200 British (many Palestinian and Cypriot workers), about 2,500 Australian troops, and 1,300 0f the New Zealand division. By 17 May 1941, there were about 15,000 British troops, 7,750 New Zealand troops, 6,500 Australian and 10,200 Greek troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Dispositions for the defence of Crete: 3 May 1941

At least by 3 May 1941, General Freyberg had issued an order with his plan for the forces defending Crete. The plan included artillerymen armed like infantry, since there were no guns for the medium regiment. General Freyberg called his little army "Creforce". Brigadier Chappel commanded the Heraklion sector. He had the 14th Brigade, or at least two battalions, along with others including the 7th Medium Regiment armed with rifles. There were four units with two Greek battalions. The Australian, Brigadier Vasey, commanded the Retimo sector. He had four Australian battalions and two Greek battalions. At Suda Bay, Major-General Weston had the 1/Welch and 2/8th Battalions along with one Greek battalion. The Maleme sector was defended by the New Zealand division, or least the 4th New Zealand Brigade now commanded by the eventually to be famous Howard Kippenberger. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about troops on Crete: early May 1941

The main British unit on Crete in early May 1941 was the "fresh" 14th Brigade. They had been the Crete garrison at the time of the Greek operation. After the Greek fiasco, there were also four units built up from withdrawals from Greece: the "Rangers, Northumberland Hussars, 7th Medium Regiment, and 106th ROhal Horse Artillery". There were also men from the mobile naval base, coast artillery, anti-aircraft units, and base units.

There were also some ten thousand Greek troops, of which only three battalions were of any value. The other eight battalions were just recruits. The 5th (Cretan) division had fought in Albania and had been lost in the Greek collapse. General Freyberg had hoped to help organize the Greek troops on Crete, but there was the shortage of arms, equipment and leadership that hampered the effort. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian situation on Crete

The Australian troops on the island of Crete in early May 1941 were there due to the fallout from the Greek debacle. The Australians had gone to Greece with their senior officers knowing that the operation was doomed to failure. They would have been better never to have gone into Greece, especially with General Wilson and his staff in command. General Wavell had essentially liked to the Australian commander, General Blamey, and to his Prime Minister to get the Australians into Greece. They were fortunate to get as many men as they did out of Greece. Many were dumped onto Crete at Suda Bay to free up ships for more evacuation trips. When men were pulled out of Greece, they were told to leave their weapons and equipment. That included their great coats. That meant that there were thousands of Australians on Crete out in the weather with no organization or anything else. What order was eventually restored was due to Brigadier Vasey, the senior Australian officer on Crete. There was a rather large brigade group, that commanded by Brigadier Vasey, but he was being pressed to reform another brigade from the unorganized Australians on Crete. Brigadier Vasey was trying to get the Australians who were without equipment and organization transported to Egypt, but his desires were ignored. This is based generally on the information in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Troops on Greece in early May 1941

None of the important commanders in Britain and Egypt had any real idea about the troops on Crete in early May 1941. There was a British infantry brigade, the 14th Brigade, along with other troops from the garrison before troops arrived from Greece. There was most of the New Zealand Division, but not all, along with Australian units that had been transported from Greece. There was also part of the 1st Armoured Brigade and other British units from Greece. The approximately ten thousand recruits from the population of Crete were almost untrained and useless. There were seven New Zealand battalions along with most of the New Zealand Division division troops. The brigades were the 4th and 5th New Zealand brigades. The battalions were the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 28th battalions, of which the last were Maori. The 6th New Zealand Brigade had been sent on to Egypt on orders of the navy. The senior Australian officer, Brigadier Vasey, commanded some 8,500 Australian troops, despite nominally only commanding a brigade group. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The command situation on Crete in early May 1941

General Freyberg had a challenging job simply assembling a staff to aid him in defending Crete. He had arrived on Crete with only two of his division staff from the New Zealand division. He now had to create what amounted to a corps staff as well as a new division staff for the New Zealand Division. In the new scheme of things, Brigadier Puttick was New Zealand Division commander. Freyberg's chief of staff was Colonel Stewart. He had a British officer, Brigadier Brunskill, as his senior administrative officer. The commander of the 7th Medium Regiment, Frowen, was his artillery commander. He had played a leading role in making the artillery plan for the attack on Bardia. All these were supposed to support General Freyberg in his effort to plan a defense for Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg on 4 May 1941

After Churchill had sent a reassuring message to the New Zealand prime minister, General Freyberg sent a message to Churchill. This was on 4 May 1941. General Freyberg expressed the opinion that they could repel a strictly airborne attack on Crete. If the attack were made simultaneously by air and sea, that was a different matter. If they troops were equipped with "guns and transport", they might be able to cope, but in the condition at the time, they would have been in trouble. General Freyberg also asked General Wavell to evacuate some ten thousand troops without arms or equipment from the island, as they were an administrative problem and would only get in the way of a fight. In the meantime, General Freyberg had his headquarters set up east of Canea. In the foothills, they had established dugouts to provide cover for the headquarters troops and equipment. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Blamey weighs in: early May 1941

General Blamey expressed his opinion on Crete in early May 1941. He agreed that every effort should be made to hold the island against attack. He thought that three brigade groups, along with "coastal and harbour defences" and a "reasonable air force" could hold the island against attack. They thought that the Germans might use one airborne division and one division brought by sea to attack Crete. While the troops from Greece on Crete gave adequate numbers, they were equipped with what was needed, especially artillery. General Blamey hoped to pull the Australians from Crete when a second British infantry brigade could be deployed. Almost immediately after that, General Freyberg and the New Zealand government were in communication with the British government over the inadequate state of the New Zealand contingent on Crete. this is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

What forces were on Crete? Early May 1941

After sending what had to be false information to General Freyberg, General Wavell sent a letter to General Dill, the CIGS. General Wavell thought that the brigade groups and a larger number of anti-aircraft guns would be adequate to hold Crete against an airborne attack. This was in early May 1941. He estimated that there were eleven battalions on the island, although the ones from Greece were understrength and without artillery. The implication was that if the required equipment were sent to Crete, that the island could be defended. The actual number of units on Crete was larger than Wavell knew. There were seven New Zealand battalions, plus part of a machine gun battalion. There were also four-and-a half Australian infantry battalions, and a machine gun battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Freyberg in command on Crete

When General Freyberg was appointed commander of the defence of the island of Crete in late April and early May 1941, he had almost no information about the situation. He wrote later that he knew nothing about the island, the troops that he commanded, nor the maintenance situation, nor the size of the expected attack force. In fact, General Freyberg urged that if there were not sufficient air and naval strength available to support the defenders, that they should evacuate the island. General Freyberg used his connection to the New Zealand Prime Minister to pass on his assessment and asked him to pressure the British government to either bring the necessary forces needed to defend the island or to evacuate those troops that were presently on the island. General Wavell responded with a disingenuous note about how the estimate of the German attack scale were exaggerated that in the end, the needed naval support would be available. The latter was true, as the navy responded and for their bother, expended a large number of valuable warships sunk and damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation on 29 April 1941

Newly arrived from Greece, General Maitland Wilson was sent packing. He was off to North Africa from Crete to "go to Jerusalem and relieve Baghdad". General Wavell then proceeded to tell General Freyberg about the expected German attack on Crete. They expected an attack by five to six thousand airborne troops, possibly supplemented by troops sent by sea. They would see if they could get more fighter aircraft from England. They should be able to repulse the attack with the force they had on Crete. In any case, there would be no withdrawal, because there were not enough ships. We might well think that they had all been lost in the withdrawal from Greece. That is not really true, because the navy was about to take another major hit during the attack on Crete and the subsequent attempt to withdraw troops after the Germans were seen as winning the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The Greeks on Crete on 28 April 1941

By 28 April 1941, the Greek government was located at Canea. The Prime Minister, M. Tsouderos, had a meeting with the British general officers on Crete. He asked for there to be an Allied commander on Crete who would command all forces, including what Greek forces there were on the island of Crete. He requested that the Greek forces be armed by the British. The British officers included the air commander and a rear-admiral. Following the meeting, Churchill proposed that Genral Freyberg be appointed commander on Crete. General Freyberg, his staff, and the 6th New Zealand brigade arrived on 29 April. The 5th New Zealand Brigade was thought to already be on the island. Freyberg met with Generals Wilson and Wavell in a small village between Maleme and Canea and they held discussions about the withdrawal from Greece and the situation on Crete. General Wilson was to proceed to North Africa and be involved in the crisis that was ongoing there. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The impact of the evacuation from Greece on Crete

In early March 1941, before the Greek situation had unraveled, commanders had foreseen the need to accommodate in Crete as many as 50,000 troops evacuated from Greece. By 17 April, the command in Crete had requested 30,000 "tents, clothing and blankets" for evacuated troops. Troops and civilians brought from Greece started to arrive by 23 April. By 25 April and immediately after, there were 25,000 troops brought to Crete at Suda Bay by warship. There were no tents or even coats for them. Because of the lack of preparation for what many had anticipated, time was lost to prepare defences on Crete. Men sat around, even in organized units that had arrived. There were no tools or any of the normal essentials. After the disaster in Greece, the men relished the time spent doing nothing but resting in Crete.

Once more senior officers arrived on Crete there was more serious consideration about how to prepare for the expected invasion. The existing garrison was positioned. There was a small air condition on the island. There were four squadrons withdrawn from Greece with six or eight Blenheim day bombers, six Hurricane fighters, six Gladiator biplane fighters, one squadron that flew in from Egypt with nine Blenheim bombers, and a Fleet Air Arm squadron.

General Wilson thought that if they wanted to defend Crete, they needed to increase the strength to a greater degree than General Wavell and the other commanders wanted. General Wilson thought that it was a mistake to try and defend Crete with inadequate resources, which was probably true. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Plans for defending Crete in April and May 1941

Because the operations in Greece collapsed, the island of Crete was left as the nearest position to the Germans in the Balkans. Except Churchill and his leadership team, the Greek campaign was seen as being a likely failure by key participants. Only by late April were the leadership team acknowledging that they would have to withdraw from Greece after having failed to stop the Germans. The commander in Crete, General Weston, suggested that with the failure in Greece that Crete would be exposed to an invasion by sea. The commanders in Britain and the Middle East must have had access to decrypted German communications that indicated that they would attempt an airborne invasion. By 24 April, General Wavell and his staff projected that the Germans would use airborne troops to attack Crete. They would need three brigades, but for now, they would bring the garrison up to two brigades. They wanted to send troops from Greece to Egypt, but that did not happen. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Major-General Weston takes over on 26 April 1941

After the commanders decided to make Suda Bay, in the northwest corner of the island of Crete, a fleet base, a Royal Marine, Major-General Weston was appointed to take command. He was commander of the "Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation". The intent of that organization was not to defend against a major invasion, but to provide local defence. One role of the organization was to do the construction work required for a naval base. The construction included "buildings, jetties, and roads". There was also a defence group. Only about 2,000 men of the organization had arrived on Crete at the time of the invasion. The anti-aircraft artillery available was limited to 16-3.7in AA guns, 16-3in AA guns, and 36-Bofors 40mm AA guns. There were 24 anti-aircraft search lights available to work with the guns. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Island of Crete in May 1941

The island of Crete was populated along the livable areas in the north. In the northwest was Suda Bay, near the capital city of Canea. About 30 miles east of Canea was Retimo. The largest seaport was at Heraklion, perhaps two-thirds of the length of the island to the east. Each of these towns had an airfield located nearby. The northern shore had a road that ran the length of the island. At times, the road ran further inland to minimize the distance traveled. There were also five roads that ran north and south. Suda Bay was the only port that could accommodate large ships, and it only had a quay without a large crane. In late 1940, the British talked about increasing their garrison on the island. By February 1941, the 14th Brigade had three battalions. What was disruptive, is that the island garrison commander changed many times during early 1941. At the same time, by April 1941, the higher command decided to make Suda Bay a major fleet base. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in April and May 1941

Winston Churchill was constantly meddling in affairs. He considered himself a military and naval expert, and he assumed that his various creative enterprises were a help. for example, Churchill wanted to use the old battleship Barham as a blockship in Tripoli harbor in mid-April 1941. The fleet commander, Admiral Cunningham, objected, but he did bombard Tripoli on 21 April 1941. Churchill's next project was the Tiger Convoy, where about 240 tanks were sent through the Mediterranean on fast transports to reinforce the army in North Africa. Churchill then pushed Wavell to throw the tanks into combat even before they were fitted for desert operations. Churchill then pushed to have some tanks from the convoy. This met resistance, so then he wanted 12 tanks sent to Suda Bay after they were unloaded in Egypt. This was ordered, but Wavell came back to say that he had already had six infantry tanks and 15 light tanks sent to Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Iraqi operation in perspective

The Iraq operation was very important for a variety of reasons. The first was that by little cost, the Iraqi army was defeated by British forces. The obvious effects were to assert firm control over the port of Basra, the pipeline to Haifa, and the British-owned oil fields in Iraq.The forces involved were relatively small. There was a brigade-size force from Transjordan and two Indian brigades that had been en route to Malaya. All this had happened while the Greek campaign had been coming to a disastrous end and before the Germans were ready to attack the island of Crete. Knocking down the Iraqi Arab nationalist movement got the attention of the rest of the Arab world and put to rest any idea of similar uprisings, such as "in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Wavell and Auchinleck

I was curious about General Archibald Wavell's background and how that compared with his successor, General Claude Auchinleck. Wavell's father was an army officer, in fact a Major General, and he grew up in India. He followed his father into the army. He quickly accumulated staff officer experience, although he distinguished himself in the Great War in combat and was awarded the Military Cross. He also lost an eye in the process.

General Auchinleck was much more closely aligned with the Indian army and his Great War experience was in the Mespotamian Campaign against the Turks. While Wavell learned Russian before the war, Auchinleck learned Punjabi. Auchinleck commanded troops in combat when Wavell was in a staff officer role. Between the wars, both spent time on half pay. Wavell became a Major General in 1933 while Auchinleck was promoted to that rank in 1935.

Before the beginning of the Second World War, Wavell was head of Southern Command in the UK. He was appointed to command the Middle East in July 1939. He presided over the successful campaign against the Italians in late 1940 until early 1941. That campaign was ended prematurely and in an unsatisfactory way so that Anthony Eden and Churchill's ill-fated adventure in Greece could proceed. Wavell tarnished his reputation in Greece and subsequently in Crete. The Germans, with Erwin Rommel in command, upset the situation in North Africa and that would eventually lead to Wavell's removal.

Aunchinleck was appointed to replace Wavell. We can imagine that he was chosen for his experience in the region. In many ways, Auchinleck lacked the skills to be theater commander. He would have been more comfortable commanding the army fighting the Germans. In fact, Churchill repeatedly urged Auchinleck to do just that. Auchinleck took his role as theater commander seriously and thought that commanding the army in the field would detract from that role. Only twice did Auchinleck take command, and in both cases, he outfought Rommel and saved the situation. Once was in December 1941, when Auchinleck saved the Crusader operation when his choice as army commander, Alan Cunningham, was exhausted after the whirlwind East African campaign. He was not ready to take on command of the army in North Africa, where he had no experience with armoured forces. The second occasion was after the surrender of Tobruk in 1942, when Rommel threatened to advance to the Suez Canal.

Wavell had a better eye for choosing commanders to serve under him, while Auchinleck lacked that ability. However, if you needed an army commanded in a tight situation, you wanted Auchinleck, not Wavell.

German aid for the Iraqi's

Starting on 13 May 1941, the Germans had aircraft based at Mosul and Erbil to aid the Iraqi's in their fight against the British. Three German He-111 bombers raided Habbaniyah on 16 May and were able to do considerable damage. The German aircraft lacked the necessary support, however, so there were only one fighter and one bomber still operational by 28 May.

The Iraqi anti-British group were upset at the lack of support by the Germans and Italians. The Iraqis wanted arms and gold. Apparently, any Arab revolt against the British needed to have gold, presumably to buy support. The Germans saw the Iraqi revolt as more of a political event, rather than a real uprising of the Iraqi people against the British. The latter might have actually received substantive support. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.