At the last minute, the navy was expected to evacuate 20,000 men from Crete

The evacuation from Crete started on the night of 28 and 29 May 1941. The navy was expected to rescue the 20,000 soldiers on Crete, 4,000 from Heraklion and 16,000 from the beach at Sphakia. In fact, the situation was so dire and communications were lost that some were never informed. Colonel Campbell and his men at Retimo surrendered on 30 May, after they were running out of ammunition and food.

On the first night, Captain Arliss, with four destroyers, took 700 men from Sphakia and carried them back to Alexandria. At Heraklion, three cruisers and six destroyers were under attack. The destroyer Imperial took a near miss and the cruiser Ajax was damaged enough to have to withdraw. Still, by 3am, the ships had evacuated 4,000 men and were headed for Alexanderia. The Imperial's steering gear failed and she was sunk. That delayed the withdrawal, and they were caught in daylight. In the attacks, about 800 of the soldiers evacuated were killed.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation on Crete on 26 May 1941 was getting very bad

On 26 May 1941, General Freyberg's concerns about the feasibility of withdrawing forces from Crete were ignored by the commanders in Egypt. The air attacks were so intense that all unit cohesion and control were evaporating. We see that General Wavell had informed London, and Churchill replied that they could not afford to lose Crete. In fact, the "Canea front had collapsed", and there was no prospect of bringing in reinforcements. They would be fortunate to hold off the Germans long enough to withdraw any of the troops. The Chiefs of Staff finally authorized a withdrawal. How the navy would be able to withdraw 20,000 troops was a mystery. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

From 24 May 1941, the Chiefs of Staff were living in unreality

When asked on 24 May 1941, Admiral Cunningham informed the Chief of Staff that the fleet could not operate in the Aegean or near Crete in daytime without crippling losses. The Chiefs of Staff responded that the fleet had to be ready to accept those losses. On 26 May, Admiral Cunningham told the Chiefs of Staff that he could predict losses if the fleet were required to operate in daytime. By 24 May, the battle on the ground was clearly lost. The airforce was able to do some damage, through heroic efforts, but the available strength was too small and the distance from Egypt was too great. Interestingly, the SAAF was using Marylands on offensive sorties, not just maritime reconnaissance. By the morning of 26 May 1941, General Freyberg informed General Wavell that if they wanted to save any of the troops on Crete, the withdrawal should start immediately. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

At sea on 22 and 23 May 1941 near Crete

Admirals King and Rawlings were headed southwest from Crete in the afternoon. At one point, the battleship Valiant was hit. Lord Louis Mountbatten, with the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, arrived at 4pm on 22 May 1941. They were sent to the southwest side of Crete. Kelly and Kashmir attacked a caique laden with troops, and then bombarded the airfield at Maleme. Captain Mack and four destroyers were sent to patrol on the north side of the island. On the south coast, two destroyers embarked the King of Greece, "the British Minister and other important persons". Admiral Cunningham ordered the ships at sea to replenish during the night to be ready for another day of activity. By mistake, the commanders thought that Warspite and Valiant were low on light AA ammunition, although this was not the case. They were ordered to withdraw, leaving Lord Mountbatten unsupported. In the morning, about 8am, 24 divebombers attacked Lord Mountbatten in the Kelly with the Kashmir and sank them. The Kipling was able to rescue Lord Mountbatten and 278 other men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Australian War Memorial website has a page about the battle for Crete, as do others

The battle over the island of Crete in late May 1941 was of epic proportions. Our friends from the southwest Pacific played an important part. The Australian War Memorial website has a page on the battle. The History Learning Site in the UK also has a page called the "Fall of Crete". The Explore Crete site has a page called the "Battle of Crete". The Wikipedia also weighs in with a Battle of Crete page.

The German plan to attack Crete by sea

The Germans had hoped to use two groups of caiques to carry troops to Crete's beaches. The first of caiques, carrying about 2,000 troops came to a bad end at the guns of Admiral Gennie's ships. The second group of 38 caiques, carrying about 4,000 troops, is what Admiral King had seen when forced to withdraw because of diminishing AA ammunition. After word had been received of the disaster to the first group, the German admiral ordered the second group to turn back. He also had planned to tanks and artillery carried in merchant steamers, as well, but these apparently did not arrive in time for the battle. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The naval defence of Crete: 21-22 May 1941

After destroyers had bombarded Scarpanto airfield during the night of 20 to 21 May 1941, they withdrew to the south. They came under heavy air attack and "the destroyer Juno was sunk and the cruiser Ajax damaged". A Maryland maritime reconnaissance aircraft from No.39 Squadron saw destoyers escorting small vessels approaching Crete from the direction of Milos. They were attacked around midnight of 21-22 May by Dido, Ajax, Orion, and four destroyers. The Italian torpedo boat Lupo was damaged and 10 caiques carrying German troops were sunk. The British force then withdrew to the west. During daylight on 22 May, Admiral King's force swept to the north. He had Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, and Carlisle, with four destroyers. They found some stragglers and sank them. As they were running out of AA ammunition, they were forced to retire, even though there were obviously more small vessels with German troops. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Naval dispositions at the start of the invasion of Crete

The navy started the fight to defend Crete at a disadvantage, as the aircraft carrier Formidable was unable to participate, as after the Tiger Convoy, her fighter strength was reduced to four. Suda Bay was no longer usable, so the fleet had to return to Alexandria to restock with ammunition and to refuel. There were only some motor torpedo boats based there.

Admiral Cunningham's plan was to interdict traffic by sea at night and to withdraw to the south during daylight hours. He had assembled three groups of cruisers and destroyers, augmented by the MTB's from Suda Bay.

The Corinth Canal was mined to impede traffic flow, and this was successful.

At the start of 20 May 1941, Rear-Admiral Rawlings, in the Warspite and with the Valiant were to the west of Crete. They had a screen of 10 destroyers. The Naiad and Perth, with four destroyers were heading south from Kaso Strait. The Dido, Ajax, and Orion, with four destroyers were heading to join Rear-Admiral Rawlings from Antikithera Channel. The cruisers Gloucester and Fiji had left Alexandria, heading to join the battlefleet, as well. The Queen Elizabeth and Barham had returned to Alexandria after the Warspite and Valiant had arrived.

This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History

The second day in the attack on Crete

On the second day, two companies of the Second Parachute Regiment were dropped into near Pirgos. In the event, the Maoris cut them up pretty badly and they were pinned in Pirgos. What started to tip the scales was that transport aircraft, landing under artillery fire, brought in the 100th Mountain Regiment. This was apparently at Maleme. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German attack on Crete on the first day

German air superiority meant that the British forces defending Crete had to keep under cover, as any movement brought an attack from roaming German aircraft. The air attack was so intense at Maleme airfield that the commander of the defenders had little idea of what was happening. All of his communication lines had been cut. The defenders had to withdraw to better cover, and this left the airfield in contention. In Prison Valley, the attackers had not been able to advance. At the end of the first day, Retimo and Heraklion airfields were still in British hands. Georgeopolis had not yet been attacked, and General Freyberg moved an Australian battalion to Suda Bay. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Correlli Barnett points out all that was happening in April to June 1941

Correlli Barnett says, in The Desert Generals, that General Wavell hoped for relative quiet in Cyrenaica, as he was fully occupied in many other places. He characterizes withdrawal from Greece as the British being "thrown out", with the loss of one fifth of their forces on 29 April 1941. In Iraq, on 5 May, Rashid Ali led a coup that was sympathetic to the Germans. On 20 May, the Germans attacked Crete. Intelligence indicated that Germans were entering Syria, so Wavell resolved to take the country. The British invasion launched on 8 June, with forces inferior to the Vichy French. From 12 May, Churchill starting pressing Wavell for a date when the Tiger Convoy tanks would be used in an offensive. Wavell seems to have been unable to deal with this sort of political pressure for premature or unwise action, and it ultimately led to his downfall. Churchill's lease on power must have seemed tenuous enough to him, that he continually made decisions based on politics, and his anxiety to see action taken.

The attack on Crete proceeds

Aside from a psychological effect, the paratroopers mostly were ineffective, except where they dropped into an area where they were unopposed. The glider-borne troops were decimated. The two points where they posed a real threat were the Assault Regiment landing in the dry river bed of the Tavronitis and where the 7th Air Division had dropped in the southwest of Canea, in the Prison Valley. The New Zealand Division took the main assault. From 6am on 20 May, the attacks proceeded. Many of the paratroopers dropped into a bad situation and were immediately pinned down, reminiscent of Normandie, three years later. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The attack on Crete

General Wavell had one eye on Iraq in mid-May 1941, as the Iraqi's had moved their army up on the plateau near Habbaniyah, the RAF training station. He soon had his attention fixated on Crete and on 14 May, bombing and strafing attacks had commenced against British airfields on Crete.

The German attack forces were distributed against what they considered to be the main targets. The Assault Regiment would take Maleme. The 7th Air Division would take Canea, Retimo, and Heraklion. One regiment of paratroopers was allocated to each target. The Assault Regiment would use gliders against Maleme. The attack would commence in the early morning on 20 May 1941. The Germans planned to have the airfields under their control by evening of the first day. The attacks were intended to be made where there were no defenders, a pretty reasonable plan. In the event, the plan did not work, as the Germans lacked adequate intelligence of the defences. This is based on Vol.II of the Official History.

Crete: one British advantage

The one shortcoming of the German preparations for attacking Crete is that they new essentially nothing about the forces opposing them. The seem to have expected far fewer troops in the defence than there were actually there. The British, in contrast, had been keeping watch over preparations through aerial reconnaissance. Undoubtedly, they must have had agents in Greece, as well, since they had only recently left there. They had a fairly complete picture of the forces being prepared for the assault. The mistaken report that the Germans might attack Cypress, instead of Crete proved an unwelcome distraction for Wavell and his staff. The deteriorating situation in Iraq seemed to lend credence to Cypress being the target. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

German preparations for the attack on Crete

One reason that the Germans were able to ready so large an airforce for the attack on Crete was the weather had become drier. They also were able to perform such feats as building a new airfield at Molaoi in a week. They also took Milos Island on 10 May 1941. In three days, they built another airfield. As it was, airfields were greatly congested. The German organizational skills were displayed in their ability to distribute fuel to all the bases. The shorter range Ju-87 and Me-109 fighters were deployed forward at Milos, Molaoi, and Scarpanto. Their bases were back at Corinth and Argos. The Me-110's operated from the Athens area. This was about 200 miles from Crete. The longer range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft could be accommodated further away, a locations such as Salonika, Bulgaria, and the island of Rhodes. The Ju-52 transports were based forward in southern Greece at places such as "Corinth, Megara, Eleusis, Tatoi, Tanagra, and Topolia". Everything but the gliders were ready by 14 May. The gliders only arrived at Tanagra on 16 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The leadup to the attack on Crete in May 1941

May 1941 was action-packed. There was the battle for Crete, the Bismarck voyage and destruction, and there was the Tiger Convoy. British resources were stretched to the breaking point. Prior to the German attack on Crete, Wellingtons from No.37, 38, 80, and 148 squadrons flew from Egypt to bomb airfields in Greece every night. Egypt was 300 miles from Crete while Crete was within range of an arc of German air bases.

The German effort would primarily involve the army and air force, as Hitler had decided to leave naval efforts in the Mediterranean Sea to the Italian navy. The air force proposed taking Crete with an airborne attack, and planning proceeded in April and into May. The attack on Crete was named Operation Merkur, and the command was given to General Löhr, commander of Luftflotte 4, with Fliegerkorps VIII and XI. The latter had the airborne troops and their aircraft. The operation included 13,000 troops from the 7th Air Division and 9,000 mountain troops.

Fliegerkorps VIII was equipped with "228 bombers, 205 dive bombers, 114 twin-engined fighters (Me-110), 119 single-engined fighters (probably mostly Me-109), 50 reconnaissance aircraft". The total was 716, of which 514 were serviceable on 17 May. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More preparations and misgivings about defending Crete

General Freyberg must have contacted his government and expressed his concern, because the New Zealand government approached Churchill with their misgivings about their troops defending Crete. Churchill simply replied that defending Crete would greatly contribute to the security of Egypt, and that was it. General Freyberg was particularly worried about a combined seaborne and airborne attack. Many support personnel were withdrawn to reduce to the drain on provisions, and the rest were armed with rifles. The heavy AA guns were all protecting Suda Bay. The light AA were spread over the other sectors, except for Retimo, where there were none. The air strength was decimated over time, and with General Freyberg's agreement, the Air Officer Commanding "sent away the surviving four Hurricanes and three Gladiators". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Preparing to defend Crete

General Wavell flew to Crete on 30 April 1941 to tell his senior officers that he wanted to deny Crete as a base to the Germans. He expected that the most likely targets would be the two airfields, at Heraklion and Maleme. General Wilson was sent to Palestine to command the force against Iraq, leaving General Freyberg to command the defence of Crete. General Freyberg's reaction was to tell the high command that either they give him adequate force or they should reconsider the decision to hold Crete. The air resources on the island were 6 Hurricanes and 17 "obsolete aircraft, clearly inadequate. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the early situation in Crete

One thing that General Wavell told General Wilson was that the RAF strength in Crete would not be increased. At least, the anti-aircraft artillery had been increased, but only to 32 heavy AA and 36 light AA, "of which 12 were not mobile". A consequence of the decision to not increase the air strenght was that there would be almost no capability for aerial reconnaissance north of Crete. The only aircraft with the range would be Sunderlands, and they were too vunerable. General Wilson told Wavell that without additional aircraft, their ability to resist invasion by sea would be limited. There was too much beach to be able to defend it all. General Wilson also told General Wavell that unless all the services could increase their force levels, that the island could not be held. Basically, he was saying that as the situation stood, the "he did not think that the island could be successfully defended". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The island of Crete by April 1941

When General Papagos suggested the British withdraw from Greece, he assumed that Crete would be defended. Apparently, by 17 April 1941, Churchill had decided that Crete would be held. Only the day before, the Mediterranean Fleet had been given guidance that their top priority was to interrupt the flow of supplies to Libya. By 18 April, Churchill acknowledged that in fact, the top priority was to withdraw the troops from Greece. With all the conflicting priorities, a new one was forming: a pro-Axis coup in Iraq. Given the chaotic state in the Mediterranean theater, supplying Crete was low on the list. General Wilson arrived at Suda Bay on 27 April. General Wavell immediately asked for his recommendation for defending Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The British presence on Crete

Early in the war, the British and French had contingency plans for French troops from Syria to occupy Suda Bay in Crete, as soon as Greece was attacked by Axis forces. After the fall of France, the British were hard-pressed to find the resources to defend Suda Bay. The issue became critical after Italy had invaded Greece in late October 1940. Once they went to Suda Bay, a natural refuelling spot, the Royal Navy provided a few defenses and the army stripped Malta to provide a weak brigade along with 8 Heavy AA and 12 Light AA guns. A landing strip was built a Maleme so that fighters could defend the harbour. The only available aircraft were from the Fleet Air Arm. The Greeks withdrew their troops to the mainland when they assessed that the Italians were unlikely to attack Crete. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Mediterranean Fleet Prior to the Loss of Crete

The Mediterranean Fleet had been involved in intense operations from the date that the fleet sailed from Alexandria on 18 April 1941 to bombard Tripoli. Shortly after returning to Alexandria, they had the withdrawal of the army from Greece to carry out. This was followed closely by the Tiger Convoy. The only losses incurred were one of the Tiger Convoy fast transports and the damage to the destroyer Fortune. This was mainly possible due to the highly unusual weather in late April and early May 1941. The heavy clouds and rain meant that the fleet had considerable immunity from air attack. There was also the factor that the Italian navy was recovering from the attack at Taranto on 11 November 1940 that crippled their fleet. While good fighter cover and AA fire had so far saved the fleet from losses, the coming battle over the island of Crete would be a different matter. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The second bombardment of Benghazi

Lord Louis Mountbatten commanded the 5th Destroyer Flotilla, which had five destroyers. A short time after midnight on the night of 10 May to 11 May 1941, they closed with the harbour at Benghazi and commenced firing. One merchant ship "lying at the northern breakwater as severely damaged", but the remaining ships could all be seen to be wrecked, so firing stopped. In the first case of divebombing at night in the Mediterranean Sea, the 5th Destroyer Flotilla was attacked. AA fire was difficult due to the aircraft only being visible at the last moment before bomb release. Lord Mountbatten decided that instead of the further sweep planned, they should withdraw to Malta. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Tiger Convoy on 8 and 9 May 1941

On 7 May 1941, Vice-Admiral Malta had reported that the harbour was closed due to mining. Admiral Cunningham resolved that the two Malta convoys should continue, despite that word. On 8 May, there was rain and restriced visibility. Two Albacores from Formidable were lost, and only one crew was recovered. The light cruiser Ajax and three destroyers rejoined the fleet at 5pm after having bombarded Benghazi. On 9 April, the Mediterranean Fleet was still giving general cover to the convoys. The fleet was about 120 miles to the south, while the convoy was 90 miles west of Malta. The two Malta convoys were able to enter the harbout due to minesweeping and dropping depth charges to explode mines. The Tiger Convoy met the fleet at 3:15pm and continued with them in close escort towards the east. Axis reconnaissance aircraft had seen the convoy and fleet, but there had still been no attacks. Beaufighters from Malta continued to fly cover for the convoy and along with the weather conditions, this had so far deterred air attacks. In the twilight of 10 May, 9 Malta-based Beaufighters straffed bombers on the airfields at Catania and Comiso, Sicily. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More about the Tiger Convoy

Five 15-knot transports made up the Tiger Convoy. Three had "Clan" names: the Clan Chatton, the Clan Lamont, and the Clan Campbell. The others were the Empire Song and the New Zealand Star. They carried 295 tanks and 53 Hurricanes. The convoy entered the Mediterranean Sea on the night of 5th and 6th May 1941. In the Skerki Channel, on the night of 8 May, the Empire Song hit two mines, which set ammunition afire. The New Zealand Star had a mine explode on a paravane with little damage. The Empire Song exploded, but her crew had been removed by a destroyer, prior to that moment. The Empire Song had carried 10 Hurricanes and 57 tanks, all of which were lost. 238 tanks and 43 Hurricanes eventually arrived at their destination. These included 135 Inf. Mk.II Matildas, 82 Crusader Mk.I tanks and 21 light tanks, probably Lt.Mk.VIC. A torpedo bomber, probably an SM79, staged an attack on the Queen Elizabeth, but she narrowly avoided the torpedo. The next day, Beaufighters from Malta flew cover for the convoy. The destroyer Fortune, with Force H, was hit, but reached Gibraltar. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The motivation for the Tiger Convoy

General Wavell sent a message to the commanders in London on 20 April 1941, telling them of his inferiority in armoured vehicles, and that the situation was to get worse. When Churchill saw the message, he decided to make a bold stroke and send tanks through the Mediterranean Sea to Egypt. For such an operation, Admiral Cunningham thought the risks were acceptable. This was despite the increased air threat from Fliegerkorps X. As usual, multiple convoys would run concurrently. One fast and one slow convoy would be run from Alexandria to Malta. Force H would escort the Tiger Convoy to Malta and the Mediterranean Fleet would take over the escort and accompany them to Alexandria. Force H consisted of the Renown, Ark Royal, Sheffield, and 9 destroyers (soon to be involved in the Bismarck operation). There were also reinforcements being added to the Mediterranean Fleet: Queen Elizabeth, Naiad, and Fiji. Based on Malta, there was Gloucester and 5th Destroyer Flotilla. Malta harbour was mined after Gloucester, Kipling, and Kashmir had sailed, so they were not able to return. The Mediterranean Fleet consisted of Warspite, Barham, Valiant, Formidable, Orion, Ajax, Perth, Abdiel, and destroyers. The Breconshire carried fuel and munitions for Malta. The slow convoy to Malta had "two tankers, [and] was to be escorted by two anti-aircraft cruisers, three destroyers and two corvettes". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Admiralty was going to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta

The commanders in London seem to have been far removed from reality. They had stopped the advance in North Africa. They had sent and army to Greece that was unable to affect the issue, and mainly served to expend equipment not easily replaced. It also placed a great burden on the Mediterranean Fleet. They had pressed for the bombardment of Tripoli, which achieved little but which risked the fleet. They even were ready to press Admiral Cunningham to put a battleship at Malta. That would have been a grave mistake, as increasingly, ships in Malta could not be defended from air attack. What decided the issue, however, was that the Germans were increasingly using air-dropped ground mines. When originally broached on the subject of a battleship at Malta, Admiral Cunningham had agreed, if there were two fighter squadrons available to give cover, with 150% reserve of spare aircraft. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We might be excused if we wondered what happened to Fliegerkorps X during the operation to bombard Tripoli. The fleet was at sea during the day on April 21 and 22, and did not experience any air attacks. Fliegerkorps X did attack Malta on those two days. The Official History speculates that the German command was too inflexible to be able to respond to a fluid situation. They also point out that during this period that Fliegerkorps X had a lower aircraft availability and a shortage of crews trained for maritime operations. In any case, for the next week or two, the British Mediterranean Fleet was heavily involved with withdrawing the army from Greece, where they were exposed to intense air attack. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The aftermath of the attack on Tripoli

We now know that the attack on Tripoli caught the Italians completely by surprise. The results were disappointing, considering the 478 15in rounds and about 1,500 smaller caliber rounds were fired at the city and port. Only one cargo ship with fuel and bombs was sunk. The torpedo boat Partenope was damaged. Many 15in shells hit the city, but many failed to explode. Reports give the civilian casualties as 100 killed and 300 wounded. The Official History notes that more damage was done when a cargo ship exploded on 3 May 1941. The ship was said to have carried German bombs which spontaneously exploded. Two merchant ships were sunk and the quays were seriously damaged. Admiral Cunningham was thankful that the fleet was untouched, but expressed the opinion that the operation was a poor use of valuable resources. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The operation to bombard Tripoli in April 1941

The Mediterranean Fleet sailed on 18 April 1941 and headed "through the Kaso Strait". The escorting destroyers refueled in Suda Bay, in northwest Crete. The fleet met Pridham-Whipple's cruisers and destroyers and the convoy for Malta (the Breconshire and her escort). The empty ship convoy from Malta passed them on their way back to Alexandria. In the dark, the Breconshire and one destroyer made their dash to Malta. The bombardment force and the carrier force headed in the general direction of Tripoli. The bombardment was preceded by an air attack by 8 Wellingtons and Swordfish, all from Malta. The bombardment ships passed the submarine Truant, which was acting as a lighthouse. The bombardment of Tripoli commenced at 5:02am. The dust in the air and the AA fire made spotting impossible, so we can imagine that the gunfire was less effective than it could have been. The fleet turned for a second pass and only then did shore batteries fire, and then ineffectively. The firing lasted 40 minutes and then Force B, the bombardment force withdrew, covered by Force C, the carrier group. The fleet arrived back in Alexandria the next morning. The attack had been carried out without loss. The results were paltry, however, due to the firecontrol difficulties. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.