At the close of Halberd

The opportunity was taken during Operation Halberd to run three empty merchant ships west, from Malta, to Gibraltar. They encountered aircraft and an Italian MTB, but arrived safely. Force X steamed along the coast of Tunisia and then turned to join Force H for the voyage back to Gibraltar. The torpedoed Nelson had preceded the two groups that arrived on 30 September and 1 October 1941. The ships were attacked by Italian submarines along the way, but took no hits. They did sink one Italian submarine, the Adua. The nine British submarines that provided cover had no success, either. Utmost had fired torpedoes at three Italian cruisers near Naples, but was lucky to escape, as she was almost rammed by a destroyer. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Halberd convoy in September 1941

The decision was made on 28 August 1941 to send another convoy to Malta through the western Mediterranean Sea. The operation was called Halberd, and would include a heavy naval force: the battleships Nelson, Rodney, and Prince of wales and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. There were 5 cruisers and 18 destroyers. The convoy would include 9 merchant ships. 22 Beaufighters and 5 Blenheim fighters were available for air cover. On 27 September, the Nelson was torpedoed by an Italian aircraft (perhaps an SM79 torpedo bomber). No.69 Squadron was providing maritime reconnaissance, and one of their Marylands sighted 2 Italian battleships and 8 destoyers to the ENE. They were about 70nm away. Another force was sighted 20 miles closer: 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers. When the British battleships steered for them, the Italians turned away.

When the concoy entered the Skerki Channel, Force H turned towards Gibraltar. Towards nightfall, small groups of torpedo bombers staged attacks. One hit the transport Imperial Star, which had to be sunk. The convoy reached Malta at about midday. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More Malta supply runs in 1941

In September 1941, hthe merchant ship Empire Guillemot was sent with supplies for Malta. She had an odd cargo, as she carried "fodder for livestock". The passed through the Western Mediterranean by flying "false colours". At various times, she flew the flags of Spain, France, and Italy. She was seen by aircraft, but not disturbed. She arrived at Malta on 19 September.

Submarines were also used to carry supplies to Malta, although only small quantities could be sent this way. The minelaying submarines Cachelot and Rorqual had larger volumes, so they were especially suitable. The larger O-class ships, such as Osiris and Otus also were used. On 30 July 1941, the Chachelot was caught on the surface by an Italian torpedo boat and had to be eventually scuttled. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Minelaying in the Mediterranean Sea in August 1941

The cruiser minelayer Manxman carried out an operation to lay mines south of Livorno (Leghorn) on the night of 24/25 August 1941. For part of the trip, the Manxman wore a disguise as a French light cruiser. She left Gibraltar in disguise, but removed it at sunset on 24 August. The British were being meticulous about adhering to international law, which thought that carrying out hostile acts in disguise was unsporting. After laying mines, the Manxman escaped at 37 knots, and then reassumed her disguise. She was back in Scotland by 30 August.

Admiral Somervilled, commander of Force H, carried out a diversionary operation to draw any potential attention away from the Manxman. On 24 August, he had ten Swordfish from Ark Royal "set fire to some cork woods and bomb a factory near Tempio in Sardinia". The Italian fleet was drawn out, thinking that another Malta convoy was at sea. When Force H returned to Gibraltar, they figured that they had cause the convoy to turn back. This is based on teh account in Vol.II of the Official History.

An attack on Gibraltar

After failing in their attack on Malta, the Tenth Light Flotilla turned its attention back to Gibraltar. They had tried three previous attacks: September and October 1940, and May 1941. They planned a new attack, this time with human torpedoes. They launched the attack on 20 September 1941. The naval tanker Denbydale was attacked in the naval harbour by one human torpedo. The tanker was "seriously damaged" "but remained afloat". "Two other merchant ships were attacked in the commercial anchorage". They succeeded in sinking one and caused the other to need to be beached to stay afloat. All the human torpedo crew members, two per torpedo, escaped to Spain and were eventually returned to Italy. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Italian attack on the Grand Harbour at Malta.

In both WWI and WWII, the Italians excelled at individual acts of heroism, such as the frog men at Alexandria, or in this case, explosive boats in an attack on the Grand Harbour at Malta. The attack occurred in the dark in the early morning of 26 July 1941. The attack was carried out by men of the Tenth Light Flotilla, a sort of Italian special forces unit. British fighter cover had prevented a reconnaissance before the attack, so the Italians lacked knowledge of ship positions. A "human torpedo", such as was later used at Alexandria, was to attack the torpedo net at the boat entrance to the harbour. In the event, the attack failed, as the British saw the ship that carried the attackers and were forewarned. Instead of breaking the net barrier, a bridge was brought down into the boat entrance, and this effectively blocked the way. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Malta in August 1941, after being reinforced

The primary goal of the Substance and Style convoys was to increase the strength on the island. The Official History says that there were now 22,000 in the garrison. This is a summary:

13 battalions
112 heavy AA guns
118 light AA guns
104 pieces of artillery (light, field, and medium)

aircraft:

15 Hurricane I
60 Hurricane II

In August, a night fighter was formed with 12 Hurricane IIs, and this seems to have reduced the frequency of night raids. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Operation Style in August 1941

The next convoy, in August 1941, was named Style (the previous had been Substance, so they were having some fun with names). Force X, for this operation, had Hermione, Arethusa, the minelayer Manxman, and two destroyers. They actually sailed from Gibraltar on 31 July and arrived at Malta on 2 August. They carried 1,750 "officers and men and 130 tons of stores". The only incident of note was that on 2 August "at first light", the cruiser Hermione caught the Italian submarine Tembion by surprise and rammed and sank her. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Substance was a hard fought convoy

As we showed, the escort for Operation Substance was substantial. Force H, Force X, and the battleship Nelson, from the Home Fleet were involved. The operation was costly to the Navy. The cruiser Manchester was torpedoed on 23 July 1941 as was the destroyer Fearless. "The Fearless had to be sunk". The Manchester was sent to Gibraltar with a destroyer as escort. Force X was also involved, and this included:

cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Hermione
cruiser Arethusa
8 destroyers

In fruther attacks, the destroyer Firedrake was damaged and had to be towed to Gibraltar by another destroyer. The transport Sydney Star was torpedoed by an Italian MTB at night, but was able to proceed towards Malta, after her troops and part of her crew were removed. She actually arrived on 24 July, before the convoy. The rest arrived safely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Malta needed more forces

After the German capture of Crete with airborne forces, the British became increasingly concerned that the Germans might attempt the same sort of attack on Malta. The decision was made, perhaps in July 1941, that more troops and artillery needed to be shipped to Malta. With the Germans more active in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, the convoy would be sent from west to east. The force to be sent to Malta would include "two battalions of infantry, one heavy and one light anti-aircraft regiment, thirty field guns and then men to man them, and a number of Royal Air Force pilots and technicians". The operation ran from July 21 to 24, 1941, and was called Operation Substance. A considerable naval force was involved:

battleship Nelson
battlecruiser Renown
cruiser Edinburgh
cruiser Manchester
cruiser Arethusa
aircraft carrier Ark Royal
some destroyers
8 submarines

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History. I also consulted this web page about convoys.

The period from July to October 1941, in the Mediterranean, consisted of a fight for control of the sea and the flow of supplies and equipment

Very quickly, after Italy entered the war, the British established an ascendancy over them at sea. Before the arrival of German airpower, the British were able to operate pretty much where they wanted. After the arrival of Fliegerkorps X in January 1941, as we have seen, that situation changed. After May, the waters between Cyrenaica and Crete became almost impassible to the British. The decision was made, though, that the supply and defense of Malta was critical, and must be pursued, regardless of cost. The losses off Crete now greatly affected operations. The scarcity of destroyers meant that the battleships Queen Elizabeth and Valiant were confined to Alexandria. The Warspite and Formidable were sent to America for repair. Other damaged ships were sent to "Durban, Bombay, or the United Kingdom". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Official History tries to spin that General Auchinleck should have attacked sooner

Vol.II of the Official History of the War in the Mediterranean and Middle East paints a picture that the Germans and Italians so benefitted from the delay in the British attack until November 1941, that the British should have attacked sooner. That ignores the fact that the British army in North Africa was not ready for any offensive. They would have just repeated Battleaxe, where they squandered what strength they had without result. They focus on the benefit to the Axis forces and ignore the realities of the British situation in this discussion. To be fair, they had already examined the British situation and had convinced me that even November 1941 was too soon to attack.

So, we should go ahead and list the Axis reinforcements that arrived between August and November 1941:

Part of the Afrika Division, later renamed as the 90th Light Division
Italian artillery units
Trieste (motorized) Division
Sabratha Division, reformed after being almost totally destroyed
100 M13/40 tanks for the Ariete Division
some light tanks of little value
15th Panzer and 21st Panzer Division were built up
  to 250 tanks from 180, almost all by repairs

New plans had to be made, as Russia was stronger than thought

By 28 August 1941, the Germans realized that they were likely not to achieve their objects before winter, and they needed to make longer term plans about the course of the campaign in Russia. They faced the reality that the British would be in contact with Russia through Iran. In the Middle East, the British seemed to be too weak to launch an attack, but if Rommel were able to take Tobruk, that might help the Axis supply situation. The British goal would obviously be to expel Axis forces from North Africa, and that would allow the Americans free access to French North Africa and West Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on Russia started so well, that they started planning their next moves

The German attack on Russia, launched on 22 June 1941, was succeeding so well in the initial phase, that planning commenced for the nexts moves following the collapse of Russia. The Russian campaign was planned to be over by the fall of 1941. At that point, the Germans would be free to concentrate pressure on the British position in the Middle East. With a successful result in Russia, Germany would be in a better position to apply pressure on Turkey. They would press Spain to remove the British from Gibraltar. They would be able to attack Egypt from Libya, through Bulgaria and Turkey, and possibly, through Iran. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Command changes on the Axis side in the summer of 1941

The German high command (OKH) had wanted to setup General Gause as a new level in the command structure, with his responsibilities as a liason to the Italian commander in North Africa, and for ensuring that supplies flowed smoothly. In fact, neither the Italians nor Rommel liked this arrangement. The Italians actually preferred either an Italian general or else Rommel in the role of an Army commander. Rommel was acceptable, as he had gained the support of the Italian people with his successes in Libya. To further strengthen their hand, the Italians replaced General Garibaldi with Generatl Bastico. The OKH relented and made the new headquarters Panzer Gruppe Afrika, with General Gause as chief of staff and Rommel as the commander. Rommel would command Italian as well as German troops in his new role. General Bastico would also have an Italian mobile corps with General Gambara as commander. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German situation from May 1941 in North Africa was quite different

For the Axis powers, especially for the Germans, the situation was reversed from the British situation. The German High Command was very conservative and did not want to risk an advance until they had built up their strength considerably. Rommel was an opportunist, and was always looking for a chance to attack the British positions. Then, you had the inter-ally politics, where the Germans wanted to see the Italians use their navy more in support of North Africa and the Italians wanted to see the Germans bring in air power and attack the Suez Canal through Turkey. It seemed that the most suitable Axis units for an attack were the 5th Light Division, the 8th Panzer Division, and the Italian Ariete armoured division. They also decided to send more medium and heavy artillery for use against Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Churchill was not to get his early offensive

General Auchinleck was in a position to argue to Churchill that an offensive could not be mounted with any chance of success until late 1941. Battleaxe was a convenient example pointing to the consequences of a quick offensive with untrained troops. The fact was that there would not be a complete, fully trained armoured division in North Africa. Even by mid-October there would only be one division and one army tank brigade. After the commanders in Britain understood the situation (Auchinleck had argued persuasively), they decided to send out the 22nd Armoured Brigade, from the 1st Armoured Division in Britain. They had hoped that the 22nd Armoured Brigade could arrive in mid-September, but it convoy only arrived on 4 October 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British tank situation in the summer and fall of 1941

The British had to face that reality that infantry tanks such as the Inf.Mk.II Matilda were unsuitable for tank-to-tank combat, and so they were finally withdrawn from the armoured divisions. Instead, they would be used to equip the "Army Tank Brigades", for use in the infantry support role for which they were intended. The Matilda had actually shown itself quite capable in the Battleaxe operation, but they had radio problems and limited range, so that alone necessitated that they could not be used in mobile operations. Their superior armour had shown itself to be useful against the Germans, however.

Since the British were not able to supply enough cruiser tanks (increasingly, Crusaders), they had to use the American Stuarts in their place during the summer and fall of 1941. The Stuarts were extremely mobile, but they suffered from lack of desert equipment and had an odd, rather small gun in the 37mm. They were thus burdened with a gun that was non-standard and required special ammunition that was only in limited supply. Still, they played an important part in the Crusader battle in late 1941. They were replaced, though, in the cruiser role, as soon as adequate numbers of Crusaders and the American Grants were available. This is based, in part, on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

As soon as General Auchinleck arrived, Churchill was pressing for a new offensive

General Auchinleck had been in India, prior to taking over from General Wavell as the theater commander for the Army. Churchill was already asking him if a new offensive could be mounted, partly to take advantage of the German preoccupation with Russia. Political considerations were largely behind the desire for an offensive. In Britain, they did not want to do nothing, so if Russia defeated Germany that they could claim to have done so without British help. They were also concerned that if Russia were defeated, that Britain could have been said to have done nothing to help. When Auchinleck seemed unresponsive, he and Air Marshal Tedder were called to Britain to discuss the situation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Iran ("Persia") becomes a problem

Even in 1939, there had been about 3,000 Germans in Iran. More entered after May 1941, after the Iraqi coup. British operations, in conjunction with the Russians, began on 25 August 1941. The plan was "to occupy the oilfields at Ahwaz" "and at Khanikin". Khanikin was just to the northeast of Baghdad. Lt-General Quinan, the commander in Iraq, commanded the operation. Following the usual forms, they had given the Iranian government an ultimatum on 17 August. The 8th Indian Division took the southern oilfields. The northern operation was undertaken by the 10th Indian Division and the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade and the 9th Armoured Brigade. These were actually motorized, as only the 2nd Indian Armoured Brigade had one regiment of British light tanks. The RAF had 7 squadrons available to support the operation. The Iranian government collapsed by 28 August, and the Shah was succeeded by his son. "British and Russian forces entered Teheran" on 17 September. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The threat to the British position in the Middle East from Barbarrosa

The German attack on Russia, on 22 June 1941, greatly changed the strategic picture in the Middle East. The concern was that the Germans could be in a position to threaten the oil fields in Iran (Churchill insisted on calling it Persia), particularly. If Russia was quickly overcome, then the Germans might head to the south through Turkey or Iran. Depending when they reached the Caucasus, they might really pose a threat to the entire British position in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. The British were heavily dependent on their oil fields in Iraq and Iran and the refinery at Abadan. Basra, in the south of Iraq was also an important port. By 1 September 1941, the suggestion had been made to India that they might increase the planned force for Basra to 10 divisions with 30 squadrons of aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

After the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941

The British Chiefs of Staff were not surprised at the German attack on Russia on 22 June 1941. The British had been weakened and were not a threat, but were strong enough at home that an invasion was impractical. The British were aware that there was a large scale movement of German forces to the East. The reduction in German air activity in the Mediterranean theater and over Britain was also indicative of the shift in forces elsewhere.

Rumours accurately forecast that the Rumanians would attack Russia with the Germans. By late May, the German armies facing East had grown to at least 100 divisions. The British expected the Germans to go through some exercise where they would demand concessions from the Soviets that they could not accept, and then use that as a pretext to invade. The reality was the Germans skipped what used to be the accepted forms and just attacked without warning on 22 June. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More thoughts about generals

I was interested to see that General Alan Cunningham, who brilliantly commanded a fast-moving and far-ranging campaign against the Italians in East Africa, was an artilleryman. For me, that helps to explain why he was so out of his element as 8th Army commander. The Wikipedia entry for him was above average, as were those for Generals Wavell and Auchinleck. Auchinleck and Cunningham both lived to a great age. Some of what is in Wikipedia is mediocre and best, but the biographies of the generals are quite good.

More thoughts on Generals Wavell and Auchinleck

We might make a few comparisons between Generals Wavell and Auchinleck. Some obvious things to examine are appointments and their strengths and weaknesses.

Based on results, General Wavell seems to have done well with his appointments. He was in his position for about two years. Auchinleck held his position for only about a year. General Auchinleck did not do well with his appointments, and I have wondered at the difference. One example was Alan Cunningham, who had done well in East Africa, and had conducted a fast-moving campaign that routed the Italians. The problem was that General Cunningham was near exhaustion at the end of the campaign. General Auchinleck was more impressed by Cunningham's campaign, and seems not to have been able to assess the man.

Wavell's primary strength seems to have been his planning ability. His ability to judge men was another strength. His weaknesses were his verbal inarticulateness and his seeming inability to recognize which orders from Britain were reasonable and which were not. He accepted the end to the offensive in Libya without protest and the adventure in Greece. Both turned out badly. He objected to Iraq and Syria, both of which turned out well.

I have wondered if General Auchinleck was more of an idea man. One factor that I had not considered was the Auchinleck was an Indian army man, and lacked much exposure to the regular British army. He did not do well with his appointments, but he proved himself a brilliant field commander, something that was not consistent with his position as theater commander. Auchinleck saved the Crusader battle, in late 1941, and turned it from a defeat into a victory. He then turned the 8th Army over to General Ritchie, who was not up to the job. Auchinleck had to step in and restore the situation, finally halting Rommel at the First Battle of El Alamein. He and his chief of staff, Eric Dorman-Smith, were removed by Churchill, as Churchill had finally lost confidence, and politically, needed to make a change.

The root of Wavell's problem

The Official History says that the real problem with relations between Churchill and General Wavell was the General's lack of verbal skills. Churchill was the consummate speaker, and he apparently expected his commanders to be able to speak well. Churchill first met General Wavell in August 1940, and it was only the favorable opinions of General Dill and Anthony Eden that kept him from removing Wavell, after the meeting. Of course, General Wavell could tell that Churchill had taken a dislike for him, and that was enough to erode his attitude, over time. With the constant telegrams from Churchill and orders to take actions which further eroded British security in the theater, General Wavell went from being a good soldier, following orders, to the point he reached in May and June, where he was resistent to direction from Britain. Because of Churchill's priorities, they had a setback in the Western Desert, which jeopardized the whole British position in the Middle East, they had been forced to pursue the disastrous campaign in Greece and the further losses at Crete. By the time Iraq and Syria had been ordered, Wavell had become useless, really, because his attitude had broken. It turned out that Iraq and Syria went well, and the next obvious step was to remove Wavell from his command.

The root of Wavell's problem

The Official History says that the real problem with relations between Churchill and General Wavell was the General's lack of verbal skills. Churchill was the consummate speaker, and he apparently expected his commanders to be able to speak well. Churchill first met General Wavell in August 1940, and it was only the favorable opinions of General Dill and Anthony Eden that kept him from removing Wavell, after the meeting. Of course, General Wavell could tell that Churchill had taken a dislike for him, and that was enough to erode his attitude, over time. With the constant telegrams from Churchill and orders to take actions which further eroded British security in the theater, General Wavell went from being a good soldier, following orders, to the point he reached in May and June, where he was resistent to direction from Britain. Because of Churchill's priorities, they had a setback in the Western Desert, which jeopardized the whole British position in the Middle East, they had been forced to pursue the disastrous campaign in Greece and the further losses at Crete. By the time Iraq and Syria had been ordered, Wavell had become useless, really, because his attitude had broken. It turned out that Iraq and Syria went well, and the next obvious step was to remove Wavell from his command.

Churchill makes personnel moves, starting in May 1941

In many ways, the manic way in which the Prime Minister and his staff in Britain managed the war was bound to cause friction. The first casualty of the impatience for results, when impossible and unreasonable demands were being made from Britain was Air Chief Marshal Longmore. He was relieved by his deputy, Arthur Tedder, on 1 June 1941. General Wavell's attitude was beyond repair, so he was another of Churchill's targets. Wavell was very much the establishment soldier, and was one of those responsible for striking down innovators, such as Percy Hobart and Eric Dorman-Smith. Another component of the clean sweep in the command structure was when General Sir Claude Auchinleck was appointed as the new theater commander, starting 5 July 1941. The third of the air-land-and-sea commanders, Andrew Cunningham, survived as Mediterranean Fleet commander until 1942. He had such prestige that he continued in high commands through the war, by 1943 becoming First Sea Lord. This is based, in part, on the account in Vol.II of the Official History, with my commentary.

Lend Lease

The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act on 11 March 1941 by the United States was a major event that greatly helped the British. They also allocated equipment for Greece, although this was too late to be any use there. The Americans had allocated 30 Grumman F4F fighters, 50 field guns, and ammunition for Greece. They were shipped in early April, but this equipment, along with some alloted to Yugoslavia, didn't arrive at their intended destination, due to the German invasion that started 6 April. Production in the United States was very small, in some types of equipment. They produced only 16 tanks in March 1941. The Grant tank prototype had been produced in April and in May, the M3 Stuart light tank went into mass production. One outcome after Lend Lease was that large-scale shipments of American equipment were started in May 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British aviation situation greatly improved by the summer of 1941

The British air strength in the Middle East had grown to 300 aircraft by May 1941. They expected to reach 520 in the middle of July. The situation in Takoradi had greatly improved. They were able to erect 161 aircraft in May, a huge improvement over the 100-or-so that they had been able to erect. The goal was that there needed to be 300 aircraft a month added, to just replace losses and worn-out or obsolescent aircraft. The actual figures in mid-1941 were:

Month    Aircraft arrivals

May      206
June     352
July     265

In addition, in July, 16 aircraft arrived from South Africa and 76 from the United States.
This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

British aircraft in use in May 1941

The Official History discusses the aircraft in use in May 1941 and their strengths and weaknesses:

1. Hurricane I: equal to the contemporary Italian aircraft and the Me-110, but inferior to the Me-109 above 16,000ft
2. Hurricane II: not available yet. Some were equipped with cannon for low-level attack
3. Blenheim IF: still used for low-level attack on airfields and vehicles
4. Blenheim IV: outclassed and could only operate with escorts
5. Martin Maryland: maritime reconnaissance only, as its speed and armament limited its ability to operate where there were enemy fighters. Its bomb capacity was too limited and its loaded range was too short
   
6. Sunderland flying boat: good for maritime reconnaissance, but not of defended ports
7. Westland Lysander: obsolescent, and not able to operate with out escorts
8. Wellington: only able to operate as a night bomber
9. Curtis Tomahawk: new and unproven, although it was hoped that it would prove useful for both the fighter and low level attack roles

Takoradi, in early 1941

Most aircraft destined for the Middle East were sent by the route to Takoradi, in west Africa (now Ghana). Almost all fighters and light bombers were sent to Takoradi, where they were assembled and then flown on to Egypt. That was not without difficulties. In February 1941, there were 150 aircraft at Takoradi that were not yet erected or were not flyable for some reason. Many were new Curtis Tomahawks, most of which had arrived without their equipment. By March, there were 180 in that state. Part of the issue is that with the staff they had, they were hardly able to process 100 aircraft in a month. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The next phase in North Africa

Following the end of fighting in Syria, the next major development was the massive reinforcements sent to North Africa. After the Italian surrender in East Africa, the 4th and 5th Indian Divisions and the 1st Sourth African Division were sent to Egypt. From the UK arrived the HQ 50th Division, the New Zealand Division, and the 7th Australian Division. From Australian came the 9th Australian Division. The liners Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth brought troops from Australia to the Red Sea. Since the Italian defeat in East Africa, they were able to north to Suez. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.