The Axis air effort in April to May 1942

The Axis air effort in March 1942 had concentrated on eliminating Malta as a threat against Axis shipping. They succeeded in that effort. By April, they concentrated against targets that would help the planned May land offensive. They hit Tobruk, the railroad along the coast, the forward airfields and troops deployed near the front. Particularly the German air force recommenced hitting Alexandria and the Suez Canal. the British night fighters of No.89 Squadron had a field day against Axis night bombers. Fighters and bombers were shifted from Sicily to North Africa, as well as to Greece and Crete. The operational tempo greatly increased by the third week of May. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Increased air activity from March

Because of the convoy run from Alexandria to Malta in March 1942, the air activity increased considerably. The British made a special effort against the Axis air forces, especially the Luftwaffe. In conjunction with the convoy, the army conducted raids against Rommel's army. These were supported by fighter cover and resulted in three Me-109's destroyed, although at the cost of five Kittyhawks and one Hurricane. At the same time, Wellington bombers raided airfields and ports.

When the Germans started flying supplies and troops over the sea in Ju-52's, long-range Kittyhawks and Beaufighters were sent against them. After a successful action on 12 May 1942, the Germans resorted to escorting the Ju-52's with Me-109's fitted with "extra fuel tanks". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Axis fighter-bombers

The Axis air forces in the desert started using fighter-bombers in response to the British operations. El Adem and Gazala received visits from Me-109 fighter-bombers, which achieved "considerable success". Due to the impact of dust on operations, the British pulled their fighters back to Gambut and Gasr el Arid. They were further from the front, which gave sufficient time to intercept German raiders. They also had better communications and AA defenses. Before ground operations began in May, British fighters mainly operated in defense of Tobruk, shipping, roads, rail transport, and airfields. They had to contend with Me-109's using the sun to attack. Four Hurricanes were jumped by six or eight Messerschmitts. Two were shot down and two were badly damaged. The British adopted the tactic as well with equal success. They shot down six Macchi 200 fighters over Tobruk. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The air war in March through May 1942

After the British fighter bombers and day bombers achieved some successes against Axis airfields in Western Cyrenaica, the Germans resolved to do something to put a stop to it. They decided to go after British airfields with the aim, as the Official History quotes, "to regain air supremacy".

The British aircraft also staged a low level of attacks on the Axis supply line. Why this was only a low level, we have a hard time understanding, but that is what it was. During this period, about one hundred sorties against ground targets were carried out by Beaufighters, Hurricane and Kittyhawk fighter-bombers. Particularly successful were the Hurricanes that operated at night against encampments, transport, and aircraft.

Another change was that tactical reconnaissance units were replacing Hurricane Is with Tomahawks. In the period leading up to May, tactical reconnaissance in the forward areas was critical, so the effort to improve the survivability of reconnaissance aircraft was very important. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Malta neutralized

Unlike May and June 1941, Malta was not a factor in the war in North Africa in May 1942. A few Wellingtons still operated from Malta, but they were only able to make sixty sorties against Tripoli during the "lull" in the fighting. They did have a few successes while raiding Palermo, Sicily, sinking or damaging ships.

Only Liberators from Egypt could now hit Tripoli, and they only arrived in numbers by May 1942. Because of that, the main successes against Axis shipping were achieved by raiding Benghazi, due to the closeness of Desert air fields. Bombers operating around the clock made 741 sorties against the port and installations at Benghazi from February to May. As the enemy showed signs of an imminent land attack, Kittyhawks and Bostons appeared over Benghazi during daylight. The attacks seemed to not seriously interrupt the supply buildup, however. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Fighter Bombers

In the Spring of 1942, there was a shortage of British day bombers in North Africa. As a way to make up for the shortage, fighters came to be fitted with "one or more bombs". Fighters could always shed their bombs if they needed to perform as fighters, so there was little negative about their role as fighter bombers. Both Hurricanes and Kitty Hawks were fitted with bombs in May 1942. One Hurricane and three Kitty Hawk squadrons started operations as fighter bombers. Initially, they carried two 250lb bombs, but Kitty Hawks eventually came to be armed with a single 500lb bomb. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History,

Day Bombers

The priority for day bomber crews was bombing practice. The usual altitude was eight to ten thousand feet, in level flight. Training also was conducted in 15,000 foot altitude bombing and bombing in a shallow glide. The Douglas Boston was replacing the older day bombers and had the advantage of higher speed than the Martin Maryland and Bristol Blenheim. The new arrangements in late spring of 1942 facilitated greater cooperation between British fighters and day bombers. Now, the two were based in close proximity and that allowed the fighters to usually escort the bombers. Interestingly, one of the new procedures was to avoid flying "down sun". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Bf-109F threat (Me-109F)

The Bf-109F (the official history calls it the Me-109F) was present in enough strength in early 1942 that the fighter plane was causing problems for the British over the desert (as many problems as it was causing the Russians). British pilots tended to be under trained in the desert and they were not very accurate in firing. As part of the measures implemented to better counteract the Bf-109F, British pilots started "shadow firing", rather than firing at a towed drogue. Radar coverage had improved to better detect low-flying Bf-109F's and there were more ground observers equipped with radios. For more flexibility and to reduce the number of targets for the German planes, the British instituted patrols with 4 to 6 fighters. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British air force in the Middle East

By Spring 1942, the British air strength was greatly strained by the military situation. They were especially short of trained aircrew. One of the ongoing complaints about the air crews in the Middle East was the lack of operational training. The Middle East needed reinforcements, but the home forces were so taxed that there was little available to send. Bomber Command was in such as state that there was only one pilot per heavy bomber at this date. The Air Ministry reacted negatively to Air Marshall Tedder's plea for more air crew for the Middle East, but they stretched enough to send some reinforcements.

An important piece of the plans for the upcoming land offensive was to have a stronger air strength available to both protect the troops and to attack the Axis forces on the ground and sea. A new fighter group headquarters, No.211 Group, was built from two wing headquarters. Group Captain K.B.B. Cross was the first commander. He had been a senior wing commander during the recent Crusader battle. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Richard O'Connor

I was reading the Wikipedia entry for General Sir Richard O'Connor, who beat the Italians in Operation Compass that took Cyrenaica from the Italians, starting from late 1940 and ending at Beda Fomm. What interested me was that O'Connor served under J.F.C. Fuller, as brigade major of the Experimental Brigade, from 1921 to 1935. General Fuller was an early advocate for the use of combined arms forces, including armour, artillery, infantry, and aircraft in support. O'Connor had this mysterious knowledge about mobile forces that I could not explain.

The Royal Air Force in the Desert from February to May 1942

The end of the Crusader Battle left the RAF to rebuild. They had suffered great losses in the battle during a transition period when some aircraft types were out of production while their replacements were slow in arriving. As the Hurricane I had lost its effectiveness, there were not many Hurricane IIs in the pipeline. This was the case for a number of aircraft:

Old Model            Status            New Model           Status
Hawker Hurricane I   outperformed      Hawker Hurricane II slow in arriving
Curtis Tomahawk      production ended  Curtis Kittyhawk    few arriving
Martin Maryland      production ended  Martin Baltimore    few arriving, 
                                                            needed modifications
Bristol Blenheim IV  engine troubles   Douglas Boston      engine troubles

One positive move was the arrival of Consolidated Liberator and Handley Page Halifax heavy bombers in the Middle East. They were much more capable than the older Vickers Wellington medium bombers. They belonged to the original twin-engined heavy bomber category that had gradually become obsolescent. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Malta and North Africa in May 1942

The Middle East commanders continued to obliviously send communications to Britain that greatly incensed the prime minister and the Chiefs of Staff. For example, on 9 May 1942, they stated that they thought that the loss of Malta would not be fatal to the position in North Africa, as long as the supply lines through the Indian Ocean remained open. The restated their opinion, which proved correct, that an attack without adequate force strength would result in the loss of the attackers. If there was no reserve, Egypt would be lost. They did acknowledge that the Axis forces seemed to be grouping for an attack on the Gazala line. The Middle East commanders thought that such an attack risked the loss of significant Axis strength and might even open the way to a successful counterattack. The Prime Minister would have none of it, however: "We are determined that Malta should not be allowed to fall without a battle being fought by your whole army for its retention". This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Chiefs of Staff and Prime Minister force premature action

The Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff refused to acknowledge that the army in North Africa was seriously out-matched by the Axis forces in May 1942. They were back to the late 1940 mentality that thought that the army needed to go forward when needed, regardless of the consequences. Strategic factors outweighed the facts on the ground. General Auchinleck was also concerned about the situation in the Far East and was fully prepared to go in the defensive so that more forces could be sent East. The concern in Britain, though, was that Malta was very vulnerable and could be easily lost. They felt that such a loss would seriously compromise the entire Commonwealth defense posture. Therefore, the army had to attack soon to relieve the pressure on Malta and allow air forces to operate closer in support. Those in Britain also had reason to expect an Axis attack in North Africa in June and wanted to forestall that attack. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

Early April 1942

Naturally, the decision to allow time for training the troops greatly angered the Prime Minister. He decided that his men who he had sent to the Middle East had simply not answered the arguments. Churchill assumed that he was correct and that the commanders in the Middle East were wrong! After accepting mid-May, the commanders in the Middle East decided that they could not commit to an attack, even at that date. All this had occurred very early in April 1942. By 9 April, the Chiefs of Staff had become very concerned about the safety of Ceylon, and ordered the Middle East to send further forces East. They were ordered "to send 30 Hurricane IIs, 20 Blenheim IVs and a squadron of Beaufort torpedo-bombers". When the Middle Eastern commanders inquired about the situation, they were warned that the Japanese could well threaten India and very soon. General Auchinleck's reaction was that under the circumstances, it would be foolhardy to risk and offensive in North Africa when the situation in the East was so grim. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Prime Minister is angered

Churchill, as always, was pressing for a premature offensive in the desert. General Auchinleck presented the reasons why such a move would be risking disaster. Churchill, in fit of pique, wanted to bring Auchinleck back to Britain to confront him. Auchinleck argued that he did not want to be absent from the theater, as he did not want anyone but himself to be responsible for even a short period. In a compromise, Sir Stafford Cripps, who was travelling to India, was diverted to the Middle East to meet with Auchinleck and his commanders. The Vice-CIGS, General Nye, was also present. They met with Auchinleck and were convinced that he was correct. One factor ignored by the Prime Minister and others in Britain was the urgent need for training of raw troops. Churchill was extremely displeased, but he grudgingly accepted the date of mid-May 1942 for the offensive against Rommel's forces. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The Middle East was to be further stripped of forces

The Middle East was informed on 17 February 1942 that they would lose the 70th Division, which was to be sent to the Far East, in the face of Japanese advances. They were also warned that they were likely to lose the 9th Australian Division, as well. At the same time, Alan Brooke, the CIGS, warned General Auchinleck that a division in Iraq would be withdrawn to India. At best, one more division was would be sent from Britain to the Middle East before the fall of 1942. The Chiefs of Staff in London was ready to assume a defensive posture in the Middle East in order to stop the Japanese offensive in the Far East. In response, General Auchinleck replied that an offensive in the Western Desert prior to 1 June would put the entire enterprise in North Africa at risk. The one spot that the Chiefs of Staff were determined to protect was Malta. They were prepared to commit a considerable force to pass a convoy through with supplies and arms. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

A shortage of Ordnance Workshops in the Middle East

One of the continual complaints in the Middle East from mid-1941 onwards was the long period required to return damaged tanks to action. Besides the inherent shortcomings of the Crusader and other tanks, a major factor was the scarcity of Ordnance Workshops. This shortage was acknowledged, but a series of events thwarted sending more to the Middle East. In October 1941, the commanders had decided that replacement drafts were more important than Ordnance Workshops, so they were bumped from several convoys. Only two were in transit by March 1942. Another workshop was blocked by the intended convoy being diverted to the Far East. The ongoing battle between the commanders and staff in Britain, who desired an attack as quickly as possible and the commanders and staff in the Middle East, who did not want to attack until they had prospect of success. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The British plan for an offensive in 1942

Because of the pressing need for the British to base aircraft in western Cyrenaica, a plan was prepared that envisioned a force of "three armoured divisions, two armoured brigade groups, one army tank brigade, and three infantry divisions" by mid-April 1942. This plan was made as early as February 1942. A tank superiority of 3:2 was needed to fight the Germans, due to the inferiority of the Crusader tank. There was increasing pressure from the staff in Britain to launch an early offensive, but the commanders in North Africa, including General Auchinleck resisted an attack before a superior tank force could be assembled. The goal was not just to take Cyrenaica but to advance into Tripolitania. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan with respect to Tobruk

In February 1942, General Auchinleck had told General Ritchie to do everything possible to keep Tobruk from capture. What General Auchinleck resolved not to do was to have a division in Tobruk and have the Axis forces surrounding the fortress. The intent was to withdraw to the frontier rather than allow a division to be tied down and put at risk. The commanders in chief concurred, apparently, at least in February. February to May would be spent in building up the tank forces for a new offensive that would reconquer the western Cyrenaican airfields. They were desperately needed to allow convoys to run to Malta and to operate against Axis shipping. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.

The plan to invade Malta in early 1942

Taking the island of Malta would have been a much more difficult task than taking Crete, a year before. While Crete was taken by airborne forces, Malta would require troops and equipment landed from sea. The first stage would have 8300 men landing on the island by landing craft. These initial troops would be supported by artillery and tanks also landed. Supplies and reinforcements would follow, also by sea. The Italian fleet would prevent British surface ships from reaching the island. There would also be a flotilla of German submarines to protect the attacking forces and to prevent reinforcements and supplies from reaching Malta. Germany would also supply Italy with "40,000 tons of oil fuel and 12,000 tons of aviation spirit". Three corps were allocated for the attack. The one Airborne Corps had one German and one Italian airborne division. Of the other two corps, one had two Italian divisions and the other would have three. Additional forces included six independent Italian battalions, "two tank battalions, some armoured cars, self-propelled artillery, motor-cyclists and ancillary units and a few German tanks". Between 370 and 470 tranport aircraft would carry the airborne forces. These would include 155 Italian SM.82's, the rest being German Ju-52's. This is based on the account in Vol.III of the Official History.