Problems at Tolos and Navpliion on 26-27 April 1941

The Australian destroyer Stuart had been sent to Tolos to take men off the beach, if possible. Starting late in the evening of 26 April 1941, a landing craft was approaching the beach to pick up men. A sandbar was a major impediment to taking off men. The landing craft would go in and men would wade out. The landing craft carried them out to the Stuart. When the Stuart could hold no more men, the ship took them to the cruiser Orion and then returned to Tolos. They asked for help from a cruiser, so the Perth was sent. By 4am on 27 April, they had took off 2,000 men, but 1,300 men were left on the beach.

At Navplion is where the transport Ulster Prince was bombed and burnt. The burned out Ulster Prince blocked the quay so that destroyers could not use it to pick up men. The seas were too rough for small boats, so they were fortunate to embark as many as 2,600 men. They were forced to leave 1,700 men still ashore. They were too late leaving Navplion so the Slomat was bombed and sunk by German aircraft. The two destroyers present tried to rescue men, but they were eventually sunk, as well. They went ahead and sent 700 men to Tolos, in hopes of taking them off the next night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Navplion on 26-27 April 1941

The fast transport Glenearn had been intended for use in embarking troops at Navplion. After the Glenearn was disabled, the plans had to be radically recast.

This picture shows Glenearn later in the war after she had her anti-aircraft armament greatly increased. After the Glenearn was disabled, Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wipple reacted decisively.

He took two precious cruisers in to embark soldiers. They were the British cruiser Orion and the Australian cruiser Perth.

Another of the warships, HMAS Stuart was sent to Tolos to take off as many men as possible. The cruisers, along with destroyers and transports worked to embark the men. At Navplion, one transport, the Uster Prince was bombed and burned. The ship was a total loss and obstructed the quay. Two of the destroyers which had taken risks to embark men were themselves bombed and sunk. They were the Wryneck and Diamond. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

HMS Ulster Prince-lost at Navplion

Plans are forced to change

The plan had been to embark troops at three ports on the night of 26-27 April 1941. These were to have been from the beaches at Athens and Argos, and from Kalamata. The artillery group were at Porto Rafti, while the remnants of the armoured brigade were at Rafina. At Porto Rafti, they only had one landing craft, and it needed to retrieve men left at Kea Island. Once Brigadier Miles realized the problem they faced, he sent part of his men to Rafina. The tragedy was when the Glengyle sailed in the night, there were still many men left on the beaches. While events played out, they learned that the whole 4th New Zealand Brigade would have to be embarked from the Marathon beaches on the night of 27-28 April. They had hoped to use the Glenearn at Navplion, but the ship had been bombed and damaged. Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell took big risks to get the men embarked at Navplion. He took the cruisers Orion and Perth to Navplion. There was another cruiser and four destroyers and two transports already there. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Events in the north on 26 April 1941

A detachment of the 1st Armoured Brigade was with an artillery detachment at Rafina. They had orders to embark during the night of 26/27 April 1941. The armoured brigade detachment was at Tatoi. They had heard of Germans in Athens, although that was premature. In response, a small unit from the Rangers was sent out to block roads from Athens. The Rangers and the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry moved to Rafina, where they were joined by the detachment of Rangers from the rearguard.

The 4th New Zealand Brigade was at Ethrai, where they tried to remain inconspicuous. By 11am, they could see an German column approaching from Thebes. The Australian artillery succeeded in dispersing the advancing Germans. They were attacked by German aircraft at midday, and started to receive incoming artillery fire since they had revealed their positions. After they heard of the German paratroop attack at Corinth, they embarked on vehicles and headed for Porto Rafti. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The airborne attack at the Corinth canal

The Corinth canal area had come under increasingly intense air attacks from at least 25 April 1941. The airborne attack by paratroops and gliders had started early on 26 April. The paratroops quickly overcame the defending Australians, although the engineers were able to blow the bridge over the canal. Some nearby New Zealand troops were also captured, after being overcome. There had been troops left at Megara, but about 500 men were attacked by German paratroops, as they neared Corinth. The commanders were slow to learn of the attack at the Corinth canal. After they realized what had happened, they organized defenses to gain time for troops to withdraw. There were still troops to the northwest of Athens. The rest were to the south. General Wilson planned to withdraw and leave General Freyberg in command of the remaining troops. We already know that the troops at Kalamata came to a bad end as prisoners. They mostly were not fighting troops. The British had pulled out and left the Australians and New Zealanders to fend for themselves. If the troops still left were lost, the two countries would have to endure great losses in men and women. On 26 April, the 4th New Zealand Brigade was at Ethrai, trying to stay under cover. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 19th Australian Brigade embarked

As the evacuation became increasingly disorganized and out of control, the 19th Australian Brigade was withdrawn from Megara. The men carried their small arms only. They were embarked on the transport Thurland Castle, the anti-aircraft cruiser Conventry, and five destroyers. Of an additional 2,000 on a nearby beach, only 1,500 were picked up. Many of those left were from Australian and British hospitals. Others were transported to Marathon, hoping to be embarked on another night. The Thurland Castle arrived at Crete, although the ship was attacked by dive-bombers en route. The stragglers tried to join Allen's battle group, as it was the largest force left in the south. Allen received orders to move to Kalamata. They arrived there on 26 April. Early on 26 April, waves of bombers attacked the Corinth bridge area and were knocking out the anti-aircraft guns. About 7:15am, German paratroops landed and captured the bridge. The engineers were able to fire the charges that had been planted and destroyed the bridge. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The outlook on the night of 25-26 April 1941 in Greece

During the night of 25-26 April 1941, General Wilson moved his headquarters from Athens to Miloi. He crossed the Corinth bridge shortly before dawn. At this point, all the troops except rearguards were south of the Corinth bridge. Two brigades had already been embarked, along with about 7,000 base troops. Those north of the Corinth bridge included the 4th New Zealand Brigade, a rearguard of 1st Armoured Brigade troops, along with a few other detachments. The Corinth bridge crossed the canal that had been cut through the isthmus that connected the mainland with the Peloponnese. The commanders were concerned that German paratroops might try and take Corinth, so there was a scratch force assembled in defence. There were a diverse group of carriers and some of the 4th Hussars. There were also some infantry and engineers. The engineers had alreay prepared to blow the Corinth bridge, when that became necessary. They hoped to embark the 19th Australian Brigade from Megara that night. During the changes and indecision in General Wilson's staff, they decided at the last minute that half the brigade should head for the Marathon beaches. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The New Zealand Division in late April 1941

The New Zealand Division was withdrawn from Greece in late April 1941. The division commander, the famous General Bernard Freyberg was instrumental in supervising the withdrawal of many of the troops from Greece. The division was split during the withdrawal. The 4th and 5th New Zealand Brigades were withdrawn to the island of Crete between 24 and 27 April 1941. The 6th Brigade was withdrawn to Egypt on 28 and 29 April. On 31 April, General Freyberg was appointed to command the force on Crete, dubbed "Creforce". About 1,850 New Zealanders were left behind and were taken prisoner by the Germans. Some of the personnel taken were sick and wounded, along with staff from the 1st NZ General Hospital. There were six New Zealand medical officers and 92 orderlies. The hospital had been ignored by General Wilson's staff during the withdrawal and were "put in the bag". Given the disorganization experienced in the last few days, as Wilson's staff were overwhelmed by the enormity of the situation, the capture of the hospital is not surprising. General Wilson and his staff were put in the position of having to perform above their level of experience. The Commonwealth officers and staff were much more experienced, even if from the Great War, and could have done a more creditable job.

Withdrawal plans changed: 25 April 1941

The force that General Wilson commanded in Greece was called "W Group", W presumably standing for Wilson. By 25 April 1941, the evacuation plan had changed. Now, they would try to hold off the German advance while embarking from more southern beaches. They had hoped to have all troops withdrawn by 27 April, but it was not to happen. New rear guards were mounted to buy time for more troops to withdraw. Brigadier Charring, commander of the 1st Armoured Brigade, was to try and hold eastern Attica, to protect the Athens beaches from the north. They were then to move to Rafina for embarkation on the night of 26-27 April. They also hoped to withdraw some 8,000 troops from Kalamata the same night. Now, they hoped to withdraw the New Zealand troops from far southern beaches on the nights of 28/29 and 29/30 April. General Freyberg was designated as the commander in the Peloponnese. The plan was now to withdraw the 19th Brigade from Megara on the night of 25/26 April. Wilson's staff then doubted that all the men could be embarked at Megara, so they were to send half to the beaches at Marathon. It seemed that the situation was starting to be more than Wilson's staff could handle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Things start to go wrong: the night of 24-25 April 1941

An unplanned 7,000-8,000 men had gathered at Navplion, where the plan had only envisioned 5,000 men. The transport Ulster Prince was wrecked at Navplion, late in the day. The ship ran aground when entering the harbour at the entrance. Despite that mishap, some 6,500 were embarked on ships. That night, nothing happened at Tolos. During the same time, at the Piraeus, there was a disaster. The yacht Hellas had embarked civilians and sick and wounded. The ship was bombed by German aircraft at about 7pm and the ship burned and capsized, killing the passengers. Somewhere between 500 and 742 were killed. At the same time, Allen's group headed towards Argos from Megara, hoping to be embsrked from there. As they were heading out, they were stopped and asked to provide a battalion as a guard against attack by German tanks. General Freyberg was still in Greece, and he heard of the plans and told them that Corinth had been bombed and the road was impassible. The original plan had been to have everyone embarked by the night of 26-27 April, but that had all been changed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal from Kalamata on 26 April 1941

Tomorrow will be the 71st anniversary of the withdrawal of Australian troops from Kalamata in Greece. This picture shows Australian troops waiting for the embarkation at Kalamata. Some of the troops were from the 2/1st Field Regiment, which had fought well in the waning days of the Greek campaign. The withdrawal had started to go wrong about this time, as the next day, German troops had arrived in Athens. In a few days, by 30 April, some seven to eight thousand troops were captured in Kalamata by the Germans. By then, 43,311 troops had been evacuated, but the lack of coordinated command by the British had allowed the Germans to gain the upper hand and to overrun the defenders trying to hold them back to allow more to withdraw. The picture is from the Australian War Memorial. This is in part, based on the Official History and online sources.

The ships Calcutta and Glengyle at the Porto Rafti embarkation

The two ships that embarked troops from Porto Rafti in Greece were the cruiser Calcutta and the fast transport Glengyle. The Calcutta was near the end of her service life, while the Glengyle was a relatively new ship.

The British cruiser Calcutta was a World War I veteran that had been converted into an anti-aircraft cruiser in 1939. The Calcutta was one of the C-class cruisers that had been built with a "trawler bow" to improve sea keeping during North Sea operations. Prior to embarking troops from the beach at Porto Rafti, the Calcutta had been assigned convoying duties to provide some protection against air attack at a time when there was inadequate fighter strength in the Mediterranean Sea. The Calcutta became a victim of the increasing German air presence in the Mediterranean Sea and was sunk on 1 June 1941 by Ju-88 dive bombers at the end of the battle for the island of Crete. The picture is at least of one of the converted cruisers of the same class (Cairo, Carlisle, Calcutta).

The Glengyle was one of a group of four fast cargo ships (18 knots) that quickly became favorites of Winston Churchill. The Glengyle was fitted to be able to carry early British landing craft and had been involved in a raid on Bardia a few days before the embarkation of Australian and New Zealand troops from Porto Rafti in Greece.

Preparing to leave Greece

The plan for leaving Greece involved three large embarkations of "British" troops. The majority of the troops were actually from either Australia or New Zealand. The first group to leave were the 5th New Zealand Brigade Group, with other units. They were picked up from Porto Rafti. Major Sheppard, in charge of a team of Australian officers, directed the embarkation. Major Sheppard was the 6th Australian Division's legal officer. The troops were loaded by 2am, with about 5,000 men on the amphibious transport Glengyle and 700 men on the old cruiser Calcutta. The other evacuations ran into problems. The cause was partly because the groups of men were not in a large, organized unit. The Australians supervised the Tolos Bay embarkation while a British staff supervised at Navplion. Another issue at Navplion was that there were many more men than had been expected. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A successful defence at Thermopylae

The April-May 1641 timeframe saw determined infantry backed by artillery able to defeat German tank tanks. One of these was at Tobruk on 11 April 1941. Another was the defence of Thermopylae. The third was again at Tobruk on 1 May. The Germans considered that 12 of the tanks knocked out at Thermopylae were total losses. Many more were disabled but were repaired. The Germans were already masters at recovering and repairing knocked out tanks. The British had yet to learn the skill. German records show the attack against the New Zealanders was made by 18 tanks, including four Pzkw IV's armed with short 75mm guns. The tanks were crewed by 70 men, of whom 7 were killed and 22 wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History."

Withdrawal from Skamnos and Brallos-24 April 1941

On 24 April 1941, the Australian battalions defending such places as Skamnos, Brallos, and Gravia were being hard pressed by the Germans and Brigadier Vasey, 19th Brigade commander, realized that they would have to withdraw. The 2/2nd Field Regiment preserved their guns, rather than destroy them, and had tried to save some rounds before they moved south. They left the battle at about 8:30pm on the 24th, heading down the road. The engineer company made a road for the guns to use in their withdrawal and then destroyed it after they passed. Fortunately, the pressure had eased, somewhat, on the rearguard. There remained one more rearguard at Erithrai, the King's 2/5th Battalion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Greek reception for the troops in Athens

When the troops arrived in Athens, the had the marks of a twelve hour battle and a 160 mile trip through the night. On 25 April 1941, a long column of trucks and carriers, filled with troops from Brigadier Barrowclough's 6th New Zealand Brigade. The people greeted them and threw them flowers. Men and girls climbed up on the running boards to shake their hands. The quote, which is representative of what the men heard, is "Come back--you must come back again--Good luck--Good luck".

Back in the hills, on the left, the 19th Australian Brigade had been under German attack. The guns had been attacked from the air on April 23rd. The guns were moved at night further to the rear, but left the previous emplacements looking as if they were still occupied. Sure enough, on 24 April, 65 Stukas hit the positions that they had vacated. The men could see German tanks on the move, wheeling to hit the New Zealanders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The last battle and withdrawal on 24-25 April 1941 in Greece

Brigadier Miles, a New Zealander and regular army officer, commanded the artillery defending the troops near Thermopylae. Firing up the road succeeded in stopping any tank attacks for the moment. There was a danger of being flanked, however. General Freyberg was on the spot commanding the troops. When it seemed that the ammunition trucks would not be available, he had Brigadier Miles carry troops on the artillery vehicles. The remainder would have to march. The battle continued, but by 9:15pm, the trucks had arrived to carry the troops. The artillery pieces were destroyed at that point. By midnight, the column was headed south and would pass through Athens. Brigadier Miles had been sent ahead, but General Wilson's staff had just left when he arrived. He had to find a route through Athens without any help. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Molos bottleneck defense

Three battalions were positioned to defend the Molos bottleneck. The 24th Battalion was positioned on the right. The left was defended by the 25th Battalion, with the 26th Battalion being held in reserve. The three battalions were well-supported by artillery. The most obvious place for a tank attack would be across the dried marshes. These were covered by field guns. The road would be easy to cover. The artillery included one medium regiment, four field regiments, two anti-tank regiments, and a light AA battery. The battle started in the afternoon on 24 April 1941. Some German tanks started across the marsh. They were quickly knocked out by field guns and for now, no more tanks attempted the crossing. At 3pm, the main attack up the road began with tanks and infantry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation in Greece deteriorates from 24 April 1941

The lack of experience of General Wilson's staff continued to play a factor. They were going to send commanders from Greece before their units, as an example of what they were doing wrong. Fortunately, the Australians were able to improvise, as they were forced to do, so that the situation didn't immediately descend into chaos and disaster. Brigadier Allen was essentially functioning as divisional commander for seven battalions of infantry. Fortunately, the able Brigadier Savige was also present, along with a small core of Australian staff officers. They were able to rely upon a cadre of Lt-Colonels to help organize the withdrawal to the beaches and especially the defensive arrangements to keep the German from overrunning the withdrawing troops. By 24 April 1941, the Greek army had surrendered and King George were flown to Crete in a flying boat. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

24 April 1941

On 24 April 1941, General Wilson's staff tried to order General Freyberg to withdraw. You have to think that the staff, and possibly General Wilson, were living in some fantasy world. For one thing, it would have made sense to leave the ANZAC Corps in command of operations and let them control the withdrawal to the beaches. Instead, they sent General Blamey off to Egypt where he was out of the picture. General Freyberg let the staff know that he was involved in a battle with German tanks and he intended to stay and command the New Zealand Division. After that, General Freyberg was free to control the New Zealand Division operations. On 24 April,, the plan was to embark as follows:

Date       Athens             Megara     Navplion       Tolos        Kalamata
4/24-4/25  5th NZ Br.                    Corps troops
                                         RAF personnel
4/25-4/26  19th Brigade
           Part 1st Ar.Br.

4/26-4/27  6th NZ Br.         4th NZ Br. Base details   Base details 16th Br.
           Part 1st Ar.Br.               3rd RTR                     17th Br.
                                         4th Hussars                 4000 Base

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. We can see that General Wilson and his staff were not really up to the task that they had to perform, as it this stage they were making greater mistakes.

General Blamey was appointed deputy Commander in Chief in the Middle East when he arrived from Greece. The Official History rehashes the situation in early 1941 when General Blamey thought that he should command in Greece, since the force was largely Australian. This was relevant due to the fact that Blamey had been suggested as commander of what became the Eight Army, but was still called the Western Desert force. The Australian Prime Minister had consulted with the CIGS, General Dill, who concurred that General Blamey should become Wavell's deputy. That put General Blamey over General Wilson in the new setup. After shutting down ANZAC Corps, General Wilson had assumed direct control of the withdrawal from Greece. Only on 24 April 1941 did Generals Freyberg and Mackey hear that their troops would embark that night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Planning for withdrawal from Greece from 23 April 1941

Members of General Blamey's staff arrived in Athens early on 23 April 1941. They searched for a contact with General Wilson's staff to make arrangements for the withdrawal from Greece. The Australians were to provide beach parties at three beaches. Arrangements were made to establish communications with the units involved. During the night of 23/24 April, the 16th and 17th Brigades were able to move to Megara in preparation for the move to the beaches. After issuing orders for the withdrawal in the evening on 23 April, the ANZAC corps was dissolved. General Blamey reported to General Wilson informed them that withdrawal from beaches near Athens could not be done and that the plans had changed. General Blamey was to be flown to Alexandria to meet with Admiral Cunningham on the 24th. General Blamey returned to Mandra before his withdrawal and informed the officers of the changed situation. From the Australian staff, they could not understand why ANZAC corps had been disbanded, because they could have provided more control over the withdrawal. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

April 22 to 24 1941 in Greece

German air attacks on 22 and 23 April 1941 forced the remaining Hurricanes to withdraw to the island of Crete. The attacks on 22 April in the Athens area caused the Hurricanes to fly to Argos. More attacks on 23 April caught 13 Hurricanes on the ground and destroyed them. It was after this incident that Air Vice-Marshal d'Albiac ordered the withdrawal to Crete. It was about this time that Lt-Colonel King, the 2/5 Battalion commander, was ordered by General Mackay to take a column of all arms through the night to Levadia to provide cover for the ongoing demolitions. The men drove all night with their lights on, knowing that the German aircraft were not likely to be operating at night. At this point, the King of Greece announced that he would move to Crete with his government to continue the fight against the German attackers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

From 23 April to 25 April 1941

They heard that the Germans were now on Euboea on 23 April 1941. They sent reconnaissance aircraft to verify the story, but they did not see anyone. There were concerns about the 1/Rangers guarding the crossing at Khalkis. They needed to hold the crossing until the 6th Brigade could be south of there by the evening of the 25th. The 6th Brigade would leave a rearguard at Tatoi until they saw the Rangers withdraw through there.

Meanwhile, at Thermopylae, the British medium guns dueled with the German artillery. The troops were gradually withdrawing towards the beaches where they would withdraw. Some of the troops headed for the beaches at Marathon. An effort was made to post rearguards along the way that would move back in stages. There was some concern that the Germans might take the Delphi Pass, and cut off the line of retreat. The general state is reflected by the condition of the 4th Husssars, reduced to 12 light tanks, 6 carriers, and one armoured car by 23 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Defending Thermopylae

Once the order had been given to withdraw from Greece, the 6th New Zealand Brigade was left to defend Thermopylae Pass. Altogether, they had men from five battalions: the 25th on the heights above the road and river, the 24th holding the road at Ayia Trias, and the 26th behind them on the road to Molos. The brigade had strong artillery support in the form of one medium, four field, and two anti-tank regiments. Carriers from the 5th Brigade were patrolling to the north during the night. The other two brigades moved at night on 22 April 1941. The 5th Brigade had destroyed its heavy gear before withdrawing to Ayia Konstantinos. The 4th Brigade pulled back to Erithrai. As this was happening, the Australians were being pressed by the Germans. 21 and 22 April saw heavy German air attacks on the defenders at Thermopylae. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Australian guns finally silenced: 22 April 1941

The two Australian guns on the side of the mountain, in an exposed position, had dueled with the German artillery for eight hours. The guns were 25 pounders. One gun finally had a recuperator oil leak and had to stop firing. The officer in charge, a young lieutenant, noticed that there were German infantrymen unloading from trucks that were too close to fire upon. The gun was sited in a pit, so they lifted the trail onto the back edge. That allowed them to fire on the infantry with reduced charges. They could have easily flipped the gun with full charges. That fire brought down medium artillery fire that disabled the remaining gun. The artillery duel had lasted eight hours by the time, at 4pm, when the gun was disabled. The men exposed on the hillside were finally hit by German fire and there were men killed and wounded. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The gunners on 21-22 April 1941

At the Brallos pass on 21 April 1941, Brigadier Herring, the 6th Australian Division artillery commander was on the scene and directing the placement of field guns. They also had an Italian Breda 20mm AA gun with the field guns to provide cover. By 6pm, they could see the first Germans leaving Lamia, heading south towards the guns. At 10,900 yards, the guns opened fire and hit the leading vehicle. The rest of the Germans turned around and drove back into Lamia. From the heights, the gunners could see a large number of vehicles descending and driving into Lamia in the dark. Early on 22 April, four large German guns, probably medium guns, opened fire on the Australians from beyond the range that they could reach. More German vehicles headed south on the road, and were fired upon by the field guns. As the field guns fired, the medium guns returned fire,, becoming increasingly accurate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

After Wavell's visit

General Wavell's visit where he ordered a withdrawal from Greece greatly shook up the command. The commanders had been thinking in terms of a last ditch defence and then surrender. Wavell told them that the men should not surrender, but if they were cut off, they should try and reach the islands, where they would be rescued later. Embarkations would take place at designated beaches. They would try and bring out guns, if possible. If they had to be abandoned, they would be stripped of breach blocks and sights. The men would travel light, with no packs. They would be taken off the beaches on three nights: 24/25, 25/26, and 26/27 April. They would be taken off in lighters, early landing craft, as we would call them now. As the preliminary moves took place, the artillery fire between British and Germans along the whole front became much more intense. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Decision to Withdraw from Greece

General Mackay has said later that he expected to stand in position for another two weeks and then be beaten by greater force. That is what he was apparently thinking late on 20 April 1941. Brigadier Vasey, commanding the 19th Brigade, thought the same thing at the time. Out of the blue, General Wavell arrived at the headquarters and ordered the force to withdraw from Greece, contrary to what everyone expected. What had happened was the surrender by General Tsolakoglou. That changed the picture completely, at least from General Wavell's perspective. Wavell was ready to take sympathetic Greeks with them, if they wanted to leave before the German occupation. General Wilson's plan for withdrawal was only issued on 23 April. He had already given verbal instructions, however, to Generals Blamey and Freyberg. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates: 21 April 1941

The positions that the British and Commonwealth troops were occupying on 21 April 1941 were becoming increasingly untenable. There was concern about German airborne troops landing behind the British lines on the plain of Thebes, news had been received of the Greek Army of Epirus surrender, and it looked like the Germans would be able to flank the position on the left. The British lacked a sufficient force to block the roads from German attack, as the Australians were decimated in part. The Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler Division was was to the west at Yannina, and posed a threat to the British position. The main delay to the German advance was crated roads. The Germans had strong forces, but the state of the roads were keeping them from pressing the British as hard as might be expected. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Thermopylae from 19 to 22 April 1941

British troops waited at Thermopylae for the expected German attack. The army commander's headquarters was now at Thebes. ANZAC Corps headquarters would be at Levadia. General Freyberg was to have his headquarters near Longos. General Mackay was ordered to move his headquarters to a position near Ayla Marina. He was unhappy with such a move, as the forward troops defending Brallos would be 20 miles distant. 16th Brigade, now reduced to two "weak battalions" would hold the west side. At sunset on 21 April 1941, the 2/7th Battalion was about four miles forward of Brallos. The 2/6th Battalion was to the west. The 2/5th Battalion returned and was in reserve. The new positions were very weak and really needed divisions, not brigades. Although the New Zealand Division was still relatively intact, the 6th Australian Division had three battalions that greatly reduced in strength. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

A messy withdrawal: 20 April 1941

Allen's force straggled back towards the bulk of the division. The rearguard had finally pulled back after 5pm on 20 April 1941. Colonel Lamb had reached the division headquarters and realized that he had not seen Brigadier Allen since the morning. Men from the 2/2 and 2/3 battalions were straggling back towards the rear in small groups. By later in the day, there were seven officers and 297 men from the 2/2 Battalion near General Blamey's headquarters. Many of the men from the 2/3 Battalion were on trucks that were still on the road. By later on 20 April there were as many as 500 men from the 2/3 Battalion assembled. Some New Zealanders and more men from the 2/2 and 2/3 battalions arrived after having to abandon their vehicles and march towards the division headquarters. We find that Brigadier Allen had driven down a dead-end road, found some sixty men, assigned an officer to command them, and then instructed them to keep marching south. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

20 April 1941, more from the rearguard

In the afternoon of 20 April 1941, the rearguard at the Lamia Pass was being tested by the Germans. There was a rainstorm that enabled the Germans to bring mortars forward and they started firing on the Australians. As the Germans advanced across ground at the foot of the pass, they received accurate fire. Major Guinn decided that they would withdraw when they started to receive artillery fire. He gave the order to withdraw when the Germans opened fire with four light guns. One British tank was hit and had to be left behind. There were two cruiser tanks holding the road while the Australian infantry started to withdraw. One gun covered the engineers while they set off charges to damage the road. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

20 April 1941 the second rearguard

Late on 19 April 1941, the decision had been made to withdraw Brigadier Lee's brigade. Some troubling aspects were that there was a New Zealand brigade that no one knew where it was, not even the brigade commander. Another issue was that Some mistakes were made in the process of doing demolitions. Several anti-tank guns were lost as a result. They saw a vehicle arrive and start repairing demolitions and opened fire on them, not realizing that they were "British" (meaning British, Australian, or New Zealand).

A second rearguard was designated, this time a small detachment. Major Guinn was to command the rearguard and hold the road until the last Australian and New Zealand troops had gone past Lamia. This was on 20 April, and the men became aware of advancing German forces. The rearguard was well-concealed, so they surprised a team of German motorcyclists who were approaching. A small contingent of British tanks were concealed, ready to engage any approaching German tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Mackay on 19 April 1941

General Mackay wanted to see what Brigadier Lee's force was enduring, so he spent time with the rearguard at Domokos from about 7:30am until 4pm on 19 April 1941. General Mackay understood what Rommel also understood: the importance of leading from the front lines. On 18 April, Brigadier Lee had four infantry battalions, engineers, and additional troops. At that point, he thought that there was little danger of being pressed by the Germans until after the Australian and New Zealand divisions had passed through Lamia. Because of that, he had sent one brigade of two battalions back to Thermopylae. General Mackay had approved the move early on 19 April. That was when the men discovered a train of valuable fuel and explosives two miles away. The Victorian railway men were determined to take the train to Athens. However, they were bombed by German aircraft and caused and explosion that destroyed the train. Miraculously, the Australian railwaymen survived. This is based on the account in Vol.II of hte Australian Official History.

On 20 April 1941, the last 15 Hurricanes in Greece took off and intercepted a German attacking force consisting of 100 divebombers and fighters. The British had 22 certain kills and 8 more probables. The British losses were five Hurricanes. During the night, General Wavell visited General Blamey's ANZAC Corps headquarters and ordered him to withdraw as soon as possible. The troops needed to reach the embarkation beaches on 24 April to be evacuated that night. The ANZAC Corps were mostly on the road with rearguard detachments protecting the retreat. The column on the road from Larisa to Lamia was attacked from the air in the morning. The senior officers were involved in the retreat and made sure that the men saw them along the roads. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

19 April 1941

The commanders in London had decided to withdraw the force in Greece. The Greek government actually agreed that would be the best thing to do. The only dissenters were the commander in Greece. General Wavell had arrived in Athens on 19 April 1941 to meet with General Wilson and other commanders. General Wilson was overoptimistic in thinking that the troops could hold the Thermopylae line for an extended period. They met with the Greek king and General Papagos, and General Papagos suggested that the Greek army was in dire straights. They had a message from Churchill that he did not want the force to withdraw without Greek concurrence. Independently, the rogue Greek army commander met with the Germans to surrender. The die was cast and the British would have done best by heading for a withdrawal. This is based on Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The retreat on 18 April 1941

A retreating column of vehicles stretched some seventy miles during the day on 18 April 1941. This was happening on a day when the Germans dominated the air and were frequently present dropping bombs. The surprising thing was that the German bombing was not very effective. There were a few successes, such as the exploding ammunition truck that destroyed a bridge. The Generals Freyberg and Mackay were present, setting an example for the troops, ignoring the German air attacks. Both men had been inspiring leaders in the Great War and were demonstrating those same qualities in the second war. The results of 18 April lifted the mens' spirits and gave them a new resolve to continue the withdrawal from Greece in the face of German air superiority, which for their sakes, was largely and inexplicably ineffective. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 21st New Zealand Battalion at the Pinios Gorge

There is a good article about the 21st New Zealand Battalion in Greece in the Sunday Star Times newspaper (online). 21 Battalion had arrived in Greece in late March 1941. They arrived under German air attack that had set a nearby ammunition ship afire. The New Zealanders had put the fire out and saved the ship and themselves. From there, they were sent forward to Platamon. They were attacked by two German armoured divisions on 15 April 1941. The Germans attacked and broke the New Zealand line on 16 April, causing them to retreat after a desperate battle that lasted for some 36 hours. From there, they pulled back to the Pinios Gorge, where they defended the western end of the gorge. They were supported first by the 2/2 Australian Battalion and subsequently, by the 2/3 Battalion. They had destroyed the railroad bridge and blocked the tunnel. The New Zealanders had four anti-tank guns (2pdr) and two mortars that were inoperable by the time of the action at the Pinios Gorge. The Germans attacked starting at 5pm on 17 April and then by the morning of 18 April mounted a larger attack. They had gotten tanks across the river, by fording almost turret high water. The 21st Battalion was supported by Australian artillery, and together they stopped the initial attack. The Germans, with tanks, finally broke A company at about 4:30pm on 18 April. They were forced to retreat at that point. The commander, Colonel Macky, was treated shabbily, as he was relieved of his command and sent home after the fight. General Freyberg tried to apologize, much later, but Macky would not see him.

18 April 1941 involving Larisa

The British commanders spent the day of 18 April 1941 in a state of anxiety. They feared that one or both of the rearguards might be pushed past Larisa before the retreating columns could safely pass. The other concern was that German bombers might inflict heavy casualties on the forces on the roads. At 9:30am, a truck laden with explosives was hit by a bomb and exploded. The explosion blew a large crater in the road. Brigadier Steele, himself, the ANZAC Corps Chief Engineer was on the spot to personally supervise the repairs. A knocked out bulldozer made matters worse. They not only had to repair the crater but to create a detour. At 2pm, Brigadier Rowell had gone to see Mackay and Freiberg to see if they might postpone the withdrawal. The situation was so tenuous that it was not possible, but by then, the columns were able to continue on the detour and traffic moved forward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More on German movements 18/19 April 1941

A German mountain company cut the road between Allen's force and Larisa. They were fighting Australians who were attempting to move down the road to Larisa. The Australians were in trucks and carriers, without supporting arms. Late in the evening on 18 April 1941, the Germans captured a convoy of trucks and knocked out a carrier. Units of the 2nd Panzer Division joined the company and moved into Larisa on the morning of 19 April. At the same time, there was a battle at the Pinios Gorge while several armoured groups moved on Larisa. On the morning of 18 April, there was a large convoy of trucks moving south from Larisa. These seem to have been mainly Australians. The sky was clear and they fully expected to be bombed from the air. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German movements from the 16th to 17th April 1941

When the attack on Servia failed, Stumme's corps was sent west towards Grevena while Boehme's corps moved around the east side of Mount Olympus. They left a weak force facing Servia. Stumme's corps consisted of the 5th and 9th Panzer Division, the Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler, at this stage of the war, a regiment-sized unit, and the73rd Division. Boehme's corps apparently consisted of the 5th and 6th Mountain Divisions, the 2nd Panzer Division, and the 72nd Division. The 2nd Panzer Division divided into two battle groups. One went towards the Olympus Pass while the other attacked the 21st New Zealand Battalion at Platamon. The group advancing on the Pinios Gorge was augmented to include 150 tanks and more infantry and artillery. They reached the Pinios Gorge on 17 April, early in the day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Savige's force on 18 April 1941

Brigadier Savige had put Lt-Colonel King in charge of a rear-guard located about five miles east of Kalabaka King commanded a small combined arms force, equipped with tanks, artillery, machine guns, and infantry. This was an Australian force. The 2/11th Battalion were moving towards Zarkos at dawn and arrived at 10am. By 11am, the engineers were blowing up sections of the road. Part of Savige's men crossed the Pinios by bridge, but the bridge was bombed. The bombs detonated the prepared explosives and destroyed the bridge. Vehicles were forced to detour a long ways to Tirnavos to cross the river. One bridge had not been prepared for demolition and still stood. An elite demolition party, led by Warrent-Officer went back and blew the bridge. By midnight, they had crossed the river and rejoined the rear guard. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard withdraws while under attack

As the sun set on 18 April 1941, the 24th New Zealand Battalion was withdrawing as a German attack was mounted on the road to the Menexes Pass. The German force had tanks in the lead until they ran onto mines in the road. They were followed by motorized infantry. The infantry dismounted and attacked, but they were held up long enough for the 24th Battalion to withdraw. The Australian field guns withdrew by troops and left only some New Zealand artillery. They slipped away at about 11:30pm. They had arrived at Larisa by 3am. The 26th New Zealand Battalion had traveled to Larisa by rail, but the other two battalions traveled by road to Volos. All this occurred as Brigadier Savige's force had an adventure on 18 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 6th New Zealand Brigade on the defence: 18 April 1941

By late morning on 18 April 1941, a German attack was underway against the positions held by the 6th New Zealand Brigade, south of Elasson. A combination of medium and field artillery was able to inflict damage on the advancing German tanks. At this time, the 6th Brigade was not attacked by air, except by one Stuka. The medium guns eventually had to withdraw after they fired off all of their remaining ammunition. Fortunately, the Australian field artillery was well-supplied with ammunition. This was due to the work of the 5th New Zealand Regiment's drivers who moved the entire ammunition dump from Ayios Dimitrios to the 6th Brigade's positions. The 2/3rd Australian regiment fired some 6,500 rounds at the Germans on 18 April. There was an abundance of targets with the artillery observers spotting the large groups of targets. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

6th New Zealand Brigade on 18 April 1941

The 6th New Zealand Brigade was deployed as a blocking force south of Elasson. They were across two roads that led to Larisa. The 25th Battalion was on the west side and the 24th Battalion was on the east. The 26th Battalion was in reserve. The brigade had heavy artillery support:

2/3rd Field Regiment   20-25pdrs
one troop 64th Medium Regiment
two groups of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment   8-25pdrs (in the anti-tank role)
one battery of the 5th NZ [Field] Regiment in reserve at Domenikon  12-25pdr
7-2pdr anti-tank guns dug in and 4 mobile with the 25th Battalion

The 24th Battalion was in mountainous terrain with no artillery. They had performed demolitions and laid mines to aid the defence. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard units on 18 Apil 1941

There were three rearguard units that would have to withdraw through the Larisa bottleneck. The three were positioned on roads leading south. April 18 saw the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, with anti-tank guns sitting on the junction of roads from Servia and Katerini. The illustrious Colonell Kippenberger, with a small contingent, were all that remained of the 4th New Zealand Brigade rearguard. One cavalry squadron had 2pdr guns on portees with their guns pointed up the roads. The men guarding the road from Katerini were surprised to see German tanks and motorcyclists coming down the road. They had assumed that demolitions would have delayed their advance. As they were being attacked repeatedly, the men finally withdrew behind the 6th New Zealand Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Two battalions cut off

By 5:45pm on 18 April 1941, Brigadier Allen could tell that the 21st New Zealand Battalion and the 2/2 Australian Battalion were cut off by advancing Germans. Brigadier Allen had collected a large number of carriers from the various units in his brigade. He was extremely low in infantry strength, however. They had endured bombing and strafing through the day. There were five German tanks advancing up the road. They were met by 25pdr fire and two tanks were knocked out. They lost one gun and had to pull back. The men were forced to pull back to their trucks for a withdrawal. The withdrawal was covered by New Zealand armoured cars. The column ran into a German ambush and took casualties along the way. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Things get dicey on 18 April 1941

The New Zealand 21st Battalion withdrew at about 11am on 18 April 1941. They left the Australian 2/2 Battalion to fend for themselves. They lost contact with General Macky during this period. The 2/2 Battalion had several hours where they were not hard-pressed by the Germans. By 3pm, the battalion was attacked on the ground and by air. They were being overrun by German tanks. There was a concurrent infantry attack on a different part of the defensive front. A mortar team of the 2/2 Battalion fired some 350 rounds on the advancing Germans. The unit was also able to mount heavy Bren gun fire which slowed the advance. The tanks, however, continued to move up the road. Two companies of the 2/2 were able to withdraw and reached their trucks, which transported them to the brigade headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

18 April 1941 in the Pinios Gorge

The units defending the Pinios Gorge on 18 April 1941 included the 21st Battalion, the 2/2 Battalion, and the 2/3rd Battalion. Early on 18 April, German troops could be seen advancing towards the defenders. It was apparent that the Germans were working their way around the left, trying to outflank the defenders. A platoon of carriers was sent out to intercept the Germans. The carriers came under heavy fire and were forced to withdraw. There was a great deal of mist in the morning that reduced visibility. A tank attack developed in front of the 21st Battalion. There were 2pdr anti-tank guns defending, but they were overrun by advancing tanks. By 11am, troops from the 21st Battalion (New Zealanders) had started to withdraw. The Australians were still able to hold on for the present. By 3pm, a bigger attack was mounted. The attack included about 35 aircraft that commenced bombing. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The fateful conference in Athens on 17 April 1941

General Papagos had suggested that the British force exit Greece. General Wilson exchanged cables with Winston Churchill who stated that they should not stay in Greece against the wishes of the Greek government. General Wilson attended a meeting in Athens on 17 April 1941 where Mr. Koryzis told the King that he felt like he had failed the country. He then commited suicide. Churchill ordered on 18 April that they must both withdraw from Greece and keep on fighting in Libya. The battle in Libya had priority over the Greek operation, however. The island of Crete seemed to be a close location to which they could go after leaving Greece. The troops in the field were unaware of the events of 17 and 18 April, and they were fully occupied with resisting a German advance. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The rearguard at Domokos

Brigadier Lee's rearguard was gathered at Domokos on 17 April 1941. Two battalions arrived from the north: the 2/4th and 2/8th. the 2/8th still had 533 men, but with fewer weapons than they should have had. At least the men of the 2/1st Field Regiment arrived by train from Larisa. They had come back to Domokos to be with their guns. The 2/6th Battalion had arrived by train on 16 April. The British troops had been able to move under cover of rain and mist. Four of the seven brigades were at Domokos or Thermopylae. The others would be harder to safely move. Greek resistance seemed ready to cease by 18 April. The general consensus was that the Greeks liked the Germans and would like to work with them. By then, the Macedonian armies had dispersed. The remaining Epirus army was in dire straits. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Savige

Brigadier Savige's force, an augmented infantry brigade was left unsupported on the left flank. He had been directly under ANZAC Corps command, but by 18 April 1941, he was switched back under his division. He had thought that the best plan would be to sit where they were until the night of 18/19 April. Early on 18 April, Captain Grieve brought back orders from General Mackay to withdraw that night. The orders from Mackay had apparently been written without knowing that the armoured brigade had already withdrawn. Brigadier Savige informed Captaina Grieve that they would start withdrawing. He had already ordered his artillery to withdraw. He hoped to be near Larisa by 5pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

On 17 April 1941, the 5th New Zealand Brigade had been loaded onto trucks to move to Almiros. Their assigned road was so bad that General Mackay had them move on the Australian division's road. The withdrawal also commenced from the Servia Pass. Lt-Col. Howard Kippenberger commanded the rearguard. The artillery withdrew first and then the infantry. The demolitions effectively held up the German advance. Savige Force, to the left, was left to hold for too long. They would only get to start the withdrawal in the night of 17/18 April. They had the dubious protection of the 1st Armoured Brigade. By the afternoon of 17 April, there was no armoured brigade to provide cover. The road behind them was packed with vehicles, so any withdrawal would be difficult. Brigadier Savige only expected to be able to start a withdrawal on the night of 18/19 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Pinios Gorge-17 April 1941

The battalions were prepared to defend against a German attack at the Pinios Gorge. The tracks ran along the north side of the gorge and the road was on the south side. The defenders included two Australian battalions and a New Zealand battalion. They had stretched out to prevent the Germans from going around the flank. The Official History notes, though, that if the New Zealanders were not able to hold, that the position could become untenable. The three battalions were included in Allen Force and were equipped with some anti-tank guns. By late on 17 April 1941, the men could see the first Germans on the ridge. The Germans were mountain troops and got into position where they were able to fire downwards on the New Zealanders. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Victorian railwaymen

It was the 2/7th Battalion of the 17th Australian Brigade whose Greek train crew abandoned them. They had been heavily attacked near Larisa by German aircraft, and the Greek crew had more than they could handle. Fortunately, the 2/7th had some Victorian railwaymen in the battalion. The leader, Corporal Jock Taylor, along with Corporal Melville and Private Naismith stepped up to solve the situation. They fired up a train as a decoy, and then about 5oo yards away, they assembled a train to carry the battalion to relative safety. They were able to carry the 2/7th Battalion to Domokos. All this seems to have occurred during the night of 16 April 1941. The 17th was uneventful, as the British were executing a withdrawal plan that included demolishing roads and bridges behind them. The brigade was able to prepare defensive positions on 17 April so as to be ready for the expected German attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal on 17 April 1941

The roads leading south were packed with vehicles, bumper-to-bumper. Men lay sleeping in the floor. There were a very few Greek vehicles. You were more likely to see donkeys with men riding or Greek cavalrymen on their horses. Early on 17 April 1941, there was rain, but it cleared later in the day and there were more German aircraft in the sky. The roads all ran through Larisa which was wrecked from a combination of earthquake and bombing. Not only were the roads clogged, but the railroads were having difficulties. The Greek railroad crews were abandoning trains due to fear of German aircraft. Australian railwaymen came forward and got a train assembled and moving with men from the 17th Australian Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

By 16 April 1941, the Greeks were ready to surrender

The Greek generals had been asking the Prime Minister to give up the fight. By 16 April 1941, the Bishop of Yannina made the same request of Mr. Koryzis. By 15 April, General Wavell had warned General Wilson that they should prepare to retreat further. At this point, the only place to go was to board the ships and leave Greece. The British and Commonwealth troops were in Thessaly on 17 April, where it was rainy and the skies were filled with marauding German aircraft. There were often conflicts on the roads between the supply vehicles carried supplies forward and the troop-carrying vehicles trying to withdraw. Since 14 April, the Germans had been firing in the trucks with machine guns from aircraft. The men had become extremely nervous and at the first sign of aircraft, they would jump off the vehicles to the roadside. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Armoured Brigade

General Wilson's staff had ordered the 1st Armoured Brigade to withdraw over a mountain road that no one knew anything about. The road turned out to be so rough, that most of the brigades remaining tanks broke tracks and had to be abandoned. They could easily have allowed the brigade to travel on the main road, but chose not to let them do so. The brigade had originally been planned to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal, but he was just left with a small contingent while the remnants of the brigade tried to withdraw over the mountain road. Sadly, this was symptomatic of how General Wilson's command functioned. The entire campaign was ill-considered and driven by politics to begin with. The British should never have gone into Greece, but Anthony Eden, Churchill's foreign minister, decided that they needed to aid Greece and try and pull Yugoslavia to the British cause. The entire enterprise was a disaster and nearly cost the British North Africa. This is some commentary in addition to information from Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The NZ protective force

General Freyberg was concerned about the security of his forces while they were withdrawing from the Servia and Olympus passes. As a precaution, he established a force under the command of Lt-Col. Duff to cover the withdrawing units from the two passes. Colonel Duff's force included anti-tank guns, machine guns, and carriers. That measure was put in place, but an attempt to use the armoured brigade to cover Brigadier Savige's withdrawal misfired due to General Wilson already having issued orders to the brigade. He had ordered the brigade to withdraw over rough mountain roads. That had the effective of causing most of the available tanks to break down in route due to track failures. That was a constant danger with the early British cruiser and light tanks used by the 1st Armoured Brigade. That was what Robert Crisp mentioned in his book, Brazen Chariots, about the abortive and failed Greek campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 4th NZ Brigade on 16 April 1941

The 16th of April 1941 saw a determined New Zealand fight on the left where the Maori's repelled a German attack, with the help of artillery. When the sky cleared, they could see a German column stretching far off into the distance. New Zealand artillery fire called in by the observer that broke the attack. The was the 4th NZ Brigade with the 23rd Battalion on the right in a heavy mist. By late afternoon, they were being pressed hard, but reinforcements helped them block the attack. German mountain troops had threatened to overrun the Maori's, but in the end, they held. As darkness fell, they were to withdraw south along the road, although they were late in starting. The other two battalions of the brigade were able to stage a more orderly withdrawal according to plan. In the mountainous terrain, they had to abandon their nine 2pdr anti-tank guns. They tipped these over and they fell into a ravine. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official history.

The dispositions late on 16 April 1941

On the left, the 5th Panzer Division, with a detachment from the 9th Panzer Division were pushing down towards the Aliakmon River and then south towards the Pinios. The 1st Armoured Brigade was withdrawing ahead of them, and was not south of the Aliakmon River. To their right, the main body of the 9th Panzer Division was attacking the 4th New Zealand Brigade at Servia. Near the coast, to their right, the 2nd Panzer Division was attacking the 5th New Zealand Brigade. Further south, right on the coast, the 6th Mountain Division, with a portion of the 2nd Panzer Division, was attacking the 21st Battalion near Rapsani. The NZ Division HQ and the ANZAC Corps HQ were still at Elasson,. Far to the southwest, Savige Force was still holding Kalabaka. The 6th Australian Division HQ was far to the southeast, at Larisa. This was to be a difficult period in the face of attack by armoured forces and experienced mountain troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Elaborate plans were made to withdraw to Thermopylae

Generals Mackay and Freyberg were to closely coordinate the withdrawal from the north to Thermopylae. At the beginning, the 5th NZ Brigade was on the north slope of Mount Olympus. This was some twenty miles from where "Allen Force" was to move toT the south bank of the Pinios. The 4th NZ Brigade was to leave the Servia Pass the same night (17/18 April 1941) that the 5th NZ Brigade was to leave Olympus. The 6th NZ Brfgade was to leave Elasson in the night of 18/19 April. Savige and Allen, and the 1st Armoured Brigade all had to be moved south in the process of withdrawing. One concern was that some of the trails might provide a route to German mountain troops to outflank them. As early as the night of 15/16 April, the New Zealanders broke up a German attack and destroyed two tanks and 14 other vehicles. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

17 April 1941: a scratch brigade is formed

Brigadier Allen was put in charge of a scratch brigade formed of two of his battalions (the 2/2nd and 2/3rd) and the 21st New Zealand Battalion. They were to move to the Pinios Gorge in an attempt to block the advancing Germans. He had a mixed force of infantry, along with most of a field artillery regiment, some anti-tank guns, and carriers. He was to defend Larisa from the east. Allen's 2/1st Battalion was put under the command of the division commander at Olympus. The plan was still to withdraw to Thermopylae, the site of the famous battle in antiquity. General Mackay would have responsibility for protecting the flanks of Freyberg's NZ division. The commanders could only hope that the Germans could be delayed long enough for their withdrawal plans to be executed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation turns increasingly desperate

Anthony Eden had a lot to answer for over the Greek debacle. Serious military men, such as General Blamey, could see before the commitment was made that going into Greece with a threat of an impending German intervention would be a serious mistake. At least Anthony Eden was a politician. Winston Churchill had aspirations to military expertise, so he had no excuse for being a part to what would be an obvious opportunity for a military disaster.

Anthony Eden had portrayed the British operation to be in ghttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifreater force than was available in order to gain thehttp://www.blogger.com/img/blank.gifir acquiescence. The Greeks, on the other hand, were in a much worse condition than was understood. Not only were their troops poorly equipped, but their leadership was suspect. In particular, General Tsolakoglou was not only incompetent, he proved to be a traitor, as well. He abandoned his troops in the Western Macedonia Army, and then signed an armistice with the Germans when given the opportunity. The situation became so intense, than when confronted with a possible British withdrawal, the Greek prime minister committed suicide on 18 April 1941.

Sources:
Diggers and Greeks

We cannot leave Greece in the lurch

A critical situation from 16 April 1941 in Greece

The ANZAC corps had expected to be able to hold the Olympus passes against the German advance, but by 16 April 1941, they realized that the Germans were a threat to the right flank. Lt-Colonel Macky, commander of the 21st NZ Battalion reported an attack being pressed by 150 German tanks at the Platamon tunnel. On the 15th, they had fought off an attack by motorcycle troops. Late in the day on 15 April, a German armoured regiment had moved into position. The Germans actually had assembled an all-arms force and planned to attack the New Zealanders in the morning on 16 April. By 9am, Col. Macky ordered a withdrawal. General Blamey had sent his artillery commander, Brigadier Clowes, forward to the 21st NZ Battalion with authority to order whatever he thought necessary. When they had retreated to the gorge mouth, they had to cross by ferry. They had brought across a large flock of sheep and two shepherdesses before sinking the ferry. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British are treated to a view of the worst of the Greek army

By late on 15 April 1941, the Greek general Tsolakoglou's army was disintegrating. The remnants were reduced to two divisions near Grevena. The other units had disintegrated and the men from the units were scattered along the roads in Brigadier Savige's force. Tsolakoglou had owed his appointment to his family connections, and he was both incompetent and had the aura of corruption. During the period of 13 to 15 April, the German staff had believed that the three ANZAC divisions and the 2nd Armoured Division units were in retreat. That was not actually true at the beginning of the period. During 15 and 16 April, the British forces were greatly outnumbered and were going to be outflanked unless some move was made. They were still holding, though. During 16 and 17 April, the situation was rapidly deteriorating. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Savige Force and the 1st Armoured Brigade

On 14 April 1941, General Wilson ordered the 1st Armoured Brigade to move to Kalabaka and to join Savige Force. There was concern that the Germans might be close by, but a 4th Hussars patrol found that the Germans were on the other side of the Aliakmon River at this point. On 15 April, General Wilson informed Brigadier Savige that some 3000 Greek troops would be arriving in his area. All they did was to clutter the roads and make life more difficult for the Australians and 1st Armoured Brigade. The British liaison officer, Lt-Colonel Barter informed Brigadier Savige that the Greek commander was politically well-connected and they just couldn't move his troops out of the area. Brigadier Savige bitterly remembered the events that followed. By this time, the Greeks were living in a fantasy world where they considered that they were stubbornly resisting, not disintegrating, which was the reality. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 19th Brigade's withdrawal went poorly

Again, there was difficulty in communicating with all the companies in the 19th Australian Brigade to inform them of the order to withdraw on 14 April 1941. They had assumed that they would be able to take their Bren carriers with them. They found to their dismay that the bridge could not hold them and the one raft they had was unequal to the task and overturned. They were forced to destroy the carriers as best as they could. One company became separated, but they were reduced to sixty men, so they were able to transport them across the river using a small boat. While all this was happening, the Germans were pressing the Greeks defending the mountain passes to the north. The armoured brigade was caught in the mess. They attempted to withdraw along congested roads. In the process, the 3rd RTR had seven tanks break down. This was Robert Crisp's unit and he was present. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans press forward against the 19th New Zealand Battalion

The Germans continued to press forward late on 14 April 1941. During the night of 14/15 April, Major Sampson, commander of the 19th NZ Battalion, realized that his unit was almost surrounded by the advancing Germans. In the dark, he had his men pull back, further up the slope. He had two platoons stage an attack that drove back some Germans that had advanced near to Prosilion. Early on 15 April, General Blamey ordered General Mackay to pull the 19th Australian Brigade across the Aliakmon. The day was already late, with little light left. Communications were poor and there was no bridge across the river. The engineers made an amazing achievement, in that in a few hours they had built a wooden bridge over the Aliakmon, so that the 19th Brigade could cross at 9pm. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History,

The Servia Pass from 14 April 1941

The 4th New Zealand Brigade had been holding the Servia Pass. From 14 April 1941, they came under increasing air attack from German divebombers. The brigade was positioned high above the river, looking down steep mountain slopes and then down an escarpment. During the afternoon, the men could see the advancing German troops headed their direction. The Ju-87's were equipped with the noisemaker that was intended to shake the morale of their victims. They proved to be disquieting to the New Zealanders who were having their first taste of this sort of attack. As the sun set on 14 April, the German artillery started firing ranging rounds towards the New Zealanders. By early on 15 April is when they noticed the Germans pretending to be retreating Greek troops and who were trying to infiltrate the New Zealand lines. That was when they had opened up with machine gun fire and had decimated the Germans. They killed, wounded, or captured some 400 men in the process. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The situation deteriorates further in Greece

As events progressed on 14, 15, and 16 April 1941, the Germans were pressing forward. The mountainous terrain had made even communication difficult. One battalion of the 16th Australian Brigade found on 16 April 1941, that they should have withdrawn the night before. No one had been able to find them earlier, so that was not possible. By 14 April, General Wilson had ordered a withdrawal from the Aliakmon line. The Germans were using infiltration tactics to penetrate the New Zealand and Australian lines. They pretended to be retreating Greek troops to gain entrance to the positions. The New Zealanders recognized what was happening and opened fire with machine guns, doing dreadful execution on the Germans. They then rounded up many prisoners, some of them being Austrians. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

New Zealanders in action

The situation on the night of 13-15 April 1941 was that the New Zealand troops on the left could hear the Germans advancing towards them. The next day saw the Germans moving past the demolitions and probing the New Zealand positions. The Germans only started replying to artillery in the late afternoon on 15 April. The 16th Australian Brigade, which was to position themselves between two New Zealand brigades only crossed the Aliakmon on the night of 13 April. The Australian battalions became separated and were faced with mountainous terrain. On the morning of 15 April, the troops of the 2/3rd Battalion that they had been cut off by German troops during the night. They eventually all got themselves into what they believed were their intended positions. When the decision was made to withdraw to Thermopylae, the commanders wondered how they could let the 16th Australian Brigade know. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek army 13 and 14 April 1941

On 13 April 1941, the Greeks were hold several passes and were staging an orderly withdrawal. At noon on 14 April, the 20th Division was pushed out of the Klisoura Pass. The remnants of the 20th Division were ordered south to the Grevena road. Other Greek divisions were able able to stage an orderly withdrawal into other positions to the south. By 14 April, German units had reached the Aliakmon line where the ANZAC Corps was deployed. Demolitions were started, but the troops in Greece lacked the equipment necessary for adequate demolition in mountainous terrain. The New Zealand brigades had seen German units approaching by late afternoon on 14 April. During the night, the New Zealanders could see the Germans bringing troops forward for use in the morning. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The move back to Thermopylae

The plan for the retreat was to put the New Zealand Division on the east of Thermopylae and the 6th Australian Division to the southwest. They would occupy the Bralios Pass. The move would be made by vehicle, so that the men would not have to march the whole way. As long ago as 13 April 1941, Admiral Cunningham was told of the intent to evacuate Greece. General Wavell's staff was planning for the embarkation of the forces. At this point, the Germans caught the small British air contingent on the ground and destroyed ten Blenheims. What was left of the RAF in Greece was withdrawn to Athens, too far away to support the troops. The Germans mounted air attacks in increasing intensity from this time onward. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The next phase of withdrawal: from 16 April 1941

General Freyberg, the commander of the New Zealand Division, would command the next phase of withdrawal in Greece starting on 16 April 1941. The 5th NZ Brigade Group would be the first, withdrawing from the Olympus Pass. The 4th NZ Brigade would move out of Servia at the same time, starting overnight on 17 to 18 April 1941. Brigadier Savige's force was exposed, far out on the left. He would also withdraw his troops on that same night. The rearguard would also withdraw on the following night. That would leave the 1st Armoured Brigade to move across the plain during the day on 19 April. The New Zealand Division would move south along the coast road, while the armoured brigade and 6th Australian Division would move on the main highway through Pharsala. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Blamey's withdrawal plan: 15 April 1941

The first move in the withdrawal of General Blamey's corps would be made by the 6th NZ Brigade. They would from the Olympus Pass to a position astride two roads between Tirnavos and Elasson. They would be supported by an Australian field regiment. The 19th Australian Brigade would withdraw from north of the Aliakmon River to a Damakos, where they would come under the command of Brigadier Lee. The 16th Australian Brigade would move to a road at Zarkos. They would be supported by a field regiment. General Blamey hoped to have all the 6th Australian Division "behind the passes" by the morning of 16 April 1941. By then, a second withdrawal would begin, commanded by General Freyberg. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The withdrawal to Thermopylae

After the events of 13 April 1941, General Wilson and General Blamey were in agreement to withdraw to Thermopylae. A new feature of the campaign were the frequent German air attacks. They entailed dive bombing and strafing. The British had relied upon their small air strength for reconnaissance up to then. The Australians and New Zealanders would keep the roads for themselves to the exclusion of Greek forces. This was a drastic measure for them to take with their allies, the Greeks. The actual orders for withdrawal were only issued early on 15 April 1941. General Blamey issued detailed orders for the withdrawal early in the evening of that day. He planned a quick move and to have the men start before the end of the day. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Brigadier Savige's orders on 14 April 1941

Brigadier Savige was ordered to hold the road junction of the Pindus and Grevena roads. He only received the signed orders very late on 14 April 1941. He was also to support the British armoured brigade. To accomplish his mission, he was given what we now call a combined arms force consisting of four infantry battalions, seven tanks from Robert Crisp's unit, the 3rd RTR, two troops of medium guns, one NZ field artillery battery, one Australian anti-tank battery, one MG company, a field company, and an ambulance unit. Brigadier Savige did not actually see his orders until early the next morning. When General Blamey heard that the Greeks had lost Klisoura pass, Generals Wilson and Blamey had the sense that the Greek army was at the point of collapse. This is baed on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 17th Australian Brigade arrives

Brigadier Savige, brigade commander of the 17th Australian Brigade, arrived at General Blamey's headquarters on 13 April 1941. His three battalions and the third battalion of the 19th Brigade, were still in Athens. For better or worse, General Wilson was at Blamey's headquarters when Brigadier Savige arrived. He was immediately sent off to scout the road from Larisa and the road from Kalabaka and Grevena. That latter road was the route for the 1st Armoured Brigade and the Western Macedonian Army to use for their withdrawal. They called Brigadier Savige back to Blamey's headquarters the next day and wanted him to take the newly arrived 17th Brigade to Kalabaka. While they talked, they found out that the Germans had broken through and so they wanted the 17th Brigade to position themselves to defend the road to Grevena and the road to Pindus. We can guess at this point that the situation near the breaking point. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the situation on 13 April 1941

The Australian Official History argues that General Wilson misunderstood enough about the Greek army that he assumed that the Central Macedonian Army failed in its role during the withdrawal. They admit that the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions were disorganized and had become incapable of further fighting. They argue, however, that Wilson ignored the potential of ragged Greek troops marching on roads with donkeys and farm carts. Wilson became increasingly concerned about being attacked on his right flank, the side away from the sea. Even though the 17th Australian Brigade was just arriving at the Piraeus, General Wilson ordered them to move to his right flank and provide protection. Some of the 17th Brigade had only arrived on 12 April 1941 and were still in Athens. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Greek situation

The Greek armies of the Western Macedonia and Epirus were ordered on 13 April 1941 to withdraw to the line of the Venetikos River. This runs along the western part of the Albanian border to the coast. At the time of the order, they were located in a "deep salient" back to a line that continued the British line. The orders to the Greeks would force them to cross difficult and mountainous terrain so that the Australians could use the roads. Some Greek units were expected to have to march as much as a 100 miles. At the same time, the 1st Armoured Brigade was to move to the east. The roads turned out to be jammed with Greek unit moving south. Already, the Greek units were no longer capable of organized action and were useless, as they were only intent on reaching Athens. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The defenders at Aliakmon, circa 15 Apil 1941

The force defending the Aliakmon River position was mostly comprised of battalions with Australian a few Australian battalions in a aadly depleted state. They belonged to the 19th Australian Brigade. The 4th NZ Brigade headquarters was south of Servia. Further to the southeast were the 6th Australian Division and New Zealand Division headquarters. Communication was complicated by the fact that the Australian radios did not work reliably. Still, General Blamey's corps was largely in place by 15 April 1941 at the Aliakmon line and the Olympus passes. The initial plan was to fight on the Aliakmon line for an extended period of time. That relied on their ability to stop the Germans, which was not a given. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

13 April 1941

While they had left the 1st Armoured Brigade as a rearguard at Sotir on 13 April 1941, the Australians and New Zealanders were securing the south side of the Aliakmon River defences. There was the 4th NZ Brigade and the 16th and 19th Australian Brigades on the river. By 10am, the 1st Armoured Brigade was withdrawing from their positions. The truss bridge across the river was blown by sappers, just before six British 3 ton trucks arrived. They had left a pontoon bridge intact, so the trucks were able to cross the river. The 4th NZ Brigade was positioned in the Servia pass and had been preparing defensive positions. They were supported by three field regiments positioned in the heights. This is based on the account in VOl.II of the Australian Official History.

The 16th Brigade's epic retreat

While the New Zealand Division withdrew to the Olympus defences, the 16th Australian Brigade staged an epic retreat over mountainous terrain. They obtained donkeys from tɨg Greek villagers to act as pack animals. After they left their positions at Veria, the engineers set off explosives in the pass to impede the German advance. Since they had too much equipment for the donkeys and themselves to carry, they were forced to destroy much of what they had accumulated. Tents were burned and ammunition was buried. They broke tools and spare gun barrels as best as they could. They burnt things like great coats and blankets and only kept one each per man. Right before they left Veria, there was fresh snow. The 2/3 Battalion moved back to the pass and took position to cover the track. The other battalions started to move back on 11 April 1941 and the rest by 12 April. One battalion, the 2/1 reached Leventes early in the morning on 13 April. From there, they marched to Lavianna and woke a villager to show them how to find the pass to the river. They marched in deep mud for four miles. The men were so tired that they had to stop. Men who were struggling were unloaded with their comrades carrying their possessions. They arrived at the top of the pass at 6am. They could see the Aliakmon River below them. They were met by sappers at the river who ferried them across. They then had to climb up to Velvendos, a village. On their arrival, they estimated that they had traveled 34 miles under difficult conditions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Withdrawal to the Olympus-Aliakmon line

As General Mackay and the Greeks fought a rearguard action, the Australians and New Zealand Division withdrew on the Aliakmon-Olympus line. The New Zealand Division had made the move as early as 10 April 1941. They left the divisional cavalry forward, with armoured cars and bren carriers and supported by field artillery. They made a fighting withdrawal as they were pressed. They pulled back about ten miles behind an anti-tank ditch. As the Germans brought forward infantry and tanks, the cavalry regiment withdrew to Olympus. As all this occurred, the 16th Australian Brigade had been withdrawing towards Servia. As the terrain was mountainous, they were reduced to using donkeys and had to discard, burn, or otherwise destroy equipment and supplies. They marched towards the Aliakmon under very difficult conditions, with snow and mud. By 6am on 13 April, they were four miles from the Aliakmon. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The attack on Yugoslavia: 12 April 1941

As early as 6 April 1941, the 14th Panzer Division had captured bridges on the way to Belgrade. They were only utilized by the Second Army, starting on 9 April 1941. The ambiguous political situation in Yugoslavia can be gauged by the fact that Zagreb was captured by the Germans, late on 10 April, they were cheered by the populace. The 8th and 14th Panzer Divisions then drove towards Belgrade. Three groups of German units moved into Belgrade from different directions on 12 April. Their main difficulties had been caused by bad roads and blown bridges. They had generally suffered very few casualties, as Yugoslav resistance had collapsed. This points out that British hopes of Yugoslavia as a serious ally were fantasies, only, in Anthony Eden's mind. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German forces on 12 April 1941 in the Balkans

General Stumme's 40 Corps had two panzer divisions, an infantry division, and one SS motorized division. They had connected with the Italians in Albania and then were ordered to swing south to hit the British forces in the rear. While this operation was in motion, Field Marshal Kleist's panzergruppe was rolling over the remnants of the Yugoslav army in the south. The Germans expected to find the Australians and New Zealanders aligned east-west between Kaerini and Kozani. They thought that the corps headquarters would be at Kozani and made plans accordingly. The Germans had attacked on 11 April at Vevi with units from the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler division. They were supported by armour from the 9th Panzer Division. They planned a further attack on the 12th with three kampfgruppes. There was heavy fighting where the Germans took "English" (presumably Australian) and some Greek prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The declaration of the ANZAC Corps

Generals Blamey, Mackay, and Freyberg had all fought in the Gallipoli campaign in 1915. Early on 12 April 1941, remembering those days in 1915 when the Australians and New Zealanders had fought together, he declared that from henceforth, the 1st Australian Corps would be known as the ANZAC Corps. This was to celebrate the reunion betweem the Australians and New Zealanders.

At this time, the German plan was to turn the British flank and catch them in the rear with armoured divisions. They had intelligence from Egypt that there were four divisions opposing them. They included the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions and the New Zealand Division, with part of the 2nd Armoured Division. This was certainly the plan, but did not accurately reflect the troops on the ground. The Germans had roared through Yugoslavia, almost unopposed, and then swept towards the British troops. They arrived on 12 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

British armour on 13 April 1941 in the rearguard

The Rangers, of the armoured brigade, and the 4th Hussars and 3rd RTR were involved in the rearguard on the morning of 13 April 1941. The 27th NZ MG battalion was on their left. The Germans had pushed into the Rangers, although the Rangers were supported by tanks and artillery fire. They hoped to hold the Germans long enough for the Greek 12th Division to withdraw. The Rangers were still holding in the afternoon and were backed by anti-tank guns. Some thirty German tanks turned the British left flank and were driving towards the armoured brigade headquarters. As night drew on, the remnants of the armoured brigade were forced to withdraw on Grevena. The 1st Armoured Brigade had ceased to exist as a fighting force, although they had inflicted losses on the advancing German armour. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The western Greek armies withdraw: 12 April 1941

General Papagos ordered the two western Greek armies to withdraw on about 12 April 1941. These were the Western Macedonian and the Epirus Armies. They had held an extended salient. By early on 13 April, the Greeks held the three passes to the west and the British rearguard was at Sotir, blocking the road. The 2/4 Australian Battalion was added to the infantry with the armoured brigade. By this time, they only had two companies. They were deployed next to the Rangers. They had most of the 3rd RTR and one squadron of the Hussars. They had the 2nd RHA, an anti-tank battery, and some New Zealand machine gunners. In the morning, the men could see the enemy troops and opened fire. They inadvertently killed some of their own men who had been taken prisoner during the night. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Papagos felt like the British had not met their commitments

Wilson's Force W was supposed to cover the Greek 12th and 20th Divisions as they withdrew. General Papagos felt abandoned, because General Mackay's force, which would have covered the Greek divisions, had started to withdraw late on 10 April 1941. General Mackay was very concerned about meeting his obligation, but the Greeks ran into trouble and ended up being partially dispersed. Only part of the force managed to arrive at their destination by the night of 12/13 April. The 12th Division was protected all during 13 April. The Greek troops actually performed a good withdrawal to new positions and fought well in their new positions. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/8th Battalion on 12-13 April 1941

The 2/8th Battalion had been thrown in the gap, straight from the Desert, with raw reinforcements. They were just seven days out of Athens, and had little food or even the ability to rest. They had held out for two days, stopping the Germans, before the Germanss broke into their position with tanks. They stubbornly held the ridge a little longer, before they were forced to withdraw, leaving weapons and other equipment too heavy to carry in their weakened state. After all, they had gone for several days without sleep. They were lucky to withdraw as many men as they did. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 2/8th was in deep trouble: 12 April 1941

The 2/8th Battalion had depended on the Rangers to form a screen in front, but the Rangers misunderstood what was happening and withdrew to the "rearguard position at Rodona". By late afternoon on 12 April 1941, the situation became desperate, as German tanks and infantry penetrated the Australian position. The men withdrew as best they could, lightening their loads by abandoning weapons and other equipment. As the night fell, the men were marching in mud, which only made matters worse. The battalion should have started a retreat sooner, but the headquarters did not realize how bad the situation had gotten. As the men assembled at Rodona, there were only 250 men from the 2/8th. They included about half the officers but only a fraction of the men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The German attack on 12 April 1941

The Germans attacked General Mackay's Australians on 12 April 1941. They attacked on a broad front and were in close formation. They overran a platoon, but Capt. Robertson's platoon was able to stop the Germans. The Rangers below, however, had thought that they were overrun, so they started to withdraw. The Germans had trucks and tanks and used the tanks to advance with the infantry following. These were the tactics that the Australians had used, themselves, in Libya. The Australians were increasingly under machine gun fire, and the Royal Horse artillery was left in an exposed position with no infantry in front. By 5pm, the Germans had penetrated the Australian front and had advanced deep behind the lines. In order to escape, the Australians often left their weapons behind. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Mackay's situation

General Mackay found that the Greek Central Macedonian Army had withdrawn from their positions at Perdika. He had not been informed beforehand. Now, he found that the last of the army was to move from the right to the left, and that there were 4,500 men, not the 3,000 that he had been led to believe. General Mackay ordered the Greeks to withdraw at 3pm on 12 April 1941. He gave them thirty trucks (lorries) to help with the move. General Mackay then gave orders to the 19th Australian Brigade to be ready to move by early on morning of 13 April. He wanted them in their vehicles by 4am. After the 19th Brigade withdrew, the remaining units would revert to the armoured brigade command, under Brigadier Charrington. Plans were disrupted by the German attack that hit about 8am on 12 April. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Greek plans on 11 April 1941

Given the German threat to the left flank of the Allied army in Greece, General Papagos proposed pulling troops from Albania to reinforce the threatened area. He asked, though, for the 1st Armoured Brigade to provide support to the III Greek Corps that would be withdrawn. In the early morning on 12 April 1941, General Wilson issued oerders for a withdrawal of his forces to the line along the Aliakmon river and the Olympus passes. The New Zealand Division was already back at the Olympus passes. Late on the 11th, General Blamey had already ordered one battalion of the 16th Australian Brigade to withdraw from Veria. By early on 12 April, General Mackay could tell that his forces would be at risk at Vevi. The weather was also having a great negative effect on his troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The Germans attack on 11 April 1941

By 5pm on 11 April 1941, the Germans launched an attack on the Australians astride the road in the Greek mountains. The attackers were about two battalions of infantry. British artillery stopped the attack before they reached the most forward Australian infantry. The Germans continued to probe and finally dug in a short distance from the Australians. All the while, the snow continued to fall. In the late evening, the snow was about six inches deep, although in places on the 3000 foot ridge, the snow was as deep as a foot. After 10pm, the Germans attacked the 2/8th, but lost prisoners. Some were found to be from the Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler SS motorized division. The Australians of the 2/8th were not well-equipped and lacked such essentials such as blankets. By then, the 2/8th was thinly spread over two miles of front. To the north, the Greek Cavalry division was able to hold their German attackers. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

11 April 1941: the Germans move forward

During the morning of 11 April 1941, some German tanks probed towards the dug in British and Dominion troops. In front of the Rangers, two German tanks ran onto mines and were disabled. During the day, the British field artillery fired on the German vehicles. The German artillery only arrived by late morning and started firing, including with heavy mortars. No direct attack had been launched yet, as there was word of a German flanking movement with tanks that would hit the Greek 20th Division. All the British could do was to send a squadron of the 3rd RTR and a troop of anti-tank guns. Six of the British tanks broke their tracks. Fortunately, the German flanking movement did not continue, so the British could withdraw. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 10th and 11th of April 1941

By the end of 10 April, 1941, the New Zealand Division had occupied the Olympus passes. They had left behind a screen at Aliakmon, but that was all. At Vevi, things had gone wrong, as Greek units were cut off, despite the British intent to coordinate with them to prevent such an occurrence. With the retreating Greek soldiers and civilians passing through the British lines, there was increasing concern that there might be Germans among them. On the morning of 11 April, there was snow in the mountains, even though the valley had better weather. The soldiers on the mountain were wet and cold, and the snow restricted visibility to perhaps 150 yards. To make matters worse, they found that Germans were trying to infiltrate by speaking English and then taking prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.