22 July 1942 at El Alamein, General Morshead is involved

During the day on 22 July 1942, General Morshead visited 24th Brigade headquarters a number of times. The general was waiting to hear that the brigade had achieved the first phase goals. "Just before 3:45pm" heard that the 2/32nd Battalion now had solid possession of its ground. General Morshead was thinking ahead to the exploitation phase. The situation was not quite so rosy, as Point 24 was still to be resolved. General Morshead consulted with General Ramsden and they decided not to continue with armor and infantry exploitation some 2,000 and 4,000 yards. They would still push to the south with the goal of reaching Ruin Ridge by dusk and setting up positions on the back side during the night.

They had planned to use the 2/28th Battalion for the westward move that was cancelled, so they decided to use the battalion for the push to the south. The 2/28th would take the place of the 2/43rd Battalion. The 50th RTR would be used for the attack on Ruin Ridge. Two squadrons would transport infantry and engineers. They were to cover six miles in just an hour. The tanks would have some six-pounders and machine-guns following them. Behind all that would be the rest of the 2/28th Battalion on foot, covering two miles in an hour. At the rear would follow the remainder of the 50th RTR. The 50th RTR, with 52 Valentine tanks would move into hull down spots on Ruin Ridge. They were to say there until the main group of the 2/28th Battalion arrived. They would be able to withdraw once the 2/28th Battalion was in place.

Ruin Ridge had been attacked four days earlier, so they hoped that the enemy would not expect another attack so soon. They optimistically expected that they could skimp on preparation, which was a bad idea. Major Cox, of the 2/28th Battalion had just received "oral orders" for an attack starting at 7pm. Here they were leaving the brigade headquarters at 5pm. The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey heard between 6pm and 7pm that a reconnaissance aircraft had seen some five hundred vehicles dispersed on Miteiriya Ridge> They were infantry reported digging positions and the report mentioned twenty gun positions. Brigadier Godfrey reported the news to Colonel Wells as 9th Australian Division headquarters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 July 1942 with the 24th Brigade at El Alamein

Operations on 22 July 1942 had been tough for the Australians in the north at El Alamein. The 2/32nd Battalion was to attack Trig 22. They knew that Trig 22 was well-defended and had anti-tank guns and machine-guns. The 2/32nd Battalion was reduced to three 90-man companies, short of NCO's. The commander got the loan of one 2/43rd Battalion company for the attack. The attack was made with three companies in front. They stepped out at 5:30am with 1,700 yards to travel. They had fifteen minutes of artillery support before the attack started. The 2/43rd Company took the first fire from the enemy. They were stopped by heavy fire and forced to dig in. The company commander was hit and died. The 2/32nd Battalion company in the middle also lost its company commander. The company reached its objective, but was then pinned down by enemy fire. The third company "captured three anti-tank guns". But the company was stopped short, below Trig 22 and had to dig in as well. An Australian commanding a machine-gun section, charged a German machine gun in a sanger. The Lieutenant had only a pistol, but he used it very effectively. One of his men shot the German machine-gunner. They then fired on the Germans with the Spandau which eventually jammed.

On the right, the 2/43rd Company was till pinned down by artillery fire from two field guns. The reserve company was sent out to attack the gun position. They were supported by artillery and mortars. They took the position and forced the Germans to retreat. Later, Australian engineers ventured out and damaged the German guns. Suddenly at 9:45pm, the Germans hit the Australians with artillery and then sent tanks and armored cars at the center company. The company commander was killed and 66 Australians were taken prisoner. Artillery fire finally forced the tanks to withdraw.

The tanks and armored cars, along with several self-propelled guns attacked next at Trig 22. There was a protracted fight where two of the armored cars and the two moblie guns were disabled. The Australians were finally able to position some anti-tank guns to protect Trig 22 from further attacks. They also dug positions "back from the crest". The 24th Brigade had taken 57 German prisoners in the fighting, all from the 1/155th Infantry Battalion. This is based on the account in VOl.III of the Australian Official History.

Tough fighting by Australians on 22 to 23 July 1942 in the north at El Alamein

While the 2/248th Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col. Hammer, was in difficulty. D Company of the 2/48th Battalion was without a commander and the company "had lost coheision". Despite that, small groups of men were able to hold on in their positions. One remaining section was commanded by a private. They had been able to overrun some enemy "posts". Those men noticed a knocked out Valentine tank. Germans had taken the crew prisoner along with two Australians from the section. Private Ashby's aection was able to shoot up the Germans and free the prisoners.

B Company of the 2/48th Battalion was now commanded by a Sergeant. He was able to call Lt-Col.Hammer and told him that they still holding their ground, but he didn't have map, so he didn't know where he was. Lt-Col.Hammer picked men for a force to go help B Company. He got men from his headquarters, the Headquarters Company, and some fifty men who had just arrived as reinforcements. He also pulled A Company from its positions and sent them all, along with some machine-guns and an anti-tank gun troop. B Company called just as the group had moved out. B Company was surrounded but would fight their way out. Only 15 men were able to get out from their positions. Lt-Col.Hammer ordered A Company to re-take East Point 24. They did that and laid wire and mines.

Late in the day on 22 July 1942, the 2/23rd Battalion, commanded by Lt-Col.Evans, they had been involved in desperate fighting. A Company from the 2/23rd Battalion was preparing positions close to the railway. They had lost touch with two platoons and the company commander may have been killed. The 2/23rd Battalion had taken losses. They had some 1oo wounded and had about fifty missing. They had lost 43 NCO's.

The infantry of the two battalions were fine men. They had been pushed back from a great deal of the ground that they had taken. Just holding on as well as they had was all they had been asked to do. As the 23rd of July began, they realized that the had withdrawn from around "East and West Point 24". The 2/23rd Battalion was reorganized based on their surviving strength, so they now had two companies. One of the companies was at East Point 24. The second company was between Esst Point 24 and the 2/24th Battalion. The 2/48th Battalion was stretched along the rail line to the east. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Germans counter-attack the Australians on 22 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Germans attacked East Point 24 at about 8am on 22 July 1942. The position was occupied by companies of the 2/23rd Battalion. There was a company on the left and one on the right. The left company was threatened, but was able to hold on for three hours. At least one part of the right company was able to keep the enemy back. The battalion commander sent his second-in-command forward in a carrier. He was to inform the the Australians at East Point 24 to hold on, as he was sending his other company (A) forward to provide support. However, the situation changed when the 2/23rd commander learned that the 2/24th Battalion was "withdrawing from the Ring Contour". That left A Company of the 2/23rd Battalion in an exposed position. A Company had started forward at 8:30am. While the situation deteriorated greatly, a Corporal in control of a carrier did a commendable job (he was Corporal McCloskey). The Corporal was originally sent to carry "a mortar detachment forward". After he transported the mortar detachment, he went back to get ammunition. As he traveled, he "stopped to pick up wounded men". He then took the mortar bombs to the mortar detachment. He realized that communications were poor, so he traveled between the companies to contact company commanders. He carried wounded men back to the rear. His carrier was hit and damaged. He was knocked out but recovered consciousness and repaired his carrier and continued to do useful things.

A man from the company on the right was able to reach the battalion headquarters to inform Lt-Col. Evans that the men of the company were pinned down by enemy fire. The company commander had been killed and "the other officers and half the company were casualties". The battalion commander ordered a smoke screen laid down, and some 30 men were able to escape. The acting company commander had been wounded and couldn't walk. He was rescued by a patrol after dark.

The battalion had lost touch with the left 2/23rd Battalion company. They were able to hold their ground until 11am. The company was essentially eliminated, but A Company from the 2/23rd Battalion had arrived and was keeping the Germans back from East Point 24. Lt-Col. Evans of the 2/23rd got 80 men together to the "positions between Trig 33 and Tel el Eisa". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

22 and 23 July 1942 in the north at El Alamein

The 26th Brigade was to attack the enemy positions that blocked the coast road. The understanding by the 2/24th Battalion company was that the 2/23rd Battalion company would attack at the same time. They had some concerns about their ability to make contact. A signal was sent up "over Ring Contour 25" and that was the signal to attack. They tried to move forward, but took "terrible enemy fire".
The main operation for the 2/23rd Battalion had two companies forward with heavy artillery support. Once they reached "East Point 24", the dust churned up made visibility difficult. At that point they became involved in a "fierce fight". They felt able to signal success at 6:20am. They had captured and sent back some 24 German prisoners.

The 2/48th Battalion heard at 5:55am that the other battalions had reached their objectives. On hearing the news, they moved to the left of the 2/23rd Battalion, moving towards West Point 24. They started to take heavy enemy fire. The situation was that they were attacking prepared positions and took heavy losses, especially in leadership, such as officers. Men returning to the battalion headquarters reported that they had taken heavy losses. The battalion commander did not understand the extent of the losses, as he thought that there would have been men left needing support.

They had sent a section of carriers to provide support, but the carriers reported having many men wounded and supporting weapons sent forward on vehicles could not get through. The 2/48th Battalion commander requested help from tanks. From the Australian perspective, the tanks were extremely slow in moving forward. The tank commander had estimated 30 minutes would be enough for them to move up in support. The reality was that they took 4-1/2 hours, which was unacceptable. The tankers were extremely cautious. Then they saw signs of a minefield, they stopped and wanted talk before moving again. While they were moving forward, two tanks were knocked out by an enemy anti-tank gun. At that point, the tanks withdrew, leaving the Australians without support.

An Australian private had been left to guard German prisoners. They were close to their own lines and they were under heavy German fire. He managed to keep control of the prisoners and eventually was able to take them to the battalion headquarters. He had managed to keep the prisoners for some fourteen hours. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Operations at El Alamein from 19 to 23 July 1942

The Australians had become very proficient at executing raids during the night during their occupation of Tobruk. During the night of 19 to 20 July, 1942, the 2/28th Battalion sent a company of infantry with "20 sappers of the 2/7th Field Company". They raided enemy positions near Trig 22. They left their unit at 12:25am and were gone over an hour. They returned to their unit at about 3:40am. They found a tank which a sapper destroyed with a "No.73 grenade". They thought that some three or four enemy were killed "in or around the tank".
Despite the planned attack (besides the raid), the 26th Brigade were left to hold "the salient in the north". That meant that the 2/24th and 2/48th Battalions had to continue defending their lines. That meant for an offensive operation, they only had two companies each. They had to hope for the best, as they were left without any reserves. Three companies from two battalions would push forward along the coast road. That left the rest of the battalions to take East Point 24 and West Point 24.
What the 26th Brigade was to do was to attack the enemy positions blocking the coast road and be ready to push into the headquarters area and (wishful thinking, we suppose) to push on to Mersa Matruh, Tobruk, and Tripoli. The Australian historian notes that they were attacking the enemy's strongest postions, not their weakest. The historian thought that they should have used a larger force to push along the coast road.
The situation was such that when Major Weir arrived from Alexandria to take command of the 2/24th Battalion, he was surprised to find that his battalion was ordered to make an attack the next morning. The accidental firing of a Very light "probably alerted the enemy". When the attack commenced, enemy artillerty fire hit right away. They men were forced to attack while traveling through "heavy machine-gun fire". The men who took their objectives were then forced to endure heavy enemy fire. Most officers were wounded and a new lieutenant had to find a way to take command.

Major Weir, the new commander of the 2/24th Battalion withdrew two companies that were in danger and he got the brigade commander's permission when he was able to communicate. Some men did not get the word to withdraw and were eventually overrun. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The lead-in to the 9th Australian Division operation, where General Morshead was very unhappy

General Morshead, the 9th Australian Division commander disliked General Ramsden, the XXX Corp commander. They had a two hour meeting where Morshead told General Ramsden that he disagreed with the plan for the attack on 22 July 1942. After hearing about the conference, General Auchinleck sent for General Morshead for another meeting at XXX Corps headquarters. The meeting attendees were General Morshead, General Auchinleck, General Ramsden, and Eric Dorman-Smith, DCGS. The DCGS took notes for the meeting. Auchinleck laid out the plan for the XIII Corps attack. If you read The Desert Generals, you learn that Eric Dorman-Smith was sort of "co-conspirator" during this period with Auchinleck. They were intent on making radical changes to how operations were conducted with the aim of becoming more competitive with Rommel's forces. Eric Dorman-Smith was disliked by the.
In the meeting, General Morshead objected that his division would be too dispersed to give the necessary support. Morshead told Auchinleck that the Australian objectives were much more difficult than Auchinleck and Ramsden realized. General Auchinleck apparently did not like how Morshead had responded, although he did not let Morshead know that. General Auchinleck told General Morshead that he wanted a willing commander for the operation. General Morshead told Auchinleck that he just wanted tasks that he could reasonably be sure of accomplishing with the goal of minimizing casualties  while performing the needed operation.The Desert Generals book has the time of the meeting wrong, in that the meeting was prior to the attack on 22 July, not for an operation on 24 July.
In the time leading up to the attack on 22 July, the men of the 9th Australian Division, at least those in the battalions facing the enemy, were given no rest. They were involved in active patrolling. The 2/48th Battalion diary noted that the "heat and flies" made  sleep during the day impossible. At night, they were too busy "digging and patrolling". They took to sending one man each day to the beach to be able to sleep. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The XXX Corps battle at El Alamein from 22 July 1942 onwards

The XXX Corps operations on 22 July 1942 involved the South African Division and the 9th Australian Division. Almost typically, General Morshead was unhappy with what General Auchinleck had assigned for his division to accomplish. The South African role in the battle was to capture a depression "to the north of Deir el Shein." The 9th Australian Division was to attack with two brigades. That would then be succeeded by tank and infantry push to the west and then turn to the south. The Australians were to push onto the Meteiriya Ridge in their "turn to the south". The Australians were to have the 1st Army Tank Brigade and the 5th RTR in support. They would also have the South African artillery firing in their support.
The Australian attack would occur in three "phases". After the first phase of the attack, there was a two hour pause planned to allow time for the artillery to more forward. During the first phase, the 26th Brigade would make two attacks. One was straight out to take "Ring Contour 25". The other attack was planned to cross the road and railway to take the high ground associated with Point 24 (which had two high points). The 24th Brigade role was to attack from "the Tel Makh Khad Ridge." They were to take the high ground that dominated Point 24. Once the two Australian brigades had taken their objectives, the 9th Australian Divisiional Cavalry would control the area between the brigades to obstruct any enemy movements.
The second phase of the plan was for the 50th RTR to Point 21 west of the 24th Brigade. The 2/28th Battalion was to come forward to hold Point 21. The third phase would see the 50th RTR would capture "Trig 30 on Ruin Ridge". Another Australian battalion, the 2/43rd, would move forward to hold Trig 30. To make the 2/28th Battalion available for the operation, the 2/13th Battalion was assigned to the 24th Btigade. They were to take over the 2/28th responsibilities prior to the attack. The 20th Australian Brigade was to push forward to exploit the expected successes. They would move towards Daba following the night of 22 to 23 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The attack on 21 July 1942 in the El Alamein area

The Australian historian is quick to criticize General Auchinleck's plans. XIII Corps would attack with the new 161st Indian Motor Brigade to push along the Ruweisat Ridge toward Trig 63. The 2nd New Zealand Division would push north to the El Mreir depression. They would take the eastern portion. After that the 23rd Armoured Brigade, with infantry tanks mounting 2pdr guns would drive forward into the enemy "headquarters and administrative area". They would go between the two German armored divisions and towards the German Africa Corps. The tanks of the mobile British formations would be saved for the push to the west after having broken through.
The attack stepped off on 21 July. The South African division took a depression on the Indian motor brigade's right. The Indian motor brigade attack failed to achieve its objective. The 6th New Zealand Brigade was successful, but they were left without the tank support that they had believed they had been promised. The brigade took 700 casualties and Brigadier Clifton was captured. He was able to escape "later in the day".
The reserve Indian battalion attacked at 8am and was able to "reach" Point 23. The 23rd Armoured Brigade set off to the west, but took heavy tank losses. Still, their move "threw the enemy into confusion". They did not withdraw, howoever. XIII Corps had executed all their plans and had not intention of doing more. The 2nd Armoured Brigade came up to support the 23rd Armoured Brigade to allow them to withdraw. The 23rd Armoured Brigade was reduced to 7 running tanks of the 87 they had started with. At least half of the tank losses were recovered so that they could be repaired.
The Australian historian rated the efforts of 21 July as a disaster. General Inglis, now commanding the 2nd New Zealand Division stated that he refused to take part in another operation like they had just executed. They were supposed to have tank support which was actually absent. He wanted to have his own tanks under his own command. The New Zealand Division lost 904 men, of which 69 were officers. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Auchinleck makes plans and then changes them from 17 and 18 July 1942 and beyond

The evening of 17 July 1942 started with a carrier raid near the Tel el Eisa. The raid was conducted by three carrier sections from the 2/48th Battalion. The raid had artillery, machine-gun, and mortar support. The carriers ended up firing some 3,400 rounds from their guns during the raid. They had crossed the rail line near the station and then drove to the two points of point 24 (East and West). After doing that, they returned to their starting point. On the return there was a mishap where the carriers ran onto their own minefield and took six casualties and had  three damaged carriers.
Far to the south from the 9th Australian Division, the 7th Armoured Division staged several successful attacks on the enemy. Their impression was that the enemy had thinned out their forces in the south.
Auchinleck's first idea, expressed later on 17 July was to attack the enemy flanks at the end of July. Before that, the "British" forces at El Alamein would keep pressure on the enemy. The XXX Corps role was to destroy the Italian forces they faced. On 18 July, Auchinleck changed his mind and issued a new set of orders. Instead, right away, they would attack (by 21 July) the center, near Ruweisat Ridge. The forces in the south would move against the enemy left and rear. XIII Corps would attack near Deir el Shein, Deir el  Abyad, and Buweibat el Raml. They hoped to break through and chase the enemy to "Daba and Fuka". Meanwhile, XXX Corps would attack in the north. Auchinleck's staff made plans for what to do while pursuing the enemy.
The British were reading Rommel's communications for one thing. They also had received two new brigades: the 161st Indian Motor Brigade and the 23rd Armoured Brigade Group. The reality was that the British had a much greater strength than the enemy. The British thought that the Germans had 31 tanks when they actually had 38 (not many). The Italians were thought to have 70 tanks when they actually had 59. The 1st Armoured Division now had 61 Grant tanks, 81 Crusaders and 31 Stuart light tanks. The 23rd Armoired Brigade had 150 Valentine and a few Matilda tanks. The 1st Army Tank Brigade also had infantry tanks. The 23rd Armoured Brigade waws essentially and Army Tank Brigade. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

17 to 19 July 1942 at El Alamein

Rommel was very concerned about the situation near El Alamein. He wrote his wife on 17 July 1942, remarking that the "enemy" (the Australians) were using their infantry strength to attack and destroy Italian "formations". There were not enough Germans to fight without Italian support. The 9th Australian Division's attacks caused enough damage to make the enemy decide to not attack at the "center".
Tanks (probably German) attacked the two Australian battalions where they touched. In the attack on the 2/32nd Battalion, a gunner was able to knock out six tanks. Still, the 2/32nd Battalion lost 22 men as prisoners where the front platoons had been overrun. The situation was tense, but they were able to pull back to a firm line some 1500 yards behind the previous position at "the telegraph line". The Qattara track cut across where the two battalions touched each other.
The 24th Brigade "brigade major" went forward to see the situation. He told Brigadier Godfrey that they front was solid. Godfrey then ordered the 2/28th Battalion to attack during the night and take the ground that they had just lost. They moved forward after midnight and pushed forward to the objective, which they reached by 1:30am. The attackers had seen very few enemy infantry and had destroyed one enemy tank. Their only casualties were two men wounded.Australian sappers got busy after that and initially laid 2500 mines. The next night, they laid more mines to the field.
The new situation found the 24th Brigade in a triangle by battalions. The 2/28th was at the forward point with the other two spread behind at the telegraph line. The 2/32nd Battalion was to the northwest and the 2/43rd Battalion was to the southeast. The 2/28th Battalion sent out a carrier patrol at sunrise. They found a German machine gun ("Spandau") firing occasionally. The gun was protected by a mine field. The gun was manned by one man. The carrier patrol also noticed German tanks and armored cars scouting around the Makh Khad Ridge. Soon, enemy artillery was firing "air bursts" over the 2/28th Battalion. The firing was apparently from 88mm AA guns which caused heavy casualties in the 2/28th Battalion.
The enemy held off attacking on 18 July 1942. The German situation was very difficult. The two German armored divisions had very few running tanks. the 15th  Armored Division had 9 tanks while the 21st Armored Division had 19 tanks. The 90th Light Division was sent north to take the place of four Italian divisions that had "collapsed". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Australians in action on 17 July 1942 at El Alamein

The 2/43rd Battalion was now under attack by tanks and infantry where they were at Ruin Ridge, but they were without anti-tank support and were also low on ammunition. To make matters worse, they no longer could communicate with the field artillery. The battalion commander wanted to move farther foward some eight hundred yards, but he was informed by the 44th RTR squadron commander that he could not help with such a move. The alternative plan was to withdraw and permission was granted for the move. They ended up on Makh Khad Ridge. They were then located to the left of the 2/32nd Battalion. The 2/43rd had some accomplishments. In their fight, they "had destroyed 13 guns and 12 machine-guns and three heavy mortars".
The fighting at Trig 22 was becoming increasingly tough. They were now taking heavy shelling. The enemy had started to fire "air bursts", which were very damaging due to the positions being very shallow with no cover. The enemy launched an attack with tanks and armored cars at 10am. 2-pdr fire and fire from a captured Italian Breda 20mm forced the attackers to withdraw. The Breda was damaged but the gunner, a corporal, was able to repair the gun. He used the gun to fire at soft vehicles "and low-flying aircraft".
The enemy continued to apply pressure against the two battalions. One issue was that the enemy had been able to put a post on Trig 22. At least, the two Australian battalions were in contact. The 24th Brigade commander, Brigadier Godfrey gave permission for a reorganization of the 2/32nd Battalion positions to form a line "that followed the telegraph poles and linking with the 2/43rd's positions astride the Qattara track".
The 24th Brigade had accomplished enough to draw attention (however unwanted). They had overrun Italian units from the Trieste Division and from the 7th Bersaglieri Regiment and had penetrated the Trento Division front. Rommel had ordered German units to the area. He also ordered General Nehring to change to a defensive posture. Rommel wanted a regiment from the 90th Light Division, but all he got was a battalion. In the north, the enemy forces at near Tel el Eisa were "not happy". That was with the 26th Australian Brigade not pressing them. German armor and infantry pulled back to where they had been on 16 July. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Tough fighting early on 17 July 1942 near Trig 22

The 2/32nd Battalion moved out at 2:30am. In what was just 15 minutes or so, they came under fire from the enemy with "artillery, mortars, and machine-guns". By 5:15am, the right company had gone some 1,500 yards past Trig 22. The other two companies took their objectives. The 2/32nd took about 160 prisoners. The three companies that had attacked were spread wide over a 2,500 yard front. They had left gaps between the companies. Some Australian anti-tank guns and machine-guns were in place on Trig 22. An enemy counter-attack had taken the crest of Trig 22. The 2/32nd Battalion commander sent his fourth company against the crest which it took again by 7:45am. They had taken their objectives by 8:45am. The 9th Australian Division cavalry had seven tanks and 15 carriers. This was their first fight while equipped with tanks. Previously, they had carriers, although they may have had some British light tanks. They were able to knock out "some anti-tank guns and machine-gun posts".
Starting at 6am, the 2/43rd Battalion attacked onto the Qattara track. They had two companies forward with a third following. They experienced heavy enemy fire. They arrived at Ruin Ridge at about 7am. The left company had a fight to break through enemy positions. The ground was "broken", which must have made progress difficult. Everyone man but one in the left section was wounded. The un-wounded man carried a Bren gun and eventually rejoined his platoon after moving another thousand yards. One company captured some four hundred enemy soldiers. They arrived at Ruin Ridge by 7:30am. They could see that there were 19 enemy guns firing from 300 yards away. The company commander led an attack with a scratch group, including men from his headquarters. They added 150 more prisoners to their bag. They were short of anti-tank grenades and wanted to preserve what they could for use against tanks, so they only destroyed three of the guns.
The other foward company from the 2/43rd moved across 2,500 yards under artillery fire until they were fired on from a position. The men attacked while "firing from the hip" which allowed them to overrun the enemy, who surrendered in the face of the attack. They kept going another thousand yards where they reached machine-guns and an anti-tank gun, probably Italian. The Australians attacked from the side and caused the enemy to stand and surrender. After the anti-tank gun fired two more rounds, the gunner was killed. Once they had occupied Ruin Ridge, they could see 7 tanks and some four hundred vehicles in the distance. A corporal moved forward and observed the enemy to "direct his platoon's fire". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

The Australians dominate and are again used for more attacks in July 1942

The 2/23rd Battalion had "overran" the last existent battalion of  the Italian Sabratha Division. They had also hit a German battalion, the I/382nd Infantry Regiment. The situation was desperate enough to cause Rommel to send help from the south that he had planned to use to follow-up on successes at Ruweisat Ridge. So the 33rd Reconnaissance Battalion, the Briehl Group of the 90th Light Division, and a 104th Regiment battalion. By ten to ten, the 21st Armored Division reported that heavy fire from the right made any advance impossible. By 1:40pm, 5th Armored Regiment had to change to a defensive posture. A strong infantry force had moved into position to attack the two Australian infantry companies at Tel el Eisa.
In the fighting leading up to this situation, just one Australian brigade had managed to capture and hold "high ground west of the El Alamein fortress and nogth of the railway." They had hit the enemy so that they had lost some 2,000 killed, wounded and took 3,708 prisoners. They Germans and Italians suffered from Australian artillery fire and machine guns. For once, Australian artillery and machine gun units had been used to support Australian infantry. The Austalians also had "direct air support" for the first time,
Brigadier Ramsey was now the 9th Australian Division artillery commander. Had previously commanded the artillery at Mersa Matruh. He had served as an enlisted artilleryman in the Great War and received a commission after the end of the war. At the start of the second war, Ramsey had been a division artillery commander. He stepped back down and formed the 2/2nd Field Regiment. After that, he had been the corps medium artillery commander. "He wasa schoolmaster and university lecturer and destined to fill the most senior posts has branch of the teaching profession offered."
By 17 July, General Auchinleck planned to attack the enemy forces "in the center" at Ruweisat Ridge. The 24th Australian Brigade would attack from the north. They would try to take Makh Khad Ridge and then push some five thousand yards "towards Ruin Ridge". The 2/32nd Battalion would take Trig 22 without artillery preparation during the night. By dawn, the 2/43rd Battalion "would pass through" with a 44th RTR Valentine squadron to take Ruin Ridge to the south. Most of the 44th RTR with the 9th Australian Divisional Cavalry, equipped with Crusader tanks would guard the flank, and if needed, help with Trig 22. There was heavy artillery support provided. They had the 9th Australian DIvision artillery, the 1st South African Division artillery, along with two British field regiments. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

Action on 15 July 1942 "in the north" at El Alamein

As early as 4:15am on 15 July, the Germans ordered tanks from the 5th Armored Regiment as well as infantry to stage an attack on the Australians. The infantry that was immediately involved were men from the II;104th Battalion. They pushed ahead and crossed the railroad "north-west of the cutting at 5:50am. By 8am, 12 tanks belonging to the 5th Armored Regiment pushed to the east, running along to the north of the rail line. At 2pm, the unit reported that they had moved back into positions that they had previously held. They were not able to bring up heavy weapons due to the heavy artillery fire.
By later in the afternoon, the Germans were unable to continue forward and in fact had to move against an attack coming from "south-east of the El Alamein Box". The one infantry battalion from the 104th Regiment was left on their own to hold "the northern sector". New orders for the 5th Armored Regiment were to attack starting at 4:30am on 16 July. They were to attack "in the south-east".
On the opposing side, the Australians planned to retake "Point 24", which had two hills connected, as we remember. Half of the 2/23rd Battalion with five tanks were allocated for the attack. The attack was launched in the morning. One company of the 2/23rd Battalion with two  troops from the 8th RTR moved out at 5:20am. The enemy had a position "at the railway cutting". They fired on the leading Australians. A successful attack with grenades and sub-machine-guns took the enemy position (a "post"). The active Australian company was able to take the eastern portion of Point 24 by 6:30am.
The second company from the 2/23rd Battalion moved through the first. They were supported by tanks from the 44th RTR. They were able to take the western part of Point 24 by 7:45am. The company commander had gone to help a wounded man and while returning, he "was killed by a shell". The Australians took 601 prisoners, including 41 Germans. They also took three colonels prisoner, one of which was a German. Of the attacking Australians, they lost some 90 men killed or wounded. That was 90 out of about 200 men who attacked. At 11:30am, Lt-Col. Evans came forward to inspect the situation. The enemy was able to fire on the positions so he ordered the men to withdraw from what he considered to be a valueless area. They had no machine guns, ant-tank guns. They continued to take losses, so they withdrew with no further losses. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

New plan for 15 July 1942 at El Alamein

The Australian 20th Brigade was organized as a brigade group. During the afternoon of 15 July 1942, they had moved into positions near Auchinleck's "tactical headquarters". The brigade had orders to be executed at 5:30am on 16 July. They were to break into three battalion battle groups "in mobile box formation" and travel to the Mubarik tomb which was "behind the 5th Indian Division".  The British had intelligence that indicated that Rommel was planning to attack the 5th Indian Division. The 20th Brigade Group (as it was) set up a defensive line that was quite hastily constructed. All this happened without General Morshead being informed. When Morshead learned of developments, he immediately phoned General Auchinleck and told him that what had been done was contrary to their agreement and also to Morshead's "charter". At first, General Auchinleck agreed to return 20th Brigade to the 9th Austraslian Division. However, Auchinleck called Morshead back to tell him that Auchinleck was being "heavily attacked". Morshead relented in those circumstances and let Auchinleck continue to use the 20th Brigade. Auchinleck was not able to return the 20th Brigade until 17 July.
Meanwhile, on 15 July, Rommel attacked 26th Brigade. Rommel was handicapped by having sent reinforcements to General Nehring of the German Africa Corps. During the night before the attack, men from 2/48th Battalion could hear vehicles in the area near the Tel el Eisa railroad station. The battalion fired on the force that was close by. By morning, they noticed some 15 German vehicles "near the wire" and that there two machine guns and two anti-tank guns setup close to the rail station. The Australians attacked and took 32 prisoners and captured the vehicles (initially). The vehicles were stripped of "ammunition and equipment" and were then destroyed. During the night of 15-16 July, men from the 2/48th Battalion attacked German engineers engaged in removing the minefield. They took seven of hte engineers prisoner.
Back at dawn on 15 July, the men of the 2/24th Battalion saw ten German tanks and as many as 70 vehicles carrying infantry. They were driving in the direction of Trig 33. The enemy fired a heavy artillery barrage starting at about 7:30am. A significant attack was sent with 35 tanks and "seven companies of infantry". The tanks reached the foot of Trig 33 with 14 tanks having scaled the Trig. The accompanying infantry was beaten back while the tanks eventually pulled back. Another attack was sent forward at 8:15am. They had 25 tanks but they were again repulsed. The 44th Tank Regiment attacked with "light tanks" (presumably Stuarts). The enemy again sent an attack (the third). They did not have any tank support and they were beaten back after about a half-hour fight. Another attack with tanks and infantry "at midday" was stopped by artillerty and machine guns. That day, they destroyed ten German tanks and they took 63 prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

14-15 July 1942 a success "up to a point"

The New Zealand Divsion was "hung out to dry" by the 1st Armoured Division. To a degree, the New Zealand Division created their own problem by bypassing significant German units. In one case, eight German tanks were bypassed. As day broke, the German tanks attacked the 22nd New Zealand Battalion. The New Zealanders had expected to see tanks, but British ones not German. The New Zealand anti-tank guns engaged the tanks, but after a "fierce fight", the New Zealanders surrendered with some 350 taken prisoner, as we previously had mentioned.
On the morning of 15 July, the Africa Corps commander reported the attack at Deir el Shein to Rommel. Rommel ordered German forces to head for the British "penetration". He sent the 3rd Reconaissance Unit and a battle group of 100 infantry with other arms heading south. The Baade Group with 200 infantry and some artillery, along with the 33rd Reconnaisance Unit driving north. An attack started at 5pm from the north that included the available tanks from the 15th Armored Division. One issue was the Baade Group did not reach the battle area. Still, the 4th New Zealand Brigade was overrun due to the non-support by the 1st Armoured Division. Still, a few tanks from the 2nd Armoured Brigade came up to the battle to support the New Zealanders. General Gott told the New Zealanders that they could withdraw to "a line from Trig 63 to to a position south-west of Alam el Dihmaniya". The British armor created some very great anger over their failure to support the New Zealand Division.  They particularly were angry with the Briitsh commanders involved in the bad situation.
Auchinleck's plan for the battle was good enough that "some 2,000 men of the Brescia and Pavia had surrendered, and in Rommel's words, the 'line south-east of Deir el Shein collapsed'". The problem was that the British armor's failure to support the 2nd New Zealand Division caused the loss  of 1,405 "killed, wounded or missing".
The great New Zealand officer at this time a brigadier, Howard Kippenberger not only blamed the British armor but said that the New Zealanders could have done more to get better cooridate support from the armor. Still, this was another example where the British armor seemed afraid to fight the Germans. This is based on the accoiunt in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

14 to 15 July 1942 at El Alamein

Some of the tanks that had been engaged at Point 24 cut across the front of the 2/48th Battalion near the Tel el Eisa rail station. When no one fired on the tanks, they continued on towards Point 26. Field guns opened fire on the tanks and turned west where Australian anti-tank guns fired on the tanks. Nearby infantry also fired on the tanks. Some of the tanks exploded and burnt. The survivors withdrew under fire. The Australians of 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment claimed seven tanks knocked out, four by one gun and three by the other. In the morning, the 1st Army Tank Brigade sent tanks forward to support the Australians. In the light, they counted ten German tanks knocked out!
Rommel had planned an attack on 15 July, but Auchinleck's attack on Ruweisat Ridge caused Rommel to have to reduce what he would do at Tel el Eisa. Auchinleck had planned to break through the enemy forces in the center and wipe out the enemy north of Ruweisat Ridge. He also wanted to destroy the enemy forces that lay to the east from the track from El Alamein-to-Ab Dweis. XXX Corps would capture the eastern portion of Ruweisat Ridge and then attack south and capture Miteiriya Ridge. XIII Corps was also in the plan and was to push to Trig 63 in the west of Ruweisat Ridge and then move to the northwest. Auchinleck decided on 14 July to attack that night. The corps were to achieve their objectives by 4:30am on 15 July. The orders to "XIII Corps and 1st Armoured Division" show that Auchinleck had actually decided on a more limited set of objectives. They realized later that the conferences that were held did not successfully communicate how the cooperation between units was to occur. For example, the New Zealand Division had expected to have close armor support. General Lumsden understood that his armor only needed to come forward when requested. The lack of support by two armored brigades had unfortunate consequences.
The XXX Corps attack was launched by the 5th Indian Brigade. One battalion was held up by fire, while another was pushed back.
2nd New Zealand Division attacked from the XIII Corps area. They had two brigades engaged, the 4th and 5th, They moved forward starting at 11pm. They moved until they encountered minefield. They bypassed enemy positions and kept moving forward. The New Zealand brigades had reached their objectives, but were not in good condition. They expected to have two armored brigades ready to support them and the Indian brigade, but they were instead sitting stopped, in the rear, waiting for orders. Some German tanks had been bypassed, and these attacked the New Zealanders. New Zealand anti-tank guns engaged the tanks, but the New Zaaland Division lost 350 prisoners. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Offiicial History.

Fight in the north of the El Alamein position from 12 July 1942

On 12 July 1942, the 9th Australian Division had been in a holding posture until late afternoon. The enemy prepared for an attack on Australians on Hill 33 with increasingly heavy artillery fire. The Germans sent their infantry forward in waves starting at 6pm. This was directed at the 2/24th Battalion positions. The German infantry faced fire from the 2/8th Field Regiment and some British howitzers, possibly the 6in BL 26cwt used by medium regiments. A company from the 2/23rd Battalion, reinforcing the 2/24th Battalion, was heavily attacked. A Bren gunner and a machine-gun platoon inflicted heavy casualties on the Germans. The company commander, however, was killed "when his trench was hit".
The German infantry attack had ended by about 9pm. The Germans had lost some 600 casualties in the attack, perhaps most to the machine-guns. The Australian infantry company had also taken many casualties. Captain Harding was now the company commander for the men from the 2/23rd Battalion. He commanded the company over the next five days while defending their position.
Early on 13 July, the men of the 26th Brigade received word that the 21st Armored Division was planning an attack. Rommel apparently hoped to push into the Australians rear and isolate them. East Point 24 was attacked twice, but was protected by artillery fire from five artillery regiments. Rommel's attack hit the South African Division, which was holding positions south of the El Alamein Box. The South Africans were able to beat off the attack.
General Auchinleck was already planning for an attack on Ruweisat Ridge. At first, he considered moving the whole 9th Australian Division to a new position "south-east of Jevel Bein Gabir." This original plan would leave the 26th Brigade with the South African Division. After some preliminary moves and some reconnaissance, Auchinleck decided to only send the 20th Brigade. They would be in a box just behind Auchinleck's headquarters, which was so close to the front as to be very vulnerable. Because of that, the position of Auchinleck's headquarters was kept secret. No one was allowed to mark the position on a map.
Rommel's latest plan was to hit the Australians on 14 July. During the night before, the Australians could see infantry and artillery movements. That drew Briitsh/Australian artillery fire. By "mid-morning" they could see enemy infantry moving close, while three tanks drove up near a company of the 2/24th Battalion to provide cover for engineers who were lifting mines. The Australians were not able to fire on the tanks with anti-tank guns and infantry weapons were ineffective. The Australians finally were able to call in artillery fire, which slowed the enemy progress. By mid-afternoon, German infantry supported by tanks attacked two Australian companies at East Point 24. The tanks looked for weapons pits and drove over them to crumble them when they were found. The defenders kept the tanks under heavy fire with infantry weapons, forcing the tanks to keep closed up. The Australians beat off a second attack, killing time until dark, when the tanks couldn't see well enough. The Australians were in desperate straits, so they eventually walked out to keep from being taken. The anti-tank gunners took their breach blocks, but were able to bring in vehicles later and towed the guns out of harms way. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.

A dangerous business, being so far forward into enemy territory on 11 to 12 July 1942

Traveling in the dark when you were so far into enemy territory was very dangerous. 26th Brigade held a conference at their headquarters very late on 11 July 1942. They were returning to their units early on 12 July, driving in the dark. They were all in a jeep. They left the meeting but never arrived at their destinations. They found that the driver had missed the turn "just east of battalion headquarters" and had driving straight into enemy positions. They were put in the bag by the Germans. The same thing happened again "three nights later".
The XXX Corps attacks in the north had been very effective and had turned into a crisis for the enemy. The attacks started early on 11 July after heavy artillery fire falling on Italian units. Two Italian positions that were thought to be strong, as the had held on 10 July. They "fell very soon". They sent a Trieste Division battalion to "plug the gap", but it was "wiped out". The situation was so dangerous, that the enemy had to commit most of the army-level artillery to the fighting in the north. The remaining battalions from the Trieste Division had to be used at Point 21 to stop the British attack. The situation with the Italian forces was so bad that Rommel got all his German soldiers out of bed and sent them to the fighting. The Reconnaissance Unit 3 was ordered to the area southwest of point 237 to keep the British from breaking through the front and pushing to the west.
Sometime on 11 July, Rommel decided to attack the British force in the north with the 21st Armored Division. Rommel ordered the division to move north on 12 July to be ready for a battle on 13 July. Rommel wanted to capture the El Alamein Box and isolate the Australians at Tel el Eisa. Rommel put a high priority on the operation so he allocated "every gun and every aircraft". As you can imagine, what was eventually named "The First Battle of El Alamein" turned into an extended affair.
General Auchinleck was very aware of the German movements. With German armor moving north, Auchinleck put in motion a plan to attack Ruweisat Ridge from the south and middle. The 21st Armored Divsion had some thirty tanks, which amounted to  about two-thirds of the remaining German armor. Despite that, the bulk of the German armored force, included in the German Africa Corps, was still in south, now commanded by General Nehring. They were armored, but without many tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of hte Australian Official History.