A supply run to Tobruk that left Alexandria, Egypt, on 23 June 1941 had severe problems. The petrol carrier Pass of Balmaha was escorted by two sloops, the Auckland and the Parramatta. There was also a store ship, the Antiklia that was escorted by the sloop Flamingo. The promised fighter cover did not arrive. A bomb hit the Auckland and the ship was sunk. The Pass of Balmaha took damage from a near miss. The destroyer Waterhen arrived on the scene and started to tow the Pass oof Balmaha. The Parramatta turned around and took the survivors of the Auckland back to Alexandria. The Antiklia was diverted to Mersa Matruh until a fighter escort could be provided. The Antiklia finally got underway, heading for Tobruk, but turned back when heavy weather was encountered. The Antiklia set out again on 29 June accompanied by the supply ship Miranda. They had a three ship escort of small warships. The destroyer Waterhen was hit by a bomb off of Sidi Barrani in the evening of 29 June. Another destroyer, the Defender, took the crew off from the Waterhen and attempted to tow the ship. The Defender noticed an Italian submarine and fired on her. The Italian submarine dove to escape. The Waterhen eventually took on so much water that she rolled over and sank. During the afternoon of 30 June, a large force of bombers with fighter escort was driven off by RAF and South African fighters. The store ships arrived safely at Tobruk. Two escorting ships were damaged. The petrol carrier, Pass of Balmaha arrived safely at Tobruk, as well. Her cargo of petrol was successfully delivered.
A change of plan was tried following this operation. Eight "A" Lighter landing craft were provided for cargo runs to Tobruk. Two were able to reach Tobruk on 7 July. The first time used three days. They arrived at night. They would unload on the next night. They would sail on the third night. They decided to experiment with a faster turn around. They would arrive at night. They would unload under "camouflage nets" during the day. Then they would sail on that night. In parallel, the destroyer supply runs would continue. They also experimented with running the fast minelayers Abdiel and Latona. They were capable of making 40-knot speeds and had considerable space for cargo, since they were designed to carry mines.The month of July was very successful for supplying Tobruk. Ships brought in some 5,000 tons. They managed to run some small merchant ships and sailing vessels to carry ammunition and treats for the soldiers.
They experimented again with using schooners. They had first tried them to see if they could be sailed by volunteers. They found that the needed to put the service on a more regular basis, so they created the Western Desert Schooner Flotilla and put Lieutenant-Commander Duff in charge. They tried some foreign vessels and crews on the run, but the best were the British vessels and crews. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, March 28, 2018
Monday, March 26, 2018
Supply runs for Tobruk in 1941
Ships bringing supplies to Tobruk left ports in Egypt. The ships involved were generally small and they included the 40-knot fast minelayers. Some of the supply ships used sail power. The ships faced danger from air attack and from submarines. The wakes of ships at night were very visible in moonlight.
Captain Poland commanded the inshore squadron. He took command on 5 February 1941 and continued until the siege was lifted. At the beginning, the squadron included "two destroyers, three river gunboats and other small craft. They originally were employed for protecting shipping and for attacking enemy targets. Merchant ships entered and exited the Tobruk harbor both in daytime and nighttime. The Tobruk harbor accumulated ship wrecks over time.
Tobruk-bound shipping could not be protected by fighter aircraft. This was partly due to the scarcity of fighters and because the RAF had abandoned western airfields. The inshore squadron took heavy losses. Between 12 April 1941 and 1 June, they lost "a whaler, 2 armed boarding vessels, 2 minesweepers, a gunboat, a sloop and an anti-submarine trawler, and had four other ships damaged". Starting in early May 1941, the decision was made to employ ships of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla to carry supplies to Tobruk. The flotilla included five Australian destroyers. The first run was made on 5 May by two of the V-class destroyers. Once the battle for Crete commenced, destroyers were mostly involved in that operation.
Once the Germans had captured Crete, air attacks increased on shipping that was supplying Tobruk. Admiral Cunningham issued an order to only use destroyers on the run to Tobruk, and then only at night. That started as of 7 June 1941. The destroyers ran supply missions until 15 June, when Operation Battleaxe caused the end of the runs. They were restarted on 18 June. The Inshore Squadron now had four destroyers, three sloops, two gunboats, along with other smaller ships. They also now had some "A" Lighters, which were early landing craft. For a period, two destroyers would run into Tobruk, unload, and then leave during the night. This typically happened two nights out of three.
To send adequate supplies to Tobruk, slower ships had to supplement what was sent by destroyer. Supporting air power included "three Royal Air Force and two South African Air Force Squadrons. The closest air field for supporting Tobruk was one hundred miles a way at Sidi Barrani. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Captain Poland commanded the inshore squadron. He took command on 5 February 1941 and continued until the siege was lifted. At the beginning, the squadron included "two destroyers, three river gunboats and other small craft. They originally were employed for protecting shipping and for attacking enemy targets. Merchant ships entered and exited the Tobruk harbor both in daytime and nighttime. The Tobruk harbor accumulated ship wrecks over time.
Tobruk-bound shipping could not be protected by fighter aircraft. This was partly due to the scarcity of fighters and because the RAF had abandoned western airfields. The inshore squadron took heavy losses. Between 12 April 1941 and 1 June, they lost "a whaler, 2 armed boarding vessels, 2 minesweepers, a gunboat, a sloop and an anti-submarine trawler, and had four other ships damaged". Starting in early May 1941, the decision was made to employ ships of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla to carry supplies to Tobruk. The flotilla included five Australian destroyers. The first run was made on 5 May by two of the V-class destroyers. Once the battle for Crete commenced, destroyers were mostly involved in that operation.
Once the Germans had captured Crete, air attacks increased on shipping that was supplying Tobruk. Admiral Cunningham issued an order to only use destroyers on the run to Tobruk, and then only at night. That started as of 7 June 1941. The destroyers ran supply missions until 15 June, when Operation Battleaxe caused the end of the runs. They were restarted on 18 June. The Inshore Squadron now had four destroyers, three sloops, two gunboats, along with other smaller ships. They also now had some "A" Lighters, which were early landing craft. For a period, two destroyers would run into Tobruk, unload, and then leave during the night. This typically happened two nights out of three.
To send adequate supplies to Tobruk, slower ships had to supplement what was sent by destroyer. Supporting air power included "three Royal Air Force and two South African Air Force Squadrons. The closest air field for supporting Tobruk was one hundred miles a way at Sidi Barrani. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, March 22, 2018
More about bombing attacks on Tobruk in 1941
Apparently, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft barrages across the line of flight greatly effected daylight high level bombing attacks. After July 1941, bombing attacks mostly switched to the night. They still might attack during the day if there were inviting targets, but mostly, they found that they could more effectively bomb at night. There is another table giving the numbers of night bombers employed per month in 1941.
Night Bombers employed
Last 21 nights of April 32
May 74
June 132
July 126
August 205
September 187
First 9 days of October 152
The night raids in April and May 1941 were mostly low-level attacks to drop "thermos" bombs. By June, all night raids but one were made with high-level bombing. A major change started with 21 July, when night bombers dropped mines hoping to block the harbor entrance. Two more mine laying attacks occurred in the last week ofo July. The night bombing intensified, and this became a serious matter. Some raids were as large as fifty aircraft at night. The enemy also mixed bombing and minelaying to attempt to confuse the defense. Attacks did not occur every night, but were mostly during nights with moon light. Up through July, night bombers would attack singly. As many as 30 to 50 per cent were turned back by barrages. Anti-aircraft gunners were hard pressed by lack of sleep. To counter aircraft dropping mines, listening devices were used and they fired a barrage in conjunction with searchlights center and ends of the harbor. The barrage, when it could be fired in time, was so effective that the enemy would avoid it.
To understand the effort involved, from 10 April to 9 October 1941, some 3,525 aircarft were fired on by anti-aircraft guns. They lost 40 gunners killed and 128 men were wounded. They fired greater than 49,000 rounds of 3.7in anti-aircraft rounds. The available guns can be seen by the rounds fired. Another 3,700 40mm rounds were fired. The scale of 20mm guns meant that they fired some 75,000 rounds. There were also captured Italian guns in use, so there were even more than these fired. The guns were thought to have definitely destroyed 74 aircraft. Another 59 aircraft were probably destroyed. finally, another 145 aircraft were thought to have been damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Night Bombers employed
Last 21 nights of April 32
May 74
June 132
July 126
August 205
September 187
First 9 days of October 152
The night raids in April and May 1941 were mostly low-level attacks to drop "thermos" bombs. By June, all night raids but one were made with high-level bombing. A major change started with 21 July, when night bombers dropped mines hoping to block the harbor entrance. Two more mine laying attacks occurred in the last week ofo July. The night bombing intensified, and this became a serious matter. Some raids were as large as fifty aircraft at night. The enemy also mixed bombing and minelaying to attempt to confuse the defense. Attacks did not occur every night, but were mostly during nights with moon light. Up through July, night bombers would attack singly. As many as 30 to 50 per cent were turned back by barrages. Anti-aircraft gunners were hard pressed by lack of sleep. To counter aircraft dropping mines, listening devices were used and they fired a barrage in conjunction with searchlights center and ends of the harbor. The barrage, when it could be fired in time, was so effective that the enemy would avoid it.
To understand the effort involved, from 10 April to 9 October 1941, some 3,525 aircarft were fired on by anti-aircraft guns. They lost 40 gunners killed and 128 men were wounded. They fired greater than 49,000 rounds of 3.7in anti-aircraft rounds. The available guns can be seen by the rounds fired. Another 3,700 40mm rounds were fired. The scale of 20mm guns meant that they fired some 75,000 rounds. There were also captured Italian guns in use, so there were even more than these fired. The guns were thought to have definitely destroyed 74 aircraft. Another 59 aircraft were probably destroyed. finally, another 145 aircraft were thought to have been damaged. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, March 21, 2018
Bombing attacks on Tobruk in 1941
The enemy air attacks on British anti-aircraft guns at Tobruk were primarily with dive bombers. The gun crews quickly learned that they could be most effective by staying with their guns during attacks rather than taking cover. The dive bombers were apparently all Ju-87 Stukas. Of the dive bombing attacks at Tobruk from the last twenty days of April 1941 until October 9, nineteen of these attacks were against the anti-aircraft guns. The last attack on the guns was on 1 September 1941 after commencing on 10 April. When you look at the chart you can see that the number of aircraft involved decreased over time, as the raids became more dangerous to the attackers. Frequently, at least one dive bomber took a direct hit during an attack on the anti-aircraft guns. This is from the chart on Page 411 of Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Month Dive bombing raids numbers of aircraft involved
April (last 20 days) 21 386
May 17 277
June 6 123
July 4 79
August 11 217
September 1 46
October (first 9 days) 2 57
As the enemy realized that dive bombing raids were too ineffective for the effort involved, they switched to high level bombing raids. The level bombers generally flew at between 18,000 and 25,000 feet. The defenders on the ground had trouble seeing the attacking aircraft. Even though the defenders were hampered by the high altitude attacks, the attackers were able to bomb effectively. Initially, the defenders could not see the aircraft until they dropped their bombs. To try to improve their ability to see the high level bombers, the defenders started listening for the sound of aircraft so that they could predict where to point their telescopic lenses. This was not a very successful tactic. The next tactic tried was to fire a barrage of shells into the expected aircraft path. The barrages were designed to be in the course flown to known targets in the harbor area. They had 16 heavy anti-aircraft guns, so they were used in four-gun groups. By September, the guns had a position officer who had the authority to decide when to fire. They had to be watching for the attacking aircraft to fly deceptive routes to attempt to outwit the guns. The use of the barrages was very effective and caused the attacking bombers to have problems hitting targets. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Month Dive bombing raids numbers of aircraft involved
April (last 20 days) 21 386
May 17 277
June 6 123
July 4 79
August 11 217
September 1 46
October (first 9 days) 2 57
As the enemy realized that dive bombing raids were too ineffective for the effort involved, they switched to high level bombing raids. The level bombers generally flew at between 18,000 and 25,000 feet. The defenders on the ground had trouble seeing the attacking aircraft. Even though the defenders were hampered by the high altitude attacks, the attackers were able to bomb effectively. Initially, the defenders could not see the aircraft until they dropped their bombs. To try to improve their ability to see the high level bombers, the defenders started listening for the sound of aircraft so that they could predict where to point their telescopic lenses. This was not a very successful tactic. The next tactic tried was to fire a barrage of shells into the expected aircraft path. The barrages were designed to be in the course flown to known targets in the harbor area. They had 16 heavy anti-aircraft guns, so they were used in four-gun groups. By September, the guns had a position officer who had the authority to decide when to fire. They had to be watching for the attacking aircraft to fly deceptive routes to attempt to outwit the guns. The use of the barrages was very effective and caused the attacking bombers to have problems hitting targets. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Friday, March 16, 2018
Air attacks on Tobruk and the anti-aircraft defenses
Brigadier Slater commanded the 5th Anti-Aircraft Brigade at Tobruk during the siege. The harbor and base were priorities for anti-aircraft defense. This was a constant struggle as the enemy continued to evolve their operations. The units involved were typically below strength and guns were in constant need of repair. That meant that they needed spare parts for the guns, as well as spare guns. They also relied on laborers to help with digging and the like. The enemy targeted guns, so that they would repair.
Early in the siege, the enemy staged daylight air attacks, often with dive bombers. As the defense capabilities improved against dive bombers, the enemy switched more to night bombing attacks. The air attacks were constant, with only one day during the 9th Australian Division's time at Tobruk when there were no air raids. All these dates are from 1941.
Dive bombing Total Night Raids Total Bombing Day Reconnaissance
Daylight raids Raids
April 10-30 21 41 11 73 27
May 17 60 22 99 58
June 6 58 76 140 39
July 4 91 43 138 46
August 11 55 77 143 30
The defenders took a while and had to experiment to find tactics to deal with dive bombers. The enemy made a first heavy dive bombing attack on 14 April 1941. The guns fired a fixed barrage to explode at 3,000 feet. They found that some aircraft had gotten in before the barrage was fired. to counter that danger, they set up an observation post on the escarpment where they could look down on the harbor. There were problems found with inadequate depth to the barrage. The guns often fired too soon in the attack. The barrage had to spread from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and was fired to swing across the harbor area. They had four Italian 102mm anti-aircraft guns which were repaired and employed. By August, they had found three more of the Italian guns and added them to the defense. The static 40mm guns were used to engage aircraft that survived the barrage. The 12 40mm static guns were manned by the 40th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery.
The defenses added three 20-barrel parachute rocket launchers provided by the navy. The rockets had parachutes and trailed long wires. Small bombs were attached to the end of the wires. They were first used on 18 August against a dive bombing attack. They successfully disrupted the attack.
The enemy resorted to attacking the anti-aircraft gun positions. They damaged six guns that were all repaired. The gunners quickly learned that they were safest by staying in action and shooting at the attacking aircraft. That was a lesson learned in May and June 1941. Dive bombers were used against the guns. They started on 10 April and ended on 1 September 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Early in the siege, the enemy staged daylight air attacks, often with dive bombers. As the defense capabilities improved against dive bombers, the enemy switched more to night bombing attacks. The air attacks were constant, with only one day during the 9th Australian Division's time at Tobruk when there were no air raids. All these dates are from 1941.
Dive bombing Total Night Raids Total Bombing Day Reconnaissance
Daylight raids Raids
April 10-30 21 41 11 73 27
May 17 60 22 99 58
June 6 58 76 140 39
July 4 91 43 138 46
August 11 55 77 143 30
The defenders took a while and had to experiment to find tactics to deal with dive bombers. The enemy made a first heavy dive bombing attack on 14 April 1941. The guns fired a fixed barrage to explode at 3,000 feet. They found that some aircraft had gotten in before the barrage was fired. to counter that danger, they set up an observation post on the escarpment where they could look down on the harbor. There were problems found with inadequate depth to the barrage. The guns often fired too soon in the attack. The barrage had to spread from 3,000 to 6,000 feet and was fired to swing across the harbor area. They had four Italian 102mm anti-aircraft guns which were repaired and employed. By August, they had found three more of the Italian guns and added them to the defense. The static 40mm guns were used to engage aircraft that survived the barrage. The 12 40mm static guns were manned by the 40th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery.
The defenses added three 20-barrel parachute rocket launchers provided by the navy. The rockets had parachutes and trailed long wires. Small bombs were attached to the end of the wires. They were first used on 18 August against a dive bombing attack. They successfully disrupted the attack.
The enemy resorted to attacking the anti-aircraft gun positions. They damaged six guns that were all repaired. The gunners quickly learned that they were safest by staying in action and shooting at the attacking aircraft. That was a lesson learned in May and June 1941. Dive bombers were used against the guns. They started on 10 April and ended on 1 September 1941. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, March 14, 2018
Aggressive patroling near Tobruk from April to October 1941
Aggressive patroling, mostly at night, was a feature of the Tobruk defense from April 1941 up until the Australians had left in late October 1941. Much of the work was done by Australians from the 9th Australian Division, but there were others as well. They included the Indians of the 18th Cavalry and the men of the King's Dragoon Guards. In mid-April, a German soldier's diary spoke of the stress and effect of attacks on the motorized infantry by night. They had taken losses and the attacks had a negative effect on morale. For example, in one night, six officers and 57 other men were captured.
Some thirteen Australian battalions were involved in defending Tobruk. They took losses as killed, wounded, and as prisoners. The German success in breaking into the perimeter resulted in 259 men being captured then, and later from the 2/24th Battalion of the 26th Brigade. The 2/23rd Battalion lost as many as 79 men as prisoners. No other battalions lost prisoners as many as those. The 2/9th Battalion had suffered 205 men wounded. Both the 2/23rd and 2/24th Battalions had many men killed. The 2/23rd Battalion had 78 men killed while the 2/24th Battalion had 70 men killed.
In the vicinity of the Salient, when the enemy had penetrated the perimeter in a surprise attack, the area became one of the most dangerous areas of the fortress. Near the wire there was a chalk mound that they named Forbes Mound. In one incident on the night of 24-25 July 1941, six men were going after German machine gun and mortar crews. The Germans were moving in a truck to fight another Australian patrol. The Australians had been surprised to find German sangers close to the wire.
During the summer of 1941, there were no photographs from the air and the artillery depended on information gathered by patrols operating at night in enemy territory. There was a period when some successful patrols were made using carriers. In early May, a daylight raid was made with carriers. Despite being lightly armored, they were able to attack a working party and fight tanks and guns. They succeeded in returning without loss.
Because of the inshore squadron operations by the navy and the success of the anti-aircraft gunners, Tobruk was kept adequately supplied, so that there were not any extreme shortages of supplies or food. The anti-aircraft gunners had to deal with four types of air attacks. They would be hit by daytime dive bombing attacks against the harbor and installations. There were also daylight level-bombing attacks from higher altitude. The enemy would also bomb at night and would drop mines at night. Early in the siege, they would have large dive bombing raids. As the anti-aircraft defenses improved, the enemy moved to mostly night bombing raids.
Early in the defense of Tobruk, there were 16 mobile 3.7in anti-aircraft guns actually in use. There were other guns not yet available for use. There were also 40mm and 20mm Breda guns in use. They had as many as 42 of the captured Italian Breda guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Some thirteen Australian battalions were involved in defending Tobruk. They took losses as killed, wounded, and as prisoners. The German success in breaking into the perimeter resulted in 259 men being captured then, and later from the 2/24th Battalion of the 26th Brigade. The 2/23rd Battalion lost as many as 79 men as prisoners. No other battalions lost prisoners as many as those. The 2/9th Battalion had suffered 205 men wounded. Both the 2/23rd and 2/24th Battalions had many men killed. The 2/23rd Battalion had 78 men killed while the 2/24th Battalion had 70 men killed.
In the vicinity of the Salient, when the enemy had penetrated the perimeter in a surprise attack, the area became one of the most dangerous areas of the fortress. Near the wire there was a chalk mound that they named Forbes Mound. In one incident on the night of 24-25 July 1941, six men were going after German machine gun and mortar crews. The Germans were moving in a truck to fight another Australian patrol. The Australians had been surprised to find German sangers close to the wire.
During the summer of 1941, there were no photographs from the air and the artillery depended on information gathered by patrols operating at night in enemy territory. There was a period when some successful patrols were made using carriers. In early May, a daylight raid was made with carriers. Despite being lightly armored, they were able to attack a working party and fight tanks and guns. They succeeded in returning without loss.
Because of the inshore squadron operations by the navy and the success of the anti-aircraft gunners, Tobruk was kept adequately supplied, so that there were not any extreme shortages of supplies or food. The anti-aircraft gunners had to deal with four types of air attacks. They would be hit by daytime dive bombing attacks against the harbor and installations. There were also daylight level-bombing attacks from higher altitude. The enemy would also bomb at night and would drop mines at night. Early in the siege, they would have large dive bombing raids. As the anti-aircraft defenses improved, the enemy moved to mostly night bombing raids.
Early in the defense of Tobruk, there were 16 mobile 3.7in anti-aircraft guns actually in use. There were other guns not yet available for use. There were also 40mm and 20mm Breda guns in use. They had as many as 42 of the captured Italian Breda guns. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Friday, March 09, 2018
A retrospective of the 9th Australian Division after their departure from Tobruk in October 1941
The British politicians, particularly the prime minister, were very angry about the Australian government's insistence on withdrawing the 9th Australian Division. To rub salt in the wound, the fast minelayer Latona was sunk and the destroyer Hero was damaged in an attempt to bring out the last 1200 Australians from Tobruk. They were very fortunate that the Germans did not start aggressively bombing the shipping earlier, because the situation would have turned out much worse. The Australian government insisted that the last group of men be withdrawn at the next moonless opportunity.
The defense of Tobruk certainly was made possible by the efforts of the field artillery units, which were largely British. The anti-aircraft gunners were another important factor in the successful defense force. The anti-aircraft units were often the targets of German air attacks. General Auchinleck praised the defenders of Tobruk for their efforts in holding a strong enemy force in place away from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. The enemy had committed four Italian divisions and three German motor battalions to besieging the fortress of Tobruk. They had held the place from sometime in April until November 1941 when the enemy was beaten and pushed back to the border between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
General Morshead often asked more of his men than was possible. His insistence on aggressive patrolling and never allowing the enemy to take and hold territory was an important feature. That was not always possible, as the capture of the Salient showed, but it was still a guiding principle. The mutual respect between the defending units showed a recognition of the roles played by the various players.
There were two factors that caused the Australian demand for the withdrawal of their division. One was the hidden agenda behind General Blamey's manipulation of his government to cause the withdrawal. He was waging a battle against his personal rival in the Australian army, General Lavarack, who was more qualified than General Blamey. General Blamey spent part of the time keeping General Lavarack from gaining more prestige and power than he had, and also did at times promote General Lavarack, such as recommending his appointment as corps commander in Syria and Lebanon.
The other issue was the political turmoil in Australia, that cause some rapid changes. There were three prime ministers in 1941, the last of which was the Labour Party leader, John Curtin. The misadventures of Winston Churchill must have had an influence in Australia, you have to expect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
The defense of Tobruk certainly was made possible by the efforts of the field artillery units, which were largely British. The anti-aircraft gunners were another important factor in the successful defense force. The anti-aircraft units were often the targets of German air attacks. General Auchinleck praised the defenders of Tobruk for their efforts in holding a strong enemy force in place away from the Libyan-Egyptian frontier. The enemy had committed four Italian divisions and three German motor battalions to besieging the fortress of Tobruk. They had held the place from sometime in April until November 1941 when the enemy was beaten and pushed back to the border between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
General Morshead often asked more of his men than was possible. His insistence on aggressive patrolling and never allowing the enemy to take and hold territory was an important feature. That was not always possible, as the capture of the Salient showed, but it was still a guiding principle. The mutual respect between the defending units showed a recognition of the roles played by the various players.
There were two factors that caused the Australian demand for the withdrawal of their division. One was the hidden agenda behind General Blamey's manipulation of his government to cause the withdrawal. He was waging a battle against his personal rival in the Australian army, General Lavarack, who was more qualified than General Blamey. General Blamey spent part of the time keeping General Lavarack from gaining more prestige and power than he had, and also did at times promote General Lavarack, such as recommending his appointment as corps commander in Syria and Lebanon.
The other issue was the political turmoil in Australia, that cause some rapid changes. There were three prime ministers in 1941, the last of which was the Labour Party leader, John Curtin. The misadventures of Winston Churchill must have had an influence in Australia, you have to expect. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, March 07, 2018
FInal relief of the 9th Australian Division in October 1941
The relief of Australian units by British units was well-planned. Relief convoys used one minelayer and three destroyers. The final relief started on 12-13 October 1941. An arriving unit was generally given a day before the unit that was being replaced left Tobruk. That was to give the newly arrived men time for a transition. Also, that allowed for no reduction in strength defending the fortress of Tobruk.Convoys generally brought in one thousand men and removed slightly less than that number. Men of the 26th Brigade Group were the first to leave.
General Scobie became the new fortress commander, taking over from General Morshead. General Scobie arrived at Tobruk on the night of 20-21 October. General Morshead introduced General Scobie at all the brigade headquarters. One of the first changes was that the division reserve was moved from the 26th Australian Brigade to the 23rd British Brigade. The next move was for the 23rd Brigade to replace the 20th Australian Brigade in the south of Tobruk. General Scobie formally took over as commander at 5pm on 22 October. General Morshead then bade farewell to units that were to stay, and then ate dinner with the naval staff. He then left Tobruk on HMS Endeavor. On the 22nd, more of the 20th Australian Brigade was removed from Tobruk. The 23rd British Brigade assumed the duty of protecting the Southern Sector on 23 October from the 20th Australian Brigade. The Australians moved into division reserve. A feature of the relief process is that the Australian units passed all their equipment to the arriving units. On the night of 24-25 October, the 14th British Brigade took command of the division reserve. Before night fell, an air attack by dive bombers hit the harbor.
During the relief process the enemy had fired artillery against the harbor. There was still no indication that the enemy realized that the relief was proceeding. One hazard that was not immediately recognized was that German submarines had arrived in the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic. The first ships sunk were "A-Lighters". The submarines were assigned to attack ships supplying Tobruk.
The British gunboat Gnat was able to hit the guns that fired on the harbor at Tobruk. The relief convoy cruiser escorts, the Ajax, Hobart, and Galatea were alsos able to fire at the guns. The Gnat was torpedoed on 21 October. The ship was not sunk, but was stopped. The destroyer Griffin was able to tow the Gnat to Alexandria. One final mishap was that the minelayer Latona was bombed and eventually sunk. That ended the Australian relief, because they had reached the end of the moonless period. The remaining Australians were stuck at Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
General Scobie became the new fortress commander, taking over from General Morshead. General Scobie arrived at Tobruk on the night of 20-21 October. General Morshead introduced General Scobie at all the brigade headquarters. One of the first changes was that the division reserve was moved from the 26th Australian Brigade to the 23rd British Brigade. The next move was for the 23rd Brigade to replace the 20th Australian Brigade in the south of Tobruk. General Scobie formally took over as commander at 5pm on 22 October. General Morshead then bade farewell to units that were to stay, and then ate dinner with the naval staff. He then left Tobruk on HMS Endeavor. On the 22nd, more of the 20th Australian Brigade was removed from Tobruk. The 23rd British Brigade assumed the duty of protecting the Southern Sector on 23 October from the 20th Australian Brigade. The Australians moved into division reserve. A feature of the relief process is that the Australian units passed all their equipment to the arriving units. On the night of 24-25 October, the 14th British Brigade took command of the division reserve. Before night fell, an air attack by dive bombers hit the harbor.
During the relief process the enemy had fired artillery against the harbor. There was still no indication that the enemy realized that the relief was proceeding. One hazard that was not immediately recognized was that German submarines had arrived in the Mediterranean Sea from the Atlantic. The first ships sunk were "A-Lighters". The submarines were assigned to attack ships supplying Tobruk.
The British gunboat Gnat was able to hit the guns that fired on the harbor at Tobruk. The relief convoy cruiser escorts, the Ajax, Hobart, and Galatea were alsos able to fire at the guns. The Gnat was torpedoed on 21 October. The ship was not sunk, but was stopped. The destroyer Griffin was able to tow the Gnat to Alexandria. One final mishap was that the minelayer Latona was bombed and eventually sunk. That ended the Australian relief, because they had reached the end of the moonless period. The remaining Australians were stuck at Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Friday, March 02, 2018
The battle for the outposts at Tobruk, from 12 October 1941
Sunrise on 12 October 1941 showed some 19 German tanks and about six vehicles facing the 2/17th Battalion area. Perhaps most were near Plonk, which the Germans had reoccupied since it had been left vacant. The Australians could discern a line of sangars on both sides of Plonk. Workers could be seen during the day extending this new defensive line. The enemy had setup wire around Plonk by mid-morning on the 12th. Later in the afternoon showed that the enemy had laid more wire from Plonk out to the sangar line.
After these developments, the decision was made to provide tanks for Cooma for the night hours. They would drive through the perimeter at dusk and return there by dawn. During the day, troops of infantry tanks would be kept available to drive to Cooma, if needed. The 4th RTR initially provided these tanks, and then for two days, the 7th RTR provided the tanks.
In the evening, the Australians could see enemy tanks near Plonk and Cooma. Several tanks drove near the perimeter wire. The Australians sent out "tank hunting patrols", but they did not make contact with the enemy. The scheduled British tank presence set out at 1am. They did not see any enemy tanks, but they fired on the enemy working parties. The enemy had about twenty anti-tank guns set up and they fired at the British tanks. To the Australians within the Tobruk perimeter, there seemed to be a tank battle happening, but it was just the anti-tank gun fire and the tanks shooting. The Australians moved back into the Cooma outpost and went to work on strengthening the defensive positions.
After the last battle over Plonk, the enemy was content to work on extending their defenses. The Australians continued to occupy Cooma and the arrangements for tanks were continued while the Australians were still in the southern sector. Their remaining time was limited, because they were to be withdrawn while more units were carried in to replace them. The enemy now had some 100 guns available. The largest were the 210mm howitzers, one battery of 149/35 guns, and another battery thought to be 155mm. The enemy was thought to have 10 field batteries, 12 medium batteries. and the three heavy batteries. The enemy strength in the south was so dominating that the options for raiding at night were greatly reduced. In other sectors, the Australians were still strong enough to carry out aggressive patrolling. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
After these developments, the decision was made to provide tanks for Cooma for the night hours. They would drive through the perimeter at dusk and return there by dawn. During the day, troops of infantry tanks would be kept available to drive to Cooma, if needed. The 4th RTR initially provided these tanks, and then for two days, the 7th RTR provided the tanks.
In the evening, the Australians could see enemy tanks near Plonk and Cooma. Several tanks drove near the perimeter wire. The Australians sent out "tank hunting patrols", but they did not make contact with the enemy. The scheduled British tank presence set out at 1am. They did not see any enemy tanks, but they fired on the enemy working parties. The enemy had about twenty anti-tank guns set up and they fired at the British tanks. To the Australians within the Tobruk perimeter, there seemed to be a tank battle happening, but it was just the anti-tank gun fire and the tanks shooting. The Australians moved back into the Cooma outpost and went to work on strengthening the defensive positions.
After the last battle over Plonk, the enemy was content to work on extending their defenses. The Australians continued to occupy Cooma and the arrangements for tanks were continued while the Australians were still in the southern sector. Their remaining time was limited, because they were to be withdrawn while more units were carried in to replace them. The enemy now had some 100 guns available. The largest were the 210mm howitzers, one battery of 149/35 guns, and another battery thought to be 155mm. The enemy was thought to have 10 field batteries, 12 medium batteries. and the three heavy batteries. The enemy strength in the south was so dominating that the options for raiding at night were greatly reduced. In other sectors, the Australians were still strong enough to carry out aggressive patrolling. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, March 01, 2018
A night tank battle on 11-12 October 1941 near the Plonk outpost
The attack on the Plonk outpost was late to start, partly to the late arrival of the infantry tanks. The supporting artillery barrage was repeated for the real attack. The attack on Plonk was set to launch about 15 minutes after midnight on 12 October 1941. They could hear digging and voices at Plonk before the barrage started. Enemy artillery responded to the British artillery fire. This time, the Matilda tanks were moving up to attack Plonk. The Australian infantry patrol moved closer to Plonk as all this happened. A little before 1am, the infantry tanks commenced firing at enemy tanks that were visible. The range was very short, about 100 yards. There were the tank guns firing as well as the tank machine guns. The enemy was described as firing their tank guns wildly, and not well-aimed. The British tanks were able to move towards the objective. The German tanks retreated in front of them. The tank firing was across the infantry path and kept them from moving into Plonk.
They could see German tanks advancing from the west, but were driven back by the British tank gun fire. The Australian infantry patrol did not enter Plonk, as there was too much risk to the men from occupying Plonk.The Australians did fire their "Very light signal" to communicate that they had achieved their desired objective. That triggered the enemy to open artillery fire on Plonk, as the expected that the signal meant that Plonk had been occupied. By 1:25am, the enemy troops had pulled out of Plonk. Firing stopped after they left. After a brief respite, the enemy resumed firing at Plonk. An extraordinary barrage, the largest yet seen at Tobruk, descended on Plonk. While the firing continued, more enemy tanks drove towards Plonk, but the British tanks in Plonk fired at the enemy tanks, causing them to pull back.
The Australian patrol that had been sent to Plonk pulled back after sending one small group back with a wounded man. The patrol went looking for the machine gun that had fired on them earlier, but didn't find it. The patrol commander then sent the other men back, but he stayed until 2am, when he fired the Very light signal. After he gave the signal, the enemy started another artillery barrage on Plonk.
While Plonk wss receiving enemy artillery fire, the men working on creating an outpost at Cooma had been busy. The British tanks had driven on to Cooma from Plonk. They had fired on some enemy tanks that had gotten close, but they eventually drove back to the perimeter and reentered Tobruk.The 32nd Army Tank Brigade commander had ordered his tanks back to Cooma, but while the sky was getting lighter, the tanks had not reached the gap in the perimeter. The Australian 20th Brigade commander had suggested that the tanks return to the "forward assembly area". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
They could see German tanks advancing from the west, but were driven back by the British tank gun fire. The Australian infantry patrol did not enter Plonk, as there was too much risk to the men from occupying Plonk.The Australians did fire their "Very light signal" to communicate that they had achieved their desired objective. That triggered the enemy to open artillery fire on Plonk, as the expected that the signal meant that Plonk had been occupied. By 1:25am, the enemy troops had pulled out of Plonk. Firing stopped after they left. After a brief respite, the enemy resumed firing at Plonk. An extraordinary barrage, the largest yet seen at Tobruk, descended on Plonk. While the firing continued, more enemy tanks drove towards Plonk, but the British tanks in Plonk fired at the enemy tanks, causing them to pull back.
The Australian patrol that had been sent to Plonk pulled back after sending one small group back with a wounded man. The patrol went looking for the machine gun that had fired on them earlier, but didn't find it. The patrol commander then sent the other men back, but he stayed until 2am, when he fired the Very light signal. After he gave the signal, the enemy started another artillery barrage on Plonk.
While Plonk wss receiving enemy artillery fire, the men working on creating an outpost at Cooma had been busy. The British tanks had driven on to Cooma from Plonk. They had fired on some enemy tanks that had gotten close, but they eventually drove back to the perimeter and reentered Tobruk.The 32nd Army Tank Brigade commander had ordered his tanks back to Cooma, but while the sky was getting lighter, the tanks had not reached the gap in the perimeter. The Australian 20th Brigade commander had suggested that the tanks return to the "forward assembly area". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, February 21, 2018
More action near the 2/17th Battalion from 11th to 12th October 1941 at Tobruk
Early on 11 October 1941, Tobruk artillery fired on the outpost Plonk that had been occupied by enemy troops. The Australians could hear "yelling and screaming" after the artillery fire on Plonk. They heard tools tossed into trucks and then the trucks drove off. Again, at 6am, Tobruk artillery fired on Plonk. A patrol investigated Plonk after that and saw men walking about the area. They drew more artillery and machine gun fire. About this time, the enemy artillery fired on the 2/17th Battalion defenses, as was usually the case. Right before 8am, the Australians observed more men at Plonk and fired on them. The enemy responded with more artillery fire on the Australians. Between haze and dust, the Australians could no longer see Plonk.
Between 8:30am and 9am, increasing numbers of tanks were seen near the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion positions were machine-gunned. They were not used to having so much activity near them. They found that the enemy troops had moved back into the Tugun outpost. The Australians were concerned that the enemy might make a major attack on the 2/17th Battalion front. A practice attack near Carmusa by 2/15th Battalion soldiers and tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade was cancelled due to the enemy activity. All of the 20th Brigade was kept at the ready, rather than proceeding with training. By 9:45am, they saw twelve enemy tanks "hull-down" near Plonk. Despite the activity, no attack was launched by the enemy.
By the next night, the 11-12 October 1941, General Morshead ordered the 20th Brigade to attack and retaked Plonk. They would no use Plonk but would create a new outpost to be called Cooma. The plan was to keep the enemy from advancing their line towards the Australians. The infantry directly involved would be from the 2/17th Battalion with support from the 4th RTR in the form of one squadron. The 2/17th Battalion would have one company of the 2/13th Battalion in reserve. The attack would have the 107th RHA firing a bombardment to soften up the enemy. If possible, the 1st RHA would fire smoke in the area of the enemy minefield.
Two platoons from the 2/17th Battalion made the attack. They expected to see tanks coming up in support, but the plan for the tanks was to move at 5 mph with a mile between tanks. That meant that they were not immediately available. At the time of the infantry attack, the tanks were just at the perimeter wire. The enemy artillery fire was so heavy, that two other Australian battalions, the 2/23rd and 2/24th were readied for use. The attacking platoons would then attack without the tanks. After some fits and starts, the new plan was to attack at 12:15am. The artillery would fire in support, again. The tanks that were still running would join in the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Between 8:30am and 9am, increasing numbers of tanks were seen near the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion positions were machine-gunned. They were not used to having so much activity near them. They found that the enemy troops had moved back into the Tugun outpost. The Australians were concerned that the enemy might make a major attack on the 2/17th Battalion front. A practice attack near Carmusa by 2/15th Battalion soldiers and tanks from the 32nd Army Tank Brigade was cancelled due to the enemy activity. All of the 20th Brigade was kept at the ready, rather than proceeding with training. By 9:45am, they saw twelve enemy tanks "hull-down" near Plonk. Despite the activity, no attack was launched by the enemy.
By the next night, the 11-12 October 1941, General Morshead ordered the 20th Brigade to attack and retaked Plonk. They would no use Plonk but would create a new outpost to be called Cooma. The plan was to keep the enemy from advancing their line towards the Australians. The infantry directly involved would be from the 2/17th Battalion with support from the 4th RTR in the form of one squadron. The 2/17th Battalion would have one company of the 2/13th Battalion in reserve. The attack would have the 107th RHA firing a bombardment to soften up the enemy. If possible, the 1st RHA would fire smoke in the area of the enemy minefield.
Two platoons from the 2/17th Battalion made the attack. They expected to see tanks coming up in support, but the plan for the tanks was to move at 5 mph with a mile between tanks. That meant that they were not immediately available. At the time of the infantry attack, the tanks were just at the perimeter wire. The enemy artillery fire was so heavy, that two other Australian battalions, the 2/23rd and 2/24th were readied for use. The attacking platoons would then attack without the tanks. After some fits and starts, the new plan was to attack at 12:15am. The artillery would fire in support, again. The tanks that were still running would join in the attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Tuesday, February 20, 2018
Operations from 10 October 1941 at Outpost Plonk
General Morshead became involved with the defense of Outpost Plonk on 10 October 1941. He was not ready to allow territory to be ceded to the enemy without a fight. General Morshead ordered the 2/17th Battalion to defend Plonk. The brigade commander told the battalion that they should hold Plonk with two sections of infantry and with an anti-tank gun section. The guns would be supplied by the 20th Anti-Tank Company. The battalion commander was free to add to the defensive force as he saw fit.
The 2/17th Battalion commander decided to send out working parties to accompany the "standing patrol", They would build additional defense with wire and mines. They would also dig gun and weapon pits. A platoon was positioned about 300 yards south to provide cover. The standing patrol had "four light machine guns and two mortars". The men arrived at outpost Plonk at 7:50pm. The enemy started firing artillery at the general area. The firing lasted "more than half an hour". They took some casualties from the artillery fire. The working parties were pulled into the position. The artillery fire did not stop, so the working parties tried to work while under fire. The explosions raised dust which reduced visibility "to five yards". By about 9:20pm, they had lost communication with the battalion. The 2/17th commander heard that tanks had been seen moving. The trucks that carried the anti-tank guns had been disabled. The command of the working parties decided to attempt to recover the anti-tank guns. Tanks were reported to be circling Plonk. A reconnaissance patrol had seen 11 large tanks and five armored infantry carriers, presumably half-tracks. The infantry were recognized as being Italian.
The trucks with anti-tank guns were recovered. One gun was disabled but was eventually repaired. The standing patrol had been forced to leave Plonk to the enemy. When the 9th Australian Division headquarters learned of the situation, they had no further orders for the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion was taking heavy artillery fire by around 3am. From then until about 7am, the battalion received about 2,000 rounds of artillery shells.
The 2/Queens also also received heavy artillery fire. They had wanted to work on a new outpost, but they were taking too much artillery fire to work. The enemy had had active tanks near the old Tugun outpost. They had departed by 5:30am. Normally, the Australians were dominant at night in "no-man's land", but that was only the case in the west side of Tobruk. Men from the 2/43rd Battalion had decimated some Italian infantry near the "White Knoll". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
The 2/17th Battalion commander decided to send out working parties to accompany the "standing patrol", They would build additional defense with wire and mines. They would also dig gun and weapon pits. A platoon was positioned about 300 yards south to provide cover. The standing patrol had "four light machine guns and two mortars". The men arrived at outpost Plonk at 7:50pm. The enemy started firing artillery at the general area. The firing lasted "more than half an hour". They took some casualties from the artillery fire. The working parties were pulled into the position. The artillery fire did not stop, so the working parties tried to work while under fire. The explosions raised dust which reduced visibility "to five yards". By about 9:20pm, they had lost communication with the battalion. The 2/17th commander heard that tanks had been seen moving. The trucks that carried the anti-tank guns had been disabled. The command of the working parties decided to attempt to recover the anti-tank guns. Tanks were reported to be circling Plonk. A reconnaissance patrol had seen 11 large tanks and five armored infantry carriers, presumably half-tracks. The infantry were recognized as being Italian.
The trucks with anti-tank guns were recovered. One gun was disabled but was eventually repaired. The standing patrol had been forced to leave Plonk to the enemy. When the 9th Australian Division headquarters learned of the situation, they had no further orders for the 2/17th Battalion. The battalion was taking heavy artillery fire by around 3am. From then until about 7am, the battalion received about 2,000 rounds of artillery shells.
The 2/Queens also also received heavy artillery fire. They had wanted to work on a new outpost, but they were taking too much artillery fire to work. The enemy had had active tanks near the old Tugun outpost. They had departed by 5:30am. Normally, the Australians were dominant at night in "no-man's land", but that was only the case in the west side of Tobruk. Men from the 2/43rd Battalion had decimated some Italian infantry near the "White Knoll". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, February 15, 2018
The British and Australians respond to the enemy activity near Plonk and Bondi
The response to the enemy tank activity near the outposts of Plonk and Bondi was to send out sixteen infantry tanks and two light tanks to Plonk. This was at 9:45pm apparently on 7 October 1941 at Tobruk. They were to fight any enemy tanks that they encountered and defeat them. Men from the 2/17th Battalion and "an engineer party" were to remove anti-tank mines near the Plonk outpost. Other mines laid near the path that enemy tanks had taken were also removed. The minefield on the perimeter would have two gaps created. Anti-tank guns would be sited to protect the gaps. The gaps were for the British tanks to drive through on their return.
Two men set out from Plonk "to the enemy minefield to the south". They noticed that a forty yard gap had been created and tape laid to mark the gap. The Australian men removed the tape that they had found. They also fired on a working party they encountered. They were followed by ten enemy soldiers as they walked back to Plonk.
As it got dark, the men at Plonk could hear engine noises from the direction of Bondi. They called in artillery fire on the area around Bondi. That kept enemy tanks from entering the post. Communication failed with Bondi sometime after 9pm. By a little after 10pm, two men arrived who had escaped from Bondi. They heard the news that Plonk had been overrun by German tanks and infantry.
The Matilda infantry tanks drove slowly to Plonk to reduce the engine noise. As they approached, they heard that Bondi had fallen. They also heard that the enemy had fired on Plonk with artillery. After the tanks reached Plonk, they heard German tanks moving closer. The British tanks drove out towards the German tanks and started firing at 100 yards distance. That was fairly close range for a tank battle, and the infantry tank squadron commander was wounded when his tank was disabled. The fight lasted about 15 minutes. The German tanks drove off with the British in pursuit. The German tanks were faster than the Matildas, so the Matildas quickly fell behind. One Matilda had mechanical problems, so it drove into Plonk. That tank fought a battle with five German tanks and drove them off from Plonk. About this time, the men at Plonk were called back to the perimeter. Some time after midnight, a patrol came back to Plonk and found that the enemy had not taken possessiion, so they stayed in occupation of the post. During the rest of the night, they could hear enemy tank engines, but they did not attack Plonk.
The 2/17th Battalion policy was to hold outposts, but they would not attempt to hold the ground between the outposts and the perimeter. The commander decided that they would hold plonk and defend the area. They would have anti-tank guns as protection against tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Two men set out from Plonk "to the enemy minefield to the south". They noticed that a forty yard gap had been created and tape laid to mark the gap. The Australian men removed the tape that they had found. They also fired on a working party they encountered. They were followed by ten enemy soldiers as they walked back to Plonk.
As it got dark, the men at Plonk could hear engine noises from the direction of Bondi. They called in artillery fire on the area around Bondi. That kept enemy tanks from entering the post. Communication failed with Bondi sometime after 9pm. By a little after 10pm, two men arrived who had escaped from Bondi. They heard the news that Plonk had been overrun by German tanks and infantry.
The Matilda infantry tanks drove slowly to Plonk to reduce the engine noise. As they approached, they heard that Bondi had fallen. They also heard that the enemy had fired on Plonk with artillery. After the tanks reached Plonk, they heard German tanks moving closer. The British tanks drove out towards the German tanks and started firing at 100 yards distance. That was fairly close range for a tank battle, and the infantry tank squadron commander was wounded when his tank was disabled. The fight lasted about 15 minutes. The German tanks drove off with the British in pursuit. The German tanks were faster than the Matildas, so the Matildas quickly fell behind. One Matilda had mechanical problems, so it drove into Plonk. That tank fought a battle with five German tanks and drove them off from Plonk. About this time, the men at Plonk were called back to the perimeter. Some time after midnight, a patrol came back to Plonk and found that the enemy had not taken possessiion, so they stayed in occupation of the post. During the rest of the night, they could hear enemy tank engines, but they did not attack Plonk.
The 2/17th Battalion policy was to hold outposts, but they would not attempt to hold the ground between the outposts and the perimeter. The commander decided that they would hold plonk and defend the area. They would have anti-tank guns as protection against tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Action in early October 1941 at Tobruk
During the night of 2 to 3 October 1941, the 16th Brigade was involved in fighting when a patrol from the 2/Queens had contact with an enemy patrol south of the Tobruk perimeter. The enemy soldiers threw grenades and the British fired at them. The enemy soldiers withdrew faster than the British chased them. In the evening, men from the 2/Leicester took machine gun fire from Italian positions some 600 yards away. The British fired back with artillery and mortars, stopping the machine gun fire. This action occurred on the west side of Tobruk.
Australians were in action on the night of 5 to 6 October in the south. A small patrol from the 2/17th Battalion moved out some 2,400 yards to a position near an enemy minefield. They observed two groups of men being led through the minefield. A third group was following behind. They alternated crawling and then walking fast. The Australian patrol lay low to escape being seen. Then they moved close to an Italian "working party". They opened fire on the Italians with great effect. Machine guns and "light automatic weapons" opened up on them. The Australians "scattered towards the north" and finally reached their listening post through a "pipe-line ditch".
The action at this point seemed to all be at night. During the next night, up until dawn, the 2/17th Battalion could see tanks on the move. They were near the pipeline and to the west of outpost Plonk. Plonk had three observation posts, one of which was occupied. Outpost Bondi was some 3,000 yards west of Plonk. Men from the 2/Queens were at Bondi. Tanks were seen further west from Plonk. The tanks approached to a mile from the perimeter. The Australian battalion commander guessed that the tanks were operating to defend working parties.
Men at Plonk reported five tanks moving towards them at 12:25am. They saw more tanks near the pipeline. The Australians employed tank-hunting patrols armed with "68" grenades. This time, they got some hits against one of the tanks. Due to the concern about tanks, the men at Plonk were withdrawn and not replaced. The 107th RHA opened up on the tanks near Biir el Azazi at dawn. In response, enemy artillery fired on the perimeter. Divebombers hit the positions occupied by the 104th and 107th RHA. They knocked out two guns and killed three gunners.
The Australian brigade commander ordered the 2/17th to move back into Plonk. Right before it got dark, sappers moved out to lay mines on the route the tanks had taken. An infantry patrol moved towards Plonk, hoping to move back into the post. The patrol had to take cover when tanks were seen, but after they moved off, the men moved back into Plonk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Australians were in action on the night of 5 to 6 October in the south. A small patrol from the 2/17th Battalion moved out some 2,400 yards to a position near an enemy minefield. They observed two groups of men being led through the minefield. A third group was following behind. They alternated crawling and then walking fast. The Australian patrol lay low to escape being seen. Then they moved close to an Italian "working party". They opened fire on the Italians with great effect. Machine guns and "light automatic weapons" opened up on them. The Australians "scattered towards the north" and finally reached their listening post through a "pipe-line ditch".
The action at this point seemed to all be at night. During the next night, up until dawn, the 2/17th Battalion could see tanks on the move. They were near the pipeline and to the west of outpost Plonk. Plonk had three observation posts, one of which was occupied. Outpost Bondi was some 3,000 yards west of Plonk. Men from the 2/Queens were at Bondi. Tanks were seen further west from Plonk. The tanks approached to a mile from the perimeter. The Australian battalion commander guessed that the tanks were operating to defend working parties.
Men at Plonk reported five tanks moving towards them at 12:25am. They saw more tanks near the pipeline. The Australians employed tank-hunting patrols armed with "68" grenades. This time, they got some hits against one of the tanks. Due to the concern about tanks, the men at Plonk were withdrawn and not replaced. The 107th RHA opened up on the tanks near Biir el Azazi at dawn. In response, enemy artillery fired on the perimeter. Divebombers hit the positions occupied by the 104th and 107th RHA. They knocked out two guns and killed three gunners.
The Australian brigade commander ordered the 2/17th to move back into Plonk. Right before it got dark, sappers moved out to lay mines on the route the tanks had taken. An infantry patrol moved towards Plonk, hoping to move back into the post. The patrol had to take cover when tanks were seen, but after they moved off, the men moved back into Plonk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, February 08, 2018
The new situation after the British 16th Brigade arrived in September 1941
The newly arrived British 16th Brigade went in with an aggressive spirit and a positive attitude. They were going to take the Australian outposts and set them up as Observation Posts. They would then concentrate on "offensive patrolling". Despite that plan, the truth was that the outposts outside the wire ended up being taken by the enemy soldiers and setup as "defended localities". The plan was still to plan on dealing with enemy attacks. There was cause for concern, because the enemy outgunned the 104th RHA, which was supporting the 16th Brigade when they would take over from the Australian 20th Brigade. The 104th RHA had 24 guns, two of which were anti-aircraft guns. The anti-aircraft guns were only there in case of a tank attack, when they would be manned and available to fire on enemy tanks. They only had 16 25-pdr guns, 4-60pdr medium guns, and 2-Italian 149mm guns. The enemy was thought to have 52-field guns, 16-medium guns, and two heavy guns. Given that the enemy had much more artillery, the 104th RHA expected that the enemy could be expected to attack.
The 20th Brigade really did not understand the situation very well, because all they saw made the enemy seem to be at a considerable distance. Still, the 20th Brigade commander expected that any attack would be likely to come against the line south of the Bardia Road. The 20th Brigade didn't like the defenses, because the secondary line were small enough that when there were two battalions, one from the division reserve and one from the brigade reserve, the second line was "congested". The second line of defense was too far back from the perimeter, so that the brigade reserve battalion was remote from the perimeter. They wanted to build a new position that was closer to the perimeter.
The 16th Brigade arrived to replace the Australian 20th Brigade on 25, 26, and 27 September. The next day, 16th Brigade took responsibility for the defense of the area. Two British battalions were in the line and one was in reserve on the secondary line. During the first two days of October 1941, the Polish Carpathian Brigade replaced the Australian 26th Brigade in the west. The 26th Brigade then was made the division reserve brigade. They had spent 8 weeks in the high-pressure Salient.
The western sector had four battalions. When the Polish Carpathian Brigade arrived, the 2/43rd Battalion stayed in place. The Polish cavalry had been in the Wadi Schel, so they now were back with their parent unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
The 20th Brigade really did not understand the situation very well, because all they saw made the enemy seem to be at a considerable distance. Still, the 20th Brigade commander expected that any attack would be likely to come against the line south of the Bardia Road. The 20th Brigade didn't like the defenses, because the secondary line were small enough that when there were two battalions, one from the division reserve and one from the brigade reserve, the second line was "congested". The second line of defense was too far back from the perimeter, so that the brigade reserve battalion was remote from the perimeter. They wanted to build a new position that was closer to the perimeter.
The 16th Brigade arrived to replace the Australian 20th Brigade on 25, 26, and 27 September. The next day, 16th Brigade took responsibility for the defense of the area. Two British battalions were in the line and one was in reserve on the secondary line. During the first two days of October 1941, the Polish Carpathian Brigade replaced the Australian 26th Brigade in the west. The 26th Brigade then was made the division reserve brigade. They had spent 8 weeks in the high-pressure Salient.
The western sector had four battalions. When the Polish Carpathian Brigade arrived, the 2/43rd Battalion stayed in place. The Polish cavalry had been in the Wadi Schel, so they now were back with their parent unit. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Wednesday, February 07, 2018
Who was right? Into the last days of the 9th Australian Division in Tobruk
In retrospect, we can now say that Churchill's complaints about the 9th Australian Division removal were overblown. There were no great effects by the removal. If the German air force had been attacking during the withdrawal, the situation could have been critical, but they were not. Operation Crusader was not materially affected by the Australian relief operation. The issues that caused the operation to be in jeopardy had nothing to do with the Australians. The issues were British problems, not Australian. Churchill was more concerned about the political impact of delaying the offensive in North Africa. The British at the time were unaware of the impending Japanese attack planned for December 1941. That was going to cause the most trouble for Churchill and the British forces.
Towards the end of the Australian participation in the defense of Tobruk, the Salient was the most dangerous area. From August to September 1941, the 2/24th Battalion worked to re-position the wire to help the 2/13th Field Company. They did the work on the left side of the Salient from "18 August to 1 September". They moved the wire on the right side of the Salient starting on 8 September and finishing on 25 September. When moving the wire, the presence of German anti-personnel mines took a toll.
We find that by September, there were some peculiar behaviors in place. For one thing, there was what the Australian historian called "live and let-live" to some extent by the Australian and Axis troops. Most of the time, German patrols were defensive in nature. They only rarely made attempts to penetrate the Australian positions. One exception occurred on 11 September, when a German patrol was spotted and ambushed. They killed three men and eventually captured a man who seemed to be lost. He was a member of what eventually was called the 90th Light Division. In September 1941, they were known as the Division Afrika zbV. The 9th Australian Division intelligence view on this was that the new division had been brought in to free up the armored division motorized infantry, so that they could go back to providing support to their divisions.
When the British 16th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, they had already served with the Australians in three previous campaigns. They had participated in the first campaign in the desert when they had defeated the Italians and captured Cyrenaica. They had also fought in Crete and finally in Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Towards the end of the Australian participation in the defense of Tobruk, the Salient was the most dangerous area. From August to September 1941, the 2/24th Battalion worked to re-position the wire to help the 2/13th Field Company. They did the work on the left side of the Salient from "18 August to 1 September". They moved the wire on the right side of the Salient starting on 8 September and finishing on 25 September. When moving the wire, the presence of German anti-personnel mines took a toll.
We find that by September, there were some peculiar behaviors in place. For one thing, there was what the Australian historian called "live and let-live" to some extent by the Australian and Axis troops. Most of the time, German patrols were defensive in nature. They only rarely made attempts to penetrate the Australian positions. One exception occurred on 11 September, when a German patrol was spotted and ambushed. They killed three men and eventually captured a man who seemed to be lost. He was a member of what eventually was called the 90th Light Division. In September 1941, they were known as the Division Afrika zbV. The 9th Australian Division intelligence view on this was that the new division had been brought in to free up the armored division motorized infantry, so that they could go back to providing support to their divisions.
When the British 16th Brigade arrived in Tobruk, they had already served with the Australians in three previous campaigns. They had participated in the first campaign in the desert when they had defeated the Italians and captured Cyrenaica. They had also fought in Crete and finally in Syria. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, February 01, 2018
Considerations involving the Australian relief and Operation Crusader in October 1941
We have seen that the whole issue about relieving the 9th Australian Division and removing it from Tobruk were something initiated by General Blamey, the senior Australian officer in the Middle East. We have the sense that he was not totally candid about his reasons for the move, but rather he provided excuses for what he wanted that he felt would get results. He had found a way to overcome the British bad habits of extremely short-term thinking to meet the day's crisis. That approach had led to breaking units into small groups and dispersing them across great distances.
There was also Churchill's influence at work. Churchill always figured himself to be a great military expert, based on his early years and his experience in the Great War. The truth was that Churchill was a politician, and based his actions on political considerations. That often led to disasters, such as the Greek Campaign and the Crete debacle. Churchill was at his best as a political leader, with his ability to communicate and inspire people.
The Australian historian and author wondered if General Blamey would have been vindicated by the events of 1942, if the Japanese had not entered the war in dramatic fashion. That obviously is something about which we can only speculate.
We can also examine the arguments for keeping the Australians in Tobruk, rather than withdrawing them, and they still look like excuses for what Churchill wanted to do. He liked getting his way and having everyone agree with him. He ran into General Blamey, who was also a schemer, like Churcill, we suspect. In this case, General Blamey found a way to override Churchill, much to Mr. Churchill's distress.
Operation Crusader was eventually delayed to 18 November 1941, greatly angering Churchill, who wanted the attack on the enemy forces as early as possible. An interesting note is that Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 20 November. Churchill's anxiousness for an early attack was based on the larger view of the war, not just issues surrounding the situation in North Africa.
The most important real issue was the demands made on the RAF. The Australian historian again notes that during the run up to the offensive, the RAF "was not in the even unduly extended". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the situation.
There was also Churchill's influence at work. Churchill always figured himself to be a great military expert, based on his early years and his experience in the Great War. The truth was that Churchill was a politician, and based his actions on political considerations. That often led to disasters, such as the Greek Campaign and the Crete debacle. Churchill was at his best as a political leader, with his ability to communicate and inspire people.
The Australian historian and author wondered if General Blamey would have been vindicated by the events of 1942, if the Japanese had not entered the war in dramatic fashion. That obviously is something about which we can only speculate.
We can also examine the arguments for keeping the Australians in Tobruk, rather than withdrawing them, and they still look like excuses for what Churchill wanted to do. He liked getting his way and having everyone agree with him. He ran into General Blamey, who was also a schemer, like Churcill, we suspect. In this case, General Blamey found a way to override Churchill, much to Mr. Churchill's distress.
Operation Crusader was eventually delayed to 18 November 1941, greatly angering Churchill, who wanted the attack on the enemy forces as early as possible. An interesting note is that Rommel planned to attack Tobruk on 20 November. Churchill's anxiousness for an early attack was based on the larger view of the war, not just issues surrounding the situation in North Africa.
The most important real issue was the demands made on the RAF. The Australian historian again notes that during the run up to the offensive, the RAF "was not in the even unduly extended". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History and our general knowledge of the situation.
Monday, January 29, 2018
Churchill tries to bulldoze the Australian government in late September and October 1941
The British prime minister, Mr. Churchill, was determined to get the Australian government to agree not to withdraw their last two brigades from Tobruk during the moonless period in October 1941. Churchill's argument did not really have any firm basis in fact, but it was the principle of the thing that drove him to press the Australians. Churchill sent a telegram to the Australian prime minister, now Mr. Fadden, telling him that General Auchinleck had wanted to resign over the Australian government's lack of confidence in him. Churchill told the prime minister that he was asking him to not withdraw the two brigades in the interest of comradeship with the British forces. The timing was bad, because Mr. Fadden's government had fallen and the Labour party was assembling a new government at the time that Churchill's telegram had arrived on 30 September 1941.
Mr. Curtin, the leader of the Labour Party was busy forming the new government. Mr. Fadden consulted with him and then answered Churchill's telegram with a refusal to stop the withdrawal. Mr. Fadden told Churchill that it was not the case that the Australian government lacked confidence in General Auchinleck. Churchill then notified Auchinleck of the Australian response.
Mr. Curtin, the new Australian prime minister, responded to yet another message from Churchill, saying that the previous government had considered all the issues when arriving at a decision, and the new government would make no changes. Churchill replied that he regretted the Australian decision, but he notified General Auchinleck to proceed with the relief of the remaining two brigades. Churchill was very unhappy that other issues caused the start of Operation Crusader to be postponed to 18 November 1941.
Churchill then sent a stern note to General Auchinleck complaining about the delay, when there had been some 4-1/2 months since any other major operation. Meanwhile, the Russians were thought to be getting battered severely by the Germans and the British were not doing anything to help, Churchill believed. The Australian governments felt obligated to follow the advice from their senior officer in the Middle East, General Blamey, rather than submit to pressure from Churchill that would have caused them to have to ignore General Blamey.This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Mr. Curtin, the leader of the Labour Party was busy forming the new government. Mr. Fadden consulted with him and then answered Churchill's telegram with a refusal to stop the withdrawal. Mr. Fadden told Churchill that it was not the case that the Australian government lacked confidence in General Auchinleck. Churchill then notified Auchinleck of the Australian response.
Mr. Curtin, the new Australian prime minister, responded to yet another message from Churchill, saying that the previous government had considered all the issues when arriving at a decision, and the new government would make no changes. Churchill replied that he regretted the Australian decision, but he notified General Auchinleck to proceed with the relief of the remaining two brigades. Churchill was very unhappy that other issues caused the start of Operation Crusader to be postponed to 18 November 1941.
Churchill then sent a stern note to General Auchinleck complaining about the delay, when there had been some 4-1/2 months since any other major operation. Meanwhile, the Russians were thought to be getting battered severely by the Germans and the British were not doing anything to help, Churchill believed. The Australian governments felt obligated to follow the advice from their senior officer in the Middle East, General Blamey, rather than submit to pressure from Churchill that would have caused them to have to ignore General Blamey.This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Friday, January 26, 2018
The British tried to keep from having to remove the rest of the Australians from Tobruk in September 1941
Upon the completion of Operation Supercharge, there were still two Australian brigades left in Tobruk. Churchill, in particular, wanted to not withdraw the brigades, at least not prior to Operation Crusader. The last two Australian brigades fully expected to be withdrawn during the next moonless periods. The British 16th Brigade had arrived and advance group from the 6th Division headquarters were in place in Tobruk. The British units were already being familiarized with the ground that they would defend. The British soldiers met the Australians and socialized with them.
Churchill and his military leadership planned to complain about the impact of the further withdrawal on Operation Crusader. Churchill was always optimistic about the possibilities for future operations. He could visualize announcing in Parliament that the new 8th Army had pushed through and relieved Tobruk and had destroyed the enemy armored forces on the way.That vision seemed much more important than the Australian government's insistence that the division that had been in Tobruk for about six months needed to be withdrawn.
The British thought that they could plead that establishing an ascendancy in the air over the Axis air forces would be compromised by having to provide air cover for the final Australian removal from Tobruk. The unmentioned reason for the British low capability in the air was that they were still unwilling to send Spitfires to the Middle East. That left the RAF in North Africa with Hurricanes and Tomahawks, which were outclassed by Bf-109 fighters.
The truth was that despite having to provide air cover for the relief convoys removing Australians from Tobruk, They already were committed to provide air cover for the regular supply convoys. These were mainly carried in destroyers which had a limited capacity for cargo. To unload at the Tobruk harbor, some ships were moored to jetties while others were tied up to sunken ships and others were simply anchored while lighters moved the cargo ashore.
Air Marshal Tedder wrote a message to the Chief of the Air Staff. The gist of the message that if the enemy continued to refrain from attacks on shipping, the continued relief could proceed without having a great impact. If they did decide to attack the convoys, then the burden on the RAF would greatly increase due to the continued removal of the Australians from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol. III of the Australian Official History.
Churchill and his military leadership planned to complain about the impact of the further withdrawal on Operation Crusader. Churchill was always optimistic about the possibilities for future operations. He could visualize announcing in Parliament that the new 8th Army had pushed through and relieved Tobruk and had destroyed the enemy armored forces on the way.That vision seemed much more important than the Australian government's insistence that the division that had been in Tobruk for about six months needed to be withdrawn.
The British thought that they could plead that establishing an ascendancy in the air over the Axis air forces would be compromised by having to provide air cover for the final Australian removal from Tobruk. The unmentioned reason for the British low capability in the air was that they were still unwilling to send Spitfires to the Middle East. That left the RAF in North Africa with Hurricanes and Tomahawks, which were outclassed by Bf-109 fighters.
The truth was that despite having to provide air cover for the relief convoys removing Australians from Tobruk, They already were committed to provide air cover for the regular supply convoys. These were mainly carried in destroyers which had a limited capacity for cargo. To unload at the Tobruk harbor, some ships were moored to jetties while others were tied up to sunken ships and others were simply anchored while lighters moved the cargo ashore.
Air Marshal Tedder wrote a message to the Chief of the Air Staff. The gist of the message that if the enemy continued to refrain from attacks on shipping, the continued relief could proceed without having a great impact. If they did decide to attack the convoys, then the burden on the RAF would greatly increase due to the continued removal of the Australians from Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol. III of the Australian Official History.
Thursday, January 25, 2018
Operation Supercharge in September 1941
The British had expected that the enemy air forces would attack the relief convoys that were carried out as part of Operation Supercharge. The attacks either did not occur or were ineffective. The only air attack occurred on 19 September 1941 on a convoy of landing craft coming from Mersa Matruh with a cargo of tanks. At this point in the war, the landing craft were called "lighters". Bombs were dropped by the attacking aircraft, but they fell into the sea about a half a mile from the landing craft. The only problems encountered during Operation Supercharge occurred when the small craft involved had some defect that prevented them from sailing to Tobruk. The day after the air attack, there were three schooners had sailed for Tobruk. None of them arrived at Tobruk due to various problems.
During Operation Supercharge, not quite six thousand men were transported out of Tobruk. This number included 544 wounded soldiers. Their replacements in the number of 6,300 men arrived at Tobruk. The operation interfered with supplies for Tobruk, so more than 1,000 tons less than had arrived during July and August 1941. This was partly due to the destroyers having to make room for soldiers and partly because the landing craft were carrying tanks rather than supplies. They also had restricted shipping to and from Tobruk to periods when the RAF could provide air cover.
Shipping traveling to Tobruk was stopped pending a conference to be held on 30 August to discuss supplies for Tobruk. Shipping continued to be suspended for a time following the conference.
The importance of restricting convoys to days when there was no moon was demonstrated on the night of 8 to 9 September when a convoy of destroyers ran in to Tobruk during time when there was moonlight. The destroyers were bombed while entering the Tobruk Harbor and when they departed. Two of the destroyers narrowly missed being hit by bombs. As soon as three days later, another convoy sailed when there was moonlight and it was bombed very early in the day.
Tobruk needed some 1,500 tons of supplies per day. That included about 20 tons a day of petrol. The supply that arrived averaged about 32 tons a day less than was needed. The situation was actually better than the figures would indicate, because "actual ration strength" was less than the nominal figure of 25,000 that was used for planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
During Operation Supercharge, not quite six thousand men were transported out of Tobruk. This number included 544 wounded soldiers. Their replacements in the number of 6,300 men arrived at Tobruk. The operation interfered with supplies for Tobruk, so more than 1,000 tons less than had arrived during July and August 1941. This was partly due to the destroyers having to make room for soldiers and partly because the landing craft were carrying tanks rather than supplies. They also had restricted shipping to and from Tobruk to periods when the RAF could provide air cover.
Shipping traveling to Tobruk was stopped pending a conference to be held on 30 August to discuss supplies for Tobruk. Shipping continued to be suspended for a time following the conference.
The importance of restricting convoys to days when there was no moon was demonstrated on the night of 8 to 9 September when a convoy of destroyers ran in to Tobruk during time when there was moonlight. The destroyers were bombed while entering the Tobruk Harbor and when they departed. Two of the destroyers narrowly missed being hit by bombs. As soon as three days later, another convoy sailed when there was moonlight and it was bombed very early in the day.
Tobruk needed some 1,500 tons of supplies per day. That included about 20 tons a day of petrol. The supply that arrived averaged about 32 tons a day less than was needed. The situation was actually better than the figures would indicate, because "actual ration strength" was less than the nominal figure of 25,000 that was used for planning. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Australian Official History.
Subscribe to:
Comments (Atom)
