The 21st Brigade attacks on 7 June 1941

The men of the 7th Australian Division were very much aware that they were untested in battle and needed to prove themselves. We look first at the 21st Brigade on the first day of the attack on Syria and Lebanon. During the day on 7 June 1941, Brigadier Stevens learned that the commandos would not be able to land on 8 June due to the expected weather. Later in the evening, some four hours before the official start, the first Australians crossed the border. They were wearing rubber footwear to help silence their passage. There were men from the 2/14th Battalion and from the 2/6th Field Company. They cut the phone wire that would have alerted the men who would have set off the demolition charges. Their guides, who were Australian and Palestinians, took them to "a Jewish farming colony at Hanita." After they ate a meal, the men crossed the frontier. The hills were very overgrown with thorns and rough. The sky was dark with clouds to help cover their movements. By 3:30am, one group reached the point where charges were expected to be found. The men checked the bridges and culverts, but did not find any mines. A small group blocked the road while the others went south looking for explosives. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Run up to the attack on Syria and Lebanon in June 1941

The units that were to attack Syria and Lebanon moved into position on the nights of 5th and 6th June and 6th and 7th June 1941. The Australian Official History described the situation as being like the Germans, moving forward in secrecy, ready to attack a peaceful frontier. So far in the second war and never in the first war did British soldiers do such a thing. One group was hidden under olive trees in a grove. They were careful to only move vehicles by road, if at all, and to sweep the tire marks from view where they were under cover. Typical of the level of thinking from General Wilson's staff was a suggestion to change the shape of the Australian hat to hide that they were Australians. That was described as dismal failure of a measure, because the French knew very well who they were fighting. They were up against Australians, primarily. June 7 was spent relaxing, under cover to pass the time. The attack would commence before midnight and the men switched from their comfortable clothes to what they would wear to fight. There was skepticism about the idea that the French would fold when attacked. That was wishful thinking motivated by politics, not reality. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Wilson's strategy for the attack on Syria and Lebanon

The Australian Official History says that by dividing his force into three columns for the attack on Syria and Lebanon, General Wilson assured thatnone of the attacks would have overwhelming strength to achieve a major success. We don't understand why General Wilson was put in charge, except that he was a favorite of Churchill for reasons that we have not yet understood. General Wilson also had bought into the idea that the Vichy French would collapse when attacked, which was not the case. They had a history with Churchill, since at least the attack on Mers el Kebir in July 1940, and they were ready to resist any attempt to occupy Syria and Lebanon. In retrospect, a strong resistance should have been expected, but there were politics involved that kept leaders from thinking clearly. A multi-front attack was appropriate if there had been a real possibility that the defenders would collapse when attacked, but that was very unlikely. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the 25th Australian Brigade's advance into what must have been Lebanon in June 1941

The plan for the 25th Australian Brigade was to move north towards Metulla. The brigade would start from the road to Dafna. They would take the outputs along the high ground that overlooked the road. After that, they would occupy a line including towns like Chebaa and Nabatije et Tahta. Having done that, the brigade would divide into two columns of combined arms. One would move through Hasbaya. The other would move along the Litani gorge and then to Zahle. The expectation is that the left column would move faster and turn to the right, cutting off the defenders of a defile that would be difficult to attack from the front. The plan then envisioned the right column would be able to move north and across the Damascus road and then take the Rayak airfield. The attackers would start under cover of darkness, but then would be exposed. There was the overoptimistic expectation from the British that the French resistance would collapse and they would not have a hard fight. There were some reasons to be concerned, however, including the fact that the French had a strong tank force. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The plan for the 21st Australian Brigade in June 1941

The 21st Australian Brigade was to move north along the coast as well as inland. The planners expected that demolitions by the defenders would greatly interfere with the planned operation. To attempt to prevent demolitions, infantry and engineers were sent north along the coastal road towards Iskandaroun. At the same time, a British commando battalion would be landed north of Litani. The commando battalion commander, Lt-Colonel Pedder was killed in action on 9 June 1941. Another possibility were roads that ran along the border, one to the south and one to the north. Some twenty miles to the east of the coast, the two roads came within a thousand yards of each other. If they could cross to the northern road, they would have an open route to Tyre. The 21st Brigade commander decided to seize French block houses that formed a barrier near the frontier. He also planned to build a road to the northern road that paralleled the border. The best of the battalions, the 2/16th, would be the core of a column that would travel the inland route towards Tyre. The 2/14th Battalion was to capture the French posts on the border. A column consisting of the 2/27th Battalion, light tanks, and engineers would attempt to move north on the coast road. If that was blocked they would move east and follow the other column north. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The 7th Australian Division brigades in June 1941

The commander of the 21st Australian Infantry brigade had been found by General Lavarack from the 6th Australian Division in 1940. Brigadier Stevens had served in the Great War and in the militia until 1935. He had specialized in signals and had been in charge of the 6th Division signals organization in 1940 when he had been selected to form the 21st Brigade. In 1935, Brigadier Stevens had been appointed as a battalion commander, out of the militia. He had as long as nine months to train his brigade prior to the operation in Syria and Lebanon. His counterpart, Brigadier Baxter-Cox had only been appointed to the 25th Brigade in March 1941. Brigadier Baxter-Cox was an architect who had stayed involved with the militia after the Great War. He had been a 2nd Lieutenant in 1918 prior to the end of the war. He had been a militia brigade commander prior to being selected to form the 2/16th Battalion in 1940. The third brigade was an add-on to the 7th Australian Division. This was the 5th Indian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Lloyd. He had recent experience in the Western Desert and in the Abyssinian campaign. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Generals Lavarack and Blamey

For some reason, the reason for which is unclear, General Thomas Blamey had developed a dislike for General John Lavarack. General Lavarack had been commissioned as an officer in 1905, while Blamey had been commissioned in 1906. Blamey was eventually promoted to Field Marshal, but he had a checkered history. He had left the army and had become a police commissioner, where he had been involved with a scandal. He had apparently kept involved with the militia and eventually commanded the 2nd Australian Imperial Force and the I Australian Corps. General Blamey seems to have been politically astute, but had questionable judgment. He kept getting by, due to his political connections. General Lavarack had stayed in the regular army until he finally had tired of Blamey's campaign against him and retired. We are somewhat surprised that General Blamey had let General Lavarack be promoted to command the I Australian Corps during the Syria and Lebanon Campaign. By all accounts, General Lavarack was a very good officer and held senior staff positions, including as Chief of the General Staff in Australia, which made him commander of the Australian Army. Political interests in Australia wanted to not spend money on the army and would have relied on the Royal Navy based in singapore for protection. December 8, 1941 showed that General Lavarack was correct in his belief that the Australian army needed to be strong enough to repel and Japanese invasion. This is based on the account in the Wikipedia.

General Lavarack

Promoting General Lavarack to command the I Australian Corps was a reasonable thing to do. He was a Lieutenant-General, although to get a command in the war, he had accepted command of the 7th Australian Division as a Major-General. He had previously been the Chief of the Australian General Staff, so he had experience as very senior officer. General Lavarack had been commander of the force in the Western Desert, but had been replaced by General Beresford-Peirse, who was junior to him. General Lavarack had a more experienced staff than that of the 6th Australian Division. The brigade commanders in the 7th Division would be operating independently, off in separate directions, so their role was very important. Brigadier Stevens had been a signal corps officer, and had been in the militia pre-war. General Lavarack had been selected Stevens from the 6th Division in 1940 to form the 21st Brigade. He was very junior and had been a 22 year old subaltern in 1918. He was the youngest Australian brigadier. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The reasoning behind General Wilson's plan for the Australians in Syria and Lebanon in 1941

You might wonder why, if the Australian losses in Greece would mean that the I Australian Corps was not ready to take overall command of the occupation of Syria and Lebanon, why they would be ready a short time later? The Australian Official History suggests that General Wilson and his staff thought that the Australian corps losses of vehicles and communications equipment (signals) in Greece would hamper them if they were in command at the start of the invasion of Syria and Lebanon. The I Australian Corps headquarters was moved forward to Nazareth immediately before the start of the operation. The only thing that the corps headquarters lacked was the commander. General Blamey sent a message to the Australian Prime Minister giving his intentions. For the I Australian Corps, he would promote General Lavarack to be corps commander. He wanted an ANZAC corps with the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division, with General Freyberg as the corps commander. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Why did Churchill have so much confidence in Henry Maitland Wilson?

I wondered about the relationship between General Henry Maitland Wilson and Winston Churchill. After he came to power, Churchill kept calling on a select few men to command. My impression is that they were men he personally knew in some way or at least had grown to have some confidence in them. Henry Maitland Wilson was one of the those, just as Bernard Freyberg was.

It is easy to lose sight of Churchill's military service. He was involved in Africa prior to 1900 and then served in the Great War from early on, at Antwerp, and finished the war. Winston Churchill was both an inspirational leader and a menace. From late 1940 until 1942, we see a lot of Churchill as menace. The later CIGS, Alan Brooke, called Churchill a menace, as he was intimately involved in planning and operations for the latter part of the war. The campaign in Greece was an early example of Churchill as menace. He chose his buddy, Henry Maitland Wilson, to command in Greece. What we saw in Vol.II of the Australian Official History was that General Wilson and his staff were substandard and were the cause of men going into captivity when they should have been withdrawn.

General Wilson is again involved with the Syria and Lebanon campaign. The Australian Official History, Volume II, again makes a case that his judgement and staff work were not what were needed. The Australians had to work hard to compensate for the lack of support that they received from Wilson and his staff. The basic plan for Syria was flawed, in that a short time after the operation began, the Australian General Lavarack was to take over as the commander. The Australians again thought that could have been done prior to the start.

From our knowledge of Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, we suspect that he was all about people, relationships, and bold ideas. From June 1940 on to July 1941, we don't see anything to change or minds about him.

The Australian Plans for the occupation of Syria

The 7th Australian Division would have three objectives. One was to move to a "line from Merdjayoun along the road to Sidon." The second objective was another line. This one was formed by a line drawn through "Rasheiya, Machrhara, Jezzine, and Sidon." The last objective was the road from Rayak to Beirut. One brigade, the 21st would be in Beirut. The other, the 25th, would hold the airfield at Rayak. There were also the two battalions from the 6th Division. They would be relegated to holding prisoners and providing police for the areas that would be captured.

Only one June 5, 1941 was General Lavarack officially informed that when they had reached the first objective, he would take command of a I Australian Corps and command the entire operation. The logical thing, from the Australian perspective, would have been to give him the command from the beginning, but that was rejected. The 16th Brigade commander, Brigadier Allen would be promoted to command the 7th Australian Division when Lavarack became the Corps commander. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The invasion force for Syria and Lebanon in June 1941

Vol.II of the Australian Official History lists the order of battle for the invasion and occupation of Lebanon and Syria in June 1941:

7th Australian Division (Major-General Lavarack)
  21st Brigade (2/14, 2/16, 2/17 battalions)
  25th Brigade (2/25, 2/11, 2/33 battalions)
  Division troops
    6th Australian Division Cavalry Regiment
    9th Australian Division Cavalry Regiment
    2/4 Field Regiment
    2/5 Field Regiment
    2/6 Field Regiment
    2/2 Anti-Tank Regiment
    2/3 Battalion
    2/5 Battalion
    2/3 MG Battalion
    2/3 Pioneer Battalion
    one composite mechanized unit from the Greys and Staffordshire Yeomanry
    one squadron of the Royals (armoured cars)
    57th Light AA Regiment
5th Indian Brigade Group (Brigadier Lloyd)
   5th Indian Brigade (1/Royal Fusiliers, 3/1 Punjab, 4/6 Rajput Rifles)
   1 field regiment
   1 battery RAA
   1 troop LAA
Free French Division (General Legentilhomme)
   Brigade d'Orient (1 B.M. battalion, 2 B.M. battalion, Foreign Legion)
   1 battery artillery (4-75mm guns)
   1 tank company (9 tanks)
   1 anti-tank company
   company Marine fusiliers
   Circassian Cavalry (300 men)
   Force troops

Syria and Lebanon: A typical General Wilson operation

The operation to occupy Syria and Lebanon had the handicap of being planned by Generals Wilson and Wavell. Fresh off the dual disasters of Greece and Crete, they were working their magic on Syria and Lebanon. On 28 May 1941, the staff work backing the operation was shown to be inadequate. General Lavarack, who was still the 7th Australian Division commander at this date, was critical of the over-optimistic view that was shaping the plans. By early June 1941, the French were moving troops and equipment up to the border area. The operation was set, on 4 June, to commence on 8 June. The plan now was to have one Australian brigade on the coast, another in the center, and the 5th Indian Brigade and Free French on the right. The plan left out the Arab Legion from Jordan, which distressed the commander "Glubb Pasha." This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Discussions about augmenting the 7th Australian Division for the Syrian occupation in 1941

General Lavarack commanded the 7th Australian Division in May 1941. His division had been the garrison for Mersa Matruh prior to their inclusion for the Syrian occupation. The division only had two infantry brigades at this time, the 21st and the 25th. The division did have all three of its artillery regiments and had the 6th Australian Division's cavalry regiment, as the 7th Division cavalry regiment had been sent to Cyprus. General Blamey was in Cairo and still had some control over Australian forces. Most of the surviving 6th Australian Division battalions were still in Crete in May. Two battalions were in Palestine, though, so those were allocated to the 7th Division. The battalions were the 2/3rd abd 2/5th. On May 22, General Wilson informed General Lavarack that main objective of the force along the coast road would be Beirut. The British were going to use an elaborate deception scheme to try and hide their operations. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

The force to occupy Syria in 1941

The primary unit that would attack and occupy Syria was the 7th Australian Division. Up until June 1941, the division had not seen combat. They had formed in April and May 1940 and then was primarily training. Since April 1941, the division had been at Mersa Matruh. They had been holding the fortress and improving the defences while under fairly constant air attack. The British liked to use brigades and battalions as independent units, so the 7th Australian Division had units removed and added over time. In May and June, the division only had two brigades, the 21st and the 25th. The 7th Australian Divisional Cavalry regiment was in Cyprus, so the 7th Division was given the 6th Australian Divisional Cavalry Regiment, who were veterans. The 6th Australian Division had been a victim of the policy of scattering units that continued into 1942. Only when Bernard Law Montgomery arrived on the scene was there a push to stop the practice. The other units that were to attack Syria were the 5th Indian Brigade, which had been involved in the campaign in East Africa, the Free French, along with some smaller units. The air force included fighters, bombers, and an Army Cooperation Squadron. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

What the Attackers Faced in Syria in 1941

General Wavell would have not wanted to attack Syria so soon after Greece and Crete. His forces were in disarray and Syria might have been a tough region to take. Syrla was a fairly large area, stretching for some 300 miles both north and south and east and west. The French forces in Syrla and Lebanon were larger and were better equipped than any force that Wavell could field. The would-be occupiers would have to deal with mountains and deserts. The French General Headquarters was located in Beirut, Lebanon. A railroad ran from Beirut through to Damascus, Syria. The British would have to decide if they would go north along the coast, of if they would try the mountain roads, or if they would cut across the desert.

The defenders had six regiments, including a Foreign Legion unit. There was another mixed regiment of colonial and metropolitan troops. There were also four regiments of African native troops. Of the cavalry, there were 9,000 men, some of which were mechanized and some where on horseback. As for artillery, they had 90 field and medium guns. There were about 10,000 troops from Syria and Lebanon, but they were thought to be unreliable. General Dentz was the overall commander, with a deputy commander. There were also three regional commanders at Damascus, Beirut, and Aleppo. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

Indecisive German Policy in the Middle East Squandered Some Opportunities

As we mentioned the initial German policy towards French North Africa was to disarm the colonial armies. Once they realized that would make more difficult resisting British occupation, they stopped the process. Later, when the Iraqi Arab Nationalist had asked Germany for help in revolting against the British occupation, they had ignored him. Only by January 1941 did they decided to help. The initial request was for weapons and gold. Even now, an Arab uprising will want to have both those things. Gold is important for buying participation. Once the revolt in Iraq had started independently, the Germans were still without any plan to be involved. The Germans finally sent a few plans to Iraq, but the commander of that flight was shot down by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire over Baghdad because they were not expected. The French finally sent a train with weapons to Iraq, but the revolt was already failing by then. The French in Syria did not really want to help, but had to make a token gesture for German consumption. The French in Syria were under Italian supervision under the Armistice, which the French disliked immensely. The French in Syria also greatly disliked the Germans who had conquered their country in 1940. They also disliked the British, who had been their competitor for influence and colonies in the Levant. The British were also thought to have failed the French in 1940. The Free French were considered to be disloyal to France by cooperating with the British. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

German action with respect to Syria in early June 1941

The Germans decided to pull out of Syria any overt presence. Disguised German intelligence officers would be the only Germans to stay in Syria. General Keitel had passed this information on to the Italians on 2 June 1941. The German plan was to keep from giving the British any excuse to attack Syria and to foment discontent between the Vichy French and the British. The Vichy French government had ordered General Dentz to fight any British attempt to occupy Syria. At his trial after the war, General Dentz argued that he had to resist the British invasion to keep from giving the Germans any reason to move into the French colonies and the continental Vichy France. The case was that the British pretext for invading Syria was to keep Syria out of German hands, but by the time of the invasion, German policy was to withdraw from Syria and not offer any reason for the British to invade. A mistaken German policy after the Armistice in 1940 had been to disarm the French colonial armies. They later regretted that plan as they could see that the only way to keep the British out was if the French colonial forces were strong enough to resist invasion. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

General Dentz was not on board with helping the Germans in May and June 1941

The key person involved with the Germans in May and June 1941 was none other than Admiral Darlan. General Dentz, the commander in Syria, had assured the British in April that he had the airfields guarded and they would not let the Germans use them. However, on 6 May, Admiral Darlan had ordered that the Germans should be allowed to use the airfields. During the fighting in Iraq, as many as 120 German aircraft passed through Syria, going to Iraq and returning from there. General Dentz had been doing the best he could to thwart the aid to the rebels in Iraq. He had sent a small number of artillery pieces without sights and had send old machine guns. By the end of May, the failure of the rebellion in Iraq was obvious. By 6 June, the Germans were gone from Syria. The Americans were informed of this fact. It seems strange to have the Americans involved, but they were. The Germans were also concerned that the British would have a pretext for occupying Syria, and ordered the aircraft and men to be withdrawn. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.

More about the Darlan Agreement about Syria in May 1941

Admiral Darlan, the Vichy Foreign Minister, had signed an agreement that would give aid to Germany and the efforts in Iraq to create trouble for the British. One particularly inflammatory move was to agree to sell three quarters of the military equipment in Syria at the armistice. The sale would be to Iraq to equip the rebel forces that were in opposition to British rule. We already mentioned that German and Italian aircraft would be able to use Syrian airfields and be refueled. The German aircraft would be allowed to operate out of the airfield at Aleppo and would be permitted to use Syrian ports and railroad facilities. France would be allowed to send artillery to Syria along with heavy anti-aircraft batteries. They would also be permitted to send more troops to Syria. Marshal Petain was informed that the Darlan agreement would cause trouble with America and the British. In early June, Marshal Petain ordered a reappraisal of Vichy relations with Germany. France, of course, did not know about the pending German invasion of Russia which would have a great impact on the military situation in North Africa. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Australian Official History.