Air units in East Africa

All of the air units available to support General Cunningham were with the South African Air Force. The squadrons available were:

No.3 Squadron SAAF  Hurricanes and Gladiators
No.11 Squadron SAAF Fairey Battles
No.12 Squadron SAAF Ju-86s
No.40 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF  Hartbeests
No.41 Army Cooperation Squadron SAAF  Hartbeests

This force was "commanded by Air Commodore W, Sowrey, R.A.F., with Brigadier H. Daniels, S.A.A.F., as his Senior Air Staff Officier". An army cooperation control group was reconstituted on 20 May for this compaign. This is based on Vol.II of the Official History.

General Cunningham's plans

General Cunningham's plan, dating from April 1941, had been "to move on Jimma and the Lakes from Addis Ababa and at the same time advance northwards from Yavello and Neghelli". The orders from General Wavell to take the road from Asmara to Addis Ababa changed the plan. General Cunningham was reduced to part of the 11th African Division the 12th African Division. His new plan was for the two divisions to push forward and to join and then "drive the enemy from the Lakes region". This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation at Galla-Sidamo

Under Italian rule, Ethiopia was divided into five provinces. Galla-Sidamo was in south-western Ethiopia. General Gazzera was located at Jimma. The province was 500 miles long and 300 miles wide. Jimma was connected to the capital at Addas Ababa by one of three roads into the province. There is a string of lakes that stretch over 140 miles, starting from the northernmost, which is about 60 miles from Adda Ababa. "South African engineers were building a new all-weather road" from Marsabit in Kenya. The other roads could only be used in fair weather, and were poor. The Italian forces in three locations, and consisted of four understrength divisions supported by the remaining 30 light and medium tanks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The situation in East Africa, starting in the spring of 1941

After the main Italian army, commanded by the Duke d'Aosta had surrendered in East Africa, the British commanders had wanted to strip down the remaining forces to the minimum. It was only due to General Cunningham's successes that he had won permission to continue offensive operations. One factor that greatly helped was that the Italian air force in East Africa had "collapsed". The SAAF and RAF in the Sudan were able to "play a decisive part". Air power proved to be a "decisive factor" at Gondar, later in the summer and fall. General Cunningham's first operations were in Galla-Sidamo from April to October 1941. Some of General Platt's force was made available to General Cunningham from the Sudan. The second phase ran from October to November and included the attack against Gondar. French Somaliland also was an ongoing concern, although that mainly was a political problem. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The remaining Italian forces in East Africa in May 1941

The Official History now switches context to "the final campaign in East Africa". We have previously summarized the victories in East Africa, as convered in Volume I of the Official History. Somewhat less than 25% of the Italian forces in East Africa remained, after the Duke of Aosta had surrendered on 19 May 1941. The remaining Italians were located in Galla-Sidamo and in Gondar. There was also a "garrison at Assab on the Red Sea". General Nasi's army in Gondar consisted of "about 41,000 men and 70 guns". General Gazzera had more guns (200) and somewhat fewer soldiers (38,000) in Galla-Sidamo. His force was swelled by refugees from fallen areas, such as Somalia. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The roles of the German and Italian air forces in the Mediterranean Theater

The German and Italian air forces were essentially two separate commands. While they obviously had joint interests and often cooperated, there was no unified command. The Official History suggests that if they had a unified command, that they might have been able to hurt the British quite badly, if they had made a determined effort to attack shipping in the Suez and the ports. Rommel's priority was immediate pressure on the supply line to Tobruk, so while that pressed the British Inshore Squadron to the limit, they did not succeed in starving Tobruk to the point of surrender. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Dilution of Axis air power in the fall of 1941

The German air unit in the Mediterranean was Fliegerkorps X. They had a force of He-111 and Ju-88 bombers. Both had a considerable range. They might well have caused a great deal of damage if they had been concentrated on bombing Malta, the Suez, or even the British supply lines. Instead, they were occupied in tasks for which they were ill-suited and misused. The primary one was escorting convoys. I suppose the idea was to bomb any British surface attackers. The Official History offers the opinion that Fliegerkorps X was inadequate for the demands being made up on it. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The Italian air power

The Official History says that the Italian air force, at their entry to the war, consisted of 313 aircraft "in Libya and the Aegean" and "325 in East Africa". In the period we are presently considering, June to October 1941, the Italian air force had "73 bombers and 137 fighters" in Libya and "37 bombers and 46 fighters in the Aegean". The air force in East Africa was non-existant by this time. The Italian air force was commanded from Italy, so that the Libyan army commander had less control over operations than he would have liked. There was a liaison between the German and Italian air forces, but this was in Rome. The Official History points out that the German High Command still considered the North African war an Italian operation. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

The German air force in the Middle East and Mediterranean in 1941

In January 1941, Fliegerkorps X had been sent to Sicily to operate against Malta and shipping in the Mediterranean Sea. They were the specialist unit for martime operations, and had taken part in the Norway campaign, later in 1940. Fliegerkorps X was only peripherally involved with Greece and Crete. They were mostly the province of Fliegerkorps VIII and XI, from the Balkans. After the capture of Crete, Fliegerkorps X was left. They had between 400 and 450 aircraft. Their serviceable aircraft often was as low as 250 at any point in time. The point was made that Fliegerkorps X and Rommel's army were just detachments and were not intended to absorb a lot of resources that were needed elsewhere. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Comparative losses in the air in the Middle East from mid-June to mid-October

The British intelligence estimates in 1941 were that they had destroyed 142 German aircraft and 253 Italian aircraft between the middle of June 1941 until the middle of October. The real German records show that their total losses, from all causes, were just 81 aircraft. There are not comparable records for the Italians, but existing records for the middle of June to the middle of September show that they lost 89 aircraft, plus others "destroyed on the ground from July onwards". The British losses for the same period "were 198 destroyed in battle and 48 on the ground". This is based on the account in the Official History.

More on the Axis air effort in the fall of 1941

Attacks on shipping to Tobruk were carried out by Ju-87's, often escorted by Me-109F's, which were superior to every British fighter in the Western Desert. The Official History says that at times, almost every British fighter in the theater was involved in the protection of shipping.

The Axis airforces carried on harassing raids against "targets in the desert". Suez and the canal were hit by Ju-88's based in Greece. These were carried out over July to October 1941, aanmd involved 34 attacks with 300 sorties. Few of these were successfully attacked. Five were lost, of which one was in August and four were in September. This is based on the account in the Official History.

The Axis air campaign

Much of the German air campaign was devoted to bombing Tobruk and the ships carrying supplies. The Germans used their divebombers to attack shipping. They also hit the harbour with divebombers, as well as level bombers. Night bombers based in Greece conducted unaimed bombing of the general area at night. The Germans also laid mines in the harbour, to do everything they could to weaken Tobruk for an anticipated attack. Apparently, the British anti-aircraft artillery were very effective. Fighter cover was less of a factor, due to the range from bases. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More on air operations in the Middle Eastern Theater in the fall of 1941

German supply dumps in the forward areas were repeatedly hit by South African Marylands, flying under escort. Dumps near Gambut, between Tobruk and the border were singled out for more attention. The result was that German preparations for a renewed attack on Tobruk were delayed, so that the British were ready for offensive operations before Rommel.

Besides supply lines, the battle for air supremacy was waged by a bombing campaign against Axis airfields. Fields at Gambut and Gazala were particularly targeted. Gazala was the main fighter base.

British fighter aircraft were totally devoted to air defense of the main army bases and convoys to Tobruk, and to escorting reconnaissance and bomber aircraft. The alternate, more offensive strategy would have entailed patrols over Axis-held territory, looking for opposing aircraft to engage.
This is based on the account in the Official History.

More on the RAF bombing offensive in the fall of 1941 and the Martin Maryland

In August and September 1941, Wellingtons flying from Egypt hit the Corinth Canal with the aim of blocking it. At the time, it had been thought that they had succeeded, but we now know that they had not been able to block the canal.

Both Derna and Bardia were bombed frequently. At night, they were hit by Wellingtons and Fairey Albacores and in the daytime, they were hit by Blenheims and Marylands. The Maryland was playing a greater bombing role at this date, while they had previously had been restricted to maritime reconnaissance. They were a diminishing resource, however, as production had been limited. As I have previously written, this lists Maryland production:

Customer        Martin
Designation     Model  Customer    Production    Initial Delivery
XA-22           167    US Army       1 prototype  9/28/1939
167-A3          167-F1 France      115 aircraft  12/12/1939
167-A3          167-F2 France      100 aircraft   2/08/1940
167-A3 Armoured 167-B3 France       45 aircraft   6/18/1940
Maryland I      167-B3 British RAF  50 aircraft   ?
Maryland I      167-B3 British RAF  35 aircraft   7/25/1940
Maryland II     167-B4 British RAF 150 aircraft   4/14/1941

The successor aircraft was to be the Martin 187 Baltimore. Volume deliveries to the Middle East only happened in the Spring of 1942. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History and from the Glenn L. Martin Maryland Aviation Museum site.

This was apparently an early Maryland I, perhaps taking off.

These are some Maryland pages:

1. Warbirds: The Martin Maryland
2. RAF Museum: Maryland photo
3. Wikipedia: A-22 Maryland
4. The Glenn L Martin Maryland Aviation Museum: Martin Model 167
   

Middle East air operations June-October 1941

During a four month period from mid-June to mid-October 1941, there were widespread air operations in the Middle Eastern theater. The Tripoli port was hit at night 72 times by a total of 357 Wellingtons (one aircraft per sortie). Daylight raids were made by Marylands and Blenheims. As the British were only able to use 500 lbs. bombs and smaller, the damage was not as extensive as it might have been.

Operations continued from Malta. They hit targets in Sicily and Southern Italy, concentrating on airfields and ports.

Benghazi was hit in 102 attacks by Wellingtons operating from Egypt. The squadrons involved were No.37, No.38, No.70, and No.148. Marylands from No.12 Squadron SAAF and No.24 Squadron SAAF, as well as No.39 Squadron RAF. Marylands and Blenheims also were used in night attacks on Benghazi, starting in August. By the end of this period, SAAF Marylands were used in daylight attacks. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air support for the Army from July 1941

As previously noted, the No.253 Army Cooperation Wing had been formed for the expressed purpose of providing air support for the Army. The wing was now part of the Western Desert Air Force. Joint army RAF exercises were conducted, starting in July 1941. One step that was defined by September was to provide an Air Support Control Headquarters (ASC). These units were provided to corps headquarters and to armoured divisions. Each brigade had a "tentacle" that could communicate with wireless telegraphy to the ASC. They functioned as forward air controllers, as we would call them. The ASC units only came into existence by 8 October, when the first two were formed. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Air Vice-Marshal Dawson

Air Vice-Marshal Dawson was sent to the Middle East from the Ministry of Aircraft Production. He role was as Chief Maintenance and Supply Officer was to oversee the assembly of new aircraft, including any modifications, the maintenance of aircraft, their storage, and supplying associated equipment and parts. He arrived in June 1941. There had been four maintenance units in the Middle East, three focused on repairs and one on ordnance. No.103 at Aboukir was heavily bombed and was moved. No.102 had fallen into disuse and had practically ceased to exist. More was moved to the Massara caves, and it was expanded to deal with storage and repair, becoming the No.111 Maintenance Unit. When Aboukir was under attack, it was partially moved to Heliopolis. The became a new repair unit. The British Overseas Aircraft Corporation largely supplied the staff. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

More Churchill intervention in later 1941

Political concerns continued to drive the Prime Minister's agenda on the Middle East. He relented and was going to allow 25,000 more air personnel to be transported to the Middle East, but in fact, only 15,000 were sent by the end of 1941. Everyone but Churchill also wanted more "reinforcements and drafts" to build up existing units that had been depleted, but Churchill wanted to send out new divisions, instead, to have more British divisions in the field, so that all the fighting was not being done by "the Dominions". Even that did not happen. Churchill had asked President Roosevelt for shipping for two "regular British divisions", but in the event, there was only shipping available for one, and that to be sent from Halifax, and that division, the 18th, ended up being sent to the Far East, not the Middle East. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Churchill was unhappy with RAF staffing plans for the Middle East

Convoy capacity from Great Britain to the Middle East never was great enough for the demand. By the summer of 1941, the Chiefs of Staff had wanted to send 35,000 men to the Middle East to build up the RAF there, to correct the shortages and shortcomings. Churchill was resistant, because he wanted to send army troops instead. In stead of 35,000 men, he wanted that number to be reduced to 20,000. The 35,000 men was intended to aid the buildup to 62-1/2 squadrons, including 17 new fighter squadrons. Churchill was also unhappy with the total planned number of 85,000 men, which he considered to be excessive. Even without the 17 new fighter squadrons, the need was to build to about 74,000 men. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.

Factors limiting the RAF in the Middle East

The RAF's numeric strength in the Middle East grew rapidly from June to October 1941. This is a summary of the numbers:

                  Formed Squadrons  Total Aircraft  Newest Aircraft 
Mid-June    1941    34-1/2            549             419
Mid-August  1941    49                722             550
Mid-October 1941    52                846             780

Air Marshal Tedder was concerned that the air strength would expand beyond the capacity of air fields, maintenance, and trained air crew. The air crew training was a major issue. On paper, there were three operational training units in the Middle East, but none were functional in June. The operational training units would be expanded to four and built up to an efficient state, but progress was slow. By "late Autumn", one was "fully staffed". One other was half-ready, while another had untrained staff, and the fourth had not been formed, yet. This is based on the account in Vol.II of the Official History.