The larger picture in April 1941

 The Germans were seriously considering an airborne attack on the island of Crete. They had considered a purely seaborne attack on the island, but didn't think that the Italian navy was reliable enough for that to be an option. They had seen success with airborne troops in Holland and Corinth, so they were planning on an airborne attack. They had a relatively large airborne force, including Para troops and glider-borne soldiers. 

The British were aware that they could face an airborne attack on Crete. Staffs in both London and Cairo were planning for a defence of Crete from an airborne attack. The overall situation was so desperate that defending against an airborne attack on Crete did not get the attention that was needed.

There was a lot of action in Aril 1941. General Cunningham, the admiral's brother conducted a brilliant campaign in East Africa defeating the Italians and their colonial allies.  The 2nd Armored Division was defeated and the 9th Australian division was pushed back, eventually being isolated in Tobruk. The Germans captured three British generals, including Richard O'Connor, who had defeated the Italians and who had captured Cyrenaica. AS early as 11 April, the 9th Australian Division, one 7th Australian Division brigade, and the 3rd Armoured Brigade were defending the former Italian fortress at Tobruk. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

The next fight was to be for control of the island Crete

 The island of Crete was a valuable prize. The Germans wanted to deny Crete as airbases within striking distance of Rumania. Crete was also well-located to allow interfering with sea traffic to Malta and to North Africa. 

Crete also seemed like an obvious location to use German airborne troops. On lesson learned was that the German airborne force was not a very effective fighting force. Instead German mountain troops were much more effective

Another issue was the rapid advance of a German mechanized force to the east. This force was under the command of General Rommel, who was an expert on infiltration as a means to break through and advance. Rommel learned the technique in the Alps against the Italians. Rommel was also an innovator in applying infiltration to mechanized warfare. Rommel was able to do some amazing things in North Africa against some rather mediocre British leadership. 

Infiltration tactics were the greatest innovation to come out of the Great War. The concept was tested against the Russians with considerable success. It also was tried in Western Europe by the Germans, but the Americans also adopted the ideas, at least on a small scale. Sergeant York's exploits were the best example.

Rommel's success caused the the 7th Australian Division and the Polish Carpathian Brigade to be kept in North Africa rather than being sent to Greece. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The British withdrawal from Greece in 1941

 British organizational failures were excused by blaming the Greeks. The Australian historian credits the Greek army with fighting well against the Italians and Germans. An example of General Wilson's failures was the delayed planning of the withdrawal and loading onto ships. A contributing factor was that Wilson had ordered two commanders and their staffs that could have helped "plan and control" the "withdrawal and embarkation of British soldiers". Base troops that should have been withdrawn were instead left in Greece. 

When there has been a failure of command there will be recriminations. That is what happened in Cairo after "the evacuation". The air force and army each blamed the other for the failure in Greece. There was also a tendency to blame German air attacks for failures. In fact, the German air force in Greece largely failed to be a major factor in the outcome. 

After the withdrawal from Greece, there was a discussion about British equipment quality. The opinion of the Australian historian was that British and German equipment quality was comparable. "British" infantry performed well, at times functioning as improvised mountain troops, performing creditably against specialist German mountain troops.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria by Gavin Long.

British and Greek communications in 1941

 In early 1941, the British and Greek commanders did not trust each other. It also seems that the British and Greek commanders had problems communicating in that communications were often misunderstood. 

In early 1941 the British wanted to be able to cooperate with Yugoslavia and the Greeks agreed with this goal. 

General Papagos the Greek leader in early 1941 decided to hold Salonika at least until they had learned what the Yugoslav intentions were Salonika was the port that could be used to supply Yugoslavia. After the British commanders saw how the Greek army was deployed, they decided to hold a line along Olympus and the Vermion, as it seemed to be very defensible. 

Once the coup happened in Yugoslavia the British considered trying to defend Salonika. They gave up that idea after being unable to cooperate with the Yugoslavian army. 

Before the Greek campaign even started, the British commanders had no confidence in the Greek army. That was partly influenced by General Wilson's lack of understanding of the situation. He thought that the Greeks on the left had "disintegrated" when the real problem was to the right of the ANZAC Corps. 

This is based on the account in "Greece Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Communications and Politics involving Greece

The principal commanders involved n the Greek campaign decision-making were the GIGS, General Dill, General Wavell and Admiral Cunningham. They all had doubts about undertaking the campaign but understood that te politicians thought that the right thing to do was to support Greece. The Prime Minister,  Mr. Churchill, so dominated his cabinet and military staff that no one was prepared to oppose what Mr. Churchill wanted to do. It was also true that Churchill was more knowledgeable than his peers in any government involved in the war. One thing that created Churchills dominance was his prestige. 

The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, was surprised at how Churchill had established his "dominance over his cabinet". There was no one in early 1941 who was able to tell Churchill when he was wrong. When Alan Brooke arrived on the scene, he made it his responsibility to attempt to keep Churchill from doing things which would cause trouble. 

The "Dominion Governments" might decided to block the Greek campaign, but the way that Churchill operated in early 1941, he withheld information from the Dominion governments that would have made it possible for the governments to be part of the "strategic decision-making process". General Blamey was told that Mr. Menzies had agreed to the Greek campaign while Mr. Menzies was told that General Blamey had agreed. This seems like a general lack of respect for the Dominions.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

operated operated

More thoughts on the conduct of the Greek campaign

 The British forces in Greece had little confidence in the capability of the Greek army. The reality was somewhat different. General Wilson and his staff tended to Blame the Greek army when the failure was due ro General Wilson and his staff. General Wilson ordered a withdrawal from the Aliakmon Line while saying that the Greek army had "disintegrated" when the truth was that the real problem was to thr right of the ANZAC Corps. The corps seems to have been too weak to hold their position in the face of the forcs that the Germans had ready. 

By the time that the ANZAC Corps occupied the Thermopylae line, the Greek army in Epirus had "surrendered to the Germans. That German force made no move against the Thermopylae position. Again, the truth was that the weakened ANZAC Corps was not strong enough to hold against General List's army. 

As for the withdrawal, General Wilson and his staff had waited too long to bein planning. It was also true that General Wilson had sent to commanders and their staffs to leave Greece when they should have been used to plan the withdrawal. General Wilson and his staff lacked the judgement and experience needed to command the Greek campaign. Wilson's main qualification to command in Greece was that Churchill knew him. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

German planning in early to mid-1941

 By 6 April 1941, the Germans had a plan for occupying Yugoslavia, That allowed the Germans to fix the invasion of Russia as 22 June 1941. They now had 17 armored divisions and 106 non-armored divisions for the Russian operation. The countries subservient to Germany also had deployed their units for the Russian operation. 

The Greek General Papagos believed that the British should focus on taking Libya rather than defending Greece. The British General O'Connor had thought he could have captured Tripoli if he had not been stopped and the units sent to Greece. 

By the time that the Greek government had accepted British aid in defending Greece, the British army in North Africa was withdrawing from Rommel's advance to the East. 

The Australian General wrote that ignoring military considerations because of political factors was asking for trouble, as the outcome in Greece showed. The outcome in Greece was pre-determined due to wishful thinking  and ignoring real military considerations. As we have seen, the motivation for the Greek operation was strictly political. 

General Dill, the CIGS, General Wavell, and Admiral Cunningham all realized that the chances of success on Greece were small. They went ahead with the operation because they knew that they were expected to make the effort.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Greece and the German attack on Russia

 We have already expressed the opinion that the formation of a Balkan Front was simply a fantasy held by Winston Churchill. The two potential participants were Yugoslavia and Turkey. There was at least one faction in Yugoslavia that was ready to join Germany. Turkey simply was skeptical that the British could field an effective force to fight the Germans. As for Greece, they were already fully engaged with a stronger Italian army in a war in Albania. The Greek government was also of the opinion that the British lacked the means to be able to fight against a German attack with any chance of success. British professional military opinion opposed going into Greece, but Churchill ignored their advice because he was determined to do what he wanted regardless of expert opinion. The eventual results showed that this was a valid concern. The British were thought to be able to provide four infantry divisions and one armored brigade. Their armor consisted of rather delicate cruiser tanks with fragile metal tracks and machine-gun-armed light tanks. The British also were equipped with a substantial number of infantry armored vehicles that they called "carriers".

One wildcard was the German plans to invade Russia after they took Greece and Yugoslavia. While the Germans moved into position to attack Greece and Yugoslavia, no date had been set for the attack on Russia. 

This based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Comments on the British effort in Greece

 The idea that a Balkan Front could be established was simply a fantasy that had no real prospect of success. It was the sort of unrealistic thinking by Churchill that when Alan Brooke became the CIGS, he worked to squash, because that was a prime example of how Churchill would cause trouble. The British "moral obligation" to help Greece to fight the Germans was a real factor. During the British retreat in Greece, we saw that the Greek populace really appreciated the  British aid. 

The  British government had  a real concern about the American reaction if they ignored the plight of Greece in the face of a German attack. General Metaxas had opposed the British entry into Greece because he thought iy would weaken the British, which it did. General Metaxas died suddenly, and the new government welcomed British help. The Geek government wanted the British to wait to enter Greece until the Germans had moved into Bulgaria. The problem with that condition was that the British had little time to transport a force that was large enough to effectively oppose the Germans. 

The new Greek government understood the political importance for the British to help defend Greece against a German attack. The Allied side needed to see British soldiers fighting alongside Greek soldiers. Greek republicans accused Greek monarchists of being pro-German. When the British took a position at Thermopylae, "where Leonidas and his 300 Spartans fell", the British fought without any Greek help.

This is based om the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Escaped Prisoners

 A number of British soldiers escaped from the Germans. An Australian, Warrant Officer Boulter, was one of those escaped prisoners. Warrant Officer Boulter had been captured at Kalamata on 29 April. He was sent by train to a POW camp near Corinth. This was a camp that was said to house some ten thousand British prisoners, of which about 350 were officers. Oddly enough, the Germans had take four to five thousand Italians as prisoners and put them in the camp. Apparently due to poor sanitation, there was a dysentery problem. 

Since the prisoners were at Corinth, they were able to watch aircraft take off for Crete and return with battle damage. On 5 June, the prisoners were starting to be moved to Germany. So many railroad bridges had been destroyed, the prisoners were marched to Lamia. This provided Warrant Officer Boulter with a chance to escape. He hid in scrub next to the road until it was dark. A Greek gave him clothes. He "worked in the fields in exchange for "food and shelter".  After a few days, they sent him to "a remote mountain village" with other fugitives, "two more Australians, a British pilot, and a Pole". They started walking, went across the rails and "the main road". The crossed the mountains and arrived at the coast on 22 June. 

A greek fisherman took them by boat to Euboea. They were with Greeks and could hear the BBC, where they learned that Germany had invaded Russia. Most of the fugitives decided to stay where they were, with Greeks. Boulter had started to learn "qite a little Greek". He had arrived at a monastery. He was treated well and the bishop found a fisherman to take Boulter to Skyros. He met a Greek who had been paid to ferry fugitives to Smyrna. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

From 10 May 1941 after Greece

 Some soldiers had traveled to the island of Lamia. A small group of 16 men, including Sergeant Peirce. They had learned of Lt-Col. Cullen's escape as part of a large Group. The group with Sergeant Peirce had traveled to Skyros, taken there by a Greek sea-captain. Greek civilians, such as fishermen and peasants, treated the soldiers very well. The Greek people really appreciated the British help in fighting the Germans.

A Greek soldier had "told them that a boatload of Germans had landed". Fortunately, they were actually Colonel Chilton and his companions. He was now part of a 16 man group. The "combined group" arrived at Turkey near Smyrna. At Smyrna, they met two old Turkish colonels who "had been wounded by Australians in the first war and were quite proud of it". The Turks spoke admiringly of tje Australians of the First War. 

Eighteen men, including Sergeant Tanner, were already at Smyrna, under Colonel Hughes supervision. The men were told to wear civilian clothes and to tell anyone who asked that they were "English civilian engineers". A train took the men to Alexandretta. A Norwegian tanker then carried the men to Port Said where they "arrived on 24 May. This story gives a much more positive view of Turks tan you would get from the current news.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

The aftermath in Greece from late April 1941

 The end of loading soldiers onto ships in Greece was followed by Germans taking prisoners. The prisoners were mostly taken at Kalamata and Navplion. Evenaftyer that, there were still many British soldiers remaining in Greece. At least hundreads of British soldiers managed to escape. A large Australian group from the 2/2nd Battalion had been "trapped" in the Pinios Gorge. It qas on the night of 18-19 April that they had been pushed "into the hills above Tempe". They ended up scattering into small groups. Lt=Col. Cullen gave men 200,000 drachmae. Most villagers gave food without taking any payment. 

Most of this group headed south. By 25 April, m

ost were transported by Greeks to Skiathos. They were eventually taken to Chios in luggers. A Greek "shipowner" loaned the two senior officers another 150,000 drachmae. Some men sailed in a ship that carried 400 Greek soldiers. In a couple of days, they met a ship that had some 280 men/ They all arrived at Heraklion on Crete on 5 May.

A group of 133 men had come to Chios. The men eventually reached Chesme in Turkey. An Australian, Col. Hughes was an old Turkey hand and handled negotiations for the escaping prisoners through a neutral country. 

Col. Chilton and several men headed southwest. They found some British vehicles that were "bogged down". The found some bully beef tins that they took. This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Summary of the Greek campaign in 1941

 The German forces in Greece in 1941 were from the Twelfth Army. There were official figures for losses announced at the end of the operation:

"1,160 killed,

3,755 wounded,

and 345 missing."

The British forces in Greece included the following:

"British army 21,880

Palestinians and Cypriots 4,670

RAF 2,217

Australian 17,125

New Zealand 16,720"

losses:

"British 146 killed, 87 wounded, 6,489 prisoners"

"RAF 110 killed, 45 wounded, 28 prisoners"

"Australian 320 killed, 494 wounded, 2,030 prisoners"

"New Zealand 291 killed, 599 wounded, 1,614 prisoners"

"Palestinian and Cypriot 36 killed, 25 wounded, 3,806 prisoners"

When the "ANZAC Corps pulled back from Thermopylae and Brallos, the Germans were slow to advance towards Athens. The first Germans to reach Athens had come from Corinth. This was "on the morning of April 27". The "Adolph Hitler" Division had been at Yannina. They only advanced by 26 April. They were in a position where they could "outflank" the Anzac Corps. By 27 April, the "Adolph Hitler" Division had reached Patras and sat there while the British withdrawal was accomplished.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

At Kalamata on April 28-29 1941

 The soldiers at Kalamata were divided into four groups, hoping to be loaded onto ships on the night of 28 to 29 April 1941. There was a plan to guide the loading of men. The first group were the wounded and stretcher bearers. The second group was called Pemberton Force. They were about 1,400 men, mostly base troops. The third group was Harlock Force, including both Australian and New Zealand soldiers. Then there was Lister Force, a mixed group of men. They had 2,400 British depot soldiers. There were some "100 Indian mule drivers". The rest were laborers. About 2,000 were Palestinian and Cypriot. The last 2,000 were also laborers in this case, Yugoslav and Lascar. 

The 4th Hussars were patrolling towards the north. They had seen no Germans so far. But there was a surprise, because two ours later, Germans had run over the Hussars and went "through the town" and drove tot he quay. The captured the beach master. The "British" started fighting. Officers gathered soldiers and led them "to the quay". A New Zealand battalion "fixed bayonets and charged towards the quay. The fighters had very few weapons left. The quay had been recaptured by 9:30pm. The captured two German field guns and took about 100 Germans prisoner. During the fighting, two cruisers and six destroyers were headed for Kalamata. The Germans had disrupted withdrawal plans for Kalamata. Destroyers had succeeded in loading some 399 soldiers.

Admiral Pridham-Whippel sent destroyers to see if they could pick up soldiers from the coast south of Kalamata. They succeeded in picking up somewhat more than 900 soldiers. 

After this, one Australian hospital unit remained in Greece. They gradually were controlled by the Germans. They eventually took in wounded from Crete, after that battle had started.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

Last minute developments in Greece from 28 April 1941

 By 28 April 1941, the Germans were said to be advancing into the Peloponnese. German paratroopers were thought to be jumping in an area near Navplion. The senior officer at Navplion suggested that everyone should "head for the hills", 

At the beach at Tolos, the rear-guard was an "Australian Composite Battalion". They were soldiers from the area around Athens. They had reached Argos early on 26 April. They were ordered to travel to Kalamata and to be ready to fight as a rear-guard. When they had passed through the Tripolis Pass, German bombers and fighters attacked the group. They took action to make the road unusable and half of the battalion move into a defensive position "near Tripolis". Brigadier ordered them to protect the loading soldiers from Navplion and Tolos. These were referred to as the "Argos beaches". About 130 men from the battalion moved into a position to protect the beach at Tolos. The decision had been made to not use Navplion to load soldiers onto ships. By early on 28 April, the soldiers at Navplion were told that if they wanted, they could try to "break away". Miller and Jackson chose fight to keep the Germans from moving into the beach that night. The two groups set up on either side of the road into Navplion. By the afternoon, they fought a German group riding in trucks and captured British carriers. The battle lasted some three hours, the Australians were forced to surrender. Most soldiers had surrendered to the Germans, but many small groups escaped from Tolos. Some used boats they found while others found Caiques that were functional.

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long. 

British soldiers at the "Argos beaches" 29-29 April 1941

 By 28 April 1941, there was only fairly strong "group" left in Greece. This was a New Zealand brigade that was still at Monemvasia. They had no artillery with them, but they were still a good fighting force. The plan at this point was to send a cruiser and four destroyers on the night of 28 April. 

They also thought that there were some 7,000 soldiers at Kalamata, although there were actually more than 7,000 at Kalamata. Two cruisers and six destroyers were to be sent to Kalamata. They would also send three sloops to Kithera load about 800 soldiers. The operation at Kithera was successful. Landing craft took the soldiers from the beach to the sloops. They carried the soldiers to Suda Bay, a place that is familiar to me (Spring 1977). 

One sloop, the Hyacinth, towed the landing craft. Loading soldiers went well at Monemvasia. The first ships, the Isis and Griffin arrived at 10:30pm on 8 April. At about 1am on 29 April, aa cruiser, the Ajax, and the destroyers Hotspur and Havock appeared, The soldiers were carried to the ships on barges and fishing vessels. All the men, including General Freyberg and Rear-Admiral Baille-Grohman were loaded and were underway. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria, by Gavin Long.

more embarkations on 27-28 April 1941

 During the night of 27-28 April there about 2,000 men, with groups of stragglers still arriving. Thesewere the "Argos beaches", namely Navplion and Tolos. There were German aircraft firing machine guns and dropping bombs. An attemt was made to provide a "rearguard". Men were collected from the "Australian REinforcement Battaliom" along with some 200 men of the 3rd RTR (Robert Crisp's unit). They expected to see destroyers, although there were none seen. By 3am, the men were sent back into hiding. 

There was a fund with Greek money. They hoped to hire small Greek boats, but none were available for hire, with the Germans expected to appear soon.

Of some 8,000 men still at Kalamata, there were largely unorganized "base troops" without weapons. There  some 800 New Zealand soldiers and 380 Australian soldiers. During the day, some 300 men from the 4th Hussars arrived. While men were preparing to move to the beach, they were bombed by about 25 German aircraft. After that, the got organized and waited for ships. No ships arrived, so the men went back into hiding. The men of the 4th Hussars were to defend Kalamata. The New Zealand battalion was to provide cover for an embarkation, if it happened. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

More embarkation on 27-28 April 1941

 No men were loaded onto ships in the Peloponnese on the night of 27-28 April. The transports used the night before were now at Alexandria. Their escorts had been four of the cruisers and 12 of the destroyers. 

The Bew Zealand 6th Brigade was at Miloi and Tripolis. They saw German aircraft but no ground troops. General Freyberg ordered the brigade commander to sit where they were until darkness fell and then move to Monemvasia as quickly as they could. My the middle of the day, the brigade started to "thin out". One battalion travelled south, seemingly under constant air attack. The rest of the 6th Brigade travelled at night. Freyberg moved his headquarters with the brigade. By 28 April daylight, they had moved some 120 miles. After that, the brigade was incorporated into the "defensive line" located at Monemvasia. 

Lee's force was already included in the defenses at Monemvasia. There was a Greek destroyer run aground in the harbour. New Zealand engineers took some depth charges from the destroyer and planted them in the road. 

The Group W headquarters "Rear Party" was setup close by. The went looking for Caiques that could be used to evacuate soldiers. They asked the people who lived in the area to move to villages "in the hills". That would create the illusion that the "town would look deserted". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Events from 27 April 1941 in Greece

 On 27 April, there were still some 800 men of the armored brigade located at Rafina, which was about ten miles north of the action we have been following. They had no artillery left, since all the guns were destroyed. During the day on 27 April, the men of the armored had gotten into defensive positions close to the beach whch kept them hidden. The group included about 250 Rangers at the left end. There were also some anti-tank gunners in the middle, along with the New Zealand cavalry. Early on 27 April, they observed German aircraft bombing the vehicles that had been wrecked. These were "in the hills at Rafina". The German aircraft also bombed the village. They flew over the hidden men, but did not see them. Some men from the anti-tank regiment took charge of a Greek caique that lay in the harbor. Their lieutenant spoke "classical Greek". They expected that the caique could carry about 250 men. The other 600 men would head for Porto Rafti. There was a planned embarkatiom planned for Porto Rafti "that night". 

There were Germans blocking the route to Porto Rafti to Rafina. The men headed for Rafina instead. The caique's engine had been sabotaged, but they could see a destroyer approaching Rafina, which proved to be the Havock. The destroyer's captain hard that there men at Rafina, so he headed there. They were able to load all 800 men onto the destroyer. They sailed from Rafina to Crete. 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria" by Gavin Long.

Near Markopoulon from 27 April 1941

 After the air attack on 27 April 1941, the New Zealand 18th and 20th Battalions were positioned forward while the 19th Battaluon was held in reserve. They were supported by the Australian 2/3rd Field Regiment. Some their guns were pulled forward, to act in      the anti-tank role.

The Greeks living in Markopoulon came out to watch the soldiers move up to their positions. The Greeks knew how the battles had gone, many Greeks showed support to the New Zealand soldiers. Greeks threw roses to the soldiers and left roses in the road. "women and girls" took water in cups to the soldiers. Old men flashed "thumbs-up" to the soldiers from the road-side. There was a smoke cloud from burning trees and crops.

At 3pm, a line of vehicles, mostly German light tanks, drove into Markopoulon. The Australan artillery did not fire on the village, butas the vehicles drove out, "guns and mortars" opened fire. German tanks sheltered in the village, knowing that they were safe there. Many of the German "vehicles" drove to "the little port of Loutsa". There was never an attack while the soldiers prepared to be loaded onto ships. By 6pm, the soldiers began destroying trucks. At 8:45pm, they destroyed guns. The 19th battalion made a perimeter "about a thousand yards from the beach. By 9pm, thr forward soldiers moved into the perimeter. Men were loaded onto ships from Porto Rafti. The ships were the cruiser Ajax and "the destroyers Kimberley and Kingston". 

This is based on the account in "Greece, Crete, and Syria:, by Gavin Long.